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Politics and War: Clausewitz's Paradoxical Equation

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Introduction

According to his critics, Carl von Clausewitz believed war was entirely governed by reason and controlled by the dictates of policy. Martin van Creveld claims Clausewitz viewed war as little more than a “rational instrument for the attainment of rational social ends;”¹ and Barbara Ehrenreich states Clausewitz saw “war itself as an entirely rational undertaking, unsullied by human emotion.”² Yet these assertions, viewed outside their proper context, distort Clausewitz’s contribution. His ideas are more complex than these crude depictions of strict political rationalism suggest. Indeed, Clausewitz believed that logic often came to a stop in the labyrinth of war.³ There is no simple, pithy explanation of the manner in which the political element fits into his theory; no formulaic or linear characterization will suffice.

This article seeks to reveal the depth of Clausewitz’s insight into the relationship between politics and war. Ideas of politics, policy, and reason hold a number of differing implications in terms of their relationship to one another and their influence on war. Indeed, misinterpretations of Clausewitz stem from the complexity of the subject itself, combined with its somewhat limited and confusing presentation in *On War*.⁴ This is cause for detailed analysis of the text, the logic of Clausewitz’s thought on the subject, and the implications of his ideas.

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War as an Instrument of Policy

That war is an instrument of policy has become something of a truism, almost to the point of cliché, in Western strategic literature, regardless of how well the complexities of the idea are understood. The ubiquity of the idea can largely be attributed to Clausewitz; direct reference is often made to *On War* whenever this principle is outlined. The idea is commonly quoted out of the context Clausewitz intended, diminishing it of much of its meaning. Also, it is often mistakenly presented as representing the totality of his theorizing on war. Its most common modern usage is as a prescriptive device—one especially suited to modern liberal democracies in which the subordination of the military to civilian control is deemed a vital component of a properly constituted state, especially in the nuclear age.⁵ The complexities of the concept are often diluted in the interest of doctrinal precision and pedagogical clarity. Given the profusion of critiques in relation to this aspect of Clausewitz's thought, this situation will not suffice. A more robust explanation is required.

Clausewitz wrote that war contains an “element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.”⁶ This claim may appear cold-blooded and militaristic, but his assertion is descriptive, not prescriptive. This is confused by the fact that Clausewitz often draws prescriptive conclusions on the basis of this observation, and the two perspectives are often juxtaposed in the text. It is perhaps ironic that what appears to be a morally repugnant statement, because it suggests he viewed resorting to force as an “entirely routine extension of unilateral state policy”⁷—actually leads Clausewitz to conclude that war, in a practical and moral sense, ought to be subject to policy; otherwise, it becomes “something pointless and devoid of sense.”⁸

Ostensibly, the concept of war as an instrument of policy is straightforward. The use of military force is a means to a higher end—the political object. War is a tool that policy uses to achieve its objectives and, as such, has a measure of rational utility. So, the purpose for which the use of force is intended will be the major determinant of the course and character of a war. As Clausewitz explains, war “is controlled by its political object,” which “will set its course, prescribe the scale of means and effort which is required, and makes its influence felt throughout down to the smallest operational detail.”⁹ This idea is clearly reflected in his work where he discusses distinctly rational chains of action that establish a purpose to be achieved, a military aim that serves the purpose, and the selection of means appropriate to attain the aim.¹⁰

According to this hierarchically structured logic, we should essentially be able to explain, in broad terms, the actions of individual units

by the overarching demands of policy, because all parts stand in logical relation to it. The control of policy might manifest itself in, for instance, setting geographical limits on an army's movements or establishing the appropriate moment to seek a negotiated settlement. This perspective does not necessarily minimize

War is a tool that policy uses to achieve its objectives and, as such, has a measure of rational utility.

the importance of military considerations; war "is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with these means." Policy should understand the capabilities and limits of the instrument it employs. The crucial point is that military actions are ultimately geared towards political objectives; military concerns "will never do more than modify them."¹¹ One might use the analogy of cogs in a machine: the movement of the smallest cogs is determined by the master cog of policy; when it turns, all others turn in relation to it.

In this abstract conception, all action in war rationally relates to the given purpose. When, for example, the stated object is achieved, one would terminate the war; or where the sacrifices become too great in relation to the purpose, one would seek a settlement or capitulate the value attached to political object rules, not military success. As Clausewitz notes, because "it is policy that has created war," it is only natural that it remains subordinate to the "guiding intelligence that brought it into existence."¹² In one of his more rational passages, Clausewitz notes that "the value of the object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in *magnitude* and also in *duration*. Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow."¹³ The assumption is leaders choose what they believe to be the most appropriate means to attain the desired end, and that will remain the principal criterion of efforts made and resources employed. The particular military solution depends on circumstances and the object in question. As Clausewitz notes, there are many potential roads to victory and a "general can best demonstrate his genius by managing a campaign exactly to suit his objectives and his resources, doing neither too much nor too little."¹⁴

The description above, while capturing the essence of the issue, by no means represents the extent of Clausewitz's ideas. If it did, accusations of pure rationalism would, no doubt, be justified. The idea of a rational process supports the concept of war as subordinate to policy but only to an extent. Where Clausewitz discusses purpose and means or war plans, his intention is clearly prescriptive and represents an ideal strategic construct whereby all parts gel seamlessly into a rationally directed whole. This perspective is most clear in Book 8 where Clausewitz states: "War plans cover every

aspect of war, and weave them all into a single operation that must have a single, ultimate objective in which all particular aims are reconciled.”¹⁵

Undoubtedly, this idea is seductive and perhaps reflective of the state servant in Clausewitz. While his ultimate intention in *On War* was to describe the objective nature of war, this did not prevent him from passionately promoting his ideas regarding how war should be fought. These perspectives sit together uneasily in his work, and one should be careful to distinguish between the two. Nevertheless, Clausewitz stressed the great difficulties that he knew, in reality, intervened in such theoretically neat relationships:

The degree of force that must be used against the enemy depends on the scale of political demands on either side. These demands, so far as they are known, would show what efforts each must make; but they seldom are fully known Nor are the situation and conditions of the belligerents alike. This can be a second factor Just as disparate are the governments' strength of will, their character and abilities These three considerations introduce uncertainties that make it difficult to gauge the amount of resistance to be faced and, in consequence, the means required and the objectives to be set.¹⁶

This means that any strictly logical solution is impossible; indeed, in war, such reasoning may prove to be “a most unsuitable and awkward intellectual tool.” Rather, what is required is intuitive judgment “to detect the most important and decisive elements in the vast array of facts and situations,” which requires decisions and behavior not strictly derived from rational processes or abstract principles. Clausewitz certainly did not believe that any superlative standard of the rational use of force, maximizing the interests of policy-makers, was humanly possible.¹⁷ The form of instrumental logic described above will, Clausewitz held, be apparent in any war, but the extent of its influence will be extenuated by many factors: instruments may be used for purposes other than those that they were ostensibly designed for, be ill-suited to certain tasks, or employed by the user ineffectively.

Clausewitz emphasizes that war's subordination to policy by no means entails complete control. Subordination, he explains, “does not imply that the political aim is a tyrant.” Just as subordinate commanders can disobey orders and follow their own inclinations, so too can war in relation to policy. Policy, he states, “will permeate all military operations, and, in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them.” Clausewitz was clear in his assertion that, even though the political aim will remain the first consideration, because the “prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it,” war can often escape the control of its user.¹⁸ The primacy of policy has been overstated in the literature, with the result that some scholars, particularly during the Cold War, believed Clausewitz's theory presented a doctrine. If

followed, this doctrine would restrict force “to a scale that is no greater than necessary to achieve the objectives at stake.”¹⁹ But, as Echevarria notes, the instrument “is a dynamic one. War involves living forces rather than static elements; thus, it can change quickly and significantly in ways the logic of policy may not expect.”²⁰

The concept of war's subordination to policy causes us to focus on an important aspect of war relating to the extent to which, from the perspective of individual groups involved, there is a constant, albeit messy, interaction between the ends and means at every level. This weaves a thread of reason throughout the whole, even if it may appear to be absent in some conflicts. Ceasing the analysis here would ignore a central idea Clausewitz wanted to convey. Indeed, mistaken interpretations often stem from a failure to explore beyond policy into the more complex realm of politics.

From Subordination to Continuation

As Clausewitz stressed, war is a multilateral and interactive phenomenon. So how can it be described simply as the instrument of one or both parties? To answer this we need to return to the text and examine the manner in which policy should be understood—as one aspect of a multilateral, interactive, and complex whole.²¹

At the beginning of Book 8, Chapter 6B, Clausewitz provides one of his clearest expressions of the relationship between war and politics. Over the first five paragraphs, the context of the discussion relates to the total political situation, as distinct from unilateral policy. Clausewitz explains how the “source of war is politics—the intercourse of governments and peoples” and a “continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.” War's salient factors are political or “so closely connected with political activity that it is impossible to separate the two.” The final sentence of the fifth paragraph explains that war, “cannot follow its own laws, but has to be treated as some other whole; the name of which is policy.”²² This reversion to the term policy represents a change in Clausewitz's argument and the rest of the chapter is more obviously concerned with the unilateral, instrumental perspective, which is natural given that Clausewitz is dealing with war plans. He then synonymously refers to policy, political decisions, and political objectives.

Clausewitz is keen to draw attention to the importance of the broad political situation out of which war arises; war's instrumentality emerges so seamlessly out of this idea of interactive politics that the reader almost misses the transition from one to the other. As natural as this interconnectivity may have seemed to Clausewitz, students of his philosophies have struggled with it. This seamlessness is the first clue to his belief in the indissoluble

connection between politics and war; that one is inherently implicated in the other. This thought is clarified in Clausewitz's narrative in Book 1. It is here that policy and politics are even more intertwined and treated as one. Crucially, in Section 23, Chapter 1, Clausewitz states, "When whole communities go to war . . . the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of policy." Policy is presented as an intrinsic element of the political situation, essentially arising out of it. The discussion continues largely from the perspective of unilateral policy. The instrumental nature of war is reaffirmed in Section 24, where its connection to politics is stressed: "[W]ar is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means."²³

War as an instrument of policy is presented almost nowhere as independent from the idea of war as a continuation of political intercourse. From an objective viewpoint, war, as a whole, emerges from a political situation between belligerents and propels the central conflict without suspending the initial intercourse. It is natural to switch abruptly to the policy perspective, because the political situation is the interaction between the belligerents' individual policies. War is a continuation of the political situation and an instrument employed by the groups that comprise the situation.

Once the reader acknowledges that the idea of war as a continuation of politics is inescapably implicated in the concept of subordination to policy, they can move away from the ideal of controlled instrumentality. Indeed, the idea of subordination takes on a very different meaning in so far as it is war's very subordination to policy, and by extension politics, that makes its rational control extremely difficult. Politics as a process is irrational; thus, if war is a continuation of that process, it too is irrational. Although belligerents in war generally act according to their objectives, they do so in a complex, multilateral, and interactive environment pervaded by uncontrollable external political dynamics and chance occurrences. War is shaped by not only the reasoned objectives and decisions of each actor, but also the complex nature of the political dynamics that their interaction produces, which are inherently unpredictable and irrational.

The Political Logic of War

To state that war is a continuation of politics is to make a point beyond war's instrumentality. Continuation powerfully conveys the idea that war is itself a form of political behavior, and thus, even if subjective policy loses control of its instrument, the lines that run through war remain fundamentally political in nature. This idea cannot be overstated because,

as Clausewitz states, the concept of subordination may encourage the belief that war is something entirely different from politics because:

It is apt to be assumed that war suspends that intercourse and replaces it by a wholly different condition, ruled by no law but its own [But] war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. In essentials that intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs. The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace.²⁴

To clarify his position Clausewitz provides a powerful metaphor: while war might have its own unique grammar, the underlying logic of war is always political. Naturally, armed groups decide how best to defeat the enemy based on military operational realities, somewhat in isolation from political concerns, and war's grammar. As Clausewitz conveys through his abstract concept of absolute war, that tends to emphasize the annihilation of the enemy.²⁵ The idea of subordination does not suggest war is entirely governed by political considerations; commanders should be free to use their judgment in determining how best to achieve the military aim outlined in policy.

War is a means and has its own peculiar character—the dynamics of combat—that distinguishes it from typical political behavior. But, as the concept of continuation conveys, at its heart, war is political behavior. War substitutes the use of force for speech or writing and represents a different expression of the thoughts of political leaders.²⁶ Continuation underlines why war should never be viewed as representing a unity. The idea of subordination enables us to envision a strong relationship, yet can be concurrently misleading, in that it implies the substitution of political behavior by military force. The idea of continuation goes further, emphasizing that war's complete autonomy is impossible because of its indissoluble connection to political behavior.²⁷ Both are social forces that determine the distribution of power among groups, even if the means of war—its grammar—are distinctive and possess their own dynamics and principles. The instrument of war may take many forms and serve many purposes, but its universal essence can be grasped when it is understood that policy is inherently embedded in the perpetual realm of the political, within which the use of force is but a continuation of that interaction with altered means. It is in this respect that Clausewitz could state that all wars are things of the same nature.²⁸

Even if this concept is completely understood, there is still room for confusion, because history reveals countless occasions when practitioners and theorists alike have rejected it. In fact, the default position has been one that emphasizes a clear separation between the two: the belief that once war begins, politics end and success can only be achieved by military means.

This conception is mistaken, for it confuses a necessary relationship with a mere point of view. For instance, by extolling battle, Napoleon was able to secure repeated military victories, while generating a political environment fundamentally inimical to the survival of his empire: war will have political consequences however much practitioners may believe or desire otherwise. War may be an instrument, but if it is to prove an effective one it should be deftly handled—often along with other policy tools—otherwise politics has a habit of delivering its own verdict on events. As Clausewitz noted, “War does not contain in itself the elements for a complete decision and final settlement.”²⁹

Any commander may fervently subscribe to the notion that war should be fought regardless of political imperatives. This position is understandable, yet objectively irrelevant and simply reveals the way in which war can be subjectively mishandled. The effects of such mishandling will ultimately be political. Outright military victory may be the most appropriate way of achieving one’s objective, but history has shown that it may not. Modern counterinsurgency operations reveal that the use of overwhelming force may prove strategically counterproductive. As the proverb relates: war is too important to be left to the generals. Yet, if war is never autonomous, how does politics interact with and impact the phenomenon?

The Political Web of War

A major implication of the assertion that war is a continuation of politics is that the panoply of perpetually shifting relations within, between, and beyond individual groups will shape the course of war. Clausewitz states, “wars must vary with the nature of their motives and of the situations which give rise to them.”³⁰ The political web within which war takes place greatly influences the types of policies adopted, decisions taken, and actions initiated in war. This proposition—perhaps underrated by Clausewitz, at least explicitly in *On War*—helps account for many otherwise inexplicable events and developments in past wars. Indeed, sometimes action that makes sense militarily is apt to be entirely subverted by politics.

This is particularly apparent with respect to the impact of internal politics on war. Decisions made will not always be geared toward strategic or military imperatives, but might be influenced by electoral politics, departmental turf-wars, or inter-service rivalry. In such cases, political interests that override strategic pragmatism may be detrimental to the accomplishment of policy aims.³¹ A prominent instance of internal politics driving strategic decision-making is the phenomenon of foreign wars begun by states to stave off an impending domestic insurrection or to strengthen national unity. Such political dynamics compound the difficulty of arriving at a clear political

purpose or ensuring military operations are conducted according to achievable objectives. Where extraneous political concerns impinge on strategic decisions, soldiers can find themselves being sacrificed for the sake of a politician's position, industrial contractor's profits, or the continuance of amicable relations with allies.

Wars, or events within war, are often utilized as political tools for interests that differ from proclaimed objectives. Whatever the form of such hidden motives and influences, these simply reflect the political web in which war takes place and from which it cannot be isolated. Policy-makers and commanders are inevitably entwined in this political web. The cynical reasons for which force is often employed may degrade the purity of policy, but it remains policy nonetheless and will invariably impact war, potentially to its detriment.

As such, this underlines the paradoxical impact of politics on war. On one hand, policy provides war with a rational structure, whereby belligerents seek to attain their ends through the reasoned use of force. On the other hand, it is embedded in what we have termed the political web of war, and this constitutes one of the greatest barriers to rational strategic behavior. War is inextricably ensconced within and impacted by a whole range of political forces beyond the manipulation of individual actors—a substance “removed from means and purpose that can be steered by the will.”³²

Nonlinearity and Dynamic Feedback

The analysis so far has examined the relationship between politics and war in a predominantly static, linear fashion to elucidate the basic concepts. As Alan Beyerchen notes, “the conventional approach . . . envisions a compartmentalization of politics and war in a linear sequence—first comes politics/policies, then war, then politics/policies again to make or maintain peace.”³³ The concept of subordination paints a picture of a one-way relationship, whereby policy sets the goals for war to achieve and remains the chief consideration throughout, until the objective is either attained, lost, or marginally accomplished. This is not the image Clausewitz intended to convey. In fact, he believed there would be a constant, complex, dynamic, and nonlinear feedback process between politics, policy, and war. He notes that “the political situation can change from year to year”³⁴ and, more importantly, “the original political objects can greatly alter during the course of the war and may finally change entirely since they are influenced by events and their probable consequences.”³⁵

Because the major lines that run through war are political, military developments will have political effects, which affect the decisions and calculations of leaders. Thus, in war there is a constant interplay between

objectives and the use of force, ends, and means. The incredible complexity this observation encompasses means that, in theoretical terms, the best one can hope for is to draw attention to its prominent characteristics. The concept of continuation emphasized the belligerents' roles in continually creating new political realities. Because new power relationships are created during the course of war, the interests of third parties, domestic factions, and local populations might prompt them to intervene or react in myriad ways, with all the political and military consequences such moves entail. This is often the case when the military success of one group encourages others to support its cause, confident in the belief they are backing the winning side and gaining politically as a result.

In this way, military developments impact political dynamics and feed into policy choices. It is important to remember that behind the abstract notion of policy there are human decision-makers, whatever institutional guise they may adopt. Those responsible for setting policy do not disappear at the outbreak of hostilities, rather they respond, adapt, and reassess policies in the light of changing circumstances. Policy responds actively or passively to the effects of its instrument.

The Ambiguity of Policy

Finally, Clausewitz believed the influence of policy on war was essentially ambiguous in relation to the rise of extremes: the political purpose neither necessarily causes a rise to extremes nor limits war, but it is the central, though not only, determinant of both. The student should be careful not to mistake war's subordination to policy for the limitation of war, as some have been known to do. As Clausewitz observes, when policy requires an extreme effort, war will follow, precisely because of its element of subordination. He states, "The closer . . . political probabilities drive war toward the absolute, the more the belligerent states are involved and drawn into its vortex."³⁶ Clausewitz's dialectical argument in Book 1, Chapter 1, demonstrates that limited and unlimited wars are largely politically determined, regardless of what appearances might suggest.

The matter is much more complex than political determination alone, because war creates its own dynamics. Wars begun for ostensibly limited objectives may rapidly escalate disproportionately to the original causes. The magnitude of any war in reality, Clausewitz believed, is determined by factors other than the political object—such as the effects of friction, uncertainty, passion, and cultural norms—that cause the use of force to be modified. In wars where policy essentially becomes a struggle for existence, those extraneous forces inhibiting violence are seldom marginalized, and only the friction inherent in war can serve to limit its ferociousness.

Policy is ambiguous in terms of its effect on strategic performance. The fact that Clausewitz believed war should be subject to the guiding intelligence of policy was not an attempt to argue that policy is always a wise or positive strategic force. For instance, policy can be unclear and make unrealistic demands on the military, or it may even be wrong. Nevertheless, sensible policy can have a positive impact on strategic effectiveness. Clearly stated objectives provide the military with a firm basis on which to plan operations.

Reflections

Clausewitz believed that a rational thread, derived from the overarching direction of policy, runs through war, connecting individual combatants to the higher purpose of war. The extent to which this influence is present depends on unique circumstances and the character of the belligerents, but Clausewitz held it was mistaken to conceive of war as ever being conducted without a guiding purpose, be it shallow or vaguely articulated. Groups attempt to achieve their ends through military means, even if this is a highly problematic undertaking. This is especially true given the difficulty of translation between the two realms, the uncertainty surrounding all decisions, the unstable nature of the military instrument, and the unpredictable effects that any use of force entails. He did not believe war could always be employed in a purely rational manner in pursuit of purely rational objectives. The relationship between policy and war is certainly not linear or narrowly deterministic, but rather reciprocal and dynamic in nature. Even if policy is definite about what it intends to achieve, the grammar of war can cause objectives to radically change during hostilities and the extent to which policy remains in control is highly contingent.

Placing emphasis on the political nature of war focuses attention on the dynamics that underlie the use of organized force, the logic of the distribution of relative power between groups. Power may be manifested in radically different forms, but at its heart it is about the ways in which social actors attempt to shape the context of their existence. When force is employed, the logic of politics does not cease; it continues in its most potent manifestation. Sometimes the main political lines in war will be distinct; at other times, they will be barely perceptible or shrouded by the brute clash of military forces. Often the political complexity can appear overwhelming, particularly when war is composed of myriad forces each pursuing divergent agendas. Yet this simply reflects the reality of such complex political relationships. In war, the scales of political power are constantly weighed and re-weighed, victory is rarely final, and military success can promptly be displaced by political failure.

War is an instrument of policy and a continuation of the web of political interactions through the medium of force. So, a paradoxical situation is apparent whereby war is imbued with rationality through its subordination to policy, while simultaneously deriving its unpredictable, irrational dynamic from its continuation of politics. War impacts upon power constellations at multiple levels and in endless ways, which no individual or organization can entirely control. Extraneous political considerations encourage decisions that do not directly correspond with objectives or make sense strategically. Not only is pure, rational action impossible in war, but attempts to achieve rational outcomes can be thwarted by the play of chance, influence of irrational impulses, or external political developments. War is an instrument that can easily slip from the hands of those who wield it or, while individuals may be successful in solving certain problems, they can create others where least expected. Those contemplating war as a means to achieve their ends have to understand the nature of the instrument, and attempt to accurately read the political landscape in an effort to ensure force is employed to produce desired effects, while minimizing adverse or unexpected developments.

Modern states struggle to employ their militaries as effective instruments of policy, primarily due to complex political conditions rather than any significant military shortcomings. Particularly in situations of insurgency and terrorism, the preeminent forms of warfare faced by the West today, politics is central. As Paul Cornish recently argued, counterinsurgency “must be political first, political last, political always.”³⁷ Force can be an extremely blunt instrument in dealing with various forms of organized violence and extreme care is required to avert unintended consequences. Clausewitz recognized that an era dominated by the annihilation battle and exemplified in Napoleon’s campaigns; in war, politics is “the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching” consideration.³⁸

NOTES

1. Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict Since Clausewitz* (New York: Free Press, 1991), 179.
2. Barbara Ehrenreich, *Blood Rites: Origins and History of Passion in War* (St. Ives: Virago Press, 1998), 7.
3. Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Everyman’s Library, 1993), 701.
4. Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1999), 102.
5. *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe (London: Oxford University Press, 2007), 11.
6. Clausewitz, *On War*, 101. Christopher Bassford convincingly suggests the sentence should be translated as ‘pure reason’, which, as opposed to ‘reason alone’, implies it is just one of the forces integral to war.

Politics and War: Clausewitz's Paradoxical Equation

Christopher Bassford, "The Primacy of Policy and the 'Trinity' in Clausewitz's Mature Thought," in Strachan and Herberg-Rothe, *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*, 77.

7. Michael Howard, "War as an Instrument of Policy," in Clausewitz, *On War*, 193-94.
8. Clausewitz, *On War*, 732.
9. *Ibid.*, 104 and 700.
10. In particular, see Book 1, Chapter 2, "Purpose and Means in War," in Clausewitz, *On War*.
11. *Ibid.*, 99.
12. *Ibid.*, 733.
13. *Ibid.*, 104.
14. *Ibid.*, 208. He probably had the example of Frederick the Great in mind.
15. *Ibid.*, 700.
16. *Ibid.*, 707.
17. *Ibid.*, 702-07.
18. *Ibid.*, 98-99. He argues war usually lasts long enough for it to 'remain subject to the action of a superior intelligence.'
19. Robert Endicott Osgood, *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1957), 26, quoted in Antulio J. Echevarria, II, *Clausewitz and Contemporary War* (London: Oxford University Press, 2007), 87.
20. Echevarria, *Clausewitz and Contemporary War*, 94.
21. The following analysis holds that the Howard/Paret translation of *On War* is accurate in its usage of the terms 'policy' and 'politics' where in German only the single term exists 'politik.'
22. Clausewitz, *On War*, 731-32.
23. *Ibid.*, 98-99.
24. *Ibid.*, 731.
25. *Ibid.*, 700-03.
26. *Ibid.*, 731.
27. *Ibid.*, 737.
28. *Ibid.*, 732.
29. Clausewitz, *On War*, 123, quoted in Michael I. Handel, *War, Strategy and Intelligence* (London: Routledge, 1989), 455.
30. Clausewitz, *On War*, 100.
31. Echevarria, *Clausewitz and Contemporary War*, 95.
32. Andreas Herberg-Rothe, *Clausewitz's Puzzle: The Political Theory of War* (London: Oxford University Press, 2007), 142.
33. Alan D. Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Importance of Imagery," <http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Readings.shtml> (accessed 20 August 2009).
34. Clausewitz, *On War*, 725.
35. *Ibid.*, 104.
36. *Ibid.*, 706.
37. Paul Cornish, "The United States and Counterinsurgency: 'Political First, Political Last, Political Always,'" *International Affairs*, 85, no. 1 (January 2009), 79.
38. Clausewitz, *On War*, 100.