From the Editor

Robert H. Taylor
In this issue . . .

In our first article, Michael Gallagher, Joshua Geltzer, and Sebastian Gorka provide readers with a paradigm for eluding the “cult of complexity.” Their article, “The Complexity Trap,” details a belief that American foreign policy and the national security establishment have fallen prey to the philosophy that the world has grown too complex for the traditional methodologies associated with creating a realistic grand strategy. The authors espouse the view that America is almost entranced, to the point of strategic paralysis, by the notion of complexity. They build their case for escaping this strategic failure by advocating a methodology that overcomes the reactive combination of paralysis, bet-hedging, and revisionism associated with the belief that today’s world is just too complex. The authors conclude that if America is to respond proactively and effectively in today’s international environment, “prioritization” is the key first step. Ideally, the ability to correctly prioritize will provide the appropriate reaction to the complacency and undifferentiated fear that the notion of complexity encourages.

Certainly, there could not be a timelier offering than Zachary Selden’s “The European Debt Crisis and American Security Policy.” The author examines how Europe could hope to build institutional capability in the financial and security sectors given the associated costs. Selden brilliantly links the consequences of Europe’s fiscal difficulties with the strategic objectives of the United States’ economy. He builds his thesis on an examination of Europe’s ability to manage the dual storm of the current financial crises and longer-term demographic shifts in its population. To successfully manage these challenges the author believes two factors need to be addressed. The first is the ability of various European governments to shift defense funds away from personnel accounts and into operations and procurement. Second, Europe needs to demonstrate the ability to manage a rationalized base closure program that goes beyond nationalistic objectives.

“Counterinsurgency, Legitimacy, and the Rule of Law” is Thomas Nachbar’s attempt to remind readers that “law” is featured more prominently today in the conduct of war than at any other time in world history. Perhaps it is the emphasis emergent from our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan or, possibly, it is linked to the ascendance of counterinsurgency as a form of warfare. Nachbar further examines counterinsurgency to determine it is not, in and of itself, a contest for law but rather a quest for “legitimacy.” He provides numerous examples of attempts to codify legitimacy in various documents and concludes that current doctrine is better at identifying when legitimacy exists or what it entails, rather than what it actually means. The challenge for counterinsurgents is to pick the model of legitimacy that is most helpful in developing an ideological position for a particular government.

The lexicon associated with hybrid threats and their origin has become increasingly prevalent in today’s military vernacular. Christopher Bowers tells readers that such threats are indeed very real security challenges, with the ability to combine the strengths of an irregular fighting force with the capabilities of an advanced state military. “Identifying Emerging Hybrid Adversaries” is the
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The author’s presentation of a methodology that refocuses the current emphasis from the “what” and “who” these threats pose to “where and in what capacity” they exist. The author bases this methodological transformation on three core variables: maturity, capability, and complex terrain. Bowers provides readers with templates based on the variables associated with potential hybrid threats.

John Lynn reminds us that even following the brutal attacks of 9/11, the real impact on the American psyche was not from the tremendous physical damage and associated death, even greater was the state of mind such attacks provoke. Lynn draws on a decade’s worth of experience in teaching the history of terrorism to pen “Fear and Outrage as Terrorists’ Goals.” This reexamination of the basics associated with terrorism: definitions, diversity, and the accompanying dynamics, provides a greater understanding as to how relatively few terrorists can generate such intense moral outrage. The author examines the roles of fear and outrage throughout history to contrast the various strengths and weaknesses of terrorist organizations.

“Allies and Airpower in Libya” by Erica Borghard and Costantino Pischedda is an insightful analysis of NATO’s intervention to end the 42-year regime of Muammar Qaddafi. They analyze the model of precision airstrikes, combined with allies fighting on the ground, to determine the likelihood of success in similar operations. The authors contrast the operational methodologies associated with Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan with the Libyan incursion to raise a number of issues regarding the varying strategies. Borhard and Pischedda espouse the position that there are two competing schools of thought regarding the conditions under which the “Afghan model” is considered effective: “the balance of technology” and “the balance of skill” schools.

Tanguy Struye de Swielande provides our final article with his examination of “The Reassertion of the United States in the Asia-Pacific Region.” The author recognizes the fact that the Asia-Pacific region is gaining in reputation as the epicenter of world affairs, a meeting place for world powers, and home to one-third of the world’s population. The recent emphasis on the region in US strategy carries with it a number of strategic challenges. Struye de Swielande analyzes the interests of various world-powers to determine that America needs to reinvigorate its strategic and foreign policies if it is serious about maintaining its role as a Pacific power. The author reexamines America’s history in the region and draws on the works of two great naval strategists, Alfred Thayer Mahan and Homer Lea, to propose a strategy for the future. He concludes that with the number of new power centers emerging in the region, America would be wise to again rely on the three lines of defense and triangles first associated with the works of Lea and Mahan. – RHT