Book Reviews

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China, The United States and 21st Century Sea Power: Defining a Maritime Security Partnership
edited by Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and Nan Li

Reviewed by Richard Halloran, former foreign correspondent in Asia and military correspondent in Washington for The New York Times

At first glance, this collection of essays would appear to be based on a questionable premise, that the People’s Republic of China is interested in defining a maritime partnership with the United States to keep the peace in the western Pacific, the South China Sea, and the Indian Ocean. Repeated confrontations—verbal, at sea, and in the air—in recent years make that seem unlikely.

As the essays unfold, however, a more realistic assessment of China’s naval capabilities and intentions appear over the horizon. In particular, contributions by a senior Chinese naval officer and several civilian scholars lead to the conclusion that Sino-US naval relations are far more competitive than cooperative and will continue to be well into the future.

These essays bear close reading because they faithfully reflect the thinking and policies of the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which comprises all of China’s armed forces. The disclaimers that a contribution is based on personal opinion can be ignored as can platitudes about “mutual trust” and “peaceful development.” Rear Admiral Yang Yi, Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies at the PLA’s National Defense University, is forthright: “One undeniable fact is that China and the United States harbor strategic suspicions toward each other.”

Admiral Yang asserts that the United States is “bogged down” in the Middle East and the US military is stretched so thin “that it has impaired the routine building of its defense capability.” Conversely, he writes, China has enjoyed political stability, economic prosperity, and a “Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese characteristics.” Moreover, he contends: “The United States needs a threat like China to maintain its military hegemony,” with China taking the role he says the Soviet Union played during the Cold War. Today, he maintains, “only China can fulfill that role.” The admiral argues that China and the United States are “both making military preparations for worst-case scenarios in the Taiwan Strait.”

Taiwan, the self-governing island off the coast of China, is Chinese territory in the eyes of Beijing. The United States says sovereignty is unsettled and must be decided peaceably by people on both sides of the strait. Until that difference is resolved, Admiral Yang concludes, “it is unrealistic for the PLA and the US military to engage in substantial military cooperation.”
A political scientist at Peking University, Yu Wanli, outlines the development of China’s naval strategy over the past six decades from coastal defense and near-seas defense to the ambitions of some Chinese leaders to build a blue-water navy. He makes the pertinent point, however, that China’s maritime strategy is “subject to the influence of China’s traditional land power culture.” Dr. Wu states that the late Alfred Thayer Mahan, the American maritime strategist, has influenced Chinese thinking but not to the point where the Chinese navy is ready to adopt a “far-oceans strategy” or a “dominance of the oceans” doctrine. Instead, he says, “there has emerged a great debate on sea power in China’s academic and strategic thinking circles.” No matter how the debate turns out, Dr. Wu concludes, “almost all scholars agree that the development of Chinese sea power will inevitably result in contradiction and conflict with the existing maritime hegemon—the United States.”

An economist who is vice president of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, Zhu Huayou, focuses on the vital waterway through which more shipping passes than through the Panama and Suez Canals combined. That sea-lane is crucial to Southeast Asian nations, to China, Korea, and Japan, and to US warships transiting between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Unfortunately, Dr. Zhu lapses into platitudes: “Increased mutual understanding is the fundamental condition for Sino-US maritime cooperation.” He ducks the critical issue, which is that China insists that it holds “indisputable sovereignty” over what it claims is an internal sea while the United States considers it an international passage governed by freedom of navigation.

Andrew S. Erickson, an experienced China hand, an editor of this volume, and a political scientist at the Naval War College, is mildly optimistic that the US Navy and the PLA Navy can reach an accommodation rather than seeking to blow each other out of the water. He bases his positive view on the US Maritime Strategy and a skeptical but serious Chinese response.

The 2007 Maritime Strategy emphasizes “conflict prevention,” securing the “global maritime commons” in the interests of both nations, and using humanitarian operations “to build mutual trust.” Dr. Erickson says it has been subjected to meticulous Chinese scrutiny, with translations passed to top leaders. He warns, however, that “Chinese analysts express concern that the United States retains power to threaten core Chinese interests,” including control of Taiwan, sovereignty over the South China Sea, and sea-lane security. Those concerns, he concludes, “offer a useful caution regarding the possibilities of US-China cooperation in the near term.”
Any biography, old or new, of Hannibal Barca is problematic. There are no Carthaginian textual sources on the famous general, archeological evidence (although fairly plentiful) does not give direct information on the man or his life, and the two major Roman sources have been examined from every conceivable angle. Nevertheless, Richard Gabriel has published his take on the great Carthaginian general, who, despite his eventual defeat, makes most great captains lists. This book complements Gabriel’s earlier biography of Hannibal’s arch enemy Scipio Africanus (reviewed in Parameters Summer 2009) and is based on much of the same research. Thus, Gabriel is not offering anything particularly new; however, as with most of his books, he tells an old story in a refreshingly readable manner.

We know virtually nothing about Hannibal’s childhood—what you find is repetition of old legends, pure speculation, or extrapolation from archaeological evidence. Gabriel uses a little of each. He opens with an unnecessary scene based on the disputed practice of Carthaginian child sacrifice, but overall he gives a reasonable description of what a young Carthaginian boy of Hannibal’s class might have experienced growing up. Similarly, lack of evidence makes description of the Carthaginian military system difficult. The default model has to be the Roman army, about which we have detailed information; however, Carthage’s mercenary army would not have been trained, equipped, supplied, administered, disciplined, or fought like their Roman opponents. Even assuming similarity of weapons after years of capturing Roman equipment, one cannot infer Hannibal’s forces changed their tactical patterns or if they did, how. Gabriel recognizes this and gives an informed assessment of the Carthaginian military.

One strength of Hannibal is its discussion of the strategic environment. Gabriel gives a good assessment of the strategic situation and the choices (and lack thereof) of the two sides. While it is common to recognize the strategic significance of Roman seapower, Gabriel gives a more complete and thorough analysis of the impact of seapower than many other authors. He points out frequently during the narrative where Rome’s control of the seas inhibited Hannibal or influenced events. Conversely, Gabriel can reason himself into corners on minor points. For example, he asserts that the classical descriptions of the method of crossing the elephants over the Rhone River (ferrying them on rafts with at least some jumping off partway across) seems to assume the Carthaginians had limited knowledge of elephants, which they did not. Gabriel’s alternative technique of enraging a dominant female and having her...
charge into the water while the herd followed makes no sense either. What competent handler would purposefully start an elephant stampede in hopes they would swim across a river just because they can swim? Sometimes, we need to simply believe the source.

A more significant issue is the question first raised in antiquity of why Hannibal never attacked Rome. Gabriel scoffs, I believe correctly, at the idea that Hannibal could not attack Rome because he did not have siege equipment. Ancient armies frequently constructed siege equipment on site, and there was no unique technology involved. However, the idea that the defeat of Servilius’ cavalry in a skirmish after the Battle of Lake Trasimene (June 217 BC) left the way open to Rome stretches credibility. Servilius had an intact consular army at Ariminum on a good road not much farther from Rome than Hannibal, and the consul would certainly have responded had the Carthaginians approached the capital. Even after Cannae (August 216 BC), Hannibal did not have sufficient force to besiege a major city regardless of the magnitude of his victory. In his narrative of the maneuvering before Cannae, the author emphasizes that Hannibal had to resort to foraging to feed his army, and the presence of a Roman force prevented that. The situation outside Rome would have been no different. Unless one assumes Rome would have surrendered in panic at his approach, regardless of when he attempted the feat, Hannibal would have had to besiege a major, fortified city while simultaneously securing and protecting supplies and fending off relief forces. He never had the requisite force to accomplish that, and he did not think it was necessary. Hannibal believed he could defeat Rome without capturing or destroying it. Gabriel would agree with the last statement if not the previous.

Gabriel’s description of the Zama campaign and battle mirror the analysis in his biography of Scipio Africanus, which is to be expected. Gabriel has little new to add to the story of Hannibal’s life after Zama, his exile, or his death.

Overall, there are better sources on specific issues, events, battles, and campaigns of the Second Punic War. For example, Adrian Goldsworthy has published an excellent book on Cannae (Cannae: Hannibal’s Greatest Victory, Phoenix Press, 2007) and another on the entire struggle between Rome and Carthage (The Fall of Carthage: The Punic Wars 265-146BC, Cassel, 2002). Or, one might consult John Prevas’ Hannibal Crosses the Alps: The Invasion of Italy and the Punic Wars (De Capo Press, 2001) on the route across the Alps, a traditional controversy Gabriel avoids. Gabriel’s work is an academically viable piece focused on Hannibal and aimed at a general audience, and as such is a valuable addition to the literature.
The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom
by Evgeny Morozov

Reviewed by Dennis M. Murphy, Professor of Information in Warfare, Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College

In January 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave a highly touted speech on Internet freedom in which she stated, “The freedom to connect is like the freedom of assembly, only in cyberspace. It allows individuals to get online, come together, and hopefully cooperate. Once you’re on the Internet, you don’t need to be a tycoon or a rock star to have a huge impact on society.” Evgeny Morozov, in his book The Net Delusion, takes great issue with the implication, however, that the so-called “Arab Spring” and “Twitter Revolution” were caused by unfettered access to the Internet. Instead, Morozov, a research academic, provides a cautionary tale about what he argues is any attempt to establish a monocausal relationship to meaningful political change (especially when that single focus is information technology).

The book opens with a discussion of cyber-utopianism and Internet-centrism—mind-sets that focus on the positive “emancipatory” aspects of Internet communication while ignoring the downsides. The argument throughout centers on nation-state policy, or lack thereof, that attacks the “wicked” problem of authoritarianism by, as a colleague of mine has dubbed it, “wiring the world.” Morozov, expectantly, but importantly, cites the hedonistic world portrayed by Huxley and the “Big Brother” world of Orwell to consider both the proactive and reactive approaches to Internet freedom by authoritarian regimes. Interestingly, he notes that there is often a mix of both. Such regimes certainly use the anonymity and openness of the Internet to spy on their people and shutdown undesirable sites. But there is also a subtle approach that belies the jackboot on the keyboard methodology. While China may be known more for suppressing the Internet and for employing the masses to counter antiregime rhetoric, Russia imposes no formal Internet censorship. It relies on entertainment (porn is specifically cited) to soothe the masses, assuming that given options for political discourse and anything else, most opt for “anything else.” Hitler would understand. And in nations where freedom is not widely understood from a western perspective, any bit of additional mindless diversion may be viewed as liberty by the populace.

Perhaps most importantly, Morozov rails against social media determinism as driving the end of authoritarianism, labeling it “an intellectually impoverished, lazy way to study the past, understand the present, and predict the future.” He does not dismiss the value of Facebook and Twitter to quickly mobilize like-minded individuals. He notes as well that the development of that very like-mindedness is complex and potentially can be manipulated by authoritarian governments using the same Internet freedom. Morozov’s caution...
then is policymakers need to understand both the threats and opportunities posed by Internet freedom. The fact that authoritarianism still exists in its many forms serves as evidence to the complexity of the connections between the Internet and the rest of foreign policymaking. The winds of information may be “the oxygen of the modern age, seep[ing] through the walls topped by barbed wire,” but the winds blow both ways. Policymakers need to focus on the ends versus the means. What are the root causes of the wicked problem of authoritarianism in each of its individual cases? How will our foreign policy address them in order to achieve our interests recognizing the outcome may likely be the least-worst solution? Only when these tough questions are meaningfully and thoughtfully addressed can one turn to the Internet as one potential means to solve the problem. Furthermore, the threats of Internet freedom demand a consideration of potential regulations regarding its use in a globalized world. Examples of Google in China and Twitter in Iran come to mind. Once again, if one dismisses social media determinism and accepts that authoritarian governments can use Internet freedom to their own ends, what restrictions must liberal democracies consider in order to ensure protection and advancement of their own interests?

Morozov is not balanced in his approach. He skews sharply toward the threat of Internet freedom versus the opportunities it portends. He certainly addresses both, but the uninformed reader may not pick out the nuanced attempts at balance at the expense of supporting his thesis. Given that caution, The Net Delusion is an extremely well-researched and interesting book. It should definitely be read by policymakers, and it will be of interest to anyone who cares about the future of foreign policy which must include the role of unfettered access to information. This reviewer will admit to being a rather avid contributor to Facebook, Twitter, and blogging as a means of professional discourse. Not surprisingly, this reviewer began this reading leaning to the side of cyberutopianism. But Morozov’s arguments were able to move me rather significantly toward the center; perhaps becoming a cyberrealist, if you will. Oliver Wendell Holmes noted, “If you resist reading what you disagree with, how will you ever acquire deeper insights into what you believe? The things most worth reading are precisely those that challenge our convictions.” In that light, The Net Delusion was worth the read.
Liberty’s Surest Guardian: American Nation-Building from the Founders to Obama
by Jeremi Suri

Reviewed by Louis J. Nigro, Jr., US Ambassador (Retired), Ph.D, and author of The New Diplomacy in Italy

Jeremi Suri’s study of America’s experience with nation-building is an ambitious monograph that addresses a critical contemporary strategic and national security policy issue by putting it into historical perspective. In so doing, Suri makes an original, if not entirely satisfactory, contribution to the history of US diplomacy and foreign policy; to the scholarly debate on “the American way of war”; and to the policy debate over the usefulness and efficacy of nation-building as an element in US national security policy and practice.

Suri, who is Professor of History at the University of Texas at Austin, took the title of his book from Washington’s 1796 Farewell Address, which is a good place to start for this attempt to define what he considers America’s most original and enduring contribution to “grand strategy.” The author’s thesis is that the Founders’ great accomplishment was the first successful attempt to build a nation-state out of its preexisting raw materials—political, demographic, cultural, and economic. For Suri, the nation-building gene is the key strand in America’s national DNA and the key to understanding America’s engagement with the world since 1776. Nation-building created the new United States and dictated its policy of continental expansion, as territories became states of the Union across the continent. Nation-building has also characterized the US approach to solving international problems and promoting international stability, becoming in the process America’s home-grown “grand strategy” in a dangerous world.

Suri tests and illustrates his thesis by examining five American nation-building experiences. In “Reconstruction after Civil War,” he describes the national effort to reconstruct a single and more perfect union as “the most intensive and aggressive nation-building endeavor of the nineteenth century.” The author focuses on the work of a unique institution, the Freedmen’s Bureau, that was the main civilian engine of the Northern effort to bring political, economic, and social development to the backward, “failed state” that was the post-bellum South. He emphasizes that Abraham Lincoln “looked back to . . . the American founding to articulate Union aims in the Civil War.” Most historians would not consider reconstruction of the former Confederacy as successful as Suri.

In “Reconstruction after Empire,” Suri examines how the United States refused after the Spanish-American War to make the Philippines the first piece of a traditional colonial empire and opted instead to create a new, democratic nation-state and American ally in the Far Pacific, “navigating as Americans always do between opposition to empire and fear of chaos.” The
author concentrates on future President William Howard Taft’s civilian efforts to implement America’s first attempted nation-building project outside the continental United States. He pays little attention to the intensive parallel military effort there.

The chapter, “Reconstruction after Fascism,” addresses US policy toward Germany after the Second World War, emphasizing the roles of President Truman’s political decisiveness, former President Hoover’s vision for post-war Western Europe, and the Marshall Plan, which institutionalized Truman’s and Hoover’s ideas. The result was a “self-sustaining, sovereign nation-state”—a democratic and prosperous Germany that anchored the US strategy of “containing” the Soviet Union in Europe. This is Suri’s most successful application of his thesis.

“Reconstruction after Communist Revolution” is the author’s attempt to tackle Vietnam, seeking an explanation of America’s ultimate strategic failure by its refusal to engage Ho Chi Minh early in the post-war period and partner with him to apply American nation-building experience in an effort to unify and develop Vietnam. This requires the author to do some creative reimagining of history. In “Reconstruction after September 11,” Suri praises General David Petraeus’s management of the “surge” in Iraq, which he calls “a return to more traditional American nation-building,” after the United States failed to apply those “traditional” methods in Afghanistan soon after the quick military victory there in 2001.

His “Conclusion: The Future of Nation-Building” attempts, not very deftly, to lecture the current administration on foreign policy priorities by advancing what Suri calls “the five Ps of nation-building, and politics in general: Partnerships, Process, Problem-Solving, Purpose, and People.” This is the least satisfactory part of the book.

The book has its faults, but the author makes a timely contribution by using the past to inform and illuminate current scholarly and policy debates related to nation-building. His imperfect but provocative effort should be followed with more sustained inquiries by experts, not only into the early nation-building episodes Suri examines, but also other similar US efforts in Cuba, Haiti, and Central America in the early twentieth century, as James Dobbins and various collaborators have done for US nation-building enterprises since the Second World War.
On 30 December 2009 Dr. Humam al-Balawi, an al Qaeda suicide bomber, killed seven CIA agents and a Jordanian intelligence officer in Khost, Afghanistan. The Khost tragedy was widely viewed as a failure of CIA tradecraft whereby an unusually large number of officers allowed themselves to be placed in a situation where they could be killed in a single suicide strike. The background to this incident and the reasons such problems occurred is the subject of Joby Warrick’s *The Triple Agent*. Additionally, this book is also a consideration of the larger war against al Qaeda and the ways in which the combatants wage that struggle.

The most important figure in this story is the suicide bomber himself, Dr. Humam al-Balawi, a married Jordanian physician, with two daughters, who maintained a seemingly stable life in his own country. Balawi was a tremendous believer in the actions of al Qaeda including those of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a terrorist detested in Jordan where his agents bombed three Amman hotels causing 60 deaths in 2005. The victims of this assault included a number of guests at a Jordanian/Palestinian wedding reception, although Balawi called Zarqawi a “tiger” who should inspire true Muslims. The Jordanian physician asserted this outlook and other views in Internet chat rooms where he posted radical essays under a false name. These postings often appeared to be that of a leader who was speaking for al Qaeda rather than a mere follower or fan. As such, they rapidly attracted the attention of the Jordanian intelligence service which easily established Balawi’s true identity.

As an Internet tough guy and dreamer, Balawi was no match for his Jordanian interrogators. He broke rapidly under interrogation even without torture, but in the face of a number of threats to his livelihood and the future of his family. The Jordanian intelligence service viewed Balawi as soft and weak and eventually decided that he might be pliable enough to serve them as an intelligence asset. His case officer was Captain Ali bin Zaid, a top intelligence professional and distant relative of the Jordanian king. Bin Zaid made the fateful decision to assume that this apparently timid man could be managed through implied threats to his future and that of his family, and thereby turned against al Qaeda as a double agent. In his conversations with Balawi, bin Zaid was quick to point out the successes of Jordanian intelligence included helping the United States track down and kill Zarqawi. These types of discussions were meant to suggest Jordan was part of the winning coalition and was also more
than capable of tracking down its enemies should Balawi ever chose to betray the monarchy.

At bin Zaid’s instigation, Balawi was sent to Pakistan as a low value Jordanian agent who cost little but was unlikely to produce much valuable intelligence. Balawi’s background as a physician and his previous online extremism were viewed as potential ways to enter al Qaeda circles. If al Qaeda executed him for security reasons, little would be lost. Yet this did not happen. Instead, in a remarkably short period of time, Balawi was proven to be in contact with al Qaeda’s mid-level leaders. He also claimed to have met with al Qaeda’s then second in command (now its leader), Ayman al-Zawahiri. Although Zawahiri is a physician, he was described as seeking out Balawi for medical advice on his supposed diabetes and to help in acquiring difficult-to-obtain medicines. This mesmerizing story seemed too good to be true, and it was. Rather than cracking al Qaeda open, Balawi had quickly changed sides in line with his core convictions about that organization. Moreover, as the agent’s information became more compelling, Warrick maintains that the CIA quickly became involved as partners with the Jordanians. Warrick asserts that the intense frustration in Washington over the government’s inability to find bin Laden and Zawahiri generated increasing CIA excitement over Balawi and led to a fatal lack of skepticism. According to Warrick, the CIA had no leads on the whereabouts of either terrorist leader at the time. This frustration may have caused the CIA to become especially willing to take the bait and believe an increasingly unbelievable cover story which then led to disaster.

In summary, this is a well-researched book that has a great deal to say about the ways in which intelligence organizations under pressure can be drawn into the deadliest of traps. Warrick’s discussion of the grinding war against al Qaeda and the Jordanian role in it is also particularly interesting and worthwhile. Less valuable is the extensive biographic information about the Americans killed in the Khost strike. The biographical aspects of the book are apparently meant to portray the bombing victims as human beings rather than statistics, but this can easily become excessive. Somewhere there might be someone who wants to know the details of how various CIA people met their spouses, fell in love, or viewed their religious principles, but most readers will not care. Some details such as a female CIA officer’s favorite hairdo (pigtails) come across as especially irrelevant. Nevertheless, on balance, this is an exceptionally valuable book that is well worth the short time required to read it.
This is a test. If anyone reads That Used to Be Us: How America Fell Behind in the World It Invented and finds shockingly new ideas and issues—well that means they are probably not well read or sufficiently informed to deal with the strategic issues facing the nation. Three-time Pulitzer Prize journalist Tom Friedman and Johns Hopkins foreign policy professor Michael Mandelbaum have rounded up the usual suspects to explain why America is becoming less competitive on the global stage and what to do about it.

Friedman and Mandelbaum posit the United States faces four key challenges—staying ahead of the Information Technology revolution; the federal deficit and unsustainable entitlement spending (read Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid); energy; and climate change. The authors also argue there are five key “pillars” for the foundation of a competitive America—public education; modernizing infrastructure; immigration; government research and development; and “necessary regulations on private economic activity.”

As a writer of global developments, Friedman earned a well-deserved reputation as an astute observer. He engagingly described the emerging post-Cold War world in two mega-selling books The Lexus and the Olive Tree and The World is Flat. This book is different. It purports to be prescription not just surveillance. That’s a problem. The journalist’s eye is less well suited to crafting strategy and offering sophisticated public policy analysis. Furthermore, there is scant evidence that Mandelbaum’s academic discipline provided any balance to the reporter’s notebook. Throughout That Used to Be Us, the authors’ choices of problems and answers seem largely intuitive. There is no rigorous method of analysis behind how they decided to fix all of America’s problems—beyond their own gut judgments.

Even the basic premise of the book—the “key” problems to be solved is a bit suspect. What seems to make these issues key is that they are all currently in the headlines. Sure, for example, energy policy is an issue de jour. But is ending our addiction to oil really the key to winning the future? What if there is a spectacular breakthrough in nanotechnology that dramatically reduces the size, power, and weight requirements for all the tools of modern life—revolutionizing “how” and what kinds of energy are required?

Nor do Friedman and Mandelbaum appear to understand how global change really happens. They see the world functioning in a linear fashion that can be managed mostly by sage governments and directive polices. Often,
world changing innovation does not happen on demand or by design. Again, energy offers a good example. The advance of the Industrial Revolution was heavily dependent on discovering new and more efficient sources of energy. The greatest boost occurred largely by accident—the result of a handful of entrepreneurs in Pennsylvania hawking a cleaner-burning lamp oil.

The pillars of progress also invoke head scratching. Why exactly are they the indisputable pillars of prosperity? Mostly, it seems, because the authors want government to play a greater role. The authors have a clear prejudice for “big” government—and that really skews how they see the world—often leading them to observations that are just not true. Take the case of government research and development (R&D). After the Cold War, the ratio of government to private sector flipped. Today, private sector R&D eclipses what the government spends—and the size of our economy has more than doubled since the end of the Cold War. Likewise, before the turn of the 20th century, government R&D had a negligible affect on economic growth. Arguably, the Cold War was an anomaly and not standard practice for ensuring the innovation that drives American prosperity. Other pillars look equally shaky on close inspection. A good percentage of the key 19th century infrastructure in the United States from roads, to canals to railroads was built by the private sector.

As to what role national security plays in the prescription offered in That Used to Be Us—the answer is not much. In well over 300 pages of text, Friedman and Mandelbaum offer about one paragraph worth of ideas. “In the cuts in spending that America will have to make,” they conclude, “foreign policy cannot be exempt. Defense spending is invariably among the biggest item in the federal budget, and it too, will have to be reduced . . . they have become too expensive. We need these resources, in other words, for nation-building in America.” This amounts to little more than fuzzy math. Defense is hardly the heart of Washington’s fiscal problems. When Eisenhower complained about the Military-Industrial Complex, Pentagon spending was half the federal budget. Today it represents less than a fifth of what Washington shells out. Furthermore, as a percentage of spending our national wealth, defense (including the costs of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq) is about half the average of military spending during the Cold War. The armed forces are not the problem. In fact, gutting defense to reign in federal spending (an old Washington habit) actually exacerbates fiscal crisis because it allows politicians to ignore dealing with the hard issues—getting a handle on entitlement spending.

Also missing from Friedman and Mandelbaum’s glib treatment of national security is any consideration of the “opportunity costs” incurred by unpreparedness. It is much more expensive to rebuild a military than maintain one. It is also cheaper to deter war and dissuade competition than fight a real shooting conflict that emerges in part because potential enemies were allowed to lay their plans unchecked by any fear of American military might.

That Used to Be Us is strategist eye candy. It is a treasure-trove of slick ideas, easy button answers, and sweeping generalizations. Picking it apart ought to be good practice for serious security analysts. With that said, Friedman
and Mandelbaum are correct in that America’s competitive advantage is at risk. Keeping the United States a first-class competitor depends largely on reviving the nation’s capacity for economic growth and innovation. Real American grand strategists must master domestic policies not just foreign affairs.

**Philip II of Macedon: Greater than Alexander**
by Richard A. Gabriel

**Reviewed by Dr. John A. Bonin, Professor of Concepts and Doctrine, US Army War College**

In *Philip II of Macedon: Greater than Alexander*, historian Richard Gabriel seeks to elevate Alexander’s father, Philip II, to a “greater general and national king” than was his son. He is a member of a growing number of historians who seek relevant insights to present problems from the distant accounts of Greek and Roman wars. Gabriel is a distinguished professor in the Department of History and War Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada and in the Department of Defence Studies at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto. He has written numerous books and articles on military history.

What Gabriel seeks in this work is to examine “Alexander’s inheritance” in detail. The author claims that “Philip’s legacy was so significant that without it, there would have been no Alexander the Great.” He goes on to state that “Philip was a military genius who invented the military instrument that allowed Alexander to carry out his conquest of Asia.”

The book’s first three chapters are short and readable accounts of Philip’s personality, his strategic environment, and the Macedonian war machine. Gabriel also argues that “Philip was a supreme strategist in that he understood the place of war in policy, and he knew its limits.” Philip had a manifest preference for political solutions over military ones, and was flexible in his willingness to change course politically or militarily when events required. Philip’s grand strategy had two aims: to unify the Macedonian state into an effective national entity, and to expand Macedon’s hegemony over all of Greece. When Philip came to power after the defeat and death of his brother Aymtas, for all practical purposes, the Macedonian Army had ceased to exist. Over the next 24 years Philip innovatively created a balanced and modern Macedonian war machine that transformed warfare itself. Gabriel states that “Philip’s creation of the first competent corps of Macedonian infantry was not only an achievement of military genius but also an experiment in social engineering.” This Macedonian phalanx employed a longer spear, or sarrisa, than Greek hoplites, also elevated peasants to paid members of the king’s “foot companions and changed infantry combat completely by providing a unit with greater combat power, flexibility, and maneuverability than the traditional hoplite phalanx.” Philip also reformed his cavalry from a noble mob incapable
of defeating infantry *hoplites* to arguably the most effective cavalry arm in antiquity capable of breaking opposing infantry by employing penetrating wedge formations. In addition, Philip created a logistics service capable of supporting distant expeditionary operations and an engineering arm capable of successfully conducting sieges.

The remaining six chapters are an engaging narrative survey of the numerous campaigns of Philip. These cover the period from 359 BCE when he assumed responsibility for governing Macedonia, through his unification and expansion of Macedonia to his becoming the *hegemon* of Greece, and ending with his assassination in 336 BCE. One of Gabriel’s interesting arguments is that the Persians, not Alexander’s mother Olympias, were probably behind Philip’s death because of motive, means, and opportunity.

Even though the sources dealing with Phillip are limited, the author succeeds in bringing Philip II’s dramatic story to life. He credits Philip with creating a strong sense of national identity among the diverse peoples of his realm as a strategic base. Phillip also saw war as only one of several means to obtain his goals. Phillip much preferred to achieve his strategic objectives by employing other less kinetic, but smart, power means such as diplomacy, bribery, or even marriage. To Gabriel, Philip was the ultimate and better strategist than Alexander, who relied too much on the single strategic option of his magnificent army.

This reviewer believes that Gabriel fails to completely prove his contention that Philip was a greater overall general than Alexander. He acknowledges that “there is no doubt that Alexander was a brilliant tactician in his own right” as Alexander employed tactics he learned from Philip. But, while Alexander never lost a battle and conquered the mighty Persian Empire, Philip lost several battles, sieges, skirmishes, and never made it out of the Balkans.

While the research for this book is extensive, Gabriel makes several assertions about the Macedonian Army and its enemies not supported by recent scholarship. For example, he states that prior to Phillip, Macedonian infantry “were little more than untrained peasants,” when most likely Macedonian tribesmen resembled the *peltasts* of their neighbors. The author also presents the primary reason for Phillip’s defeat at the hands of the Phocians during the Sacred War as a result of Phillip being ambushed by massed “stone-throwing catapults.” Gabriel awards the Phocian leader “Onomachus the distinction of being the father of field artillery” for this brilliant military innovation. Modern scholars, however, have suggested that the “stone throwers” may have been using their hands and not machines. Regardless, *Philip II of Macedon: Greater than Alexander* is a must for readers interested in ancient military history or for a current perspective of the strategic parallels between today and the classical world.
Brothers, Rivals, Victors: Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley and the Partnership that Drove the Allied Conquest in Europe
by Jonathan W. Jordan

Reviewed by LTC Matthew D. Morton, Regional Fellow, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, and author of Men on Iron Ponies: The Death and Rebirth of the Modern U. S. Cavalry

Jonathan Jordan knows how to tell a good story filled with colorful heroes, a well-chosen complement of supporting characters, villains, and events that permit readers to consider the protagonists’ actions against the backdrop of war at the operational level. As a historian, he draws on a wide array of archival material to capture the state of mind in which Eisenhower, Patton, and Bradley went about their business, especially when dealing with each other. In fulfilling the roles of storyteller and historian, the author makes a strong case for his thesis that Allied success in Western Europe during World War II was in large part a function of the special chemistry that existed between these very different men. The author uses an attention-grabbing prologue set in the icy Ardennes as a point of departure for his argument before describing the unbroken chain of events that led to a critical meeting at Verdun in 1944 and beyond to victory in 1945.

In the early going, Jordan succinctly describes how each of the protagonists spent their time between the end of the war to end all wars and the beginning of the war that would make them into household names. Eisenhower, initially the junior partner, and Patton forged their friendship around tanks, of all things, and ideas associated with a new way of waging war that dominated the minds of so many during the interwar years, even as it was suppressed to varying degrees by the institutional army. Patton introduced Ike to Fox Connor, who, in conjunction with Douglas MacArthur, transformed a minor league coach—a tactical thinker—into one of the greatest general managers of war, writ large at the nexus of operations and strategy. Bradley, the team player, built his reputation as a trainer and solid soldier garnering the attention of the story’s most important supporting character of all, George C. Marshall. Patton did what he had to in an effort to make sure he did not miss the next war; this included playing upon his personal relationships with Marshall and others. Although Patton and Bradley served together in Hawaii, and Bradley and Eisenhower were West Point classmates, there was no single context that brought them together other than their collective desire to please Marshall, thus making “brothers” an apt part of the book’s title as they all vied for the attention of the Army’s father on the eve of the United States’ involvement in World War II.

Jordan charts the meteoric rise of all three men as the Army expanded, prepared, and deployed to North Africa and the Mediterranean theater. By the end of the African campaign and the subsequent liberation of Sicily, Patton...
emerged as an able warfighter at the Army level. So much so that Eisenhower could ill afford to part with him, even in the light of the slapping incident. Bradley, once an understudy, moved past Patton only to learn that senior or subordinate, his relationship with the dashing cavalryman was always going to be complicated. Ike earned the starring role for D-Day and the associated headaches that came with it. In this story, the problems were rarely the Germans, but more often than not, the British. Chief among them, cast in the role of lead villain, was Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery. Jordan effectively uses Montgomery, and everything about him, as a reference point to trace the shifting views held by all three American generals, but also to track the changing nature of their dealings with one another.

Ashore in Europe, Bradley emerges as a solid choice for Army and Army group leadership. He gets high marks for the COBRA breakout and escapes serious criticism for his role at Falaise and in the Ardennes. Patton, driving through the hole created by Bradley, gets Eisenhower’s campaign back on track with a dramatic demonstration of the open warfare concepts they had debated as junior officers and neighbors in the early 1920s. He delivers again in the Ardennes and beyond the Rhine, but sadly fails when asked to reinvent himself as the military governor of Bavaria. Throughout the book, Eisenhower evolves a more sophisticated coalition leader, sometimes at the expense of those who served him so well while he gained his footing in Africa and Sicily.

Patton provides the energy that keeps the pages turning. What will he do next? Did he really say that? Jordan lends more color to Ike and Bradley by reaching beyond their postwar edited and reconsidered thoughts to the papers of those closest to them when the events played out. By the end of the book, one can almost see Kay Summersby hovering at Ike’s side in a cloud of cigarette smoke. Thoughts of Bradley require an uncomfortable shift in the chair contemplating his hemorrhoid surgery as a personal prelude to the invasion of Sicily. All generals emerge as something more than plaster saints.

Jordan has done an admirable job in creating balance while describing how each man’s role contributed to the success of the others, but a bookshelf straining under the weight of Weinberg, D’Este, Blumenson, Ambrose, and Pogue need not make room to accommodate this newest offering. The reader searching for critical analysis of the crisis case studies—Kasserine, the failure to close the Falaise Gap, and the Ardennes—will be better served elsewhere. Someone new to the study of World War II will enjoy this readable account that should lead them in search of a broader perspective of the war and the richly detailed bibliography points the way.
In *On China*, Henry Kissinger has written an excellent history and analysis of China’s political culture. He emphasizes the historical influences on how China approaches relations with other nations. Also, based on his own experience and extensive research, Kissinger provides insight on how Chinese leaders approach negotiations. The book is well researched and takes advantage of a variety of sources, including Kissinger’s own records of conversation.

Throughout the book, Kissinger looks at what he sees as key events that shape how Chinese leaders, indeed, even the general populace, draw on China’s traditions and classical culture when developing domestic or foreign policies. Henry Kissinger portrays China’s classical past as key to understanding how Beijing relates to other countries. Powerful emperors isolated themselves and treated other states and peoples as vassal states over which the “Middle Kingdom,” China, or *Zhongguo*, exercised suzerainty.

In the prologue, the author deftly weaves in the blend of Confucian thinking and the military maxims of Sun Tzu, which influence interpersonal relations and military thought today. Yet, in some places, Kissinger is surprisingly narrow and dogmatic. On page 15, he tells the reader “The Chinese never generated a myth of cosmic creation. Their universe was created by the Chinese themselves, whose values . . . were conceived of as Chinese in origin.”

In reality, while interpersonal relations and the structure of Chinese society is heavily influence by Confucius, there are a number of creation myths in China. Central to them are a sense of a primordial, cominged, and chaotic heaven and earth. According to one Taoist myth, a god, *Pangu*, separated earth from heaven like a yolk from an egg. Parts of his body became wind, water, the moon, mountains, dirt, and stone. In another myth, of Taoist and Buddhist origin, a successor goddess, *Nuwa*, used clay to make men and animals. Enough mythology; the point is that while Kissinger’s research staff was excellent, the reader must realize that Henry Kissinger is writing the history of China in a way that also validates his interpretation of events. To get beyond Kissinger’s own biases, one must read more widely and not take *On China* as gospel.

There are other historical interpretations that challenge Kissinger’s description of the Opium Wars. In *On China*, he adopts the Chinese perspective and describes invasion and domination by foreign powers, which weakened the Qing Dynasty and led to the warlord period. The author explains how the forced creation of extraterritorial zones in China created the sense of a “century of humiliation” that pervades Chinese education and influences the sensitivity of Chinese leaders to matters of sovereignty. But there are
other interpretations. Julia Lovell, in The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams, and the Making of China, describes how the Qing Dynasty crumbled because of poor leadership, corruption, affectation, and ritual. For Lovell, the reasons for China’s decline and the imperial successes of Western powers were because the Qing had created “an impressive but improbable high-wire act, unified by ambition, bluff, pomp and pragmatism.”

These flaws aside, On China has strengths that make it an important book for students of China and US diplomatic history. Kissinger describes personal contacts and meetings with some of the most influential and important figures in recent Chinese politics. His accounts of encounters with Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Hua Guofeng, and a host of other Chinese leaders are superb. And Kissinger is able to discuss the events surrounding the meetings in the context of the policy issues facing the United States. The accounts in On China are accurate when compared to the descriptions in Ezra Vogel’s Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China.

In describing the arrival of the American delegation sent by President Nixon to China, Kissinger provides outstanding detail on how the US team prepared for its 9 July 1971, visit. He complements this with a parallel description of the way that Zhou Enlai had prepared the Chinese diplomatic team to receive and escort the Americans. Zhou had selected the Chinese diplomats two years earlier when “the idea of opening to the United States” was debated at the highest levels of China’s civilian and military leadership. Marshall Ye Jianying greeted Kissinger in Beijing. Ye was one of four PLA marshals tasked by Mao Zedong to analyze strategic options for China.

There is probably no other senior figure who can discuss how a series of American presidents maintained continuity in China policy better than Henry Kissinger. He includes a critical description of the policy options explored by President George H.W. Bush after the massacre of Chinese workers and students when the People’s Liberation Army ended the Tiananmen Square demonstrations on 4 June 1989. Bush had to navigate between Americans who “argued for Confrontation, urging the United States to resist undemocratic behavior or human rights violations,” and proponents of engagement, who argued that “human rights progress is generally better reached by a policy of engagement.”

The same debate is raging today in the United States, compounded by questions about China’s currency valuation and the nation’s investments in American treasury bonds. When dealing with a nation that is a member of the Permanent-Five in the United Nations Security Council, it is difficult for any president, or for realists in Congress, to subscribe to a single-issue foreign policy. Kissinger is always the pragmatist and by reading On China one comes away with a sense of the policy dilemmas facing America’s leaders as well as the decisionmaking process inside China.
Omar Bradley: General at War

by Jim DeFelice

Reviewed by COL Dennis D. Tewksbury, Strategic Plans Senior Analyst, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, US Army War College

Admit it, the first images that come to mind when you hear the name Omar Bradley are either of a wire-rimmed glasses-wearing, bookish-looking math teacher or actor Karl Malden portraying the greatly admired general in the movie Patton. Jim DeFelice’s book, Omar Bradley: A General at War provides the reader with an excellent resource for understanding who the GI general was, how he evolved into a wartime leader, and the critical relationships and challenges he faced throughout World War II. The reader will certainly gain a greater understanding of who this distinguished general was, how he made decisions, and how he led.

As DeFelice explains, this book fills a perceived void—that of an “impartial, easily accessible summary and evaluation of [General Omar Bradley’s] life . . . .” Opining that historians have either “forgotten or miscast” Bradley, the author endeavors to explain why this general should be hailed as one of the architects of success in Europe. Finally, DeFelice believes we cannot understand our victory in Europe without understanding Bradley.

To help with his cause, the author draws upon a number of original sources in the presentation of his assertions. First, and certainly most critical to the project, he utilizes General Bradley’s personal and professional papers housed in West Point’s Omar N. Bradley Collection. Aiding the author with firsthand observations were the personal papers and diaries of Bradley’s aide, Chester Hansen. These, in particular, fill the gaps by supplying context to statements made by various personalities throughout the book. In addition to other primary sources, the author relies on Bradley’s two books as well as a number of other works covering such World War II titans as Eisenhower, Patton, Montgomery, and Marshall.

An important component of any biography is the story of the individual’s formative years. DeFelice does a nice job of presenting material that provides the reader an understanding of Bradley’s humble upbringing and how growing up in rural Missouri impacted his professional development. The general’s discipline, studious approach toward problem solving, sense of fair play, and unrelenting commitment can be traced to the manner in which Bradley was raised.

The most interesting portions of the book are those devoted to Bradley’s professional relationships. DeFelice devotes a significant number of pages toward debating the manner in which other authors portray Bradley’s relationship with various peers and superiors. He provides the reader with insight into the friction and controversy that existed between many battlefield commanders during the war. Generals Patton and Montgomery warrant several pages,
which makes sense considering the amount of time these three leaders worked together. The constant friction between the key leaders makes one grateful they somehow managed to get past their egos, personalities, and self-serving issues in their efforts to win the war in Europe. As DeFelice describes the competition between the coalition generals, we gain a greater appreciation for the difficult task General Eisenhower had with balancing those egos. The reader will come to understand the struggles senior leaders endured more than sixty years ago that continue to transcend the ages. Politics and personalities were critical factors in every major decision throughout the Second World War; even today, they continue to bedevil military leaders.

Another timeless topic is the never-ending love-hate relationship between General Omar Bradley and the press and his eventual acceptance of the value in holding regular press conferences. Odd, some things never change. What today’s leaders can gain from Bradley’s story is an appreciation for the pressures that come with leadership. There are multiple accounts in which the reader can empathize with the general, such as when he is planning the break out from the Normandy and the turnaround of American efforts in North Africa, all while dealing with the multitude of strong personalities that filled the ranks of the Allied Army. Today’s operational and strategic leaders can relate to these challenges.

In the end, DeFelice accomplishes his mission—to provide the reader with a deeper appreciation of General Omar Bradley. The book is a worthwhile read. Although it appears at times the author goes out of his way to defend Bradley, he does not shy away from offering criticism of the man. DeFelice’s point-counterpoint with other authors appears at times as a history food fight and detracts from an otherwise excellent work. This work is an easy read for Bradley fans as well as those unfamiliar with the general and seeking insight into the life of one of America’s great leaders. DeFelice covers all the critical points. He provides a link to a number of other commendable works such as, Omar Bradley’s *A Soldier’s Story* and *A General’s Life: An Autobiography*. This book provides an opportunity to further examine controversial decisions, contentious relationships, and the continuing debate as to which leader was the best of World War II.