

The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters

Volume 41
Number 2 *Parameters Summer 2011*

Article 3

5-1-2011

From the Editor

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Recommended Citation

Taylor, Robert H.. "From the Editor." *The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters* 41, 2 (2011).
<https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol41/iss2/3>

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From the Editor

In this issue . . .

We are indeed pleased to present an eclectic collection of articles on a number of critical issues facing the Nation and its military. Our first article “Reframing Suicide in the Military” by George Mastroianni and Wilbur Scott, professors in the Department of Behavioral Sciences & Leadership at the Air Force Academy, addresses an issue at the forefront of every leader’s chain of concern. The authors analyze a number of the current philosophies and approaches for dealing with this insidious epidemic and determine that neither repetitive deployments nor intensity of combat can completely explain the rising suicide rate. They conclude that today’s soldier is more connected to and aware of current social and political trends. These considerations suggest that some of the difficulties soldiers encounter may arise from a perceived conflict between their beliefs and expectations concerning military life and the ever-changing realities in their work environment as exposed by news and electronic media. Any new framework for meeting this growing challenge needs to include some consideration of the capacity of soldiers to meaningfully interpret their experiences in military service.

“Unconstitutional War: Strategic Risk in the Age of Congressional Abdication” is Joseph Gallagher’s attempt to heighten awareness of the imbalance of constitutional power across the branches of US government. The author highlights the fact that over the past 60 years, through a combination of executive initiative and congressional abdication, the United States has engaged in a number of large scale offensive wars without congressional war declarations, despite Congress’s constitutional authority. His analysis supports the thesis that congressional resolutions are an insufficient substitute for war declarations. The resolution process undercuts the intent of framers of the Constitution that a well-conceived declaration process was required to provide popular support for the nation’s wars. As the keeper of the nation’s treasury, the Congress determines the sustainability of any military effort. Gallagher’s research supports the contention that it was the founders’ intent that their carefully crafted constitutional war-making authority be placed with the branch of government most representative of the people—the Congress. Likewise, it was never the founders’ intent that the military would serve as the nation’s primary agency with the world or stand as a dominant instrument of foreign policy. The author examines the history underpinning *The War Powers Resolution of 1973* to conclude that although this may have been a noble attempt to place power in the appropriate place, its convoluted and cryptic language did exactly the opposite; it allowed an assertive executive branch to run roughshod over an abdicating Congress, while compromising US military efficacy. Gallagher closes with the mantra that if this nation declared war when it went to war, as required by the Constitution, the United States would have fewer wars—and would be in a much better position to win them.

Paul Kan provides readers with insight concerning America's approach to countering the threat generated by Mexican drug cartels. "What We're Getting Wrong About Mexico" is the author's attempt to answer the question surrounding the violence occurring in Mexico, "Is it narcoinsurgency, narcoterrorism, or a crime wave that is gripping Mexico?" Kan believes the use of such terms as "insurgency" and "terrorism" only serves to confuse our understanding of the threat. The act of defining a particular type of organized crime can have deep and far-reaching implications for policy makers responsible for designing the strategies to be implemented. He espouses a belief that the strategic rationale for the ongoing violence and the tactics being employed by the cartels do not support those touting the narcoinsurgency or narcoterrorism schools' assessment of the situation in Mexico. Kan believes that the frustration many express over the cause and effect of cartel violence is part of the reason why individuals and organizations use inappropriate labels to describe the situation. The author closes with a warning that if we are to successfully counter this high-intensity crime threat there needs to be greater and more mutually reinforcing cooperation on the part of the United States and Mexico.

If we are to truly understand the ramifications of actions and strategies impacting land-warfare in the joint environment, it is imperative that we explore and analyze the strategies of our sister Services. "Revitalizing the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower" is Charles Moore's attempt to educate the reader on the first new naval strategy in 25 years. In 2007, in cooperation with the Marine Corps and Coast Guard the US Navy promulgated *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*. This succinct 15-page document outlined six core capabilities that would contribute to national security. The author's concern is that there has been no attempt to revise or update the original document despite significant changes in the domestic and international landscape since 2007. He suggests that even though the Cooperative Strategy is useful as the Navy's strategic base document, it needs expansion in four key areas: the document should address the means (fleet requirements) required to connect the strategy's ways and ends; it should better define potential maritime threats; the strategy should be aligned with the *National Security Strategy*; and finally, it needs to outline a strategy capable of maximizing cooperative maritime capabilities with partner nations. Moore analyzes each of these key areas and concludes that the Navy needs to rapidly develop these functions and the supporting core capabilities if it is to be on the strongest possible footing prior to pending budget reductions.

Major General Naveed Mukhtar of the Pakistan Army provides our final article in this issue, "Afghanistan: Alternative Futures and Their Implications." The author establishes four possible scenarios for the future of Afghanistan without the involvement of major regional and international parties. The author develops and analyzes these scenarios as a means for suggesting the formulation and modification of various political and strategic objectives. Mukhtar understands that scenarios are only one way to examine the possible outcomes

and governing factors impacting the future US and Afghanistan-Pakistan (Af-Pak) strategy. He makes the reader blatantly aware that the scenarios presented are not predictions nor are they assured consequences of potential strategies. Rather, they are narratives of alternative future environments that may manifest plausible developments by combining underpinning influences and trends. Each of the scenarios contains a brief projection of the particular operational and strategic environment, identifies scenario goals, and describes a way forward. The author closes with the apothegm, “No strategist deliberately designs a strategy to fail.” He again reminds the reader that the scenarios articulated in the article are intended to be illustrative and not predictive; they do, however, highlight possible strategic acts that have the potential for negative consequences.

Parameters’ “Book Reviews” department again offers expert appraisals and analyses on an array of contemporary literature of interest to academe, senior military leaders, and defense professionals. The perceptive reader will realize the number of reviews in this issue goes beyond our normal run. This is done in an effort to provide readers more timely assessments of new entries to the market. Robert Killebrew leads the way with an incisive look at Jeffrey Record’s *Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq*. Dan Henk contributes an excellent review of *Global Security Watch: Kenya* by Donovan C. Chau. Henk’s regional expertise and cultural awareness provide readers an understandable and informative assessment of the book. John J. Carafano offers a penetrating analysis of Paul Kan’s *Drugs and Contemporary Warfare*. Robert Friedenbergh brings his vast expertise to bear in his consideration of another in the Praeger series on regional affairs, Dr. Andrew Terrill’s *Global Security Watch: Jordan*. Terrill answers the question regarding how the Jordanian monarchy successfully navigated Middle Eastern politics. These and some 22 additional reviews are certain to add insight as to the choice readers make regarding whether or not a book is worthy of their investment. We heartily encourage readers, authors, reviewers, and other interested supporters of the journal to suggest recently published books for review. This may be done by visiting *Parameters* online at the address shown on the inside of our front cover. – RHT □