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
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Review Essay

Reflections on the Great War

JAMES D. SCUDIERI



Courtesy of Harvard Univ. Press


Dance of the Furies: Europe and the Outbreak of World War I

by Michael S. Neiberg

Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2011

336 pages

\$29.95



Courtesy of Univ. Press of Kentucky


Nothing Less Than War: A New History of America's Entry into World War I

by Justus D. Doenecke

Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 2011

432 pages

\$40.00



Courtesy of Houghton Mifflin Harcourt


To End All Wars: A Story of Loyalty and Rebellion, 1914-1918

by Adam Hochschild

Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011

480 pages

\$18.95



Courtesy of Cambridge Univ. Press

World War One: The Global Revolution

by Lawrence Sondhaus

New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2011

544 pages

\$33.99

The first decade of the twenty-first century saw the publication of numerous monographs on the First World War. The second decade has started with a sprint. This essay reviews four works all published in 2011.¹

World War I, the Unwanted Conflict

Historian Michael S. Neiberg focuses on the outbreak of the war from the perspective of Europe's middle classes. He argues that the start of war in 1914 was not the spark for the enthusiastic plunge of millions into conflict with nationalistic frenzy. He outlines six major points. The first is that few Europeans wanted or even expected war; in that sense, August 1914 began as more of a traditional, cabinet war. Second, nationalism has been an exaggerated element of causation. Third, the peoples of Europe generally believed that their participation was defensive. Fourth, war disillusionment existed by the end of the first year. Fifth, popular determination had rested upon the belief of a short war fought for defensive reasons. Sixth, societies kept fighting despite the shocking realities, because they determined that the price of ultimate victory would be far less than stark defeat.

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Dance of the Furies covers the familiar lack of concern over the 28 June 1914 assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and wife Sophie. It also explains broader trends and other, more newsworthy incidents. These topics do not depict a militaristic Europe with pent-up nationalism bent on war. Rather, Europe was genuinely focused elsewhere.² Moreover, the lack of concern reflected great faith in diplomacy to weather this latest storm. European diplomacy had settled diplomatic furors short of general war from Morocco to Libya to the Balkans. The monarchies, often viewed as relics, yet appeared too as servants of peace and stability.

This same faith presumed that Austria-Hungary would react with a sense of proportion, which would net some minor compensation. Instead, the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was without recent precedent in its harshness, based upon an assumption that the time had come for the war brewing with Serbia. Moreover, German support was categorical, the product of its own fatalistic determination on timing, vis-à-vis Russia. Early in the introduction, Neiberg categorized Germany and Austro-Hungary as the key aggressors.³

The seeming suddenness of the outbreak of war a month after the assassination led to analogies of natural disaster and reinforced mass perceptions that their nations had become involved in an evil, but necessary, defensive war that would be short. The first weeks and months witnessed a general lack of news marked by increasing censorship and economic dislocation. Such reality provided a serious jolt. Neiberg emphasizes how this reality, so far from expectations and already confused, resulted in disillusionment, from the battlefield to the home front. Worse, hatred emerged, fed by stories of atrocities perpetrated by the other side, real and imagined, the latter by mounting propaganda machines.

The failure of the so-called Race to the Sea by November 1914 brought yet a worse reality. The onset of trench warfare on the Western Front demonstrated a war without end in sight. Europe's peoples were not prepared psychologically for the mass, mechanistic slaughter of early twentieth-century warfare within the first half year alone. Casualty lists mushroomed remorselessly. Europe had to cope with mass mourning. Another result was worsening hatred, commensurate with wider and deeper economic hardships, e.g., bread became a source of class tensions. Governments had to establish necessary and appropriate roles and policy for intervention. Civilian populations generally yearned for comprehensive news, lacking even a rudimentary understanding of events and conditions.

Perhaps the occasion symptomatic of Europe in the midst of turmoil was Christmas, 1914. The book provides a comprehensive summary of the famous Christmas truces on the Western Front, their individual uniqueness across the front, and how they varied greatly in expression and conduct. This holiday reminded contemporaries of a vanished world and the present as harbinger of severe foreboding.

Neiberg is quite emphatic that an analysis from the people's perspective rather than key leaders provides a holistic and far more complete view of Europe in 1914, not the narrow focus heretofore upon selected elites.⁴ His

assessment of the outbreak of war as a failure in cabinet diplomacy is very convincing; a key question remains. Why are the numerous, bellicose, public pronouncements ranging from the elites and multiple special interest groups to the crowds cheering the troops on film not more representative of the totality of national mood? Furthermore, how much domestic control did political leaders lose by failing to end the war quickly? Thus, to what extent did individual, national, representative institutions, however embryonic or sophisticated, contribute to sustained conflict with more-ambitious war aims?

Nonetheless, Neiberg's assessments are truly groundbreaking in that they provide very significant insight and superior context into the escalating totality of the war and, more importantly, the sheer depth and breadth of prolonged, post-war bitterness and disillusionment. A century later, few can appreciate Europe's predicament. The warring powers merely had accomplished a bloodbath of unprecedented proportions—and for so little return.⁵ No wonder there was a so-called "Lost Generation" with fears of political or social revolution, economic disaster, and lack of security.⁶ Europe, too, had plunged into an unprecedented, long-term grieving.⁷

The Great War's Protesters

Adam Hochschild has demonstrated the talent to weave genuine, human struggle within sweeping, historical events. *To End All Wars* maintains that reputation, as he delves into Britain's antiwar protestors.

Part I in six chapters introduces famous protestors, their prewar relationships with each other, and, most intriguingly, with members of the establishment. There are Charlotte Despard; Emily Hobhouse; the Pankhursts' mother Emmeline, and daughters Sylvia and Christabel; and James Keir Hardie. Despard was sister to the first British Expeditionary Force (BEF) commander, Sir John French, and a close sibling. Other British leaders profiled are Sir Douglas Haig and Sir Alfred Milner. The characters are full of confidence, even at the expense of kindred spirits. The protestors come off better early. Indeed, Hochschild castigates cavalry officers in the prewar Army, especially their restoration of the lance after the Boer War. However, early twentieth-century British Army reforms were contentious and dynamic; the story is far more complex.⁸

The next five Parts, II through VI, each concern a year of the war. Hochschild endorses Austrian and German bellicosity in 1914. Unlike Neiberg, he believes Europe's supportive crowds reflected a blind enthusiasm and mass patriotic hysteria, if not militarism, to the detriment of protestors' wishes for unified workers' and/or socialists' action to avoid war.

His concentration on British domestic events recounts the divisiveness of the war, not often heard, superbly. For example, the Union of Democratic Control (UDC) numbered over 650,000 among all its affiliated organizations, mostly labor unions. Conscription birthed the No Conscription Fellowship (NCF). Bertrand Russell, famed Cambridge philosopher, bemoaned the nation's militaristic mood as it waged a vast war with no end. Rebellion struck Ireland.

Perhaps no juxtaposition highlights the divisiveness of the war better than the 1917 visit of Emmeline Pankhurst to Russia, to encourage the Kerensky regime's continuation of the war, vice daughter Sylvia's overt nonconformity. Sylvia renamed her newspaper from *Woman's Dreadnought* to *Workers' Dreadnought*—then published an unabashed vow to cease fighting from an officer at the front, Second Lieutenant Siegfried Sassoon.⁹

Here, too, is the story of Britain's Conscientious Objectors (COs), along with trench incidents which led to prosecution. These spark a deeper look into the British Army's disciplinary code and specific cases, like Stephen Hobhouse. Cousin to Emily, he had lived the stereotype of privilege until drafted as a professed CO, then imprisoned. Mother Margaret had well-placed friends and published *I Appeal unto Caesar* in 1917, questioning his prolonged confinement. Bertrand Russell himself was the secret ghostwriter.

The centerpiece in the search for spies is antiwar advocate Alice Wheelodon with her two daughters and son. Admittedly guilty of sheltering conscription evaders, their arrest on 30 January 1917 was for no less than conspiracy to murder the Prime Minister and another member of the recently formed War Cabinet.

The principal, official corrective for morale was Director of Information John Buchan's comprehensive, concerted efforts. These ranged from the standard pamphlets to war films to display tanks helping to sell war bonds, and censorship. One film was the controversial documentary "The Battle of the Somme" with actual footage.

The overpowering reality of a long war of attrition made for a bleak, national mood. Lord Lansdowne commented publicly in a letter on 29 November 1917 in the *Daily Telegraph* with prescience. He foresaw devastating consequences, and advocated negotiations with Germany and Austria. A depressing, fearful sense of forthcoming revolution marked 1918. Across the Channel, the British depot at Étapes saw six days of sporadic rioting by thousands of troops. An unprecedented strike by the famed London bobbies took place on 30 August. Stark statistics number how many troops remained in Britain—just in case—to maintain order. Meanwhile, Britain had passed a bill to enfranchise women, albeit conditionally. Ireland beckoned revolt again; the Cabinet sent French, former commander of the BEF, to restore order.

Hochschild also weaves aspects of domestic events elsewhere in Europe, e.g., Rosa Luxemburg in Germany and the 1917 upheavals in Russia, including the clandestine German support of the Bolsheviks. The final chapter highlights the immediate-post-war turmoil, some statistics on the cost of the war, along with excellent vignettes of the human tragedy, both during and after the conclusion of peace. A map tallies "The War's Toll on the British Empire."

Unfortunately, the overviews of military operations lack substance. The research here is woefully incomplete.¹⁰ He does not address the admittedly conflicting prewar debate to understand the nature of the next war.¹¹ He omits the accomplishments in pervasive, frustrating searches for solutions to the trench deadlock, painful learning curves for all armies, exacerbated in the British as it came simultaneously with unprecedented growth.¹² He essentially

dismisses the British as dolts at the Somme; the Germans thought otherwise.¹³ Thus, his commentary on British triumph at Amiens in August 1918 appears as some sudden revelation. Unsurprisingly, there is no attempt to explain and understand what happened to the British Army on the Western Front and why.¹⁴

Similarly, there is no consideration of the complexities of prewar, national, diplomatic concerns.¹⁵ He also does not address the tortuous changes in war aims and the frustrations of war termination.¹⁶

Hochschild stated that his work showcased a clash of dreams, i.e., between those of rebellion and loyalty. He explained the story of the protestors splendidly. Unfortunately, his unbalanced descriptions and assessments of military operations detract significantly from his work.

Presidential Business

Justus D. Doenecke is an accomplished historian of American diplomatic history and foreign policy. This work focuses on Woodrow Wilson's presidential leadership, his interactions with major players, and a sweeping incorporation of historians' assessments. The first chapter provides comprehensive, substantive reviews of Wilson himself and his key advisors, e.g., Col. Edward House and Secretaries of State William Jennings Bryan and Robert Lansing, with detailed evaluations of personal relationships, to include when they served the President ill. The remaining chapters generally are organized chronologically, each with a specific topic. This structure lays out some major themes very effectively.

The First World War placed the United States in quite a predicament. British and German naval policies in particular wrought unforeseen issues in international law, largely based on the experience of the nineteenth century, with commensurate challenges to the rights of neutrals. America was clearly the premier neutral. The German use of U-Boats became central, but was one amongst several, e.g., definitions of contraband, blockade enforcement and the concept of continuous voyage, the status of armed merchantmen, belligerents' blacklists of ostensibly neutral firms, and even the seizure of mail.¹⁷ The administration also had to deal with espionage and German saboteurs, among others.

American neutrality in the years 1914-17 witnessed unprecedented economic change. Wilson had to balance America's position as the premier neutral with the increasing profits associated with European trade. Already the largest economy, accounting for one third the world's total, the outbreak of war had hurt the American economy. American trade eventually quadrupled in this period; by 1917 it had established a record of \$3.5 billion valued in exports greater than imports. The issue was not simply war profits. Significant diminution of this burgeoning trade could damage the American economy irreparably. Moreover, despite this volume, only 10 percent of American goods moved in American ships at this time. Hence, one key initiative was the 7 September 1916 authorization which created a national merchant marine.

Wilson had to understand numerous perspectives; American neutrality did not speak unilaterally. Doenecke tracks these domestic politics well. The

President had to balance the powerful, multiple views of Congress; the media, e.g., Randolph Hearst, but including a diverse array of newspapers and journals; and influential leaders like Theodore Roosevelt. Special interest groups abounded. Some had abiding, cultural roots and identity with the countries at war. Others had strong views on the nation's lack of military preparedness, or conversely, the need to avoid military investments.¹⁸ One event will illustrate the seriousness. Between July-September 1916 Congress passed and the President signed a \$315 million navy bill and a revenue bill which raised the income tax on the upper brackets and added inheritance and munitions taxes, a first for such level of taxation on the wealthy in peacetime. The naval appropriation reflected a generic sense of "armed neutrality" rather than preparation to intervene.

While the presidential election of 1916 dominated the balance of the year, Wilson confronted glaring foreign policy issues upon reelection. Both sides were feeling the effects of over two years of war. German leaders increasingly viewed unrestricted submarine warfare as the solution, which could achieve results before likely American intervention. Britain had now become financially and economically dependent upon the United States, while American prosperity was tied to Britain in particular.

Despite this sense of desperation among the antagonists, Wilson still wanted to try a peace bid. On 18 December he asked for all parties to offer concrete peace terms. Secretary of State Lansing publically and advisor House privately conducted themselves at variance. Indeed, Doenecke states, "Seldom in American history had a cabinet official so undercut a president."¹⁹ The belligerents responded formally; Wilson riposted with his 22 January address to the Senate, calling for a community of power, a public statement geared towards what would become the League of Nations.²⁰

The Kaiser approved unrestricted submarine warfare on 9 January 1917, effective 1 February. Germany informed the United States on 31 January. Wilson advised a joint session of Congress on 3 February that he was severing diplomatic relations. On 25 February, he learned of the infamous "Zimmerman Telegram," a proposed alliance between Germany and Mexico and possible Japanese participation.

Events now moved rather swiftly. Doenecke covers the period from Wilson's address to Congress on 26 February through the formal declaration of war on 6 April in detail. Wilson's fortunes varied. A political fiasco over arming merchantmen caused him to issue a blistering statement on 4 March. By 2 April he was requesting Congressional recognition that a state of war existed with Germany. The Conclusion reviews the tortuous road to war, and then considers American war aims.

This story of Wilson's leadership confirms categorically how personalities matter deeply, broadly, and very directly. Doenecke never loses sight of these dynamics through policy formulation, execution, modification, and further implementation. He analyzes as impassively as possible the several occasions when President and Cabinet member/advisor no longer spoke with one voice, relationships with Congress, and the fluctuating opinions of a diverse citizenry.

The incorporation of much historiography adds great depth to the analysis, but requires careful synthesis. The effort will reap great rewards. This book is a case study in senior leadership.

A Broad Sweep of War

World War One: The Global Revolution by Lawrence Sondhaus is the latest survey, earmarked as a college text. Hence, its structure has a tailored organization. Revolution is the unifying theme for fifteen chapters, with other features. Each begins with a timeline, captioned photograph, and a long, introductory paragraph. Each ends with a formal conclusion, notes, and suggestions for further reading. Multiple boxes cite excerpts from primary-source documents. Eight perspectives showcase certain historiographical debates, and five essays showcase specialized topics. Moreover, Sondhaus emphasizes that his survey is more holistic as it reflects his research into the Austro-Hungarian Empire and its relationship with Germany. He believes that earlier surveys focused excessively on the Western Front.

His narration of the war generally maintains balance, with very effective results. Chronological chapters have detailed discussion of all major fronts. They do so with a depth and breadth both unique and impressive for a survey work. An example of depth is the inclusion of the large, generally unknown operations in Abyssinia in the context of the Middle East and Africa. An example of scope is the even treatment of the war at sea, including naval actions round the globe, the submarine war, and the rise of naval aviation. Thematic chapters provide sharp focus. For example, he identifies the dual dilemma on the home front for the Herbert Asquith Government in 1915 to deal with both the Gallipoli failures and the shell shortage in May 1915. In the opposing camp General Erich von Falkenhayn's determination that trench warfare compromised Central Powers' victory in a war of attrition eliminated the option of a classic battle of annihilation.²¹ His realization lent support of unrestricted submarine warfare.

Selected comments raise potential debate. Sondhaus bluntly and categorically states that Serbia, a dysfunctional and semifailed state united by a single national idea, started the war in 1914, concluding later that Serbia was one of the war's true winners. He proposes the possibility of an Italian collapse, as at Caporetto in 1917, two years earlier. This option would have required the use of Austrian troops expended in offensives against the Russians and German forces sent to the Balkans. He views the sinking of the *Lusitania* in April 1915 as a seminal event to harden British resolve. Interestingly, he espouses a less harsh assessment of the Treaty of Versailles, also believing that Germany was in a better position in the postwar world compared to 1914. He further emphasizes that Wilson compromised the famed Fourteen Points heavily, to obtain concurrence for Point XIV establishing the League. His military overviews are generally well balanced.

Sondhaus concludes that the key participants on the Western Front tried to innovate during initial attacks, but then defaulted to attrition. A more helpful

discussion would have been the preeminent challenge to restore mobility to an attacker faced with great technological firepower and no commensurate advances in command and control. Tactical and operational changes and technological innovations, in whatever combinations, even by 1918 did not constitute war winners.²²

There are some caveats. Far from alone, he spells Clausewitz's first name as Karl, vice the correct Carl. His linkage of Clausewitz, nationalism, social Darwinism, and the cult of the offensive is a bit too neat and clean. He does mention some prewar, military thought and preparation to deal with the nature of the next war. Relative numbers notwithstanding, he is rather silent on the effects of the original BEF in 1914. While he is straightforward in his discussion of Russian operations, his assessment of serious Russian equipment deficiencies by August 1915 requires citation.²³

The book relies on statistics to facilitate conciseness, but some are questionable, exacerbated by the lean documentation associated with a textbook. Unfortunately, the figures often appear as hyperbole. He cites numerous Syrian and Palestinian deserters from the Turkish forces attacking Suez in 1915, an unlikely event.²⁴ One wonders, too, the source for 84,000 Turkish troops at the start of the Gallipoli landings.²⁵ He states that Australia was the only major belligerent not to use conscription, omitting India.²⁶ The claim that the British mine detonations at Messines killed 10,000 Germans outright is exaggerated.²⁷

Nonetheless, this survey of the Great War is masterful. Sondhaus summarizes well, synthesizes holistically, and has incorporated much of the latest historiography in some 500 pages. He has provided commendable balance, especially on Austria-Hungary as pledged. To a large extent, the explanation is length.²⁸ Indeed, the sheer scope, depth, and breadth raise the question that the text could overwhelm the neophyte student.

Concluding Thoughts

These four works deal with their particular focus on the Great War. In that sense, points of convergence are exceptional. The most consensus concerns the German and Austro-Hungarian roads to war. Perhaps the greater agreement is implied. In a sense this quartet on the horizon of the centennial suggests that the world may be what it is today due to the First World War.

NOTES

1. This review essay provides documentation in support of the reviews per se. Space precludes fuller lists and more comprehensive cross-referencing.

2. Barbara W. Tuchman, *The Proud Tower: A Portrait of the World before the War, 1890-1914* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1965) provided a highly-readable, though popular, account how Europe was far from idyllic in the prewar period. Neiberg's work agrees in the sense that he sees the bulk of European attention on the host of such issues, overwhelmingly domestic, political, and economic. He does not agree with jingoistic nationalism as a major cause of the war.

3. Neiberg cites David Stevenson, *Cataclysm: The First World War as Political Tragedy* (New York: Basic Books, 2004). The reviewer also mentions David Fromkin, *Europe's Last Summer:*

Who Started the Great War in 1914? (New York: Heinemann, 2004), who views German support of Austria-Hungary as very secondary to German concerns over Russia and France. In that sense, certain Austrian and German elites deemed July 1914 as the time of reckoning for types of preventive war. See also Daniel Allen Butler, *The Burden of Guilt: How Germany Shattered the Last Days of Peace, Summer 1914* (Haverton, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2010). Butler goes so far as to say that the Treaty of Versailles was just.

4. He cites, too, the example of US presidential advisor Edward House, whose 1914 visit netted the comment on a militarism gone mad. House's remark resulted from being a guest at a Prussian ceremony with the Kaiser and some soldiers.

5. For a concise review of the cost to France, see Andre Tardieu, "The Policy of France," *Foreign Affairs* 1 no.1 (September 15, 1922): 12-13 (the journal's premier issue). For a more accessible source, see the citation in Brigadier General (Retired) Robert A. Doughty, *Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War* (Cambridge, MA.: Belknap Press, 2005), 1-2. On Britain, begin with Juliet Nicolson, *The Great Silence: Britain from the Shadow of the First World War to the Dawn of the Jazz Age* (New York: Grove Press, 2010).

6. For example, Samuel Lynn Hynes, *A War Imagined: The First World War and English Culture* (New York: Collier Books / Macmillan Publishing Co., 1990), xi, xiii, articulates the postwar British sense of radical discontinuity, radical change, and the meaning of modernity.

7. Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, and Annette Becker, *14-18: Understanding the Great War* (n.p.: Hill & Wang, 2002) is a psychological study of mass grieving.

8. On the cavalry weapons' debate specifically, see Marquess of Anglesey, *A History of the British Cavalry, 1816-1919: Volume 4: 1899-1913* (London: Leo Copper, 1986), 389-419. Admittedly, the cavalry had its Old School advocates. Note too that the cavalry also received firepower similar to the infantry. The photograph in Michael Barthorp, *The Anglo-Boer Wars: The British and the Afrikaners, 1815-1902* (Poole, England: Blandford Press, 1987), 137, shows infantry in action in the "new" dispersed formations. Thomas Packenham, *The Boer War* (New York: Random House, 1979), 363, 380, 485, discusses the embryonic artillery tactics of creeping barrage in support of the infantry. Granted, British military reforms in the wake of the Boers' Mauser firepower was insufficient preparation for WW I, but that issue is different from an inaccurate perception of utter, reactionary stubbornness.

9. The ending was anticlimactic. Hochschild credits the power of group loyalty over political conviction, as Sassoon accepted promotion and returned to the front after three months' hospitalization.

10. The citations frankly reflect a very narrow, biased focus with little depth and breadth.

11. European armies had debated and studied seriously the implications of the "new technology," i.e., unprecedented technological development, ca. 1850-1900, unlike the relatively static previous century and half. Furthermore, several iterations of change took place during the careers of WW I commanding generals. A good start point is Michael Howard, "18. Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914," in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paet (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 510-26. For the German states and France, see Dennis Showalter, *The Wars of German Unification* (Modern Wars), 63-66, 99-101, 140-46, 207-10, 215, 225-29. More focused is Lieutenant General Rudolf Von Cammerer, *The Development of Strategical Science in the 19th Century*, translated by Karl von Donat (n.p.: Hugh Rees, 1905), 66-67, 80-82, 85-87, 96, and 98 in which he discusses other analytical works. Likewise, see Ferdinand Foch's lectures to the French Staff College in 1901, published originally in 1903 and reprinted in English as Ferdinand Foch, *The Principles of War*, translated by Hillaire Belloc (London: Chapman & Hall, 1918), 341-65, which covers "Modern Battle."

12. Jonathan B. A. Bailey, "The First World War and the Birth of Modern Warfare," in *The Dynamics of Military Revolutions, 1300-2050*, MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 132-53, is a general overview. An elementary example of sweeping change is the infantry battalion. In 1914, composed of ca. one thousand riflemen with two machine guns, the war transformed them into troops trained on rifles, rifle and hand grenades, light or medium machine guns, and mortars. They developed detailed techniques for small-unit tactics,

artillery integration and synchronization, and combined-arms cooperation with tanks and armored cars, and to an extent with aircraft. The artillery completed a similar transformation in growth, training, and equipment.

13. Ian Passingham, *All the Kaiser's Men: The Life and Death of the German Army on the Western Front, 1914-1918* (Stroud, England: Sutton Publishing, 2003), 97-126 considers the Somme, as does Christopher Duffy, *Through German Eyes: The British and the Somme, 1916* (London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 2006; paperback ed., London: Phoenix / Orion Books, 2007).

14. Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, *Fire-Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904-1945* (London: George, Allen, & Unwin, 1982), 61-65, is an amazingly crisp summation of the daunting task to understand why events happened as they did, both for contemporaries and the current generation. They begin with both Haig's 21 March 1919 Final Despatch and counterarguments of critics. See, too, Andy Simpson, *The Evolution of Victory: British Battles on the Western Front, 1914-1918* (London: Tom Donovan Publishing, 1995) and Paddy Griffith, *Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army's Art of Attack, 1916-18* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996; paperback ed., 1996).

15. Aside from the monographs cited in notes 2 and 3 above, Dennis Showalter, *Tannenberg: Clash of Empires* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1991), 2-4, 13-31, provides a succinct review of leading Germans' views of the nation's predicament in the prewar years. Interestingly too, just published is Sean McMeekin, *Russian Origins of the First World War* (Cambridge: Belknap / Harvard University Press, 2011).

16. For example, an interdisciplinary analysis is H. E. Goemans, *War & Punishment: The Causes of War Termination & the First World War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

17. German U-Boat policy also evolved during the war. The sinking of the *Lusitania* was on 7 May 1915, some two years before America's entry into the war.

18. Special interest groups included the American Neutral Conference Committee, American Neutrality League, American Peace Society, American Rights Committee, American Truth Society, American Union against Militarism, Anti-Militarism Committee, Anti-Preparedness Committee, League to Enforce Peace, National Foreign Trade Council, National Guard Association, Navy League, National Peace Federation, and the National Security League.

19. Justus D. Doenecke, *Nothing Less than War: A New History of America's Entry into World War I* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011), 234.

20. Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary, had mentioned such a League as early as September 1915.

21. Less convincing is his strict dichotomy between the cult of the offensive and the earlier operations of Moltke the Elder, Clausewitz, and Napoleon. He cites the latter three as seekers of enemy armies' destruction as precursor for successful diplomacy, and not related to a battle of annihilation.

22. Sondhaus has tapped into recent historiography effectively, but perhaps insufficiently. The format with Suggestions for Further Reading at the end of each chapter geared towards students is no substitute for a comprehensive Bibliography.

23. The classic study remains Norman Stone, *The Eastern Front, 1914-1917* (London: Penguin Books, 1975). His more recent Norman Stone, *World War One: A Short History* (n.p.: Allen Lane, 2007; reprint ed., New York: Basic Books / Perseus Books Group, 2009), 85-88, cites a shell shortage for artillery due to wrong-headedness vice backwardness. For that matter, all the major participants experienced a shell shortage in 1915. Yet Russian shell production rose from the winter; Hew Strachan, *The First World War* (New York: Viking Press, 2004), 151-52. Moreover, Russia launched three offensives in 1916: Lake Naroch, Riga, and Brusilov's. The ensuing challenges were far more attributable to tactical and operational planning and techniques, along with aspects of troop training, vice general equipment shortages.

24. The Turkish high command had selected the troops for the Suez expedition carefully. Most were Anatolians, and even ostensibly Arab divisions had some native Turks. Moreover, these units were well trained and equipped. Some Arab soldiers who had crossed the Canal surrendered too readily. Edward J. Erickson, *Gallipoli & the Middle East, 1914-1918: From the Dardanelles to*

Mesopotamia, The History of World War I Series (London: Amber Books, 2008), 41-44. The British also did not pursue, but followed up the Turkish retreat.

25. Turkish divisions, smaller with nine infantry battalions to others' twelve and Russia's sixteen, were also significantly below establishment. Philip J. Haythornthwaite, *The World War One Source Book* (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1992; reprint ed., n.p.: Brockhampton Press, 1998), 303. A closer estimate of Turkish strength is 54,000 in Huw Rodge and Jill Rodge, *Gallipoli: Helles Landing*, Battleground Europe Series (Barnsley, England: Leo Cooper / Pen & Sword, 2003), 41. Yet more sanguine is 40,000 by the time of the landings, with III Corps' 7th and 9th Divisions covering those sites; Robin Prior, *Gallipoli: The End of the Myth* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009; paperback ed., 2010), 77. The immediate Turkish challenge was not numbers, but effective deployment with counterattack plans given the harshness of the terrain and environment.

26. Lawrence Sondhaus, *World War One: The Global Revolution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 181, despite his reference to respective numbers and voluntary enlistment on 26-27.

27. Ian Passingham, *Pillars of Fire: The Battle of Messines Ridge, June 1917* (Thrupp, England: Sutton Publishing, 1998; paperback ed., 2004), 90, states "thousands" and elaborates on 147-48 that the Germans lost 7,354 prisoners and 23,000-27,000 casualties for the period 21 May-10 June 1917, of whom over 10,000 were missing for the three weeks. Alexander Turner, *Messines, 1917: The Zenith of Siege Warfare*, Campaign Series (Oxford, England: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 55, cites 7,548 Germans reported missing for the period 1-10 June. Andrew Wiest, *The Western Front, 1917-1918*, The History of World War I Series (London: Amber Books, 2008), 64 states tentatively "... as many as 10,000."

28. Considering recent surveys, Strachan, *First World War*, is 65 percent in size. His book also formed the basis for a TV documentary whose ten parts mirror his chapters. Stone, *World War One*, has less than 40 percent the length. Michael S. Neiberg, *Fighting the Great War: A Global History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005) comes closest and is less than 80 percent. All three are excellent works in their own right.