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Raymond A. Millen

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Time for a Strategic and Intellectual Pause in Afghanistan

RAYMOND A. MILLEN

After eight years of increasing involvement in Afghanistan, the US-led Coalition appears to be at an intellectual crossroads. Despite progress in a number of sectors, the tipping point in favor of an irreversible momentum toward functional governance remains elusive. As frustration mounts, Coalition members have become more vocal about their desire to withdraw by a certain deadline rather than seeing the effort through to completion. Ironically, the growing impatience emanates not from any successes by the Taliban but from political and strategic missteps by Afghanistan's international partners. This article focuses on three misconceptions that deserve greater scrutiny: associating Hearts-and-Minds with government legitimacy, using correlation of forces as the foundation of strategy, and assuming unity of effort is a natural consequence of multinational endeavors.

As the insurgency in Afghanistan continues to smolder, a strategic pause in thinking is necessary to assess US strategy and its underlying principles, but due to various political pressures, time is of the essence. The purpose of this article is not to propose definitive solutions so much as to raise the debate on premises that have a substantial impact on America's strategic approach. One thing is clear, though; the current strategy is not working.

Government Legitimacy

Apparently, during an insurgency, the meaning of government legitimacy changes drastically from traditional political philosophy. In this alternate universe, the social contract between the government and its citizens is displaced by the nostrum of Hearts-and-Minds. If winning the Hearts-and-Minds of the population is the most assured means to defeating

Raymond A. Millen, a retired Army officer with three tours in Afghanistan, is the Security Sector Reform analyst at the Peacekeeping and Stabilization Operations Institute, US Army War College.

an insurgency, what does it exactly mean? Originally, the phrase epitomized the ideological struggle between communism and liberal democracy. The idea was to convince indigenous populations in threatened nations that their lives would be much improved under a liberal democratic political system compared to Communist socialism. Over time, however, Hearts-and-Minds appears to have degenerated into a popularity contest with giveaways as the means of gaining popular support. Unsurprisingly, this tacit policy approach has not reaped the expected results in Afghanistan or anywhere else.

The Hearts-and-Minds mantra is most often bandied about as the *sine qua non* of government legitimacy, which is the main focus of a counterinsurgency strategy. Unfortunately, the term means all things to all people, and it is this inherent ambiguity that limits its practical application pursuant to a credible strategy. When viewed as a laundry list of divergent silver bullets, a strategy that tries to do all things will ultimately achieve nothing.¹

Ironically, a double standard appears to pervade editorial comments on Hearts-and-Minds, and effectively stacks the deck against the Afghan government. Theoretically, political legitimacy should favor the side that wins the Hearts-and-Mind struggle.² In practice, however, only the established government is taken to task for shortfalls, whereas insurgent efforts, no matter how slight or brutal, are cited as proof of a growing legitimacy. Incidentally, insurgents have no difficulty aligning loyalties within their areas of control because brute force and coercion are powerful mechanisms. This fact is not intended to imply that authoritarian rule is the key to legitimacy. By their very nature, tyrannical regimes are brittle and eventually crumble as a result of inherent flaws and contradictions. In the final analysis, Hearts-and-Minds is really a proposed shortcut to securing government legitimacy and avoiding intellectual rigor to get fast results. Because the framework of a political system has an enduring impact on functional governance, understanding the essence of political legitimacy is necessary.

The concept of government legitimacy has evolved over time and is closely aligned with sovereignty. Traditionally, legitimacy and sovereignty rested on a state's power to provide physical security, but although the use of force served the immediate needs of a state, it was also self-limiting. State obsession with security frequently led to intense international competition, resulting in arms races, balance-of-power alliances, and conflict. Even during times of peace, over-investment in military expenditures stunted economic growth, contributed to militarization of society, and often created regional security dilemmas. During the second half of the twentieth century, government legitimacy evolved to include progress in services, political and social reform, economic growth, education, etc. Consequently, twenty-first century modern states have become much more powerful due to increased capacities beyond their military capability. In this

regard, legitimacy is particularly strong in democratic, representative political systems. Still, young democracies need to provide physical security before advancing to the subsequent stages of legitimacy. There are no shortcuts.

***The current strategy
is not working.***

In their struggle to intellectualize an enduring political structure, some western political philosophers note that sovereignty ultimately rests in the people, who form society and create a government in order to secure inalienable rights, with physical security considered the most important right. The plight of establishing a workable political system has plagued societies from the very beginning. Regardless of the best intentions of man and the elegance of their political systems, most fell to ruin. As James Madison wrote:

If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.³

The American Founding Fathers wrestled with creating a democratic political structure that maintained a balance between the extremes of anarchy and tyranny, both of which historically contributed to the demise of a democracy. Their solution was to establish three separate but equal branches of government (i.e., executive, legislative, and judicial), which depended on each other to conduct the business of government. Additionally, they conscientiously conferred all powers not vested in the federal government to the states and local communities in order to ensure the rights and interests of the people were guaranteed. This system of checks and balances and limited central government embraced both subsidiarity⁴ and representative government at all levels.⁵

Today, the focus of debate should not be whether democracy will work in Afghanistan but whether the Afghans' democratic political structures are sufficiently balanced. Unless a political system has a self-correcting mechanism to check the accumulation of power in one government body, then its demise is inevitable. When prefacing their thoughts related to various political systems, western political philosophers discuss universal observations, such as the flawed nature of man, the unquenchable pursuit of power, or the corruption of man by power. It would be specious to suggest that Afghans or any culture are incapable of practicing democratic governance simply because they may display undesirable political traits. Organizational flaws in the nation's constitution are the likely culprit. Thus, for a young democracy like Afghanistan to survive and flourish, it has to start with a

limited central government with the majority of powers vested in the elected provincial and community governments. So long as its provincial governors and police chiefs feel beholden to the Afghan president, then the interests of the citizenry will lack representation. The long-term threat to Afghanistan is not the Taliban but structural imbalances in power.

America's Founding Fathers also developed an absolute faith in the power of private enterprise to generate wealth, which over time develops economic power for the state. Within a secure and stable environment, people may practice entrepreneurship and other pursuits that benefit both individuals and society. The freedom to succeed or fail instills in the individual a greater sense of industry, pride, and innovation. In the Founding Fathers' view, the role of the federal government is to foster healthy economic competition by ensuring a level playing field and not a command economy. For a developing democracy, a command economy will most likely stymie development through inefficiencies, corruption, and redundancies.

Twenty-first century legitimacy transcends the traditional provision of security. As a nation attains greater wealth and transforms as a result of representative government, the expectation of more services, development, and reforms—sometimes described as progress—is a logical product. As states grow more powerful and wealthy, the standards for legitimacy rise. This phenomenon applies not only to a state's citizenry, but also to the international community, which accords greater legitimacy to democracies because they also embrace international norms, regimes, and laws.⁶

As now construed and practiced, it is difficult to discern how the Hearts-and-Minds enhances government legitimacy. The lavish provision of goods and services, the frenetic activity of construction projects, and the massive influx of money may have gained some initial gratitude, but none of these activities creates wealth. Instead, they undermine local markets and small businesses, create public expectations that the government cannot sustain, and encourage government corruption. Admittedly, there are circumstances in which humanitarian assistance and services are essential, especially in the aftermath of a disaster or national emergency, but where no exigency exists, then Hearts-and-Minds becomes nothing more than an exportation of social welfare.

The rational approach is to build legitimacy through political systems (i.e., electoral representation, checks and balances, separation of powers, and subsidiarity), free enterprise to foster the creation of wealth, while focusing the majority of the security effort at the community level. It is this last point that plagues the counterinsurgency effort, for without basic security, the other elements of twenty-first century legitimacy are nullified. How to achieve security in Afghanistan is the focus of the following section.

Correlation of Forces

Correlation of forces (e.g., force ratios) is often used as a justification for determining manpower ceilings for security forces without due consideration of the ratios' practicality and impact on society. Two camps have emerged regarding force ratios, the counterinsurgent-to-insurgent camp and the counterinsurgent-to-population camp. The argument comes down to who can best manage the insurgent problem effectively and efficiently, the military or the police? Because the argument involves the competition for resources, both sides have a stake in the answer. But how practical is the use of force ratios in formulating counterinsurgency strategy and what are the likely consequences for a weak state like Afghanistan? Would it not be more beneficial to invest in community police instead of national police as the front-line against insurgents and criminal organizations?

The use of force ratios appears to be a blunt instrument for the development of strategy and an even poorer justification for force levels. The noted insurgency expert Bernard Fall premised that a counterinsurgent-to-insurgent ratio of 15:1 or even 20:1 was required to isolate and destroy guerrillas, who enjoy the advantages of the defense, intimate knowledge of the terrain, and the sympathy of the population. If the goal is to stabilize the threat, then a ratio of 10:1 would suffice.⁷ In both cases, though, Fall was referring to well-organized, trained, and equipped paramilitary forces (i.e., Vietminh), far surpassing the capabilities of the disparate and vastly unpopular groups calling themselves Taliban. But even if a planning ratio of 10:1 sufficed for the current conflict in Afghanistan, the aggregate numbers needed are misleading. Fall's ratio pertains only to combat units (primarily dismounted infantry) since they are the ones performing clear and hold operations. The rest (i.e., support and headquarters) operate predominantly in rear-area encampments. If such a ratio was truly a requirement for success, then the total deployed force needed to secure Afghanistan would be exorbitant.⁸ The fact is, force ratios have never been a requisite for military success; at least the Great Captains in history never viewed them as such. In counterinsurgency operations, the issue is not aggregate numbers but the manner in which forces are employed.

The problem confronting the strategist is the paradoxical relationship between the counterinsurgent and insurgent. On paper, the larger, better resourced conventional forces should immediately crush the smaller, poorly resourced insurgents. In practice, conventional forces generally exhaust themselves conducting iterative clearing operations (e.g., counterguerrilla) and raids, which have no lasting effect. If insurgents retain the means to enter a "cleared" area again, then counterguerilla warfare is not decisive and hence remains a suboptimal solution. Canny insurgents understand that

the struggle revolves around controlling the population and not taking terrain. The counterinsurgents may clear an area rather easily, but once they move on, insurgents return and regain control, a strategy not lost on the local populace. This appears to be the pattern in Afghanistan, where the insurgents' main focus is on remaining ensconced in the local communities. Logic would dictate that positive control of population centers should become the centerpiece of the counterinsurgency strategy.

Toward this end, counterinsurgent-to-population security ratios have greater relevance in counterinsurgency because separating the insurgents from the populace is the most assured way of defeating the insurgency. The US Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual mentions 20 to 25 counterinsurgents for every 1,000 residents.⁹ In view of Afghanistan's population of 30 million, 750,000 counterinsurgents (combat forces) would be required to garrison all population centers. Again, in view of the tooth-to-tail ratio, this approach is impractical. Garrisoning population centers with headquarters and support forces would be ineffective because they cannot meet both their normal mission requirements and protect the urban population.

Regardless, it is questionable whether an extensive military response to the insurgency is necessary or in Afghanistan's best interests. The Taliban insurgency has yet to manifest into a virulent threat against the government. In fact, the term Taliban carries with it considerable contradictions. It is generally known that the Taliban are not a monolithic organization, enjoy no sophisticated central command and control, and have little tactical capacity. It is also well-known that the Taliban have very little popular support, even in the southern region, which is considered their base. To suggest that the Taliban shadow governments compete for government legitimacy is an absurd mischaracterization of twenty-first century legitimacy. Militarily, their amorphous organization permits the Taliban to survive, but on the other hand, such lack of coordination confines them to low-level paramilitary operations, predominately confined to bombings, suicide attacks, and small raids. Under these circumstances, it makes little military sense to increase the size of the US military contingent in Afghanistan, unless the strategic plan calls for multiple, simultaneous offensives (which does not appear to be the case). Worse, the corresponding rapid increase of the Afghan National Army (ANA) to 134,000 soldiers (and perhaps 240,000) as part of an exit strategy lacks a logical rationale. If the United States intends to provide greater logistical support to the ANA as part of the accelerated expansion, then it will be committed to propping up an excessively large military for an indeterminate time. Of greater concern is the effect an overly large ANA would have on Afghan society in terms of excessive military expenditures,

high inflation, budget deficits, rationing, and shortages. These are precursors to a militarized society, historically a major instigator of regional instability.

In contrast to the military, the police sector holds greater promise in terms of managing the lower-level insurgent activities, combating organized crime, and engendering a sense of confidence and trust among the population. Not all police forces are uniformly suited for assigned responsibilities, however. This is especially so in Afghanistan, where attempts to police local communities using the Afghan National Police (ANP), auxiliary police, and Afghan National Civil Order Police have completely failed. Through a combination of incompetence, corruption, depredations, and mixed loyalties exhibited by these police forces, local communities have reacted with mistrust and rejection.

One possible solution to this dilemma is for the Coalition to develop community police forces. US Police Mentor Teams (PMT) and European Union Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (POMLT) would be ideal for the creation of community police forces. With the sanction of the local authorities, these teams would recruit, organize, equip, and train community police officers for immediate use. Over time and starting with selected leaders, formal training at the regional training centers and police academy would increase the professionalism of the force. Since these police officers come from and live in the community they serve, they would engender greater trust and confidence among the citizenry.¹⁰ The community police approach is not only better aligned to the needs of the community, it undergirds government legitimacy through the principle of subsidiarity.

The growth of community police forces needs to occur in a permissive environment, so integrating and sequencing of actions are critical to the counterinsurgency strategy. It follows that an effective and cost-efficient counterinsurgency strategy would have the military conduct a number of iterative, limited offensives to clear selected areas in bite-sized chunks. As a planning tool, applying the counterinsurgent-to-population security ratio (20 to 25:1) would determine the number of combat forces involved in a local offensive, predicated on the aggregate number of residents in the area of operation. Once the military clears a specific area, then PMT or POMLT enter assigned villages to establish community police forces, using a standard ratio of 2.5 police officers per 1,000 residents as a planning guide.¹¹ This ratio suggests that 75,000 community police officers are needed to serve and protect 30 million Afghans. It further suggests that smaller ANA (a return to the 80,000 ceiling) and a smaller ANP are sufficient for Afghanistan's national security needs. In this regard, community police backed by ANP stationed in the provincial capitals, local ANA brigades, and provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) are more than a match for insurgents and criminal gangs.

The initial period of community police training is critical; the military forces conducting clearing operations can assist in each population center by taking a census with a corresponding map of the town, establishing a curfew (to prevent the insurgents from operating at night, planting bombs, and issuing threat letters), and setting up checkpoints. While the local communities are being secured, the bulk of the Coalition and ANA forces should conduct counterinsurgency operations in the surrounding areas for the purpose of hunting down fleeing insurgents, uncovering their bases and caches, and providing a quick reaction force.

In Afghanistan, the narcotics trade has to be included in the counterinsurgency strategy. Accordingly, as the military is conducting the clearing operations, counternarcotics teams conduct crop eradication and drug lab destruction with military reserves providing back-up in case farmers, insurgents, or drug lords resist. To promote legal crop cultivation, farmers should be paid for the destruction of poppies based on the market value of an alternative crop and be given appropriate alternative crop seeds for the next growing season. During harvest time, the local provincial reconstruction team in coordination with the ANA and ANP can plan and implement an escort system for farmers bringing their produce to market in order to protect them from criminal and insurgent threats.

Once an area is sufficiently secure, the flow of construction, development, and assistance activities may begin, under the management of the PRT, while the ANA and Coalition forces depart for the next clearing operation. At this point, the PRT assumes the primary mission of managing the hold and build phases. The PRT has tremendous potential for advancing the counterinsurgency strategy:

- Serving as a provincial civil-military operations center for all advisory, assistance, reform, and construction activities (e.g., other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, United Nations Assistance Mission, engineers, and advisers).
- Functioning as the communications center for organizations operating in the province.
- Providing the provincial quick reaction force (i.e., company or platoon) and scheduling security forces in support of various projects.
- Staging supplies in warehouses to support projects as well as respond to natural and manmade disasters.
- Serving as the financial center for police mentors, immediate impact funds, and humanitarian assistance.

In short, the PRT serves as the bridge for the counterinsurgency hold and build phases as well as acting as the clearinghouse for development initiatives within the province. This approach permits the national-level

organizations (i.e., US Agency for International Development, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command) to centralize planning and decentralize implementation programs rather than trying to manage and coordinate everything centrally.

This counterinsurgency paradigm is a measured expansion of security by squeezing out insurgents and criminal gangs with appropriate forces, thereby providing the basis for force levels. The integration of community police, ANP, and ANA in operations permits the Afghans to assume increasing responsibility for the counterinsurgency. As the Afghans demonstrate greater competency in implementing the paradigm, Coalition combat forces can be withdrawn, leaving mentor teams and PRTs to continue assistance. This approach ameliorates the pressure on Coalition governments regarding measurements of success by establishing the ways and means for the Afghan forces to assume greater responsibilities as they mature, and deflating insurgent propaganda regarding foreign occupation.¹² Ironically, a small Coalition contingent provides greater leverage with the host government by diminishing over-dependence and permitting Coalition governments to withdraw forces without suffering political fallout.¹³

Unity of Effort

Unity of effort is perhaps the most sought after and yet elusive principle of any international enterprise. Predictably, as the size of a coalition grows as more international and other actors become involved, unity of effort diminishes. Usually, allies and partners do not argue over strategic goals; rather, ways and means are the most frequent cause of disputes. Different organizational cultures and agendas can contribute to the erection of cooperative barriers. As a possible solution, a Security Sector Reform Council and a reformed provincial reconstruction team concept could serve to increase cooperation and participation in civic action programs.

The comprehensive approach, alliance, coalition, and multinational operations are terms that connote the aspiration to achieve unity of effort in security-related enterprises.¹⁴ Due to the inherent flaws in human nature, achieving full unity of effort is unattainable. Greater attention to organization can ameliorate the myriad problems associated with large bureaucracies working together; yet, this aspect always seems to get short shrift. President Dwight Eisenhower recognized this human reluctance to leverage organization as an indispensable problem-solving tool:

To the adult mind “organization” seems to summon visions of rigidity and machine-like operation, with an inescapable deadly routine and stodginess in human affairs. Yet it is not the enemy of imagination or

of any other attractive human characteristic. Its purpose is to simplify, clarify, expedite, and coordinate; it is the bulwark against chaos, confusion, delay, and failure.¹⁵

Would this hold true for Afghanistan, which is really the test case for the comprehensive approach? With a Coalition consisting of more than 40 nations, mostly operating in 26 PRTs; hundreds of nongovernmental, governmental, international, and private-sector organizations providing assistance; and the dozens of departments and agencies of the Afghan government taking part, integrating these efforts into a cooperative whole is truly daunting. As the largest, wealthiest, and most powerful contributor, the United States might find it tempting assume the entire effort so as to accelerate Afghanistan's transition to a functional state.

A shift to unilateralist action would have pernicious long-term consequences, however. Since World War II, with few exceptions, the United States has preferred United Nations sanction and collective action, because such nations underscore international solidarity and resolve as well as counter the old canard of imperialism. Collective action also underscores the US aspiration of a global community as embodied by the United Nations. Moreover, because NATO placed its prestige on the line in Afghanistan, any impression of failure could have serious consequences to the solidarity of the Alliance. While smaller Coalition partners tend to free-ride and suboptimize contributions to collective action, the overall solidarity of the Coalition serves the higher interest of the United States.

America might embark on a number of initiatives to improve unity of effort. Afghan security forces have to lead the security effort. To paraphrase T. E. Lawrence, it is better to have the Afghans shoulder this responsibility even if done imperfectly.¹⁶ If they are never given the freedom to fail and try again, they are unlikely to fare better when the Coalition withdraws. The aforementioned counterinsurgency approach permits the Afghan military and police to exercise the freedom to fail and try again without suffering a catastrophic collapse. In terms of the national narrative, it is important for Afghans to be the victors, not the Coalition. If the Afghans have no hand in achieving success, then success has no value.

To nourish greater cooperation toward unity of effort, a corporate body at the national level is required. Similar to the Eisenhower Administration's National Security Council, a Security Sector Reform (SSR) Council would create greater integration, formulation, and implementation of policy issues.¹⁷ The essential elements of the SSR Council mechanism are an executive chairman with uncontested authority, a board to integrate and prepare policy issues for consideration, an SSR forum of no more than 15 members to debate policy issues as a corporate body, and an implementation board to assist in policy coordination and

tracking of implementation.¹⁸ The mechanism is specifically designed for large bureaucratic efforts, resulting in mutual education and buy-in of participants, definitive articulation of policy decisions, and a coordinated and coherent body of policies. To be effective, the executive chairman should be someone of substantial executive experience, accustomed to making decisions. Likewise, both board coordinators should have extensive staff experience in order to establish efficient structures, processes, and procedures. Such a mechanism is critical to avoid incoherence, redundancy, and inefficiencies in policy formulation.

Finally, PRTs provide a potent means for allies to contribute to SSR and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Currently, 16 of the 28 PRTs are allied, but the vast majority lack the capacity to achieve much beyond securing themselves and providing some advisers. A NATO PRT conference on force generation might focus on the following requirements: (1) the total number of PRTs needed (e.g., one per province and an additional one per major city); (2) a standardized PRT organizational design; (3) allied force and resource commitments to each PRT; and (4) agreement on roles and missions. Given their civil-military nature and image as a channel for economic development and assistance, PRTs are more politically palatable for contributing governments to support. Accordingly, PRTs should have civilian chiefs as a means of promoting the civic nature of the organization, but to be truly effective, the leaders should possess substantial executive management skills.¹⁹ The essential purpose of the PRT is to provide a structural vehicle for government agencies, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private-sector entities to align and coordinate projects as well as reduce redundancies. Although PRTs have limited capacity to support SSR and counterinsurgency efforts, their main focus should be on development and economic assistance. Lastly, for future endeavors, the PRT descriptor is self-limiting and susceptible to misperceptions by host nations. Consequently, the designator of Civic Fusion Center appears to convey a greater sense of design and purpose.

Conclusion

Counterinsurgencies are protracted conflicts, but they need not be ruinous in terms of blood and treasure. The true test of success is how well the host nation functions after the conflict ends, not necessarily the military defeat of insurgents. Greater attention to a balanced political structure will certainly curb the central government ineptitude and corruption that plague Afghanistan, while simultaneously empowering the extant tribal societies. Although the logic of force ratios has a certain appeal, burdening Afghanistan with an overly large military and national police would be

economically and politically ruinous. It would be a case of killing, rather than curing, the patient.

The counterinsurgency operational paradigm provides commanders with the framework to secure areas with available resources, permitting an integrated, phased approach. Accordingly, the pace of securing a state like Afghanistan depends on the amount of resources (i.e., forces and PRTs) available. With military forces focused on clearing targeted areas, police mentor teams can generate local police units and PRTs can consolidate success with development, construction, and reform programs. Incorporated into a broader strategy, this approach provides a definitive way for the Afghans to take the lead against the insurgency. Failure to achieve unity of effort will continue to plague the effort in Afghanistan. Establishing an SSR council mechanism at the national level is an effective way to integrate the expertise of engaged organizations and produce coherent policies. PRTs in particular are the most effective vehicle for garnering greater contributions from Coalition partners and involved organizations. PRTs are certainly more politically palatable for the Coalition partner governments that desire to support the effort in Afghanistan. The key is to enhance PRTs for the tasks at hand.

It is incumbent upon policymakers to instill greater intellectual rigor on issues involving counterinsurgency and state-building rather than permitting bromides to influence strategy. By lifting the blinders from its eyes, the United States can begin to view future counterinsurgency efforts with a sense of determined optimism rather than the dread of another prolonged, unwinnable struggle.

NOTES

1. Prevalent themes include physical security, law and order, aid, social services, construction, economic development, and political reform (e.g., anti-corruption).

2. I. A. Rigden, "The British Approach to Counterinsurgency: Myths, Realities, and Strategic Challenges," in Harry R. Yarger, ed., *Short of General War: Perspectives on the Use of Military Power in the 21st Century* (Carlisle, Pa.: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 221.

3. James Madison, "The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances between the Different Departments," in Clinton Rossiter, ed., *The Federalist Papers* (New York: Signet Classic, 2003), 319.

4. Subsidiarity is the principle enshrined by the Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution (and Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union), in which responsibility for the resolution of issues is handled at the lowest level possible. This tenet holds that responsibility for action starts with the individual and ascends progressively to the family, community, county/province, state, and lastly the central government.

5. A comprehensive explanation regarding the intent of the Founding Fathers with the US Constitution is provided by W. Cleon Skousen, *The Five Thousand Year Leap: Twenty-Eight Great Ideas that Changed the World* (Franklin, Tenn.: American Documents Publishing, 2009).

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6. Harry R. Yarger provides sound insight regarding the evolution of state legitimacy in *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2008), 62, 75.

7. Bernard B. Fall, *Street without Joy* (Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1964), 17-172; Bernard B. Fall, *Last Reflections on a War: Bernard B. Fall's Last Comments on Vietnam* (Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 2000), 235.

8. For example, if 15,000 insurgents require a counterinsurgency force of 150,000 combat forces (in accordance with the 10:1 ratio), and if combat forces comprise about 20 percent of the total force (a very conservative tooth-to-tail ratio), then the aggregate number of counterinsurgency forces needed comes to 900,000.

9. *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual: U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3-24 : Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5* (Chicago, Ill.: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2007), 23.

10. An excellent description of community policing is in *Understanding Community Policing: A Framework for Action* (Washington: US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, August 1994).

11. The International Association of Chiefs of Police gives a general ratio of 2.5 police per 1,000 residents, though warns the ratio is an inappropriate instrument for staffing decisions. In this sense, the ratio is a historical trend. "Police Officer to Population Ratios, Bureau of Justice Statistics Data," *Research Center Directorate Perspectives*.

12. The principal lesson of Operation Enduring Freedom is the immutable requirement for security of the indigenous population. In hindsight, the rapid demobilization of warlord militias created a security vacuum in the local communities, which was filled by insurgents, gangs, and criminal organizations. There was no question of the necessity to rid Afghanistan of warlord militias. Strategic prudence, however, should have given priority to maintaining militia forces under the tutelage of Special Forces advisers (if possible) and then changing them out with local police at the appropriate time.

13. Host government over-reliance on benefactors is empirical, and Afghanistan is no exception. Benefactors should avoid the situation in which the host government uses failure as a means of extortion. Further, benefactors should avoid tying their prestige to the success of the host government. If the government later falls, insurgents will proclaim it as a defeat of the benefactors.

14. Formal definitions of each are as follows. A "comprehensive approach" integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the US government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private-sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. An "alliance" is a relationship that results from a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. A "coalition" is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. "Multinational operations" is a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken with the structure of a coalition or alliance. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations* (Washington: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2008), Glossary-2, -3, -4, and -7.

15. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace, 1956-1961: The White House Years* (New York: Doubleday, 1965), 630.

16. The actual quote is as follows: "Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is." T. E. Lawrence, "Twenty-seven Articles," *Arab Bulletin*, 20 August 1917, http://telawrence.net/telawrencenet/works/articles_essays/1917_twenty-seven_articles.htm.

17. For an in-depth description of President Eisenhower's National Security Council mechanism, see US Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, *Organizational History of the National Security Council* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), 23-52.

18. For a greater explanation of this mechanism, see Raymond Millen, "Organizing for Success during Transitions," *PKSOI Bulletin*, 2 (April 2010), 6-9.

19. As a balance, the deputy could be the military commander of the assigned battalion.