From the Editor

Robert H. Taylor
Nader Elhefnawy analyzes the two decades that have transpired since the end of the Cold War in “Twenty Years After the Cold War: A Strategic Survey.” The author contends that this is an era that any American under the age of thirty may not remember, in terms of events and policies that dominated the “post-Cold War” period. The author analyzes a time in American history that witnessed “the end of history, the clash of civilizations, a reaffirmation of realpolitik, and the birth of collective security.” He focuses his examination of the international environment that developed during the period and its impact on America’s foreign and domestic policies. Elhefnawy suggests that there were six specific trends that characterized the two decades: great power conflict; intrastate war; neoliberal globalization; the distribution of global output; world manufacturing and the balance of trade; resource politics; and international cooperation. He concludes that many of the trends resultant of this post-Cold War period are likely to continue, leaving the United States in a state of decline, as was predicted in the 1980s and 1990s. This decline will not, however, be military in nature, as many believe, but economic.

Our first thematic presentation examines a number of initiatives the authors believe will have an impact on the “Evolution of Strategy.” W. Alexander Vacca and Mark Davidson address an issue that would appear to the novice to be innocuous, the use of the term “irregular warfare.” “The Regularity of Irregular Warfare” is their examination of the impact that terminology can have on the unique tactical and strategic aspects of conflicts. The authors argue that poor terminology can have serious consequences. They maintain that by utilizing the term “irregular” whenever we are faced with a threat that demonstrates vastly different tactical systems and resources, we run the risk of making deductive and inductive errors in our planning and execution. Vacca and Davidson analyze a number of historical examples of tactical asymmetries to determine that warfare has always been irregular in nature. To attach the mantel of “irregular warfare” simply because the opponent’s tactics are different from our own is much more than simple imprecision, it can have a pernicious effect on the way policy makers plan for and conduct military operations. The authors close with the warning that the continued use of the term “irregular warfare” only reinforces a false and dangerous divide on how war is thought about and planned for. Our second article is Ben Lombardi’s “Assumptions and Grand Strategy.” The author provides insight into the critical role played by assumptions in the formulation of strategy and grand strategy. The article is in response to an earlier piece by T. X. Hammes “Assumptions—A Fatal Oversight,” that appeared in Infinity Journal (Winter 2010). Lombardi believes that Hammes’ argument was unnecessarily narrow in that it focused on assumptions that influence warfighting. He presents the argument that assumptions affect all levels of strategy formulation, from grand strategy to the tactical level. Following a detailed analysis of various types of assumptions
the author examines the efficacy of assumptions to determine “to what degree does an assumption describe the strategic context and capture the intentions of the political actors they are supposed to be describing?” He concludes with the observation that it does not require a great thinker to understand the critical role that assumptions play in the development of strategy, and it is at our own peril if we fail to pay attention.

Michael Breen and Joshua Geltzer provide the last article under this theme, “Asymmetric Strategies as Strategies of the Strong.” The authors question the persistent identification of asymmetric strategies as strategies of the weak and reveal how, in many ways, they are becoming strategies of increasingly strong actors. Early in the article they develop a definition of asymmetric strategy that defines such strategies independent of the actors that execute them. Breen and Geltzer later extrapolate that definition in a series of examples of how asymmetric strategies are already being adopted by America’s adversaries. They conclude that the American foreign policy community needs to cease thinking of asymmetric strategies as the exclusive province of weak nonstate actors and, instead, should conceive of such strategies as critical to success when executed by strong state actors—to include America.

In “Just Add Women and Stir?” Sahana Dharmapuri examines the impact of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on the tenth anniversary of its passage. UN Resolution 1325 was the first time that the Security Council recognized the link between gender equality, peace, and security. The author espouses the belief that military planners and policy makers have yet to recognize the critical role that gender equality plays in peacekeeping and security operations. She identifies three distinct ways in which the inclusion of women has enhanced operational effectiveness: information gathering, enhanced credibility, and force protection. Her analysis reveals that by adding a gender perspective in peace and security operations different threats are identified and greater opportunities occur for the security of men and women. Likewise, Dharmapuri draws on empirical data from international organizations to determine that the failure of various operations can be traced directly to a gender-blind approach, in terms of ignoring the differing needs, interests, and roles of different actors in a particular society. The author closes with the warning that while there may be a debate regarding how best to implement UN Resolution 1325 in today’s operations, there is little disputing the evidence reflecting the effectiveness of the employment of a gender perspective in ongoing operations.

Our second thematic feature “A New Focus in Professional Military Education” presents the works of two respected experts from the fields of academe and civil-military relations. Adam Oler provides insight and guidance regarding a critical omission in Professional Military Education (PME) at the various war colleges. Oler believes, because of its pertinence to the current global environment, we need to include the study of the early history Islam in war college syllabi. The author reminds the reader that if we are going to produce senior leaders and policy makers who are capable of making informed decisions, we need to start incorporating a block of instruction on the formative
years of Islamic history. He recognizes the debate among academics on how best to approach this subject, but reminds us that such debates cannot be an excuse for avoiding this critical piece of senior military education. What makes this article truly unique is the author’s outline for a course on 700 years of Islamic history. Oler would divide the course into four sections: The life of the Prophet Mohammed; the forty-five year period following his death; the early empire period; and the “Golden Age.” He closes the article with the admonishment that if we are going to educate officers so that they understand the strategic implications of their decisions, the nation’s war colleges need to enhance their curricula to incorporate a historical framework related to early Islam. Marybeth Ulrich provides the second article “The General Stanley McChrystal Affair: A Case Study in Civil-Military Relations.” Ulrich analyzes the actions of General McChrystal and his staff, and their lack of understanding on how to interact with the civilian political leadership in the context of democratic civil-military relations. The author believes this case demonstrates a specific deficiency in the PME system. She uses this case study to mine the details of the general’s relief, so that various elements might be incorporated into a pedagogy related to an officer’s senior education. Ulrich advocates for a PME curricula with sufficient emphasis on civil-military norms that will produce commanders better prepared for the duties associated with leading and supervising at the senior level, thereby enhancing the trust between the political and military worlds.

Our final article in this issue is by Kevin Stringer, “Tackling Threat Finance: A Labor for Hercules or Sisyphus?” The author examines a threat to national security that for various reasons has been somewhat neglected, threat finance. He explores the world of threat finance by first defining it for the reader and then differentiating between terrorist financing and cartel money laundering, its two main components. Following a historical review of threat finance, terrorist financing, and cartel money laundering, Stringer provides readers with an analysis of the ongoing efforts to disrupt threat financing around the globe. He presents a detailed analysis of the major banking centers impacted by threat financing. He concludes that if we are to successfully counter threat financing on a global basis, we need to focus on four main themes: mandate a single organization to be in charge of all the various agencies; utilize public diplomacy and psychological operations to influence donors; increase interagency efforts against specific financial centers; and increase coordination, information exchange, and education of the banking sector.

We are indeed fortunate to have in this issue two insightful and informative review essays by experts in their fields. In his review essay on “Terrorism,” Robert Bateman presents a thorough analysis of several new entries to the genre. “The Piracy ‘Threat’ in Perspective” is John Patch’s analysis of five works related to the growing threat of international piracy. These review essays combined with an outstanding Book Reviews feature should have readers dashing to their favorite online or brick and mortar outlet. – RHT