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Phillip S. Meilinger

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Soldiers and Politics: Exposing Some Myths

PHILLIP S. MEILINGER
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Americans today could not imagine the nation’s senior military officer running for high political office while still in uniform. They would think it absurd for that officer to campaign for the presidency, lose, and then quietly resume his position in the Pentagon while continuing to serve for another decade, receiving not only a promotion but also wide respect and acclaim from Congress, the people, the news media, and even the President. And yet, this is what occurred in the mid-nineteenth century. Major General Winfield Scott, the general-in-chief of the US Army and hero of the War of 1812 and the Mexican War, contested with the incumbent President, Millard Fillmore, to win the Whig Party’s presidential nomination. Scott then ran against his erstwhile subordinate, former Brigadier General Franklin Pierce. Scott did not resign his commission. He lost the election of 1852, but continued as the Army’s top general for another decade. In 1856, a grateful Congress promoted him to lieutenant general, the first officer to hold that rank since George Washington.¹

The campaign of 1852 was not Scott’s first foray into politics. In 1848, he had lobbied for the Whig presidential nomination, but the party chose another general, Zachary Taylor, as its standard bearer. Taylor, also a Mexican War hero, was then-commander of the Army’s Western Division. He remained in uniform throughout the campaign. In fact, the election was held on 7 November, but General Taylor did not submit his resignation from the Army until 21 December, to take effect the following 28 February, four days before his inauguration.²

These were not isolated incidents. Throughout most of our nation’s history this type of conduct was part of the American military tradition. It is a myth to argue that the military has been divorced from political affairs. On the contrary, military leaders have been deeply involved in politics. Yet, one of the foremost observers of civil-military relations, Richard H. Kohn,

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¹ Phillip S. Meilinger is a retired US Air Force colonel with a Ph.D. in military history. His most recent book is Hubert R. Harmon: Airman, Officer, Father of the Air Force Academy.
argues in his seminal essay on the subject that a crisis is now unfolding because the military is becoming politicized. It was not always so, says Kohn:

Historically, one of the chief bulwarks of civilian control has been the American military establishment itself. Its small size in peacetime, the professionalism of the officers, their political neutrality, their willing subordination, and their acceptance of a set of unwritten but largely understood rules of behavior in the civil-military relationship—all had made civilian control succeed, messy as it sometimes was and situational as it must always be.3

The record is clear: The US military was anything but politically neutral throughout much of its history; its leaders were not always willingly subordinate to civilian authority; and they did not often agree to an unwritten standard of behavior. Rather, there was in essence a “permeable membrane” between the military and political spheres that allowed men to pass back and forth between the two as it suited their purpose—and the purpose of the political parties and even the nation.

Politics and the Military

America’s founding fathers were fearful of a standing army. The Declaration of Independence railed against King George III because he “kept among us, in times of peace, standing armies without the consent of our legislature;” he imposed an occupying force that “affected to render the military independent of and superior to the civil power;” and he brought in mercenaries “to complete the works of death, desolation, and tyranny.” It was therefore no surprise that the issue of an army was highly contentious in the newly independent United States. Debates at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 were heated. When the Constitution was finally agreed upon, it included several provisions specifically designed to regulate and define the powers and limitations of an army. The President was to be the commander-in-chief of the military and would appoint officers, but Congress would control the purse strings and have the power to declare war. The Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights ensured the right of the people to keep and bear arms in order to constitute a “well-regulated militia,” while the Third Amendment put stringent restrictions on the quartering of soldiers among the populace—a grievance that had also been mentioned in the Declaration of Independence. The American people were largely averse to a standing army and viewed it as a threat to liberty.4

Paradoxically, the fear and distaste felt for a professional army did not extend to those who led it. As in England, which also had a traditional apprehension of a standing army, the officer corps was viewed with respect. From the beginnings of the nation a military career was often seen...
as a stepping-stone to political office. That trend began with George Washington, commander of the Continental Army in the American Revolution. Washington’s chief Cabinet officers during his two terms—Henry Knox, Edmund Randolph, Timothy Pickering, and Alexander Hamilton—had all served with him as Continental officers. In the years ahead a number of generals, and a few admirals, would attempt to parlay success in battle into a political career. Of the first 25 men to hold the office of President, 21 had military experience. Career politicians understood this, and it was thus no surprise when Presidents selected military officers based on their known political leanings. President John Adams was loath to appoint anyone but Federalists to the officer corps, and in February 1801, shortly before leaving office, he hurriedly nominated 87 men to fill Army vacancies. Virtually all were either former officers and therefore deemed reliable, or known Federalists. The new President, Thomas Jefferson, would have none of it. He had Captain Meriwether Lewis did a survey of all officers on active duty in the Army, ranking not only their professional ability but also their political affiliation. The Federalists were purged, and the Republicans were advanced. Major General Jacob J. Brown, the general-in-chief from 1821-28, fancied himself a kingmaker. In the presidential election of 1824, he used his influence to promote John C. Calhoun for President. When the results were in, no one had a majority in the Electoral College, and Calhoun was third in the voting behind Andrew Jackson and John Quincy Adams. Brown then threw his support to Adams, writing to a friend that his erstwhile comrade-in-arms “cannot be seriously thought of by wise men.” Adams eventually won, and announced that Henry Clay, who had been fourth in the initial voting, would be his Secretary of State, in return for his support in the vote. Brown went to Adams and remonstrated with him that Clay was a poor choice for secretary. He pushed instead for DeWitt Clinton, an old friend who was governor of New York. Adams kept Clay.

In 1845, President James K. Polk, a Democrat, was in a quandary over whom to appoint as Army commander in the war against Mexico. He knew that whoever landed such an assignment would have the inside track in the next presidential election. Polk’s two top generals, Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott, were known Whigs and therefore politically unacceptable. In an attempt to thwart Whig plans, Polk nominated Democratic Senator Thomas Hart Benton, a career politician with no military experience, to the rank of lieutenant general. If approved, Benton would outrank Taylor and Scott and, presumably, be in line for the presidency after the war. The Senate
understood the game Polk was playing but balked at Benton’s proposed rank, which until then only George Washington had held. Senator Benton had to be satisfied with the rank of major general. The entire point of the commission now rendered meaningless, Benton played no role in the war, and, as Polk feared, the two Whigs vied for the White House in 1848.\textsuperscript{10} As noted, Taylor won.

Others taking the path from high command to high political office included Generals Andrew Jackson, the hero of New Orleans and the Seminole Wars, and William Henry Harrison, a War of 1812 veteran and the victor over the Prophet at the battle of Tippecanoe. Both became President. Jefferson Davis was an excellent example of someone who went back and forth between the military and politics. After graduating from West Point in 1828, he served five years in the Army. He resigned and several years later ran for Congress, taking office in 1845. Davis quit the House of Representatives the following year to serve as a colonel in the Mexican War. Afterward, he was elected to the Senate in 1848 and was named Secretary of War in 1852; after four years he returned to the Senate. In January 1861, he left office to become a major general in the Mississippi militia when his state seceded from the Union; one month later he was elected president of the Confederate States of America.\textsuperscript{11} Colonel John C. Frémont was a noted explorer while serving in the Army through the 1840s. The son-in-law of Senator Thomas Hart Benton, Frémont used this family relationship to further his political career. In 1850, he was elected senator from California, and in 1856, “The Great Pathfinder” was the first Republican candidate for President. He lost to James Buchanan. When the Civil War began, Frémont returned to uniform as a brigadier general and was later promoted to major general, even temporarily outranking Ulysses S. Grant. In 1878, he became governor of the Arizona Territory.\textsuperscript{12}

It is important to note that the Constitution permits such activities. Article I, Section 6 prohibits members of Congress from simultaneously holding another federal office, but it does not bar anyone already holding federal office, such as a military officer, from running for Congress or the presidency, as long as they resign one commission before taking up another.\textsuperscript{13} (Significantly, over the past century the courts have deemed that this “ineligibility clause” does not apply to officers of the National Guard or Reserves who may serve simultaneously as members of Congress.)

\textit{Civil War Transformation}

As close as the connection was between the military and politics throughout the country’s first 70 years, the relationship underwent a transformation during and after the Civil War. Such intrastate conflicts are inherently
political, so it is no surprise that politicians became heavily involved in military affairs and military officers dabbled in politics. There were, literally, scores of politicians at the federal and local level who left office to don the uniform. In the 36th Congress of 1859-61, only 9.8 percent of members had military experience, but a remarkable 73 members resigned to join one army or the other. Numerous veterans ran for political office in the war’s aftermath. Of the 516 Union generals surviving the war, 134 of them (26 percent) eventually held public office, and nearly 200 more wartime brevet brigadier generals entered public service as well. In the South, this propensity was even greater: 150 of the 412 Confederate generals alive at the end of the war entered politics (36 percent).

Some of the more notable men who moved from political office to soldiering and back to politics included:

- Carl Schurz was a German immigrant who campaigned for Abraham Lincoln in 1860 and was rewarded with an ambassadorship to Spain. He joined the Union Army and was promoted to major general. After the war he was elected as the senator from Missouri and in 1877 was named Secretary of the Interior.

- Nathaniel P. Banks was a congressman, elected speaker of the House, and governor of Massachusetts before the war. He attained the rank of major general; at war’s end he returned to politics to serve six more terms in Congress.

- John B. Logan was an Illinois congressman who joined the Union Army as a private at the outbreak of the war. He rose to major general and was the only non-West Point graduate to command a corps. After the war he served in the House and Senate and was the Republican candidate for Vice President in 1884, losing to the Grover Cleveland ticket.

- John McCauley Palmer was a state senator from Illinois prior to the war. During the conflict he rose to major general; afterward, he was elected governor and then to the US Senate. In 1896, he ran for President on the National Democratic ticket.

- Rutherford B. Hayes was elected solicitor in Cincinnati in 1859, then joined the Union Army and rose to major general. He was wounded in battle seven times. While still on active duty he was elected to Congress in 1864, taking office the following June. After two terms he was elected governor of Ohio and in 1876 won a contested election for President.

- James A. Garfield was elected to the Ohio state senate in 1859. At the outbreak of the war he joined the Union Army and rose to major general. While on campaign he was elected to Congress; in December 1863,
he arrived at the Capitol in uniform to take the oath of office. He was later elected to the US Senate and in 1880 to the presidency.

- Benjamin Harrison, grandson of President William Henry Harrison, was elected as city attorney of Indianapolis, secretary to the state Republican Party, and elected reporter of the Supreme Court of Indiana in 1860. In July 1862, he resigned his offices to join the Union Army, and by war’s end was a brevet brigadier general. He then returned to Indiana to be governor, senator, and in 1888 was elected President.

There were other military officers who rose to high rank in the Civil War and then used the fame gained to run for office. Examples include:

- George B. McClellan, West Point class of 1846, served in the Mexican War and was twice commander of the Army of the Potomac during the Civil War as well as general-in-chief. In 1864, he was the Democratic Party’s nominee for President and ran against Abraham Lincoln. He submitted his resignation from the Army on Election Day. In 1878, he was elected governor of New Jersey.\(^{18}\)

- U. S. Grant, West Point class of 1843, ended the war as general-in-chief of the Union Army and soon after was promoted to full general, the first in American history. He retired from the Army effective 4 March 1869, the day of his inauguration as President. He was reelected in 1872.\(^{19}\)

- Winfield Scott Hancock, West Point class of 1844, was a hero at Gettysburg. In 1880, he was the Democratic Party’s nominee for President, while still commanding the Atlantic Division of the Army. He lost the election to former Major General James Garfield but was graciously invited to the inauguration, which he attended. Hancock remained in uniform and died at his desk on Governors Island in 1886.\(^{20}\)

- Simon Bolivar Buckner, West Point class of 1844, fought in the Mexican War and upon secession joined the Confederate Army, rising to the rank of lieutenant general. In 1887, he was elected governor of Kentucky and in 1896 was Palmer’s vice-presidential running mate on the National Democratic ticket that lost to William McKinley.\(^{21}\)

- John B. Gordon was not a West Pointer and indeed had no military experience before the war. He was steadily promoted to major general and became an outstanding corps commander for the Confederacy. Following the war he returned to Georgia where he was elected three times to the US Senate and once as governor.\(^{22}\)

- Benjamin F. Butler, also not a West Point graduate, was a major general and afterward was elected six times to Congress and as governor of Massachusetts. In 1884, he ran for President on the Greenback ticket, losing to Grover Cleveland.\(^{23}\)
Aside from these specific examples, other events during the Civil War demonstrated that the American tradition was not one of separation between the military and politics. In January 1863, President Abraham Lincoln relieved Major General Ambrose E. Burnside as commander of the Army of the Potomac. In his place, he appointed Major General Joseph Hooker. In his letter appointing Hooker to this post, the President noted:

I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the government needed a dictator. Of course, it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain successes can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship.24

This is a stunning letter, showing that the President was well aware of the political maneuverings among his generals. Such intrigues were no doubt unsavory to Lincoln, but they were expected.

An even clearer example showing Lincoln’s understanding of the close relationship between the military and politics is seen in his reelection campaign of 1864. Lincoln’s opponent that year was Major General George B. McClellan, formerly general-in-chief of the Union Army, but who had not been reassigned since Antietam. He remained on active duty and was still drawing pay while residing in New Jersey. McClellan’s political beliefs had been known since July 1862 when he had forcefully written the President that he did not think the war should be about slavery but simply about saving the Union.25 Obviously, McClellan, like Hooker, had strong feelings regarding domestic politics and was not shy about expressing them. It should be noted that Lincoln did not feel secure in his position. Not only did he worry about reelection, but it could not be assumed that he would even receive his party’s nomination. Republican Party leaders wanted a successful military officer to run, and they raised the prospect of nominating Generals U. S. Grant, William T. Sherman, William S. Rosecrans, Benjamin Butler, and Joseph Hooker, or Admiral David Farragut. Although Lincoln deflected these moves and won the nomination, he remained worried about the election against General McClellan.26

Five states did not yet have absentee ballots in 1864; if a man wanted to vote, he had to do so in person in his home district. Soldiers were encouraged to exercise the franchise, but their ability to do so was a serious problem while away at war. Lincoln made it easier. In August 1864, he wired General Sherman in Georgia, asking him to furlough his soldiers so they could return home to vote. Free railway passes were issued to transport the soldiers to their homes states and back to their units. Amazingly, the President also ensured that the soldiers “were assessed a fraction of their pay for the support of the [Republican] party.”27 In some cases, prominent officers were sent home for the specific purpose of campaigning for
Lincoln: Major General John Logan to Illinois, Colonel Benjamin Harrison to Indiana, and Major General Carl Schurz to several northern states; the latter was popular among immigrant groups. In an extreme example of how the Army engaged in politics, Major General Stephen G. Burbridge, the military governor of Kentucky, in 1864 began arresting “persons suspected of opposing the reelection of Lincoln.”

*Trends during Reconstruction*

The Army’s involvement in politics did not end with the war. One of US history’s most interesting and difficult examples of the Army’s role in civil affairs occurred during Reconstruction. In the aftermath of the Civil War, the Army occupied the defeated southern states, and military commanders played a paramount role in governing there until 1877. Their task was daunting; all wanted to restore civilian control as quickly as possible and bring the erstwhile rebellious states back into the Union fold, but it was just as important that the hard-won gains of the war not be jettisoned. These somewhat conflicting aims resulted in Army commanders being torn between political factions in Washington—the so-called conservatives supporting President Andrew Johnson who wished a speedy return to normalcy, and the “radicals” who insisted that de facto slavery not be reinstated.

This was a melancholy period for the Army that saw it assuming a role for which it was neither trained nor suited. Examples of how soldiers imposed their rule on American civilians were legion. In July 1865, a white man in Mississippi was arrested by military officials and accused of killing a black person. The accused appealed to a local judge who ordered the man released. The military commander, Major General Henry W. Slocum, not only refused to release the man but also arrested the judge who issued the writ freeing him. That same month the Army set aside the results of an election in Richmond, Virginia, because “too many unpardoned rebels had been elected.” In September, Major General Alfred H. Terry closed down a Virginia newspaper and had its editor arrested for publishing what Terry believed was “an indecent insult” to the memory of President Lincoln. Major General George H. Thomas was offended by an Alabama bishop who advised that a prayer in support of “all in civil authority” not be said, because the civil authority was composed of Yankee soldiers who did not deserve such prayers. Thomas ordered the bishop suspended. On 3 July 1866, General Grant directed military commanders to arrest anyone in the South for crimes in situations where “civil authorities either could not or would not do so.” In April 1867, Major General John A. Pope annulled elections held in Tuscumbia, Alabama, and appointed a new mayor himself. In July, Major General Philip H. Sheridan ousted Texas Governor James W. Throckmorton
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for being “an impediment” to Reconstruction. Sheridan then installed the loser in the recent gubernatorial election. Between July and December 1867, Major General John M. Schofield intervened 21 times in civil court cases. In some instances he simply halted proceedings, while in others he ordered the cases turned over to military commissions for trial. As the definitive history of the Army’s role in Reconstruction states, the “viceroys” garnered “a fearsome amount of political power.”

The Civil War and Reconstruction were periods of civilian-military intermingling greater than any in American history, and their effects were felt for decades. Six Presidents following the war had been Union Army officers, including Andrew Johnson, who was a brigadier general in Tennessee before being tapped by Lincoln to be his running mate. A seventh, Chester Arthur, had been a brigadier general in the New York militia but saw no action. Over the next century there were several military officers who sought high public office. Lieutenant General Nelson Miles suggested to Governor Theodore Roosevelt that they run for the White House on the same ticket—Miles as the presidential nominee. Roosevelt rejected the idea as “futile,” but when William McKinley won the Republican nomination in 1896, Miles approached him and offered to be his running mate. McKinley instead chose Garret A. Hobart. Major General Leonard Wood’s well-known political ambitions ensured that President Woodrow Wilson would not give him a prominent command during World War I. Nonetheless, Wood ran for President in 1920, while still on active duty, but did not get the Republican nomination. He resigned from the Army the following year. Throughout World War II, General Douglas MacArthur contemplated his presidential chances and sent Lieutenant General George Kenney to Washington, D.C. in April 1943 to discuss such matters with Republican Party leaders. In 1952, General Dwight Eisenhower planned and organized his presidential campaign from his office outside Paris while serving as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. In the years following, retired officers running for the presidency or vice presidency included Curtis LeMay, James Stockdale, Alexander Haig, and Wesley Clark.

Conclusion

The belief that the American military has been uninvolved in politics is traditional and long-held. In his magisterial work on the subject of civil-military affairs, Samuel P. Huntington stated flatly that “after the Civil War officers unanimously believed that politics and officer-ship did not mix.” This article has attempted to show that such an assessment is simply not true. Rather, senior military officers were continually and deeply involved in political affairs both before and after the Civil War. More importantly,
such a relationship was not seen as either un-American or unconstitutional. On the contrary, for most of the nation’s history the close relation between soldiers and politics has been encouraged and accepted.

To be clear, the issue here is not civilian control of the military. That is a separate matter and one that is not at play in most of the cases previously cited.³⁶ The soldiers mentioned understood that they were subject to civilian control; what they wanted was to win public office so they would themselves be in control. Few times in American history have military commanders contested the issue of civilian control: Winfield Scott and his squabbles with Secretary of War Jefferson Davis; Federal commanders, including Grant, following the Civil War in their confrontation with President Andrew Johnson over Reconstruction; and Douglas MacArthur’s challenge to President Harry Truman early in the Korean War are among the most notable exceptions.

The issue is not even whether the military should take part in political campaigns. The consensus today, clearly, is that such involvement is inappropriate. Rather, the point of this article has been to show that the US military, for much of the nation’s history, has been deeply involved in political affairs. Partly this involvement was a result of the enormous power given to military commanders, especially those designated as combatant commanders in geographic areas. Dana Priest of The Washington Post commented on the power and prestige these officers hold: “[They are] the modern-day equivalent of the Roman Empire’s proconsuls: well-funded, semi-autonomous, unconventional centers of US foreign policy.” William Pfaff argues that they “have become more important agents of US foreign policy than the embassies in their regions because of their wealth and their lack of congressional scrutiny.”³⁷ When the commander in Iraq was raised to four-star level in 2004, the rationale given for the move was “making sure the civilian-military effort is consistent and well-integrated” and that the “military and civilian pieces fit together.”³⁸ It was not explained why a civilian diplomat could not ensure cooperation.

It is thus small wonder that Army officers such as the current commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan have become well-known public figures. It is also why such powerful commanders are feared by some who see a crisis unfolding in American civil-military affairs. Moreover, the past decade has seen an increase in retired military officers expressing their opinions in public. Numerous retired senior officers campaigned for presidential candidates in the last three elections, and in April 2006, six retired Army and Marine Corps generals called for the firing of their former boss, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.³⁹ Of more recent interest, a retired vice admiral won the Democratic Party’s nomination to run for the US Senate in
Pennsylvania, partly by campaigning against the agenda of the incumbent Democratic President.

These types of activities are not new. Theater commanders today have no more power than did Winfield Scott in Mexico City in 1847, military governors in the South during Reconstruction, Lucius D. Clay in Germany from 1947-49, or Douglas MacArthur in Japan from 1945-50. Our collective memory has simply forgotten these events. As the facts show, the US military has always been deeply involved in political affairs. For the most part such involvement has been condoned and even encouraged; the political parties generally contacted the generals regarding running for office, not the other way around. It may be the case that such a strong tradition of involvement is no longer desirable. Theater commanders today do indeed have a great deal of power at their disposal. Ensuring that power is kept on a short leash is an understandable and plausible response. But if that is to be our policy, then we should rely on reasoned arguments regarding changes in the nature of the world, the nation, and America’s political environment. Policy should not be based on a flawed and mythological version of American history.

NOTES


4. For the standard work detailing the aversion early Americans had for the military, see Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802 (New York: Free Press, 1975).

5. Thomas Jefferson had been a colonel in the Virginia militia during the war but did not see action; John Jay, who succeeded Jefferson as Secretary of State, had not served in uniform.

6. The exceptions were John Adams, John Quincy Adams, Martin Van Buren, and Grover Cleveland.


9. John D. Morris, Sword of the Border: Major General Jacob Jennings Brown, 1775-1828 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State Univ. Press, 2000), 251-55. Morris concludes that Brown “had been interested in, and involved in, politics in one way or another all of his adult life and would never relinquish his interest in it.” Incidentally, Calhoun became the Vice President under both Adams and Jackson.

14. This data is derived from Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774-1989 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1989). Of the 73 men who went off to war, six were killed in action and 18 returned to political office. Of the 583 Union generals of “full” rank (as opposed to brevet rank) during the war, 47 (eight percent) were full-time politicians before the war. Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1964), xix.
15. Roger D. Hunt and Jack R. Brown, Brevet Brigadier Generals in Blue (Gaithersburg, Md.: Olde Soldier Books, 1990). Brevet rank, which is no longer used in the US military, was an honorary rank given for merit. It entitled the bearer to prestige but neither seniority nor extra pay.
22. Gordon is usually listed as a lieutenant general in the Confederate Army, but Ezra Warner in his authoritative Generals in Gray, xvii, states that he was a major general.
25. Sears, 227-29.
27. Ibid., 16, 341. The five northern states without an absentee ballot were Illinois, Indiana, Delaware, New Jersey, and Oregon.
30. Not surprisingly, the military veteran presence in Congress more than tripled after the war. The 42d Congress of 1871-73 consisted of 329 members, 104 of whom (31.6 percent) had served in uniform during the Civil War. Data from Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774-1989.
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40. In 1805, President Thomas Jefferson appointed Brigadier General James Wilkinson, then-commanding general of the US Army, to serve as both the governor of the Louisiana Territory and Commissioner of Indian Affairs, combining an enormous amount of military and civil power in one man. Linklater, 235.

41. It was the constant pestering of General William T. Sherman to run for President by both political parties that prompted his famous telegram to the Republican National Convention in 1884: “I will not accept if nominated and will not serve if elected.” Lloyd Lewis, *Sherman, Fighting Prophet* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1932), 631.