From the Editor

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William Gregor provides a warning that repeal of Section 654 of Title 10 US Code, titled “Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces,” carries with it the loss of critical policy regarding the American system of military justice and discipline. “The Death of Military Justice” is the author’s analysis of Section 654 and its associated findings. These findings are drawn from original testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in 1993 and appellate and Supreme Court rulings on matters of military law. Gregor espouses a belief that repealing these findings will have consequences far beyond simply admitting open homosexuals to military service. He concludes that because these findings outline the principles that have governed the order and discipline of military service since the Civil War, the meaning of good order and discipline is in real danger. Gregor leaves readers with an understanding that, as presently fashioned, the rescission of Section 654 sets aside critical principles of military law without defining new rules to take their place. These acts are almost certain to cast the armed forces into a period of legal confusion and disorder.

Ali A. Jalali examines the strategy outlined in President Obama’s December 2010 review. He analyzes each component of the strategy and the resulting operational environment. Jalali believes it is the inability of all concerned parties to deal with these emerging issues in a coordinated manner that has stymied any long-term objectives related to Afghanistan’s future. In “Afghanistan in Transition” Jalali analyzes the short-term prospects for a sustainable transition of security responsibility under the renewed US-ISAF strategy and the impact such a transition will have on Afghanistan’s future. He makes a compelling case for a measured drawdown of US forces in 2011. Throughout the article Jalali highlights the critical factor in the transition, the need to provide sufficient time to permit the strategy and the associated initiatives to succeed.

In the autumn of 1999, Parameters published an article by General Remo Butler titled, “Why Black Officers Fail.” The article received a good deal of attention throughout the Army and resulted in Irving Smith’s follow-on piece, “Why Black Officers Still Fail.” Butler suggested that black officers were failing in two specific areas: promotion to the rank of lieutenant colonel and selection for battalion and brigade command. Replicating Butler’s methodology, Smith’s hypothesis is little changed; black officers are continuing to fail in today’s Army. Failure in this particular study, however, is defined as not reaching the rank of general officer. Whether or not the reader agrees
with Smith’s methodological approach and conclusions, most will agree that the author provides a unique cultural perspective.

“Politics and War: Clausewitz’s Paradoxical Equation” is Thomas Waldman’s attempt to provide readers with an understanding of the depth of Clausewitz’s insight into the relationship between politics and war. The author believes that many of Clausewitz’s critics have mischaracterized this relationship as simply little more than “a rational instrument” to obtain social ends. Waldman argues that much of this misinterpretation stems from the complexity of the subject itself. He concludes Clausewitz did, in fact, recognize that force could be a rather blunt instrument for dealing with various forms of organized violence. It was this understanding that brought Clausewitz to the conclusion that in war, politics is “the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching” consideration.

In “State Building, Stability, and Oil as ‘Shared Competencies’ in Iraq,” Traci L. Nelson examines the history and the future of Iraq’s ethnic, sectarian, and political groups regarding the division of the nation’s oil wealth. Nelson, a social scientist currently stationed in Iraq, analyzes the tensions created by the Iraqi Council of Representatives’ inability to pass hydrocarbon laws capable of clarifying the management of Iraq’s oil and gas deposits. This discord, driven by competing regional interests and exacerbated by constitutional division of powers, has resulted in weak institutions at every level of government. The author warns that until people perceive the Iraqi government as legitimate and capable of overcoming these ethnic-sectarian and geographical tensions, the shared competencies of oil and gas resources will continue in gridlock.

Our thematic presentation examines a number of factors influencing tomorrow’s strategic environment. In “Environmental Change, Strategic Foresight, and Impacts on Military Power,” Chad M. Briggs introduces a thesis based on the belief that national security cannot be fully understood without taking environmental factors into consideration. The author believes that if military planners are to be successful, they need to engage the larger community of researchers and scientists on matters related to environmental and conflict dynamics. Briggs concludes that it is necessary for security planners and policy-makers alike to fully understand the scientific data underpinning environmental risks. Our second article in this feature is Seth Bodnar and Jeremy Gwinn’s “‘Monetary Ammunition’ in Counterinsurgency.” The authors draw a correlation between General David Petraeus’ 1996 maxim “money is ammunition” and US economic development efforts in the Philippines from 2002 to 2007. Conscious of the fact that there is always a danger in drawing lessons from one theater and directly applying them to another, they glean a number of lessons from
the US application of “monetary ammunition” during the Philippine insurgency. Bodnar and Gwinn close with a series of recommendations on how commanders might best utilize their monetary ammunition.

In “The Insurgent’s Response to the Defense of Cities,” Eric Jardine examines why the majority of counterinsurgency campaigns begin in the major cities of contested nations. The author attempts to answer two questions for the reader: Why do counterinsurgencies begin their campaigns in cities? And, how does an insurgency react to this decision on behalf of the counterinsurgency? He concludes that the deployment of counterinsurgency forces in rural areas and the leveraging of local power holders are two methods for increasing the counterinsurgent’s probability of success.

Our final article in this issue is John James Patterson’s “A Long-Term Counterinsurgency Strategy.” The author examines the unique capabilities of Special Operations Forces to meet various strategic objectives and their synergistic relationship with airpower. Patterson then assesses the strategic utility of this combination in an irregular warfare environment.

Our Review Essay feature presents Charles M. Brown’s superb review of a number of new entries to the market. “Contextualizing Iran” provides an analysis of five books examining the Islamic Republic of Iran and its military, political, and economic future. Brown focuses his review essay on the authors’ attempts to contextualize or refine existing contexts for contemporary Iran, while at the same time defining viable US policy options for dealing with the Republic of Iran. The reviewer highlights those portions of the books rebutting sage predictions of a palpable, imminent threat from Iran. The Book Reviews feature again offers expert appraisals of an array of contemporary literature of interest to senior military, defense professionals, and academicians. Anthony J. Joes leads the way with his sterling review of David Kilcullen’s The Accidental Guerrilla. Alan Cate contributes an excellent analysis of Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815 by Gordon Wood. Paul Kan has prepared a splendid analysis of Vanda Felbab-Brown’s Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs. These and the remaining reviews are certain to send readers to their favorite bookstore or online outlet. – RHT