Book Reviews

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**Book Reviews**

**War by Land, Sea, and Air: Dwight Eisenhower and the Concept of Unified Command.** By David Jablonsky. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2010. 416 pages. $35.00. Reviewed by Andrew J. Bacevich, Professor of History and International Relations at Boston University.

This workmanlike study takes up a very old question, which generations of soldiers once firmly believed to be a matter of vital importance. Today, however, we know better, or at least ought to. The subtitle accurately conveys the author’s purpose. David Jablonsky, himself a former military officer and author of many previous books, sets out to describe twentieth-century US efforts to achieve unity of command, paying particular attention to the contributions of Dwight D. Eisenhower, as both soldier and statesman.

*War by Land, Sea, and Air* accomplishes this purpose admirably. The prose is clean, the research solid, the conclusions for the most part sound. Revelations are few, but this is to be expected. Jablonsky is working a pretty well-plowed field. Some readers may think that the author overstates Eisenhower’s personal role. After all, his story begins well before Ike appears on the scene and concludes long after he was gone. Moreover, institutional reform tends to be a corporate enterprise. To attribute big change transpiring across generations to the efforts of a single individual, whether Emory Upton, Alfred Thayer Mahan, or Billy Mitchell, distorts the process. But that is a quibble. Anyway, we all like Ike.

The narrative is a familiar one. The experience of 1898 in Cuba first alerted American officers to the need for interservice cooperation. Participation in World War I introduced them to the frustrations and complexities of inter-Allied relations. During the interval between the World Wars, the Army and Navy made at best halting progress toward confronting these issues. Little urgency existed to do so.

World War II forced the issue, at least for the duration. Yet as Jablonsky makes clear, even under the pressure of global war, unified command—between allies and among services—did not just happen. Creating it required a major push, led by George C. Marshall, with Eisenhower serving as his principal agent. Once established (at least between Brits and Americans), it required constant tending. To prevent backsliding, Eisenhower as supreme commander exhibited tenacity, patience, and considerable acumen. Even then, Allied unity of effort was partial, failing to incorporate the forces commanded by either Douglas MacArthur or Josef Stalin, both of whom played nice only to the extent that doing so served their purposes.

The emergence of the postwar national security state triggered a battle royal over what was then called “unification.” President Harry Truman insisted upon it. Led by Eisenhower, confirmed as Chief of Staff in November 1945, the Army generally supported the President. The Navy and Marine Corps stubbornly dissented and eventually prevailed.

The result was a mess. The second half of Jablonsky’s narrative recounts efforts, pursued over a period of four decades, to repair that mess. The solution, supported by Eisenhower both before and during his years as President, was to centralize authority, enhance the clout of the Secretary of Defense, establish the primacy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) chairman at the expense of the service chiefs, and (in an allied context) recreate within NATO command arrangements comparable to those that had existed in the wartime European Theater of Operations.
During Eisenhower’s presidency, this effort culminated in the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act, which Jablonsky hails as a major achievement. Given the performance of the national security establishment during the decade that followed, that qualifies as a generous evaluation. The fact is that defense reorganization engineered by Eisenhower did nothing to avert and may even have exacerbated the debacle of Vietnam.

Jablonsky chooses not to deal with Vietnam. Instead, he skips from 1958 to 1982, describing the sequence of events that produced the next major reshuffling of Defense Department deck chairs. This effort culminated in the storied Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the ultimate expression of the conviction that unity through centralization holds the key to military effectiveness, and, according to Jablonsky, legislation that would surely have earned Ike’s own blessing.

There Jablonsky’s story ends. He devotes exactly one page to the post-9/11 era, choosing not to evaluate the efficacy of US policy in an era in which unity of command is now presumably fully established. His reticence in this regard is, to put it mildly, difficult to comprehend. The question demands to be asked. With the Defense Secretary now fully in charge of the Pentagon, the primacy of the JCS chairman now a given, and the authority of field commanders over the air, naval, and ground forces under their purview accepted by all, how have we done over the past nine years?

Opinions may differ. My own judgment is that we have not done especially well. Overall, the performance of senior military and civilian leaders in connection to Iraq and Afghanistan has not represented an appreciable improvement over the performance of Russell Alger, Nelson Miles, and William Shafter in connection to Cuba in 1898.

Jablonsky quotes, approvingly, a comment by General Marshall shortly after the United States entered World War II. Creating a system of unified command, Marshall insisted, “will solve nine-tenths of our troubles.” Well, we have got that system and our troubles continue. Perhaps unity of effort is not quite the panacea it was cracked up to be.


Antony Beevor’s D-Day: The Battle for Normandy covers events that span roughly three months of some of the most intense fighting on the Western Front during World War II. Written as a campaign history, the book focuses on the operational level of war and the phases of the campaign. The distributed battles from the landings along the Normandy coastline to the march on Paris make up the building blocks of the story.

In doctrine, campaigns are targeted on strategic ends. In this instance, the strategic ends begin with the establishment of a lodgment in France and are directed toward subsequent operations aimed at defeating Nazi Germany. Intermediate objectives vital to the success of the campaign include seizing beaches, enlarging the beachheads to permit the buildup of men and material, as well as securing ports to sustain efforts as the armies move inland. Campaigns, because of their scope and complexities, require phasing, or incremental efforts to ensure appropriate allocation of resources and “troops to tasks” as the fighting progresses. In the Normandy campaign, the final phase line, which Allied armies expected to achieve within 90 days, ran along the Seine River. Whether Paris was to be liberated as the final phase line was reached was an open question in the minds of Eisenhower and his generals, as well as his military and civilian bosses—the
Combined Chiefs of Staff, Franklin Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill. On the question of liberating Paris, Charles de Gaulle never harbored any doubts, a consideration that makes Beevor’s account of this familiar history especially interesting.

Readers in search of tactical detail will be disappointed at not finding a narrative flush with granular detail. Beevor has far more ground to cover than a few hundred yards of beach. His narrative must speed along, moving quickly from battle to battle. The book describes the big tasks, such as the months of preparation required to set the stage for the invasion. Preparation of the theater, to isolate the beaches, is a battle fought by the strategic air forces and involved the destruction of bridges and railroad nodes that the Germans would need to shift reinforcements to the threatened front. Beevor chronicles the tug of war between Eisenhower and the air barons over the best use of strategic bombers while Churchill weighs the costs in civilian casualties against military necessity.

Beevor covers the amphibious landings, and their supporting airborne and commando operations, with an even hand and a military historian’s eye for the balance between essential detail and unnecessary clutter. Major actions at memorable locales such as Pegasus Bridge, St. Mere Eglise, Pointe du Hoc, and so on are tightly sketched in crisp, precise prose, and then quickly recede as the narrative and the battle lines move inland. The author strikes an even balance between and among the British, Americans, Canadians, Poles, French underground, Free French, and so on, as well as the Axis forces. Events on D-Day itself get only broad coverage as Beevor moves quickly to the consolidation of the beachheads and subsequent operations. His narrative is brimming with insights and critical analyses. For example, Beevor criticizes Bernard Montgomery for his leadership throughout the campaign, beginning with his failure to seize Caen on D-Day, and is equally harsh in his criticism of Omar Bradley’s generalship from his handling of Omaha Beach, the breakthrough at St. Lo, and the subsequent battles that led to the controversy associated with the failure to close the Falaise Pocket. This critique of the commanders avoids the two-dimensional armchair generalship that many historians find difficult to resist, armed as they are with perfect hindsight. Finally, good writing makes for interesting reading, and Beevor is a writer of considerable skill. The chapter on the American experiences fighting in the famous hedgerow country, “The Battle of the Bocage,” is particularly well written and illustrates Beevor’s excellent use of tactical detail to enrich the narrative.

If anything, Beevor’s comments reflect, appropriately, emerging revisionist interpretations of World War II generalship. Ike’s reputation for skill as a coalition commander endures, but he is rightly criticized for his too-gentle supervision of Montgomery’s handling of the land battle. Indeed, Beevor pulls no punches in his assessment of Montgomery’s generalship, stating convincingly that Monty made a series of serious mistakes during the campaign, especially in the fighting around Caen and later at Falaise. Bradley and George Patton, along with Montgomery, receive low marks from Beevor on their fumbling efforts to close the Falaise Pocket. With more than 60 years now having passed, the time is right for this kind of evenhanded and judicious reevaluation of the World War II leaders.

Readers familiar with the events of the Normandy campaign will find a familiar story well told. Beevor’s narrative includes an excellent account of the assassination attempt against Adolf Hitler and the ensuing impact it had on command and control of German forces in France. Equally interesting is Beevor’s examination of the impact of the Normandy campaign on the French populace. Normandy was indeed liberated, but...
its cities and towns, Caen, St. Lo, Cherbourg, Carentan, and many others bore the brunt of the fighting, as streets were turned into piles of rubble and the French population became refugees.

Another interesting aspect is the reassessment of the efforts of the French Resistance, concluding that it deserves more credit than is generally accepted. Similarly enlightening is Beevor’s analysis of the actions of French General Philippe Leclerc’s 2d Armored Corps during the campaign and in the liberation of Paris as well as the efforts of the French Resistance to these ends. Beevor’s account of de Gaulle’s leadership before and during the campaign, culminating with his triumphant march down the Champs-Elysees in Paris after the liberation, compels the reader to consider the man in a new and more favorable light, and that, for those familiar with the history, is no small feat.

In keeping with Beevor’s careful but decidedly revisionist account of the campaign there is another aspect of the fighting in France that while generally familiar to historians will come as a surprise to some readers. Although accounts of atrocities perpetrated by German soldiers, especially the SS, are common fare in most WWII histories, Beevor describes a number of instances where British, Canadian, and American soldiers killed German prisoners of war. War is a terrible thing, and Beevor does not shy away from these dark pages. Although veterans often commented on such killings for many years, historians have chosen to overlook the subject. A truly objective perspective demands we do not turn away our gaze but rather see the nature of this war for what it was, both good and bad.

Among the many histories written about the Normandy campaign, two stand out. Carlo D’Este’s Decision in Normandy and Max Hastings’s Overlord endure as the best when it comes to an analysis of the operational level of war. Antony Beevor’s D-Day ranks up there with these two, and that is high praise indeed.


Eric A. Heinze’s discussion in Waging Humanitarian War provides a striking contrast to books such as David Finkel’s The Good Soldiers, which focuses on the experiences of one battalion in Baghdad during the surge and vividly portrays the physical and social suffering inflicted on soldiers and Iraqi civilians alike. Heinze examines theoretical justifications for humanitarian intervention, not the grim reality that accompanies the use of military force. Human suffering is at the core of his argument concerning the justification for intervention, but it is a cool, distant, theoretical concept in his analysis.

The following quotation from Heinze suggests the distance between the language of Finkel’s narrative and Heinze’s argument: “Drawing primarily from the English School of international relations theory concerning the relationship between power and legitimacy, I then identify and explain three additional and interrelated elements of efficacy: multilateral legitimation, the humanitarian credentials of the intervener, and the position of the intervener in the prevailing international political context.” That quotation also makes clear that Waging Humanitarian War is not light reading. Heinze’s arguments are carefully constructed and systematically presented. The criteria he presents for determining the acceptability of humanitarian intervention provide
a useful set of standards that integrate moral, legal, and political perspectives. His may be the first attempt to mesh all three fields into a coherent structure for judging the appropriateness of intervention. He straightforwardly states that the primary criterion in evaluating the ethical, legal, and political issues related to humanitarian intervention is that of minimizing human suffering.

A consequentialist perspective is thus central to the author’s analysis of humanitarian intervention, which he defines as the “transboundary use of military force for the purpose of protecting people whose government is egregiously abusing them, either directly, or by aiding and permitting extreme mistreatment.” Weighing the consequences of our actions is the basis of much of our thinking, and thus seems quite natural. A consequentialist moral perspective claims that the right action will be the one that produces the most good. In the context of humanitarian intervention, Dr. Heinze maintains that the action that maximizes human security is the morally justifiable choice, and that human security, defined as the absence of both direct and structurally caused violence, is the good that takes center stage when we consider the moral acceptability of using external military force to compel governments to do the right thing or to refrain from inhumane actions. He thus marries a theory of the right, a consequentialist view, with a theory of the good, in this case predicated on human security, to produce a normative theory that tells us when the use of military force against a sovereign government is justified for humanitarian reasons.

The book is an attempt to answer three pertinent questions and in the process to provide practical guidance with respect to humanitarian intervention, a use of force less extreme than conventional war but more invasive than peacekeeping, since intervention violates both territorial boundaries and national sovereignty. The three questions are: What level of suffering provides moral justification for humanitarian intervention? Does international law provide a legal basis for what appears morally justified? Who should undertake humanitarian intervention and why do they merit such a task?

The author’s analysis does provide a set of considerations that should be treated seriously when governments or regional groups debate whether to intervene in the affairs of another state for humanitarian reasons. His careful argument provides an excellent basis for discussion of the problems of humanitarian intervention. Further, the consequentialist approach obviously has application. As a theory, however, it leaves us with difficult questions. Is an action right because of the actual consequences it generates, or is it right because the agent made an appropriate choice among the sets of expected consequences?

If the former, we cannot know which was the right choice until we can measure the consequences (and of course, even if we can make such a measurement, we can never know what alternative choices would have produced). If the latter, we are left with a limited tool, because when we try to weigh potential human suffering, we cannot come remotely close to an accurate quantitative assessment of the reality of a badly wounded soldier at the Brooke Army Medical Center, multiplied thousands of times, or the travails of the Iraqi people. Trying to measure the suffering that intervention will cause, necessary for applying a consequentialist formula, appears to be an academic exercise, far removed from the blood and agony of injury, uncertainty, and despair.

Few scholars have left footprints as gigantic as the late Samuel Huntington, whose eight books, from 1957 to 2004, set the terms of public debate more profoundly than any other scholar of his generation. To the wider public, Huntington will probably be better remembered for his incisive Clash of Civilizations than for any of his other works. Yet for military professionals and civilian students of military affairs, he will be remembered for The Solider and the State, his first work, a volume that essentially founded the study of civil-military relations as a major academic field.

The post-World War II military services, and the newly created Department of Defense, found themselves in a new political world order, both in relation to potential enemies overseas and their own environment at home. The services had never been so large, so powerful and, with the draft in effect, had never had such impact on the daily lives of Americans. The draft had also had its own effect on military professionals’ perception of themselves; universal service of males during WWII and the quasi-peace that followed reinforced the perception that military service was a necessary part, almost a training ground, for citizenship. This affected strongly the officer corps’ perception of their relation to the state and its political leaders. But until Huntington, there was no discipline that explained one to the other, or, indeed, explained the military profession, as it had become, to itself. Civil-military relations have been a major academic discipline, the subject of a bookshelf’s worth of scholarly inquiry, and a continuing dialogue between soldiers and political leaders. American Civil-Military Relations is a continuation of that discussion. The editors, Suzanne Nielsen and Don Snider, have records of distinguished scholarship. They have assembled a top-notch cast of scholars for a series of essays covering the gamut from the Rumsfeld-Shinseki tensions through military education, the “military mind,” and the military profession and politics. Three highlights from the book illustrate its breadth and the continuing spread of ripples from Huntington’s original work.

The first, Nadia Schadlow and Richard Lacquement’s essay “Winning Wars, Not Just Battles,” challenges Huntington’s too-rigid separation of the soldier from policy. Writing about today’s wars and the involvement of military personnel in quasi-political activities such as “stability operations” and civil affairs functions, Schadlow and Lacquement point out that the nature of modern conflict unavoidably involves soldiers in political issues. While they occasionally wander off course themselves, for example, confusing advisory functions with stability operations, their observation that there has never been a clear line between purely military considerations at the higher level and politics is both historically and practically accurate, and speaks to Huntington’s 1957 concern to preserve civilian oversight of the newly powerful Cold War military services. Huntington’s stricture, they correctly note, “removes political judgment from the realm of military professionalism [and] unduly narrows the focus of military leaders to operations and tactics.” Their observation is spot-on.

Second is David Segal and Karin De Angelis’s chapter on “Changing Conceptions of the Military as a Profession.” Huntington (and Morris Janowitz in 1960’s The
Professional Soldier) wrote about military service during the draft, circumstances that have long passed out of existence. Today’s all-volunteer forces bear little resemblance to the draft-era services, especially the Army. Huntington’s narrower definition of military professionalism—responsibility to the state, specialized expertise, and sense of corporateness—now pertains to senior noncommissioned officers and reserve members, even as it no longer reflects current understandings of what constitutes a profession or its practice. While the authors occasionally lapse into social science jargon, they accurately pick up on the post-draft work of Charles Moskos regarding whether in a long-service, volunteer force the boundaries of “professionalism” should be expanded to noncommissioned officers, particularly as enlisted careers became increasingly technical. They occasionally run the risk of casting too wide a net, as when suggesting that civilian employees of the service departments could also be considered members of the “profession of arms,” and finish by suggesting that the broader the definition can be stretched, the greater the likelihood will be that “the behavior of the force will meet the professional standards to which it is held, and the more effective the military will be.” Whether military professionals will be willing to reach quite that far, Huntington’s narrow definition has long been outdated, and the authors’ corrective essay is a welcome addition to the book.

Third, Richard H. Kohn’s “Building Trust” speaks to the often-rocky “unequal dialogue,” borrowing Eliot Cohen’s term, between service chiefs and their civilian bosses. In two long sections about building trust between military professionals and their civilian masters, Kohn takes a hard line—justifiably so, in this reviewer’s opinion—against senior military officers allowing themselves to be drawn into partisan political roles. This caution is doubly difficult when Presidents push senior officers forward to justify administration positions, as when General David Petraeus walked a difficult tightrope to support President George W. Bush’s Iraqi “surge” decision. Kohn also offers words of advice to civilian policy-makers, pointing out that though the dialogue may be unequal, civilians owe military professionals respect even while they require accountability. He notes approvingly that within his first six months in office, Defense Secretary Robert Gates replaced a number of top officers without any suggestion of personal animus or political agenda. “Military people,” writes Kohn, “respect strong leadership. They want decisions, instructions, goals, and guidance in as explicit and comprehensible a form as possible . . . . If this is impossible, they deserve candid, honest explanations.” Kohn concludes that, in the end, it is fundamentally the responsibility of the military leadership to make the civil-military relationship work, unequal as the dialogue may be.

The book’s concluding chapter summarizes what is evident from these examples; Huntington’s Cold-War model of military professionalism, and its relationship to strategy, the political leadership, and ultimately to the state has been overtaken by new social and strategic realities, and by correspondingly complex relationships with the civilian leadership in a more partisan world. Although the authors sometime fall into convoluted sociology-speak, the essays cogently support these conclusions, and many, particularly the Kohn chapter, should be required reading for military professionals everywhere. American Civil-Military Relations is a valid and vital updating of Huntington’s work and should be on every military reading list today.

The Fourth Star by David Cloud and Greg Jaffe, both experienced Pentagon correspondents, is a thoughtfully written book that deserves critical attention. It is recommended strongly to national security professionals—military, civilian, and legislative leaders alike. The general public, too, will find a worthy read in this volume.

Most of the book is dedicated to the first element of the subtitle, “Four Generals.” Cloud and Jaffe present a fairly even-handed, detailed, and intimate look at the personal histories, formative assignments, and relationships among a quartet of influential four-star officers: General John Abazaid, now retired and the former commander of US Central Command; General George Casey, the Army Chief of Staff; General Peter Chiarelli, the Vice Chief of Staff; and General David Petraeus, the current commander of Central Command. The authors provide insight into how these four generals influenced the important events, decisions, and actions of the war in Iraq. Cloud and Jaffe also use the stories of these men and their interaction in the Iraq war, however, for a second purpose.

That purpose, captured in the second element of the book’s subtitle, “The Epic Struggle for the Future of the United States Army,” is one that is worth study, reflection, and debate. The authors pose the following questions, the answers to which frame what they call “the epic struggle;” What have we actually learned in nearly a decade of war? How will those lessons affect the size, composition, and equipment acquisition of the Army as well as its training and leader development programs?

On the positive side of the ledger, the book describes most of the elements of the epic struggle. Two examples will suffice. First, the Army will have to regain its conventional warfighting skills without losing its ability to fight irregular war. Finding the right balance certainly will be a struggle for an institution more comfortable with “either/or” than it is with “and.” Second, ground-truth realities of the war—for example, fighting that is close-in combat and soldier intensive, high tech combined with physical presence; requiring not just military but coordinated interagency solutions; where civil-military unity of effort had to replace departmental stovepipes; and where innovation rules, and adaptable strategic processes are required to support tactical and operational flexibility on the battlefield—often conflict with “inside the Beltway” policies. Finding ways to overcome the biases of the Pentagon bureaucracy, military-industrial acquisition system, the budget process, and the US interagency process will also be a monumental struggle. The default positions of those institutions are (1) a near-dogmatic belief that “technology offsets the need for soldiers,” (2) a penchant to equate strategy with large acquisition programs, (3) sustaining the relative balance among the services’ total budget obligation authority, and (4) a national security apparatus that isolates war within the Department of Defense.

On the disappointing side of the ledger, Cloud and Jaffe include as part of the “epic struggle” a straw-man version of the Powell Doctrine, a version that has guided, and unfortunately still guides, the thinking of many. This version holds, they explain, that the nation should only enter short, intense wars with clear objectives and exit strategies. The eight questions called the Powell Doctrine, and the six principles
from Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger’s 1984 speech on “The Use of Military Power” that General Powell’s questions amplify, actually embody a much richer, and more realistic, understanding of the principles that should guide a nation deciding to wage war, regardless of type. The straw-man version misses this point. Part of the epic struggle will be a return to a more comprehensive understanding of war in all its varieties; the full Powell/Weinberger approach would be helpful in getting there.

The main shortcoming in The Fourth Star, however, is not its misrepresentation of Powell/Weinberger. Rather, it is: The epic struggle is not just within the Army, and not just for its future. The struggle is national. The Army is an important element of the struggle, but it is not the main element. As well as the authors do in presenting many elements of the “epic struggle,” they miss this larger context. The stories of these four generals illuminate the struggle of our nation, within the family of nations, trying to come to grips with the collision of a still-emerging and often violent post-Cold War strategic environment, a still-evolving and often convulsive global information-age economy, nonstates waging a worldwide war, and all the social-political unrest such momentous change produces. If our national leaders, from both the executive and legislative branches, do not learn the right lessons from this war and take persistent and thoughtful action to modify our national-security laws, institutions, and processes, as well as the international conventions associated with war, adapting the Army will be insufficient to prepare for whatever future will unfold. The struggle is certainly epic, even if not in the sense the authors intended.


By way of self-disclosure, I will open as Pat Conroy did in The Lords of Discipline, “I wear the ring.” Like the author, I was a West Point cadet and that experience has left an indelible mark on me as well as many others throughout American history. Honor Bright is a detailed historical review of the emergence and evolution of the West Point Honor Code and its implementation by means of the Honor System. Lewis Sorley is eminently qualified to tackle this project. A third-generation US Military Academy (USMA) graduate and history scholar, he taught at West Point and the US Army War College.

The book is well defined, adequately structured, and intentionally limited in scope. Much of the research is from the USMA archives and includes annual reports, doctoral dissertations, oral histories, and personal material. An integral portion of source materials is taken from the reports of several groups that have examined the implementation of the Honor System. These examinations generally followed a challenge to the sanctions (termination from the academy) or were the result of a significant event or scandal. While such events recounted in the book are few (two major incidents in the twentieth century), these scandals shook the foundation of the academy.

Woven throughout the author’s narrative is the link to the professional military ethic. Accordingly, the chair of the William Simon Center for the Professional Military Ethic, General (Ret.) Frederick Franks, provides the foreword for the book. The author presents a three-pronged formula related to the military profession, a sense of corporateness, body of expert knowledge, and self-governance of its membership by means
of an accepted set of values and ethics. It is the latter traits that Sorley examines in
detail in his historical journey: to whom does the Honor Code and the Honor System
belong? While necessary oversight is provided by the institutional Army and American
society at large, it becomes readily apparent that the author believes the Honor Code
and the supporting system must belong to and be embraced by the cadets if they are
to be effective.

The book is written primarily for graduates of West Point and serves as a foil
to compare experiences during their tenure, either as cadets or members of the staff and
faculty. I found myself doing exactly that. Much of the history of West Point recounted
in the book is well known to its graduates. Names such as Thayer, Cullum, Delafield,
Brewington, and Upton are an integral part of a cadet’s education but may not be as
well-known to the casual reader as Lee, Grant, MacArthur, Taylor, and Abrams. The
sense of corporateness of West Point cadets and graduates is evident in America’s mili-
tary throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Sorley explores the role these
leaders have played in times of war and peace.

The initial chapter outlines the history of the founding of West Point in 1802
and the appointment in 1817 of Sylvanus Thayer as superintendent. Thayer’s appoint-
ment was designed to ostensibly get the academy and the cadets under control. Indeed,
his first task was to get accountability of the cadets who were at various locations be-
sides West Point. The vehicle used to establish decorum and discipline was the concept
of the military officer’s Code of Honor, which had its origin in European tradition and
had been adapted and modified based on the American experience in the founding of the
nation.

Various episodes of the self-policing of the Corps of Cadets are presented in
accounts of the cadet “Vigilance Committees” that judged the conduct and employed
actions (tacitly approved by the academy officials) against cadets determined to be in
violation of the prevailing code of ethics. Sorley does an excellent job of documenting
events leading to the institutionalization of the Cadet Honor Committee in 1922 and the
eventual development and publication of the Cadet Honor Code in 1932. He examines
these events through the prism of changes in American society and culture manifested
in the experiences of cadets at West Point in the years following the formal establish-
ment of the Honor Code.

This reviewer read with great interest how the author portrayed the cheating
scandal of 1976, where 152 cadets were expelled. Of special note was the fact that five
were members of the Honor Committee; an additional five committee members left
the group in the aftermath of the scandal. Of interest was how the author dealt with the
Borman Commission report (designed to identify and correct underlying causes of the
scandal). In the chapter detailing the report the author finds some of the report and its
findings “curious” and “surprising”—an implicit challenge by Sorley that the Borman
Commission was “the most permissive.” He is clearly more in favor of the findings of
the 1989 Posvar Commission (a follow-on to the Borman Commission), which realized
all but one of its 25 recommendations. More mature West Point graduates may be as
interested in the examination of another scandal in early 1951 when the nationally ac-
claimed Army football team was at the core of pervasive violations of the Honor Code.

Well written and informative, Honor Bright will in all likelihood appeal to
a very specific audience. The overall tenor of the book emphasizes the uniqueness
of West Point to the point of verging on elitism as detailed in the Epilogue. It is rea-
sonable to assume that other military and educational institutions have faced similar ethical challenges. This reviewer would have appreciated information about how other esteemed institutions incorporated similar systems for ethical development and how such systems may have been reflected in the military service of their graduates. Is there evidence that the behavior and performance of West Point graduates inculcated with the Honor Code are any different from military officers from other sources of commission? An interesting point found in one of the book’s endnotes is that the career success (promotion to colonel) of cadets re-admitted following the 1976 cheating scandal is commensurate with other members of graduating classes (19.5 percent compared to 20.7 percent). Other additional insights related to how the practice of the Honor Code and System fared with the introduction of minorities and women during the last decades of the twentieth century would have been of interest. Despite the limited scope of the book, readers will find it a valuable resource on the value of honorable and ethical conduct within organizations and professional bodies.


On the face of it Chris Bellamy should be the ideal author to write this book. He is an outstanding war correspondent and military historian, has a complete command of the requisite languages, and an intimate knowledge of the Soviet system. All of these virtues are evident throughout the book. Yet it is a disappointing and unbalanced work. To say this is not to dismiss the entire enterprise. Indeed, there are many valuable points here, for example Bellamy’s discussion of the Eastern Front in World War II as an incarnation of Clausewitz’s concept of absolute war, hence the title. This discussion is spot-on. Likewise, Bellamy’s discussion of the big campaigns of 1941-43, the initial German offensives, Soviet counteroffensives, and battles such as Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, and Kursk are superb. The problems, however, prevent the knowing reader from considering the book as a true history of Soviet Russia in WWII.

First, *Absolute War* is essentially an operational history of the war, and its coverage virtually ends in 1943. Much less space and consideration are given to the Soviet offensives of 1943-45 compared with the campaigns of 1941-43. Second, even though it is an operational history, the strategic consequences of these campaigns also get short shrift. Beyond those failings, which are lamentable, given Bellamy’s diligence in depicting the earlier operations, there are other shortcomings that undermine the book’s value.

A history of the war that lives up to the premise implicit in the title should give an account of more than just the battles that took place, however epochal they may have been. Yet we do not see that in this work. The reader needs to consider the omissions. There is virtually nothing about the recovery of the Soviet defense industry, one of the most heroic and consequential actions of the entire Eastern Front. Also absent is any detailed examination of the Stalinist deportation of entire nationalities and what these deportations meant in the context of the war and for the Soviet system. The absence of any exacting analysis of the campaigns of 1943-45 means that we do not get to see how the relationships between Stalin and his generals evolved, let alone the workings of other key governmental institutions, the Communist Party, secret police, etc. Little if anything is mentioned about the partisan campaign in the rear of the Nazi forces even
though the number of partisans reached more than a million by 1944 and wreaked considerable havoc upon the German invaders. Stalin’s diplomacy with his allies, Great Britain and the United States, do not figure in this account either, a fact which substantially detracts from the account of the various campaigns. That is another consequence of the failure to focus attention on the strategic, rather than the operational, dimensions of the war in the East. Finally, there is nothing about the Holocaust. This is truly a stunning omission, since from the German point of view, the purpose of the campaign was the extermination of European Jewry, most of which was located in the Eastern Front’s theaters of operation.

Perhaps it may be asking too much to expect any author, even one so well-equipped with the necessary skills as Bellamy, to cover all these topics in one volume with the depth they deserve. This could and should have been a multivolume work. It is only in the last 20 years that we have been able to get a truer picture of the Eastern Front, thanks to the efforts of Russian scholars and archivists and various western scholars such as the late John Erickson, Richard Overy, and David Glantz. Bellamy has a masterly command of this literature and could have contributed a great deal more to scholarly and popular insight into the greatest and most titanic of all recorded wars. Unfortunately, this account, despite its many virtues, falls short of that goal. While the reader will not be disappointed with what this book offers, there is so much more it could have accomplished.


America sends its sons and daughters to war with the expectation that in the event they are injured or become ill in the combat zone, they will receive the appropriate care. Those less fortunate service members who return to the United States after being wounded often ponder the uncertainty that the future holds. Spouses, friends, employers, and family members may feel uncertain and unprepared regarding how best to help their wounded warrior. A recent study by General (Ret.) Fred Franks, chairman of the Task Force to Better Fulfill the Army’s Duty in MEB/PEB, concluded that there is currently no formal training available for wounded warriors or those caring for them to address these issues, except a standard briefing on the Medical Evaluation Board (MEB) and Physical Evaluation Process (PEB) on how to return to duty or transition to civilian life. Consequently, the wounded warrior stumbles through the bureaucracy not knowing what resources are available.

Recognizing this deficit in the dissemination of information to those in need, Nathan Ainspan and Walter Penk gathered a group of experts and produced a book to help wounded soldiers restore some degree of normalcy in their lives. Returning Wars’ Wounded, Injured, and Ill is an anthology of 16 chapters that address a spectrum of topics to include veteran demographics, benefits for veterans, disabilities and injuries among members of National Guard and reserve units, and the impact of an injured soldier on family and friends. Moreover, and perhaps arguably so, the most important chapters discuss the physical, psychological, and social impact of wounded warriors’ injuries and disabilities. Each chapter provides advice, guidance, and resources regarding questions previously left unanswered. A recurring theme in each chapter is the “return, reintegra-
tion, and resiliency” of the soldier. “Return” examines the outcomes that result from the soldier’s disability. “Reintegration” analyzes the soldier’s feeling of personal or actual acceptance back into society, and “resiliency” defines the soldier’s ability to continue in the service, or if leaving active duty, secure employment in the civilian sector.

Using the metaphor of tactical and strategic, Returning Wars’ Wounded, Injured, and Ill is a tactical leader’s handbook, as well as a guide for wounded service members and their families. The book provides insight and suggestions on coping with injuries in an attempt to overcome service members’ reluctance to acknowledge their difficulties or ask for assistance. A perfect example of such behavior is found in Chapter 3, “Injuries and Symptoms,” where the author tells of a soldier regretting some of his actions and surrounding himself with feelings of blame and guilt. In this particular case, the author offers a recommendation that “families can help their veteran to understand that while fighting in a war one might be forced to harm others and may have feelings of regret. Although this can be painful to live with, it does not make the vet a bad person.”

Although Returning Wars’ Wounded, Injured, and Ill specifically addresses medical issues, disabilities, and recovery, these topics have far wider implications if not taken seriously. We know that if the tactical-level leader fails to recognize the importance of compassion and taking care of wounded warriors, the implications can be felt in Washington. A vivid example occurred in March 2007, when The Washington Post published a series of articles that tactical-level leaders at Walter Reed Army Medical Center had placed recovering wounded soldiers in substandard housing. The comment during a congressional hearing by the Army Surgeon General stating, “I don’t do barracks inspections,” sent the message that the senior leaders did not care about soldiers. The Surgeon General resigned and the Secretary of the Army was fired as a result. To restore the nation’s confidence in Army leadership and the belief that America’s sons and daughters in uniform would be properly cared for required intervention from then-Army Vice Chief of Staff General Richard A. Cody and Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates.

The editors and contributors to Returning Wars’ Wounded, Injured, and Ill are all eminently qualified experts in their subject area. Each currently works with wounded warriors, so the circumstances they describe are authoritative. Each chapter can stand alone and is not linked to the previous chapters. Despite all the salient points made in the book, this reviewer recommends that strategic leaders read it only if they need edification on the issues addressed.

At the lower levels of leadership, Returning Wars’ Wounded, Injured, and Ill should be required reading for any Army Medical Department staff member involved in patient care of wounded warriors, and should also be recommended reading for family members of a wounded warrior. This recommendation cannot be better demonstrated than by all-too-often reported cases of parents quitting their jobs to take care of their wounded sons and daughters because they did not understand the military benefits provided.

The journey of a wounded warrior possesses both tangible and intangible elements. The tangible aspects are clearly shown by the visible injuries and suffering, while the intangibles are rolled into the emotion and frustration experienced by the wounded and their caretakers en route to a hoped-for better tomorrow. This book has made a valiant attempt to close the gap of uncertainty in how to care for our wounded, while providing a roadmap to better and more meaningful and productive lives for soldiers and their caregivers.

Sometimes, pieces of journalism succeed in presenting matters more clearly than scholars can achieve via their methodological rigor and theoretical innovativeness. China Safari is definitely one such work. By describing their multiyear journey from meticulously orchestrated official meetings in Beijing to dusty oil fields in Sudan, the authors unravel the achievements and shortfalls of China’s African charm offensive. They trace the underlying political and personal aspirations, place the actors in the proper perspective, connect revealing facts based on their careful discernment, and above all tell a balanced story.

The safari starts in the “Communist Versailles” of Beijing during the 2006 Sino-African summit, introducing the political ideology that accompanies China’s policies. From there it proceeds to 12 African nations. In Nigeria, the authors meet a Chinese steel producer who also has a cookie factory and several other enterprises, utilizing Chinese machines and African employees. “We all do several jobs,” the boss explains. “You did the same thing in Europe 50 years ago when you were still prepared to work, right?” Entering the nightlife of Lagos, expensive wine and champagne seem to facilitate networking between the Nigerian jet set and its new Chinese friends. The same kind of networking permitted a large Chinese company, the local minister of forestry among its shareholders, to strip vast swaths of the Congolese forest. In Niger, more ministers are observed turning to the Chinese to get money from the uranium deposits and to rid the region of the faltering policies of the International Monetary Fund. The crown jewels of China’s new economic empire are found in Sudan. The crisis in Darfur has not precluded the Chinese from gaining control over virtually all important sectors of the economy. In Addis Ababa, China is currying favor with both the national government and the African Union, for which Beijing will build a brand-new headquarters. It is only in Angola that the Chinese locomotive starts to lose steam. While China seemed to be on its way to turn the nation into a second Sudanese success story, at least to the satisfaction of Chinese interests, the Angolan government has other ideas.

Serge Michel and Michel Beuret succeed in clarifying the complicated structure of China’s engagement with Africa. They recognize the pivotal role of the national government, elucidate its many strategic ambitions, and show how its embassies are becoming sentinels of China’s new mercantilism, as they screen local markets for lucrative deals and nurture close ties with African elites. But the government’s efforts do not always gratify influential companies or the tens of thousands of Chinese migrant workers who often feel as much exploited as the Africans.

What also becomes clear is the thin line between the low politics of trade and the strategic rivalry that seems to emerge between China and other global powers. Obviously, there is some competition with Taiwan to win over the last few African countries that still support the Taipei government. More importantly, China’s expanding economic footprint pushes European countries to the sidelines. The authors properly highlight how Africans feel that Europeans have let them down. This attitude encompasses both the politically dishonest who seek to sustain their networks of patronage and ordinary citizens who see Europe as being absent when it comes to improving public infrastructure. Michel and Beuret trace the subtle indications of a new great game with the United States. Both sides try to secure their interests, and given the lack of
communication and coordination, the competition will likely lead to continued distrust and proxy wars. The reports of Chinese nationals using United Nations peacekeeping missions, mercenaries, or private guards to protect their assets in Africa are certainly worth examination.

Thus far, Beijing has had an easy ride. It could capitalize on the disinterest of the West and make quick and visible progress by pursuing “checkbook diplomacy.” The authors warn that China in fact faces a tougher challenge. It has won over the minds of the elites, but the latter certainly exercises opportunities to strike hard bargains. Chinese companies have been allowed to exploit a portion of Africa’s natural resources, but local leaders inevitably raise the stakes for new concessions and contracts. Even more problematic is that China has only partly won over the hearts of ordinary citizens. There is a lot of enthusiasm expressed when a new road opens, but sinophobia is on the rise. Better than any other recent work, China Safari gives an impression of these mixed feelings. It reveals the accounts of villagers who believe that Chinese workers steal their cattle, merchants who complain about being outbid by the proliferating Chinese shops, or African workers who feel mistreated by Chinese employers. “They treat us like slaves. When we make a mistake, we get smacked with a shovel,” a Congolese worker testified. It would require a major effort to process these subjective reports into a thorough academic analysis, but Michel and Beuret have succeeded in presenting the diverse opinions in a balanced manner to support their conclusion that the tide is changing. The authors leave for readers to conclude whether the Chinese will be able to deal constructively with such growing resistance.

This book does not pretend to offer all the details and insights related to China’s Africa. The authors want to give an impression and, supported by Paolo Woods’s revealing photography, they achieve this remarkably. China Safari quotes the right people, visits the right places, and above all asks the right questions. It will definitely stimulate discussion regarding the impact of China on Africa’s future development, and it also creates inroads for closer scrutiny of new developments in Beijing’s strategy to secure new assets.


Richard Gabriel, the prolific author of books on ancient military history, has produced another biography of one of the ancient world’s greatest military figures—Thutmose III, the Egyptian pharaoh from 1482 to 1450 B. C. Gabriel finds in Thutmose a warrior whose accomplishments equal (and in some respects exceed) those of Alexander the Great a thousand years later. Some of this devotion is Gabriel’s typical hyperbole for his subject; much is well-deserved praise for a significant figure of the ancient world.

Thutmose III succeeded his stepmother and aunt, Hatshepsut, who was technically his regent and later coregent, actually serving as de facto ruler during Thutmose’s infancy and much of his young adult life. Perhaps to remove him from the potential dangers of the palace, Thutmose spent his youth with the army. His apprenticeship there served him well when he assumed full control of the throne following Hatshepsut’s death. Egypt was still recovering militarily and politically from the long Hyksos occupation, a recovery that Hatshepsut’s weak foreign policy had decidedly retarded. When he fully
assumed the throne in his own right, Thutmose was already an experienced soldier who had led the Egyptian army on campaigns in Nubia and Gaza. During his reign, he led 17 consecutive campaigns into Canaan and Syria, often moving to the region by sea, to secure control of the key lines of communication through the area and to provide Egypt a strategic buffer from the other great powers of the day, especially the Mitanni. The first of these campaigns resulted in one of the most famous battles of the ancient world (since it is the first about which we have much information) at Megiddo. Thutmose’s most bold exploit took the Egyptian army, dragging rafts for the eventual river crossing, all the way from the Lebanese coast to Carchemish, a Mitanni city on the banks of the Euphrates near the border of modern Syria and Turkey. These campaigns are well documented, at least by the standards of ancient history. Thutmose’s last two campaigns in Nubia are less well documented, and the modern world knows little about them.

Gabriel tells this story in a detailed, interesting, and compelling manner. He has synthesized a large amount of material from diverse sources and provides insight into military technology, organization, administration, logistics, operations, and strategy, as well as a look not only at the ancient Egyptian military but also its opponents—the Nubians, Canaanites, and Mitanni. Gabriel has processed new archaeological information and recent reinterpretations to create a modern portrait of Thutmose and his military career. For example, those familiar with the traditional story of the battle of Megiddo, including Gabriel’s earlier work in books such as The Great Battles of Antiquity, will find significant differences in this account, starting with simple things such as the date (the author accepts a more recent calculation of 1481 B.C. vice the traditional 1479 B.C.) and the size of forces engaged. The conduct of the battle, especially the critical decision to use a narrow mountain road rather than the main road to Megiddo, also reflects new thinking. Following the interpretation of Hans Goedicke (supported by his own terrain analysis), Gabriel finds that Thutmose probably entered the valley of the Kina Brook much earlier than previously believed. Despite the implicit assumption that the terrain has not changed in 3,500 years, which is difficult to support, this interpretation is convincing, and Gabriel does a good job of discussing its pros and cons. His analysis of other issues is equally detailed and generally compelling. Gabriel has always been skilled at supplying logical and plausible explanations where the sources are contradictory or missing.

One might dispute the author’s overall assessment of Thutmose II, however. James Henry Breasted called the great pharaoh the Napoleon of Egypt, and Gabriel likens him at different times to Alexander the Great and Scipio Africanus. Gabriel is correct that Thutmose III reestablished Egyptian influence in Canaan and Syria that lasted for centuries, but that influence was never complete or especially deep. Annual campaigns by large armies were needed to extract the tribute Egypt imposed on its “empire,” and Thutmose never had the siege capability to conquer the well-defended major cities of the region, such as Kadesh. That consideration, however, is little more than quibbling regarding degrees of greatness. The fact remains that Thutmose III’s accomplishments were remarkable by any standard and deserve study. Richard Gabriel’s military biography of the great pharaoh is an excellent place to start.

Sadao Asada is a former professor of history at Doshisha University in Kyoto, Japan. Long ago his teacher at Yale University, the late distinguished historian Samuel Flagg Bemis, introduced him to a fine dissertation topic, “Japan and the United States, 1915-25,” centering on the Washington Naval Conference. That dissertation was the beginning of Professor Asada’s academic career and this book.

*From Mahan to Pearl Harbor* is a diplomatic history of United States and Japanese relations from 1890 until 7 December 1941. In preparing this book, Professor Asada enjoyed access to an unparalleled collection of interwar naval conference materials, and he exploits those materials to provide a detailed account of Japanese decision-making and the politics of the Imperial government and navy. While the book can be read alone, it really is a companion volume to *War Plan Orange* by Edward S. Miller and *Kaigun* by David C. Evans and Mark Peattie. *From Mahan to Pearl Harbor* covers the same period as those two works, but provides additional details about intraservice and intergovernmental politics, leaving assessments of the military implications to the others. For example, the chapter on the Washington Conference contains descriptions of the personalities of the participants, Navy Minister Kato Tomosaburo and Vice Admiral Kato Kanji, as well as the contents of telegrams relaying government instructions to the delegation. In contrast, the navy’s operational response to the treaty’s effects is handled in summary fashion. The approach is parsimonious and effective.

Although the reader will probably be drawn to this book by an interest in the details of interwar Japanese politics and diplomacy, the discussion of the diplomatic maneuvers and intergovernmental politics ultimately becomes tedious. It is not the author’s fault. The exciting story is the 1921 Washington Conference. Following that conference, the positions of the navy and government factions hardened, and the authority of those officials who supported treaty limitations continuously diminished. Thus, each retelling of the positions for the 1927 Geneva Conference, 1930 London Conference, abrogation of the treaty in 1934, and the final decision for war seems less compelling. What comes through the narrative is the stubbornness of the antitreaty faction led by Kato Kanji and that faction’s utter fixation with calculations of fleet ratios.

The most important part of *From Mahan to Pearl Harbor*, however, may not be the discussion of the 1921 Washington Conference. It may quite possibly be Professor Asada’s splendid account of the impact of Alfred T. Mahan’s writings on Japanese perceptions of America and their relationship to naval strategy. Most histories of the Imperial Japanese Navy and the US Navy in the Pacific note that Japanese naval officers were dedicated to Mahan’s strategic principles. Readers of those books are left with the impression that Japanese naval officers actually read *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783* either in English or in translation. Professor Asada observes that this was not the case. Few, if any, naval officers read Mahan. Instead, prominent Japanese naval theorists such as Ogasawara Naganari (1867-1958) wrote simplified versions of Mahan’s book, using examples from Japanese naval history. Thus, what influence Mahan had on Japanese naval strategy was indirect, filtered by Japanese interpretation and imparted through lectures at the Naval War College. In contrast, Mahan’s imperialist and racist opinions were published in periodicals, quickly translated, and conveyed directly to the Japanese public and navy. Consequently, if the Imperial Japanese Navy took its focus on the decisive naval battle from Mahan indirectly, it also directly learned that the United States considered the Japanese to be racial inferiors and that America needed to advance into the Pacific to defeat the “yellow peril.” Mahan’s influence certainly did not provide much support for naval limitations or diplomacy.
From Mahan to Pearl Harbor is an excellent diplomatic history and an important addition to the literature on Imperial Japan and the road to World War II. Its contribution to diplomatic history, however, will in the long-run probably be less important than the impact on discussions of academic military theory and the use military leaders make of those theories. Certainly, the book provides ample evidence to call into question the interpretations of Mahan’s influence on Japanese naval and strategic doctrine. It just may be that western historians embraced Mahan to explain Japanese military doctrines because his work was accessible. In that case, they have overlooked for too many years the influence of Japanese naval officers such as Ogasawara Nagarnari and Akiyama Saneyuki, whose lectures and writings were the actual expressions of Japanese naval theory.


Masterfully integrating a relatively narrow yet rich trove of unique materials, D. M. Giangreco has produced an engagingly written piece of history that, if nothing else, adds texture to the fabric of World War I. Most likely, students of Harry S. Truman will see this work as basic confirmation of the person they have encountered in other writings. The Truman who emerges from letters to his girlfriend, fiancée, and his own notes and fragmentary attempts at a memoir is a fairly average fellow who sees life through a practical lens and acts to make the best of opportunities that come his way. He seems to have had the ability to pick quite competent subordinates who flourished under his supervision. His successes appear to simply emerge, yet they do so within the broader framework of a person committed to doing assigned jobs or missions as well as possible. “Straightforward” should have been the family motto.

Entering active service despite being technically unqualified due to poor eyesight, Truman found himself elected to officership by his battery-mates, then confirmed in that status by both state and federal governments who, somehow, again failed to notice his near blindness. An energetic fellow, he made the best of every minute, sightseeing when the opportunity presented and studying to stay one step ahead of his students while teaching gunnery in France. Unexpectedly given command of Battery D, 129th Field Artillery, 60th Field Artillery Brigade, 35th Division, Truman performed remarkably well even in the face of the apparently certifiably irrational behavior of his regimental commander. To this reviewer, an artilleryman, the single most useful part of this work is the detailed description of the inner workings of a light (75-millimeter) field artillery battery in combat. The details will likely be lost on many readers, but they are the best single source of “how it really worked.” Everything except specific firing calculations are there—encrusted in mud, surrounded by chaos, compromised by lack of sleep, and, naturally, punctured throughout by enemy action. It really does not matter who is the focus of the story; Giangreco’s detailed descriptions are so well provided.
The style and clarity in which this book is written make it an easy, compelling read for anyone who has served in combat or is interested in Harry Truman, World War I, the Army National Guard, or, frankly, just a fast-moving adventure story. *The Soldier from Independence* provides serious insight into a man who would become one of the most effective Presidents of the United States.


In what may be his most controversial book yet, historian Simon Schama examines the multiple crises besetting the United States today and inquires how these problems look in the mirror of time. He begins with the historical perspective of the 2008 presidential primary in Iowa. An unabashed supporter of President Barack Obama, Schama concludes that after years of neglect and abandonment of the fundamental principles of the American republic, US democracy is returning from the dead by means of “a populist rejection of political business-as-usual, of the dominant orthodoxies.”

Schama is a gifted social historian. A professor of art history and history at Columbia University, he is the author of numerous books, including *Rough Crossings*, which earned the National Book Critics Circle Award for nonfiction. He is also a cultural essayist for the *New Yorker* and has written and presented more than 30 documentaries for the BBC, PBS, and the History Channel. Schama wrote *The American Future* as a companion book to a television series of the same name that began on President Obama’s inauguration day.

From the perspective of the 2008 presidential election, Schama explores four critical debates that have shaped the United States: war, religious fervor, immigration, and economic growth. Within each of these areas, he uses individual biographies to examine the struggle within these respective themes.

In his discussion on war, Schama begins his analysis amid the graves of this country’s most hallowed ground, Arlington National Cemetery. Set aside in 1864 by Union Quartermaster General Montgomery C. Meigs as retribution for Robert E. Lee commanding the principal army of the Confederacy, the cemetery houses the remains of more than 225,000 American servicemen and women, including Meigs’s own son killed during the Civil War. On the reverse of many of these headstones are inscribed the names of the soldiers’ spouses. Schama views the need to reunite military families in death as a peculiarly American habit that separates the United States from other warrior societies.

Meigs serves as the personification of Thomas Jefferson’s idealism, a soldier whose selfless service gravitated toward such grand projects as devising a new water supply for the nation’s capital and managing the logistical support of the Union armies during the war. Schama continues Meigs’s lineage through Lieutenant Colonel Montgomery Meigs who led the first wave of attacks on the German positions at Rohrbach in World War II to his son, a retired general who now teaches a course at Georgetown University on “Why presidents go to war when they don’t have to.” That officer possesses the same “flinty obdurate nature” that made his illustrious ancestor so indispensable to the Union’s victory. This tendency to question existing policies and to understand better the nature of this nation’s adversaries is exactly the leadership trait that Schama extols in the Army’s officer corps.
In examining the impact of evangelical Protestantism, Schama selects an itinerant black evangelist named Jarena Lee, an “inexhaustible road warrior,” whose sermons converted thousands of people to Methodism during the early years of the nineteenth century. Balancing Lee is civil rights activist Fannie Lou Hamer, who took the long bus ride with the Freedom Democratic Party from the Mississippi Delta to Atlantic City in an effort to unseat the Mississippi delegation at the Democratic National Convention in August 1964.

The author also ponders the question, “What is an American?” in his treatment of the nation’s conflicted attitude toward immigrants. At the heart of his narrative is Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, whose early writings “lit the candle of hope that would reach across oceans and continents to millions.” To de Crevecoeur, America was the most perfect society on earth, but decades later he found his idealistic image did not match the nation’s mistreatment of those not native-born. Jump ahead to the present time and Schama is optimistic that the presidential election of 2008 is a vindication for America, even when “much is still wrong.”

Schama’s final area of interest is the economic prosperity of the United States. The journey from colonial times has been tempered, however, by America’s penchant to exploit the land and water that served as the nation’s great natural resources. On the way to recovering that precious sense of national community, Schama sees “a lot of hard knocks will be given and taken, which is exactly what the Founding Fathers anticipated.” In short, he is calling for the United States to reinvent itself following the recent Republican administrations “as though their life depends on it, which it does.”

Returning to the present, Schama wonders if President Obama is destined to be “the impotent angel, struggling against the tempest, but blown backward into the future.” If readers can get beyond the anti-Reagan-Bush rhetoric that permeates every section of The American Future, they will realize that hanging in the balance in 2010 are the two forces that made America great—capitalist energy and democratic liberalism. According to Schama, America’s future depends on the ability of the current President to marshal all the good will and resolution his campaign and election generated to contain and defeat “the hydra-headed monster of recession.”

Was the 2008 presidential election merely an illusion of progress? Schama resoundingly replies, “No!” Under the current Administration, “government once again is no longer the enemy of freedom, but its guardian, no longer the bogeyman of enterprise, but its honest conscience and forthright guide, a transparent government no longer shrouded in furtive entanglements.” History will judge if Schama is correct.


Dr. Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution is an indefatigable researcher committed to understanding his chosen milieu, the Middle East. A Path out of the Desert reflects his continuing effort to gain even more knowledge regarding this complex and important region. In the latest of several books devoted to coming to grips with the Middle East conundrum, Pollack seeks to demonstrate the Middle East’s importance to the United States and propose a strategy for America. Pollack believes it is in US
interests to continue engagement in the region and suggests ways America might participate more effectively. Equally important, he believes the United States can develop a strategy that would resonate with Middle Easterners who have reason to view any new US approach with reservation.

In *A Path out of the Desert*, Pollack, true to form, argues his case on the basis of defining the problem and alerting readers to any possible bias. A self-described “liberal internationalist,” he admits that, to many, this means “liberal interventionist,” or as some might argue, liberal hawk. He is all of these, but above all he is a thoughtful critic of US and western policy in the Middle East. Additionally, the author is not one to sugarcoat the problems that those who live in the region have created for themselves. His argument is presented in three parts. First, he describes the challenge by telling the reader where and what the Middle East is (North Africa, the Sudan, the Levant, the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, and Iran). Pollack also enumerates US interests in the various nations. In the second part, he describes the problems endemic in the region and their sources, including great-power meddling going all the way back to the Ottoman Empire. Finally, he explores more deeply Iran, Iraq, and the Arab-Israeli conflict, along with other security problems, overlaying all of this with US grand strategy for the region.

In many ways, Pollack’s analysis is not new, at least to those who have demonstrated more than a passing interest in the Middle East. He does effectively illuminate US interests beyond the obvious—access to resources and assuring the survival of Israel. While these are our primary interests, they are not our only interests. Pollack argues convincingly that American values as a democratic society are at stake in the Middle East. Repression, genuine yearning for democracy among the populations, and the importance of stability in the region are all important, indeed strategic interests, if the United States is to conduct policy in accordance with its values.

Pollack’s discussion of the challenges in the region is illuminating and well-documented—chiefly, humiliation, frustration, exploitation, repression, and catastrophic birth rates. The author’s assessment is well-documented with sources from the region, and his conclusions well-reasoned. Repressive regimes, western colonialism, and Cold War rivalry have confounded the development of nation-states. Pollack argues too that the cultural artifacts of Arab and Persian nations also play a critical role in the uneven development of societies. He concludes that Islam is neither the problem nor the solution but rather another complicating factor. In short, Islamism and Islamic terrorism are symptoms of the challenges in these societies rather than causal factors. Incoherent American policy adopted in response to perceived Soviet threats also played an important role in inhibiting regional development.

So what should we do about these issues? For his part, Dr. Pollack believes that the United States should take a long view that includes patiently promoting the development of democratic institutions in stages. Pollack recognizes that these societies in the end must decide for themselves; thus, the role of the United States is one of support rather than intervention. Making progress in the Arab-Israeli conflict is, he says, essential both to stability in the region and the security of the United States. Pollack argues that the United States should, where and when possible, promote the development of free-market economies in the region and invest in programs that support these ends, including working within the international community to provide micro-loans to small businesses. The author proposes a number of incremental steps, such as developing programs to produce more effective institutions, to include training for government
bureaucrats. Pollack argues for a broad, multilateral approach based on persistence and patience and utilizing all the elements of national power.

Dr. Pollack reaches far with *A Path out of the Desert*, but he has a reasonable approach in his grasp. Although he is critical of US policy, he does not relieve either the Middle Eastern governments or those who live in the region of responsibility. Pollack’s reasoning is sound throughout. Still, his case would be stronger if he took the time to explain how best to sell this long-range and resource-intensive effort to the American public and our allies. Despite this slight criticism, *A Path out of the Desert* is well worth the reader’s time; it informs and stimulates. Whether or not the United States achieves the consensus required for long-term effort in the Middle East, Americans will in all likelihood continue to serve there for years to come. Some of these years may be reasonably calm and peaceful, but those years are still in the distant future, if they materialize at all. For these many reasons, military professionals need to read and think critically regarding Pollack’s thesis.


A major shift in the alignment of US military power has been occurring in the first year of the Obama Administration, as evidenced by the recent withdrawal of US forces from the Iraqi cities and the planned withdrawal of the majority of American soldiers in 2011. Correspondingly, the American military has expanded into Afghanistan, highlighted by the addition of 17,000 more forces in 2009. Based on General Stanley McChrystal’s strategic assessment, President Obama is expected to commit an additional 40,000 more forces in the Afghanistan surge. This shift in focus and force deployment will in all likelihood define the US military presence in the region for the next decade.

Yet, another battle is simmering within the US military itself, and that battle may portend more significance than either of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It concerns the question of the future site and strategy of America’s armed forces in the twenty-first century. Where the US military goes from here and what that destination means in terms of emerging strategy, operational art, and tactics, as well as force structure, training, and doctrine will influence the next generation of military forces and their leadership. At the heart of that battle is whether US forces should have a counterinsurgency orientation or continue with a focus on conventional warfighting.

The fact that the Iraq War has gone on for more than seven years has resulted in a body of literature that has grown exponentially. With the change in presidential administrations, that body of work has grown even larger as former civilian and military officials make their contribution to the historic record.

One excellent addition to this body of knowledge is Steven Metz’s *Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy*. Metz’s book is set in the national security, defense, and military affairs arenas, and provides an interesting nexus of strategy and history regarding the Iraq War. The author notes that recent studies have focused on how the conflict has affected Iraq. What has been missing is an assessment of how the war in Iraq has changed America. Those changes are seen as part of “what we are, how we see the world, and how we define our role in the global security environment.” It is only by understanding those changes, Metz argues, that we will be able to make sense of whether
those changes were for the better or worse. That knowledge can serve as a means for
rethinking the American grand strategy.

Metz tackles that assessment by looking at how Iraq historically became a
threat to the United States; how the United States responded, first in the Persian Gulf
War, and then later, in the aftermath of that war; and finally in the current Iraqi conflict.
Covering this era of transformation, Metz analyzes the Revolution in Military Affairs
(RMA) and its focus on rapid and low-cost application of force. He also notes that the
ongoing conflict with Iraq demonstrated the limitations of the RMA construct. The au-
thor then examines the emergence of a new wave of terrorism following the 9/11 attacks,
and its effect on the Bush Administration and American society in general, including
the subsequent Iraq War. Metz concludes that the impressive battlefield victories in Iraq
were offset by the insurgency losses, revealing the shortcomings and contradictions of
President Bush’s grand strategy. Counterinsurgency, according to the author, needs to
be viewed in the broader strategic context of US efforts. This broader view led to the
realization that after a decade of hibernation, American counterinsurgency was reborn
in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Metz’s work provides an excellent primer on a number of topics, including strat-
egy in general, the history of the US-Iraq conflict, and counterinsurgency. The author
also tackles the tough topic of the Middle East and its impact on US foreign and defense
policy. That focus alone makes this book a worthwhile addition to any military officer’s
library. But perhaps the most significant contribution Metz makes is found in his conclu-
sion, where he demonstrates uncanny knowledge and insight regarding the future of US
strategy following the conflict in Iraq. He questions the current way that America thinks
about war, the effectiveness of military power, and the various styles of leadership. Metz
forces the reader to reconsider the true lessons drawn from the Iraq experience.

As history has repeatedly demonstrated, nations that lose wars have a greater
incentive to rethink their paradigms of strategy and the limits of military force. States
that win wars do not necessarily have any incentive to do so, and if anything, they tend to
repeat the strategy and tactics of the past conflict in the next war. As the war in Afghan-
istan is demonstrating, the United States is attempting to quickly conclude another war,
its war of necessity, using the same strategy and tactics it did in Iraq, the war of choice.

The real problem is that one war is never like another, despite the validity
of any academic or analytical comparison. Too many variables are in play, and new
enemies quickly learn from the mistakes and successes of former enemies. Technolo-
gies that worked in jungles do not work in deserts, and those that worked in deserts do
not work in mountains. Guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency are distinctly different
from conventional warfare. Even the force structure and various cultures within the
military are different, as the result of trying to adapt to new and differing conflict. If
America’s military leaders and strategists continue to think that war, strategy, technol-
yogy, and force structure are all the same in any given conflict, such a thought process will
result in disappointment and possibly defeat.

Leaders—political and military—are charged with looking to the future and
devising and articulating a strategy that the nation can rely on as it marches forward.
Steven Metz’s *Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy* is a superb tool to aid those
leaders in that ongoing endeavor.

Robert J. McMahon has written a compact and readable biography that critically assesses the life, career, and accomplishments of Dean Acheson, who can justifiably be called the principal architect of the non-Communist world order which the Administration of Harry Truman established in the wake of World War II. As a top State Department official from 1941-47 and as Truman’s Secretary of State from 1949-53, Acheson shaped many of the key US foreign policy initiatives of those years, including the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the creation of NATO, the rebuilding of Germany and Japan, Franco-German reconciliation, America’s intervention in the Korean War, and the subsequent decision to launch a massive expansion of US military power. More than any other individual, Acheson was responsible for the design and implementation of the ultimately triumphant strategy of containing the expansion of Soviet power and influence. Not for nothing did Acheson, never known for his modesty, title his memoirs Present at the Creation.

McMahon, the Mershon Distinguished Professor at Ohio State University and the author of several books on the Cold War and the Vietnam War, is both admiring and critical of his subject. Acheson was an exemplar of the then-Eurocentric American foreign policy elite whose educational trajectory—Groton, Yale, and Harvard Law—catapulted him to a clerkship with Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and then into the prestigious Washington law firm of Covington and Burling. He was thoroughly knowledgeable of and surefooted on economic and security challenges in Europe, including the nature of the Soviet threat to Western Europe. He was also rightly concerned in the late 1940s—and here he tangled with Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and President Truman’s severe underfunding of America’s armed forces—that a potentially disastrous gap was opening between the Administration’s expanding foreign policy ambitions and the country’s military capacity to back them up.

On Asian matters, however, except for Japan’s reconstruction as a US ally, Acheson’s judgment was faulty more often than not. Dean Rusk, who loyally served Acheson as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, later said that Acheson “did not give a damn about the brown, yellow, black, and red people in various parts of the world.” In 1941, as Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Acheson assumed the Japanese would bow to US economic coercion (especially termination of US oil exports, upon which Japan was critically dependent) because, in his words at the time, “no rational Japanese could believe that an attack on us could result in anything but disaster for his country.” Twenty-four years later, a no less hawkish elder statesman Acheson vigorously supported the Johnson Administration’s decision to commit ground combat forces to the Vietnam War. But Acheson’s worst misjudgment in Asia was his hearty support, following General Douglas MacArthur’s war-reversing landing at Inchon, South Korea, for pushing into North Korea with the aim of reunifying the entire peninsula under US auspices. The decision to cross the 38th parallel and drive on to the Chinese border along the Yalu River, despite mounting evidence of impending massive Chinese intervention, was the most calamitous foreign policy blunder of the Truman presidency, and it is one for which Acheson bears heavy responsibility given the degree to which Truman relied on his Secretary of State’s advice. McMahon rightly asks: “Why would a man renowned for his probity, prudence, and maturity of judgment act so rashly...
in this instance? Why did he not recognize the manifest dangers of the administration’s military policy and at least inject some cautionary words into the internal debate? And why would Acheson so cavalierly discount Chinese and third-party warnings while lending his support to a headlong march to the Yalu that risked so much for relatively little gain?” McMahon believes the answers lie in Acheson’s personal history of successful risk-taking, disdain for China’s military prowess (widespread throughout the US military and foreign policy establishment), and the “temptation of a huge payoff” for the United States and especially the Truman Administration, which for years had been victimized by Republican charges of being “soft” on Communism at home and abroad.

One of the many strengths of McMahon’s biography is his placement of Truman’s foreign policy in the context of the domestic politics of the early Cold War, marked by anti-Communist hysteria and vicious personal attacks on Truman and Acheson by the likes of such red-baiters as Richard Nixon, Joseph McCarthy, and Pat McCarran. For these and other Republican leaders the policy of containment was simply appeasement by another name. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had “given” Eastern Europe to Stalin at the infamous Yalta Conference of February 1945, and his successor had not only “lost” China but also tolerated Communist infiltration of the State Department. In the minds of Republican populists such as McCarthy, the “Red Dean” Acheson came to epitomize everything that was wrong with American foreign policy, monopolized as it was (in their view) by arrogant elitists who were all too willing to compromise with Communists and communism.

McMahon’s \textit{Dean Acheson and the Creation of an American World Order} authoritatively captures the strengths and weaknesses of the greatest Secretary of State since World War II as well as the interplay of economics, diplomacy, and force in American statecraft during the Truman years.


Scott Stephenson, a West Point graduate and associate professor of history at the US Army Command and General Staff College, has written a moving and often brilliant book that should serve as a model for the so-called “new military history” focused more on institutions than battlefield operations. Military sociologists mine history (very selectively in this reviewer’s opinion) for data to substantiate their theories. One might think that social historians would use military sociology to explain the data they observe. This has happened but not very often. Alfred Vagts wrote \textit{A History of Militarism.} Quincy Wright wrote a \textit{Study of War.} These obviously are hefty topics, far wider than merely World War II, modern airpower, nuclear weapons, or other subjects too broad for 99 percent of the monographs ever written. What about modest, digestible topics, Harry Truman and Douglas MacArthur, for example? Even then, we working-stiff historians tend to overlook military sociology. The author of \textit{The Final Battle} shows the rest of us that it can be very useful. We should pay close attention, indeed.

Stephenson’s methodology aside, his subject matter is the German soldiers serving on the Western Front from late fall 1918 through the civil war of early 1919, where they played the role of counterrevolutionaries against radical socialists, often sailors who spent the war in harbors and logistics forces ensconced in rear-echelon formations. One might have thought the roles would be reversed. Those at the front
suffered the most and hence should be most revolutionary. If suffering alone caused revolutions, however, then they would be a continuous occurrence. Why then, Stephenson asks and answers, did the frontline soldiers play a counterrevolutionary role? Sociologists might present a complex, jargon-laden model virtually impenetrable to those outside their guild. Stephenson explains in clear, direct prose that any reasonably literate layperson can grasp.

Combat soldiers, the Frontkämpfer frontline fighters, simply hate “loggies,” the Etappenschweine rear-area swine. If those cowardly blankety-blanks are on the left, then we real soldiers should be of the right. Selection is a factor Stephenson uses frequently. The German army sent its best officers to the front, where they won the admiration and respect of the rank and file, not the case in the rear where soldiers and sailors condemned Prussian “militarism” (the status-quo) because they condemned officers unworthy of their rank. There was pride of rank among those replacing the fallen leaders of such battles as Verdun, where the German army suffered some 337,000 casualties in 1916. Replacements got to become junior officers and senior noncommissioned officers in the army, the most prestigious institution in their nation, heretofore off-limits to people like them. They readily would lead their subordinates against those who would rob them of their status in the name of a new, model democratic army where rank lost its privileges and its prestige.

The German army and German nation weathered four hard years of war on three fronts: west, east, and south. When the Kaiser abdicated his throne on 9 November 1918 and his successors signed an armistice on the 11th, order, discipline, and cohesion went to hell, that is, on the home front. Competent officers held things together on the Western Front because the rank and file recognized that they needed discipline to execute a final, cherished mission. They had to get out of occupied territory and cross the Rhine into the German heartland before the Allied armies or enraged local citizens could turn their wrath on stragglers pausing to loot or simply not willing to keep up with the pace of sudden withdrawal. This was perfectly sensible. It also was a course of action with fateful consequences for the rest of the twentieth century. The German army that crossed the Rhine and paraded through German cities looked a lot more combat capable than it really was. (former US Army Chief of Staff Edward “Shy” Meyer might have called it a “hollow army,” lacking reserves and replacements in equipment and personnel.) Germans who believed that the enemy never beat such fine-looking forces adopted “the stab in the back” theory by which the Nazis rode into post-war political power.

Most of the recent frontline fighters remained an army (rather than disintegrate into a mob) so that individuals could return to their families as soon as humanely possible. Once back in Germany they did not wait for demobilization via the General Staff which would have kept regiments intact while the future of the nation hung in the balance. The army consequently became incapable of defending the middle-class parliamentary government against the radical alternative: Russian-inspired soviets representing the poor, unemployed, and working class. The moderates had to turn to volunteers (the Freikorps), many of whom would find their way into the fledgling Nazi Party.

The Final Battle is a first-class book: well written, innovative, and insightful, if not brilliant. It has one substantive shortcoming, for which the publisher bears sole responsibility. They priced this book at $99, which will keep it out of the private libraries of students of military history and military sociology, one of many places it belongs.

It matters that Bill Sloan is a journalist, novelist, and writer of nonfiction. Among his nonfiction books are four popular histories admiring Marines in combat. The most recent, The Darkest Summer, focuses on the period from the invasion of South Korea by the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) on 25 June 1950 to 27 September 1950, when General Douglas MacArthur personally restored Syngman Rhee as president in the National Assembly building in Seoul. Sloan then summarizes events after the friendly forces crossed the 38th parallel, doffing his cap to Marines who fought well.

Sloan describes the terrible beating taken by US forces from late June to mid-September at the hands of the surprisingly well-armed and well-trained NKPA, providing a sense of desperation and defeat. Enemy employment of the T-34 Soviet tank was particularly effective, both in combat power and psychological effect. The piecemeal commitment of unprepared soldiers that resulted in embarrassing ineffectiveness is all too familiar to historians, soldiers, and general readers. Friendly forces were scraped up where they could be found and assembled in Korea, often committed to battle without preparation or training. They barely hung onto the Pusan perimeter in the southeastern corner of Korea (with ominous memories of the British experience at Dunkirk a decade earlier). But hang on they did, buying time for the planning and execution of the daring and successful 15 September 1950 amphibious operation at Inchon, on the western side of the peninsula more than 200 miles northwest of Pusan. The NKPA, trapped between the 8th Army advancing north and X Corps in the vicinity of Seoul and the 38th parallel, was mauled and almost annihilated. This is a fair summary of events, but none of it is new.

Sloan tells what Marines call “sea stories.” He gets high marks for his descriptions of terrain, men, and how firefights at the squad, platoon, and company level fit into the larger context of what the generals were attempting to accomplish. He spins inspirational yarns of heroism in Korea and provides flashbacks to World War II to show that many of the Marine Corps officers and noncommissioned officers in 1950 were veterans of the earlier war. The sea stories are new, but a serious problem surfaces in getting specific and being certain about combat actions at the cutting edge from long ago. It has all to do with getting it right. Sea stories generally improve with age and retelling.

Truth is the first victim of war. In addition to efforts to arouse a public to support “us” and oppose “them,” emotions are at work as soldiers and civilians die while true or false reports of rape, murder, and mayhem become public. Alleged logic and rational decision-making before war become muddied by rage, revenge, and passion during war. And that happens at some point removed from actual combat.

Sloan’s absolute confidence in the veracity and accuracy of his sources is at odds with this reviewer’s inclination to be more tentative about combat reporting. It is very hard to get the truth of close combat right, even when participants want to get it right. (There are reasons to hide the truth.) Eyewitnesses can be mistaken. (DNA contradiction of eyewitness accounts is commonplace.) Veterans of close combat may be describing the most frightening experience of their lives. Their chief concern was probably survival; they report what they saw, a part of the action in a building, forest, or trench segment. The passage of time blurs memory. (That is one of the reasons we de-
brief immediately after a patrol or combat mission.) Some of Sloan’s sources described events of 60 years earlier—with quoted dialog. The better method is to paraphrase.

Then, even if you get it right, you must tell it right. Journalists write the first draft of history, fully aware that there is more to the story. Novelist find “the essential truth” in their creations. Academic historians strive to validate sources and cross-reference facts, risking dryness for the sake of accuracy. The popular historian is tempted to sacrifice scrupulous adherence to fact in order to improve the story, falling somewhere between the novelist and the academic historian.

Sloan sometimes resorts to clichés and florid prose to pose tension between soldiers and Marines, between the “brass” and frontline soldiers. Good stories need conflict, but evidence of casual research and a cavalier disregard of nuance abound. Dean Acheson denies that he “pointedly left Korea out of a protected American defense zone in the Far East.” Sloan finds the term Task Force Smith “overblown, almost ludicrous,” suggesting he had naval usage in mind. Snipers fire burp guns. Only a baseball bat or pistol is less desirable for “sniping,” as that word is used in the military. “Its code name on the maps was Hill 202.” Of course, 202 is the elevation of the hill. The author is surprised to learn that the barrel of a Browning automatic rifle is hot to the hand after firing. Sloan spins very readable yarns told by veteran Marines, but his book offers little for the serious student.


*Targeting the Third Reich: Air Intelligence and the Allied Bombing Campaign* traces the development of photographic and signals intelligence use and its impact on the strategic bombardment campaign over Europe in World War II. Ehlers guides the reader through the technological advancement, operational use, political manipulation, and interagency application of aerial photographic and signals intelligence that affected choices made by Allied senior political and military leaders. This study examines how the evolving British and American air intelligence capability affected targeting and later bomb damage assessment that influenced major strategic air objectives directed against Germany. The author focuses on examples of nighttime city bombing, arguments on how best to damage the German economy, diversion of heavy bombers to ground support during the Normandy campaign, debates on the primacy of oil targets, and other interesting issues to demonstrate the impact of advanced photography and analysis techniques.

The book illustrates how air intelligence shaped and guided senior leadership to bomb some of the most valuable Third Reich targets, actions that would ultimately cripple Germany’s ability to wage war. Despite diversions and some failed efforts, the Combined Bomber Offensive inflicted significant damage on Germany’s ability to combat the American, British, and Soviet offensives as the Allies drove to Berlin. Ehlers uses the analogy of the human body to relate air intelligence to strategic bombing. The bombers, munitions, and crews are the muscle, skeletal system, and tendons. The air commanders who direct the bombers are the brains. Air intelligence resources are the senses that help direct the brain. These resources helped direct and guide the air commanders to plan and execute the campaign. Not all air commanders used the
information the same, however. Continued political infighting about targeting and the misuse of intelligence plagued the bombing campaign. Targeting was the key, and intelligence provided Allied commanders the ability to unshackle the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the Army Air Forces’ (AAF) heavy bomber capability. Leaders were able to adapt to a changing strategic environment and learn from air intelligence. This ability permitted them to develop new target sets and evaluate bombing results to determine the impact of their efforts via damage assessment.

This book gives the reader a well-researched and detailed evolution of both the British and American air intelligence capability developed in World War II. The author provides a wealth of information on intelligence data use, analysis, discussion, and interpretation. He does a good job of interspersing accounts of combat operations with explanations of how photoreconnaissance and ULTRA information influenced particular campaigns, target selections, damage assessment, and most importantly, how leaders interpreted or misinterpreted the information. One of the strengths of the book is Ehlers’s ability to clearly delineate positions of the many participants in determining the direction of the RAF and AAF’s night and daylight bombing activities. The discussions between personalities such as Carl Spaatz, Arthur Tedder, Charles Portal, Arthur Harris, Solly Zukermann, and others illustrate the bureaucratic politics and personalities that make the value of air intelligence come alive in the reader’s eyes. Ehlers also provides not only the positions of Allied leaders, he uses German leaders’ discussions of the bombing’s impact on the economy and warfighting capabilities to compare with the Allied intelligence analysts’ bomb damage assessments. This narrative also adds ULTRA intercepts of German field commanders’ reports as corroboration of the intelligence assessment, concerning the impact of air attacks on the Third Reich’s oil and transportation systems.

Readers will find many of the problems and concerns that Allied leaders faced when introducing new technologies, weapons, and their applications, along with a means to assess their actions against the enemy. Targeting the Third Reich addresses not only the evolution of intelligence systems but also their impact on national policy and the subsequent strategic, operational, and tactical use of weapon systems based on the introduction of these systems. Students of airpower will find the discussion of the air intelligence role and development fascinating. Additionally, the arguments by leaders on how intelligence swayed top national and military personalities to direct the Combined Bomber Offensive is a relevant study with implications for today. Others will see parallels to interagency interactions, confusion, and decision-making from World War II that might be applied to the current day with joint and combined planning and operations. Additionally, one can imagine the roots of effects-based operations evolving in World War II as air planners tried to use intelligence data to guide targeting and achieve certain effects of bombing with regard to the German economy.

One aspect of the book that might have added more weight to the use or misuse of intelligence is the impact of civilian casualties. The book mentions, briefly, the attack on Dresden but would benefit from a broader discussion of the controversy of this target and the question of collateral damage. Overall, the book makes a fine addition to a better understanding of the impact of the Combined Bomber Offensive and the role that air intelligence had in its actions.