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## From the Editor

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# *From the Editor*

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## *In This Issue...*

Timing is everything! That maxim certainly is true in time of war and is equally as valid for the publication of a quarterly journal. In this issue, timing and intellectual excellence have joined together to facilitate the publication of a number of articles authored by members of the US Army War College faculty. Over a decade ago I was querying a former editor of the journal about the possibility of publishing a thematic calendar, outlining topics for the upcoming year. I will never forget his response, “No, that is not a good idea; if the subject is truly ‘hot,’ manuscripts will serendipitously appear over the transom.” I am not certain as to the degree of serendipity or inspiration that resulted in the eclectic array of articles in this issue, but we are indeed honored to share them with our readers around the globe.

In our first thematic feature, “Developing the Strategic Leader,” Charles P. Moore in his article “What’s the Matter with Being a Strategist (Now)?” revisits a theme originally penned by General (Ret.) John R. Galvin in 1989. Moore examines the rich history leading to the establishment of the Army strategists program, technically recognized as Functional Area 59, Strategic Plans and Policy officers. The author analyzes the many opportunities for military schooling, civilian education, and experiential learning that go into forming capable and successful strategists. The product of this program is officers with an expert knowledge of the Army and a sophisticated understanding of the joint and multinational arenas, capable of making major contributions to the success of the interagency process and national staffs. The final component of Moore’s development model mirrors General Galvin’s original construct, “lifelong self-development.” Our second article in this feature is “The Cultural Imperative for Professional Military Education and Leader Development” by Allison Abbe and Stanley Halpin. The authors provide an insightful examination of the role that culture plays in irregular warfare, as well as stability, support, transition, and reconstruction operations. Abbe and Halpin believe that in today’s military the impact of culture is widely recognized at every level of leadership. The real challenge, according to the authors, is how best to energize these capabilities. They describe the current conceptual approaches to increasing soldiers’ and leaders’ abilities to deal with cultural factors. The authors then define why the services need to move beyond traditional approaches to a more comprehensive strategy that better accommodates the development and institutionalization of cultural capabilities. The authors close with a warning that the only way to ensure a sustainable, organizational solution for institutionalizing cultural capabilities is for the Department of Defense to demand servicewide strategic programs that are a central component in professional military education. Our final article in this feature is R. Craig Bullis’s “The NFP Strategic Leader.” The author utilizes the framework of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) to analyze executive leader development. Bullis espouses a belief that organizations

responsible for developing leaders across their life cycle may actually be developing and reinforcing behaviors that, while required at the direct level (tactical and operational), are actually incorrect at the strategic level. His research leads to the conclusion that successful leadership at the strategic level demands behavior more in line with the “intuitive,” “feeling,” and “perceiving” preferences contained in the MBTI-measured personality dispositions.

How many soldiers are enough? That question forms the basis for Steven M. Goode’s article, “A Historical Basis for Force Requirements in Counterinsurgency.” The author draws upon research by the Center for Army Analysis at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to provide an informed discussion regarding the guidelines for force requirements in counterinsurgency. Goode analyzes force requirements from a number of insurgencies to suggest guidelines for counterinsurgency operations. His analysis of these insurgencies and the interpretation of data support the conclusion that adequate forces can enable the counterinsurgent’s ability to provide a certain level of security in the area of operations, but security alone will not be sufficient for victory. Goode cautions that the research presented should not be construed as policy recommendations or a call for specific force levels, but rather, it serves as a guide for the planning and execution of future operations.

“Military in Society” is our second thematic presentation. It highlights the work of four renowned academics from the professional military education arena. Steve Corbett and Michael J. Davidson’s “The Role of the Military in Presidential Politics” revisits a recurring theme of the disturbing trend toward the politicization of the American military, and concomitantly, the departure from the nonpartisan professional ethic. The authors provide a number of historical examples to chronicle the development of the American military’s professional ethic of political neutrality. They then analyze this position of ethical neutrality in light of the ongoing participation by retired military officers in the political process. The authors posit that any active and public participation by retired military officers should be discouraged as potentially damaging to America’s armed forces in both a military and philosophical manner. Corbett and Davidson conclude that if the military of a democracy is viewed as politically partisan, it is, in effect, damaging the very democracy it is required to serve. They caution that if there is to be an effective restraint on political endorsements by retired officers, it must be initiated from within the military. America’s armed forces as an institution need to determine whether or not the professional military ethic related to political neutrality extends to the retired ranks. Specifically, the leadership of the military should address these political endorsements by retirees acting in their retired military capacity. Following on the theme of the proper role for military officers in American society is Charles D. Allen and Breana E. Coates’s “The Engagement of Military Voice.” The authors examine the operational competencies from the civilian and military sectors to better comprehend how feedback in the form of “voice” can provide usable knowledge to both constituencies. They espouse a belief that when military voice (in the form of counsel, advice, guidance, or suggestion) is given the appropriate degree of credence, the civilian leadership of the armed forces receives valuable

knowledge. Conversely, when this voice and counsel are muted or constrained, the flow of information may entropy and valuable knowledge can be lost. Allen and Coates characterize this ineffective engagement of the military voice as “The Error of the Third Kind – E<sub>III</sub>.” The article presents historical examples of where indifference to the military voice was detrimental to the organization. Likewise, they offer a number of cases where the decision to ignore or mute the military voice proved profitable. What makes this analysis unique is its applicability to not only the defense establishment but also the private and not-for-profit sectors of enterprise. In closing, the authors remind readers that failure to consider the military voice may not only lead to an “Error of the Third Kind,” it may well impact America’s national security.

Today, civilian contractors working for the US government in Afghanistan outnumber the uniformed military. It is a fact that nations have employed contractors to fulfill combat and combat support functions for centuries. Despite this historical precedent, little is known about how military professionals perceive civilian contractors or how contractors view their own status. Is the use of contractors compatible with a strong military ethos? It is this type of question that Gary Schaub, Jr., and Volker Franke attempt to answer in “Contractors as Military Professionals?” Using survey methodology, they compared the attitudes and values of military officers with those of security contractors. They present their findings framed within a discussion of military professionalism in the United States. Schaub and Franke conclude their analysis with an examination of the implications the relationship between military professionals and contractor personnel holds for future peace and stability operations. The results of their survey, while affording room for possible criticism related to methodology and sample size, provide some rather startling conclusions. One such finding is the requirement for professional military education at every level to address the requirements of the profession as they relate to contractors. Specifically, the authors found a critical need for a better definition of the operational and legal functions and responsibilities related to the private security industry and suggest limiting the outsourcing of core military functions to noncombat roles.

Our final article in this issue is Dennis Murphy’s “In Search of the Art and Science of Strategic Communication.” The author’s analysis of the nature of warfare and the decision-making process provides readers with insight into the dual perspective (art and science) of strategic communication in future warfare. Murphy believes that the explosion of information technology and the availability of communication methods will mean all military operations, across the full spectrum of conflict, will be dependent on the proper distribution of information. Consequently, commanders need to understand how to articulate the purpose of a campaign and their vision of the end-state. This requires a total understanding of the information end-state that accompanies the traditional military conclusion to conflict. The author concludes it is imperative that the information end-state be properly articulated if commanders are to be successful in their planning and execution. – RHT □