Book Reviews

Parameters Editors

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From time immemorial, soldiers, politicians, office-holders, and other functionaries who ended their careers under a cloud of public opprobrium have seen fit on leaving office to write an “apologia”—not to be confused with “apology,” an expression of regret over admitted failure. An apologia rather is a defense, usually based on detailed explanation, evidence, and argument, of the author’s beclouded career. Perhaps the most famous instance was English Cardinal John Henry Newman’s Apologia pro Vita sua (1864), which attempted to vindicate his conversion late in life from the Church of England to Roman Catholicism and which is now recalled as one of the greatest prose masterpieces in the English language. Certainly no stigma attaches to writing an apologia. Any public person whose actions and character have been broadly impugned deserves the right to make a considered public reply.

An instance of such a reply inviting comparison with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s Known and Unknown is former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s In Retrospect (1995), in which he owned up to his failure to divulge his growing reservations concerning the Vietnam war to President Lyndon Johnson. Though McNamara’s book is nominally an apology, it is clear that he was still nursing wounds from the savaging he endured at the hands of Vietnam war critics and was hoping to rehabilitate his place in history by portraying his war decisions in a more nuanced and sympathetic light. Ironically, the appearance of his book some 30 years after the events served little more than to awaken and re-vocalize his critics. I mention his book to illustrate that authors can and do mix artful apology into their apologia as a deliberate rhetorical technique. By admitting to venial mistakes, they hope to gain credibility later in defending their whoppers.

In Rumsfeld’s apologia for his stewardship of the Pentagon during the first six years of the George W. Bush administration, he elevates the device of the self-serving admission of minor error into a high art form. One example of many: “I soon learned that my ‘old Europe’ comment had touched a raw nerve. It caused an uproar, especially from those who felt they were on the receiving end of my remark. The French Finance Minister called the comment ‘deeply irritating.’ Ironically, my comment was unintentional. I had meant to say France and Germany represented ‘old NATO,’ not ‘old Europe.’”
The title page of Rumsfeld’s lengthy apologia (16 pages of front matter plus 815 pages of text and back matter) contains no mention of coauthors or a ghost writer. On the reverse, the publisher Penguin (Sentinel is part of the Penguin Group) states that “the story, the experiences, and the words are the author’s alone.” On page xv, Rumsfeld speaks of the novel experience of writing a book: “I had never tried to do so before.” However, tucked away on pages 727 through 730 are acknowledgements containing by my count 130 named individuals excluding family, plus several library, archival, and institutional staffs. It becomes immediately clear on reading Rumsfeld’s description of the book’s production (“four years in the making”) that it is in fact a massive collaborative artifact put together by a high-powered team of writers, editors, researchers, fact-checkers, consultants, and advisors under Rumsfeld’s direction. The team invites comparison to military staff, as well it might: “The core group was headed by Keith Urbahn, my chief of staff and a Navy reserve intelligence officer, who has taken on historical, creative, and managerial responsibilities well beyond his years. . . .” As a longtime observer of the writing and production of books, I was astonished that Mr. Rumsfeld, having left office and no longer enjoying official entree to Department of Defense resources, was able to mobilize such a huge administrative, logistical, and creative effort. A clue resides in a note appearing in Army Times: “Rumsfeld received ‘big bids’ for his book, according to a publishing official who asked not to be identified, but decided to accept no advance for his book, only money for expenses. Any profit [after expenses] will be donated to a foundation he established recently to fund such projects as grants for ‘promising young individuals’ interested in public service” (28 April 2008, pp. 4-5).

Rumsfeld’s story actually covers his entire 50-plus-year professional career, an illustrious career by any standard, but most readers, including this reviewer, will focus on his second stint as Secretary of Defense, lasting from 20 January 2001 to 15 December 2006, under President George W. Bush. This period embraced both the Afghanistan war (Operation Enduring Freedom) commencing 7 October 2001, and the second Iraq war (Operation Iraqi Freedom) commencing 19 March 2003. The book has a big woolly thesis, roughly compressible as follows: Operation Iraqi Freedom, launched by President George W. Bush on 20 March 2003, to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and destroy his supposed weapons of mass destruction (WMD), was justified, even if no WMD were found; moreover, the Department of Defense’s planning for and execution of the war had been generally sound, despite the war’s unexpected prolongation and despite serious blunders by the Department of State, Coalition Provisional Authority, intelligence community, news media, National Security Council, Congress, and even the President. In purely formal terms, that is, as a display of argumentative adeptness, Mr. Rumsfeld’s defense of this thesis is extremely impressive. The case is meticulously conceived, exhaustively executed, massively documented (Rumsfeld appears never to have discarded a written thought or utterance), and, above all, shrewdly anticipative in foreseeing objections by gainsayers and then preempting them.
Unsympathetic readers who hope to find new verbal tokens of such disagreeable and widely alleged Rumsfeldian personality traits as arrogance, abrasiveness, raw egotism, and cocksureness, may be disappointed. The Rumsfeld persona appearing here has undergone an extreme makeover: generally, he is sunny, understanding, forbearing, receptive to subordinates’ bad news and disagreements, and generally sparing of others’ feelings—though he pulls few punches in expressing disappointment with Condoleeza Rice, L. Paul Bremer, Colin Powell, and George Tenet. Moreover, on big policy issues, many readers will believe Rumsfeld was substantially correct on most of them (for example, on our detainee program at Guantanamo, which despite unprecedented criticism has now been essentially adopted by the next administration).

But regardless of whether one agrees with the thrust of the book or believes it was successful in its purpose, it seems undeniable that it makes an essential contribution to the chronicle of our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. US defense policy in those nations since the terrorist attacks on American soil on 11 September 2001, has been subject to unrelenting criticism in the nation’s press, popular commentary, and contemporary histories—e.g., George Packer, The Assassin’s Gate (2005); Thomas Ricks, Fiasco (2006); Bob Woodward, State of Denial (2006) and The War Within (2008); Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, Cobra II (2006); Charles Ferguson, No End in Sight (2008); and especially Bradley Graham, By His Own Rules: The Ambitions, Successes, and Ultimate Failures of Donald Rumsfeld (2009). This onslaught has not been successfully counterbalanced by President George W. Bush’s own memoir Decision Points (2010); Douglas Feith’s memoir War and Decision (2008); or L. Paul Bremer’s mixed and narrowly focused My Year in Iraq (2005). Certainly future historians, if not today’s, need to hear the best case each side has to offer, and Rumsfeld’s is far and away the most cogent defense of US policy—and of himself as a major architect of that policy—that we are likely to get.

Let us now return to the subject of Mr. Rumsfeld’s “whoppers” alluded to earlier, that is, instances in which he steadfastly refused to admit big mistakes. Two examples. The first is a leadership issue, namely, his shoddy treatment of General Eric Shinseki, the Army’s Chief of Staff and an officer of impeccable character who had his lower leg blown off in Vietnam but continued to serve, and who today in retirement leads the Veterans Administration. General Shinseki ran seriously afoul of the Secretary during the latter part of his tenure as Chief of Staff. A prime instance was his refusal to support cancellation of the Crusader artillery system in the spring 2002 Pentagon review process culminating in Mr. Rumsfeld’s cancellation decision announced finally on 8 May. It so happened that during this contentious period, April 2002, well over a year prior to General Shinseki’s scheduled retirement in June 2003, word surfaced in the Pentagon that Shinseki’s replacement, when the time came, would be his deputy General Jack Keane (who later declined). Since in the Pentagon bureaucracy power tends to shift rather rapidly from the incumbent to the named successor, the effect was to lame duck, and thus to rebuke and humiliate, the sitting chief. Rumsfeld was roundly attacked in the press for what was apparently a
maliciously retaliatory stroke against General Shinseki, and in the present book he takes the witness stand to defend himself (pp. 452-56, 650-54). It is a long, complicated, and even convoluted defense in which he disclaims any intention of lame ducking Shinseki (he does not broach that word). In denying that he was the leaker or arranged the leak, he begs the issue entirely. Why would he even be discussing a successor with Pentagon principals 14 to 15 months before the event? Moreover, from all he says, it is impossible to establish a precise timeline for events, and, most telling, he carefully avoids spelling out the unprecedented long lapse of time between his discussion of a successor and the actual date of Shinseki’s scheduled retirement. After poring over his explanation several times and consulting other sources (Thomas Ricks, *Fiasco*, p. 69; Robert Novak, *Washington Post*, 1 May 2003; Frank Tiboni, *Army Times*, 12 June 2003; and Richard Kohn, *Armed Forces Journal*, June 2006), this reviewer concludes that Mr. Rumsfeld’s lengthy protest is disingenuous.

The second whopper is a policy issue. Philosophically speaking, Mr. Rumsfeld was a ground-power minimalist and remained one to the day he departed his position. Early on, he had become enamored of “net-centric warfare,” the theory being to integrate all actors within a common grid composed of communications, computers, sensors, and other inputs so as to universalize the flow of information. Information superiority, reinforced by technological superiority in weaponry, target acquisition, and delivery platforms, enables faster decision cycles, forestalls enemy reactions, creates more friendly options, and minimizes risks and casualties. Capitalizing on precision-guided munitions of devastating power and launched at safe standoff distances and altitudes, network-centric violence is visited upon the enemy from the hygienic confines of hermetically sealed cockpits and missile-launch control rooms. No more need for big numbers of expensive ground troops to bend the enemy to our will. No more discomfiting casualty figures assailing the eyes of voters with each evening’s news telecast. After all those bloody wars since Homeric times, we had finally discovered a way to win them on the cheap! Or so one would believe from all the hype generated by DOD’s Office of Force Transformation beginning in late 2001. Mr. Rumsfeld could never quite entertain the thought that net-centric warfare as fleshed out with its full armamentarium of gee-whiz stand-off weaponry was operationally and strategically impotent in a likely insurgency war where securing the population and providing fit governance were key.

The Weinberger/Powell doctrine had wisely counselled that no future US military intervention be undertaken without decisive force. Yet, Mr. Rumsfeld, casting aside such stodgy old thinking, arranged for Operation Iraqi Freedom to be conducted on a shoestring (even if we include the 4th Infantry Division, which was barred by Turkey from invading Iraq from its soil). We succeeded brilliantly in the initial assault against Saddam’s frontline forces, but were never able to muster the sort of widespread, smothering troop presence that would have snuffed out all significant opposition from the start. Despite the Weinberger/Powell insistence on clear political objectives, Rumsfeld’s priority
was to achieve a quick military victory and get out. He devoted little attention to such politico-strategic concerns as post-conflict consolidation and government reconstitution, which would require large numbers of troops on the ground. Mr. Rumsfeld never seemed willing to include in his definition of victory in war the coequally valid desideratum of an acceptable peace. He never seemed to grasp that war is always fought for political ends and that overriding efforts must therefore be devoted to assuring that the desired political ends materialize. This idea is as old as Clausewitz, of course, and we may note that since the inauguration of the most recent Clausewitzian renaissance by Michael Howard and Peter Paret in 1976, the nation’s political and military leaders have been literally drenched in reminders of the great philosopher’s enduring dictum. Yet, in an irony bordering on the surreal, we as a nation have continued to celebrate the heroics and drama of the battlefield while political rewards remain tantalizingly beyond reach. It is incredible that Mr. Rumsfeld and his coterie did not know this or chose to ignore it. Prior to the war the “Future of Iraq Project” was completed by the Department of State which presciently warned of the sectarian furies that would be unleashed with the Iraqi government’s decapitation and the consequent requirement for the wherewithal to establish and maintain order, security, and a functioning government in the war’s immediate aftermath. Rumsfeld was later criticized for ignoring this “plan.”

In his book, Rumsfeld grows testy on the issue, defending himself as follows: “The notion that a few in the State Department may have alerted people to potential problems in postwar Iraq—even if quite helpfully—was not on its face a seminal achievement. I had listed problems that might arise in postwar Iraq in my ‘Parade of Horribles’ memo. That does not mean my memo was a plan or solution” (p. 486). By shifting the question to the definitional issue of whether the State document was a “plan,” Mr. Rumsfeld ignores the essential point that he had been well warned about what would happen if we barged into Iraq lacking sufficient troops to establish and maintain order as a necessary prelude to establishing a viable government. In fact, growing exasperated over the drumbeat of such warning, Mr. Rumsfeld, according to retired Major General John Batiste, “at one point threatened to fire the next person who mentioned the need for a postwar plan in Iraq.” As a result, we ad hoced it with what few troops we had and could scrounge, the insurgency grew and then snowballed, and we are still there eight years later. At each step of the way, his has been the reluctant, skeptical, or naysayer’s voice against calls for troop increases, citing a general here or there in support, worrying about an overly large US “footprint,” fretting over the undeniable stress on the force and families (all legitimate concerns but not valid reasons for accepting defeat), or assuring listeners that commanders had not asked for more troops (they knew what the answer would be).

A dynamic soon emerged, both in Afghanistan and Iraq, in which we with great fanfare cleared a city of al Qaeda, then departed and used the same troops to clear another city, only to see the first revert to al Qaeda’s control once our troops pulled out. Senator John McCain accurately characterized
this pattern as “playing an endless game of whack-a-mole.” We simply didn’t have enough forces to clear, hold, pacify, and consolidate, nor were sufficient numbers of capable indigenous Iraqi police/soldiers available to take over cleared cities and protect the population once American troops pulled out to go whack the next mole. It is of course true that raising additional troops for an already stretched volunteer Army was no easy task, and it is understandable that Rumsfeld was reluctant to put the President on the spot by asking for more. But it was maddeningly perverse for him to pretend publicly that more troops were not needed or that, if they were, they could be squeezed out of headquarters and other nondeployed stateside administrative units by resorting to greater “efficiencies.”

It is significant that the book’s otherwise complete and detailed index contains no mention whatever of the celebrated 2007 surge—at least I couldn’t find it—since the successful surge, requiring an additional 20,000 troops, spectacularly revealed the utter bankruptcy of Rumsfeld’s “strategy” for winning the war on the cheap, including his pretense right up to the bitter end that additional troops would serve no useful purpose, even though control of the capital Baghdad, among other embarrassments, had been essentially ceded to thugs, death squads, sectarian militias, and the ever-present al Qaeda. Omission from the book index of this topic can be technically justified by the fact that Rumsfeld resigned on 6 November 2006 (the date of his letter of resignation but he did not actually leave the Department until 15 December), whereas the new military commander General David Petraeus was not nominated to implement the surge until 26 January 2007, over two months after Rumsfeld left office. But Rumsfeld was privy to early discussions of the surge in November and indeed treats the subject in some depth (pp. 713-17) in his final chapter. Thus, the omission of the topic from the index will raise eyebrows, particularly since the rest of the chapter is indexed.

His remarks on the surge are lukewarm at best and misleading at worst, couched in terms suggesting he was won to the idea only as the objective conditions favoring it gradually became propitious. First, in November 2006: “Since a surge of military forces still lacked support among military leaders, that suggestion was placed in my memo [on options] ‘below the line’—in other words, as a less favored option.” Subsequently, after President Bush had firmly demanded of his advisors a plan for winning the war, not for pulling up stakes, and had approved General Petraeus’s request for 20,000 more troops which began deploying in January 2007: “Though I was a latecomer in supporting the surge, by the time I left the Pentagon I felt there were solid arguments for its two main military features: a somewhat heavier US footprint [he can’t bring himself to say “more troops”] and a new operational approach that centered on securing the population” [he fails to mention that it took four years for him to admit the virtue of this approach]. At the time of his departure from the Pentagon, he was asked by a television reporter what he thought of the plan to send additional soldiers to Iraq. His reply: “Well, one first has to inquire what they’ll be used for,” or words to that effect. During the Fox Evening News on 23 November
2008, the crawler reported Rumsfeld’s statement that the 2007 surge in Iraq worked because, under him, all the groundwork had been laid, e.g., the Sunni Awakening, etc., but that the surge would not have worked earlier.

As it related to Mr. Rumsfeld’s effort to salvage his reputation, it was unfortunate for him that the President selected Robert Gates to succeed him. Their juxtaposition in office invited attention to their contrasting managerial styles, and the contrast was not flattering to Mr. Rumsfeld. Mr. Gates soon showed himself to be as smart and tough as his predecessor, while his modesty, calm demeanor, and quiet confidence reassured a doubtful public and garnered a welcome measure of bipartisan support.

As noted, Mr. Rumsfeld confessed to many niggling missteps during his second tour at the Pentagon, but to this reviewer the book disappoints because he never stepped up to the plate and confessed to the biggest missteps of all—failure to act on the elementary principle that before undertaking to decapitate a government, one must be prepared to recapitate it; and, relatedly, failure to acknowledge the troop-intensive nature of the resulting counterinsurgency war in a sect- and tribal-riven failed state. Had he recognized these requirements, and employed his vast energy and talents to meet them, the Afghanistan and Iraq wars may well have been shortened, with far fewer American casualties.

At General Shinseki’s retirement ceremony, to which Mr. Rumsfeld was not invited, the general warned his civilian masters against “trying to execute a twelve-division strategy with a ten-division Army.” This must have stung the Secretary when he read the press reports, not only because it was so epigrammatically pointed but also because it was so devastatingly accurate.

Though the apologia Known and Unknown is indeed a prodigious monument to human vanity, it remains an adroit case on behalf of the Pentagon imperium of Donald Rumsfeld, a Secretary of Defense who, though not quite larger than life, came about as close as life itself is likely to permit. The book is a major contribution to the historiography professionals who aim to stay abreast of the defense world at the top and they should definitely take a spin through this provocative work.

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Rumsfeld was a latecomer in supporting the surge.
Sun Tzu is famous for his admonition to know your enemy; this book is another step toward knowing modern Islamist terrorists. Norman Cigar, a research fellow with a strong Arabic background, and former professor at the Marine Corps University, has translated and analyzed one of several extant texts intended as doctrine for the jihadist movement. This one is by Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, who was a lifelong terrorist and briefly head of Al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula (QAP), the branch organization for Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, until Saudi security forces killed him in June 2004. Al-Muqrin wrote his text *A Practical Course for Guerrilla War* as a training manual for his QAP forces. The book was published both in pamphlet form and serialized on QAP’s website. The impact of the work on overall terrorist doctrine or the degree of authority attributed to it is unknown, although it is still available in Arabic on various terrorist websites. This is the first English translation to be published. This reviewer cannot comment on the quality of the translation, but Cigar’s extensive analysis (about half of the book) is very well done.

*A Practical Course for Guerrilla War* is a very tactical manual. There are long chapters on topics such as using dead drops for communications, how to ambush a motorcade, and urban tactical procedures. Much of this is straight out of western doctrinal manuals, which al-Muqrin leaned on heavily. For example, he recommends clearing buildings from top to bottom and blowing entry points rather than using doors or windows—standard procedures that depend on both access to roofs of denied buildings and extensive supplies of demolitions, which is always problematic for western armies and well outside the capability of most guerrilla forces. He does not discuss why a guerrilla would want to clear a building. Conversely, one sees glimpses of strategic thought or passages that give strategic insight in several sections of the book. Al-Muqrin starts his text with a definition of war, the objectives of war, and the causes of war. He covers those subjects in about three-quarters of a page, but that brief excursion gives a glimpse into how he thinks about war. For example, al-Muqrin defines just war as war by an oppressed people against their oppressor. He defines unjust war as war waged “to dominate other belief systems, to replace the prescriptions of religious laws, to seize territory, and to plunder (other’s) riches.” That reflects his (and many other terrorists’) understanding of the current conflict. When he gets into types of war and how to fight a guerrilla war, al-Muqrin defaults directly to Maoist theory. He adopts Mao’s three phases
of protracted war directly. He sees the countryside as the critical terrain. He emphasizes gaining the support of the people, although he does not spend much time discussing the subject since he seems to assume the people believe as he does and will naturally support the jihad once they see its importance. Al-Muqrin believes conventional forces supported by guerrillas will win the final victory, which is not part of standard jihadist literature. This raises the issue of *A Practical Course for Guerrilla War*’s place in jihadist literature.

Al-Muqrin’s text is representative of its genre; however, it differs from other terrorist doctrine in several respects. For example, the introductory remarks are full of the obligatory religious obeisance, but the body of the text is much more sectarian than most jihadist works. This reflects its purpose as a military manual rather than a political text, which would be more religious in nature. Similarly, this text is written in the context of QAP and with that very specific environment in mind. Thus, Cigar finds it unusual that al-Muqrin does not discuss weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but that is perfectly understandable since a devout Muslim would be reluctant to use WMD in Saudi Arabia even if he thinks the government is apostate. The Arabian Peninsula perspective also makes the reliance on Maoist theory understandable since al-Muqrin wrote as a nationalist insurgent, not as a terrorist with international pretentions. More puzzling is the lack of mention of improvised explosive devices or suicide bombers, both major elements of jihadist tactics that have been used in Saudi Arabia, perhaps reflecting experience with the negative impact of collateral damage on public opinion. The most interesting aspect of this work is how much it reflects traditional military theory; strategically, one sees heavy influence from Mao and Sun Tzu, and the tactical material is often adaptations of western military manuals or other standard works such as Carlos Marighella’s *Manual of the Urban Guerrilla* rather than some sort of new, uniquely Islamist thinking. Similarly, al-Muqrin recommends a fairly standard hierarchical guerrilla organization rather than some fancy network (not unexpectedly, since jihadists think of themselves as a movement, not a network). Perhaps he did not know about networks or have the sophistication to develop his own theory; or perhaps as we grow to know our enemies we will realize they really are not ten feet tall.

**al-Muqrin adopts Mao’s three phases of protracted war.**
A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq
by Mark Moyar

Reviewed by Gregory A. Daddis, Academy Professor, Department of History, US Military Academy

As the American commitment to South Vietnam grew in the early 1960s, so too did the literature on counterinsurgency. In fact, so fashionable had the topic become that military analyst Hanson W. Baldwin decried “the muddy verbosity and the pompous profundity that are beginning to mask the whole subject of counterinsurgency and guerrilla war.” Baldwin likely would not be surprised by the similarly abundant musings on counterinsurgency in the last five years. He might, however, have had his interest piqued by Mark Moyar’s latest contribution, which maintains that leadership is at the heart of successful counterinsurgencies. In fact, A Question of Command requires careful reading.

Moyar, the Adamson Chair of Insurgency and Terrorism at the US Marine Corps University, argues that the “leader-centric nature of counterinsurgency” demands identifying and developing commanders who are more flexible, creative, and intellectually agile than their conventional counterparts. Through nine historical case studies ranging from the American Civil War to the present conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, Moyar’s aim is to isolate the leadership attributes of successful counterinsurgents. Indeed, he has ascertained ten such attributes. Effective counterinsurgency leaders share the qualities of initiative (a major theme in this work), flexibility, creativity, judgment, empathy, charisma, sociability, dedication, integrity, and organization. Unfortunately, Moyar offers little insight into how he identified these attributes, leaving the reader to question his methodology for historical analysis.

The historical case studies form the bulk of A Question of Command, and Moyar uses them not only to display the significance of leadership in unconventional warfare but also to critique “population-centric” and “enemy-centric” theories of counterinsurgency. In the process, he attacks “doctrine or strategy that dictates in detail how to defeat the insurgents.” Neither social, political, and economic reforms nor using armed force to defeat insurgencies guarantee success. Rather, Moyar argues, the leader who is able to adjust his methods to local conditions is the most important factor. In the Civil War, for example, effective Union commanders labored to separate hostile civilians from friendly and weighed the consequences before using armed force. (According to Moyar, depopulation and forced resettlement, if done correctly, have benefits.) Poor leaders allowed corruption to flourish in their commands while more capable officers fixed bureaucratic weaknesses and replaced unprincipled commanders who abused the local populace.
In a refreshing addition to counterinsurgency literature, Moyar also considers the Reconstruction era. As in the Civil War, Federal troops contended with political ambiguities of an occupation mission and local elites who still enjoyed the loyalty of Southern whites. Likewise, the Philippine Insurrection demanded that US officers combat insurgent leaders from the Filipino upper class (principalia), bolstering Moyar’s contention that counterinsurgencies require subduing or destroying the enemy elite. The Philippines also reinforce a major theme: destructive force selectively applied by good commanders is often a necessary component of counterinsurgency warfare. As Moyar notes, the “US response to the Philippine Insurrection contradicts the view . . . that civic action is invariably more effective than military action in defeating insurgents.”

Ensuing case studies further Moyar’s defense of leadership as key to counterinsurgency success. The Huk Rebellion in the post-World War II Philippines illustrates the importance of host-nation leaders, in this instance, Filipino Secretary of National Defense Ramon Magsaysay, stimulating effective local resistance against insurgents. Moyar employs the Malayan Emergency to show how civilian-military interagency committees could direct a war without depriving local commanders of their freedom of action. Moyar’s balanced chapter on the Vietnam War reveals the trials of counterinsurgency leaders attempting to train local forces against an enemy able “to switch back and forth between regular and irregular warfare.” Though claims of the “remarkable transformation of South Vietnamese leadership in the late 1960s and early 1970s” are unpersuasive, the Vietnam chapter demonstrates that leader development in host-nation forces is just as crucial as leader development within the US armed forces.

Moyar reserves his final two studies for Afghanistan and Iraq. While each conflict’s mosaic nature required (and still requires) sound leadership at all levels, particularly the local, Moyar uses these chapters to renew his assault on doctrinal fixations. “Afghanistan’s kaleidoscopic physical and human landscapes,” he argues, “heightened the importance of adaptivity and further reduced the value of doctrine.” In Iraq, the author rightly perceives more continuity between pre- and post-surge approaches to counterinsurgency than the popular Operation Iraqi Freedom narrative indicates. As such, Moyar believes the 2006 counterinsurgency field manual did not have as much impact as its authors intended. The new manual even “impeded innovation to a degree by advancing as universal certain principles and methods that were not actually viable in all or even most counterinsurgency settings.”

Moyar’s fundamental argument makes sense. Leadership in war counts. Yet as much as it offers a unique if simple approach to studying counterinsurgencies, A Question of Command proffers arguments that should be considered with care. Moyar’s attack on doctrinal infatuation is fine; however, an army founded on good doctrine does not necessarily make it doctrinaire. Whether counterinsurgency requires a higher degree of resourcefulness than conventional operations seems equally tenuous. German and British innovations in the World War I trenches or American tactical adjustments in the World War II
Normandy hedgerows suggest that war, not just irregular war, requires all armies to adapt to their enemy and surroundings. Finally, Moyar’s thinly veiled backing of an aggressively interventionist foreign policy smacks of hubris. Throughout this work, third-world leaders fighting insurgencies are portrayed as inept and diffident administrators who only need American tutelage to be successful counterinsurgents. Moyar concedes at the end, though, that such “advice rarely sank in.”

* A Question of Command * is intended to assist counterinsurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan and, on the whole, it should be read, but with a careful eye. Moyar is surely correct that multifaceted wars require flexibility and creativity from military and civilian leaders. If readers can navigate through this work’s more specious supporting arguments, there is much to consider in developing leaders comfortable with the complexities of modern war.

**America’s Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force**

by Beth L. Bailey

Reviewed by Dr. Aaron O’Connell, Assistant Professor of History, US Naval Academy.

Beth Bailey has written a marvelous book about an important topic. Her exploration of the Army’s transition from selective service to an all-volunteer force is well-researched, persuasively argued, and clearly written in an easy style that is too often missing from both military and cultural history. From the draft protests of the 1960s to the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, America’s Army narrates how the nation’s largest armed service survived the tumultuous 1970s, rebounded in the 1980s, and fashioned a winning formula for public acceptance and support. While scholars have already given some treatment to how the Army moved to an all-volunteer force, this book situates the transition in the broader social context, using the debates over the Army’s future as a lens into American race relations, gender relations, and the role of social science research and the ideology of the market in military affairs.

Bailey begins in the Vietnam-soaked political landscape of the 1968 presidential campaign when candidate Richard Nixon first proposed abolishing the draft. Nixon’s promise was pure political opportunism, but the actual work of designing an all-volunteer force, which fell to a White House commission of economists, soldiers, and business leaders, involved a deeper ideological struggle. Should providing for the national defense be understood as an obligation of citizenship or a labor market issue of supply and demand? Prominent free-market economists Milton Friedman and Alan Greenspan believed the latter and argued forcefully that the key was improved pay and benefits to sustain the required enlistments. Other members of the commission, including
retired Generals Alfred Gruenther and Lauris Norstad, had greater reservations about the intrusion of market principles into military life. Despite the conflicts, the free-marketers seized the initiative, and when President Nixon reported the commission’s findings to Congress, he did so in decidedly Greenspanian language. That ideology of the market, Bailey claims, has undergirded the Army’s all-volunteer force ever since, and has led it to use marketing methods with increasing sophistication: social-science data to identify target audiences, marketing consultants to interpret that data, and Madison Avenue ad agencies to sell the Army as everything from a path to college to a journey toward personal fulfillment. While Bailey lauds the Army’s transition as a “tale of progress and achievement,” she notes in the book’s last sentence that “there is something lost when individual liberty is valued over all and the rights and benefits of citizenship become less closely linked to its duties and obligations.”

The most enjoyable part of the chapters on the 1970s is the narration of the Army’s dramatic branding failures. From its earliest, disastrous slogan, “Today’s Army Wants to Join You,” to “Join the People Who’ve Joined the Army,” and, on a recruiting postcard, “Nothing’s perfect, but this is pretty good,” Bailey shows that the Army’s efforts to cater to “youth values” simply did not work.

What saved the Army from its low point in the late 1970s was a new, no-nonsense commanding general for recruiting and a new slogan. General Maxwell R. “Mad Max” Thurman believed in more social-science data and better use of it, and it was under him that the Army recruiting system finally adopted modern corporate management. The nerdy and demanding Thurman (Bailey describes him as “pencil-necked”) also spearheaded a change in the corporate culture of the Army recruiting system, a shift to viewing the Army as a “gigantic business” and recruiting as a “stock-control function” (Thurman’s words). But the real hero of the Army’s rehabilitation was five little words that Bailey argues changed the image of the Army in the 1980s: “Be All You Can Be.” When the campaign began in 1980, only 54 percent of recruits had graduated from high school, and more than half were Category IVs, the lowest mental category for enlistees. Seven years later, 91 percent were high school graduates and only four percent were the dreaded “Cat IVs.” Later slogans, “Freedom Isn’t Free,” “An Army of One,” and the current slogan, “Army Strong,” had different emphases and varying degrees of success, but the Army’s path to an all-volunteer force only became smoother in the 1990s and particularly after 11 September 2001.

Military historians have only recently begun considering military public relations and recruiting history as windows into America’s civil-military relations, so there is little to criticize in this path-breaking account. But this reviewer cannot help but take issue with the conclusions Bailey draws on the Army’s “turn to the market,” the increasing reliance on slick advertising, and modern corporate management principles to keep its ranks filled. For as ads such as “Army Strong,” “Creed,” and indeed, almost every Marine Corps recruiting slogan since the 1950s show, young Americans do not respond only to
promises of economic gain and money for college. The ideology of the market may now dominate the military’s methods but not their recruiting messages nor their members’ motives. Strong beliefs in duty, martial tradition, and a desire to sacrifice are principal reasons many enter the military. While Professor Bailey does not directly suggest that military members are infected with the free-market ideology she finds in the Army’s bureaucracy, one of the book’s major claims is that in the transition to an all-volunteer force, the liberal-market ideology of Friedman and Greenspan muscled out other, almost collectivist notions of duty and citizenship. Those living and working in the armed forces of the United States would not see it that way. And while this is a quibble over emphasis rather than substance, it points the way for future work on how military members view their own culture and American society. Overall, America’s Army is an excellent volume, appropriate for anyone interested in the military and its role in American society.

**Bomb Power: The Modern Presidency and the National Security State**
by Garry Wills

Reviewed by John W. Coffey, retired Foreign Affairs Officer at the US State Department.

Recognizing that the world is a dangerous place, Alexander Hamilton observed, “It is the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative authority.” Garry Wills views the evolution of the presidency in more sinister terms. According to Wills, the secret Manhattan Project provided a paradigm for presidential usurpation of power across the spectrum of national security. Wills’s determinism makes one thing explain everything. The bomb knocked the Constitution off the skids. “Executive power,” the author claims, “has basically been, since World War II, Bomb Power.” The “forces” he describes have produced an “American monarch.”

Wills’s overwrought reprise of Arthur Schlesinger’s *The Imperial Presidency* lacks three things: an appreciation of the differences between the executive and legislative authorities; historical context; and recognition of the importance of individuals in history. Let us trace his argument.

After World War II, a “structure of fear” in the executive office drove a quest for atomic supremacy. For Wills, psychology displaces historical context to explain foreign policymaking in response to a perceived Soviet threat. The 1947 Truman Doctrine announcing aid to Greece and Turkey formed a “main pillar” of the national security state. The National Security Act of that year built the institutional structure (an Air Force, Department of Defense, National Security Council, and Central Intelligence Agency). The surreptitious diversion of Marshall Plan funds for covert operations to prevent
a Communist victory in the 1948 Italian elections, NATO’s “militarization” of the Marshall Plan, publication of NSC 68, and the establishment of the National Security Agency completed the unconstitutional edifice. Executive prerogative in secret CIA funding for covert operations fails to pass constitutional muster for Wills, and the Manhattan Project’s secrecy served as precedent in subsequent years for covering up “anything important” and concealing CIA “crimes” in its foreign interventions.

Despite congressional attempts in the 1970s (e.g., the War Powers Resolution, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and congressionally mandated CIA reforms) to limit executive power, the “imperial presidency” remained unchecked, with Richard Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld leading a “counter-revolution” against the congressional coup when they returned to power in the George W. Bush Administration. The Bush II Administration launched an “extremist” assault on the War Powers Resolution (unconstitutional in the first place), and in a “crescendo of presidential arrogance” brought executive usurpation to its climax. Wills might have indicted Richard Nixon, instead of George W. Bush, as chief usurper. In that case, however, he would have to concede that our constitutional system worked, having forced the resignation of a President under threat of impeachment. Wills also elides the fact that America does have elections in which citizens have ample knowledge to judge the propriety and efficacy of a President’s actions.

Wills ruefully concludes that President Obama has brought no real change we can believe in. The modern President is “a self-entangling giant,” an ensnared Gulliver, trapped in his insidious imperial power. The author expresses forlorn hope for a return to “the quaint old Constitution” of congressional supremacy (Madison), though the eighteenth century lies far behind us.

Wills’s thesis about the modern presidency—after the bomb, therefore because of the bomb—rests on a post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy. The evolution of a powerful federal government and chief executive (and economic chief) are due far more to presidential leadership in a Civil War, two World Wars, and Great Depression than to one thing. Recently, we saw an unelected executive body, the Federal Reserve Board, take extraordinary steps to avert a second depression. Wills considers himself a Madisonian; yet the first significant expansion of executive power occurred with Jefferson’s extraconstitutional Louisiana Purchase.

The 1830 Louisiana Purchase enlarged the area of the country about 140 percent, making the United States the second nation in total area and the first nation in tillable area. Jefferson justified his greatest presidential achievement by his concept of building an “empire of liberty” based on the law of nature underlying national security, preservation. Jefferson used executive power to protect free men from aggression and secure access to Mississippi commerce in order to preserve and nurture the republic. Hamilton laid the politico-economic foundations of modern America, but Jefferson acquired the territory making a large commercial republic possible. Joseph Story, who disliked Jefferson and
all his works, later ironically remarked that the strict-constructionist Jefferson used the “implied powers” of the President championed by John Marshall.

Nor does Wills appreciate why the respective responsibility and composition of the executive and legislative authorities favor executive predominance in national security affairs. Hamilton argued that because the common defense is the first object of the Union, the power of defense must be constitutionally unlimited on the principle that the means must be proportionate to the end: “The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed.”

A due dependence on the people and due responsibility made a vigorous executive compatible with republican government, Hamilton maintained, and “energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.” Unlike the legislative branch, the Executive can act with “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch.” The virtues of the two authorities differ: “In the legislative, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarring of parties . . . promote deliberation and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority.” Dissension enfeebles the executive, whereas “vigor and expedition” are required in the conduct of war where the executive is the “bulwark of national security.” According to constitutional scholar C. Herman Pritchett, judicial precedent upholds the president’s primacy in foreign relations and war based on the grant of executive power, authority as commander-in-chief, and recognized position as “the nation’s organ for foreign affairs.” These powers, Pritchett held, are “so great, in fact, that to a considerable degree they cancel out the most important grant of external authority to Congress, the power to declare war.”

A preoccupation with one thing leads Wills to neglect the importance of individuals in history, statesmen with different characters grappling, in concrete circumstances, with the complexities and uncertainties of policymaking in a perilous world. In Arsenal of Democracy, Julian Zelizer details the fierce partisan politics that shaped policy and party fortunes in the postwar era. Peter Rodman’s fine Presidential Command describes the ebb and flow of executive authority in national security policymaking. Rodman explains why the character of people, above all the commander-in-chief, is the paramount factor in government, and he demonstrates how effective policymaking requires personal presidential engagement.

The Obama Administration has resisted congressional calls for wider notification of covert actions, retained core elements of President Bush’s counterterrorism policy, and dramatically increased drone strikes in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Furthermore, a bipartisan foreign-policy consensus on Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran has emerged between the Administration and Republicans. These steps illustrate the permanence of our interests (and how a party in, not out of, power must protect them) as well as the interests of other nations. Only a strong President can represent the nation’s unity of purpose and provide clarity of action in a world that looks for American
leadership. That, not the bomb, is why we have a strong (not monarchical) President.

A family escapes a horrible war in their home country and starts a new life in America. The father’s death in a tragic industrial accident forces two young brothers to live in an orphanage. Through his mother’s determination, as well as patronage from influential mentors, one of the brothers rises to the military’s highest ranks, where he develops the most devastating weapons ever known.

This is not fiction from Dickens, but rather the true story of General Bernard Schriever told in compelling narrative by Neil Sheehan. An established expert on Vietnam, Sheehan had never heard of Schriever before he started to research a book on the Cold War nuclear arms race. Captivated by the incredible contributions made by this individual, he decided to make “Bennie” the common thread of his work. He chose wisely, crafting a fresh historical account that includes heroes and villains, courage and treachery, triumph and tragedy, most of which occurred in a mere decade between “Mike,” the first thermonuclear test in 1952, and the first operational alert of the “Minuteman” intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in 1962.

Born 14 September 1910, in Bremen, Germany, Schriever’s first eight years of life indeed included a family move to America, the untimely death of his father, and residence in an orphanage until his mother found employment in San Antonio, Texas. Luck and hard work brought the family back together, and Bernard (“Bennie” for short) excelled in school and sports, eventually earning his degree from Texas A&M. In 1932, he became an Army Air Corps pilot and within a year reported to Lieutenant Colonel Henry “Hap” Arnold’s unit.

In the chapters covering the next 12 years, Sheehan presents professional trends that would become Schriever’s hallmarks as a leader. By 1944, Schriever became a young colonel after winning over the ill-tempered Brigadier General “Ennis the Menace” Whitehead in Australia. After enduring unfair “chew out” sessions from Whitehead, Bennie responded by applying his technical prowess to solve persistent maintenance issues as well as by showing courage as a B-17 bomber copilot. The author highlights the autumn of that year, when Hap Arnold (now a five-star general) called Bennie to the Pentagon and entrusted him to continue innovating the Air Corps as he himself had done before World War II, and especially to aggressively embrace new technologies.
Schriever spent most of the next nine years as a leader in the newly formed US Air Force, trying to bolster the nuclear might of the Strategic Air Command, but often drawing ire from General Curtis LeMay for sticking to the facts instead of appeasing “the Cigar.” In 1952, when the United States successfully tested the world’s first thermonuclear device, Schriever saw his future venture revealed; Sheehan expertly chronicles the resulting paths Bennie traveled to fulfill Arnold’s quest. First, he had to conquer the sheer physics of building a small nuclear weapon, launching it thousands of miles, having it survive a fiery reentry, and making it accurate enough to be of military utility. Once such a capability was demonstrated, it had to be mass-produced, fielded, tested, and declared operational—all in a race with the Soviet Union. And if this was not enough, Schriever had to overcome the bureaucracy of getting any program to survive approval from 42 agencies, let alone to become the nation’s top defense priority. He excelled at building effective teams from brilliant, but sometimes flawed, individuals and by focusing them toward a common vision. Sheehan’s commentary of how Bennie’s teams tackled service rivalries, political intrigue, and a rapidly changing geopolitical environment offers a number of positive examples for today’s leaders to consider.

Sheehan takes the reader through the winding path from the conception of the ICBM to its eventual operational success as the Cold War’s ultimate weapon. He demonstrates admirable skill for simplifying complex scientific details and engaging the reader with vignettes about the personalities surrounding the events. The final sections of the book extend the story into space when Schriever is tasked to use ICBM rockets to boost America’s first photographic reconnaissance satellites into orbit. In a way, this brings the saga full circle; such space-based intelligence was used by the United States and Soviet Union to add stability to deterrence.

*A Fiery Peace in a Cold War* puts a human face on the global struggle for nuclear superiority. Fortunately for readers, the author adds new depth and details from his 52 interviews with General Schriever, as well as from dialogue with over 118 others who knew the general well. He brings to life such men as Trevor Gardner, the work-hard, play-hard Welshman who navigated the often-treacherous waters of Washington, DC; General LeMay, the mercurial nemesis who considered ICBM development as an “extravagant boondoggle” siphoning funds away from his precious nuclear bombers; Lieutenant Colonel Ed Hall, the caustic genius who designed the Atlas liquid rockets as well as the solid-fueled Minuteman; and Colonel “Moose” Mathison, who built rocket pads in swamps and perfected the art of plucking a satellite’s film from the sky. These and many more such characters bring insight and empathy to this tale of two cities—in this case, Washington and Moscow.

Perhaps the only shortcoming of the book is that it gives the impression that all is well with Schriever’s legacy. Indeed, Sheehan ends with the thought that Bennie may be smiling on what he accomplished, but one might wonder how he would reflect on our military’s recent string of careless events that endanger the stewardship of US nuclear weapons—and by logical extension,
the safety of the world. Without having to call upon Jacob Marley, perhaps reading Sheehan’s account can cast General Schriever as the “ghost of missiles past” to visit today’s leaders and help ensure that his dream does not become their nightmare.

**The Untold War: Inside the Hearts, Minds, and Souls of Our Soldiers**

by Nancy Sherman

**Reviewed by Chaplain (Colonel) David Reese.**

Director, Ethical Development, US Army War College and former Director of Soldier and Family Ministries, Office of the Chief of Chaplains.

Since the introduction of Dr. Jonathan Shay’s *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character*, there have been a handful of books that examine modern soldiers and combat through the lens of ancient Greek tales of iconic warriors such as Achilles, Odysseus, and Ajax. Dr. Nancy Sherman’s *The Untold War: Inside the Hearts, Minds, and Souls of Our Soldiers* expertly elevates the examination with the complementary pairing of ancient Greek philosophy and modern psychology. This book fulfills its promise of revealing what Sherman describes as “the moral weight of war that individual soldiers carry on their shoulders and don’t usually talk about.” It is an unflinching look beyond the veil of modern warriors who try to reconstruct their ideals and their lives. The book is a worthy read by senior leaders interested in the “inner war and its subtle moral contours,” and those who desire a better understanding of the impact of the prolonged war on terror.

Dr. Sherman is a distinguished professor of philosophy at Georgetown University. Associated with the military since 1995, she frequently advises the Department of Defense on issues of ethics, resilience, and posttraumatic stress. She served as the first Distinguished Chair in Ethics at the US Naval Academy and laid the groundwork for the institution’s Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership. During this period, serving routinely alongside soldier-scholars, she developed an interest in the relationship between the ancient Stoic philosophies and contemporary warriors. *The Untold War* follows on the heels of her previous book, *Stoic Warriors: The Ancient Philosophy behind the Military Mind*, and delves even deeper into the individual stories of soldiers as they experience war and its aftermath. Sherman relies on her background in Stoic philosophy, accompanied by her training in psychoanalysis, to unveil the existential tension that lies buried in the heart of those soldiers. In this intellectually stimulating treatise she examines the private burdens of the soldier’s life and the resultant “residue of war.”

Although similar in premise to works by Dr. Shay, she adds a distinctly personal dimension to the story. While Shay primarily uses the broad brush of
psychiatry to interpret soldier narratives revealed through classic Greek texts such as *The Iliad* and *The Odyssey*, Sherman paints a portrait of warriors with the colors of philosophy. Her canvas is Stoicism, the ancient Roman philosophy marked by a distinct decorum and management of emotions. *The Untold War* adroitly fills in the details with the fine brush of personal narrative drawn from more than 40 personal conversations with veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This distinction thoroughly engages the reader mentally and emotionally.

The author’s portrait of soldiers’ attempts to reconstruct their moral and psychological world is rife with the pain associated with both physical trauma and the invisible psychological trauma of war. In a culminating narrative, the author painfully shares the story of Colonel Ted Westhusing, a colleague at West Point. Westhusing was a professor of English and philosophy when he volunteered to deploy to Iraq in January 2005. Six months later, he apparently took his life when “his moral idealism collided with the reality of the war in Iraq and the corruption of contractors whom it was his job to oversee.” In his suicide note, Westhusing appealed to the self-sufficiency of virtue reflected in the philosophy he taught. “I came to serve honorably,” he wrote, “and [I] feel dishonored . . . . Death before being dishonored anymore.” Sherman reports that Westhusing “felt sullied, and in a tradition that Stoics made famous he took his life to preserve his honor.”

Sherman’s portrayal of soldiers’ struggles against the backdrop of the Stoic philosophy of Aristotle, Epictetus, and Seneca is captivating. From the guilt-ridden commander, Major John Prior, who lost a soldier to a horrific, yet accidental fratricide, to the starkly analytic approach of Captain Ray Longworth, a retired counterintelligence officer whose liaison duties often placed him at the scene of questionable interrogation activities, the reader is given literary permission to accompany Sherman in her interviews. The author also draws on recollections from soldiers in both World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam, lending even more weight to the thesis that the challenges of war to one’s moral and emotional health remain unchanged.

Sherman’s latest addition to the body of literature is well-researched, well-written, and helpful. What is most impressive is her gentle handling of the veterans’ stories alongside the dialogue about Stoicism. She advocates for a “gentle Stoicism” that retains the necessary insulation from those aspects of war that are beyond one’s control, yet is permeable enough to allow adequate reconstruction of the human soul and psyche following war. Coupled with her previous book, *Stoic Warrior*, this new exploration of gentle Stoicism will be an excellent addition to the required reading lists for both intermediate and senior-level professional military education.
By the mid-1780s, many Americans believed the newly independent United States was dangerously adrift. Under the Articles of Confederation, the loose form of national government adopted during the Revolution, the country seemed powerless to confront its enormous problems. Mired in depression, and experiencing a serious currency drain and rampant inflation, the Confederation Congress in New York could regulate neither trade nor money. Nor could it levy taxes. Unable to honor the recent peace treaty with Britain by paying off pre-war debts, the nation suffered the humiliation of red-coats refusing to vacate posts on American soil. The lack of funds, along with republican fears of a standing army, meant no troops were available to contest these acts.

One nationalist declared to George Washington, retired at Mount Vernon, that this situation represented “a crisis worse than the war.” The old hero replied that Americans “probably had too good an opinion of human nature” in forming the confederation and that the country needed a stronger national government with more “coercive power.” Writing to another correspondent Washington plaintively asked, “Have we fought for this?”

This “crisis of the 1780s” furnishes the backdrop to *Plain, Honest Men*, Richard Beeman’s marvelous account of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, where from late May to mid-September “a small group of men . . . convinced that America’s experiment in republican liberty was in jeopardy” took bold action to reboot the country.

Thomas Jefferson—he wasn’t there; he was in Paris on a diplomatic mission—later called this gathering an “assemblage of demigods” and the best known popular history of the Convention is titled *Miracle at Philadelphia*, but there was nothing godlike or miraculous about what transpired. Rather, what Beeman, a distinguished scholar of early America at the University of Pennsylvania, demonstrates here is that truth can be more fascinating than—and just as inspiring as—mythology.

Beeman reminds us that the past is a foreign country. In the late eighteenth century, “intellectualism and political activism could naturally, easily coexist.” The framers were “both the intellectual and political leaders of their respective states,” and were equally at home in the realms of theory and practice. Beeman limns a striking collective picture. There were 55 accredited delegates from 12 states; Rhode Island didn’t bother to send anyone and New Hampshire’s representatives had to pay their own way. Not all were present for the entire four-month Convention; some arrived late, while others checked
out early because of disenchantment or more pressing business back home. Only the most persistent, patient, and flexible stayed at it. Thirty-nine of the 42 men present on the final day signed the document. Eight of the 55 had also signed the Declaration of Independence. Thirty saw active service during the War of Independence. Fully 42 of them had served in or were current members of Congress. Twenty-five owned slaves. Two would become President. Two would be killed in duels.

The individual portraits are sharply drawn. For Beeman, the three “indispensable men” were a soldier, a scholar, and a sage: Washington, James Madison, and Benjamin Franklin. None would dispute the centrality of the first two. The “Father of our Country” presided over the Convention and, although he remained virtually silent throughout, his mere presence lent vital “prestige and gravitas” to the proceedings. The “Father of the Constitution” supplied the “intellectual firepower . . . that animated the Convention.” On the other hand, many historians might demur at the significance Beeman attributes to Franklin, who at 81 was by far the oldest delegate. Even Beeman concedes that his contributions to debate were occasionally “off the point, even a little bizarre.” Still, he convincingly argues that Franklin embodied “the spirit of compromise necessary if the thirteen independent states were to come together in an effective and durable union.”

Beeman’s depictions of the second tier participants are equally arresting. Most notable among them were Connecticut’s Oliver Ellsworth and Roger Sherman, South Carolina’s Charles Pinckney, and Massachusetts’s Elbridge Gerry. The first two repeatedly steered their frequently fractious colleagues toward compromise. Pinckney was instrumental in ensuring that important protections for slavery wound up in the Constitution. And Gerry, “the most consistent naysayer at the Convention,” ultimately refused to sign the final document.

That document “remains a model of concision.” The original handwritten version numbered just four pages; its 27 amendments if similarly written out would lengthen it to only seven pages. By way of contrast, the European Union’s constitution is currently at more than 850 pages and counting. And compared to other written charters the framers’ handiwork has endured, in contrast, say, to the old joke about where in the library one finds a copy of the French Constitution: “periodicals.”

A day-by-day account of the legislative wrangling that produced the Constitution may not sound like compelling reading, but Beeman transmits a palpable sense of the drama played out in Philadelphia over a long, hot summer. As much work was done in the city’s taverns and coffee houses as in the actual meeting venue. Beeman phrases it nicely; these were men who “appreciated the benefits of lubricious conviviality.” Dozens of issues, great and trivial, had to be resolved. The most contentious was whether to grant equal or proportional representation, based upon population, to each of the states in the national legislature. Our bicameral Congress represents the compromise solution. Curiously enough, for all the bickering over this topic, a large-small state divide has never
been an issue in our politics. On the other hand, sectionalism—specifically a north-south split over slavery—subsequently poisoned the country.

More than previous works on the making of the Constitution, Beeman analyzes the framers and slavery, “the paradox at the nation’s core.” His discussion is thorough and sensitive. The framers’ disagreements over slavery centered not on morality, but on questions of property rights, and the distribution of power between north and south. He sadly, but judiciously, concludes that there were “no moral heroes” on this issue and that our Founding Fathers were “prisoners of the prevailing economic forces and social attitudes of their time.”

Beeman tells an old story well and in a way that suggests valuable lessons for our own time. The framers were accomplished and opinionated men, yet they largely succeeded in “checking their egos” at the door. They could be highly partisan and often disagreed vehemently, yet their disputes never degenerated into the rageaholic behavior that lately has become distressingly common in our politics. And those today who insist on sticking to the framers’ “original intent” might reflect on how frequently they were divided over and tentative about the precise meaning of many of the Constitution’s parts. Yet, while not achieving perfection, they did indeed move in the direction of “a more perfect union” and Beeman is correct to conclude that their legacy remains an “extraordinary accomplishment.”

**Dogface Soldier: The Life of General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr.**

by Wilson A. Heefner

Reviewed by Colonel Cole C. Kingseed, USA, Retired

In considering the value of service rendered by the senior officers in the European and Mediterranean theaters of operations during World War II, General Dwight D. Eisenhower ranked Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr. second only to George S. Patton, Jr. as an army commander. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall also gave Truscott exemplary remarks as an able fighter in the Mediterranean, citing Truscott’s “flair for bold and decisive action.” Surprisingly, no definitive biography of this remarkable soldier exists in the sixty-five years since the war ended. In *Dogface Soldier: The Life of General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr.*, Wilson A. Heefner corrects this imbalance.

Heefner, a retired physician, spent forty-one years in the Army as an enlisted soldier, infantry officer, and medical officer in the Regular Army, Army National Guard, and US Army Reserve. He is no stranger to military biography, having written *Twentieth Century Warrior: The Life and Service of Major General Edwin D. Patrick* and *Patton’s Bulldog: The Life and Service of...*
of General Walton H. Walker. *Dogface Soldier* is Heefner’s most ambitious project to date.

In writing *Dogface Soldier*, Heefner draws heavily on Truscott’s two autobiographical memoirs, *Command Missions: A Personal Story* and *The Twilight of the U.S. Cavalry: Life in the Old Army, 1917-1942*. Heefner supplements his research with a plethora of archival sources consisting of private collections, personal interviews, and published and unpublished sources. The net result is the most authoritative biography of Truscott yet written. Of special interest to *Parameters*’ readers will be Truscott’s post-World War II career during which he served as military governor of Bavaria and as a senior Central Intelligence Agency representative in West Germany and later as CIA Director Allen Dulles’s deputy for coordination in Washington, DC.

Heefner’s Truscott emerges from the pages as the consummate battle-field commander, who demonstrated an ability “to think like” the unit that he commanded. A product of the first Officers’ Training Camp conducted during World War I, Truscott selected cavalry as his branch of service. On duty with the 17th Cavalry Regiment, Truscott saw active service on the Mexican border before his unit deployed to Hawaii in 1918. Aside from actively participating in the polo matches that had long been popular in the islands, Truscott’s overall service as a junior officer was undistinguished. Returning to the mainland in 1921, Truscott took full advantage of the interwar army’s emphasis on institutionalized professional education, graduating from the Command and General Staff School and the US Army War College with an admirable academic record.

Despite his personal preferences to the contrary, Truscott reluctantly accepted assignment to the War Department’s General Staff for duty with the IX Corps at Fort Lewis, Washington, in 1941. There, Truscott came in contact with Eisenhower and Brigadier General Mark Clark, two officers who would play a significant role in Truscott’s future advancement. When war began in December 1941, Clark, now chief of staff of the Army Ground Forces, summoned Truscott to Washington. Truscott’s mission was to join a select group of officers to join the staff of Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, commander in chief of the Combined Operations Headquarters responsible for the British Commandos and for British amphibious training. It was the beginning of what Truscott described laconically as “four eventful years.”

Truscott’s exemplary record during those years needs little recounting here. His service with Mountbatten led to the formation of the American Rangers. During Operation TORCH, the invasion of North Africa, Truscott commanded a regimental combat team as part of Patton’s Western Task Force. Personally selected by Ike to establish an advance command post to coordinate future operations, Truscott performed brilliantly, leading to his assignment as commanding general of the 3d Infantry Division on 3 March 1943. His stock had risen in Eisenhower’s eyes on the invasion of Sicily to the point that Ike characterized the 3d Division as “the best unit we have over here. The men are tough, enthusiastic, well disciplined . . . Truscott is the quiet, forceful,
enthusiastic type that subordinates instinctively follow . . . and his relations with his opposite number in the Navy are the best.”

In Sicily, Truscott mastered the art of amphibious operations and the division’s soldiers advanced farther than any other Allied unit due in no small part to Truscott’s emphasis on physical training and extended field marching, the so-called “Truscott Trot.” Combat in Italy as part of Clark’s Fifth Army added to Truscott’s battlefield laurels. Small wonder that Clark tapped Truscott on 22 February 1944 to succeed VI Corps commander Major General John Lucas, who was relieved without prejudice in the aftermath of the Anzio landing. Immediately, Truscott visited the forward elements, revamped the artillery fire support plan, and restored the fighting spirit of VI Corps. Within weeks, Truscott stabilized the front and led the corps in a massive counterattack that, along with Clark’s advance up the peninsula, led to the capture of Rome in early June.

Truscott’s service in the Mediterranean theater was not finished. In August, he commanded a three-divisional assault force as part of Operation ANVIL, the invasion of southern France on 15 August 1944. When Clark was elevated to command 15th Army Group in November 1944, Army chief Marshall nominated Truscott to succeed Clark in command of Fifth Army. Returning to Italy, Truscott led Fifth Army with characteristic distinction until the Nazis capitulated in May 1945. By war’s end, Truscott was the only officer in the American Army who had commanded a regimental combat team, an infantry division, a corps, and a field army over the course of the conflict.

Truscott’s most moving tribute to the dogface soldiers whom he had led in combat occurred on Memorial Day, 1945, when he motored to Anzio to deliver the Memorial Day address at the temporary cemetery serving as the resting place for roughly twenty thousand men killed in the fighting during the Italian command. Turning his back on the assembly of senior politicians and officers, Truscott addressed not the guests but the graves, apologizing to the dead for their presence in the cemetery. Bill Mauldin described it as “the most moving gesture I ever saw. It came from a hard-boiled old man who was incapable of planned dramatics.” It was, however, vintage Truscott.

To his credit, Heefner also addresses the more controversial aspects of Truscott’s career, including allegations of excessive drinking. One detractor characterized Truscott as “an ill-tempered Texan, who was steeped in self righteousness” and who owed his professional advancement to his close association with Eisenhower and Clark. Far more serious was Truscott’s seemingly unwillingness to hold General Ned Almond, an avowed racist who commanded the largely African-American 92d Infantry Division, accountable for the division’s poor performance. Here Heefner interjects his personal belief that Truscott’s comments about the unreliability of the black infantry elements of the 92d ID did not reflect Truscott’s personal racial bias, but rather the accepted “racial mindset” that characterized the US Army of World War II.

On the debit side, *Dogface Soldier* contains excessive military terminology and the maps are of mixed quality. More suited for avid military historian
than the general public, *Dogface Soldier* nevertheless fills an important gap in military historiography. These observations aside, Heefner has produced a comprehensive biography of a soldier arguably considered as one of America’s most highly-rated battlefield commanders in World War II. We remain in Truscott’s debt for his distinguished service during the century’s bloodiest conflict. We are in Heefner’s debt for introducing “this great soldier and patriot to a new generation of military historians.”

**The Stress Effect: Why Smart Leaders Make Dumb Decisions—And What to Do About It**
by Henry L. Thompson

Reviewed by Colonel Charles D. Allen, USA, Retired,
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There are several recent books and articles that explore leader failures, often attributing to them bad behavior, character flaw, or dysfunction. *The Stress Effect* offers a different approach and perspective that may be useful to leaders and managers across several domains.

The author has impressive credentials garnered from three careers, which provide a unique perspective on the topic of leader decisionmaking ability. Dr. Thompson began as a military officer whose experiences extend from Vietnam to assignments in the Center for Army Leadership, then as a university professor and psychology department chairperson, and now as a leadership consultant with his own firm.

The book is intended for those interested in leader development and organizational dynamics. Some chapters will be more comfortable for readers with backgrounds in industrial and organizational psychology or organizational behavior. Leadership practitioners will be tempted to jump right to the latter chapter, “The Seven Best Practices to Prevent Stress”—that would be a mistake. That chapter is an integration of a number of best practices introduced in several other books so nothing new is presented. The uniqueness is the use of the acronym ARSENAL to frame the practices—Awareness, Rest, Support, Exercise, Nutrition, Attitude, Learning. However, to appreciate how this framework may be useful, all readers should expend the requisite effort with the earlier chapters.

As befitting an academic, Thompson provides a primer on several high-level constructs presented in this book. He includes a literature review of the seminal theories of psychology combined with research findings on how individuals process information (perception and assessment), what drives them (motivation), and how they use the information to achieve goals (action).

The material in the early chapters will be familiar to former faculty of at least two senior level colleges. Most of our strategic leadership curriculum is based on the work of Elliott Jaques’s *Stratified Systems Theory* and the research...
of T. Owens Jacobs with students of the National Defense University (Industrial College of the Armed Forces). Thompson provides a spate of vignettes and anecdotes to illustrate the concepts across levels of direct, organizational, and strategic leadership. Military members will embrace the stories about Ranger and Airborne qualification courses. Business leaders will identify with examples of individuals in organizational settings. Most readers will nod their heads as the author builds the case for the effects of cognition and emotion on decision-making under “normal” conditions and under stress. The book is a marriage of ideas and brings to mind the old adage, “Something old, something new, something borrowed, something blue.”

“Something old” is the long-debated question of whether leaders are born or made and the search for the specific traits of “good leaders.” The most innate attribute of individuals is cognitive intelligence. The author cites several studies that establish senior leaders (CEOs, general officers, elected public officials, etc.) generally have above average intelligence as measured by the traditional intelligence quotient. The consistent theme is that proper selection of potential leaders begins with identifying those who have the requisite intelligence to do well in complex situations that require judgment.

“Something new” is the recent contributions from neuroscience as it applies to cognition and decisionmaking, particularly for leaders. The author effectively explains the regions of the brain that are functionally related to primal responses, emotions, and higher-order thinking. This exploration helps the reader to understand the physiological and biochemical processes of thinking and decisionmaking.

“Something borrowed” is the concept of interpersonal competencies and the re-emergence of emotional intelligence as a key competency for leaders. While emotional intelligence as presented by Dan Goleman has gotten a lot of attention in the past decade, the foundational concept has been around since the mid-1960s. This is an important competency if one accepts that leadership is the process of influencing others. In order to influence, leaders have to possess self-awareness and be able to relate to the feelings of those who may choose to partner or follow.

“Something blue” is the discouraging aspect of leadership in the modern era marked by complexity and ambiguity that make leading organizations an inherently stress-filled endeavor. The conjecture is made that smart leaders generally make dumb mistakes based on the stresses that are part and parcel of organizational life. Rather than focus on traits or the character of the individual, Thompson presents evidence that leaders are limited by their innate cognitive abilities and have shortcomings in emotional intelligence necessary to assess pertinent information, to render appropriate judgments, and then make effective decisions.

As the title suggests, stress degrades the quality of decisions made by leaders and so the author offers that developing resilience is the inoculation that leaders require. Developing stress resilience has three components: increasing
stress management capacity, cognitive resilience, and stress resilient emotional intelligence.

_The Stress Effect_ is a timely offering that complements the efforts the US Army has placed on resiliency over the past year. This era of persistent conflict has had an accompanying rise in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and suicides at the level of individual soldiers. At the operational and strategic levels, military professionals are being challenged on the quality of their strategic thinking and decisionmaking. I do not expect that this book will solve all our problems, but it may provide a greater understanding of how to define and approach problems that leaders face in this new century. This book will serve as a handy reference to mid-grade and senior leaders with practical techniques for their personal self-development as well as for members of organizations they lead.