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Book Reviews

Parameters Editors

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This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters by an authorized editor of USAWC Press.
To categorize David Kilcullen’s resume as impressive would be hopelessly inadequate. He has been an officer in the Australian infantry for 25 years, chief counterterrorism strategist for the US State Department, senior counterinsurgency adviser to General David Petraeus during the 2007 surge, and a participant in the writing of the irregular warfare and counterterrorism sections of the Quadrennial Defense Review in 2005.

His new book, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, consists of five main sections. The first lays out the author’s conceptual framework, including different models for understanding the present Islamist/terrorist situation (for example, “globalization backlash” and “Islamic civil war”). In this context Kilcullen sees the influence of groups such as al Qaeda as a result of globalization, which challenges and indeed threatens traditional societies. The second part largely deals with his personal experiences in Afghanistan during 2006-2008 (in which he observes that no one will ever know if or how the Coalition would have succeeded in Afghanistan because the Iraq conflict drew so much attention away from that earlier effort). The third section focuses on events in Iraq during the 2007 surge. The fourth discusses some other conflicts—East Timor (where the Australians were on the wrong side), Thailand, and Pakistan—looking for similarities and differences with Iraq and Afghanistan. The last section draws out some of the implications of the previous chapters and offers suggestions for how western democracies can more effectively deal with global terrorism.

Kilcullen’s “basic assumption is that insurgency is a mass social phenomenon, that the enemy rides and manipulates a social wave consisting of genuine popular grievances, and that dealing with this broader social and political dynamic while gaining time for targeted reforms to work, by applying a series of tailored, full-spectrum security measures is the most promising path to ultimately resolve the problem.” Thus he aligns himself with the (apparently) dominant view within the US military. But probably the heart of the book is Kilcullen’s identification of “the existence of an accidental guerrilla syndrome, whereby transnational extremists infect an existing societal problem, and then through a process of contagion spread instability and violence into the broader society. This provokes an intervention (from the national government or the international community) which then alienates traditional societies, causing them to close ranks and to lash out in an immune rejection response that exacerbates violence, alienates social groups from the government and from each other, and further strengthens the hand of extremists.” In effect, “accidental guerrillas” are fighting against outside intervention (however “outside” is defined) rather than in favor of some Islamic extremist ideology. One needs to handle this idea carefully. Most insurgencies have actually been
civil wars, as in the Philippines, Malaya, French Algeria, French Vietnam, Portuguese Africa, and Northern Ireland, as well as Iraq and Afghanistan.

Kilcullen cites a new term, hybrid warfare, essentially a combination of guerrilla warfare and terrorism. To counter this supposedly new type, the counter-insurgent state and its allies need to build up its military and economic capacities while dealing with insurgency, terrorism, and civil war. But these elements were all present in Vietnam (both French and South) and in Greece and the Philippines after 1945. Indeed, protracted conflicts that combined insurgency and terrorism received central coordination and assistance from outside the target country. These conflicts provoked international cooperation and often intervention, which characterized almost the entire Cold War. Recall, for instance, that during the late 1940s, Communist or Communist-influenced insurgencies raged simultaneously in the Philippines, China, Greece, Indonesia, Malaya, and Vietnam, among other places, all paying more than mere lip service to a universalistic ideology that aspired to the forcible imposition of a new world order.

Kilcullen does not analyze those conflicts. These and other omissions call attention to the fact that the reference section of his book presents very few quotations from or even citations of the counterinsurgency literature of the past 50 years, a position paradoxical but not unusual for a counterinsurgency adviser to the United States government. The author clearly understands the value of comparative analysis, but the cases he uses to support his general argument are drawn from the same recent time period, and are ones with which he has been personally involved, conditions that can limit the value of analysis. What Kilcullen wants to see done in Iraq and Afghanistan was in fact done by the United States in Greece, the Philippines, and El Salvador; these cases, however, are not analyzed or even mentioned.

In spite of this reluctance to identify or criticize much of the work that has gone before, Kilcullen nevertheless develops a number of prescriptions that are in accord with the prevailing literature. He insists that counterinsurgents need to display “virtue, moral authority, and credibility” (what some other authors have called “rectitude”). Among his other principal conclusions are that “a low-profile civilian presence will always [surely not always?] be preferable to a military presence, and where a military presence is essential it should be as stealthy and unobtrusive as possible;” that “wherever possible our interests will be best served by working with, and through, a local partner;” that “political reform and development is the hard core of any counterinsurgency strategy;” and most fundamentally, that “effective counterinsurgency provides human security to the population, where they live, 24 hours a day. This, not destroying the enemy, is the central task.” Amen to all these.

Thus, the relative narrowness of his comparative method notwithstanding, Kilcullen’s powerful intelligence, common sense, broad experience, patent sincerity, and clear writing have all combined to produce a book that deserves to be read by anybody with a serious concern about the nature of the conflicts looming in the years ahead.

Two diametrically opposing interpretations of our nation’s founding exist. One presents the United States as especially ordained and favored by Providence, destined to be a beacon to the world. The other regards the Founding Fathers’ handiwork as a noble but precarious experiment in republican self-government. The Founders themselves were conflicted. They simultaneously exalted over the possibilities, as reflected in the motto they chose for the Great Seal of the United States, Novus Ordo Seclorum “New Order of the Ages,” yet were all too aware from their study of history that decay and destruction had been the ultimate fate of republics everywhere.

Gordon Wood brilliantly captures this sense of uncertainty, opportunity, and peril in Empire of Liberty, his sweeping study of the early national period from the Constitution’s adoption to the conclusion of the War of 1812. This volume examines the emergence of a distinctive American political culture, illuminating not only institutions but also ideas about the conduct of political, economic, and cultural life. It treats the forging of the Constitution, the rise of political parties, the expansion of democracy, and the establishment of the fundamental tenets of American foreign policy. As Wood makes clear, this activity occurred against a backdrop of astonishing demographic, territorial, and economic expansion at home and a titanic global contest abroad between France and Great Britain that threatened to engulf the nascent American republic. Wood’s theme is that by 1815, “the central impulses of the Revolution had run their course” and that Americans had transformed the way they viewed themselves and the larger world.

Wood teases out ironies and unexpected developments everywhere. The founding generation adhered to an ideology known as republicanism. Its essence was a fierce devotion to liberty and equality, which were constantly menaced by both tyranny and its opposite, anarchy. All that stood between the people and these dangers was their public virtue, understood by the Founders to include citizens’ selfless willingness “to sacrifice their private desires for the sake of the public good.” But, as the country grew increasingly commercial, Americans became more individualistic. In other words, liberty and equality proved in practice to be at odds not only with each other, but with republican virtue itself. A further complication arose. The Founders loathed the idea of parties or “factions” as contrary to virtue. Yet less than a decade after ratifying the Constitution, the United States had a roiling two-party system, with each claiming to be the true defenders of republicanism: Alexander Hamilton’s Federalists supporting power against anarchy, and Thomas Jefferson’s Republicans opposing it as an instrument of tyranny.

Wood explains how this dynamic happened through shrewd portraits of remarkable figures and arresting insight. Although not an intellectual like Hamilton or Jefferson, George Washington “always understood power and how to use it.” Historians routinely contrast the two great rivals, but for succinctness, nothing matches Wood’s opening to his chapter on westward expansion: “Hamilton always faced east, toward Europe . . . . Jefferson faced west, toward the trans-Appalachian territory and even the lands beyond the Mississippi.”
The book’s most absorbing chapters cover the late 1790s, which, along with the
decade prior to the Civil War, “were the most politically contentious” years in American
history. The source of discord was the conflict between France and England. Although
almost everyone agreed in principle that the United States should remain neutral, pro-
dfound disagreement existed over specific policies. A poisonous atmosphere transformed
“quarrels over policy into contests over basic principles,” and invariably led to charges
of treason and conspiracy on both sides. The fever broke only when President John
Adams courageously defied his Federalist colleagues to negotiate an end to a naval
“quasi-war” with France, and the Jeffersonian Republicans swept into office with the
election of 1800.

Wood concludes with the War of 1812, a contest he labels “the strangest war
in American history.” The United States, under the Republican leadership of James
Madison, ostensibly entered the war to end British depredations on America ship-
ping. Yet New England, the portion of the country most invested in maritime rights,
resolutely opposed the war. The Republicans prosecuted the war in republican fashion,
without raising taxes or fielding a professional military, both anathemas to their vision
of small, weak government. As a result, American forces were largely routed on land
and, despite a brave showing by a handful of frigates in single-ship combat, the Royal
Navy commanded our shores as well. Yet, Great Britain grew weary of the backwa-
ter struggle and signed a peace on Christmas Eve 1814. While the British conceded
nothing on maritime rights, the agreement, coupled with Andrew Jackson’s one-sided
victory at New Orleans two weeks later, convinced most Americans that they had won
a “second war of independence.”

By 1815, Americans could turn their backs on Europe and look “westward
across their own expansive continent.” Much had changed in a generation. “Anyone
aged 40 or older born in America had once been . . . a subject of His Majesty George III.”
Anyone younger born on these shores had entered the world as an American citizen,
and 85 percent of the population was under 40. The terms “democrat” and “democracy”
were no longer epithets, as they had been in 1789. An American national character was
taking shape. Yet there was a serpent in the garden. For, as Wood concludes in his mag-
isterial work, while the Founders had “created a Union devoted to liberty,” it “contained
an inner flaw that would nearly prove to be its undoing.” Not until the dark shadow
of slavery was lifted could the new nation achieve its promise. The great republican
experiment was not over and faced further tests.

**Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs.** By Vanda
es. $28.95. **Reviewed by Dr. Paul Rexton Kan,** author of *Drugs and
Contemporary Warfare* and Associate Professor of National Security
Studies, US Army War College.

Merely because counterinsurgency and counternarcotics share a common
prefix and often occur in the same theater does not mean that they are mutually reinforcing
operations. This truism is the essence of *Shooting Up,* a solid contribution to the
growing body of literature on the nexus between illicit economies and violent conflict.
Using a “political capital” model, the book explains the complexity of conducting a
counterinsurgency in an atmosphere of widespread illicit activities perpetrated by insurgent groups. Through rigorous field work and exhaustive research, Vanda Felbab-Brown argues that many counternarcotics approaches used through the years have actually strengthened the dynamics of insurgencies. Thus, a paradox is generated; counterinsurgency undermines the war on drugs while the war on drugs bolsters insurgent groups. It is a paradox that few embattled governments have been able to resolve.

The first chapter lays out the case for a new understanding of this paradox beyond the narrow and clichéd concept of “narcoterrorism.” This conventional approach seeks to undermine narcotics-funded insurgents by attacking their funding streams, primarily through coercive crop eradication schemes launched by governments. As the author argues, such an approach actually strengthens insurgent groups who are able to protect the livelihoods of those who are involved in cultivating illegal crops. By doing so, insurgent groups gain political capital.

The following chapter details how insurgent groups can gain political capital from the population when four mediating conditions are present in a country: the poor state of the legal economy; a labor-intensive illicit economy; the presence of thuggish traffickers; and a harsh government response to the illicit economy. These conditions can help an insurgent group improve its physical resources, freedom of action, legitimacy, and popular support.

Such conditions have existed in Peru, Colombia, and Afghanistan, and are the case studies detailed in chapters 3, 4, and 5 respectively. These chapters form the heart of the book and demonstrate the utility of the political capital model in assessing the evolution of Sendero Luminoso, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the Taliban. It is within these chapters that the author’s field work and research shine through. Interviews and key studies are integrated to give each chapter a rich context enhancing the understanding of how the emergence of insurgent groups as key players in international narcotics trafficking made them lethal threats to the stability of their countries.

That criminal capital has been translated into political capital in these cases is beyond dispute. In these chapters the author fails to acknowledge, however, that this is not a unidirectional relationship. An increasing yield of political capital for an insurgent group does not necessarily occur everytime a drug harvest is challenged by the government. In fact, overreliance on participation in criminal schemes by insurgent groups can distort political objectives, leading to internal splits and factionalism. Members of various groups who profit from drug activities often place more importance on assuring monetary gain than the advancement of strategic goals. This prioritization was especially true in the case of Sendero Luminoso where the national leadership attempted to reassert command and control of (without alienating) its branch in the Upper Hualaga Valley, a branch that was flush with coca profits. Among members of drug-funded insurgent groups, banditry has been known to undermine political capital.

In the final chapter, Felbab-Brown demonstrates how, for governments, the paradox of counterinsurgency and counternarcotics manifests itself as a dilemma. How should governments respond to drug-funded insurgent groups without strengthening them and without permitting them to continue their criminal activities? The author argues that governments can forgo forcible eradication and focus on the provision of
security. Governments may choose interdiction or licensing as policy options that do not play into the hands of the insurgents. But the success of these approaches occurred in unique cases in unique times. If the FARC were defeated, it is unclear how the licensing of cocaine production, on such a scale that could be as profitable as it is for farmers now, would not spark a popular uprising that may lead to the generation of another insurgency. A “coca rebellion” might quickly ensue.

The novel use of the political capital model is a valuable contribution, but it becomes strained as the book unfolds. Each case study appears self-contained, although the conflicts themselves are not. Political capital is also gained, much like contemporary financial capital, through substantial transnational linkages. Broader global patterns of drug trafficking and war are increasingly interrelated and dialectic in many cases, including those covered in this book. For example, cocaine produced by the FARC transits a number of unstable West African countries on its way to the burgeoning European market; this trade path demonstrates the multicontinental dimensions of crime and insurgency. Peace in Colombia may well rest with state strength in nations such as Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone, while stability in the West African region may depend on successful counterdrug policies in the Andes. None of this substantially detracts from a book that will be of great benefit to scholars, policy-makers, and military officers who routinely confront the paradox of illicit drug trafficking and intrastate conflict.


In Allies Against the Rising Sun, Nicholas Sarantakes fills a major gap in the study of the Pacific theater in World War II with a presentation of British and Commonwealth actions in the war. Most Pacific War studies concentrate on the American or Japanese perspective. Authors tend to forget that British and Commonwealth forces fought in the theater, too. British forces were engaged in Burma, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Singapore, but not with their American allies in the Southwest and Central Pacific.

Little is written about the period before the end of the war that involved British and Commonwealth actions. By this point in the conflict American military forces had advanced throughout the Pacific in the final effort and were on Japan’s doorstep. They had conducted major actions to defeat Tokyo. By 1945, Britain and the Commonwealth nations had expended their military manpower and wealth through heavy engagements in Europe and the Mediterranean. A question that has challenged historians is why did London agree to participate in an invasion of Japan during the closing days of the war? Was the rationale based on helping an ally, satisfying a previous agreement, or post-war considerations? Britain also pressed Australia, New Zealand, and Canada to consider and eventually agree to play a role in these operations. One needs to remember that all these nations were facing demands at home to demobilize their armed forces and return to peace. Although the United States appeared to have reached its limit on providing additional forces, a number of military and civilian leaders believed that it was not necessary to seek help from Britain in the final push to conquer Japan. Many felt that
American military forces were capable of executing operations to end the war without their British allies.

Sarantakes provides a comprehensive review of the rational arguments, issues, and decisions that incorporated the British and Commonwealth nations in the final phases of the war. These plans include naval forces, bombing of the Japanese mainland, and the invasion of Honshu. The author provides an interesting discussion of the friction between Prime Minister Winston Churchill and his Chiefs of Staff (COS) related to proposed British strategy to end the war. Churchill supported opening a front capable of moving north from Sunatra with the goal of liberating Singapore. His COS recommended integrating British forces with the Americans in an effort to end the conflict faster. The author provides rich insight into the motivations and concerns of each. For example, Churchill’s COS became so frustrated with the Prime Minister’s arguments that he considered resigning in protest.

The Commonwealth nation’s position and outlook also differed from London’s rationale to enter the war’s closing stages. Instead of trying to regain colonies, as Churchill desired, these nations planned individual courses of action based on their physical location in the Pacific. The motivating factor being the belief that any nation not taking part in Japan’s defeat would have a difficult time securing a role in any decisions regarding the post-war settlement of the region. Australia was already supporting efforts in the Southwest Pacific under General Douglas MacArthur. New Zealand was also extremely concerned about its future security in the Pacific even though many Kiwis had served in the Mediterranean, North Africa, and Italy. Canadians also viewed themselves as a Pacific power. Ottawa desired to maintain good relations with its neighbor, the United States.

Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and later Harry Truman were agreeable to British and Commonwealth forces entering into efforts to end the war with Japan. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, were not united in supporting such a plan. Concerns regarding logistics, basing, doctrine, and operational matters influenced any agreement on how to use these forces. Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations, continually tried to derail the efforts. His actions make interesting reading with respect to organizational and personal arguments against such a strategy.

Still, the British and Commonwealth forces did participate in the closing months of the Pacific War. The British Fleet participated in the Okinawa campaign and suffered significant causalities from kamikaze attacks. The atomic bomb made the Commonwealth Corps’s planned amphibious invasion of the mainland of Japan obsolete. Similarly, the Royal Air Force and other Commonwealth air forces arrived too late to provide any significant bombing attacks.

Overall, the book is well worth reading. It provides a clear portrait of a little known part of World War II history that is seldom discussed. Sarantakes’s account also illustrates how politics, personal agendas, and alliances can be incorporated in an effort to develop a culminating strategy. This book has many fascinating insights and anecdotes related to key personalities. Numerous lessons from this period are applicable to today’s strategic environments, especially those concerning the development of strategy. Fortunately, through the authors superb recounting of events, these lessons come alive for the reader.
Red Cloud at Dawn: Truman, Stalin, and the End of the Atomic Monopoly.

This is a very well-researched and well-written book, replete with interesting details, and it will be must reading for anyone interested in the years of the American nuclear monopoly. But a major criticism of the book would have to be the working premise of the author, which emerges as his conclusion but seems to have already persuaded him even as he began to sort the interesting evidence, that some great opportunity was missed for heading off the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The author repeatedly characterizes the American decisions on trying to maintain a nuclear monopoly, and on watching for signs of Soviet nuclear progress, as some kind of subjective and mistaken “reactions” and “interpretations,” giving very little attention to the possibility that the objective situation might have made distrust of Josef Stalin’s Soviet Union inevitable. When Americans overestimate the length of time that it will take the Soviets to make the atomic bomb, this gets characterized as “cocky,” while when the time is underestimated, this is portrayed as “suspicious.” Given what we now know about Stalin’s Soviet Union, and what we knew even then, might it not be that the objective situation dictated that the monopoly not be surrendered any earlier than it had to be?

Gordin seems to believe that an early sharing of information on how to produce nuclear weapons, as had been advocated by Manhattan Project physicist Niels Bohr, would have reassured and relaxed the Soviets, but (seemingly countering this) he presents fascinating accounts of the suspicions with which Stalin and Lavrenty Beria, director of secret police, distrusted even the data that their own espionage agents inside the Manhattan Project were conveying, fearing that it was disinformation. If the Soviets distrusted their own spies to this degree, how much would they have trusted a more open offer of data from the Truman Administration? Such distrust of others is characteristic of dictatorships, and it is matched by tendencies to treachery.

To be fair, the author does not ignore how odious a domestic system the Soviet Union was in these years, noting that Soviet nuclear scientists might indeed have faced imprisonment or execution if their nuclear efforts failed. The account of the pace of the Soviet nuclear program does not delve into a very different alternative history. What if America and Britain had accepted at face value the signals that Werner Heisenberg may have tried to transmit via Bohr, that there was not any real German nuclear weapons program that the Manhattan Project had to preempt? If Stalin’s spies had told him that the western Allies were abstaining from developing atomic weaponry because the Germans were abstaining, would he have done likewise, or would he have told his nuclear scientists to get moving even faster?

Gordin, while noting in passing that Stalin himself was fearful of an American preemptive attack, assigns very few pages to the possibility that anyone in the West during the years of the nuclear monopoly would have entertained thoughts of a preventive war to head off Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons. One finds references to General Leslie Groves, whose depiction in this book comes across as somewhat of a
caricature, but none to Major General Orvil Anderson, who as Commandant of the Air War College in these years had regularly been giving and sponsoring lectures on the option of a preventive war. One also finds no reference to Winston Churchill’s several speeches suggesting such action while the monopoly was in place. On a not-so-trivial factual point, the author states that the Soviet nuclear detonation detected in 1949 used up the only Soviet atomic bomb, but this claim contradicts some other accounts of the process, which state that Stalin felt he needed to have at least one other bomb in reserve, in case he were confronted with an American ultimatum following the test.

To repeat, the historical and factual account of the Soviet nuclear program in this book is very rich in interesting detail and well presented, as is the American effort to assay this program, and the steps taken to detect any progress it was making. The book offers evidence for both sides of the debate on whether the surprisingly rapid Soviet acquisition of the bomb was due to Russian ingenuity or espionage. The Smyth Report, which many today would characterize as having told the world a bit too much about the way American nuclear weapons had been produced, is interestingly discussed, along with the debates at the time regarding the likely availability around the globe of uranium, the crucial ingredient for such weapons.

For anyone advocating a move to “global zero” in nuclear weapons today, the account of mutual suspicion and conflicting national ambitions presented in Red Cloud at Dawn would indeed be a very cautionary tale.


Stephen L. Melton in The Clausewitz Delusion offers a useful reminder that although knowledge of history is essential for military professionals, that knowledge must be broad and comprehensive rather than selective. Thus, Mr. Melton argues that the US Army failed in Iraq and Afghanistan because it drew from its Cold War experience a defensive mentality while forgetting its World War II experience concerning the character of offensive wars and the need for military governance in their aftermath. As a consequence of its narrowly historical focus, the Army did not have the doctrine, force structure, or training programs necessary to execute an offensive war with its associated mission of military governance. From this promising starting point the remainder of the book is disappointing for several reasons.

First, from the introduction the reader expects that because the author has identified critical shortcomings of the Army in terms of doctrine, force structure, and training, the rest of the book will provide an elaboration of what these elements should look like to prosecute an offensive war successfully. Yet nowhere in the book is such a blueprint provided. Rather, the author makes general criticisms suggesting, for instance, that the Army is too tradition bound and backward looking. Contradictorily, he also chastises the Army for abandoning the pragmatism and engineering approaches that characterized it during the Progressive Era and World War II. How can an institution simultaneously be backward looking and abandon earlier approaches? To be sure, Chapter 10, “Organizing for Military Governance,” seems to be an appropriate place
for a discussion of specific changes needed. The chapter is thin on specifics, however, beyond suggesting that the State Department is inadequate for the task of governance and the Army should be made to train and organize for the task.

Instead of detailing how the US Army could improve its performance, the author devotes much space to characterizing offensive war and distinguishing it from defensive war. According to Melton, offensive wars have an end-state different from defensive war, with the first goal to create a permanent ally, then provide for popular government, and then to reform the society along American lines. While developing precise terminology can be a useful exercise, in this case the author undermines his effort by making inconsistent assertions that virtually shift his thesis later in the book. Thus, while the first six chapters seem to recognize the need for offensive war and military occupation which requires the previously noted changes in the US Army, later chapters highlight why such wars are not feasible. For example, Melton devotes a chapter to a discussion of why some obvious rivals to the United States, such as Iran, are not feasible candidates for offensive war and occupation. He also spends one chapter explaining why offensive wars of occupation run against the grain of US tradition and political culture. Finally, he makes statements about offensive wars that are inconsistent and incompatible. After establishing the need for offensive war and postwar military governance Melton then observes, “Rather, it is our offensive military doctrine that has failed us. We simply cannot, as we once could, manage to impose new governance on nations far weaker than us.”

A second problem with the book is that the author was too ambitious in his attempt to cover so many subjects and so much material that both he and the reader lose the thread of his initial thesis. In fact, his over ambition to include everything may also account for the fact that his thesis seems to shift throughout the book. Related to this problem is the fact that he uses empirical support from cases that do not provide evidence to support his thesis. For example, in Chapter Three, which carries as its title “American Military Legacy through World War II: Case Studies in Successful Offensive War,” Melton includes a discussion of England’s offensive failure in the American Revolution and goes on to note that from the standpoint of the United States the war was defensive. Given the chapter title, the reader is left wondering why the case was included at all. Similarly, an entire chapter is devoted to the Balkan Wars without clearly linking that case to the book’s initial thesis. The reader comes away thinking that empirical support is added more to demonstrate the author’s knowledge of cases than to provide evidence to support any thesis.

Finally, because the book is deeply flawed, it reads more as a series of independent essays rather than a coherent whole. The shifting thesis and problematic use of cases are part of the problem. It seems as though the author started out with his idea about the inadequacy of the Army as indicated by events in Iraq and Afghanistan, then as he proceeded to write came to the conclusion that such missions are not feasible to begin with. At one point Melton actually says that efforts to govern Afghanistan are foolhardy. In short, the book reads as a harsh critique of the Army, yet given all the disconnects in Melton’s analysis, one wonders why the US Army would seriously consider reform of its doctrine, force structure, or training to prepare for missions that the author asserts to be undoable.

In 1976, historian and theorist Edward Luttwak published The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire. It was original and provocative and caused a stir in the historical community. Debate ranged from whether the Romans really had a grand strategy to whether Luttwak’s characterization of it was accurate. Luttwak has now released the companion piece to complete his study of Roman strategy. The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire attempts to explain why the eastern empire lasted a thousand years longer than its western counterpart. Not surprisingly, Luttwak finds the reason in the grand strategy the Byzantines pursued.

Luttwak defines grand strategy as “. . . simply the level at which knowledge and persuasion, or in modern terms intelligence and diplomacy, interact with military strength to determine outcomes in a world of other states, with their own ‘grand strategies.’” All states have grand strategies even though they may not be written or acknowledged. Luttwak recognizes that the Byzantines did not understand or practice strategy as we do today, but he contends they consistently behaved in line with a recognizable strategy that developed over time. It included some traditionally Roman practices—such as paying bribes measured in tons of gold to powerful enemies rather than suffering the devastation and expense of fighting them—it also introduced peculiarly Byzantine elements based on specific circumstances. One inheritance from the western empire that made paying bribes possible was an efficient tax system that could consistently generate significant state wealth as long as the empire retained the critical revenue and manpower producing region of Anatolia. It also permitted the Byzantines to field and support another traditional Roman institution: the trained professional army that became the soul of the Byzantine military policy.

According to Luttwak, the Byzantines fundamentally altered the relationship among the three elements he believes comprise grand strategy. Instead of intelligence and diplomacy supporting military power as was the Roman model, the Byzantines emphasized diplomacy and supported it with intelligence and military power (although military power was always the indispensable element). Thus, the Byzantines were likely to try to dissuade, deter, deflect, or convert enemies, recruit allies, or encourage enemies to fight one another rather than to fight them. He argues that by using this scheme the Byzantines were consistently able to generate disproportionate advantage through a judicious mix of the traditional elements of power. That was a good thing, since the Byzantine strategic environment presented significant challenges. The eastern empire never possessed the strategic depth of its western counterpart. Because they had extensive European holdings, the Byzantines had to deal with most of the major enemies the West had faced—Goths, Huns, Alans, etc.—but they also faced Russian and Central Asian groups that arrived after the demise of the western empire—people like the Rus, Alars, Pecheneges, Bulgars, and Magyars. Because the Byzantines inherited the Anatolian, Middle Eastern, and Egyptian territories of the original Roman Empire, they also inherited a different set of implacable enemies—Persians, Muslim-Arabs, and Turks. The mounted horse archers that increasingly became the primary threat both
from the steppes and from the Persians and later Muslim-Arabs required very special military counter-capabilities.

The Byzantines tended to follow what Luttwak calls an “operational code” embodying the grand strategic tendencies of the empire. The code began by assuming war should be avoided if at all possible, but one should always act as if it were imminent. The code required excellent intelligence as the basis of planning. It was founded on the understanding that total victory was either impossible or undesirable. If one happened to eliminate an enemy there was always another right behind him waiting to take his place, and today’s enemy might be tomorrow’s ally based on the logic of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Thus, it was better to manage some strategic problems than expend huge resources trying to resolve them. At the operational and tactical levels, that approach translated into a doctrine that avoided major battle unless there was a near certainty of victory.

*The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire* has some problems. Technically, it is grossly under-indexed and not as well proofed as one would expect from a major press. The system of transliteration is unclear; we get multiple possible forms of some words and none of others. Luttwak seems to favor the Greek forms of most names, but that is not universal. The organization is topical covering diplomacy and then military subjects, which makes sustaining the historical story line difficult; the reader can become disoriented, particularly when trying to understand the vast expanse of history entailing the Byzantine Empire. The military analysis is largely based on Byzantine texts. There are more than 150 pages of summary of Byzantine military writing; it is a good synopsis, but adds little if one has read George T. Dennis’s translations of *Three Byzantine Military Treatises* or his *Maurice’s Strategikon*, John Haldon’s translation of *Constantine Porphyrogenitus: Three Treatises on Imperial Military Expeditions*, or Eric McGeer’s *Sowing the Dragon’s Teeth*.

What is missing is as puzzling as what is in the book. There is almost no discussion of the organization of the empire or the theme system, certainly an important aspect of grand strategy. Except for an occasional mention of the Fourth Crusade, which resulted in the sack of Constantinople and is thus impossible to ignore in Byzantine history, there is little mention of the Crusades as either a strategic problem or an opportunity. Similarly, Luttwak makes a point that taxation was a key component of Byzantine success, yet there is little discussion of how it worked. Finally, Luttwak does not really take up the issue of why the Byzantine grand strategy ultimately failed.

Where this book does not have issues is in the fundamentals of scholarship. Luttwak has been meticulous and thorough in his research. He presents exceptionally clear descriptions of arcane and complex subjects despite wandering off on tangents—such as the page on the siege of Syracuse in the Second Punic War. While he has a tendency to insert too many often cynical side comments, Luttwak is a good storyteller. The strategist would benefit from reading the first section (“The Invention of Byzantine Strategy”) and the conclusion (“Grand Strategy and the Byzantine ‘Operational Code’”). Those interested in Byzantine history will like the entire book, but this is not a work a novice should undertake in an attempt to understand Byzantium.
Mary Favret has written a book highlighting the people those who follow the profession of arms typically would rather not think about: the stay-at-homes, writers who take as the subject of their fascinated incomprehension the actions of what Teddy Roosevelt called “the man in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood.” Or if the men in the arena do think of those onlookers who write poetry describing a war they are not fighting in, they tend to figure as objects of scorn. Why aren’t they present in the heat of battle, as befits real men?

Favret’s subject is how far-off wars are both subject and, to a degree, even form for the Romantic poetry written by stay-at-homes. She opens with William Cowper musing on the fact (in “The Winter Evening”) that “the sound of war has lost its terrors ere it reaches” him, and then going on to contrast the gale outside with the cozy stillness within. This image of a poet happy with the coziness within, but using the thoughts of faraway carnage to silhouette and so give substance to this domestic quiet, is central to the book.

Romanticism was the expression of the marginalized, and the musing perspective of the lyrical “I” the very opposite of the “let’s do it!” of the “man of action.” Yet apparently the marginalized, those who think or write, are fascinated with the men of action, then as now. It is this frisson of distanced interest that Favret traces through nineteenth-century writing, including poems by Wordsworth and Coleridge, among others, as well as Jane Austen’s novel *Persuasion*.

The man in the arena can understand that people would want to write about him (what he does not want, as Roosevelt makes clear, is criticism). This conceit can be forgiven of women (in the nineteenth century not part of the armed forces), the old, or infirm. But typically he does not forgive the young, able-bodied male for writing from a distance rather than participating up close. Male poets of the early Romantic period understood that men of action despised them. This consciousness of their own apparent bloodlessness comes out in poets such as Shelley as both agonized admission and badge of honor, and contributed to the later push-back against men of action by Baudelaire and the decadents.

But the man in the arena should pay attention to the point of view of the stay-at-home. One of Favret’s most effective chapters describes visual versions of this peaceful evocation of far-off tumult. She reproduces Roger Fenton’s well-known “Valley of Death” photograph of Crimean cannonballs that have rolled down a gulley like stones to make a line that recedes with the valley into a distance, as well as a placid nineteenth-century view of embattled areas of India. To the cursory glance, these are scenes of peace; only when we think about what they imply or know something about history do they seem creepy but fascinating.

This sense is one Favret identifies as the Romantic “sublime,” which was always evoked most strongly when tumult was overlaid with apparent peace—as, for example, the Byronic perception of the deceptively calm sea or of the silent but majestic
Alps. It is the feeling we get when standing on the Plain of Marathon, or looking at the beaches at Normandy, or visiting the Somme, once so violent, now so peaceful.

This sense of distant thunder is the way people with more sedentary lives are going to see the chaos of battle. For the man in the arena, it is a false perspective. But in fact, the man in the arena has no better alternative to offer. As Tim O’Brien and other modern writers on war have pointed out, there may be no “there there” with respect to war. Nobody, certainly not those involved in it, who see only intense fragments and never the whole picture, has an objective or correct view of war.

Favret’s book is largely readable, and the academic jargon is kept to a minimum (though sentences sometimes go on and on). To be sure, the now-tired scholarly mantras of the 1990s (she tells us she spent a decade writing this book) are once again evoked, especially the conviction that what appears to be one thing is actually its opposite. This overused perception is central to the thought of Derrida and Foucault, and here it is used to suggest that the boring at-home experience of the Romantic poets is actually fraught with the faraway violence to which common sense would suggest is an alternative.

But such lapses aside, this book is something those in the military would do well to meditate on: What does war look like to those not in it? Since there are more people not in wars than in them (and it is for them the war is ostensibly fought), perhaps their perspective merits consideration.


Through the ages religion has been used for political gains. Today is no different. In The Sunni-Shia Conflict Nathan Gonzalez, Truman National Security Project Fellow and author of Engaging Iran, attempts to remove religion from of what he argues is an essentially political struggle for power in the Middle East. Iraq, according to Mr. Gonzalez, is the nexus of this political struggle between nations who are using that state as a “battleground for proxy conflicts they dare not launch on a level of total war.” This insightful examination of an issue at the crux of many of the issues facing the United States today, especially as we consider continued involvement in Iraq, is certainly of value to strategic leaders in both the civilian and defense communities.

Central to Gonzalez’s argument is what he refers to as the three catalysts: charismatic leaders, a breakdown in state authority, and geopolitical battles. After a brief discussion of the basic tenets of Islam in the Prologue he spends the first chapter outlining these catalysts. The author then builds the argument that through the centuries Iraq has been at the center of each of these catalysts and therefore must be seen as key to stability in the Middle East. In the second chapter Gonzalez examines the long and storied history of the Middle East, particularly the development of monotheistic religions in Anatolia (Judaism), the Roman Empire (Christianity), and in Iran (Zoroastrianism). These empires were defined by their acceptance of a singular religion and could therefore distinguish themselves from other empires, frequently exploiting that difference in order to gain territory and power.
Gonzalez thereafter introduces the reader to the birth of the Islamic religion and the rupture that occurred shortly. This scism between the party of Ali, or Shia, and the party of Uthman, later known as Sunni, was a defining moment for Islam and set the stage for generations of conflict. The impetus for this divide was the death of the third caliph, Uthman, whose political decisions were not amenable to all of the followers of Islam. “The death of Uthman marked the hardening of two camps in early Islam—a polarization of tribal and political affiliation, but not yet representing a religious divide.” The author makes clear Iraq’s central role in the continuing divide between Shia and Sunni. Saddam Hussein’s removal allowed Muqtada al-Sadr to call for the renewal of the pilgrimages to Karbala to commemorate the death of the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson in 680 A.D., an event that had not occurred in decades.

The middle chapters offer a succinct description of two divisions; the first between those Muslims who believed in the succession of the Prophet and those who followed Ali, and the second between great nations as they adopted these narratives to suit their political goals. Central to this second, greater divide was Iraq as the eastern nations of the Middle East, primarily Sunni, were in conflict with their western, Shia neighbors. Gonzalez argues that since the tenth century the competition for regional power between the Fatamids and the Seljuks is equivalent to today’s continuing competition between the Arab states and Persian Iran, with the religious narrative changed little. While it can be argued that covering 1,000 years of intricate history in one chapter is not possible, the power in that particular chapter, and indeed throughout the book, is the continued focus on Iraq’s central role and the author’s analysis of the effects of his three catalysts.

In order for the reader to accept his argument, Gonzalez dedicates Chapter Six to bringing the imagined land of Iraq to life. Starting with the British occupation and ending with Saddam’s era, he examines all the important players, in particular the great Shia families (Sadr and Hakim) that since 2003, have become familiar to many in the United States. But the author does not contend that the current situation in Iraq has not been replicated in the region previously, and returns to where the book opened, Lebanon. It is here that Gonzalez describes the sectarian conflicts that have torn that nation apart over in the past decades. The final two chapters return to the book’s main character, Iraq. Of most interest to defense policy-makers is the review of the charismatic leaders who fought for power in the new Iraq: the Badr Organization, the Sadrists, Sunni insurgents, al Qaeda, and the Iranian security services. The nature of these contenders, argues Gonzalez, is central to his focus on the three catalysts. While the US surge clearly resulted in decreased levels of violence, the author questions if these gains are sustainable given the realities of Iraq’s location and the geopolitical forces that have influenced it for generations. In particular, the continued struggle between the Persian, Shia Iranians, and the Sunni Arab states.

Gonzalez claims his book is for the general public, and admittedly, there may be times when a more experienced Middle East student may feel the book is not rich enough. At its heart, however, The Sunni-Shia Conflict holds a powerful message for senior members of the defense community. While the reader may be taken on a wide-ranging tour of the history of Islamic political development, the author always leads you back to Iraq, reinforcing his central argument that it is the nation that has been
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and will be the center of gravity in the Middle East. As long as there are those in our
community who cannot communicate intelligently regarding the differences between
Shia and Sunni Islam, there is clearly a need for a book such as this one.

Valley of Death: The Tragedy at Dien Bien Phu That Led America into the
$35.00. Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Wayne A. Silkett, former
instructor in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations
and Department of Distance Education, US Army War College.

How and why the United States got involved in Southeast Asia in general and
Vietnam in particular is only one of several stages of post-World War II action and
intrigue in Indo-China magnificently detailed in Ted Morgan’s Valley of Death. Partly
about the epic 1954 French Vietminh battle of Dien Bien Phu, the book is also the history
of the decline of one great power, the rise of China in the aftermath of its civil war, the
success of a war of national liberation, and the subsequent replacement of French influ-
ence in Southeast Asia by America. Morgan addresses one of the pivotal issues of the
last 60 years: How did the United States, once a visceral opponent of the continuation
of British and French colonialism, get so involved in Southeast Asia with the resulting
predictable consequences?

Valley of Death begins with Franklin D. Roosevelt’s outspoken opposition
to British and French expectations to recover their empires following the defeat of
Germany and Japan. Unfortunately, this philosophy lost its principal spokesman upon
the President’s death. Very early the reader is reminded of George Santayana’s abiding
cautions, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” Later,
while immersed in France’s eight-year Indo-China war, readers will hearten Barbara
Tuchman’s accompanying caution, “There is no more entangling alliance than aid to
indigent friends.”

The Dien Bien Phu outpost, ostensibly designed to draw in the Vietminh for
a decisive battle, ranks as one of the great political and military self-delusions and
blunders of the twentieth century. Quickly cut off by road, the outpost could only be
resupplied by air, from airfields 185 miles away, with inadequate numbers of aircraft,
despite the borrowing of US Air Force C-119 transports and B-26 bombers. The French
completely misjudged matters by dismissing the possibility that the Vietminh could
transport artillery, ammunition, manpower, and materiel to support a 56-day siege that
the French could neither counter or withdraw from.

The battle itself receives detailed attention, with haunting images of high-level
incompetence and indifference. Morgan contrasts this malfeasance with examples of
spectacular heroism and astonishing suffering. It was not unusual late in the siege to see
French amputees manning machine guns fed ammunition by other amputees. By the
time monsoon rains began, the multitude of shallow graves give up their dead and the
French, as well as the attacking Vietminh, were “up to their knees in blood and corpses.”

While only 25 soldiers of the garrison were actually of French citizenry
(French conscripts by law could not serve outside France), the remainder of the force
was Algerian, Moroccan, Thai, Vietnamese, and members of the Foreign Legion. The
French never seemed to be bothered by the incongruity of a largely colonial force
fighting to preserve colonialism. A fact that was especially relevant to the Indochinese, giving them only something to fight against, and never anything to fight for. Repeated western prodding established a timeline for the independence of Vietnam resulted in very little until the Geneva talks of 1954, after the fall of Dien Bien Phu.

Besides Dien Bien Phu, *Valley of Death* addresses French, British, Vietnamese, Chinese, Russian, and American political machinations in the region, against a backdrop of byzantine intrigues, duplicity, lies, absurd expectations, and incompetence. Morgan is never boring. He enlivens his narrative with quotes, perspectives, and conclusions that are usually on the mark. Many of his vignettes describe an unspeakable lack of French earnestness regarding the battle. In April 1954, a plan to have French pilots fly American aircraft to Dien Bien Phu was postponed because it interfered with vacation schedules. Another plan, contemplated but never carried out, called for seeding clouds to hasten monsoon rains. A French noncommissioned officer complains of running out of wine; the garrison commander groused about being out of whiskey and cognac. One French officer parachuted in Dien Bien Phu with his glass eye in a pocket; another tucked his empty sleeve into his belt. Nor is it only the French that the author takes to task. One British commentator said of hawkish US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, “There is no situation so bad that Mr. Dulles cannot make it worse.”

Many of the American anecdotes have a disquieting ring, such as widespread congressional opposition to creeping US involvement and the fear of a major land war. In Geneva in 1954, Walter Bedell Smith, as head of President Eisenhower’s special committee on Indochina, declared, “American ground forces will go into Indochina over my dead body.” At the same time French memoirs claim, over American denials, that Secretary Dulles asked the French, “Would you like two bombs?” meaning two atomic bombs with which to break the siege.

A reader that is only superficially aware of the French and American Indochina experiences during this period may be confused by the similarities with America’s later experiences in Vietnam: weak Vietnamese leader, Emperor Bao Dai for the French, then later Ngo Dinh Diem (and his successors) for the Americans; the Central Intelligence Agency-owned Civil Air Transport Company during the French period, Air America during the American conflict; lack of a French timetable for Indochinese independence, similar lack of genuine reforms during the American intrusion; divisions at home regarding the wars (in February 1954, only eight percent of the French population sup-

*Valley of Death* is exhaustively researched and splendidly written, suffering mainly from photographs many readers will consider inappropriate and inadequate. It only has four maps, insufficient for keeping up with the narrative. These shortcoming aside, *Valley of Death* is a most welcome addition to the literature and a splendid read.

“WMD and their proliferation, terrorism, and transnational organized crime are the preeminent security challenges confronting the world — the fulcrum of evil,” writes Fred Schreier. True enough. Few thoughtful overseers of the international security environment will disagree with Schreier’s contentions in WMD Proliferation. “Terrorism is a threat to all states;” “Preventing the spread and use of nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons is essential for creating a more secure world;” “A state must have the most effective intelligence services as the first line of defense;” etc. The book is filled with such truisms, which have the commendable attributes of clarity and accuracy. But they do not make for the most interesting read.

Fred Schreier is a retired Swiss colonel with experience in command and general staff positions, and his book is written with military precision. He provides a systematic breakdown of the various aspects of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat and identifies components of an effective, counter-proliferation posture. Describing the danger, Schreier lays out various characteristics of nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons technology. For example, the reader learns that Americium-241 is a radioactive element and an alpha ray emitter with a half-life of 432.7 years. Depending on one’s professional background, such descriptions may appear elementary, overly technical, or somewhere in between.

Despite Schreier’s subtitle, “Reforming the Security Sector to Meet the Threat,” his text is best characterized as a general reference guide on the topic of WMD proliferation. It includes a plethora of definitions and identifications that range from international treaties and conventions to the variety of intelligence collection sources (human intelligence, signal intelligence, etc.) to the concept of “the national interest.” Schreier supplements description with proscription by putting forth the straightforward proposition that the evolving threat requires adaption, reorganization, and additional coordination within and between governments and the private sector. As part of such reform, he calls for policies and resources to be allocated based on “risk assessments” that evaluate plausible threats and existing vulnerabilities. This is not a hard case to make, and Schreier succeeds at it.

To his credit, the author delves into the dreary but decidedly important issue of bureaucratic process. The reader learns about NATO’s internal communication structure and how the European Union does and does not share intelligence. Schreier explains the roles of the various levels of the US National Security Council policy-making structure with its Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, and Policy Coordination Committees. This focus on a mundane bureaucratic component, one that is crucial to the functioning of the US national security machine, is consistent with Schreier’s sober and sensible approach to his subject.

But sensible writing does not necessarily make a sensible book. Aristotle encourages us to ask, “What is the nature of the thing?” With respect to the text in question, the “thing” is a reference book that is both too broad and too shallow. The Internet has sapped the utility of paperback references in general, which often cannot compete
with the ease of navigation, tailored results, and constant updates provided on the World Wide Web. For Schreier’s book, this challenge is compounded by an apparent disinterest in scoping the text to target a specific audience. This is demonstrated in his section on “Major Treaties,” which provides a paragraph on each treaty’s implementation requirements. These descriptions assume background knowledge so they are not aimed at the neophyte, but as single paragraphs they cannot provide value added to the professional either. Many of Scheier’s descriptions contain detail that can be easily assimilated and retained, but not enough to be useful to policy-makers tasked with developing specific countermeasures. This begs the question, who is going to read this book?

To address the WMD thread that Scheier so ably identifies, the arms control community needs more than a catalogue of disparate initiatives. It needs a strategy. It needs a theory that proposes how to use the jumbled array of national and international capabilities, authorities, and cooperative mechanisms in concert to achieve specific objectives. Good strategy starts with basic questions: what inputs (e.g., technical knowledge, materials, infrastructure) are needed to create WMD; where are these components located (e.g., universities, mineral deposits, industrial sites); and what is the process (e.g., extraction, transportation, refining, assembly, testing, deployment) by which each weapon is created from its components. Once these questions are answered, it is then possible to identify chokepoints in the process of weapons creation and transfer and consider means of exploiting them. Fitting the alphabet soup of counterproliferation initiatives (PSO [Proliferation Security Initiative], CTR [Cooperative Threat Reduction]) and nonproliferation regimes (NSG [Nuclear Suppliers Group], AG [Australia Group]) into such framework would be an immensely helpful start.

Such a strategy would also recognize that while WMD proliferation is catalyzed by technological and economic developments, it is fundamentally a political phenomenon. Controlling the creation and transfer of strategic material is an imperative as old as human conflict. Today what we call “targeted international sanctions” and “export control regimes” in an earlier age was known as blockades and siege warfare. The thread from WMD may be unprecedented, but the mission of preventing adversaries from acquiring strategic resources is not. This is not a goal like eradicating AIDS or ending global warming that can unite humanity. There will be losers if the spread of WMD can be halted. The strategies for convincing, or compelling, states to accept such a loss require a knowledge of politics and diplomacy, not physics and technicalities.


Continuing from Volume 1 of his Stalingrad trilogy, David Glantz’s Armageddon in Stalingrad is concerned primarily with the fighting for the city itself prior to the start of the Soviet counteroffensive leading up to the encirclement of the German Sixth Army and elements of the Fourth Panzer Army. After an introductory chapter outlining events prior to September 1942 and introducing key personalities, the authors move between the fighting in various parts of the city from the German
arrival in force, up until the start of the Soviet counteroffensive, Operation Uranus, on
19 November 1942. An additional chapter considers the events on the “flanks” of the
Stalingrad battle. The author then finishes with a rather brief but sound conclusion.

Those unfamiliar with David Glantz’s work should not be misled by the blurb
for this tome; while it is fair to write that *Armageddon in Stalingrad* “supersedes all
previous accounts” in its detail and source base, it is certainly not “written with the
narrative force of a great war novel.” What this volume provides is an operational nar-
rative of the fighting that for many will probably serve as a reference work rather than
a bedtime perusal.

As with other examples of Glantz’s work, the new book’s strength is in his
meticulous reconstruction of events at the operational level. Certainly, the narrative
and the operational conclusions drawn in this second volume, as in the first, are
sustained by a wealth of Soviet and German primary sources. Additionally, there are
some “new” Soviet archival sources, particularly combat journals of Soviet units and
organizations. For western scholars in particular, gaining access to materials from the
Russian Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense is challenging, and these materi-
als add a significant amount of valuable detail. The author’s work also reflects what
can be achieved through the meticulously piecing together of events from the Russian
perspective, using the vast array of published Russian-language documents along with
Soviet and post-Soviet secondary literature.

It is apparent from the wealth of material presented that during the battle for
Stalingrad the Red Army engaged in an urban war of attrition that neutralized superior
German operational effectiveness. Published Soviet documents suggest that by late
1941 Soviet military leaders were well aware that fighting in urban areas offered an
ideal opportunity to engage German forces in an environment that minimized German
strengths in such areas as command and control while offsetting their utilization of
mechanized forces. At horrendous cost, the Red Army was able to gradually counter
Wehrmacht strength within the city. Red Army operations were so effective that by the
time of the Soviet counteroffensive superior German operational effectiveness outside
the city could not make up for the losses within.

A broader context for operational detail (for example political, economic, or
diplomatic factors) is limited in this volume, perhaps understandably given the depth
with which Glantz examines the operational military history. It might have been
refreshing, however, to take a step back from the fighting at tactical level and look
at the at broader picture beyond the purely military context. This reviewer could not, for
example, find mention of the decision on October 9, 1942 to abolish dual command
in the index (whether under “Order,” “Commissar,” or “Dual Command”), despite the
interesting timing of this decision at a point when the battle for Stalingrad might have
been going against the Red Army. While the distinction between the nature of command
prior to and following this order should not be exaggerated, nonetheless it was certainly
symbolic of Stalin’s increasing trust in the Red Army officer corps.

If there are weaknesses with the actual content of this volume they are when
Glantz comments on broader issues without examining them in sufficient depth or
indicating where readers might find additional information. One example in the intro-
duction is the claim that the German army was becoming increasingly Nazified as young
replacements filled depleted units, meaning that “at the tactical level many Germans accepted the racial theories of their Fuhrer.” This situation is contrasted with the Red Army, where the average soldier “may have been less influenced by ideology compared to his Nazi counterpart,” motivated more by “loyalty to comrades and defense of the nation than their healthy fear of the oppressive Marxist dictatorship and its minions.” This assertion is made without any reference or collaborating information.

Trawling through the endnotes and noting the research that has gone into this and the previous volume, it is increasingly unlikely that in the short or medium term these works will be surmounted as the epitome of operational history regarding the fight for Stalingrad. This work will stand the test of time, making a significant contribution to the literature.


**Reviewed by David L. Perry,** Professor of Applied Ethics and Director of the Vann Center for Ethics, Davidson College, and author of *Partly Cloudy: Ethics in War, Espionage, Covert Action, and Interrogation.*

Michael Gross is a professor of political science at the University of Haifa, Israel, and the author of two previous books: *Ethics and Activism: The Theory and Practice of Political Morality and Bioethics* and *Armed Conflict: Moral Dilemmas of Medicine and War.* Recalling my largely positive assessment of the latter work, I held high hopes for *Moral Dilemmas of Modern War.*

This book addresses several intriguing and potentially fruitful ethical topics in contemporary armed conflicts, including challenges to traditional principles of noncombatant immunity and the moral equality of combatants, as well as issues surrounding targeted killing, torture, and humanitarian intervention. There are a number of interesting details about Israel’s recent wars in Lebanon and Gaza, and about debates within Israel about the ethics of its military tactics. This reviewer also found the author’s examination of legally prohibited and “nonlethal” weapons in chapters three and four to be informative. The sources cited in the book’s endnotes are rich and varied.

Unfortunately, significant portions of *Moral Dilemmas of Modern War* contain rambling and repetitive arguments, along with confusing statements. Gross frequently exhibits a lack of care in defining and applying key terms and concepts, and makes claims that are misleading or overly ambiguous in an ethical and legal sense.

Although the author notes on pages 13-14 that the term “asymmetric war” can have distinctly different connotations (he mentions material, legal, and moral), he uses that term in the remainder of the book without ever indicating which meaning is intended.

Gross also tends to categorize conventional wars as symmetric, and humanitarian military interventions as asymmetric, but neither assumption is necessarily true or historically accurate. For example, some conventional wars have been materially and morally asymmetric, while humanitarian interventions can be materially symmetric. Too often in this book (as in far too many recent military books and articles) the
word “asymmetric” seems little more than a fashionable buzzword that does no real conceptual or clarifying work.

On the second page of the book, the author states, “Torture, assassination, and blackmail are certainly not new forms of warfare.” He is clearly right that they are not new, but wrong to call them forms of warfare. They are better labeled tactics; moreover, they are ones that are neither unique to nor particularly characteristic of modern war, nor are they exclusive to warfare. Some police forces use torture against common criminals; political leaders are sometimes assassinated in peacetime; and some intelligence officers blackmail foreign agents to coerce their obedience, irrespective of whether a war is being waged.

Gross defines blackmail on page six as consisting of “tactics that intentionally or unintentionally harm, or threaten to harm, noncombatants.” While a threat to harm is implicit in blackmail, if actual harm is inflicted on noncombatants, then we have clearly moved beyond blackmail. The author would also have been better served by not classifying encirclement, siege, banishment, and relocation as forms of blackmail per se. A second attempt to define blackmail on page 153 is more successful.

On page five the author says of torture and rendition, “Each is a long-standing counterinsurgency tactic designed to deliver and hold suspects for interrogation.” But torture is not designed to do that at all, and only some forms of rendition (extraordinary ones) can sensibly be so described. The later description of rendition on page 140 is more accurate.

Gross later claims that “all nonlethal weapons intentionally target un-uniformed combatants and noncombatants alike, a blatant violation of humanitarian law.” But that statement is misleading in that it equivocates on “targeting” and “weapons” in ways that obscure moral and legal restrictions on lethal weapons. In other words, even when nonlethals are used “indiscriminately” or directed at noncombatants, that does not render them necessarily illegal (or unethical).

The author also makes the argument that civilians are increasingly targeted by states in asymmetric wars because of their ambiguous roles and status in the conflicts. Unfortunately, Gross provides inadequate documentary support for that claim, while ignoring the fact that civilians were directly targeted and indiscriminately killed in much more horrendous numbers in conventional bombings during World War II and the wars in Korea and Vietnam.

Finally, in an early portion of the book, the author says that “terrorism deliberately targets innocent civilian noncombatants for political gain, and thus is heinous by any understanding of humanitarianism.” But four pages later he qualifies that condemnation, wondering “if terrorism in pursuit of a just cause is sometimes defensible.” In Chapter Eight, although the author eloquently condemns reprisals against civilians, he also claims that terrorism is “excusable” in some circumstances, and “defensible” if “discriminating.” Do we really want to go there ethically? Did we not learn the dangers of such arguments long ago?

I regretfully conclude that this book on the whole makes few original contributions to the scholarly literature on ethics and war, and so I cannot enthusiastically recommend it. Its uneven quality also indicates that at least one copy editor at Cambridge University Press needs to work harder.

American journalist and historian Evan Thomas has once again proven why he is among the foremost modern scholars of American history, culture, and politics. The War Lovers is a captivating chronicle of war fever and calculated crisis, manipulated by key leaders in the run-up to the twentieth century and culminating in the Spanish-American War. Thomas assembles a compelling historical record for the case that the Spanish-American War was a conflict of choice, shaped by powerful politicians and statesmen, and exploited by a rabid, sensational newspaper editor. Reasons for their conduct abound from simple machismo, to earnest belief in the national interest, greed, to pure self-indulgence and an insatiable appetite for controversy. In doing so, Thomas builds an instructive case study for current military and civilian national security professionals on the causal factors for war and the agendas that influence national decision-making. He weaves the archetypal cautionary tale, revealing that sometimes conflict is the product of irrational and intensely personal calculus, rather than the pure strategic realpolitik taught in universities and war colleges.

The author recasts Theodore Roosevelt, who was Assistant Secretary of the Navy at the time, from the conventional wisdom—a loyal, altruistic model nationalist—to a sophistic, scheming demagogue, willing to stage-manage US foreign policy for his own egotistic ends, driven by psychological factors including an extreme case of father worship. Roosevelt’s self-loathing is so complete that it transforms his total perspective on related issues; introspection was not a strong suit. Similarly, Thomas paints statesman and virtual New England hereditary peer William Cabot Lodge as a puppeteer, dancing marionettes across a stage to demonstrate his power and influence. William Randolph Hearst’s legend as a muckraking proprietor of “journalism that acts” needs little exposition, but Thomas fleshes out his character with a healthy degree of cynicism and edgy historical humor. The author develops a plot line of interaction between these three principal actors and the establishments—the Washington political establishment embodied by Speaker of the house Thomas Reed, the Boston Brahmin social establishment, and the Harvard set—showing the tensions and their resolutions in a way that makes the characters at once real, competent, ludicrous, vulnerable, haughty, adventurous, and patriotic. The author himself is of relatively high birth as the son of a literary editor and grandson of a Princeton graduate and presidential candidate, educated at Phillips Andover, Harvard, and the University of Virginia’s law school, yet he spares no mercy in describing the conceit and self-importance of fellow Harvard men Roosevelt and Lodge. Thomas heaps cynical observations on the pairs, casting them as ambitious to a fault, willing co-conspirators in a subconscious plot to engineer war out of thin air by marshaling and massaging every war decision in their favor.

The takeaway for this reviewer is that actors are more complex than the over-simplified caricatures the modern press, the academy, and political society sometimes make them out to be. Roosevelt is often caricatured as a cigar-chomping outdoorsman and man of adventure, leading from the front in the Cuban campaign and earning accolades and medals for altruistic heroism. In reality, the picture of Roosevelt
painted by Thomas is not nearly so selflessly patriotic and capable, but rather a man who was willing to subordinate the national interest to his own ends. Thomas shows that circumstances 100 years ago, were quite similar to many of today’s political and personal agendas, perhaps for similar purposes. The image of Teddy Roosevelt, the purest American loyalist, charging up San Juan Hill to liberate Cuba from the malicious Spanish regime is insufficient to capture the total picture of the complex political, military, and strategic confluence that led to the Spanish-American War. The question for the polity is how to design a system that marginalizes these personal agendas and ideologies to ensure that questions of war are, indeed, answered with morality, proper state behavior, and national self-interest as the foremost considerations. Books like The War Lovers are instructive in ensuring we are not doomed to repeat history, or at least to recognize when we are.


Via the three-volume biography that he completed in 2000, British historian Robert Skidelsky established himself as the world’s leading authority on the life and writing of John Maynard Keynes, the man who pioneered thinking about macroeconomics; helped design the post-World War II Bretton Woods regime; and unabashedly asserted that “The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly supposed. Indeed the world is ruled by little else.”

The assertion by Keynes is the impetus for Professor Skidelsky’s latest book. He believes that the current Great Recession can be traced to intellectual, moral, and institutional failures that are either embedded in or emanate from the dominant strains of contemporary economic thought. The author also believes that if policy-makers hope to avoid similar crises in the future, they should reconsider the insight of Keynes.

During his university years, Keynes studied Classical Economics, the field launched by Adam Smith in 1776. In the nineteenth century, those shaping the discipline applied the mathematics of Newtonian physics to the concept of the market. That framework suggested that, starting from a state of equilibrium in which supply was equal to demand, an increase in supply of a particular good would lead to a reduction in price, which in turn would induce individuals to increase the quantity demanded of the good to the point where the market was once again in equilibrium. (Mirror-image adjustments would unfold in the event of a reduction in supply.) The logic was also applicable to markets for the factors of production, such as labor, and, of critical importance, to the interaction between the acts of saving out of current income and of borrowing in order to invest in productive capital.

Keynes, informed by his active participation in the financial markets and by the Great Depression, developed an alternative vision of economic processes. When people were confronted with irreducible and unquantifiable uncertainty about future economic events, they tended to hoard cash, the most liquid form of saving. If they did so, then that flow of saving was not made available to factory owners who wanted to borrow
funds in order to purchase new production facilities and equipment; thus, the increase in saving implied a reduction in consumption but did not imply an offsetting increase in investment. Such a state of affairs suggested the economy could settle into a less-than-full-employment equilibrium. If so, then government spending would in fact be needed to compensate for the fall in consumption and to pull the economy out of its rut.

Keynes’s economic analysis was complemented by his views on ethics and politics. With respect to ethics—and here I greatly simplify and do not reflect the tension in the thinking of Keynes or to nuances in Skidelsky’s writing —Keynes believed that the “pursuit of money was justified only to the extent it led to the ‘good life.’” In turn, the good life consisted of engaging in meaningful human relationships and appreciating those things that are aesthetically pleasing. With respect to politics, he believed that the government should act prudently in all endeavors; should ultimately provide the framework for individual initiative, as that was the best guarantor of democracy; and should concentrate on stabilizing the macroeconomy via demand management.

Keynesian analysis enjoyed its greatest influence during the 25-year period that ended in the mid-1970s. By that point, it had become vulnerable in the ongoing battle of ideas. Its relative weakness was due in part to the fact that practitioners had “bastardized” Keynes’s ideas and selectively taken segments of his framework to justify their own purposes. It also resulted from the fact that supply-side shocks associated with the oil crisis in 1974 caused in both higher unemployment and higher inflation (stagflation), a combination that was hard to explain via Keynesian analysis, which depicted an inverse relationship between the two.

Perhaps most significant, however, was the challenge that emerged from advocates of the New Classical School, who refined their assumptions about human behavior, economic relationships, and market processes and laid three foundation stones for analysis: market participants possess all relevant information about current events and possible future developments and act in automaton-like fashion to maximize utility (rational expectations hypothesis); variations in economic output are attributable solely to disturbances on the supply side of the economy that impact productivity (real business cycle theory); and current prices in financial markets adequately and appropriately reflect the tradeoff between risk and return (efficient financial market theory).

In light of the Great Recession, what does Professor Skidelsky think went wrong? The intellectual failure springs from the treatment by the New Classical Economics of the unknown. While Keynes addressed the uncertainty associated with some potentially high-impact events, the likelihood of which could not be quantified, the New Classical Economics talked about risk that can be expressed in terms of probability distributions and financial instruments that can be used to properly hedge (insure) against risk. That perception led participants to misapprehend the degree of systemic risk that had come to permeate the US financial sector by the middle of this decade. The moral failure stems from the unbridled pursuit of self-gain; if there is no sense of the good life, then prosperity is not a means to a higher end but instead becomes the end in itself. Without a larger point of reference or sense of the public good, hubris and self-interest contribute to suboptimal outcomes.

In the final section, Professor Skidelsky walks on difficult terrain, as he speculates as to what Keynes might say about a range of matters if he were still alive,
including the tension between stimulating the economy in the short-term and eliminating structural deficits in the long-term; the need to properly regulate the financial sector at both national and global levels; and even the need for the study of economics to be balanced by familiarity with history and the humanities. But by bravely pushing ahead, he helps make the case that despite a 35-year ebb tide in influence, the ideas of Keynes are once again extremely relevant in a debate that is yet to be resolved.

When all is said and done, Professor Skidelsky has delivered an elegantly written, authoritative, and provocative commentary that reinforces Keynes’s assertion about the power of ideas. All those who have a rudimentary familiarity with economic and financial concepts and an interest in current affairs will find value in this book.


The abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in the early phase of the American occupation did tremendous damage to US strategic interests. It eroded domestic and international support for American operations and facilitated insurgent efforts. In America’s Captives: Treatment of POWs from the Revolutionary War to the War on Terror, historian Paul Springer argues that although such treatment was not the result of deliberate policy it was nonetheless the foreseeable product of American attitudes toward enemy prisoners of war (POWs). While representing a clear departure from America’s long-standing policy of faithfulness to international law regarding POWs, the abuse of these detainees was the “predictable, and to a certain extent natural, outgrowth of American wartime behavior.” Springer suggests that American POW policy over the last two centuries has been characterized by the failure to properly plan for POW operations, a casual neglect of prisoners, and constant economizing in the realm of prisoner care. Prisoner welfare has periodically suffered for it.

Organized chronologically, the book compares POW policy with practice throughout the nation’s history instead of focusing on an individual war, providing a new perspective on the subject. Springer finds that the administration of captives was generally decentralized and uncoordinated prior to the Civil War. Enemy prisoners were subject to constantly changing policies that were often ignored by the individuals tasked with performing them. Policy-makers economically instrumentalized prisoners while professing humanitarian concerns. Captives were frequently handed over to civilian contractors more interested in turning a profit than in the welfare of their wards. By the time of the Mexican-American War, Springer argues, POW operations that seemed to be based on humanitarian principles actually reflected a pragmatism superseding expressed national values. Although the vast neglect of prisoners on both sides of the American Civil War and the wartime development of a framework for governing the treatment of POWs, the Lieber Code, left a lasting impression on the military establishment, moral flexibility continued to dominate operations. The exploitation of prisoner labor by American forces, for example, actually increased after the armistice ending the First World War was signed. Moreover, in the months following the end of hostilities, prisoners were subject to extremely dangerous work conditions. And while
more planning was devoted to the problem of enemy captives after 1865, potentially ameliorating poor conditions, the War Department did not issue a manual standardizing prisoner treatment until 1944.

Prisoner of war policy during Korea and Vietnam changed in two key ways, but expediency continued to be the paramount concern. First, prisoners became instruments of propaganda instead of being utilized for their labor value. Second, American policy-makers shifted responsibility for maintaining POWs to allied nations. Doing so was particularly detrimental to America’s moral authority. Springer debunks the myth that the United States forced the South Vietnamese government to strictly adhere to the Geneva Convention in its treatment of prisoners. Instead, he argues that the US government knew that prisoners in South Vietnamese custody were not being treated in accordance with humanitarian norms but took no corrective action. In turning a blind eye, the United States not only demonstrated the cynicism that continued to exist within American POW policy but also violated treaty obligations.

Springer’s work raises a number of questions for further study. Throughout America’s Captives, he touches on the difficulties of applying laws of warfare to guerrilla conflicts and illustrates that prisoner treatment practices varied according to the enemy. Racially dissimilar enemies and alien cultures fared poorly. “The distinction between civilized and savage warfare,” the author notes, “is important to any discussion of American POW policy and practice.” Americans from the colonial period onward did not restrain their treatment of prisoners when the enemy failed to follow accepted rules and traditions of war. The implications of this distinction bear further consideration in the light of America’s increasing engagement outside of Western Europe. Similarly, the use of US captives as propaganda tools for mobilizing American society for war would be a valuable avenue of investigation. While taking note of labor unions’ resistance to the use of prisoner labor during World War II, Springer misses an opportunity to analyze other effects the presence of enemy captives had on the American home front. It might also be instructive to examine whether the new approach to handling enemy prisoners which crystallized during Vietnam was linked to the changing relationship between the military and American society.

Clearly written and convincingly argued, America’s Captives expertly combines individual anecdotes with a sweeping narrative while simultaneously offering insightful analysis of the topic. It is useful reading for both the soldier and the scholar. Dr. Springer’s review of the field of POW literature will be especially helpful to the general reader, while the historical patterns and lost opportunities he reveals are particularly relevant for leaders. By illuminating unchanging principles that have guided America’s POW operations as well as important turning points in the nation’s relationship with its captives, Springer helps to demonstrate subconscious assumptions that make up an underexamined element of military culture. Whether or not a result of official policy, inhumane treatment of POWs today hands the enemy a victory by weakening domestic support for the nation’s war effort. Echoing recent critiques of military culture which suggest that military institutions often paradoxically contribute to national weakness by focusing on the operational art without regard to larger political considerations, America’s Captives eloquently reminds us to incorporate awareness of the past into future planning.

American Negotiating Behavior will be the seminal book for conducting effective international negotiations in the future. Cross-cultural negotiating has been a consistent research theme of the United States Institute of Peace for years. Their comprehensive studies in the past, however, have viewed negotiations typically from the United States’ perspective and within a bilateral framework. This book is different; it understands the dyadic process which is bilateral negotiations and looks at the US from the eyes of those who were on the receiving end of American negotiating behavior.

The most significant and perhaps most troubling revelation in the book was that high ranking and disparate negotiators from thirty countries and six continents easily developed a consensus opinion about how the US negotiates. If the American negotiating behavior can be that easily categorized, then effective strategies can just as easily be devised to counter these negotiating approaches. The book’s concentration on “how” Americans negotiate and not “how well” they negotiate is refreshing.

Synthesizing the interviews with more than fifty seasoned international negotiators, Richard H. Solomon and Nigel Quinney develop and define four facets or professional orientations characterizing past American negotiating practice: a businesslike approach to ensure purposeful and productive activity, the legalist approach to ensure concrete details and abstract principles, the moralistic approach to ensure US values and ideals reign supreme, and the superpower approach to enforce “might makes right.” In the book, the former Japanese deputy minister for foreign affairs sums up the typical American negotiator, “exhibiting high-handedness, self-centeredness, and impatience, American negotiators cite their own domestic constraints while ignoring the domestic difficulties of their negotiating counterparts.” This is quite an indictment of the US negotiators and proof positive that this book is a critical reference for today’s international negotiator.

A chapter by Dr. Robert D. Schulzinger, perhaps the foremost expert on diplomatic history, helps ground the study from the historical perspective of US presidents and diplomats. The chapter reveals the tension between presidents, Congress, and the people and the impact that these tensions have on American negotiations. The real attractiveness of this book comes from the eight different case studies. The authors have assembled these studies from the viewpoint of the foreign diplomats who were intimately involved in each of the cases opposite the US representative. These studies are illuminating as the reader begins to clearly understand the actual impact of American negotiating behavior on allies and rivals. One clearly sees that seemingly benign behavior, when viewed through a different cultural lens, can be interpreted as malevolent and undermine US interests.

America’s “exceptionalism” may be an effective call to action for most Americans but increasingly is viewed as an attempt to impose US morals on other cultures
and peoples. As the book so effectively points out, in a globalized world, this ‘exceptionalism’ may foster resentment if not outright opposition to the US and its policies. To counter this resentment, the authors have proposed a fifth facet that should characterize future US negotiating practices. They term this the “political approach.” It is characterized by the ability to reach out to stakeholders, both internal and external, to understand their interests and to develop long-term relationships; an effort not always pursued by US negotiators. American negotiators, in essence, have to be more comfortable sitting at a round table rather than at the head of a rectangle table.

Ever since Cardinal Richelieu pioneered the “modern” approach to international relations, nation state personalities have always been a part of international negotiations. As the US comes to appreciate its future economic parity with other countries, the challenges associated with forming functioning governments in Afghanistan and Iraq, global pandemics, natural disasters, energy demands, and limited world resources; there is no better time than now for national security practitioners to assess the world’s perception of the American negotiating personality. Can the US continue to maintain its post World War II persona as it negotiates its future over an ever-expanding list of issues with friends and foes alike? This book provides the reader a solid foundation on which to answer that question.

The book begins with a quote from Sun Tzu, “Know your adversary, know yourself; in a hundred battles, a hundred victories.” It concludes with the impact this particular quote should have on the reader; heightened self-reflection. The contributors reaffirm that Americans are by their nature more outward looking than introspective, spend little time seeing themselves as others might. Strengths that, when viewed through cultural prisms, can, at times, become weaknesses. Understanding the foreign perception of American negotiating behavior is critical to survival in the interconnected and dependent global environment. This book goes a long way in assisting the reader in understanding this perception.

This book is, of course, essential reading for the experienced student of international negotiations. It does however, offer so much more to defense community writ large. Effective engagement is critical to securing America’s national interests. The only way to make US engagement more effective is to understand the impact of various engagement behaviors on those sitting around the table. American Negotiating Behavior clearly is the most up-to-date and authoritative voice to assist us in understanding the perception of US negotiating behavior and, as such, belongs in the library of every national security professional.