Citizen in Uniform: Democratic Germany and the Changing "Bundeswehr"

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JENS O. KOLTERMANN

The Innere Fuehrung with its corollary of “citizen in uniform” greatly contributed to the fact that the Bundeswehr became not only a self-evident part of our society but also a reliable instrument of German security policies.¹

—Dr. Franz Josef Jung, Former German Defense Minister

On 12 May 1949, Germany’s three Western Military Governors (United States, France and Great Britain) sent a letter to Dr. Conrad Adenauer, the President of the Parliamentary Council. With some reservations, this letter approved the Draft Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany.² In less than two weeks, on 23 May 1949, the Constitution (or Basic Law) for the young democracy was confirmed by the Parliamentary Council in a public session.³ The unique preamble of the Basic Law committed the German nation to the promotion of peace and European unity. The Basic Law did not, however, include any articles regarding the establishment of armed forces.⁴ Even so, Germany and its occupying powers were determined not to repeat the militarism and fanaticism that had brought the nation and the world into two devastating wars in the first half of the century.

The ensuing deepening East-West conflict necessitated a German military contribution to defend Western freedom. This was especially evident following the 1950 communist North Korean invasion of South Korea.⁵ The United States urged its European North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners to rearm Germany as a NATO member after the Pleven Plan for a European Defense Community was rejected by the French national assembly in 1954.⁶ But German citizens, who had suffered two major wars, remained skeptical regarding their nation’s rearmament.⁷ Nonetheless, Chancellor Adenauer managed to gain formal approval of rearmament, even though the majority of Germans opposed it.⁸ He envisioned this as a way to restore Germany’s sovereignty; a rearmed Germany would gain equal partnership within the western alliance of democracies.⁹

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of General Scharnhorst, the founding father of conscription in Prussia, the first 101 volunteers joined the Bundeswehr. Two years later the first 10,000 conscripts were drafted.

A central issue was how to guarantee that the new force would be an integral part of the young democracy and not yield to antidemocratic tendencies in its ranks. This was especially important because much of its military leadership would come from the veterans of the Wehrmacht and Reichswehr. In October 1950, a Rearmament Commission established by Chancellor Adenauer issued its initial proposal for the formation of a new German army. A group of 15 hand-picked former Wehrmacht officers met at the “Eifelkloster Himmerod” under the lead of Adolf Heusinger and drafted the so-called “Himmeroder Denkschrift” (Himmerod Memorandum), which became the founding document for the new Bundeswehr. The group strongly advised that the preconditions for German rearmament should be totally different from those that led to the Wehrmacht. They insisted that Germany’s new army should be closely integrated with German society and subordinate to civilian leadership. German leaders did not want to create another “state within a state,” as happened with the Reichswehr. Nor did they want the military to be misused politically or to be subject to political indoctrinations, as was the Wehrmacht.

The preamble of the Basic Law guided the new German national vision: “Inspired by the determination to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe, the German people, in the exercise of their constituent power, have adopted this Basic Law.” The founding fathers of the Bundeswehr needed to ensure that the norms and values embodied in the Basic Law would be assured in the Bundeswehr. Therefore, Lieutenant General Graf von Baudissin advocated that the Bundeswehr be built on the principle of Innere Fuehrung (leadership development and civic education), based on its corollary of “citizen in uniform” (Staatsbürger in Uniform). Civil-military relations were established in accord with the Basic Law and in keeping with the principle of Innere Fuehrung. To ensure that the Bundeswehr conformed to the Basic Law, three pillars were established at its founding: the principle of Innere Fuehrung, the corollary of “citizen in uniform,” and conscription of German citizens for military service.

This article describes how Innere Fuehrung, with its corollary of “citizen in uniform,” assured that the norms and values of the German Basic Law were embedded in the Bundeswehr. It elaborates on this principle and shows how Innere Fuehrung shaped the civil-military relationship in Germany. The article then explains how the principle has remained intact through three paradigm changes of the Bundeswehr:

• Rearmament that included integration of former Wehrmacht and Reichswehr soldiers.
• Integration of former East German soldiers after reunification.
• Performance of new worldwide missions.

It then considers the implications of a recent fourth paradigm change—Germany’s transition to an all-volunteer force. Finally, the article offers some
recommendations to ensure that Innere Fuehrung, with its corollary of “citizen in uniform,” remains the guiding principle for the new all-volunteer Bundeswehr.

Innere Fuehrung (1st Pillar—Overarching Principle)

A simple definition or translation of Innere Fuehrung does not exist. Even the recent version of the ZDv 10/1 (Joint Service Regulation—Leadership Development and Civic Education) offers more of an explanation than a definition of the concept. On the Bundeswehr website of the Ministry of Defense, the concept is described as: “harmoniz[ing] the principles of a free and democratic constitutional state with the principles of order and operation required by the armed forces to fulfill their constitutional mission. Today [2011] Innere Fuehrung is more than ever a distinct hallmark of the German armed forces.”

Leadership and civic education are two parts of Innere Fuehrung. In German, “Fuehrung” means both. Within the Bundeswehr, both leadership and civic education are essential to avoid the unquestioning and slavish obedience that characterized Nazi-Wehrmacht soldiers. Innere Fuehrung fosters moral courage and encourages soldiers to defend their own beliefs. The soldiers’ “law on obedience” ensures that the values and norms of the Basic Law are binding guidelines for soldiers in any situation. As a mandatory part of leadership, civic education emphasizes Bundeswehr leaders’ duty to provide political education for the soldiers to “intensify their knowledge of the values and norms of the Basic Law.”

“Citizen in Uniform” (2nd Pillar—1st Vital Corollary to Innere Fuehrung)

The guiding corollary of “citizen in uniform” is the critical element of the Innere Fuehrung concept; it guarantees the army’s link to the state and society. In general, it guarantees soldiers the same rights as all other citizens while serving in the Bundeswehr. Some basic rights are explicitly confirmed by the Legal Status of Military Personnel Act (Soldatengesetz or SG). A few citizen-soldiers’ rights are, however, restricted to avoid conflicts in loyalties between the military and the state and to balance personal freedom with obligations to the state. The principle of Innere Fuehrung balances the need for an efficient, mission-ready military against the need to uphold society’s democratic values.

Conscription (3rd Pillar—2nd Vital Corollary to Innere Fuehrung)

The founding fathers of the Bundeswehr and the Parliament mandated a conscript army based on lessons learned from the past. Conscription was seen “as an organizational device to counteract anti-democratic political ambitions of the officer corps of the armed forces.” In addition, every citizen has an obligation to serve his country and thereby gain an understanding of the role of the military in society and strengthen civil-military relations. Conscription ensures that the military reflects all elements of society. As President Heuss asserted, conscription slowly became the “legitimate child of democracy” in West Germany.
Resting on these three pillars, *Innere Fuehrung* dynamically integrates the unchangeable core values espoused in the Basic Law into the *Bundeswehr*. It affirms the civil-military relation in Germany and it defines the self-image of the *Bundeswehr*. Through the corollary of “citizen in uniform,” the *Bundeswehr* became an integral part of the German state and society. It has enabled the nation’s military to adapt to major changes in society, in the state, and in the world.

**Paradigm Change 1: Rearmament and Integration of Former Wehrmacht and Reichswehr Soldiers**

The *Reichswehr* provided the armed forces for the first democratic German state, the Weimar Republic (1919-1933). Its soldiers reflected the pre-democratic attitudes prevalent in the Wilhelmine era. Because its officer corps failed to accept parliamentary democracy, the *Reichswehr* essentially evolved into “a state within [a] state” that eventually undermined the Republic. Its successor, the *Wehrmacht*, developed characteristics of extreme German militarism committed to the ideals of National Socialism. Thus the *Wehrmacht* became a willing means to achieve the perverted ends of the Third Reich (1933–1945). Consequently, the founders of the new *Bundeswehr* assiduously sought to avoid any repetition of the catastrophic consequences of these former military forces.

The Himmerod Memorandum (9 October 1950) conveyed initial views on how the new German armed forces should be designed. The memo asserted that these forces had to be fundamentally different. Accordingly, in a chapter entitled “Das Innere Gefuege” (inner structure), it recommended an innovative approach for the new force; “Inneres Gefuege” was further developed into the principle of *Innere Fuehrung* and its corollary of “citizen in uniform.” At this time, public discussions of rearmament tended to be bitter and controversial. Following the Allied programs of denazification, demilitarization, and democratization, Germans were not ready to rearm. *Innere Fuehrung* was designed to gain public trust. The new armed forces would be created completely in accord with the Constitution and the new military establishment would be an integral part of society.

To guarantee strong civil control, command and control of the military would be exercised by a Ministry of Defense under robust political leadership. The principle “divide et impera” (divide and rule) within the *Bundeswehr* was established. According to the Basic Law, a separate administrative substructure was established beneath the military structure.

General Ulrich de Maizière, one of the founding members of the Bundeswehr, articulated four components of “Das Innere Gefuege.” First, the armed forces would be integrated into an alliance that provided for a common defense of Europe. This accorded with the intent of the preamble and Article 24 of the German Basic Law. Second, Germany’s armed forces would structure and train for a defensive mission, in accord with Article 87a of the Basic Law. Any kind of offensive action was strictly forbidden. Third, Germany’s armed forces would organize jointly to reduce the independence of the separate military services. These services would fall under a single defense department.
that controlled personnel, budget, and defense acquisitions. Fourth, the forces would observe the Basic Law and submit to the primacy of civilian authority. Thus, the Parliament controls the military in all matters.  

Given Germany’s history, civilian control of the military had to be very strong and efficient. At the beginning, this requirement precipitated much discussion and frustration within the Bundeswehr. Its leaders were especially reluctant to yield direct civilian control of Bundeswehr soldiers. But this political control was designed to ensure the linkage between the Bundeswehr and the German state and society. It would also foster a democratic mindset in the troops. Innere Fuehrung thus provided the means to gain and maintain public trust in and support of the nation’s military.

Command over the Bundeswehr in peacetime was given to a civilian Minister of Defense, supported by state secretaries (parliamentary and public officials). Only in times of conflict (during actual or impending attacks) were the powers of command transferred to the Federal Chancellor. The military thus had no central command and control of its own. Its Generalinspekteur (GenInsp), similar to a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), did not outrank the civilian chiefs. In addition, as spelled out in the Basic Law, a Defense Committee (Verteidigungsausschuss) was established to represent the members of Parliament and to ensure parliamentary control over the executive and thus the armed forces. During the early years, the Defense Committee was instrumental in developing a legal framework for the young Bundeswehr. Finally, as an additional means of civil control, an independent Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces was installed. This Commissioner oversaw the civil rights of the soldiers and ensured adherence to the principles of Innere Fuehrung.

In 1956, an independent Advisory Council on Questions of Innere Fuehrung (Beirat fuer Fragen der Inneren Fuehrung) was established to support the Minister of Defense in all matters pertaining to Innere Fuehrung and to provide independent expert judgment on civil-military issues. In another 1956 democratic initiative, German soldiers were granted the right to elect a spokesperson. This individual mediated matters between soldiers and their military superiors. Clearly, German leaders focused on building a legal framework and control system to ensure that the new armed forces would be an integral part of the new democratic Germany.

But the so-called Himmerod compromise weakened the original intent of reform. The traditionalist group tried to build an “optimized Wehrmacht” and thus preserve the strengths of the former organization. Even the US military raised some skeptical questions about the concept of Innere Fuehrung and “citizen in uniform.” They feared these concepts would make the German contribution to the NATO alliance less effective. Military sociologist Samuel Huntington argued that it could “reduce the fighting effectiveness of the new army”; he claimed “a democratic state is better defended by a professional force than a democratic force.”

So fifteen years after its creation, the Bundeswehr was mired in a deep crisis; the traditionalists seemed to dominate. The Chief of the Army, Lieutenant
General Schnez, supported by most of his top leadership, demanded that German society should adapt to serve the needs of the armed forces. Major General Helmut Grashey denounced *Innere Fuehrung* as a farce. These traditionalists advocated a return to a strong warrior culture. The concept of *Innere Fuehrung* had obviously failed to permeate post-war Germany’s military culture. From its top leaders all the way down the ranks, *Bundeswehr* personnel regarded themselves as superior to society at large. *Innere Fuehrung* was at risk. The *Bundeswehr* appeared ready to separate itself from society.

The situation quickly changed when the Social Democrats (SPD) appointed their first Minister of Defense, Helmut Schmidt, on 19 October 1969. Schmidt proposed a new image for the *Bundeswehr* and a new kind of soldier for the nation. He instituted military reform by changing the recruiting policy and the education system for officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Schmidt’s education reform began with better-educated officers. He organized two *Bundeswehr* universities and mandated academic education for officers beyond their basic military training. Relying on Baudissin’s ideal of “citizen in uniform,” Schmidt’s new recruiting policy for *Bundeswehr* personnel sought to build an army that reflected Germany’s pluralistic society. Through these reforms, Schmidt broke the dominance of the old elites and diversified the officer corps. In addition, Helmut Schmidt led the development of the first Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1 (Assistance for *Innere Fuehrung*, classified: restricted).

This military reform revitalized the concept of *Innere Fuehrung* and affirmed the value of the “citizen in uniform.” For the first time in German military history, a strong civil mindset displaced the formerly dominant military mindset. The conscript system ensured a place for the “citizen in uniform.” It forced the *Bundeswehr*’s elder generation to accept a new type of soldier envisioned by Helmut Schmidt.

**Paradigm Change 2: The Integration of Soldiers of the National People’s Army**

On 1 October 1990, the secession of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) triggered the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. On the same day, all generals, admirals, and soldiers older than 55 were retired from the GDR’s National People’s Army (NPA) (Nationale Volksarmee or NVA). Members of the political cadre and military justice system had been retired earlier. More than 2.5 million East Germans had served in the NPA between 1956 and 1990. At midnight on 3 October 1990, the GDR national service flag was cased for the last time in all garrisons—the NPA no longer existed. On the same day, 1,200 officers and NCOs from the *Bundeswehr* occupied key positions in the former NPA. They came as Germans to fellow Germans. Their mission was to win the hearts and minds of their former Warsaw Pact adversaries.

In this new security environment, the total German military force had to be reduced from 600,000 to 370,000. At the same time, former NPA soldiers were integrated into the *Bundeswehr*. This was not an easy task. NPA
soldiers came from a nondemocratic society. The NPA was a political army and an instrument of dictatorship. The NPA had played an important role in socializing its young recruits into the GDR’s communist society. Their soldiers were indoctrinated to believe that *Innere Fuehrung* and “citizen in uniform” were an anti-democratic scheme “to create a human fighting machine, capable of independent, aggressive action and prepared to carry out criminal orders without scruples.” Indeed, they claimed that only the NPA within the communist regime could produce a “citizen in uniform.” In addition, these soldiers knew nothing of Western values, which were denigrated under the communist regime.

Whereas Wehrmacht veterans joined a newly established military force, these NPA veterans had to integrate into a 45-year-old organization with totally different values and mindset. Also, they would not be considered for high-level leadership positions, as Wehrmacht veterans were. Only 10,800 former NPA-soldiers were accepted “for a two-year probationary contract.” Their *Innere Fuehrung* education began immediately at military schools and academies in West Germany. In addition to self-studies, they received practical training at *Bundeswehr* installations in the West. Mobile training teams supported their training, and former NPA soldiers were provided practical instruction at their new locations. To continue their service, they had to demonstrate total assimilation into the *Bundeswehr*.

Like these former NPA soldiers, new conscripts from East Germany had no democratic orientation. They were integrated into the three-month basic training program with the West German conscripts and trained exclusively in West Germany. This was an important step for building a German “army in unity” that joined together young people from different political systems on a regular basis. These young soldiers were exposed to democratic norms and values before they returned to their garrisons and homes in the East. As of 2005, more than 600,000 East German youth had been conscripted into the *Bundeswehr*. The *Bundeswehr*’s commitment to the Basic Law helped to integrate these East Germans into a democratic society. These soldiers were exposed to the principles of *Innere Fuehrung* during their time in the *Bundeswehr* and to the norms associated with civilian control of the military. Conscription was used to train soldiers in democracy and Basic Law. Indeed, as these young East Germans donned their *Bundeswehr* uniforms, they learned not only how to be “citizens in uniform” but also how to be democratic citizens.

**Paradigm Change 3: Assignment of Worldwide Missions**

According to the Basic Law, the *Bundeswehr* was authorized only to defend Germany within its borders. All German administrations up to 1990 accepted this mandate. Therefore, missions abroad only provided humanitarian support after a catastrophe. This concept changed with the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a new international security environment. The *Bundeswehr* did not provide ground forces for the Gulf War, but it did provide 11.8 billion Deutsche Mark (approximately $6.9 billion) to support the operation. The *Bundeswehr*’s participation in Cambodia with the United
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992 was its first real deployment abroad. This was followed by German soldiers’ participation in AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) flights to monitor the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina (DENY-FLIGHT), the UNOSOM II (United Nations Operation in Somalia) mission in Somalia, and the naval blockade against Serbia and Montenegro (SHARP GUARD). These operations triggered legal complaints from two factional parliamentary parties. On 12 July 1994, the Supreme Court declared that missions abroad conformed with the Basic Law when authorized by Parliament.

An incremental approach was taken to adapt the Bundeswehr to its new missions and also to gain German society’s acceptance of these changes.

Yet ten years after the Bundeswehr undertook its first mission, German society seemed reluctant to support these new tasks. When in 2002 former Minister of Defense Peter Struck declared that “Germany’s security [was] also defended in the Hindu Kush,” this assertion triggered a lengthy and heated public debate. One year later, the 2003 defense policy designated worldwide missions as a primary task requiring further growth and reorganization of the Bundeswehr. Three years later, a White Paper specified the most probable tasks for the Bundeswehr: resolution of international conflicts, crisis management, and the war against international terrorism. For the first time, official documents publically described Bundeswehr’s operational reality. But these documents did not foster needed discussion related to security policy in German society.

Operations in Afghanistan marked the first time since World War II that German soldiers engaged in combat. When the German people learned that their soldiers were being wounded and killed in Afghanistan, they were gravely concerned and surprised. Many believed that German soldiers stationed in Afghanistan were there to “help, protect, and secure” the Afghan people. German society needed time to acclimate to the new roles their military was performing.

Consequently, a new Bundeswehr generation has emerged. German forces have been deployed on a regular basis and members of the force are suspicious of any colleagues and leaders who have not deployed. The 2003 Defense Policy Guidelines declared that Innere Fuehrung would adapt to these new tasks. A 2006 White Paper stated “The tenets of Innere Fuehrung—leadership development and civic education—will remain the Bundeswehr’s guiding principles.” Critics have argued, however, that the change of the Bundeswehr mission from defense to worldwide missions rendered Innere Fuehrung an anachronistic ideal—no longer a viable principle for current missions. At the same time, a group of mission-oriented, technocratic revisionist, senior officers replaced the tradionalists. Accompanying these officers has been a return to the “old” traditional thinking of the missions for the Bundeswehr. This group argues that efficiency in missions is more important than Innere Fuehrung. From their perspective, the peacetime concept of Innere Fuehrung does not address the realities of current missions. They espouse a position that Innere Fuehrung endangers soldiers when they participate in these missions. Recent scandals in Coesfeld (2004) and in Afghanistan (2006) are reminiscent of actions that
first appeared when the Bundeswehr was first reestablished. Again, a failure to think issues through and slavish obedience to authority, combined with a lack of human dignity, were evident in these scandals.

To address these issues, the latest version of the ZDv 10/1 seeks to restore the value of Innere Fuehrung to a mission-oriented Bundeswehr. Nonetheless, the concept of Innere Fuehrung remains under stress. As the Bundeswehr transitions to an all-volunteer force, the 3rd pillar of conscription has been removed from Germany’s military.

**Paradigm Change 4: Transition to an All-Volunteer Force**

On 1 July 2011, the Bundeswehr established the all-volunteer force following 54 years of conscription to adapt to the requirements for an expeditionary force with global reach. The conscript system had guaranteed a steady supply of young men for the Bundeswehr and a wide dissemination of the principles of Innere Fuehrung. More than eight million Germans have served in the Bundeswehr. These veterans have deeply embedded their beliefs and experiences in the Bundeswehr within the German state and society.

The all-volunteer force concept will be challenged to sustain the military’s link to society. In fact, we may see the army’s relationship with the German people dramatically weakened. There is a belief that fewer young Germans will join the all-volunteer force, and there is a risk that those who do join may overrepresent specific segments of society. Wolffsohn, a historian at the Bundeswehr University Munich, predicted that the “citizen in uniform” will be replaced by the “underclass in uniform.” Indeed, the integration of former NPA soldiers and a disproportionate number of East Germans in the Bundeswehr have already changed the character of the force. The Bundeswehr recruits one-third of its soldiers in the new Bundeslaender, where only one-fifth of the German population lives—and where democratic conditions and institutions have a short history. Without the third pillar of conscription, civil-military relations will need to be buttressed by the remaining two pillars (Innere Fuehrung and “citizen in uniform”) to ensure the Bundeswehr remains an integral part of society and the state.

The 2011 Defense Policy Guidelines assert that Innere Fuehrung and its corollary of the “citizen in uniform” will remain unchanged. This policy envisions an expeditionary, combat-ready Bundeswehr, accepted within society and the state, with a strong reputation for spreading democratic values worldwide. To achieve the proposed objectives of the Defense Policy Guidelines, much more than a simple transformation is necessary. Instead, a revolutionary and comprehensive approach, led by Parliament, is required. Such a transformation needs to ensure adherence to the concept of Innere Fuehrung and the “citizen in uniform.” The original intent for the founding of the Bundeswehr in accord with the Basic Law was to avoid creating a “state within a state.” This intent must be preserved. German citizens now have an opportunity to be involved in a vital foreign and security policy discussion, led by Parliament and involving the nation’s leadership. Widespread deliberation of this particular matter would
dispel German society’s “polite disinterest,” as former Federal President Horst Koehler described German citizens’ disengagement from civic issues.\textsuperscript{100}

Even before the decision to suspend conscription in Germany, a number of political scientists offered recommendations for adapting \textit{Innere Fuehrung} to these new missions and to an all-volunteer force. According to the political scientist Professor Elmar Wiesendahl,\textsuperscript{101} the core principles of \textit{Innere Fuehrung} (primacy of civilian authority, respect of the Basic Law, and integration of the army and society) must remain unchanged. So long as other changes in the \textit{Bundeswehr} do not violate \textit{Innere Fuehrung}, these adaptations should proceed to make the \textit{Bundeswehr} a viable 21st century armed force.\textsuperscript{102} A recent number of studies on the new missions and an all-volunteer force provide abundant material for a broad public discussion on the future of the \textit{Bundeswehr}.\textsuperscript{103}

The Parliament, including the Chancellor, need to take the lead in assuring the \textit{Innere Fuehrung} and the “citizen in uniform” retain their fundamental roles in the all-volunteer force; Parliament is the constitutional leader of the army. This adaptation is as critical as the post-war rearmament of Germany; it should attract the same level of scrutiny. The Defense Committee should be tasked to revive the subcommittee for “advancement of \textit{Innere Fuehrung},” The subcommittee needs to work with \textit{Bundeswehr} leaders and the ministerial department of \textit{Innere Fuehrung} to devise ways to embed this principle in the new all-volunteer force.\textsuperscript{104} The Parliamentary Commissioner and the independent Advisory Council on Questions of \textit{Innere Fuehrung} have to be included in this deliberation. These four groups share responsibility for the future development of \textit{Innere Fuehrung}. The \textit{Bundeswehr} Association,\textsuperscript{105} with its unlimited access to the public sector and direct access to the Minister of Defense, should also be a critical part of this process. The Parliamentary Commissioner would be responsible for implementing recommendations, as directed by law. These groups would be responsible for ensuring that the military recruiting and incentives programs\textsuperscript{106} are financed in such a manner as to increase diversity, attract quality volunteers, and retain the best \textit{Bundeswehr} soldiers.

Education also plays a critical role in this transition. In comparison to the former conscript \textit{Bundeswehr}, new volunteers will require an extended education in ethics, history, and politics to compensate for any education shortfalls and to meet the higher standards associated with an expeditionary force. The formulative education of officers and NCOs needs to be aligned in an effort to assure the army’s linkage to society and to facilitate reintegration of veterans into the civil sector. The \textit{Bundeswehr} should establish exchange programs with industry and government agencies to support integration, linkage, and mutual understanding. To sustain relationships with society, \textit{Bundeswehr} military careers need to parallel those of the US Army, which provides career officers abundant opportunities for education and internships with civilian universities, other agencies of government, and private businesses. Officers who pursue such opportunities should qualify for favorable promotion consideration. Likewise, \textit{Bundeswehr} civilians need to study with the soldiers at the \textit{Bundeswehr} Universities, ensuring networking and greater understanding.\textsuperscript{107}
As in Lieutenant General Graf von Baudissin’s time, the Innere Fuehrung department should be posted directly under the GenInsp [CJCS] to signal its fundamental importance.108 In addition, GenInsps’ assistant for education and training should become a “Management Assistant for Innere Fuehrung” and report to the GenInsp and Defense Committee. The Bundeswehr Institute for Social Sciences should be tasked with conducting annual surveys on Innere Fuehrung with survey results presented directly to the Parliamentary Commissioner.109 Finally, an information campaign needs to be undertaken at every level, designed and implemented for the purpose of gaining trust in the leadership’s ability to successfully transform the all-volunteer armed forces.

Summary

With its 55 years of successful history, the Bundeswehr has already doubled the lifetime of the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht combined. Innere Fuehrung, with its vital corollary of “citizen in uniform,” ensures that the Bundeswehr serves as a democratically structured and operated armed force that remains acceptable to the majority of the German people. This concept was initially challenged, but it has successfully adapted to the world’s complex and uncertain strategic environment by adhering to its unchanging core values (consistent with the Basic Law). With the transition to an all-volunteer Bundeswehr, the pillar of conscription will no longer be available. Accordingly, Innere Fuehrung’s other two pillars supporting civil-military relations need to be strengthened in an effort to compensate for that loss. Assuming that this will be a relatively simple transformation is not sufficient. A revolutionary process, like the one that originally launched the Bundeswehr, is required. This process has to be led by the Parliament, the ultimate master of the Bundeswehr. The process should also include societal stakeholders if we are to ensure the Bundeswehr remains an integrated and accepted part of German society.

Notes

1. Dr. Franz Josef Jung, “Tagesbefehl des Bundesministers der Verteidigung (Order of the Day of the Minister of Defense),” Bonn, January 28, 2011: Own translation. The Order of the Day is available in the German version of Innere Fuehrung (Leadership Development and Civic Education), Zentrale Dienstvorschrift 10/1, Innere Fuhruung,” (Joint Service Regulation), (Bonn: Joint Forces Staff (Fue S 1 4), January 28, 2008) only, http://www.innerefuehrung.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/ zinfue/?ut/p/c4/JYvLCsIwEEX_aCaVatWdDwQV1J3WjSTtWGLSpMSJgvjxJngPnM3h4hUT-Tr50J177j1exG70XL3hadTto909EkjDkawIJCEao-AxEmKK5_xtCRrvlOZHovlkj2A0Y- f2OY5Q0gFdu1KZNLUyq-K_4VvqZmeqvvh2sDni0PeLH0blQeM!/ (accessed May 6, 2012); [German] Federal Ministry of Defense Home Page, “History of the Bundeswehr,” February 28, 2012: “[The armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany] have officially been called the Bundeswehr since 1 April 1956.” http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmgv/?ut/p/c4/FcwxDoAgDEDGRG7W7m6dQ3A Aba1RCKML1xfy15eOFK7GDg-1exCY80Xje3ASXwBlH6I4q61JO78gHv1Jp0UGw5SH5foh Me_SgENCda9w8fiXP/ (accessed May 10, 2012).


5. Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross, 43: “Two months after the outbreak of the war in Korea, Winston Churchill demanded a West German contribution to the European defense.”


29. Ibid., no. 625, Chapter 6-II and 6-III.


36. Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 80: “The Adenauer government agreed that the future soldier should be subordinate to civilian control as never before in German history,” and 81: “by subordinating the new armed forces to parliamentary control, finally fulfilling the liberal hopes for the soldiers and the state in German history.”


38. de Maizière, “Was war neu an der Bundeswehr?” 11-15.


41. de Maizière, “Was war neu an der Bundeswehr?” 12-14: In addition, the military territorial tasks and the civil administration were joint down to the garrison. The same applies for the areas of security policy, military reconnaissance, military law, and *Innere Fuehrung*; Uwe Hartmann, *Innere Fuehrung: Erfolge und Defizite der Fuehrungsphilosophie der Bundeswehr* (Berlin: Carola Hartmann Miles, 2007), 31-34. Accordingly, the German military is often described as a “parliamentary armed force.”


43. Hans-Juergen Rautenberg, “Streitkraefte und Spitzengliederung – zum Verhaeltnis von ziviler und bewaffneter Macht bis 1990,” in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 113-114: The term “civil control,” adopted from US constitutional theory, was intentionally mistranslated to allow the civil authorities to directly control all military activities and to assure the constitutional superiority of political over military leaders.


50. Abenheim explains four major features of the Bundeswehr to ensure integration, see Abenheim, *German Soldier and German Unity*, 10-15; Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 83. According to Huntington’s theory of civil-military relations, the Germans chose “Subjective Civilian Control” to achieve “its ends by civilizing the [Bundeswehr], making them the mirror of the state.”
Objective Civilian Control on the other hand “achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state;” Bredow, “Conscription, Conscientious;” 291.

51. For more details of the use of former Wehrmacht officers in the Bundeswehr, see Jens-Olaf Koltermann, “Citizen in Uniform:” 9-11.


53. Abenheim, Soldiers and Politics Transformed, 211.

54. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 123.


59. Bald, “Die Militaerreform in der ‘Aera Brandt’,” 343-346, 349: As a result, the demographics of the officers changed in 1975 as follows: public servants from 42% (1967) to 26% (1975), white-collar employees from 26% to 41%, blue-collar workers from 4% to 17%, self-employed, farmers and craftsmen from 26% to 15%. Most important the percentage of aristocratic lieutenants fell from 15% to only 1%.


61. Abenheim, Soldiers and Politics Transformed, 28: “In its head and limbs in 1990, the NVA remained a Germanized version of the Soviet Army.”


64. Ibid.; 467; Corps and division-level units were taken over by generals and their teams from the Bundeswehr. On the regiment and battalion level, Bundeswehr officers took the lead. In cases where NPA officers were in the lead, a training and support group from the Bundeswehr was attached; Scheven, “Die Bundeswehr und der Aufbau Ost,” 442-443


70. Bundeswehr Home Page, “Hintergrundinformationen zur Eingliederung von Soldaten der NVA in die Bundeswehr (Background information on integration of Soldiers of the National Peoples Army into the Bundeswehr),” January 18, 2012, http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/ut/p/c4/ NYzBDolWEES_hR_o0gNLvGGMxoeujOKttGtpKC1ZFrn48bYHZ5K5vMmDF6QG9XFW5sYt- BeXhCp92-30S_GrQLEzoSeGbUvhag_HKYhAWFz04PTDCIzvSV8eAnJcxsEtrSXEkMUdin8l Klhw8BrpSHg9yV_4jv_X53tZNVcnL9XTLQm-hMwjzNDVbWxQ_swOnBw!!/ (accessed April 7, 2012).

71. Abenheim, *Soldiers and Politics Transformed*, 34; Nina Leonhard, “Die Soldaten der NVA und die ‘Armee der Einheit,’” in *Entschieden fuer den Frieden*, 461. Approximately 500 officers and 900 NCOs were dismissed from the Bundeswehr because they failed to report their Stasi (the East German secret police) backgrounds.


86. Dyson, “Managing Convergence,” 252: “The cult of the warrior was weak or absent within the Bundeswehr;” Spiegel Online International Home Page, “Army’s Composition ‘Still Reflects Spirit of Cold War’,” June 14, 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,700511,00.html (accessed April 27, 2012); James D. Bindenagel, “Afghanistan: The German Factor,” Prism 1, no. 4 (September 2010): 96: “German politicians have been slowly urging the German public to be more involved militarily and to accept a military-combat role in NATO operations;” Ibid., 106: “The Kunduz attack has changed the debate; Germans in Afghanistan are at war and war is [still] rejected by a significant majority of Germans at home.”


93. For possible consequences of an all-volunteer force which deploys soldiers on combat tours regularly, see Mark Thompson, “An Army Apart: 45,000 troops are coming home to a country that doesn’t know them,” Time, November 21, 2011, 35. The U.S. example cannot be translated into German society 100%, but some of the consequences may become reality for the all-volunteer Bundeswehr in the future.

94. Prof. Dr. M. Wolffsohn Home Page; Professor Dr. Michael Wolffsohn (17 May 1947–) is an Israeli-born German historian who is working at the Bundeswehr University Munich as a historian, http://www.wolffsohn.de/ (accessed January 6, 2012).


97. Hartmann, *Inner Fuehrung*, 35. The consensus in German society is that conscription has facilitated the integration of the Bundeswehr into society.


101. *Home Page of Professor Dr. Elmar Wiesendahl*. Wiesendahl is head of the department of social science at the Fuehrungsschule der Bundeswehr (Command and Staff College of the Bundeswehr), http://www.elmarwiesendahl.de/ (accessed April 9, 2012).


104. Meyer, “Inner Fuehrung und Auslandseinsatze:” 25-27: Meyer describes how the sub-committee of the Defense Committee did not properly cooperate with the Bundeswehr and the consequences of this lack of cooperation.


107. Meyer, The Concept of “Innere Fuehrung,” 6-7; “it is principally possible for civil students to study at a Bundeswehr-university, this has never happened in reality;” Zivile Karriere Bundeswehr Home Page; instead, the Bundeswehr civilians study at public universities, https://ziv.bundeswehr-karriere.de/portal/a/zivkarriere/?t/p/c4/PYqxDYQwDABnYQG7_-63ADonOMTCn7wcHCSmhwKha06nxlwvCnVZaZdaSHHEKconHHBK38hM2Bhe6dWC6OJlhUQx5xpzi9nVWBJDuBNrtbb7lv4D8vbclYK5SJ_xv3-ECWuwv73A!!/ (accessed April 27, 2012); The [German] Federal Minister of Defense, Innere Fuehrung, Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1 (2008), No. 502, 16.
