Book Reviews

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Advancing Democracy Abroad: Why We Should and How We Can
by Michael McFaul

Reviewed by John Coffey, retired Foreign Affairs Officer at the US State Department

Michael McFaul, Stanford professor of political science currently serving as Senior Director for Russian and Eurasian affairs at the National Security Council, has written a cogent case for the proposition that people around the world would be better off under democracy and that promoting democracy serves American interests. In lucid prose free of social science jargon, McFaul aims to rescue democracy promotion from the disrepute it incurred under George W. Bush’s Administration, arguing that with the right policies the United State should and can make democracy promotion a cardinal principle of our foreign policy.

McFaul puts forward a minimalist definition of democracy as “electoral democracy,” that is, a system where leaders are chosen by all citizens in competitive elections. Yet democracy, simply, merely allows majority rule over the minority. McFaul concedes that head-counting alone will not secure the political components of the “liberal democracy” he intends (e.g., constraints on executive power by other independent branches of government, freedom for all groups to express their interests and contest elections, independent associations and channels of expression, equality under the rule of law, an autonomous judiciary). McFaul seems to presume that “electoral democracy” will produce the blessings of “liberal democracy” instead of the ability of 51 percent of the people to eat the other 49 percent, a point to which we shall return.

The utilitarian standard of the greatest good for the greatest number underpins McFaul’s brief for democracy. Democratic government, he maintains, “benefits the populace more than any other system.” It is accountable, correctible, more conducive to individual freedoms, and more apt to produce competent leaders than autocracy. Moreover, democracies better foster economic growth, stability, and peace (at least with other democracies) than autocracies.

Expanding democracy would make the world a better place, McFaul believes; that, however, is not America’s purpose. The author contends that enlightened self-interest commends democracy promotion because it serves US security and prosperity. History demonstrates that the internal character of foreign regimes affects American interests; all our enemies have been autocracies. Conversely, not all autocracies have been enemies of the United States; yet McFaul judges that the long-term liabilities outweigh the short-term security gains made by collaborating with autocracies (e.g., Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan). No democracy has been our enemy, on the other hand, and
democracy’s expansion has enriched us. Promoting its spread would strengthen America and put us on the right side of world opinion. In a flight of fancy, the author envisions democratization extending to the Middle East and Asia, including Russia, China, even the Hermit Kingdom of North Korea. “Sound fanciful?” McFaul asks, “No crazier than dreaming the same for Europe in 1948.” This, despite the fact that not a shred of the liberal-democratic tradition has marked the political cultures and histories of those countries.

If the goal of global democracy is grandiose, the practical measures McFaul sets forth to implement it are limited and achievable. America should eschew “regime change,” encouraging instead incremental political liberalization and helping to consolidate democracy where it has already taken root. The United States should support civil society nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), condition US aid on domestic reforms, promote trade liberalization, and work with multinational organizations committed to democratic norms. McFaul’s policy agenda is similar to the “neoliberal foreign policy” advocated by Ambassador Dennis Ross, currently Senior Director for the Central Region at the National Security Council (NSC), in his book, Statecraft. Ross proposes that the United States assist gradual political liberalization without forcing premature democratic processes. Ross would avoid the now-jaded term “democracy” altogether in favor of modest reforms in good governance, combating corruption, and respect for minority and women’s rights.

This meliorist approach was taken by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton during her July trip to Ukraine, Poland, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. The theme of Clinton’s trip was democratic promotion, and in a speech (crafted, we can assume, by McFaul) to the Community of Democracies in Krakow, Clinton stressed the importance of civil society in building the sinews of representative government and free markets. Noting the recent assault on NGOs by autocratic regimes, Clinton offered cooperative steps and US financial support for embattled NGOs. “Democratic values,” she proclaimed, “are a cornerstone of our foreign policy.”

“In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men,” James Madison wrote, “the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.” McFaul’s minimalist “electoral democracy” will not create the “liberal democracy” he desires. For that “auxiliary precautions” are necessary. Popular rule, the Founders understood, offers no guarantee of decent, stable, effective self-government. McFaul wants to give voice to the people of the world. Our Founders sought to temper and refine the peoples’ voice. Majority rule by itself provides no check on a bad or foolish majority. To secure that end the Framers devised a democratic-republic with an elaborate system of checks and balances to divide and limit power to safeguard individual liberty. McFaul rightly warns that the Anglo-American concern with individual liberty may not
be suitable for different political cultures. He does not draw the implication that
decent, stable, effective self-government may not be feasible for most peoples.

Political culture matters above all else. Missing from McFaul’s account
of democracy’s prospects is recognition of how the vastly different political
cultures of peoples—their collective beliefs, values, habits—shape the kind of
polity they are capable of. McFaul claims the argument that certain prerequi-
sites (e.g., liberal institutions, the rule of law, literacy, absence of widespread
poverty) are necessary for successful democratic development is true only “in
the extreme” without explaining why. He states the people of the world want
democracy now, bringing to mind H. L. Mencken’s quip that “democracy is the
theory that the common people know what they want and deserve to get it
good and hard.” Nearly all the democracies in the world cited by McFaul lack a track-
record. The Anglo-American community represents the only long-standing
success of liberal-democracy in the world, a long, arduous struggle beginning
with the Magna Carta. When the Americans made their revolution, they did
so in the name of the traditional rights of British citizens, who had the benefit
of a century and a half of practical self-government during a period of benign
imperial neglect. McFaul dismisses Hong Kong and Singapore as exceptions to
the rule that liberalism does not evolve from autocracy, alluding to the fact that
those policies were the legatees of a British colonial tradition that bequeathed
to them a legacy of the rule of law, civil liberties, and honest administration.

In an insightful essay explaining the connection between culture and
the values and habits conducive to democratic governance, Lawrence Harrison
shows that not all cultures are equal and that few, least of all in the Muslim
world, match the Anglo-Protestant culture for fostering viable self-government.
Reflecting on the causes which maintain the American democratic-republic,
Alexis de Tocqueville cited, in addition to material factors such as general pro-
spersity, above all the political culture of the Anglo-Americans: “The laws and
customs of the Anglo-Americans are therefore that special and predominant
cause of their greatness which is the object of my inquiry.” Beyond the good
fortune of physical circumstances and well-adapted laws, Americans’ customs
accounted for their success: “Almost all the inhabitants of the territory of the
Union are the descendants of a common stock; they speak the same language,
they worship God in the same manner, they are affected by the same physical
causes, and they obey the same laws.”

Global democracy promotion underestimates the uniqueness of the
Anglo-American experience and lacks a sense of limits essential to a prudent
American foreign policy. McFaul is at pains to distinguish his policy from
that of the George W. Bush Administration; nonetheless, McFauls’ project
shares the missionary zeal of Secretary Condoleezza Rice’s “transformational
diplomacy,” a grand design to “change the world itself” by constructing an
international order reflecting American values. Secretary of State James Baker’s
table of “Ten Commandments” reminds us that values are not the only thing in
foreign policy and that “stability” is “not a dirty word.” Foreign policy cannot
be conducted according to the principles of Mother Teresa. “Foreign policy
is not social work,” Baker notes. In the lives of nations nothing is forever; national interests, however, must be secured in the present and near-term, inevitably requiring compromise and trade-offs. Secretary Clinton recognized this in her visit to Azerbaijan, where she muted her democratic reform message in deference to Azerbaijan’s strategic importance as a transit route to Afghanistan.

If the spread of democracy is unlikely to cast autocracies into the dustbin of history along with slavery and imperialism, as McFaul hopes, assisting gradual political liberalization abroad could ameliorate the lot of peoples in developing countries. McFaul sometimes conveys the impression that shoving bad autocracies off the path of history is all that needs to be done to let a thousand democratic flowers bloom. Responsible self-government, though, is hard to establish, harder still to maintain. The story goes that a lady approached Ben Franklin on a Philadelphia street outside the Constitutional Convention, asking, “Mr. Franklin, what have you given us?” Franklin replied, “a republic, madam, if you can keep it.” When Tocqueville surveyed the American scene, he was struck by the wide array of private associations and groups that supplied the life-blood of the democratic-republic. What do Americans typically do when confronting a problem? They form a group to solve it! Quietly and unobtrusively supporting the elements of civil society abroad—labor unions, consumer and environmental groups, women’s and human rights groups, business associations, media outlets, government watch-groups, and the like—not only can improve peoples’ lives, but, most crucially, give them practice in the art of self-government. Lincoln thought the capacity of men to govern themselves “a problematical proposition.” It remains so today.

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- **Scope.** Manuscripts should reflect mature thought on topics of current interest to senior Army officers and the defense community.

- **Style.** Clarity, directness, and economy of expression are the main traits of professional writing; they should never be sacrificed in a misguided effort to appear scholarly. Theses, military studies, and academic course papers should be adapted to article form prior to submission.

- **Word Count.** 4,500 to 5,000 words not including endnotes.

- **Format.** Double-spaced Microsoft Word (.doc) or Rich Text Format (.rtf) file with one-inch margins and numbered endnotes. Twelve-point (12pt) Times New Roman font. We do not accept Portable Document Format (.pdf) files.

- **Biography.** Include a brief (90 words or less) biographical sketch highlighting each author’s expertise.

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- **Evaluation Process.** The review process can take anywhere from three to eight weeks from date of receipt.
In the introduction to *The Grand Design*, Donald Stoker, Professor of Strategy and Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, promises the first book on military strategy in the US Civil War. The claim of first is seriously debatable, but initiating that debate would not be useful. The better question for this review is whether *The Grand Design* is truly a book on Civil War strategy. Strategy has acquired such an expansive definition it may be that Stoker has written a very good operational level history of the war. Much strategic and occasionally grand strategic discussion creeps in, but the operational story dominates the narrative. This is to some extent natural, and Stoker acknowledges the allure of the story; he consciously avoids battle narratives and concentrates on campaigns, but that only gets him to the operational level of war. The fact he discusses both theaters and more naval operations than is common gives the book some strategic credentials, and the modern use of the term “theater strategy” as an acceptable substitute for what is usually campaign planning adds cachet. Nevertheless, this is not primarily a strategic study.

For a book on strategy, Stoker ignores or underplays some key strategic issues. He does not deal with the fast-war, single, decisive battle strategy that dominated thinking on both sides in the Spring of 1861. It was a classic response to civil unrest—the Romans traditionally attacked immediately to try to squelch a rebellion before it really got going. Only if that failed did they bring in large numbers of trained troops to crush what was almost certainly a major uprising. The Union was entirely justified in attempting a similar approach, and the South in trying to counter it. Stoker also does not deal with the undeniable issue that it became obvious very early in the war that the eastern theater was the decisive theater. Lincoln’s famous comment about not getting credit for the North’s extensive gains in the west is instructive, and it was an issue for both sides. Stoker discusses the border-states issue, but because it was largely a political problem does not really flesh out (other than explaining their importance for both sides) the strategic maneuvering that kept them in the Union—a result that was arguably decisive for the eventual outcome of the conflict. Although he frequently mentions supposed Union sympathy in the South, he does not explore in much depth how that influenced Union strategy except in the case of eastern Tennessee (where it admittedly had the most significant impact).

Similarly, Stoker does not really deal with some of the modern strategic analysis of the war. For example, there is a very influential interpretation of Union strategy that essentially runs—Lincoln was a natural strategist who
learned as he went along. He identified fairly early a winning strategy of concentric pressure by overwhelming Union force to crush the Confederacy. His problem was that he did not have generals willing (McClellan) or capable (Banks, Burnside, etc.) of executing the strategy until the team of Grant and Sherman emerged. Lincoln could not fire many of his generals (for political reasons) until after his reelection in 1864, so the war dragged on waiting for competent leaders to execute the strategy. Stoker probably does not buy that argument; he would have done well to address it directly.

The author never deals with the basic issue of how people thought they were going to win the war—the most basic of all strategic questions. For example, he points out that Robert E. Lee in a letter in 1862 wrote that nothing but a political “revolution” from within would beat the Union, and that the South’s only way to produce such a revolution was by achieving “systematic success.” That is key to understanding what Lee did operationally. He kept trying to provide those successive battlefield victories that would erode Union political support for the war. Because Stoker does not accept that rationale, and because he knows the outcome, he criticizes the strategic thinking behind the Gettysburg campaign. If one accepts Lee’s strategic mind, not only does the Gettysburg campaign make sense, but the successive tactical attacks on that battlefield do too—Lee was trying to win a war, and he was willing to take huge risks to achieve that goal. Stoker claims a victory at Gettysburg would only have given Lee a win in the North, not a win in the war; however, that is counterfactual and thus pure supposition. Stoker cannot know that any more than Lee could.

Stoker knows of the ends-ways-means paradigm, but does not use it to structure his examination of strategy. In fact, he sets up excellent opportunities and then lets them slip away. For example, he cites Jefferson Davis’s inaugural address where the Confederate president laid out a classic ends-means mismatch, but that does not lead to a discussion of potential options to address the issue. This is perhaps most troubling because Stoker is very critical of Confederate strategy. He recognizes the initial problem of trying to defend everything was a political necessity. He sees the issue of too little force for the space (especially in the west) that plagued Southern strategy and argues against a cordon defense. He also argues, this reviewer believes unconvincingly, against the existence of a Confederate offensive-defensive strategy. He criticizes the constant call for concentration of forces, which directly reflected the strategic theory of Jomini all the leaders had learned, and he criticizes the departmental organization that decentralized control of the war. However, he does not offer an alternative Confederate strategy, although it would apparently have involved concentration of forces somewhere for some purpose and centralized control from Richmond. At the most basic level, Stoker fails to do exactly what he criticizes the strategists of the day for failing to do—propose a set of objectives, resources, and concepts of employment that might be able to achieve victory with an acceptable level of risk.
Less seriously, Stoker does not seem to understand the 19th century philosophy of command. He repeatedly criticizes generals and politicians for not specifically ordering their subordinates to act. The practice at the time was to acknowledge that the commander on the ground had a better understanding of his situation than a commander far removed from the action. The issuer of orders normally gave the subordinate discretion to use his judgment should the conditions differ from what the superior understood. Under that system, one should not expect direct and inflexible orders and should criticize the subordinate for failing to act, not the superior for failing to order. The superior deserves criticism only for failing to remove a subordinate when a problem developed or he abused the trust placed in him. Several Civil War commanders on both sides fit that category, and Stoker should have been advocating their removal, not their more decisive ordering.

To be fair, Stoker knows his business, and *The Grand Design* contains several instances of excellent strategic analysis—for example his analysis of Union strategy in the last half of 1863, which criticizes the North for not continuing to apply unremitting pressure on the South after the victories of the summer, or his analysis of Grant’s eastern theater strategy in 1864, which points out both the risks and benefits of an attrition strategy. Similarly, Stoker’s concluding analysis of the strategic abilities of the respective leaders is generally good, although he slams Lee because he does not like the Gettysburg campaign and belittles Lincoln’s strategic ability outside the political arena (both serious underestimations).

In summary, a book on Civil War strategy should cover the debates and decisions about what to do, how to do it, and with what resources. It should be largely at the national level, and the explanations of what happened in the field should be short paragraphs necessary only to provide background for the next set of strategic questions or decisions. Stoker concentrates on the military element of power—a reversion to an older sense of the word strategy that is not particularly helpful. Ideally, a book on Civil War strategy should look at all the elements of national power and provide detailed discussions of the alternate approaches to financing the war, recruiting soldiers, equipping units, dealing with foreign powers, handling the media, maintaining domestic political support, etc., as well as fighting the campaigns. Some of that is in *The Grand Design*—for example, the Confederacy’s Erlanger cotton loans is mentioned, although Erlanger did not make the index, and the entire cotton issue consumes only two pages of text—nonmilitary issues are just not the focus of the book.

Lest my strategic nitpicking leave the wrong impression, I actually enjoyed the book. *The Grand Design* is an excellent military study of the Civil War. It is well researched and written. It flows smoothly and keeps the reader’s interest. It is critical of both sides, although there is a Monday-morning-quarterbacking aspect that occasionally irks, and Stoker is not afraid to offer controversial interpretations. I suspect the book will do well commercially, and I recommend it to readers.
Jeff Record has had a long and distinguished career as a military and political critic. In the 1980s, for example, he was a leading light in the “military reform” movement that advocated for, among other things, smaller, cheaper airplanes like the F-16 instead of the F-15, a fact that is suggestively ironic considering the F-15’s impressive history as a fighter and Record’s present professorship at the US Air Force’s Air War College. Those who follow his scholarship are familiar with his incisive, and sometimes razor-sharp, style.

In Wanting War, Record goes after the now-public mass of mischaracterization and deceit that accompanied the push, under former President George Bush, to go to war in Iraq. It is not a pretty picture. It is also, by now, fairly well known. For example, we now know—have known—there was no solid evidence of a link between Saddam and al Qaeda, although the Administration went to considerable lengths to publicize one. Likewise, it is now common knowledge that there was no plan for post-invasion Iraq—indeed, that was known well before the invasion, to the consternation and perplexity of anyone familiar with sound military planning procedures and even a faint sense of reality. Looking back, one has to scratch one’s head that so many responsible, dutiful, and highly educated military and political leaders walked so willingly off this cliff.

The facts are so well known that Record’s book will contain no surprises to anyone familiar with the subject. A marginal note composed during this review says “another pile-on book,” and so it can be taken. He seems to have a particular burr about “the neoconservatives,” a type of political ideologue inside the Beltway given to wearing bow ties and horn-rimmed glasses and who believed—perhaps they still do—that American power can be used to advance good in the world. In fact, “neoconservative” is invoked so often in the book that one might think Record believes that they constituted a dark cabal out to destroy America, instead of people with whose political philosophy Record disagrees. The author’s politics have occasionally leant to the left, so the neocons would be ideological foes as well as lousy war planners. Vice President Dick Cheney also comes in for a good pasting, and deservedly so—the emergence of a co-president and the office of the vice president as another pole of executive power is one of the more troubling trends of recent government. Record has special scorn for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and notes
that Rumsfeld’s careless, almost breezy approach to war negated sound US strategic planning.

By going in fast, relatively light and blind to possible post-invasion military requirements, Rumsfeld created a fundamental contradiction between the war plan and the critical objectives of quickly securing Iraq’s WMD sites and the provision of security necessary for Iraq’s political reconstruction. Rumsfeld either did not understand the disconnect between his invasion plan and the war’s political objective, or he did understand it and simply chose to ignore it because he had no intention of prolonging the US military’s stay in Iraq beyond the destruction of Saddam Hussein’s regime. In any case, he subverted President Bush’s purpose in Iraq.

Books of this genre are fast appearing, and will doubtless continue to come; in retrospect, the early Bush Administration now looks hopelessly incompetent, and critiquing the war is the academic equivalent of shooting fish in a barrel. But a decent respect for very recent history requires readers to remember—for all that the runup to the war now looks like a sad Laurel & Hardy rerun—that Iraq and Saddam Hussein were the principal foreign-policy problem bequeathed by the Clinton Administration to Bush, and in the short period between Bush’s inauguration and 9/11, Hussein’s regime looked very menacing indeed. The UN sanctions were failing, US aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones were frequently attacking Iraqi air defense sites, and Saddam was subsidizing the families of suicide bombers, having decided to make himself a devout anti-Western Muslim after decades of relentless and cruel secularism. This is no excuse for bungled policy and war-planning, but the more serious question of whether the United States could have put Iraq on a back burner after 9/11, or why America chose to fight a two-front war—the first being the unfinished fight in Afghanistan—must wait another historian; for Dr. Record, the answer is simple—“The war was, in short, about the arrogance of power, an interpretation perfectly consistent with the realist theory of international politics which holds, among other things, that power unbalanced is power inevitably asserted.” The reader can be forgiven for wanting a better explanation of “inevitably.” In another chapter, the author calls for an “autopsy” of the decision to invade Iraq, giving as precedent the bipartisan 9/11 investigation because, he says, “disastrous foreign policy mistakes, like fatal accidents, mandate investigations.”

Record’s concluding chapter offers a series of insights on the use of force. Many of his comments are no surprise: he critiques both the “Weinberger-Powell Doctrine” of overwhelming force as well as the US capability to fight limited wars, and doubts that even the application of massive and rapid force can guarantee strategic victory for the United States. He acknowledges that war is uncertain, and correctly comments that “Only rarely do prewar exit strategies get implemented,” and that “the American body politic has limited tolerance for prolonged, costly, indecisive wars.” The author doubts the US military’s commitment to counterinsurgency, on which he has previously written, and suggests that in future, American leadership should think “more than twice”
about entering prolonged conflict. It is a curiously deflating ending to a book propelled by indignation and a sense of certitude about US affairs. Perhaps like many of us, Dr. Record is confessing that he doesn’t have all the answers.

One attractive feature of Wanting War is the author’s insight into warfare in general. A long and perceptive observer of strategic affairs, Record’s asides and general observations on war sprinkle the book with thoughtful points, as when he mentions that “strategy must deal first and foremost with the realities of power (including, for the United States, the limits of its own power) . . . ” or in another chapter, “. . . elections, written constitutions and other democratic institutions can and have been exploited by antidemocratic parties to achieve power . . . Democracy may not turn out to be the cure for the political ills of the Middle East but rather the vehicle on which political extremism rides to power.” Record’s eloquence and experience, his long study of war, and his insight into current events enliven a book that suffers from his evident rage at duplicitous policy and botched planning.

**Operation Mincemeat: How a Dead Man and a Bizarre Plan Fooled the Nazis and Assured an Allied Victory**  
by Ben Macintyre

 Reviewed by James R. Oman, COL (USA Retired), Director, Senior Service College Fellowship Program, Defense Acquisition University, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland

“Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori,” originally written in the ancient Roman poet Horace’s *Odes*, cited by the author in *Operation Mincemeat: How a Dead Man and a Bizarre Plan Fooled the Nazis and Assured an Allied Victory*, and inscribed as the epitaph on Glyndwr Michael’s headstone this Latin phrase translates into “It is sweet and fitting to die for your country.” It is ironic that Michael, while not dying for his country, as the author points out, nonetheless, “. . . had indeed given his life for his country, even if he had been given no choice about it.” This reviewer suspects that most readers have never heard of Glyndwr Michael. Michael played an instrumental role in concealing the Allies true strategic intentions during the decisive middle years of the Second World War. Actually, Michael’s mortal remains, combined with the contents of his briefcase chained to his body, and the many items placed in his wallet and on his person, were all part of a grand strategic deception plan. A plan aimed at misleading Hitler and other senior, influential German military leaders.

Author Ben Macintyre describes Michael’s role and much more as he tells the “rest of the story” in *Operation Mincemeat*. This latest work is extremely interesting, well written, and exhaustively researched. Macintyre is
an accomplished author with numerous publications, a columnist, and writer at large who can easily be classified as a “skillful storyteller.” Macintyre’s work supplements and rests upon the foundation provided by an earlier tome authored by Ewen Montagu. Montagu’s work, The Man Who Never Was is more recognizable due to its longevity in print, greater readership, and subsequent movie.

Macintyre demonstrates his penchant for research as well as his investigatory proficiency as he tracks down Ewen Montagu’s son during the course of his initial research and development of the story. Jeremy Montagu provided Macintyre with access to his father’s once classified files that were untouched for countless years. Using this source, the author develops numerous threads, twists, and turns inherent in the multiple story lines and subplots that are stranger than fiction. They are more akin to a detective novel.

Macintyre provides a superb context for the developing operation. The Allies faced a strategic crossroads in January 1943 when they met at the Casablanca Conference in French Morocco. As Roosevelt and Churchill contemplate the destruction of the Axis Powers in North Africa and the Third Reich in its totality, they are faced with the challenge of determining where and when the initial attack on Hitler’s “Fortress Europe” would take place.

Following a good deal of debate and deliberation, they reach a decision to assault Europe from the South via the Mediterranean Sea. A cursory examination of the land masses surrounded by the Mediterranean Sea unmistakably points to Sicily. The Allies plan envisions Sicily as a vital springboard for their drive into Italy, fulfilling Churchill’s oft-stated goal of assaulting the Third Reich by attacking through the “underbelly of Europe.”

One of the challenges facing the Allies in early 1943 was convincing the German commanders in general and Hitler specifically that the next target was anywhere but Sicily. From this inauspicious beginning sprang Operation Mincemeat, one of the most creative, ambitious, and ultimately successful deception plans in history. Operation Mincemeat was comparable in significance and complexity, albeit on a much smaller scale, to that of Operation Fortitude, the subsequent strategic deception plan that concealed the true location of D-Day.

Macintyre introduces the reader to a diverse group of individuals that includes many memorable figures. Most notably is Acting Lieutenant Commander Ewen Montagu. Recognized by the head of Naval Intelligence for his terrific intellect, Montagu is the main character and the principal driving force in developing, coordinating, and shepherding Operation Mincemeat to fruition. Montagu’s primary assistant is Royal Air Force Flight Lieutenant Cholmondeley. Cholmondeley is described as an unconventional intelligence officer with a brilliant, creative mind. He plays a supporting yet significant role throughout the operation. Other supporting members make their entrance, play their part as the operation evolves, and move to the background, although a number of participants reappear throughout the book. Whether it is Admiral Godfrey, the Director of Naval Intelligence and his assistant Lieutenant Commander Ian Fleming (the future creator of James Bond), both highly adept in deceiving their adversaries; or the noted pathologist Sir Bernard Spilsbury
(who serves as a key advisor for the operation) or his colleague, Dr. Bentley Purchase, who, as the coroner for the St. Pancras mortuary, “bent the rules” to obtain an unclaimed, once nameless corpse (Glyndwr Michael) that masquerades as a courier lost at sea.

All of these individuals, plus a number of key players, do their part in making a fantasy become plausible in the eyes and minds of their enemy. Undeniably, the successful invasion and seizure of Sicily in the summer of 1943, with its lower than expected casualty figure of 7,000 deaths out of an invasion force of 160,000 participants, can readily be traced to the successful execution of Operation Mincemeat.

The author has again vividly demonstrated that the topic of World War II remains a rich subject with an enormous number of stories yet to be told. While numerous books and articles have been written on strategic deception operations in World War II, Macintyre’s Operation Mincemeat: How a Dead Man and a Bizarre Plan Fooled the Nazis and Assured an Allied Victory is an invaluable addition to this genre and one offering fresh insight.

Macintyre’s work clearly provides a cautionary note to today’s strategic leaders and illustrates the importance of understanding one’s enemy, of properly interpreting intelligence, and the timeless relevancy of strategic deception. It is important that today’s strategic leaders be proficient in readily distinguishing between fact, fiction, and deception.

**A History of Air Warfare**

*Reviewed by Antulio J. Echevarria II, Director of Research, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College*

This anthology is a welcome addition to any library responsible for keeping an up-to-date collection of works addressing the history of warfare. The editor, John Andreas Olsen, has put together an exceedingly useful volume of 16 essays covering the history of air operations from the Great War to the Second Lebanon War (2006). Several of the chapters are written by some of the most respected of air power’s historians: John H. Morrow Jr. covers the First World War; Richard Overy has a chapter concerning the European theater of the Second World War; Richard R. Muller takes up the air war in the Pacific; Wayne Thompson examines air operations over North Vietnam (1965-1973); Benjamin S. Lambeth discusses Operation Enduring Freedom (2001); James S. Corum addresses air power’s role in small wars; and Richard P. Hallion offers an essay arguing that technological advances have made air power essential, if not decisive, and that moving into space is the next logical step in the evolution of air power; this is an argument that air enthusiasts will surely embrace, but one that land and naval proponents might challenge.
Several other luminaries whose expertise extends well beyond the history of air power are also featured: Williamson Murray contributes an essay on air power in Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003); Martin van Creveld provides a chapter on the rise and fall of air power; and Sir Lawrence Freedman addresses air power in the Falklands War (1982). The views of scholars of such stature are always welcome regardless of the topic. Martin van Creveld’s argument is particularly noteworthy because it offers a balance to Hallion’s. Van Creveld maintains that the trend toward unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) combined with an increase in “low intensity conflict” mean there is no longer a compelling case for an independent air service. These two essays offer plenty of grist for debate.

In addition to these noted authorities, A History of Air Warfare also features essays by several accomplished practitioners and former practitioners. These consist of: Brigadier General Itai Brun of the Israeli Air Force (IAF), who contributes a chapter on air power in the Second Lebanon War (2006); Samuel L. Gordon of the IAF, who addresses air power in the Arab-Israeli wars (1967-1982); Alan Stephens of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), who covers the air war over Korea (1950-1953); Air Vice Marshal Tony Mason (Ret.) of the Royal Air Force (RAF), who assesses air power in Operation Allied Force (1999); Robert C. Owen of the US Air Force, who explores the utility of air power in Operation Deliberate Force (1995); and John Andreas Olsen of the Norwegian Air Force, who examines air power in Operation Desert Storm (1991). Brun’s essay is worthy of special note, as it is a balanced and detailed case study of the 2006 campaign from the standpoint of air operations. He does not dismiss the case for capable ground forces, but rather reinforces it, highlighting the need for a coherent air operational doctrine that can close the gap between contemporary political objectives and available air capabilities. Although some IAF leaders appear to have been taken with the theory of Effects-Based Operations (EBO) and the purported efficacy of a long-range precision strike, Brun contends that the IAF did not have time to implement a new air doctrine before 2006.

A History of Air Warfare provides a selection of sixteen case studies that will be useful in any survey course on the history of warfare, or any course concerning the history of air power operations. The authors took care to incorporate the latest scholarship in their respective chapters, and the essays as a whole are well written. There is not a disappointing one in the lot. A History of Air Warfare is thus useful for students, whether civilians or military professionals, interested in air power theory and operations or who are participating in a formal education program concerning military strategy or defense studies.
Global Warring: How Environmental, Economic and Political Crises Will Redraw the World Map
by Cleo Paskal

Reviewed by Brent C. Bankus, LTC (USA Retired), National Security Issues Group, Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College

From regional states where drought and food insecurity place untenable demands on the political system to Africa, where oil recovery has created wastelands of arable land and given rise to insurgencies that are contributing to the loss of over one million barrels a day in oil production, environmental issues are creating instability and affecting America’s national security. An exponential increase in global population has made resource issues increasingly important, to the point they may become the deterministic variable. Global Warring, by security expert and journalist Cleo Paskal, is a “must read.” Divided into four sections, the book is a clearly written explanation of why the Director of National Intelligence included environmental security and climate change in his 2009 threat brief to Congress. Global Warring’s first section examines the West’s vulnerability to environmental change and how nations such as the United States and the United Kingdom are especially vulnerable to natural disasters. The second section examines the importance of vital water transportation routes and choke points, demonstrating how climactic change affects the geopolitical importance of these routes. The third part is an analysis of the changing precipitation patterns and their impact on various regions, with particular focus on China, India, and Russia. The final section provides a particularly interesting perspective on rising sea levels and geopolitics in the Western Pacific (e.g., the increase of Asian influence in the world and particularly China’s increased influence in the Pacific region while attempting to disenfranchise US influence there).

According to United Nations statistics over the past 60 years, at least 40 percent of all intrastate conflicts have been linked to natural resource exploitation. Thus, it was no surprise when on 12 February 2009, the US Director of National Intelligence and former United States Pacific Command commander, retired Admiral Dennis Blair, included environmental security and climate change in the Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, stating “Climate change, energy, global health and environmental security are often intertwined, and while not traditionally viewed as ‘threats’ to US national security, they will affect Americans in major ways.” These environmental issues affect national security and are an increasingly important element of 21st century geopolitical calculus.

A broad spectrum of security analysts, as well as those seeking to better understand China’s geopolitical strategy, will also find the book intriguing. Paskal
provides an in-depth view of China’s “Go Out” strategy (the Chinese government subsidizing private enterprises to expand outside China into resource rich areas such as Central and South America and Africa). She then examines effects of this expansive strategy locally (on the host nation) and regionally, a truly comprehensive review. The author voices caution that, left unchecked, nations such as China will create a monopoly on the natural resource markets, rendering the US strategy of depending on the “open market” in danger of becoming obsolete.

Climate change and changing precipitation patterns is another important topic examined, and the author provides a short history of the origins of the study of climate change and analyzes how scientific inroads gave rise to meteorological offices in England and elsewhere. Paskal asserts “our environment is the foundation upon which we graft all other infrastructure. Our transportation systems, cities, defensive capabilities, agriculture, power generation, water supply and more are all designed for the specific parameters of our physical environment and climate—or, more often, the physical environment and climate of the Victorian or post Second World War periods in which they were originally built.”

Essentially, the author does not argue the cause of climate change, but offers a common sense strategy to plan for and mitigate its effects. Her analysis of the associated problems of changing weather patterns is spot on and correctly correlates environmental instability to governmental legitimacy and national and regional stability. For example, if a government is unable to supply the population with basic needs, such as continued access to food and potable water, there will be dire consequences as evidenced by 33 countries who faced civil unrest because of high food prices in 2008.

Global Warring establishes a clear link between geopolitics, environmental issues, and regional stability. Unfortunately, societies have not adapted to the environmental changes that have occurred during the last half century and continue to maintain population centers close to shorelines, while failing to build “climate proof” buildings and infrastructures. Perhaps, if enough policy makers read Global Warring, governments may fully grasp the importance of changing climates and precipitation patterns, and adopt measures to avoid or at least recover more quickly from natural disasters.
Ideas as Weapons: Influence and Perception in Modern Warfare
edited by G. J. David Jr. and T. R. McKeldin III

Reviewed by Dennis M. Murphy, Professor of Information in Warfare, Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College

Anthologies are neither easy to compile nor edit, especially in a fashion that provides a depth and breadth of knowledge while minimizing overlaps and gaps in coverage. The case of Ideas as Weapons in that regard is a worthy attempt to capture thought on the increasing, if not preeminent, importance of information in modern warfare. Published in 2009, a complete reading of the book makes it clear that most chapters are based on articles written prior to 2006. While this certainly appears to date the content in what is still a nascent and emergent doctrinal field, the material often reflects accurate and prescient facts, analysis, and recommendations that are as applicable today as when they were penned. The practitioner of information in warfare will find himself nodding in agreement most of the time, but there are also readings that will cause him to scratch his head or disagree rather strongly. Given that dichotomy, a review of the book is best approached by considering valuable overarching insight that supplants individual chapters and recommending articles that provide the best insight into information as it applies to today’s and future conflicts.

Ideas as Weapons is replete with important concepts inherent to the successful application of information to military success. Counterinsurgency is a recurring theme, entirely understandable considering the current nature of conflict. The emphasis here is rightly on population-centric operations and the importance of persuasion toward attitude and behavior change. The military’s current definition of information operations is discussed and critically portrayed as obfuscatory. There is a recurring call for ownership of the information aspects of warfare by military commanders, recommending that they establish an intent envisioning the information environment in light of military operations while defining an appropriate information end state. Visual imagery’s lengthy declasification procedures are considered, this in line with the criticality of speed in today’s information environment. Perhaps the most prevalent and recurring message is the oft overlooked importance of actions in sending loud messages that portend the role of all military members as information operators. Most interesting in considering this array of topics is the fact that they have risen to prominence over the course of the past four to five years, appearing increasingly in pre-doctrinal manuals and studies pointing to the prophetic nature of their importance as presented here.

The editors have split the anthology into four sections: geopolitical, strategic, operational, and tactical. Do not be deceived by this somewhat artificial
breakout. Short of a few exceptions, it is more reflective of the level of discussion as opposed to the trend line in lessons learned. As Admiral Mike Mullen notes, “The lines between strategic, operational, and tactical are blurred beyond distinction” in today’s information environment. Having said that, it is worth pointing out to the potential reader the chapters of significance where, short of reading the entire book, one can get the most valuable insight.

Dr. Phillip Taylor offers a short but valuable chapter on “The Limits of Information Strategies.” He states what may be obvious to many, that any attempt to control the information environment at the strategic level will prove futile. Still, Taylor offers that it is imperative to consider the information effects of words and deeds as applied to multiple audiences, particularly in messages that come from Washington. T. X. Hammes and William Darley follow with previously published pieces that are well worth a first look, or a reread if applicable. Hammes, who is generally respected for his work on “4th Generation Warfare” applies that same theory directly to information operations, deftly pointing out flaws and providing relevant recommendations for fixes. Darley’s “Clausewitz’s Theory of War and Information Operations” should appear on the reading list of every senior military leader. It is strategically focused and considers the full spectrum of military operations.

Religion is “the single most problematic, complicated, sensitive, volatile, and debated subject in the current Global War on Terrorism,” notes Pauletta Otis in Chapter 19. Otis does not shy away from the subject and develops an excellent contextual overview of religion as it impacts information in warfare. There are several chapters that call upon history to apply lessons to the current theaters of war. One of the best is “Estimates, Execution and Error . . .” where Colonel Eric Walters uses Vietnam to glean lessons learned that can be directly applied to ongoing operations in Afghanistan. Several other outstanding chapters bear mention, including Metz’s “Massing Effects in the Information Domain . . .” and Kilcullen’s “28 Articles . . .” both previously published and widely read. The final “Tactical” section of the book is generally anecdotal in nature and is a mixed bag in terms of quality of writing and content.

The editors conclude the book with a note that the anthology is meant to provide a framework on which to build thinking as opposed to a checklist for how to proceed. Ideas as Weapons accomplishes its stated objective. Information practitioners will find value in reading the entire book with a critical eye in an effort to learn, reinforce their own knowledge, or consider the perspectives from different viewpoints. The layperson will not, and should not, read the entire book. The breadth and depth of coverage for an interested novice may well prove laborious. Instead, focus on the chapters recommended in this review; they provide insight and critical analyses on both the challenges and opportunities reflective of the book’s subtitle: Influence and Perception in Modern Warfare.
In *Power Rules*, Leslie Gelb, President Emeritus and Board Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, sets out to bring back “common sense” to the US government’s exercise of power and its foreign policy decisionmaking. Gelb believes that, with a few modifications, American leaders can utilize the fundamentals of power as described by Niccolò Machiavelli in *The Prince*. Gelb’s advice is that by rethinking Machiavelli, American power can be restored and effectively used to pursue US national interests.

The author asserts that the problem for American policy makers today is that the fundamental definition of power has been lost. According to Gelb, the definition of power has been hijacked by the ideological debate between liberals and conservatives and that whichever side wins this debate will control American foreign policy and its future. As such, the rewards for winning the battle over the definition of power are critical to each political party.

From the beginning of the book, Gelb refutes the ideas of other international affairs authors—Joseph Nye (smart power), Fareed Zakaria (the post-American world), and Thomas Friedman (the world is flat)—and asserts that power is power. Gelb sees no value in what he implies is faddish thinking about smart power, a flat world, or America’s decline in world politics. In Gelb’s mind, there is only one kind of power, which is the capacity to get people to do things that they normally would not want to do in the first place. In the case of foreign policy, he portrays American power as the capacity to get other states to follow the US lead and secure American strategic interests. The best way to do this then is to simply use plain old American common sense. It is here that one begins to see an inherent problem with Gelb’s overall argument.

The essential criticism is how can one create linkages between complex issues and common sense? What would common sense look like in the 21st century context, with American policy makers facing issues such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons, terrorism, cyber warfare, regional and ethnic conflict, environmental and economic security, transnational crime, and so on?

To use one of Gelb’s examples of foreign policy driven by common sense leaves the reader asking how “commonsensical” was Nixon and Kissinger’s handling of Asia post-Vietnam. As Vietnam drew to an end, in a period of American decline according to the then-conventional wisdom, Gelb argues that Nixon and Kissinger correctly saw that an American defeat would potentially cause America’s international power to atrophy. In order to prevent this, even
with military defeat inevitable, Nixon and Kissinger developed a three-step approach to preserve and even strengthen American power. First, Nixon and Kissinger dramatically opened diplomatic channels with China. Second, they signed an arms control treaty with the Soviet Union. Third, Nixon and Kissinger negotiated the Yom Kippur War settlement between Israel and Egypt. This three-step approach, far from what common sense or the conventional wisdom would dictate, set the conditions internationally for the United States to retain its influence as the only nation most adversaries were willing to work with. Within Asia, most Asian countries became more dependent on the United States because of their fear of a strong China. If this type of broad-ranging and transformative approach is highlighted as effective foreign policymaking by Gelb’s own assessment, then no wonder common sense has appeared to be lacking within the American foreign policy establishment (in all the Administrations since Nixon in Gelb’s view).

Despite this clashing dichotomy between common sense and complex 21st century issues, Gelb does provide policy analyst and strategist a good starting point for thinking about foreign policy. The author’s approach is similar to that of the Army War College in which students are encouraged to analyze the “ends, ways, and means” as they develop their strategic thinking skills. Gelb describes his approach as a similar thought process for setting achievable goals, clarifying appropriate priorities, knowing one’s power sources, and sequencing one’s “moves so as to effectively achieve one’s goals and priorities.” He also advises that American policy makers must cease the following—denying there are any limits to American power and assuming omnipotence (conservatives) or embracing all the limits to American power and assuming impotence (liberals). Again, as War College graduates first learned from Professor Lykke, this type of approach is an excellent place to start. But it is a necessary but not sufficient process for seeking to develop a deeper understanding of the complexity of 21st Century world politics and policymaking.

Readers of Parameters can profitably utilize Gelb’s approach in their reviews of the strengths and weaknesses of the Obama Administration’s current National Security Strategy (NSS). Gelb’s framework is particularly useful for its near-term insight. Does the current NSS set achievable goals? Are the priorities appropriate for the international environment? Are the power sources identified? Do the expected sequences of activities appear likely to achieve the administration’s goals? In the end, strategic thinking should follow a logical pattern and, certainly, strategies require continual tuning.

Gelb’s foundational thinking about Machiavelli’s classic provides one way to assess the utility and effectiveness of power as an instrument of statecraft. However well intentioned, calls for “common sense” by single-mindedly focusing on power is simply too easy an approach for global leadership in foreign and defense policy and strategy making in the complex and problem-filled post 9/11 world.
In *Makers of Ancient Strategy: from the Persian Wars to the Fall of Rome*, prolific historian Victor David Hanson provides a prequel to the 1986 classic *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. He joins a cohort of historians who have recently sought relevant insight to present conflicts from the sometimes opaque accounts of how Greeks and Romans made strategy and wars in antiquity. Hansen is the Anderson Senior Fellow in Classics and Military History at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and a syndicated columnist for Tribune Media Services. Much like its predecessor, most of this volume’s contributors have written noteworthy accounts of aspects of war, in this case the classical world.

What Hansen seeks in this anthology is to explore “the most ancient examples of our heritage to frame questions of the most recent manifestations of Western Warfare.” He argues that the classical world offers a unique ability in understanding war in any era due to the unchanging human nature which drives conflict. Hansen warns that, unlike the abstract thinkers who have made modern strategy, ancient strategy is more often implicit in the empirical writings of the classical authors and requires more supposition. In addition, due to the reduction of technological impact on strategy, the classical world offers seemingly novel solutions which may assist current strategic leaders in making better choices.

The book’s first six chapters are short and readable accounts of selected aspects of the Greek wars. Tom Holland leads off with “From Persia with Love,” which presents the Greco-Persian Wars of Herodotus from a fresh perspective of the Persian Empire. The Greeks and their “Western Way of War” defeated the “Persian Way of War” that relied on propaganda, turncoats, and a mass levy of the empire’s subjects. The benefits of the early Athenian Empire in maintaining security and fostering economic growth, before hubris and strategic overreach doomed it, are analyzed by Donald Kagan in “Pericles, Thucydides, and the Defense of Empire.” In one of the weakest chapters, David Berkey presents “Why Fortifications Endure” with respect to the diverse economic, political, and military agendas that led to the walls of Athens. In addition to serving as the editor and preparing the introduction, Hansen presents a new perspective on a relevant, contemporary topic in describing the defeat of Sparta and the spread of democratic governments by “Epaminodas the Theban and the Doctrine of Preemptive War.” Ian Worthington follows with the cautionary case
of “Alexander the Great, Nation-Building, and the Creation and Maintenance of Empire.” This timely tale reviews the misleading ease of initial Western military defeat of inferior indigenous forces with the difficulty of administering conquered lands with renewed and amorphous centers of resistance. Completing the Greek section is a disappointing chapter by John W. I. Lee, “Urban Warfare in the Classical Greek World.” Not only does he exclude numerous Roman examples of urban combat (Carthage, Alesia, Jerusalem), but he stays at a tactical level and fails to adequately address the issue of the strategic necessity of urban warfare.

The next four chapters focus on Roman warfare. Susan Mattern provides a thought-provoking perspective in “Counterinsurgency and the Enemies of Rome.” She submits that Rome endured for a long time not only because of overall military superiority and punitive operations, but because it offered social and economic benefits to powerful elements in subject territories. Barry Stauss in “Slave Wars of Greece and Rome” places the revolt of Spartacus and other slave insurrections in a strategic context. He concludes that despite the terror these servile insurgencies invoked, the insurgents were doomed to failure when the state responded in all its armed might. Next, Adrian Goldsworthy presents a distilled version of his larger work in “Julius Caesar and the General as State.” Goldsworthy argues that Caesar’s greatness was irrevocably entwined with his army, and that Caesar, by charismatically maintaining the army’s loyalty, overrode its duty to the state. Peter Heather’s last chapter, “Holding the Line,” presents his provocative view that Rome didn’t really collapse but, due to Roman strategic policy, blended over time with the Barbarians.

Though the book is of high overall quality, Hansen as editor curiously fails to remain focused on ancient strategy despite the name of the book. While several of the chapters stray considerably from the strategic theme to focus more on individuals, none cover some other famous classical strategists—Hannibal, Scipio Africanus, Augustus, Trajan, or Marcus Aurelius. In addition, Hansen is unabashed in focusing only on what he has written almost extensively about—the Western Way of Warfare—not Asian or Middle Eastern ancient warfare; he also shows a bias toward the Greeks rather than the Romans. Regardless, Makers of Ancient Strategy is a must for readers interested in strategy during antiquity or for a 21st Century perspective of the strategic parallels between today and the classical Greeks and Romans.
David Ucko’s book perfectly captures the central paradox in contemporary defense policymaking. According to Ucko, in spite of almost a decade of irregular warfighting against various insurgent and terrorist actors, “corporate level” DOD remains reluctant to institutionalize armed stabilization and extended counterinsurgency (COIN) at the expense of or in addition to preparation for more conventional conflicts.

Ucko’s central message? In the field, the US military has adapted to COIN and broader irregular warfighting. Admittedly, however, this adaptation was too slow, and, it was initially born of failure. Nonetheless, a decade of hard experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has resulted in real in-stride military innovation. Ucko’s key evidence pointing toward “business end” adaptation are the 2006 COIN manual, written under General David Petraeus’ leadership, and the implementation of COIN doctrine (again under Petraeus) in the now famous Iraq War “surge”—dubbed Operation Fardh al-Qanoon. Ucko concludes, however, that full or durable institutionalization of the hard-won lessons and new capabilities emerging from Iraq are vulnerable to inherent DOD biases still wedded to wars it prefers—conventional—versus wars it has—irregular.

Ucko does an excellent job outlining the policy and doctrine forensics of the current state of play. In this respect, The New Counterinsurgency Era provides solid history of the decade-long bureaucratic tug-of-war associated with DOD’s adjustments to an expanding unconventional challenge set. Ucko is on target when he places initial blame for policy-level resistance to stability operations (SO) and COIN on DOD’s general orientation under Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Senior defense officials from 2001 to 2006 sought to exploit the US-dominated revolution in military affairs (RMA), pursuing wholesale high-tech transformation regardless of the character of ongoing wars and what those wars portend for the future.

At its roots, Rumsfeld’s defense revolution focused on precision war with another state. It did not account for large-scale irregular warfighting. Reality was not to interrupt the RMA. To RMA adherents, COIN efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan were momentary abberations, insignificant in many respects to the growing neoconventional threat from China and a host of would-be nuclear powers.

To the most ardent acolytes of defense “transformation,” the early course of the Afghan and Iraq wars validated their world view, a vision where
advanced technical capability and its inherent superiority ultimately mattered more than mass. The Taliban was routed quickly as US firepower enabled the Northern Alliance on the ground, while Saddam’s grip on Iraq collapsed a mere three weeks after an under-sized, conventional US-led force drove up the Tigris and Euphrates river valleys to unseat him. Ultimately, Ucko argues that it was the insurgency emerging after regime change in Iraq that laid bare the vulnerability of Rumsfeld’s transformation.

To be sure, Ucko takes more than Secretary Rumsfeld and the RMA to task over the failure to institutionalize SO and COIN. He asserts that greater adaptation to irregular warfighting was and remains at odds with a powerful tsunami of countervailing forces—mostly emanating from inside the Washington beltway. These forces range from overly conservative institutional military leadership to defense industries relying on a “big war” narrative to sell high-tech programs. The “iron triangle” that constitutes the US defense community—DOD, Congress, and big US defense contractors—all had reasons to resist greater adaptation. Thus, advocates of COIN were often themselves “insurgents” in their own institutions.

Perhaps Ucko’s most biting criticism is saved for advocates of a special forces (SF) or SF-like “indirect approach” to pressing irregular challenges. According to Ucko, this group recognizes the need to adapt to irregular warfighting but seeks to do so at very low visibility and cost, saving room inside the defense program for traditional military challenges. Readers will find that Ucko has tapped into a recent powerful Defense predilection that seeks to offset the hazards associated with most unconventional challenges by either preventing them outright or combating them through cultivating more capable partner security forces worldwide. To Ucko and many others, the “indirect approach”—like conventional deterrence and dissuasion—is clearly preferred, as it offsets the broad costs of large-scale military operations. Building partner capacity alone, however, does not obviate the need for general purpose forces that are ready for direct intervention. Believing it does incurs enormous strategic risk.

In the end, Ucko plays into a common frustration among many COIN and SO purists. That is, regardless of how jarring recent experience has been and in spite of the exquisite quality of new doctrine and concepts based on that experience, policy can and often will go in another direction. The military’s reading—or in this case a segment of the military’s reading—of the future strategic environment does not always conform to that of senior policy makers. Military doctrine and concept developers account intellectually for “all possible wars” at the operational level. Today’s wars—more appropriately the US approach to them—will not always or even commonly look like our response to tomorrow’s. And, regardless of the proven efficacy of a very comprehensive COIN approach, there are clearly pitfalls. These are choices made by future civilian decisionmakers after the best military advice—not by COIN enthusiasts, concept developers, or doctrine writers.

In this regard, Ucko’s book is an important warning to senior civilian and military leaders against hastily discarding essential national security tools.
These same leaders, however, are the very people who ultimately decide where, when, for what purpose, and toward what end the United States next employs the military instrument. Clearly, a bounty of lessons on how to posture for and conduct extended SO and COIN emerged from Iraq and Afghanistan. That does not mean that those lessons are automatically universal, durable, or indelible. Faced with a crippled domestic economy in the twilight of two expensive COIN operations, the United States might well choose to address similar future threats in a less costly manner. This may result in the pursuit of more limited strategic objectives and, thus, a less expansive US investment.

Ucko is clearly correct. The next US war is far likelier to look like Baghdad circa 2006 than Kuwait City circa 1991. What remains in doubt is whether or not a US president—well aware of the enormous absolute costs of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—will be circumspect in the objectives pursued, by implication limiting the US effort in time, human capital, and material resources. Or, if faced again with righting a failed regional power, he or she chooses maximum stabilization, nation-building, and COIN. Prediction at this point is impossible; however, there are good indications the former is preferred.

**Global Security Watch: Kenya**

by Donovan C. Chau

Reviewed by Dr. Dan Henk, Director, Air Force Culture and Language Center, Air University

This work is a recent addition to the Praeger Global Security Watch series—publications that assess the “strategic dimensions” of individual countries. The publisher makes bold claims, calling the book “an expert analysis . . . first to examine the strategic dimensions of Kenya and the political and military circumstances that shaped the country.” The author more modestly claims that he seeks to “inform the general public, students, scholars and policy makers in the United States.” The publication may not fully live up to the advertiser’s hype but does achieve the author’s intent.

The author organized his text in a straightforward if somewhat mechanical manner—an initial chapter provides the geographic and political background to the country followed by a chapter examining the recent history of the Kenyan Armed Forces. Chau then takes three chapters to analyze Kenya’s security relationships with its neighbors (Tanzania, Uganda, and Somalia) and relations with the United States. Subthemes in these latter chapters include Kenya’s connections to various other states and institutional actors, among them the United Kingdom, People’s Republic of China, Ethiopia, and the larger East African and Horn of Africa communities. A final chapter concludes with policy recommendations for Kenya and the United States.

No publication can be all things to all people, and reviewers are vulnerable to an arrogance that insists a work should reflect the reviewer’s (rather than
the author’s) vision. So it is appropriate at the outset to note that this book is a commendable addition to the existing literature, providing a useful summary of Kenya’s contemporary external relations. The author is a seasoned analyst who draws valuable insight from his professional experience and from extensive interviewing in support of his study. Of particular value is Chau’s analysis of Kenya’s historically fraught relations both with neighboring Somalia and the Somali societies of the Horn (among which are the ethnic Somalis who happen to be Kenyan citizens). The chapter outlining US-Kenya relations since the 1970s also is worthy of note—filling a somewhat overlooked niche in the literature. These strengths make the book a useful addition to the library of an Africanist scholar and of value to policy makers concerned with security dynamics in East Africa and the Horn. The book may be most useful as an introduction for readers with a limited background in East African studies.

The work does have some limitations. The most significant, at least to this reviewer, is a deficiency within the literary genre itself—the tendency to reification. Nation-states are abstractions that cannot think, decide, or act. While it is conventional and convenient to attribute such capabilities to them, that practice obscures the fact that policy decisions are made by sentient beings, in many cases by a few individuals or by small decisionmaking elites—often not very representative of society at large. To really understand the foreign policy inclinations of a state, there is really no substitute for an analysis of the factors that influence the individuals in the decisionmaking elite—their shared cultural perceptions and values, individual personalities, and life experiences. Related to this broader issue is the importance of examining the actual processes of foreign policy decisionmaking, including a detailed look at how the relevant actors relate to each other (based, for example, on ties of kinship, patron-client relations, formative cohorts or shared ideology). The real questions here are: who is obliged to whom and for what, and are these kinds of relationships enduring in Kenyan political culture or are they undergoing significant change? In-depth analysis of such issues, drawing from other traditions of scholarship, would have significantly strengthened this work.

A second limitation is an apparent reluctance to assess Kenya’s future. Whatever roles Kenya may currently play in global and regional affairs, its future depends on the coherence of its internal political institutions—on the persistence of the weak ties that bind government and civil society. Given these often fragile connections in African countries, it is dangerous to assume that the present is a good indication of what is to come. (For a chillingly illustrative example, one need only compare the relatively prosperous and stable Zimbabwe of 1995 to the basket case of 2011.) Other than allusions to ethnic competition, the author does not really help the reader understand the centrifugal and centripetal forces in Kenyan society, nor does he map the most likely alternative futures for the country over the next decade. If the work is to be really useful to policy makers, it requires a greater focus on the future—to balance the coverage of past and present.
The author treads rather lightly both on the capabilities of the Kenyan security establishment and on emerging African security architecture. The reader is informed that the combat record of the Kenyan Armed Forces (KAF) is limited to the nation’s struggle against the “shiftas”—bandits (or dissidents) in the north. However, Kenya has participated in peace support operations around the world, has engaged in numerous multilateral military exercises, maintains a very sophisticated professional military education system, and sends its officers and other ranks in relatively large numbers to military education courses abroad—so it should not be too difficult to get a sense of the professionalism and capabilities of the KAF. Likewise, Kenya is a key actor in a new African security architecture sponsored by the Africa Union. If that structure coalesces as envisioned, it will play an important role in Kenya’s strategic future—a theme that begs for additional attention.

As a final comment, the publisher shorthchanged its editing role in this work. A thorough peer review process would have helped capture some of the missing detail noted above. The author himself is generally articulate, but the text, while certainly readable, is sprinkled with typographical errors and occasionally awkward syntax.

Despite its limitations, the book contains much useful information and very good insight. It seems oriented primarily toward an American audience that starts with a limited background in African studies. It emphasizes breadth of coverage rather than depth. With those characteristics in view, it is nonetheless a valuable addition to the literature.

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**Worse Than War: Genocide, Eliminationism, and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity**

by Daniel Jonah Goldhagen

Reviewed by Michael H. Hoffman, Assistant Professor, US Army Command and General Staff College

This book examines a stark challenge, one that’s been the focal point for the murder of millions but has escaped systematic study by those responsible for its prevention. Daniel Goldhagen offers his paradigm for genocide and its mechanisms in *Worse Than War*. This combative, clearly written, sometimes repetitive book offers an interdisciplinary perspective on genocide, incorporating more elements than readers have likely encountered or considered elsewhere.

The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide aims to prevent and punish “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group . . . .” This framework does not fully capture the universe of mass crimes that military and interagency planners will likely consider genocide. Goldhagen argues that the acts he identifies as eliminationism provide the most useful frame of reference.
Identifying these five eliminationist means of transformation, repression, expulsion, prevention of reproduction, and extermination suggests something fundamental that has escaped notice: from the perpetrators’ viewpoint these eliminationist means are (rough) functional equivalents.”

Readers looking for analysis of genocide will find it in this book, but should proceed with the understanding that Goldhagen examines genocide as a grim subset of the range of crimes and atrocities he calls eliminationism. The book explores a wide range of subjects that should be of concern to anyone with academic, operational, diplomatic, or legal concerns regarding genocide. The author outlines why genocidal crimes are committed, how, their methods, and the psychology. He concludes with recommendations for remedial action. The author’s ambitious reach and passionate conviction carries pluses and minuses.

Commanders, staff, and their interagency colleagues seeking operational design insight for counter-genocide missions will find a great deal in this book. Given its length and the complexity of ideas presented, they need to start reading now. Worse Than War does not lend itself to prompt translation into practical action or instant eureka moments. Though clearly written, the sheer range of this study requires time to think it through well before any application.

For example, chapter four, “How They Are Implemented,” includes a section on methods of genocide, and more broadly, the author’s construct “eliminationism,” institutions involved, and resistance. Operational design also requires an understanding of the more tangible considerations such as motivational factors, and these, for instance, are addressed later in chapter five. On the plus side, this wide range of coverage lends itself to long term intellectual skill building for counter-genocide understanding and visualization. On the negative side, the author’s wide interdisciplinary approach leads to specialized fields beyond his own (political science) where he has no apparent academic or professional expertise. His justifiable passion for the subject also lends itself to a number of strongly held beliefs that invite equally passionate opposing points of view from scholars and practitioners who fully share his dedication to the fight against genocide. This broad reach sometimes derails Goldhagen’s main points.

Readers need go no further than page six for the author’s opening argument that President Truman’s decision to use atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki ranks with the crimes of Hitler, Stalin, Mao, and Pol Pot. Goldhagen returns to this theme later in the book with little evidence or analysis to support his position. Other assertions may appear more nuanced to the casual reader but serve as red flags for specialists.

This reviewer, who has practiced and written in the field of international law for decades, was puzzled rather than antagonized by Goldhagen’s confident and matter of fact assertion that the law of war conventions historically focused on combatants and interstate warfare rather than civilians, “because the states’ own prerogatives to act as they wished would thereby be compromised. Political leaders wanted impunity to slaughter or to violently repress their own people as necessary, and to slaughter, expel, coerce, even enslave other peoples.
abroad.” The modern law of war possesses a fairly extensive historical trail, and an overwhelming argument can be made countering Goldhagen on this point. This, however, goes beyond the scope of this review, but the point should be taken that readers from varied occupations and specialties may find other interpretations of fact, theory, and history in this book open to challenge.

Goldhagen’s willingness to take provocative and debatable positions opens potentially crucial lines of inquiry avoided by many other writers. His section on “New Threats” is particularly worth reading primarily due to his views on trends in the Islamic world. He writes that “Political Islam is currently the one expressly, publicly, and unabashedly genocidal major political movement.”

Despite its problems, the book is worth the substantial investment of time required of readers who want an interdisciplinary perspective on genocide or those who may find themselves tasked with the responsibility of countering such horrors. Recent history points toward more of these threats and this book is a pioneering interdisciplinary effort to analyze and explain them.

**Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor/Hiroshima/9-11/Iraq**

by John W. Dower

**Reviewed by Jeffrey Record**, Professor of Strategy, Air War College, and author of *A War It Was Always Going to Lose: Why Japan Attacked America in 1941*

John W. Dower, a Professor Emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is America’s leading historian of modern US-Japanese relations and the prize-winning author of *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* and *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War*. The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on lower Manhattan and the Pentagon prompted him to begin writing a book comparing them to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 60 years earlier. Dower believed both Pearl Harbor and 9/11 exposed a disastrous failure of American imagination—i.e., a failure to recognize, much less understand, the motivations and capabilities of Imperial Japan and al Qaeda, respectively. American analysts and decision makers were “simply unable to project the daring and ingenuity of the enemy.” Japan’s decision for war with the United States also had much in common with the American decision to invade Iraq: “Like Japan’s attack in 1941, America’s war of choice against Iraq was tactically brilliant but strategically idiotic . . . . In neither case did [planners] give due diligence to evaluating risk, anticipating worse-case scenarios, formulating a coherent and realistic endgame, or planning for protracted conflict.” Indeed, in both pre-Pearl Harbor Tokyo and post-9/11 Washington, “[i]deology, emotion, and wishful thinking overrode rationality at the highest level, and criticism was tarred with an onus of defeatism, moral weakness, even intimations of treason once the machinery of war was actually set in motion.”
Further reflection led Dower to compare 9/11 and the US incendiary and atomic bombing of Japanese cities in 1945, which in turn, especially as Operation Iraqi Freedom degenerated into a fiasco, prompted a comparison of the American occupation of Japan and the George W. Bush administration’s performance in post-Saddam Iraq. “[M]uch that was associated with September 11 had an almost generic familiarity that accounts for the immediate analogies to Pearl Harbor and World War II: surprise attack, a colossal failure of US intelligence, terror involving the targeting of noncombatants, the specter of weapons of mass destruction and ‘mushroom clouds,’ rhetoric of holy war on all sides.”

Part I of Cultures of War examines the attacks and intelligence failures on the US side in 1941 and 2001, including the “institutional, intellectual, and psychological pathologies” involved. Part II uses the designation of the devastated World Trade Center site as “Ground Zero” as a departure point for “reconsidering the emergence of terror bombing as standard operating procedure” in the British and American strategic bombing campaigns of World War II. Mass slaughter from the air was hardly a novelty in 2001. (Think of what Osama bin Laden could have done to New York City with the armada of B-29s that Curtis LeMay used to burn Tokyo!) Part III assesses the ingredients of post-1945 American political success in Japan—early and comprehensive US planning for postwar Japan, the moral legitimacy of the American occupation, the presence of competent Japanese administrative machinery, and Japan’s social cohesion and geographic isolation—and why that success could never have been repeated in Iraq. The historical analogies relevant to Iraq, Dower correctly points out, were the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1981 to 1989 and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank beginning in 1967. “To lightly choose to invade and occupy yet another region in the Middle East in the face of such precedents, and without intense contingency planning, was hubris bordering on madness.”

Cultures of War is a study of great power arrogance and ignorance, especially in dealing with enemies whose material inferiority masks an offsetting determination, imagination, and skill. Despising a small enemy (Japan in 1941, al Qaeda in 2001) can be dangerous. Dower writes well, argues provocatively (some might say polemically), and offers intriguing insight. His treatment of the contentious issues of the US strategic bombing of Japan and the origins of the US-Soviet nuclear arms race is second to none, as is his devastating critique of “faith-based thinking,” which blocks critical appraisal of one’s own assumptions and decisions while simultaneously giving short shrift to the circumstances, attitudes, and capabilities of others. When Admiral Husband Kimmel, who commanded the US Pacific Fleet in Hawaii in December 1941, was later asked why he left the fleet in Pearl Harbor even after receiving a warning from Washington that war with Japan was imminent, he replied: “I never thought those little yellow sons-of-bitches could pull off such an attack, so far from Japan.” Nor is Dower afraid to assert parallels between Pearl Harbor and OIF, or for that matter between George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden: “After 9-11, [both men] came to personify holy war in the old-fashioned sense of a clash of
faiths, cultures, and civilizations. They quoted scripture, posited a Manichaean world of good versus evil, and never ceased to evoke the Almighty and portray themselves as His righteous and wrathful agent. Both were deeply religious men who lived in realms of certitude fortified against doubt and criticism.”

If *Cultures of War* has a downside, it is Dower’s attempt to keep too many themes and narratives in the air at the same time. *Cultures of War* can be read as several smaller books sheltered in a single volume. It is occasionally repetitious and somewhat disorderly. It is not on par with his magisterial *Embracing Defeat* or compelling *War Without Mercy*. That said, *Cultures of War* is an outstanding historian’s convincing employment of Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, and the American occupation of postwar Japan to improve our understanding of 9/11 and why things went so wrong for the United States in Iraq. It is reasoning by historical analogy at its best.

*Navy Strategic Culture: Why the Navy Thinks Differently*  
by Roger W. Barnett

Reviewed by Albert F. Lord Jr., CAPT (USN Retired),  
former US Navy Senior Service Representative to the US Army War College

Roger Barnett is a master at describing the “peculiar psychology” of the Navy. Why naval officers look at the world in a unique way has mystified fellow military officers and civilians since at least the time of Henry Stimson’s famous quote about the “dim religious world.” The author peels back the curtain and very effectively shows why the maritime environment shapes the world view and shows the tactical, operational, and strategic thought process of those who live and fight at sea.

The strength of this treatise lies in the first two-thirds of the book. He weaves naval history, an appreciation of the ocean environment, today’s complex geopolitical situation, and military science throughout. Barnett builds his argument carefully, and his language will be familiar to recent graduates of US military war colleges.

The book starts with the recent ascension of Navy officers to the chairmanship of the joint chiefs of staff and the highest visibility combatant commands. He asserts the unique background of senior Navy officers and their appreciation for the day-to-day nature of military influence in the worldwide security arena allows them to think strategically. Culture specific to the US Navy is examined in depth and placed within that of the larger military. Not surprisingly, the demanding ocean domain is the greatest influence that gives the Navy its singular outlook. The ship is the embodiment of Navy culture and it builds teamwork, self-reliance, and an independence that culminates in the governing concept of command-at-sea. The faith and confidence placed in ship captains, those closest to the action, fosters a disdain for doctrine and limits to
freedom of action. Naval officers are comfortable with overarching concepts rather than definitions and know, like conditions at sea, the situation at hand is apt to change suddenly and without warning.

Barnett breaks down the maritime environment into physical, political, legal, and economic aspects. His examples are well-chosen but he fails to address the international tension of late concerning resources specifically in the Arctic or South China Sea. He continues by providing a primer on the differing strategies for employment of naval forces and rightly focuses on the expeditionary characteristics of naval forces and their unique contribution to the capabilities required of a modern joint force. He could have greatly strengthened his argument by highlighting how those strategies fit into current joint doctrine and he overstates the logistic self-sufficiency of naval task forces a bit. The role of technology has been and continues to be important to sailors and Barnett effectively convinces the reader why this is so. The genesis of network centric warfare (NCW) is the early work on Naval Tactical Data exchange developed in the 60s and continually refined since. In his description, however, he comes perilously close to over promising that NCW will cut through the fog of war to provide near 100 percent situational awareness to commanders. The maritime environment will never be fully transparent, above, on the surface, or under the sea. The above small criticisms do not detract from a valuable contribution which provides a window into the DNA of US naval officers.

The author also decided to address what he considers dangers to the Navy culture. In a chapter called “Retrospective” he decries the tendency to see the terrorist challenge as one of law enforcement and sees this as diluting the warfighting focus of the Navy. He states, “The Navy Strategic Culture is about the conduct of war; it is definitively not about law enforcement.” Nothing could be further from the truth. Throughout its history the Navy has had an international policing function. Safeguarding commerce against piracy, combattion the slave trade, enforcing international sanctions, counter drug and counter proliferation operations, and exercising freedom of navigation are core competencies—an essential part of the Navy’s ethos. The Navy’s ability to be an effective and credible interagency partner is essential to its 21st century defense identity. In addition, he takes on jointness by saying the Navy is inherently joint because of Naval aviation and the Marine Corps and can be described as “indifferent” to working in the joint arena. This contradicts his earlier supposition concerning the selection of Navy officers to the chairmanship and to lead the combatant commands. He also discounts the missions of mine and riverine warfare, seeing them as sideshows and not worth the investment they clearly deserve.

The greatest error is where Barnett addresses civil-military relations. Seemingly a proponent of the Powell Doctrine’s use of overwhelming force, he sees limitations put on the use of the military instrument of power or restrictive rules of engagement as too constraining. He also criticizes the apparent feminization of the Navy—the mixed-gender crews of ships—as having a deleterious effect on warfighting capability. His footnotes refer to sources that assert that any differences, physiological or psychological, between men
and women automatically disqualify women for combat roles. The USS Cole had a mixed-gender compliment in October of 2000 and the heroism on the part of the entire crew saved that ship. This reviewer served with women in combat during Operation Enduring Freedom and the fighting efficiency was not impaired, even during the longest at-sea deployment (158 days without a port visit) since World War II. Mixed-gender crews have served on combatant ships since the early 1990s; lessons were learned early on and, simply stated, good leadership and an effective command climate is essential to training a combat capable team and conducting operations. The ship has sailed on this issue.

There is much to recommend in *Navy Strategic Culture*. The author has written eloquently on the unique role of the Navy and its contribution to national defense strategy. In particular, the Navy’s sister service officers will gain an education in the capabilities and thought processes required to put together a joint team. Barnett dilutes his powerful message, however, when he editorializes and tries to speak for current Navy strategists.

**Blood on the Snow: The Carpathian Winter War of 1915**

by Graydon A. Tunstall

**Reviewed by Colonel James D. Scudieri**, Deputy Dean, US Army War College

The Eastern Front of the Great War has arguably been the poor cousin of the Western Front as the First World War has been compared with the Second, in terms of renown. Tunstall has gone much further afield in his emphasis on just the Austro-Hungarian Carpathian Winter Campaign of 1915. His work is quite concise, a mere 212 pages of text in only six chapters. The first is the “Introduction,” takes about 15 percent of the space, and sets the stage for several key points. He returns to these key points throughout the text. Indeed, he reinforces them immediately and at length in the first chapter entitled “Background to the Battles,” which describes the preliminary operations and preparations for the “First Offensive.”

Tunstall soon establishes his focus on the Austro-Hungarian forces. He devotes considerable effort articulating the seemingly-insurmountable challenges that confronted the army of Franz Joseph. First, the author reiterates several times that the devastating losses by December 1914 had reduced the Hapsburg army to a militia. The casualties had been crippling, not merely in terms of simple numbers, but in particular among the professional officer corps, trained and educated to deal with a multi-ethnic military. Troops were increasingly older, less hardy, and lacked adequate training. In essence, the Austro-Hungarian Army suffered some 50 percent casualties overall in the opening operations during 1914.
Second, the Carpathian Front lacked the requisite infrastructure, especially transportation, to sustain large forces. Indeed, pre-war planning deemed the Carpathians a pass-through vice maneuver zone. Two tables and detailed discussion highlight the herculean-like efforts required to concentrate, reinforce, and sustain forces in this theater. The Austro-Hungarian railroad system lacked both capability and capacity for major, offensive operations here. The wintry weather degraded already-limited roads.

Third, the failure of the plan to achieve rapid success necessitated the unprecedented, prolonged conduct of operations in mountains during winter. The extreme temperatures at high elevation accounted for many more casualties than combat among troops lacking uniforms and equipment for winter warfare. These conditions also rendered every type of action more difficult, the more so as a Hapsburg planning assumption was surprise. Why, then, attack?

Three factors beckoned Hőtzendorf to the Carpathian Front. The first was Russian success. Czarist troops were postured to complete their transit of the Carpathians and spill south onto the Hungarian plain, a potentially devastating blow to morale. The second was what appeared to be the moral, political, and military imperative to push the Russians back north, relieve the fortress of Przemyśl, and reclaim the province of Galicia. Finally, a major Hapsburg success was necessary to discourage Italian and Rumanian entrance into the war with the Triple Entente.

Hőtzendorf’s cherished offensive, launched with 20½ divisions from Second and South Armies on 23 January 1915, failed. Poor visibility, ice, and heavy snow stymied combined-arms operations. The Russians defended stoutly. An aggressive General Nikolai Yudevich Ivanov was unrelenting in his counterattacks; he sought the dreaded invasion of the Hungarian plain. A second attempt began on 27 February. Heavy snow alternated with thaws and commensurate temperature fluctuations. Nonetheless, this attack was the only occasion when the Austrians had numerical superiority over the Russians, forty-one divisions from Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin, Third, Second, and South Armies. They failed for similar reasons which defeated the first attack. Tunstall’s table of the paltry artillery support available to Second Army units in this regard is telling, though it accomplished some success. Indeed, Tunstall states that front-line units reached within fifty kilometers of Przemyśl. A third attack, launched on 20 March—a day later than a breakout attempt from Przemyśl—also failed, for the same general reasons. The fortress surrendered on 22 March, freeing besieging Russian troops to reinforce their Carpathian units. Worse, remorseless Russian counterattacks developed into a concerted offensive to sever Second and Third Armies and spill onto the Hungarian plain. Second Army in particular was hard pressed to prevent a Russian breakthrough. Ultimately, a combined Austro-German counterattack in early April known as Easter Battle salvaged the situation, but Russian attacks occurred until 20 April.

No surprise, Tunstall has written a blistering assessment of the Austrian High Command in general and Hőtzendorf in particular. His critiques go back to Austrian pre-war planning through the disasters of 1914. Then Austrian
leaders stubbornly and/or blindly assumed that the 1915 operations would be brief. He concludes that the greatest Austrian efforts still constituted inadequate preparation, resulting in failure to mass and insufficient reserves. Instead, sustained winter, and mountain operations involved no less than two-thirds of the Austro-Hungarian Army, cost another 800,000 casualties, and seriously damaged its resiliency. The defeat led directly to determined German intervention and decisive victory at Gorlice-Tarnow, but at the price of diminished freedom of action in light of powerful German assistance.

The book has a fairly-easy style, but there are challenges. The author discusses numerous units from field army to division; at times the reader is hard pressed to follow. An order of battle could have mitigated some confusion. The text incorporates nine maps; six are in the preliminary Introduction and Chapter 1. Similar level of map support of the Second and Third Offensives would have been helpful. Finally, Tunstall writes with many superlatives, rightly hammering home the sheer scope of the Carpathian Campaign. The reader must digest these statistics carefully and often; otherwise, they sometimes appear contradictory.

The book is a detailed case study, based on extensive primary-source research, of an attempt to devise a viable strategy to meet drastically-changed, unforeseen conditions with impending crisis—and with an increasingly domineering ally. In that sense it is of interest to senior leaders today. The detailed description of the campaign with its three principal actions may be excessive for the nonmilitary historian.
Told primarily from the turret of Macgregor’s M1A1 ABRAMs tank, *Warrior’s Rage* vividly describes the experiences of Cougar Squadron, the 2nd Squadron of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (2/2 ACR), during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, which culminated in a classic armor battle. A battle that unquestionably demonstrated the overwhelming superiority of US tactical unit leadership, tactics, training, and equipment when faced with the most elite units of the Iraqi Army—the Republican Guard. Macgregor, the Cougar Squadron Operations Officer, captures the chaos of tactical combat, the lethality of modern weapons systems, and the complexity of joint fires. His love for American soldiers is clear, as is his personal disdain for the operational and strategic leaders he believes failed to fully exploit the tactical victory of 73 Easting.

Macgregor characterizes this fight as an overwhelming tactical success, which created an operational opportunity for a bold strike that could have destroyed the fleeing elements of the Republican Guard. When this opportunity was not grasped, the stage was set for continued conflict in Iraq—a conflict that is still unresolved almost twenty years later. Macgregor cites many explanations for this failure. Numerous strategic intelligence mistakes, including continued overestimation of enemy force numbers and capabilities, fed the fears of already conservative operational and strategic leaders. Over-stretched lines of communications and unpracticed extended-distance logistics procedures raised further concerns in risk-averse tactical commanders. An Army unpracticed in large-scale maneuver defaulted to a mechanical delineation of the battlefield that discouraged bold maneuver and denied the fluidity of the situation. Coordination among joint forces, coalition partners, and adjacent and passing units was haphazard at best. Commanders at every level were tied to command posts rather than the front lines of battle, and thus failed to quickly identify and leverage tactical and operational opportunities.

There are positive elements in *Warrior’s Rage*, along with numerous indictments. Macgregor’s account identifies skilled and capable junior officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted troops who have continued to contribute significantly to the Army and the nation, to include two who are now serving general officers. 2/2 ACR was clearly a strong unit that made the most of its opportunities prior to the battle to train for the challenges of an extended desert war, building on a base of proven doctrine, quality small unit and gunnery training in Europe, and motivated and talented tactical unit leaders. The inherent flexibility and massive combat power of an armored cavalry squadron is vividly demonstrated throughout Cougar Squadron’s attack into Iraq.

More than a few potential readers may decide to not even open this book because of its author. Others may choose to close it half-read, uncomfortable with the blunt criticism of well-respected general officers such as Frederick Franks and Norman Schwarzkopf. Regardless, the overall impact of Macgregor’s book is limited, because his intent is not clear—is it an autobiography, a unit history, or a critical analysis of operational and strategic leadership during the conflict? As an autobiography, it is interesting, but of limited scope. As a history, it provides a good story of a single unit in a critical fight, and there
is value in this account. As critical analysis, it is incomplete and hampered by the author’s repetitive broad-brushed attacks on senior leaders. Macgregor’s obvious disdain for his immediate superiors quickly grows tiresome. The many issues he raises with operational and strategic leaders before, during, and after Desert Storm are well-documented elsewhere. Blaming these leaders and their successors for many issues in the current fight is new, but Macgregor fails to provide any detailed recommendations about what can be done in response. This lack of detailed recommendations is unfortunate, given Macgregor’s previous writings on Army Transformation, where he provided numerous useful suggestions. Despite these issues, *Warrior’s Rage* is worth reading, if only for the well-told story of 2/2 ACR’s Desert Storm experience.

**The George W. Bush Defense Program: Policy, Strategy & War**

*Reviewed by Dr. John C. Binkley*, Professor of History and Government, University of Maryland, University College

Most examinations of the defense policies during the two terms of President George W. Bush tend to begin and end with Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Global War on Terrorism. These issues so overwhelmed all other aspects of the Bush defense program that one tends to forget there was a defense program prior to 9/11 and there were defense issues that continued to be addressed after 9/11 that were not directly related to the war on terrorism. To appreciate the long term impact of the Bush era, it is necessary to understand and consider the interrelationship of those major issues, i.e., Iraq, Afghanistan, and terrorism, with the other policies developed during this administration’s eight years and place them within a theoretical and historical context. This was Professor Stephen Cimbala’s intent as he brought together an impressive collection of experts to opine on various aspects of the administration’s efforts in *The George W. Bush Defense Program: Policy, Strategy & War*.

A collection of essays, no matter the topic, presents certain difficulties for any reviewer. The first difficulty is usually the uneven quality of the essays. This reviewer is happy to write that Professor Cimbala and his ten other authors have produced a scholarly yet quite readable set of essays that generally fall into the following topics: military transformation, the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, civil-military relations and how it affected the Bush defense program, nuclear weapons and arms control with a special focus on US-Russian relations, and the impact of the Bush defense program on American international relations. A second difficulty is the diversity of the essays. Too often editors do not identify the unifying themes that make a series of disparate essays a cohesive whole. Unfortunately, neither the introduction nor the conclusion pointed the reader to
the underlying themes that unified the essays and it is left to the reader to patch together the linkages. Consequently, this reviewer will note a few of the themes and relate them to some of the individual essays.

The first theme is the administration’s failure to consider the possibility of unintended consequences, unexpected results, and generally to think through the ramifications of its decisions. These issues are raised in a wonderful essay by Colin Gray entitled “Coping with Uncertainty: Dilemmas of Defense Planning.” Appropriately, this is the first essay presented in the book. Gray, one of the deans of western strategic theory, offers in a checklist-type format a series of pithy foundational thoughts that a defense planner needs to include in his or her cognitive processes—all with the understanding that much of what the defense planner does is guesswork, albeit based on certain historical, sociological, technological, or bureaucratic facts, but guesswork nevertheless. While Gray’s ideas are generic in nature and do not specifically address the Bush policies, after reading the other essays, it is obvious that the ideas formed the foundation, whether intended or not, for the other writers’ evaluations of the administration’s policies. This essay should be required reading for those officers moving into or already involved in long-rang planning assignments.

A second theme is how the Bush administration detrimentally affected its own programs by embracing unilateralism. The meaning here is the belief that the United States did not necessarily need the support of other nations nor did it consider the historical and political concerns of other states as we developed our programs. This theme is very evident in Peter Forester’s article on “Sharing the Burden of Coalition War Fighting: NATO and Afghanistan” and Stephen Blank’s “Cold Obstruction: The Legacy of US-Russian Relations Under George W. Bush.” Blank clearly shows how the Bush administration never understood that its abandonment of the ABM Treaty, along with its efforts to place theater ABM systems in Eastern Europe, undermined its own rhetoric that Russia was no longer a Cold War enemy but a partner in the new war on terror. Over sixty years ago, George F. Kennan described how traditional Russian paranoia helped set the stage for the Cold War. The Bush administration’s actions simply fed into that paranoia. Similarly, Forester’s article explores the difficulties in fighting a coalition war, and particularly a NATO coalition that is Eurocentric, in the absence of “a clearly unified policy at both the strategic and operational level.” The problem of unilateralism permeates a number of other essays as well. Larry Korb, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, in his essay “An Exit Strategy from Iraq,” points out the reality that any US exit strategy must involve other countries sharing some of the burden of political and social reconstruction. The Bush administration’s unilateralism was a continuing obstacle to such international burden sharing.

A parallel theme to unilateralism is policy hubris. By this I mean the firm belief on the part of the Bush administration that they knew all the answers and ignored any dissent. Among the articles that address this theme are Dale Herspring’s portrait of Donald Rumsfeld’s management style, John Allen
Williams’ analysis of civil-military relations, and William Martel’s critique of the administration’s efforts to define its policy in Iraq.

Military transformation, sometime referred to as revolution in military affairs, is another theme repeatedly addressed. Paul Davis’s essay on military transformation is an excellent overview of the modern history of transformation theory, how that theory was applied by the Bush administration, and where does transformation seem to be going. It is worth reading as a stand-alone article for any officer interested in the evolution and direction of transformation. But the administration’s view of transformation was directly related to its policy hubris. Secretary Rumsfeld and a number of other Bush appointees were so convinced in their vision of transformation that they ignored any advice to the contrary. This was most apparent in the post-military operational phase in Iraq, but it also had a detrimental impact on the administration’s arms control efforts.

While there are other general themes one could identify, the limits of space prevent further discussion. As in the case of all collections of essays, different readers will find some articles of greater value than others, but taken as a whole, most readers interested in the defense policies of the Bush administration will find some if not many of these articles of great value. Obviously, as documents become more available, a more complete examination of the totality of the Bush defense program will be written, but in the interim, Professor Cimbala and his cadre of authors have certainly offered us an excellent first edition.

**Osama Bin Laden: A Biography**

by Thomas R. Mockaitis

**Reviewed by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill**, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

The personality and mental processes of Osama bin Laden were never easy for Westerners to understand. Too often he was dismissed as a villain who acts out of blind fanaticism without the capacity to develop a well-defined strategy or clear operational plan for reaching his goals. This sort of approach was a mistake. While bin Laden’s ruthlessness was undeniable, he was nevertheless a thinking, planning enemy who needed to be treated as such. Bin Laden and al Qaeda have often shown that they have clear strategies and coherent goals based on their own (admittedly warped) values systems. The development of effective counterstrategies for dealing with al Qaeda and then destroying it therefore depend upon understanding the background and mindset of this man in reasonably sophisticated terms. Moreover, since at least some aspects of how to deal with bin Laden are matters of public, media, and congressional discussion, a more sophisticated understanding of this individual among nonexperts may be of considerable value.

Thomas Mockaitis in his short and straightforward book, *Osama Bin Laden: A Biography*, clearly understands the difficulty of making bin Laden
comprehensible as more than a one dimensional figure. His book is specifically written for the nonspecialist reader and can easily be read in one evening. It therefore may serve as a useful starting point for thinking about bin Laden in a sophisticated way as well as a helpful analysis for clearing up important misperceptions about bin Laden’s life. The author approaches this task by stressing the political rather than personal aspects of bin Laden’s life, although the work does contain personal details that may help to illuminate his path to becoming the world’s most well-known terrorist. The book is well-organized, packed with facts, and contains a number of useful documents as appendixes as well as an annotated bibliography which may help guide nonspecialist readers seeking additional sources to continue learning about bin Laden and his movement. Consequently, this study clearly meets the accessibility goal that Mockaitis has set for himself.

In approaching his subject, Mockaitis acknowledges problems in establishing the key events and influences of bin Laden’s early life due to a lack of sources. He does note bin Laden’s relatively limited education in Saudi Arabia and his lack of exposure to overseas study unlike many of his brothers. Mockaitis also pays suitable attention to the intellectual currents influencing bin Laden throughout his life such as the psychological aftermath of the massive Arab defeat by Israel in 1967. A constant thread in this book is that bin Laden was able to gain attention and respect (far beyond what his intellect should have commanded) because of his personal wealth and his ability to attract more gifted followers seeking the benefit of his largesse. The most prominent examples of this trend are his early mentor, the now-deceased Palestinian radical Abdullah Azzam, and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of the Egyptian organization, Islamic Jihad, which merged with al Qaeda in 2001, allowing Zawahiri to become the organization’s deputy leader. Bin Laden, in turn, was able to make good use of the services and ideas of both men.

The author also usefully attempts to correct some fairly widespread misperceptions and disinformation about bin Laden’s background such as the myth that the foreign fighters he funded were decisive to the outcome of the anti-Soviet Afghan war. While Mockaitis is not the first person to note this falsehood, bin Laden and his supporters have been so successful in embellishing their role in defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan that any effort to correct the record is a public service as well as a useful statement on al Qaeda’s strong capabilities for the dissemination of propaganda. Foreign mujahideen were too few and usually too incompetent to play much of a role in Afghanistan. Often the only reason that these people were tolerated by the Afghan fighters was the funding and other resources that they provided to those who were much more involved in the fighting. He notes that foreign fighters in that war never numbered more than a few thousand at any one time and often included wealthy Arabs on school vacations, essentially playing at being guerrillas. The role of radical Arab fighters in resisting American troops in Somalia was similarly exaggerated as Mockaitis correctly points out.
Despite this book’s strengths, as an overview, it has occasional problems with nuance such as when the author speaks of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War as a defeat that conservative Muslims attributed to divine disfavor. Actually, many Arabs and especially the Egyptians view the 1973 War as a victory. October 6 is still a national holiday in Egypt, and the crossing of the Suez Canal is viewed as a monumental achievement. The second half of the war, when Israel turned the tables, is often distorted and minimized. The real soul searching that led more people to favor a radical Islamist approach to Arab problems actually came following the June 1967 War when two secular socialist regimes (Egypt and Syria) as well as the Jordanian monarchy were undeniably trounced in a military confrontation with Israel. In addition to issues of nuance, there are also some small problems with the book that suggest it might have been more carefully reviewed before it went to press. Sayid Qutb was executed in August 1966 and not 1967 as the author maintains. In describing the nature of historical theories, the author mentions William Wallace as a collaborator with Darwin when it was actually Alfred Russell Wallace. Bruce Riedel and Lawrence Wright are mentioned in some parts of the book by their correct names and also referred to with various incorrect first names. These problems are nevertheless minor and should not be allowed to become too large a distraction from the overall quality of the book which remains a valuable work serving a useful purpose.

**Beetle: The Life of General Walter Bedell Smith**

by D. K. R. Crosswell

Reviewed by Dr. Conrad Crane, Director of the US Army Military History Institute

While assisting Merle Miller with research for a biography about Dwight Eisenhower in the early 1980s, D.K.R. Crosswell discovered General Walter Bedell “Beetle” Smith, Ike’s wartime Chief of Staff. In 1991, Crosswell published *The Chief of Staff: The Military Career of General Walter Bedell Smith* with Greenwood Press. For two decades that volume has remained the best work on Smith. When Roger Cirillo, director of the Association of the United States Army book program, approached Crosswell about republishing it, the author suggested writing a new biography instead.

The resulting revision is more than twice as long as the original. As is clear from the titles, the current volume provides a more expansive discussion of Smith’s career after World War II, when he served as ambassador to the Soviet Union, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Undersecretary of State, and representative of the United States at the Geneva Talks on Indochina. Crosswell turned the 12-page epilogue of his first work into a 106-page prologue, a strange sequencing that opens the new book in 1945. The most interesting
revelations are in the section about Geneva, where Smith’s deft maneuvering, which included some unique personal diplomacy with the Chinese, was essential in obtaining a qualified American success from the agreement on Indochina that Crosswell calls “the last hurrah of the Ike-Beetle team.”

The rest of the book parallels the earlier volume in its focus on the establishment and workings of that leadership team that had such an important impact on the course of World War II. The general narrative of the material will be familiar to those who have read the earlier biography, but most of the coverage has been significantly enriched with more detail and added research. Crosswell has mined archives in the United States, Europe, and Asia. Besides revealing as much about Eisenhower as Smith, the book is also very good showing how the “tyranny of logistics” shaped their decisions in a command system involving contentious allies and prickly personalities. Smith’s career was additionally influenced by a relationship with George Marshall, whom he idolized. While Smith felt in later life that he had been exploited as “Ike’s prat boy,” in death his wife made sure that he was buried in a ceremony just like Marshall’s, and in an Arlington grave site in close proximity to Marshall’s.

Sometimes it is possible to have too much of a good thing. For a general reader seeking to learn about “Beetle” Smith and his underappreciated and often overlooked role in history, the shorter original biography is the best beginning source. For those serious researchers and scholars looking for more detailed behind-the-scenes information about the personalities and decision-making that produced “Victory in Europe,” they will profit greatly from this thoroughly-researched, well-written, and reasonably priced new opus.

by Christopher Preble

Reviewed by MAJ William C. Taylor, Instructor of American Politics, Public Policy and Strategic Studies, US Military Academy

Moments of national distress give us pause to reconsider our founding principles as a nation as well as to reconsider the viability of our current grand strategy. As Christopher Preble rightly illustrates in The Power Problem, much has changed in the 200 years since our country’s founding. The nation’s political culture has evolved from one which distrusted standing armies, feared a strong executive, and avoided foreign entanglements to one which demands an active defense, chastens weak executives, and pursues numerous alliances. Today, amidst 10 years of war, the United States should reconsider the merits of military activity abroad. Are US foreign
policies commensurate with its national resources? When is the use of US force counterproductive and indeed deleterious to its national security?

With panache, Preble offers a timely monograph in which he chastises the use of the military as a panacea for US foreign policy. American policy makers have confused power—the capacity to affect change and the ability to influence others—with force—a tool that a state employs as an extension of its power. Power undergirds force, but an overreliance on force can erode the power foundation. Paradoxically, the expanding use of military force in the world has actually served to erode US power both domestically and internationally. As such, Preble contends that policy makers should rely more on America’s vibrant culture and economic prowess and reserve the use of military force for clear issues of national defense. Specifically, the US should deploy military force only when: (1) there are vital American security interests at stake; (2) there is a clear and attainable military mission; (3) there is broad public support; and, (4) there is an exit strategy based on a clear understanding of what constitutes victory.

Preble provocatively questions the rationality of US grand strategy. If states pursue policies which further their economic wealth and national security (as many scholars of international relations assert), then on a mere cost-benefit analysis, the United States is acting quite irrationally. Preble meticulously provides a ledger of the visible costs of maintaining a military (procurement, personnel expenses, waging war, deaths, and medical care) as well as the hidden opportunity costs (military costs preclude rebuilding our infrastructure, military interventions inadvertently threaten others, and the use of our military in one location inhibits its use elsewhere). Indeed, Preble’s stark listing of the military’s price tag (currently $2,065 per US citizen per year) as well as the opportunity costs (the cost of building one B-2 bomber equals constructing 171 elementary schools) accentuates his point—the costs of our current defense are too high, and these costs eclipse the supposed benefits.

One might forgive the costs the US invests in its military if it returned a profitable dividend of national security. Yet Preble argues that our investments have languished due to false assumptions, allies who ride free, and the unintended consequences of military intervention. Unlike previous authors, Preble argues that the United States is not the major beneficiary of the global economy. Other states, especially US allies that ride free off American security guarantees, are the primary benefactors of US military expenditures. Preble also discounts the false notion that the world will slip into chaos if America no longer fulfills its role as the global policeman. States will peacefully fill the power vacuum left by the US military to protect their economic interests. Finally, military interventionism engenders negative externalities, or “public bads,” which prove counterproductive to US security. A doctrine of preventive war decreased US security vis-à-vis Iran and North Korea, and the presence of American soldiers in Saudi Arabia elicited the ire of Muslim extremists. In short, the idea that a heavy US military presence in the world equals increased security for America is naïve, profoundly flawed, and will serve as a catalyst of
iegemonic decline. The United States should slowly withdraw its international commitments and allow other states to fulfill their fair share of the international provision of public goods. This will not lead to internecine state conflict; rather, it will further US power abroad.

While Preble rightly questions the merits of utilizing US military force abroad, readers must also carefully plumb Preble’s myriad assumptions. Will other states peacefully and cooperatively rebuild their militaries to fill the US power vacuum? Will US allies forgo nuclear proliferation as Belarus and Ukraine did or accelerate their development like Iran and North Korea? Will states continue to promote economic openness due to complex interdependence, or will states succumb to regional security dilemmas? Does the world truly admire US culture and economic practices as much as Preble suggests? Preble’s critique of American military adventurism is sound, but US policy makers should carefully consider the unintended consequences of reduced American military activity abroad.

The author’s *The Power Problem* is an important work which all foreign policy practitioners should carefully examine. As we are witnessing in Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, and North Korea, the use of military force has its limitations. A tragedy of hegemonic foreign policy is that in the pursuit of national security, hegemons often pursue a grand strategy which catalyzes their decline. As previous scholars have clearly demonstrated, military interventions do not always increase state security. The use of force, while reliant on power, may often erode a state’s power in the long run. The strength of any state resides in a robust, resilient, and regenerative economy. Foreign policy decisionmakers should be mindful of bureaucratic groupthink and wary of military solutions as a panacea for international problems. As Preble rightly argues, in many cases the construction of 171 elementary schools instead of one B-2 bomber would go much further in advancing our national security.

**The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics**

*by Michael C. Horowitz*

**Reviewed by Stephen J. Blank**, Research Professor of National Security Affairs, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

It is a truism of military studies that technological innovations do not stay confined to the state which first makes or presents them. But it also is equally true that states do not follow each other in mechanical lockstep. Some innovations are improved upon, others are ignored, and often attempts to emulate an innovation fail to realize the original intent. Horowitz’s book represents an effort to impart a theoretical basis to the question of how and why nations emulate leaders.
Michael C. Horowitz’s The Diffusion of Military Power

in military innovation. Accordingly, the author advances a theory that he calls adoption-capacity theory to explain the dynamics of emulation and innovation.

According to his theory, to the extent that the financial costs of emulating a competitor’s innovations are too high, other alternatives, e.g., alliances, will be found. By the same token, if the emulation in question requires major organizational transformations in recruiting, training, and war-fighting doctrine, those innovations will not be made and fewer actors will emulate it. For instance, a contemporary example involves the revolution in military affairs (RMA).

Soviet experts understood the new technologies that were coming on stream in the 1970s and grasped their potential for revolutionizing military operations. Yet the financial, doctrinal, and organizational transformations required of the USSR to emulate Western technological innovations was so far beyond Soviet capabilities that the effort was either not made or, when attempted, crashed, helping to bring down the whole system.

Horowitz tests the theory for four relatively recent innovations in warfare: nuclear weapons, battle fleet warfare, carrier warfare, and suicide bombing. And in each case the theory holds up. To be fair, there may be somewhat less innovation in his thinking than he presents for we have always intuitively, if not systematically, known that if states lack the resources to emulate their competitors’ innovations they either fall by the wayside or have to find surrogates for that kind of innovation. As Dominic Lieven has recently and brilliantly demonstrated, Imperial Russia could not emulate the Napoleonic levée en masse and Bonaparte’s tactics nor could it hope to win at the beginning of the 1812 campaign by fighting Napoleon’s preferred major pitched battle. Instead, it had to introduce its own reforms and fight a different kind of war that magnified its advantages and reduced Bonaparte’s.

Nonetheless, the theory is analytically important for it serves to underline just what it takes for states to compete in world politics and in warfare and points us in the direction of seeing which states can adapt and survive in an environment of ceaseless innovations, both minor and major. Russia, for example has yet to adapt to the RMA and the task may be beyond it. Yet China seems to be making a relatively smooth adjustment by utilizing its resources to build a formidable irregular warfare, missile, and naval capability in service of an anti-access strategy aimed against the United States. Moscow instead is required to find substitutes, which it has done up until now by emphasizing its nuclear capabilities and asymmetric responses. This requirement to find substitutes demonstrates its lack of both financial and organizational resources, and its inadaptability or inflexibility in military affairs.

If we might rephrase a celebrated quote of Karl Marx here, states do innovate but they are not free to innovate as they wish. Instead, they operate under constraints at all times. But some constraints are more permissive or productive than others. Indeed, the fundamental test of any state’s ability to remain in the military running is, as Horowitz suggests, closely tied to its economic-financial and organizational-doctrinal capabilities. The current crisis’s impact on Europe is graphic evidence of the extent to which successful
military competition depends upon the possession of those capabilities and how the lack of them forces a search for innovative alternatives, e.g., Anglo-French discussions about combining forces. So to the extent that states possess the requisite capabilities to emulate innovators, they and the innovators can remain major powers. But the converse is equally true as the Anglo-French example cited above suggests. Thus, this theory is also a useful means of analyzing the rise and fall of major powers in the international system. That aspect of the theory’s utility adds to the value of this valuable and useful analysis.

**Drugs and Contemporary Warfare**

by Paul Rexton Kan

Reviewed by James J. Carafano, Deputy Director of The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, and Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies

Here is an important book on an important subject. *Drugs and Contemporary Warfare* examines how drug use and trafficking complicate the conduct of modern conflict. With US forces battling poppy growers in Afghanistan; with the Mexican military trying to take back territory from peso-rich and better-armed cartels; and with many parts of the world seeing both trafficking in drugs and the dangers of failed states on the rise—there are few books that would be more helpful in a contemporary soldier’s intellectual rucksack.

Paul Kan, an Associate Professor of National Security Studies at the US Army War College, has written a well-organized and comprehensive guide to understanding a complex phenomenon that cuts across social, political, economic, cultural, public health and safety, as well as military fields of competition. The problem is inherently “inter-disciplinary.” In response, that is just the approach Kan takes in his analysis and not surprisingly he finds that a multi-faceted response is most effective in dealing with the challenge. Kan writes, “a multilayered effort from international organizations, major powers, and non-state actors is required to fully address the effects of the drug trade on warfare in today’s world.” It is refreshing to see an analysis of an international security challenge which eschews the “easy button.” Rather than argue for some simple-minded, silver-bullet solution, *Drugs and Contemporary Warfare* admits that this is just a damn difficult problem.

The real utility of *Drugs and Contemporary Warfare* is its fact-filled pages packed with useful insight. There is, for example, a long and useful explanation of the stages of production and distribution for different kinds of drugs, marking the unique qualities of manufacturing and marketing from products like heroin, cocaine, and marijuana to synthetic drugs like amphetamine-type stimulants. The author presents a grim account of how warring groups use drugs for recruiting and retention of child soldiers. Kan details a sobering
Thomas Bruscino’s A Nation Forged In War

explanation of how high-drug use in combat zones exacerbates undermining public health and safety making the challenge of ending conflicts successfully even more problematic.

In the end, however, the greatest challenge Drugs and Contemporary Warfare finds is that drug-money used to further fuel the trade and increase profits is inevitably used to challenge law enforcement, public safety, judicial systems, and even military institutions. “Police are bribed to provide information about upcoming drug raids,” Kan writes, “while soldiers are paid not to show up for duty. Prosecutors are bribed not to prosecute and judges not to convict.” When the death-spiral is allowed to continue, eventually political stability shatters.

There are, of course, always ways to make a good book better. Kan dabbles with the history of drugs and wars before the contemporary era, but it is a thin history at best. Drugs and war have been sharing foxholes through the annals of warfare. That is probably a story worth telling. Modern phenomena often seem unique, perplexing, and overwhelming simply because we don’t know our own past. The use of drugs in battle, for example, is anything but new. During World War II, amphetamine was extensively used to combat fatigue. Soldiers and pilots popped them like candy. We still do not fully understand how they impacted the course of the conflict.

Likewise, today neuropharmacology, how drugs affect cellular function in the nervous system, is often discussed as the next “killer-app,” in future warfare with designer drugs that do everything from speeding training to building super-soldier bodies. Drugs and Contemporary Warfare could well have gone on to address these future challenges.

Still, as is, it is a fine book. Drugs and Contemporary Warfare serves as a useful introduction to the reality of narcotics on the frontline. It deserves the attention of military professionals.

A Nation Forged In War: How World War II Taught Americans to Get Along

by Thomas Bruscino

Reviewed by Dr. Richard Meinhart, Professor of Defense and Joint Processes, US Army War College

This book’s title captured my interest, as I recently had a discussion with my father, who is 90 and a veteran of the Battle of the Bulge, about his WWII military experiences. Thomas Bruscino, a history professor at the Army School of Advanced Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, wrote this book, which is the first in a Legacies of War series. Bruscino’s main premise, which is aptly supported by relevant statistical data, historical events, and, perhaps even more powerfully, veterans’ anecdotes, is that the United States was remarkably changed to be more religious and ethnically tolerant because of veterans’ experiences in
World War II. Words used by the author to describe this premise are: “the intolerance and bigotry of the United States in the 1920s was visceral, emotional” to “in the years after WWII almost everyone recognized that ethnic and religious intolerance decreased dramatically.” While the author credits military WWII service overall for this significant change, he focused on the Army and provided insight into the “whys” behind the growing tolerance.

The book’s efficient introduction sets the stage for the reader by briefly examining key historical events associated with varying degrees of religious and ethnic tolerance levels in the United States from 1920 to 1960. The introduction captures the reader emotionally by first telling the story of the Four Immortal Chaplains, each of a different religion, who collectively died together linking their arms and giving away their life vests during the sinking of the *Dorchester* in 1943, and describing the country’s many tributes and memorials that commemorated their sacrifice. The introduction discusses how the book will examine the nation’s and the military’s views of ethnic and religious tolerance beginning with WWI through the inter-war years leading to WWII, events associated with WWII, and finally post-WWII through the Cold War. The two seminal events the author vividly described that bookend this 40-year time period were the 1928 resounding defeat of the nation’s first Catholic Presidential Candidate, Al Smith, versus the 1960 election of John Kennedy, the nation’s first Catholic President, and how the nation’s collective religious and ethnic tolerance greatly differed in two Presidential campaigns.

To appreciate the author’s white, ethnic, and religious focus, a brief summary of key statistics discussed in the book about the nation’s diversity is warranted. Prior to WWII, more than 25 percent of the nation’s population, approximately 35 million (M), were first and second-generation Americans. Of this total, the largest numbers were Germans (5M), Italians (4M), Polish (3M) and Irish (2.5M) with Czechs, Hungarians, Swedes, Norwegians and Mexicans approximately 1 million each. The nation’s estimated religious percentages included Roman Catholics as the largest denomination at 30 percent, followed in percentage order by Baptists (16), Methodists (11), Lutherans (7), Jewish (4), and Presbyterians (4), among the 60 different religions. The issue of racial segregation of people of Black and Asian color was not discussed in any detail. The author acknowledged, however, that an opportunity was wasted, as white soldiers did not have their views challenged from training, boredom, or combat experiences with people of color.

The book’s first two chapters, aptly titled, “The America They Left Behind” and “The Ethnic Army,” provide the intellectual and somewhat analytical basis for the later chapters focused on WWII’s impact. The first chapter broadly examines the nation’s religious and ethnically intolerant character illustrated by the rise of the Ku Klux Klan, religious bias associated with Smith’s run for president, work force discrimination issues, immigration and prohibition laws, and the development of ethnic in the nation’s cities and countryside. The book’s vignettes, describing degrees of ethnic and religious intolerances and blatant biases, were much more powerful than the statistics. As WWII recruiting and
the draft reflected the nation’s ethnic and religious percentages, they combined with the associated intolerance, the author establishing context that reveals the challenges facing the Army and its predominant Protestant Chaplain Corps.

The next three chapters—“Introduction to the Army, Hours of Boredom” and “Instants of Excitement and Terror”—capture ways the Army dealt with this diversity. The author describes how the Army “literally stripped down the recruits to their essentials” through induction processes, close quarters, and a tough physical regimen. This was followed by developing individuals in teams from initial training and stateside service that slowly allowed soldiers to see themselves and their cohorts differently. The author provides examples of how Army leaders did not ignore ethnic and religious issues and purposely enacted policies to unite individuals with a pragmatism and idealism through the effective use of print and motion picture media. The insight on how boredom enabled soldiers to deeply bond as they developed friendships across ethnic and religious barriers that lasted well beyond service was important and informative because most earlier works dealt with bonding through combat. The chapter on combat captured a different intensity as it illustrated how soldiers dealt with anxieties, formed brotherhoods, and embraced prayer in a foxhole. The vignettes depict how performance and the resultant comradeship helped to set aside negative ethnic and religious beliefs.

The final two chapters—“Coming Home, Taking Over” and “The New Consensus and Beyond”—followed by a succinct conclusion provides insight on how WWII veterans were welcomed home but not necessarily reintegrated into their neighborhoods. A key point was that many veterans did not go back to their ethnic neighborhoods or farm communities. Instead, they traveled across America and developed what is now called the suburbs, with greater ethnic and religious diversity. The GI Bill fostered home ownership and education opportunities for returning veterans in record numbers and helped ensure the nation’s economic and intellectual growth. Most importantly, the author identifies how Americans in general began to listen more to these veterans’ views in word and deed. Bruscino traces the veterans’ political influence in Congress as well as their startling, positive social advocacy roles and growth in inter-ethnic and inter-faith marriages.

The book’s strength is the effective manner in which it efficiently describes the social and political events, and the statistical data supporting the various vignettes, all designed to capture the reader analytically and emotionally. The extensive bibliography and over 75 pages of endnotes provide the intellectual rigor to support the author’s views while giving the reader excellent sources for further research. The book’s one weakness is that it should have discussed racial segregation in more detail, as well as integrating Marine and Naval anecdotes and statistics. One can certainly learn from historic events, the author’s insight provides the everyday citizen and nation’s leaders ways to think about and address some of the ongoing religious and ethnic challenges. Growing up as the child of a second-generation American and World War II veteran from a Catholic Hungarian neighborhood in a diverse ethnic and
religious Pennsylvania city, this allowed the reviewer to connect with many of the author’s revelations. If this book is any indication of the quality of the *Legacies of War* series, look forward to the upcoming releases.

**The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of Modernity**

by Antoine Bousquet

**Reviewed by Kevin J. Cogan, COL (USA Retired),** a former General Broehon Burke Somervell Chair of Management, US Army War College

If you like neither science nor military history, stop here and skip to another review. If you are still here, then first there is a little test: Jomini, Sun Tzu, von Moltke, Clausewitz, Napoleon, Frederick the Great, Boyd, Gell-Mann, Chomsky, Gödel, Mandelbrot, von Neumann, Lorenz, Schrödinger, and Shannon. If you are comfortable with the first six or seven names but started to fade with the latter names on the list, then reading this book will not extend your knowledge of warfare, but you will learn more about science. And if you were comfortable with the last half of the name list but not the beginning, then you will enhance your military acumen when reading this book. And if you are familiar with all the names on the list, you are not as likely to learn more about science or warfare, but rather you will modify your view of the world and its future in both domains.

The author organizes his book not by date, but around metaphors to describe modern battlefields: the clock for the mechanistic warfare era, the engine to introduce thermodynamic war, the computer to express cybernetic warfare, and the network to reveal the future vision for chaoplexic warfare. The reader is fortunate to have a common familiarity with the clock, the engine, the computer, and (maybe) the network (network in the sense of social networking, not routers and servers). From this familiarity, it is easy to see the impact that science has on warfare, not from a technical sense, but rather in the cultural way that society adopts its new technology and then manifests its acceptance of it throughout society including warfare. There are two primary points that the author makes: first, society has to eventually accept the new technology where acceptance is the internalization in everyday life of the science that has been wrought; second, with attribution to Alvin Tofler, “nations make war the same way they make wealth.” This latter point is expressed somewhat late in the book and the reader is left wondering when the philosophical underpinnings will emerge, and when they do, he finds that Bouquet’s sentiments toward the United States are not very flattering. Be that as it may, it is amusing to associate the clockworks of the 16th century with the mechanistic way of war—structured, organized, precise, cause and effect. Armies march in step, obey predetermined orders, obey the “clockmaker” and hope that it worked when the smoke cleared.
The emergence of the science of the engine, which transformed society as it entered and accepted the new industrial age, also transformed waging war with entropy, ballistics, and motors which define the thermodynamic era of warfare. Most notably, this era heightened destruction produced by more energetic weapons (to include nuclear) and eliminated any predictability that might have been assumed in the mechanistic (clock) era. The author injects Clausewitz’s “fog of war” concept in the thermodynamic era but will also return to it when the cybernetic era is presented. The cybernetic way of warfare is delineated as post-Hiroshima which unleashed the most energetic means of war to that date. It was thought that cybernetics could either deter or control nuclear war with the new weapons of command and control, communications, computers (von Neumann), operations research/systems analysis, information theory (Shannon), and chaos theory (Gödel, Mandelbrot). The cybernetic way of warfare ushered in the belief that information was the opposite of entropy (thermodynamic warfare) and thus the probability of vast destruction could be controlled through robust command and control networks such as the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) and other similar references.

With another stroke of disparagement towards the United States in the application of cybernetics in Vietnam, the notion of nonlinearity (chaos theory) and its mathematical underpinnings are introduced to state why low-intensity conflict is such a difficult task. Indeed, society widely accepted the computer in the last decade of the 20th century. Its adaptation to warfare had hoped to find order in disorder. Now enter chaos theory, complex adaptive systems, decentralization of command, and network centric warfare. Reenter Clausewitz and the fog of war as well as his friction in war. The author neatly marries Clausewitz’s “friction” with chaos theory’s “butterfly effect” of Lorenz which both essentially state that small disturbances in the initial conditions can have a great effect on the outcome.

At about this point the reader may have been fairly comfortable with the clock, engine, and computer metaphors for the scientific way of warfare. After all, at the dawn of the 21st century, these metaphors have been common societal and culturally accepted experiences for most. But the last metaphor, the network, is used to describe the emerging (and not yet accepted) chaoplexic way of warfare. Now the reader might say “I really don’t want to read this anymore” but is committed to finish with only 80 pages to go. Here, physicist Murray Gell-Mann states that complexity, defined as “the edge of chaos,” is at its maximum between the extremities of order and disorder. At this “edge” the author will show that positive feedback in decentralized and distributed networks will yield structures that are at their peak adaptability and creativeness. The warfighter reader might translate this to mean that the soldier immersed in the fog of war at the edge of the command and control system will emerge as the best decisionmaker. This is the antithesis of the clock metaphor, the earliest era of modern warfare presented in the book. But the notions of nonlinearity, complexity science, and self-adapting networks are not yet intuitive to most readers not to mention societal acceptance which was earlier stated to be
necessary for adaptation of new science to warfare and a manifestation of the way nations make wealth.

Although chaoplexic warfare may yet seem far off, reading about its possibilities, with the book’s ample references to other texts, may be a fertile launch point for further independent research for both the military-minded and scientific-oriented readers. This was a good place to end the book. Unfortunately, the author regresses by trying to integrate Gell-Mann, John Boyd’s Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) loop in great detail, and an emerging “chaoplexic Clausewitz” by stamping it with quotes from the US Marine Corps’ FMFM1: Warfighting manual. The real purpose of this last chapter, as this review alluded to earlier, is to denigrate the US adoption of Network Centric Warfare, also known internationally as NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC). Some may welcome this, but it really is an unnecessary political discourse and detracts from the otherwise excellent science/war dynamic of the book’s stated intent. The first three metaphors effectively integrate science and warfare as a duality for each of the modern warfare eras. The last era, chaoplexic warfare, has yet to unfold and should have enjoyed greater elaboration in that chapter. If it had, the reader would recognize that each era of warfare was followed by accelerated adoption and societal acceptance of a new science and that chaoplexic warfare may be here faster than currently imagined.

Global Security Watch: Jordan
by W. Andrew Terrill

Reviewed by Colonel Robert E. Friedenberg, currently serving as Senior Defense Official and Defense Attaché, US Embassy Damascus, Syria

Jordan is a poor Arab country with few natural resources, no oil, and a small population, yet its strategic importance has outweighed its lack of attributes. How have the Jordanians achieved this? Will Jordan remain strategically relevant to the United States following combat operations in Iraq, Jordan’s neighbor to the East?

Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, a research professor at the US Army War College, attempts to answer these questions in this book. Well researched and clearly written, his book begins with an overview of Jordanian history, effectively combining both older sources and very recent ones. Weaving a narrative from current King Abdullah II’s grandfather, Abdullah I, to his father, Hussein, to the present day, Terrill shows how the earlier monarchs managed threats, balanced competing interests and maintained alliances. Following a chapter on Jordanian political, economic, and military systems, Terrill then goes into detail on Jordanian relations with the Palestinians, the United States, Israel, its Arab neighbors, and Iran. It is here that the author’s strengths as a historian of the region come into focus. Dr Terrill has written in the past on King Hussein’s rivalry with Yasir Arafat and the Palestine Liberation Organization.
W. Andrew Terrill’s Global Security Watch: Jordan

(PLO), and his expertise in this area is useful in his interpretation of the March 1968 Battle of Karameh. This was an inconclusive military action fought on Jordanian territory between the Israelis and a combined PLO/Jordanian Army force. Terrill correctly notes, however, that Palestinian propagandists labeled it as a huge defeat for Israel and the battle became a key element in Arafat’s warrior mythology.

Terrill’s knowledge of wider Middle Eastern history also allows him to place Jordan’s current relations with its neighbors into historic context. In the case of Iraq, he covers the earlier close relations that, following Jordan’s refusal to abandon Saddam Hussein in the 1990-91 Gulf War, a move that severely isolated King Hussein. Jordanian-Iraqi relations were much more strained following the 2003 overthrow of Saddam and the rise of a Shia-dominated government in Iraq. But as Terrill points out, relations are always more complicated than at first glance. Jordan is currently assisting Iraqi police and military training, and continues importing Iraqi oil. The historic ties remain, despite some difficulties. The author answers the question of Jordan’s continuing strategic relevance in chapters on Jordan’s relations with its neighbors, the United States, and Israel. Following the 1991 Gulf War, King Hussein knew he had to get back in the good graces of the United States, and so concluded a peace treaty with Israel, thus ensuring US economic and military assistance. Abdullah, taking a page from his father’s playbook, continued to remain vital to the United States by joining the “Global War On Terror” following the 11 September 2001 attacks and assisting the United States in the subsequent invasion of Iraq. Where there may have been some risk to this strategy in terms of Abdullah’s domestic popularity, Terrill shows us that, with the November 2005 bombings of three Western chain hotels in Amman, al Qaeda overplayed its hand and Jordanian public opinion turned decisively against Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian-born al Qaeda leader. In his chapter on how Jordan deals with terrorism, Terrill includes the “Amman Message,” a sermon delivered in 2004 by the Jordanian Chief Justice that formalized Jordan’s attempt to advance moderate Islam and counter those voices that labeled all Muslims as extremists. He sees the sermon not as a single event, but as part of a larger effort by the government to counter Islamic extremism. Once again, he finds the larger context that eludes many observers of the Middle East.

In a final chapter entitled “Jordan Looks Toward the Future,” the author clearly explains how Jordan must remain relevant to a host of international power brokers—the United States needs Jordan to maintain peace with Israel and set the example for those Arab nations that have yet to conclude agreements with the Jewish State. Jordan’s ability to affect Iraqi stability in ways such as continuing to train Iraqi security forces, is also vital. In the struggle against terrorism and Islamic extremism, Jordan’s position and influence overshadow its limited population and resources. Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate, though sometimes accused of brutal methods, is critical in cooperating with the United States in the fight against al Qaeda and related organizations. In advancing the Amman Message, Jordanian “soft power” can counter more
extremist and intolerant versions of Islam. In the final chapter, Terrill has advice for US policy makers. A pro-democracy agenda must be tempered with the desire for stability. He states free elections in Jordan will not necessarily produce pro-American, pro-Israeli governments. It is here that perhaps Terrill’s advocacy of the Realpolitik view may be out of step with recent events. The January 2011 riots in Tunis show us that overdependence on autocratic regimes to maintain stability can backfire. The United States will continue to depend on Jordan for stability, but needs to be aware of growing frustration among its overwhelmingly young population facing increasing unemployment and higher costs of living. The Hashemite family has shown an amazing ability to counter threats to its rule—the increasing frustration of the population is just the latest challenge to stability in Jordan. Some reform is inevitable if the Hashemite Kingdom is to survive.

At the end of the book are several useful appendixes including biographies of Jordanian leaders, the full transcript of the Amman Message, and an address by King Abdullah II to a joint session of the US Congress.

This very readable book is strongly recommended for those in uniform and civilians with Middle East-related assignments.

**Battlespace Technologies: Network-Enabled Information Dominance**

by Richard S. Deakin

Reviewed by Dr. Jeffrey L. Groh, Professor, Information and Technology in Warfare, US Army War College

It is a challenge to stay current on information systems and communications technologies in 21st century warfare. The understanding of information-age technologies can be intimidating to senior warfighters and their staffs. Trade journals, internet resources, and technical white papers can heighten the angst to gain an appreciation for the available technologies to prosecute information-age warfare. Richard S. Deakin in his book *Battlespace Technologies: Network-Enabled Information Dominance* provides a valuable service putting the most important networking concepts, information systems, and communications equipment in one reference. Deakin argues, early in the book, that information-age technologies have significant implications for command and control within the operational environment. This thesis should grab the attention of senior warfighters and their staffs as a guide to the concepts and tools required to successfully operate in a network-enabled environment.

The central theme advances the concept of Network-Enabled Capability (NEC). The author describes NEC as an “integrated force approach to modern warfare enabled by the cohesion of communications and computer networks, sensors, intelligence-gathering assets, and databases integrated with the
necessary command and control (C2) processes.” The book begins with a brief introduction outlining the significant changes to warfare in the 21st century. He examines the myths and realities of network warfare as well as how militaries gain information superiority on the modern battlefield. In the next two chapters, the author examines the principles and evolution of Network-Enabled Warfare as well as essential NEC concepts. The reader gains an appreciation for the value added by collaborative sensing, tracking, targeting, and engagement to achieve desired effects in today’s operational environment. The following chapter provides the reader a detailed examination of the most current NEC techniques and technologies. This part of the book is an extremely technical analysis that may be difficult for those who find network theory, hardware, and software discussion intimidating. Over 400 colored photographs and illustrations clearly demonstrate concepts and equipment for those who do not have a background in information technology or communications. The author writes in language that most will understand and clearly explains central concepts. The final chapter is a brief presentation of future trends in NEC. The future will continue to see advances in networking and sensors. There will be an integration of systems assisting planners to harness even more data and information facilitating situational understanding.

The author provides value on many levels when contemplating the complexities of warfare today. He advances the notion of Network Centric Warfare beyond the ideas proffered by John Garstka, Frederick P. Stein, and Dr. David S. Alberts in their book (Network Centric Warfare: Developing and leveraging Information Superiority, 2nd Revised Edition, Washington, DC: CCRP, 1999). The term “Network Centric Warfare” has acquired a great deal of conceptual baggage over the years. Through the book, Deakin works to demonstrate that the network is an enabler to the warfighter in 21st century warfare. “To refer to network technologies as network-centric is therefore misleading. Network technologies have created quite the opposite effect of delivering decision making right across the network rather than centralizing it as the term would suggest.” Deakin stresses that network-enabled capabilities are more about networking than the network. This important distinction places information systems and communications in the proper context of information-age warfare. He also clearly articulates throughout the book that NEC is not a “panacea” to address all the challenges facing military leaders. The vulnerabilities of military forces tied to robust information systems and communications play a central role. Deakin covers in considerable detail the problems of information overload, over dependency on data, cyber attacks, and the basic complexity of today’s systems. He goes beyond technological buzzwords to examine concepts in depth.

One should not expect to read this book like a novel. Deakin provides a reference (dare I say encyclopedia) of current information systems and communications technologies along with the associated network theory. This should not dissuade senior leaders from making this a part of their professional reading. Leaders at all levels require understanding of the command and control theories and equipment that enable 21st century warfare. Deakin leverages an
impressive array of the most current scholarly and technical publications as well as military doctrine adding validity and rigor to the book.

The one minor shortcoming is the book’s focus on major combat operations. There is little coverage on how information systems and communications can enable operations in hybrid and irregular warfare environments. The author offers almost no analysis on the challenges to command and control in an interagency and intergovernmental operational environment. The book focuses mostly on UK, US, and NATO doctrine in major combat operations; the reader must extrapolate these lessons learned to an irregular operational environment characteristic of many of today’s conflicts.

This book is worthy of the attention of senior military leaders and their staffs responsible for planning and executing 21st century warfare at the operational and strategic levels of war. This work offers value to more than information systems and communications specialists. It is relevant to commanders and operations planners (i.e., J-3 and J-5s). The technologies described in this extensive work will continue to remain a central element of military information systems for years to come. It helps the reader understand the complexity of the hardware and software in today’s military networks. The author clearly outlines the relationships between sensor, shooter, and decisionmaker in the context of the “kill chain” on today’s modern battlefield.