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From the Editor

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In this issue . . .

In the military publication genre there appears to be a growing tendency to selectively focus reader attention on what many are labeling “the Pentagon’s pivot to the Pacific.” The Asia-Pacific region and the national military strategy to support America’s objectives there have always been of great import and national interest. We are indeed fortunate to have as our lead article in this issue a reminder by Lukas Milevski that the exercise of land warfare is a critical component of any military strategy, regardless of region. In “Fortissimus Inter Pares: The Utility of Landpower in Grand Strategy,” Milevski offers a word of caution; that although much of the world may appear very “blue” on a map, a unique demand still exists for the strategic effect that can only be delivered through the taking and exercising of control generated by the employment of landpower. The author concludes that although landpower cannot claim utility in every contingency, it should be a major consideration for policymakers and strategists in determining national policy objectives, grand strategy, and its relationship with the other elements of national power.

Glenn A. Goddard provides insight into China’s future in “Chinese Algebra: Understanding the Coming Changes of the Modern Chinese State.” No, for those who vividly recall classroom failure during their high school experience, this is not a test. It is, however, an in-depth analysis of China’s economic output, military spending, and population trends impacting that nation’s future. The author utilizes an algebraic methodology to examine China’s current standing in the Asia-Pacific region and its ability to compete with such regional powers as Japan, South Korea, and India. Goddard closes with a warning for the Chinese. If they are going to be successful in transforming their nation and maintaining regional dominance, rapid and dramatic change is required.

“The Accidental Pirate: Reassessing the Legitimacy of Counterpiracy Operations” is Stephen Anning and M. L. R. Smith’s examination of the piracy problem off the coast of East Africa. The authors present a detailed examination of the factors that inspire and sustain the current Somali piracy. Their analysis goes beyond the contemporary nautical view of the piracy threat, to a broader understanding that encompasses various matters related to the execution of land warfare. They base their thesis on the British experience in Afghanistan where a British Army “Influence” doctrine was implemented and Target Audience Analysis (TAA) was exercised to achieve a better understanding of actions by the local populace in various conflict zones. Specifically, the British applied a TAA strategy known as “Shade-Shift,” developed from the understanding that not all adversaries are necessarily political enemies and some may require a response beyond direct military action.

Our thematic presentation “Then and Now” showcases three articles examining foreign policy, strategy formulation, and civil-military relations during various periods in world history. In each of the presentations, the author offers a number of corollaries for events in today’s strategic environment. David G. Fivecoat analyzes the Russian retreat from Afghanistan in “Leaving
the Graveyard: The Soviet Union’s Withdrawal from Afghanistan.” The article provides a brief history of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan during the period 1985 to 1989, to include their withdrawal. The author analyzes four specific aspects of the withdrawal: leadership, military strategy, transition planning, and the economy. Of special interest to readers are the lessons from the Soviet experience that appear applicable to America’s current situation in Afghanistan. Of uncanny similarity is the emphasis on vigorous leadership, timelines, and future aid. Fivecoat concludes that Afghanistan has taught harsh lessons regarding the limits of power to a number of global hegemonies, but the Soviet’s withdrawal was not one. The author espouses the belief that the Soviet Union’s experience in Afghanistan suggests that with the proper aid and advice Afghanistan can be successful in dealing with an insurgency following America’s withdrawal. Raymond Millen provides our second article in this feature, “Cultivating Strategic Thinking: The Eisenhower Model.” Millen’s thesis is based on the little appreciated understanding of President Eisenhower’s unique approach to the formulation of security policy. The author highlights the failure of most presidents to fully comprehend the art and science of formulating grand strategy; more specifically, they appear to lack an understanding regarding the utilization of the National Security Council (NSC) in the process. He highlights the fact that Eisenhower was the only president to foster continual and extensive study, debate, and development of US national security strategy. Millen closes with the reflection that although the qualities of the Eisenhower NSC are largely forgotten, they are still relevant for today’s national security professionals and strategists. The last article in the feature is from Ethan S. Rafuse, who examines the problematic career of Civil War General George B. McClellan. He provides readers excellent insight into the tensions that often impede civil-military relations. “General McClellan and the Politicians Revisited” presents the views of a number of military and political scholars related to the interaction between military and political spheres throughout history. Rafuse readily admits there is a significant difference between the maturity and scope of formal governing institutions today and those of 1861 to 1862, but he also points out that the value of the actions by what is known today as the interagency process was as equally compelling during the Civil War. The author concludes that the case of George McClellan can be a guide for how we think about civil-military relations.

“Cross Roads or Cross Purposes? Tensions Between Military and Humanitarian Providers” is Solomon Major’s analysis of the tensions that often appear between military and humanitarian nongovernmental (NGO) aid-givers when both try to provide humanitarian assistance. He argues that both constituencies have their own hierarchy of interest. It is the organization’s perception of the other’s hierarchy of interest that often gets in the way of success. The author provides the reader with unique insight regarding the various type of aid organizations and categories of assistance that can be rendered. He concludes with a suggestion to military professionals involved in humanitarian
operations—consider the nature of the crisis and the type of NGO, then critically evaluate both in terms of consequence and appropriateness.

Matthew L. Merighi and Timothy A. Walton call for an improved US defense strategy, one that entails a security assistance program capable of adequately empowering allies and partners to provide for their own security while supporting the United States’ defense-industrial base. The authors base their thesis on the fear that the struggling global economy, combined with shrinking defense budgets, will curtail America’s foreign military aid and revenues available to defense contractors. They also suggest the United States, with a limited defense budget, must find ways to maintain its industrial base while providing for the nation’s security. They also suggest that an improved security assistance program should be a major part of any such effort. Their strategic rationale for increased security assistance is two-fold; it empowers regional partners and allies, and it sustains the defense-industrial base through increased United States exports. Merighi and Walton analyze the various security assistance programs and apparatus to conclude there is an immediate need to reform export controls while emphasizing programs that focus on streamlining the process and the number of people involved. They close with a call to unify security assistance functions in similar structures across services and for the devolution of power to these organizations. The authors espouse the belief that such actions would not adversely affect US foreign policy and could, in fact, increase support of various human rights programs.

“Citizens in Uniform: Democratic Germany and the Changing Bundeswehr” is Jens O. Koltermann’s analysis of the “Basic Law” that guided Germany’s rebuilding of its military following two world wars. How the Bundeswehr conformed to the Basic Law and its three guiding principles: Innere Fuehrung, the corollary of “citizens in uniform,” and conscription of German citizens for military service, underpin the author’s thesis. The author describes how Innere Fuehrung, along with the corollary of “citizen in uniform,” assured that the norms and values detailed in the German Basic Law were embedded in the German military. Koltermann provides a detailed analysis of several paradigm changes impacting the modern German military: rearmament, to include the former Wehrmacht and Reichswehr soldiers; the integration of former East German soldiers; and the expansion to new global missions. American audiences will be especially understanding of the author’s analysis of a relatively new paradigm—Germany’s transition to an all-volunteer force. The author calls for the concept of the “citizen in uniform,” on which the Bundeswehr was originally founded, to be strengthened by the German Parliament so the military can remain an integrated and accepted part of German society. Koltermann closes with the warning that the success of the all-volunteer force is not a certainty, and it will take a concentrated effort on the part of Germany’s political leadership to ensure this transition is successful.—RHT