Combating a Combat Legacy

Chad Serena

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters

Recommended Citation

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters by an authorized editor of USAWC Press.
The combat-centric legacy of the US Army is stable and durable. It developed during World War II and has persisted relatively intact throughout the Cold War, the post-Cold War period, and even in the post-9/11 era. The legacy endures not only in organizational form, doctrine, and equipment but also in training, education, and culture. Its persistence impedes the ability to conduct either sequential full-spectrum operations (occurring in traditional multiphase operations) or simultaneous full-spectrum operations (occurring in complex insurgencies such as those manifesting in Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF)). And it dramatically limits the US Army’s capacity to adapt to other noncombat or untraditional roles and missions. The stability of the legacy, despite the experiences of OIF, typifies the inertial qualities of the institutional US Army, which has, as Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster describes, “developed over time a singular focus on conventional warfare.” Furthermore, the legacy signifies a rejection of the hard-fought organizational adaptations realized in Iraq that made the force more full-spectrum capable than perhaps it had ever been.

The Army’s combat legacy required substantial organizational adaptation throughout OIF principally because combat skills did not translate into full-spectrum capabilities. The Army’s combat orientation retarded the force’s ability to adapt structurally and cognitively so as to modify organizational inputs (training, equipment, intelligence production, etc.) and outputs (task performance competency, behavior, etc.) to achieve organizational goals and objectives in pursuit of national interests. Significant and substantial modification was required to transform an institution with a combat legacy into one capable of conducting simultaneous full-spectrum operations in support of strategy. The duration and degree of adaptation in OIF are relevant if imprecise measurements of how unsuitable the post-9/11 force was for translating tactical and operational action and success into strategic and

---

*Chad Serena recently received his Ph. D. in security policy from the University of Pittsburgh. He is a former US Army military intelligence officer.*
political victory. Whether the adaptive and truly full-spectrum capable force created under fire during OIF will be retained in the future is unclear, but early indications suggest that a return to the legacy through “modernization” and “rebalancing” is not only likely but preferred despite strategic requirements. Instead of focusing on rebalancing, modernization, and a return to a combat-centric, legacy force, the Army should instead incorporate lessons from OIF to create a truly full-spectrum proficient force capable of supporting national interests and strategic requirements.

Full-spectrum Capabilities, Balance, and Modernization

The definition of the term full-spectrum is difficult to discern given the differing qualities that are attributed to this capability. In one sense, being full-spectrum capable refers to the capacity for fighting future combat-centric wars. In the 2008 Army Posture Statement, then-Secretary of the Army Pete Geren and Chief of Staff George Casey wrote, “To reset our force [because of the imbalance caused by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan] we must prepare our soldiers, units, and equipment for future deployments and other contingencies . . . [and] retrain our soldiers to accomplish the full spectrum of missions they will be expected to accomplish.” In another sense, being full-spectrum capable means maintaining the capacity to fight a range of threats in a multitude of environments. Major Mark Calhoun contends that “because a return to the Army’s tradition of ‘small wars’ appears to be the primary characteristic of current and future operations, a transformation process that relies on long-range destruction of targets seems anything but ‘full-spectrum.’” Although there is no published definition for full-spectrum capability, a definition exists for full-spectrum dominance that decidedly suggests (despite experience) that combat capability neatly and fluidly translates into full-spectrum capability. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms, defines full-spectrum dominance as “the cumulative effect of dominance in the air, land, maritime, and space domains and information environment that permits the conduct of joint operations without effective opposition or prohibitive interference.” One need not employ divination to conclude that the official use of the term full spectrum does not actually refer to the range of operations on this spectrum but only the narrower band(s) of combat. The prevailing sentiment encapsulated in the 2008 Army Posture Statement indicates that skills falling outside of this band necessarily detract from full-spectrum capabilities, while skills within the band are transcendent and enable full-spectrum capabilities. Therefore, the mindset of mistaking combat capable to mean full-spectrum capable endures.

The term balance, related to but not (yet) synonymous with full-spectrum, is nearly as indecipherable. On the one hand, the current force, initially and presently designed for high intensity conflict (HIC) in major combat op-
erations (MCO), is arguably unbalanced in favor of short-duration conflicts involving almost exclusively combat capabilities at the expense of future war-making capacity. According to Thomas Donnelly and Frederick Kagan:

Today’s wars are being fought with armed forces designed in the 1980s to excel in a different kind of combat—short-term, high-intensity combat that was expected to lead to rapid and complete victory or defeat in one major theater. Priority was given to getting soldiers and tanks into the fight quickly in the belief that support elements, headquarters, and reinforcements could follow more slowly. But this priority is out of sync with today’s needs and has created an imbalanced active-duty force that faces grave challenges in sustaining long-term deployments and carrying out its varied, numerous missions.\(^5\)

On the other hand, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Admiral Mike Mullen argues, the current force is unbalanced in favor of long-duration conflicts involving everything but combat capabilities at the expense of future warmaking capacity:

The pace of ongoing operations has prevented our forces from training for full-spectrum operations and impacts our ability to be ready to counter future threats. This lack of balance is unsustainable in the long-term. We must balance the strategic depth requirement for long-term national security against the pace of ongoing operations.\(^6\)

It is supposed then that current conflicts are anomalies that will not be repeated, either by choice or because these enemies will not rematerialize elsewhere; strategy has changed or will significantly change from its present form;\(^7\) and the future is full of enemies radically dissimilar than those currently found in the international security environment.\(^8\) None of these suppositions is warranted by experience or changes in the international security environment in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 periods.\(^9\)

The amount of time that the US Army spent tactically adapting to achieve goals and objectives in the simultaneous full-spectrum environment of Iraq indicates just how unprepared (or out of balance) the Army was for full-spectrum operations despite claims to the contrary. Prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, organizational inputs and outputs were almost exclusively tied to the conduct of combat to the detriment of any other conceivable or actual operation. This is the nature of adaptation: If an organization is perfectly suited to accomplishing one objective (HIC), then it is inherently less suited to accomplishing other, differing objectives. Paradoxically, the 2008 Army Modernization Strategy reverses this relationship and argues that expanding capabilities to meet strategic objectives has made the force less full-spectrum capable. The 2008 Army Modernization Strategy states that “the pace of operations coupled with insufficient time between deployments is forcing the Army to focus on counterinsurgency training and equipping to the detriment of preparing for full-spectrum operations.”\(^10\) This claim suggests that the US Army’s efforts

Combating a Combat Legacy
to become a full-spectrum capable force in OIF actually diminished its abilities by thinning its capacity to engage in HIC or MCO. There is some truth to this claim. As Admiral Mullen argues, “The imbalance between our readiness for future global missions and the wars we are fighting today limits our capacity to respond to future contingencies, and offers potential adversaries, both state and nonstate, incentives to act.”\(^{11}\) There is also quite a bit of truth to the argument that were the US Army not so fundamentally incapable of conducting full-spectrum operations in support of strategic imperatives on the eve of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, such a radical adaptation would not have been required and the force would not be out of balance, however balance is defined. Additionally, it is highly likely that potential future adversaries learned quite a bit from this process and will react accordingly by dispersing operations across the spectrum.\(^{12}\) It should also be noted that combat is only one band of the spectrum of conflict and that many other bands, tied to force and mission requirements, exist. The capabilities required for their execution have expanded dramatically in the course of recent conflicts.

Transcendent Effects of the Combat Legacy

A preference for a return to the pre-OIF balance and full-spectrum capabilities is not hard to understand given how difficult these missions are to accomplish. Pre-OIF full-spectrum dominance is where the US Army has historically excelled, and it would again like to obtain that status in the future. Conversely, post-OIF capabilities and dominance necessitate a new set of training, doctrine, and skills that is difficult to discern and would require significant and continuous organizational adaptation, regardless of what structural changes are made in the future. Determining the meaning of full-spectrum capable is necessary for determining the direction the US Army will be going and how long it will take to get there. If the 2008 Army Modernization Strategy and “CJCS Guidance for 2008-2009” comprise the Rosetta stone for this decipherment, then it seems that the pre-9/11 definition of full-spectrum prevails and the Army will continue a gradual shift toward a combat-centric force and away from the full-spectrum force developed in Iraq.

Outside of the related definition of full-spectrum dominance, it is difficult to determine what the term “full-spectrum capable” really implies. Supposedly, the force that was deployed to Afghanistan and later Iraq was full-spectrum capable because of its technical capabilities; this was quickly disproven variously by warlords, militias, criminal entrepreneurs, and insurgents for hire, resulting in four years of rampant instability in Iraq. An initial inability to manage these threats resulted in three years of organizational adaptation that ultimately redirected strategy and aligned it with operational improvements and tactical success. But it is argued that redirecting the Army’s focus to the lower-end of the conflict spectrum was not sufficient to ensure an
expansion of full-spectrum capabilities. As Major Jerome Hawkins explains, focusing on the lower-end of the spectrum of conflict has “come at the cost of training preparation for more traditional threats, and the Army’s ability to attack and defend. Neglecting training for conflict on the higher-end of the spectrum of conflict degrades the Army’s ability to conduct full-spectrum operations.”\(^\text{13}\)

Being full-spectrum capable then becomes a matter of perspective: One perspective defines full-spectrum capable as the capacity to engage a range of threats and another defines it as the capacity to engage traditional, combat-centric threats. The fact is, neither is assured in the future as the US Army continues to transform, modernize, and rebalance itself.

It appears as though the combat-centric, full-spectrum capable proponents are prevailing despite Department of Defense leadership advocating a different outcome. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has repeatedly made the case for expanding the capability of all forces across the spectrum and for inculcating the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan: “Even the biggest wars will require ‘small wars’ capabilities.”\(^\text{14}\) Secretary Gates also argues that while “having a military skilled in fighting major conventional ground wars is essential . . . such a war is unlikely in the near future.”\(^\text{15}\) He continues by emphasizing that “the Pentagon has placed comparatively too much emphasis on developing high-technology weapon systems aimed at potential state adversaries such as China or Russia that take years to develop,” noting that the 2009 budget contains more than $180 billion for such conventional systems.\(^\text{16}\) Despite Secretary Gates’s stewardship and management, many in the Army’s leadership make a powerful contrarian case that advocates following the standard prescription of the legacy: developing combat-capable forces proficient in fighting a near-peer adversary.\(^\text{17}\)

Change is difficult in any bureaucracy, and there is always the risk of damaging the organization’s capabilities. When charged with providing for the nation’s defense, change can be difficult, daunting, and potentially catastrophic. As Colin Gray suggests, “Often it is said that it is more difficult to expel an old idea than to introduce a new one. Because we only have one army, we cannot afford to depopulate our regulars, even were such mental surgery possible.”\(^\text{18}\) The entrenchment of a legacy is natural for any organization, even when it may be confronted with direct evidence that its legacy is unsuited for present and future operations. As Colonel John Waghelstein asserts, “If anyone is stunned and amazed that the US Army is having difficulties in Iraq, they should not be. There is seemingly something in the Army’s DNA that historically precludes it from preparing itself for the problems of insurgency or from studying such conflicts in any serious way until the dam

\section*{Combating a Combat Legacy}

In a rapidly changing security environment, doctrine should be dynamic but not to the point that it is in constant flux.
breaks.” But the influence of the legacy’s stability is troubling. Warfare, always a messy business, is becoming even more challenging, and commonly accepted paradigms for categorizing aspects of warfare are mutating. According to Secretary Gates, “The categories of warfare are blurring and no longer fit into neat, tidy boxes.” Despite the comprehensive tactical adaptations that the Army made in Iraq and is currently making in Afghanistan, it is still locked in a battle to “balance” capabilities with missions. But balancing to achieve a full-spectrum capable force, in the traditional sense, defies the ostensible definition of the term and confounds the adaptations resulting from Iraq.

**Implications for Strategy**

The Army crossed an operational Rubicon during OIF. There is no longer a combat-equivalent equilibrium because the spectrum of conflict has essentially been collapsed, perhaps irrevocably. Since there are infinite combinations of organizations and threat methodologies available to adversaries, there is a wide range of possibilities along the entire spectrum of conflict. Thus, success in modern warfare will require the ability to integrate and accomplish full-spectrum tasks simultaneously. As long as national interests demand military strategies ensuring some degree of stability, and as long as instability and violence plague the international security environment, the Army will have to be prepared to conduct the entire range of military operations, perhaps simultaneously. These operations require a force capable of maintaining a robust capacity for organizational adaptation.

Even if the US government chooses not to intervene in regional conflicts where national interests might be at stake, the Army still needs to maintain the capacity for restoring stability. In the future, events in the Western Hemisphere may directly threaten the continental United States. The key to retaining strategic flexibility will be maintaining the adaptability of the individual soldier and tactical organizations, so regardless of where they are deployed they will be capable of adapting and accomplishing their missions. Considering the adaptive potential of various states and nonstate threats, any organizational and operational weaknesses are assured of being exploited. It is imperative that the Army pursues and resources organizational adaptability in its effort to maintain a range of strategic options. With a larger army this adaptability is prudent; with a smaller force, it is critical.

Counterinsurgencies and unconventional operations are adaptive contests. According to Steven Metz, “Each [organization] tries to learn, adapt, and change what they are doing more quickly than the other.” Forming an adaptive organization and inculcating the appropriate mindset are difficult tasks, no matter the operational environment or the threat. In the absence of leadership that persistently emphasizes the necessity of fostering organizational adaptation, the Army will likely rebalance toward a more familiar
but less adaptive organizational form. As Leonard Wong argues, “Adaptive
leaders learn to live with unpredictability. They spend less time fretting about
the inability to establish a routine
or control the future and focus
more on exploiting opportuni-
23 ties.” Failing to institutional-
ize the adaptations of OIF will
leave the Army unable to suc-
cessfully deal with unpredict-
able threats and less capable of recognizing and exploiting opportunities in
the future.

Recognizing instability as a major threat to US interests is a common
theme of recent defense strategies. Developing supporting military strategies
that effectively meet the challenges associated with instability in the inter-
national security environment is a fundamental task. States and nonstate or-
ganizations may threaten stability by exercising initiatives that disrupt world
order. If stability of the global order (as it currently exists) is a desired condi-
tion, then the Army should be organized and resourced to provide full-spect-
trum capabilities toward that end. US Army strategy needs to recognize that
conditions dictate operational methods and not vice versa.24 Political and stra-
tegic contexts shape future strategic direction.25 Combat, counterterrorism,
humanitarian, and unconventional are simply terms used to describe various
operations, methodologies, or capabilities that facilitate operations. Stability
is the condition or desired end-state that actually has political relevance and
vitality. Creating stability in future threat environments requires full-spectrum
capabilities and significant organizational adaptation.

Since the beginning of the Defense Transformation program, the Joint
Staff, including the US Army, has been mistaking objectives for strategy, ca-
pabilities for end-states, and the preferred for the likely. These errors and
omissions have caused confusion in perceptions of the threat and masked the
need for organizational adaptation. Andrew Krepinevich argues that strate-
gic publications in the 1990s, such as Joint Vision 2020, indicated that “in-
formation superiority” was the means for enabling “dominant maneuver,”
“precision engagement,” “focused logistics,” and “full-dimensional protec-
tion.” Strategy was reduced to assertions “that the conditions desired will be
achieved,” and the need for considering resource limitations or enemy ac-
tion was obviated. In sum, the need for real strategy was assumed away.26
Other strategic requirements, such as the need for stability provisioning ca-
pabilities, were also assumed away, creating a substantial capability gap
unrecognized by those enchanted with the possibilities engendered by trans-
formation. In fact, many of the proponents of this strategy argued for a shift
away from threat-based planning to capabilities-based planning and opera-
tions. Ignoring the need for other-than-combat capabilities and mistaking ob-
jectives for strategy had significant operational consequences throughout the post-Cold War period.

Strategy necessitates that such thinking has to change. According to Field Manual (FM) 7-0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations*, “To be successful in future operations, the Army cannot look at operations today as temporary interruptions in preparing for major combat operations against a near-peer enemy. Nor can it afford to view operations dominated by the offense and defense and those dominated by stability as either/or propositions. Both usually occur simultaneously.”

Strategy needs to reflect national interests formulated with respect to the organizations threatening these interests. Differing levels of stability are likely to be acceptable in various regions of the world, based on US national interests, strategic priorities, and perceptions of risk. Stability in Europe is certainly strategically more important than, for instance, stability in Central Asia, and providing stability in Bosnia might be less complex than in Pakistan. Therefore, in our foundation of strategy and doctrine, stability should be viewed on a continuous spectrum. Although FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, does develop a framework for fragile states and a comprehensive set of stability operations tasks, these actions are not the same as developing a spectrum of stability. In this new paradigm, the level of stability required by strategy dictates the operational parameters and tasks chosen (combat, stability, offensive, defensive, humanitarian, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, etc.). Instead of modifying conditions to tasks trained, the tasks trained should be modified to achieve desired conditions. Although this change might seem like sleight of hand, it makes more sense to link tasks to desired end-states than it does to link tasks to varying levels or types of conflict. Conflict implies achieving victory through the imposition of military force; stability implies achieving a condition through the performance of a variety of fused tasks across the entire spectrum.

Focusing on stability in military strategy would not only align military planning with national interests, it would aid in the synchronization of military operations with political needs. Military strategies would then be less prone to possible failure, as in Vietnam, or Iraq prior to the surge. It would also elevate the importance of various forms of intervention in attempts to provide stability before instability spreads from a city to the state or region, in the form of a massive, multiform insurgency. The best opportunity to defeat an insurgency is in its nascent stage. The amount of time and resources required for an organization to adapt to a particular strategic environment can be an indicator of a failure in organizational design and its preparation for goal accomplishment. Given current and future national and strategic security interests, preparing for operations on the spectrum of stability would ultimately reduce the severity of painful and lengthy organizational adaptations.
Implications for Doctrine

Since the end of the Cold War, Army doctrine has reflected a conditioned bias for planning, training, and conducting combat operations. Even recent doctrinal publications still retain vestiges of concepts that are significantly less relevant in the post-9/11 security environment. For instance, Field Manual 3-0, Operations, defines military power in narrow traditional terms and extends the legacy argument that the military sets conditions while other elements of national power complete operations (despite a notable unavailability or ineffectiveness of these elements in recent conflicts).

Military power alone cannot, by itself, restore or guarantee stable peace. It must, however, establish global, regional, and local conditions that allow the other instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, and economic—to exert their full influence. Not only does this description of military power neglect what the Army was called upon to do in OIF and OEF, it also fails to account for operations in regions or environments where there is an absence of any government or centralized, responsible decision-makers—a fundamental possibility in future military operations. Diplomatic and economic instruments of national power are decidedly less effective in ungoverned areas or against complex insurgencies devoid of any discernible leadership.

The quotation from FM 3-0 contradicts that outlined in the same publication as the Army’s new operational concept: “The Army’s new operational concept has changed Army operations significantly. All operations are now full-spectrum operations.” FM 1, The Army, indicates a similar respect for a doctrinal shift in favor of current operations: “The skills and organizations required for operations against today’s threats are different from those of the recent past. The twentieth century required an Army with a large capacity focused on combat capabilities. Today’s operational environment requires an Army with more diverse capabilities as well as the capacity for sustained operations.” The first description (from FM 3-0) of what military power cannot do differs substantially from what the Army has been required to do and what doctrine says it should do. This description of military power is less of a “new operational concept” than it is an old operational concept repackaged in ambiguous terms. Setting conditions for a stable peace does not obviate responsibility for then establishing and enforcing that peace, and recent operations attest to this fact.

Even though it was published in 2008, FM 3-0 defines concepts, terms, and conditions more relevant to 1989 than the post-9/11 international security environment. The talking points used in newer versions of operational doctrine have been updated and duly note that full-spectrum capabilities are now...
a priority (although, at least rhetorically, full-spectrum operations have been a “priority” since 1991 or earlier). As Thom Shanker describes:

> The Pentagon will adopt a new strategy that for the first time orders the military to anticipate that future conflicts will include a complex mix of conventional, set-piece battles and campaigns against shadowy insurgents and terrorists, according to senior officials. The shift is intended to assure that the military is prepared to deal with a spectrum of possible threats.\(^3\)

A description of what full-spectrum operations entail (continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support tasks) is outlined in both FM\(s\) 3-0 and 3-07.\(^4\)

Despite these additions and a renewed emphasis on full-spectrum operations, doctrine remains flawed. The lexicon used in doctrinal publications (to include terms defined in Joint Publication 1-02) still reflect an institutional bias for combat operations despite contemporary operational and strategic requirements. This lack of a common and relevant lexicon, particularly in the case of simultaneous full-spectrum operations, can cause significant problems beyond the confusion created by the ineffective meshing of old concepts with new operational realities. According to Major Michael Davidson, if Effects-Based Operations lexicon is used, “for instance, in a disaster-relief mission, the military viewing all the inhabitants of a country as ‘enemy decision-makers’ may conflict with the view of the people held by several nongovernmental agencies assisting in the relief effort. This conflict of viewpoints could negatively affect the effective planning and execution of the mission.”\(^5\) Language is important because it symbolizes perceptions, intentions, and actions. Concepts are equally important. Breaking asunder simultaneous full-spectrum operations into constituent parts creates an impression that operations are indeed separable and can be planned and trained for separately. Delineating between offensive, defensive, and stability operations does not really capture the complexity of the contemporary operational environment and often leads Army units into supposing that these operations can be tangibly or cognitively separated, as they appear in doctrine. The definitions and conceptual descriptions of operations presented in doctrine are vital to the successful conduct of operations; they shape perceptions and are used as authoritative guides for planning, training, and execution. Flaws that are the result of challenges associated with the meshing of old and new concepts have to be eliminated lest they allow for improper interpretation and confusion.

Doctrine provides the fundamental principles by which military or other elements of national power render support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. If doctrine is flawed, it can inappropriately direct military forces in a fashion that does not support national objectives. If varying elements of doctrine are out of sync, military forces can become confused as to appropriateness, regardless of whether
new doctrine is prefaced with language indicating what is being superseded. This omission has created a fundamental flaw in the Army’s post-Cold War and post-9/11 doctrine. The military has failed to properly, comprehensively, and temporally synchronize military actions with national objectives across the full range of its doctrinal publications.

In a rapidly changing security environment, doctrine should be dynamic but not to the point that it is in constant flux. Without some continuity, doctrine does not provide fundamental principles; instead, it generates confusion, disrupting training and operational effectiveness. But doctrinal concepts should be reevaluated in light of current strategic requirements and operational realities. The publication of doctrine (and the terms and concepts therein) needs to be synchronized and on a timetable that is long enough to ensure relevance and yet short enough to allow for changes created by the operational environment, lessons-learned, or strategic shifts. Doctrine that is confusing, out of date, or in conflict with other doctrinal sources causes substantial problems, limiting the adaptability of organizations (they are either improperly informed or are training to standards and concepts that are no longer relevant). It also can disrupt the planning and training for specific operations (terms and tasks do not exist or are useless in simultaneous full-spectrum operations).

Conclusion

Manifestly, combat is being supplanted by stability as the principal task for US Army forces in light of ongoing changes in the international security environment. This fact does not diminish the importance of combat capabilities. But combat capabilities and skills should not be viewed through the traditional legacy lens. Instead, they should be considered as one tool that enables organizational adaptation in support of national security. Combat capabilities, in conjunction with other full-spectrum capabilities, help secure strategic objectives by suppressing adaptive threat organizations. Although the US Army’s traditional mission has been to “fight and win the nation’s major wars,” it now needs to focus on maintaining and accelerating its adaptive capacity to achieve differing levels of stability through the prosecution of simultaneous full-spectrum operations. Defending and securing national interests and security by supporting national strategy is the Army’s principal mission. Although fighting and winning the nation’s wars is indispensable, the Army needs to be capable of enmeshing this capability within the full range of operations, simultaneously. This objective can be accomplished by exploiting the Army’s newfound adaptability and the full-spectrum capabilities re-
resulting from Operation Iraqi Freedom while consciously avoiding the inertia of its combat legacy. Adjusting strategy and doctrine to reflect the importance of adaptation in achieving full-spectrum capabilities is an appropriate starting point for blunting the effects of the combat legacy on the current force.

NOTES

7. This is unlikely. Democracy promotion, a derivative of the democratic peace theory, and all of the attendant military subtasks associated with democracy promotion (to include substantial stability operations dependent upon or separate from combat operations), are historically bound to the vision and strategies of consecutive US administrations. The rationale is thus, “Because democracies are the most responsible members of the international system, promoting democracy is the most effective long-term measure for strengthening international stability; reducing regional conflicts; countering terrorism and terror-supporting extremism; and extending peace and prosperity.” George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington: The White House, 2006), 3.
8. “Iraq, the Army’s main effort for the foreseeable future, has been described by some as a warfighting anomaly, essentially a problem to be dealt with before we move on to more conventional threats. Unfortunately, this seems to be the prevailing opinion among those authoring the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review]. The technologically enabled force they envision is well suited to fight Cold War threats and ill suited to combat insurgencies or conduct other stabilization and reconstruction missions.” David Harper, “Targeting the American Will and Other Challenges for 4th-Generation Leadership,” Military Review, 87 (March/April 2007), 95.
9. The Joint Operating Environment 2010 argues that US military forces will be engaged in some “dynamic combination of combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction,” and that “we will find ourselves surprised by the creativity and capability of our adversaries.” See The Joint Operating Environment 2010 (Suffolk, Va.: US Joint Forces Command, 2010), 4-5.
11. Mullen, 3.
16. Ibid.
17. Ralph Wipfli and Metz contend that “even the military is not fully committed to transforming for the COIN [counterinsurgency] mission. As the Army and Marine Corps increase in size, they will simply add more units of existing types.” Ralph Wipfli and Steven Metz, “COIN of the Realm: U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategy” (Carlisle, Pa.: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 22 October 2007), 3.


21. While strategy may change, national interests are fixed in the near- to mid-term. Threats, on the other hand, will continue to evolve and undermine the current global order. Max G. Manwaring, Shadows of Things Past and Images of the Future: Lessons for the Insurgencies in Our Midst (Carlisle, Pa.: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2004).


24. Paul Rogers contends that the current US security paradigm is based on maintaining international stability premised on the status quo but that many states and sub-state groups are antagonistic to this security paradigm. See Paul Rogers, “‘Losing Control’—War and the Modern World,” International Relations, 17 (March 2003).


28. This concept evolved out of a conversation with Steven Metz regarding future military strategy. From Field Manual 3-0, Operations, “The spectrum of conflict is the backdrop for Army operations. It places levels of violence on an ascending scale marked by graduated steps. The spectrum of conflict spans from stable peace to general war. It includes intermediate levels of unstable peace and insurgency. In practice, violent conflict does not proceed smoothly from unstable peace through insurgency to general war and back again. Rather, general war and insurgencies often spark additional violence within a region, creating broad areas of instability that threaten US vital interests.” Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washington: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2008), 2-1.


30. Field Manual 3-0, 2-1.


34. FM 3-0, 3-1 and FM 3-07, 2-1, respectively.