Cross Roads or Cross Purposes? Tensions Between Military and Humanitarian Providers

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In October 2001, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed a conference of humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Washington, D.C. There, he remarked “I want you to know that I have made it clear to my staff here and to all of our ambassadors around the world that I am serious about making sure we have the best relationship with the NGOs who are such a force multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat team.” Although his purpose in this address was undoubtedly to build a foundation for a whole-of-nation effort to promote democracy, respect for human rights, and the elimination of terrorism, the secretary’s speech had the opposite effect, angering many of the conference’s participants who felt that the US Government was seeking to co-opt their organizations by making them mere ancillaries to the war effort.

In 2006 to 2007, Army Lieutenant Colonel James L. Cook was the CJ3 (Deputy for Plans and Operations) for Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 76, covering Regional Command (RC) South and RC East in Afghanistan. His command controlled most of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and all of the American PRTs operating in those areas of responsibility. Troubling to LTC Cook was the level of redundancy of aid and assistance programs undertaken by the military, government agencies, and the NGO community. He was confused as to why: “as operators, it was so difficult to get everyone to row together” and divide responsibilities to most efficiently and effectively use the limited resources at hand. Although he found levels of access to and cooperation with NGOs varied from project to project and NGO to NGO, Cook felt area-wide communication and cooperation were less than he thought possible and NGOs were (largely) unresponsive to his staff’s efforts to streamline the distribution of reconstruction and aid monies.

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Introduction

Like most military and foreign policy professionals, Secretary Powell and LTC Cook have a genuine interest in helping those in need. Alleviating suffering is not their only interest however. The Departments of State and Defense are arms of the United States government and are thus responsible to the nation and its people for advancing their interests as well as for meeting the needs of those affected by tragedy. Indeed, there is a hierarchy of interests that are served by government-sponsored humanitarian missions. First, advance the goals of the nation, and, second, deliver aid to those in need. There is nothing cynical or hypocritical about this hierarchy. As the previous passages reflect, rather than seeing these national and humanitarian ends as conflicting, both Secretary Powell and LTC Cook believed these two goals were in harmony—one supports the other.

As the respect for human rights and dignity from policy practitioners is genuine, they believe their common cause with their humanitarian NGO counterparts should serve as a basis for a smooth and unproblematic partnership. True, the humanitarians might not share their hierarchy of interests, as the latter may privilege the interests of those in need of aid above the interests of the nations that deliver it. But, as the government practitioner sees no conflict between serving these two interests, this fact ought not disrupt prospects for cooperation. The continued unevenness in civil-military relations between militaries and nongovernmental aid-givers, sometimes cooperative, often uncooperative (even hostile), thus continues to confuse and frustrate government agents.

In fact, the root of such problems stem from the fact that many in the policy community fail to appreciate that humanitarians also have a hierarchy of interests. Humanitarians have historically been as concerned with humanitarianism as an end as much as a means, because the practice of humanitarianism redeems the aid-giver as much as it comforts the recipient—or, more precisely, the aid-giver is redeemed through providing comfort to others. Implicitly, this means there is a hierarchy of interests among nongovernmental aid-givers. First, advance the humanitarian project, and, second, use the project to deliver aid to those in need. As a result, the humanitarian community defines itself in terms of not only its humanitarian mission, but also that of its core principles: independence (from nation states), neutrality (between parties to a conflict), and impartiality (with respect to the recipients of aid). These ideals and principles underlie the idea of an apolitical “humanitarian space” that is necessarily free from politics. There is nothing sinister or hypocritical in this perspective, however, as, like the government agent, humanitarians see their goals as being in harmony rather than in conflict: “right action” on behalf of the aid-giver advances the interests of the recipient and the humanitarian project.

This article argues the tension between these often unacknowledged hierarchies is at the heart of a similar tension between the two communities of aid-givers, with both seeking to provide humanitarian assistance to those in need. It considers the origins and implications of the differing priorities
each gives to their organizational and “humanitarian” objectives. In the latter portions of the article, divisions within the NGO community are explored. It is at this juncture the argument is made that these divisions might be exploited by military aid-givers to more effectively partner with their civilian opposites—though only when the conditions are favorable. The article will conclude by noting that when both the humanitarian and government agents serve the interests of the recipients, in part, the commonality of interest and the prospects for cooperation do indeed exist. The difficulty, however, lies between these two communities in their mutual incompatibility regarding the other interests each community serves: for the government professional, the nation-state is an intrinsically political construct and, for the humanitarian, the principles of humanitarianism are necessarily apolitical (even antipolitical) projects.

Know Thyself and My… Ally?

The great Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu argued success in battle required that one know himself and those against whom one fights. With due respect to Sun Tzu, he perhaps forgot to mention the importance of understanding one’s allies as well. This is particularly important in the case of humanitarian aid, where the fractious alliance relations between governmental and nongovernmental actors can be just as great an obstacle to success as their common enemy: disaster and its depredations.

Serving the Nation

As noted earlier, military and diplomatic officials (to include the United States Agency for International Development [USAID], etc.) self-consciously act to realize a hierarchy of goals. When government agents undertake humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) missions, their immediate concern is for those in need of help. This mission is nested within a broader one of advancing the nation’s policy goals, though they do not perceive—or even accept—that these goals could be contradictory. For example, during Operation Unified Assistance, which delivered aid to the victims of the 2004 Asian tsunami, the US Navy saw no contradiction between its genuine desire to assist those in humanitarian distress and a parallel tendency to expound on the “huge publicity coup for the Navy.” For the Navy, the humanitarian aspect of HA/DR operations is political because the Navy serves a political master—the nation state.

The success of the mission undertaken will be evaluated against the goals of advancing the nation’s interests and delivering material aid to those in need. For example, when those involved in Unified Assistance went out of their way to ensure their activities were not perceived as “inappropriate” by Indonesian Muslims, this probity was largely due to the desire to ensure efficient and effective distribution of humanitarian relief rather than a commitment to behave “properly.” While this consequentialist logic has a common-sense ring to it, it is not the only way one might consider and weigh individual actions. A
failure to appreciate the fact that others privilege more than just results can be the first step in creating misunderstandings between communities; such acts can make relations tense and cooperation problematic.

**The Humanitarian Ethos**

Contrary to any military or civilian governmental ethos, the defining principles of humanitarianism, as articulated by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), are: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality. Note that all of these demand “proper” motivation on behalf of aid-givers while none concerns the ends that might otherwise inform a logic of consequence. On the other hand, the apolitical nature of humanitarian principles have encouraged a logic of appropriate action. Indeed, as late as “the 1990s, [humanitarian] aid agencies rarely contemplated whether their actions did more harm than good—they presumed that good intentions were evidence of good outcomes.”

Contrary to those who think civilian NGOs just “don’t get” the benefits of cooperation with the military and other political actors, humanitarians do, in fact, recognize the ability to deliver aid more efficiently through such cooperation. But these organizations fear that doing so risks the ideal of a humanitarian space and threatens to overwhelm it with the interests and priorities of nations and other political actors. The importance of “good works from which the doer might also benefit,” combined with the ethics of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality have led humanitarians to see their mission from a different perspective than that of the professional soldier. Soldiers, like Cook, believe that if only they could communicate more effectively to their humanitarian NGO partners that they were, in fact, seeking the same ends, they could ease resistance. Yet this divide cannot be bridged solely through strategic communication because in reality these differences stem from fundamentally different perspectives rather than from any miscommunication. For example, where government agents welcome the cooperation and input of nongovernmental aid-givers, insofar as it helps them achieve their goals, humanitarians fear such interactions threaten to subvert and corrupt the apolitical principles of humanitarianism.

These perspectives not only support the humanitarians’ principled resistance to the government’s encroachment into their “space,” but also, on a more fundamental yet subtle level, influence how humanitarians perceive the role of aid and its success quite different from that of the military professional. The military professional focuses on the outcomes (consequence) of his actions, the humanitarian professional focuses on their intent (appropriateness). For example, one of the most effective and efficient distributors of aid to post-Katrina New Orleans was retail giant Wal-Mart. Yet humanitarians were concerned that for-profit companies’ distributions of aid, no matter how efficient, undermined the “morality” of that aid. In fact, humanitarian scholar Janice Gross Stein wrote “the meaning of effectiveness defined within the conceptual architecture
of ‘outcome’ is bitterly contested among humanitarians . . . . accountability defined as effectiveness forces a discussion about consequence [which at] its most extreme can substitute a logic—and an ethic—of consequence for an ethic of obligation.” Stein continues by noting that such “a consequentialist logic would argue that humanitarians should only give assistance when it is effective, irrespective of where it is needed,” a proposition they bitterly contest.9

Molehills are not Mountains

The differences between humanitarians and their military and civilian government counterparts are wide indeed; however, it is easy to overstate their differences. For example, although military professionals (rightly) pride themselves on their bottom-line, consequentialist logic, it is likely even they would admit to being morally constrained because of personal and professional codes of appropriate conduct. Although the Army’s latest Posture Statement says the Army must win the nation’s wars “decisively and dominantly,”10 there are few Army officers who would seriously consider the use of chemical or nuclear weapons—even if doing so would more efficiently fight and win the nation’s wars.

Equally, humanitarians do care deeply that their actions benefit those in their care. In their case, the humanitarian ethos is deemed not only appropriate but also necessary for the effective delivery of aid—as can be attested to by the number of murdered and kidnapped humanitarians, often the result of their being “politicized” by their association with warring parties.11 Humanitarians are often under threat from their too-close cooperation with the military, and their access to the people they seek to help is impacted. This is often the case when parties to a conflict refuse entry to humanitarians who cooperate too closely with one side, thereby preventing them from accomplishing the material ends they seek.12

Finally, not all aid-givers are created equal. The aid community is far from monolithic and its members’ commitment to appropriate action and pure humanitarianism versus a more pragmatic approach is as varied as the organizations and individuals therein. Members of the aid community who tread this fine line on the side of desired ends may be the best partners for the military professional.

A House Divided Against Itself

All aid is not alike. Although the aid community can be divided a number of ways, one critical distinction is between humanitarianism and development aid. Although the military lumps the two together by designating assistance missions as “HA/DR,” humanitarianism and development have very different meanings for those within the NGO community. In considering divisions within the NGO ranks, Michael Barnett, a leading NGO scholar, develops the useful distinction between “alchemical” and “emergency” aid agencies, one that is borrowed here. Barnett writes:
Emergency humanitarianism concerns the provision of relief to those in immediate peril; cleaves to neutrality, impartiality, and independence; and has a hands-off attitude toward politics. Agencies that fall into this camp include the ICRC and MSF [Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders]. Agencies that fall into this camp focus on keeping people alive. Nothing More . . . Alchemical humanitarianism involves saving lives at risk and addressing the root causes of suffering; operates with a less binding set of principles; and treats politics as necessary and at times even a welcome feature in humanitarian action . . . Although it is fashionable to call humanitarians the new missionaries, it is more accurate to call them the new alchemists, given their attempt to harness the science of the day to transform social, political, economic, and cultural relations so that individuals can lead more productive, healthy, and dignified lives.\(^{13}\)

**Alchemical Aid**

Developmental, or alchemical, aid agencies, particularly those based in the United States, have had a long historical relationship working with governments. Such partnerships permit each party to achieve their primary, if often unacknowledged, goals—advancing states’ interests and delivering opportunities for grace through altruistic service for the NGOs—while staying true to their objective to help those in need. Alchemist NGOs continue to be tightly linked to projects directly funded by government and intergovernmental organizations, such as the World Bank and the United Nations.

While this tradition of cooperation (or codependence) has a long history, it does not ensure a smooth and cooperative relationship. Perhaps counterintuitively, alchemist NGOs’ willingness to be political has, at times, made them more antimilitary than the emergency NGOs, who believe their role is best served by avoiding politics entirely. Notwithstanding, both alchemical NGOs and their governmental and military counterparts have substantial incentives to sublimate this antagonism, especially when they interact in the course of humanitarian crises.

When operating in emergency situations, the military professional has a number of tools available to smooth these relationships. The first, and perhaps the most important, is brute power. In terms of what the military can bring to the fight, the military has logistical, planning, and intelligence assets that dwarf those of even the best-resourced humanitarian organizations. Often, much of the initial disinclination to cooperate with the military by various NGOs is overcome when the latter find they need the type and depth of support that only the military can provide. But marriages of convenience rarely last and less often do they satisfy both parties. In order for a more consistent and effective manner of cooperation to be realized, a foundation built on more precise objectives is desirable, even if accomplishing all the outlined objectives is not always possible.

One possibility concerns the military’s desire to leave crisis zones once the more immediate task of saving those faced with the threat of dying is
accomplished. Even the most ardent opponents of military-sponsored humanitarianism admit that “[a]rmy—es can play a role in providing relief, especially in peacetime and natural disasters”—provided that they leave when the crisis has passed. But effectively communicating this convergence of interests is not always a simple one. In this context, the message contained in strategic communication can be an issue, and often dependent on who delivers the message. For example, USAID’s Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) often serve as an invaluable liaison between military and NGO actors, given the fact that representatives of each are often found in the other’s camp and thus have a degree of mutual understanding. In the case of direct NGO-military interaction, for example, when Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) teams, along with Public Affairs officers, interact, there is often more common ground than when other specialty officers such as Judge Advocate Generals (JAGs) are employed. Still, should the military become overly attached to the optimistic opinion that cooperation is simply a matter of getting their “message” out, it is important to remember the difference between NGOs and their military counterparts is often more fundamental than just an inability to communicate.

Emergency Aid

Although the growing commitment of moving from help to self-help, from emergency to alchemical aid, has been welcomed by many, humanitarian traditionalists decry the politicization and bureaucratization of humanitarianism this entails. While the ICRC is seen by many as the epitome of the ideal emergency response organization, the resistance to this belief has been nowhere stronger or more militant than in what Volker Heins terms sans-frontières, referring to the “Without Borders” movements (such movements include MSF and Reporters Without Borders, Engineers Without Borders, and even Geeks Without Borders). These activists argue the humanitarian’s stance must be overtly apolitical. Indeed, according to one MSF official:

It is simply not possible for a government or military to have the unconditional ambition of only providing humanitarian action. Our objectives are fundamentally different from those of the military . . . . We understand that aid supplied by military forces can provide relief to people in need as can acts of assistance provided by individual soldiers or units moved by a sense of humanity. But this aid is different. It is not humanitarian assistance. It is given as a reward.

Not surprisingly, and unlike alchemical aid-givers, these emergency organizations have sought to limit or even deny government funding, worrying that the taint by association would undermine their independence. NGO-military relations are made even more difficult by the fact that the private donor base these organizations cultivate are often composed of individuals who hold antistate and antimilitary perspectives. A failure to observe the difference between the alchemists, whose embrace of the political allows for the possibility of cooperation, and the emergency humanitarians, whose rejection
of the political does not, is at the root of much of the confusion by government representatives regarding their relationships within the NGO community.

A lack of appreciation for the differences between alchemical and emergency NGOs forms the basis for another, rarely appreciated, source of conflict between emergency aid-givers and the military: the role of aid in civil rights advocacy—in favor of women, workers, etc. According to the emergency aid-givers, actively advocating rights may actually be antithetical to the practice of humanitarianism, as the former is necessarily political while the latter is not. The committed emergency humanitarian certainly does not wish to strip aid recipients of their rights. While he might value human rights, and even allow that political actors, such as the military, might be among the legitimate guarantors of these rights, actively trying to provide them in their role as a humanitarian often demands too much in terms of political engagement.

In the end, the intransigence and hostility encountered by those seeking to work with emergency humanitarians is not necessarily because of the humanitarian’s antipathy for the military or government or the political objectives they pursue. Rather, it is because these emergency aid-givers see humanitarianism, as defined by specific actions, as necessarily incommensurate with individuals and organizations bound to serve political entities. Understanding the fundamental basis for the friction between the military and aid communities is critical if we are to overcome these differences. Essentially, from the emergency perspective, as opposed to the more pragmatic and malleable alchemical viewpoint, the fact that states may render aid does not necessarily mean that such aid is humanitarian in the strictest sense of the term. Emergency aid-givers see such aid as axiomatic based on the fact that states cannot be seen as humanitarians and thus the military’s use of the “H” in HA/DR is undermining the very understanding of the humanitarian project.

**Conclusion: A New Strategy for Engagement**

This article has argued that the tension between military professionals and humanitarians is not only one of ideology but also one of hierarchies of organizational interests and meaning. Although both sides claim to value similar objectives—easing pain and suffering—their contrary approaches determine that their ways of obtaining those goals will often be in conflict. While these differences are stark in theory, representing binaries between the political and the humanitarian, the actual differences between the soldier and the humanitarian is very often much less dramatic in actual execution. Perhaps the main reason for this fact is the variety of NGO aid providers, each having different levels of fealty to the ideals of “pure” humanitarianism. While some alchemists, especially developmentalists and rights advocates, are willing to become politically engaged, and thus may be willing to compromise with soldiers and politicians, others, especially emergency aid-givers, will continue to shun engagement with government agencies and their representatives.

With an interest in the development of military professionals in a world increasingly impacted by humanitarian concerns and the NGOs that support
them, this article concludes with several observations that might be helpful when the military and NGOs interact in the future.

- **Beware of Hidden Hierarchies**: Given the commitment of the humanitarian organization to the personal salvation of the aid-giver, the needs of the NGO often take on greater importance in the day-to-day concerns of the giver. Likewise, the military professional understands that his duty is to his country, but it is generally accepted that aiding others is a critical part of service to the nation. Soldiers and civilian humanitarians thus have issues that bring them together as well as force them apart. By focusing only on areas of common interest, military professionals often underestimate the potential for friction in these relationships while they may overestimate the likelihood for cooperation. A more balanced and sensitive approach is critical in aligning expectations with reality.

- **Logics: Separate but Equal?** The military professional needs to realize that just because they value a logic that places ends ahead of means, this does not imply that everyone else does. This is not to say the soldier should think like the humanitarian, nor even accept the humanitarian’s hierarchy of interests, but rather the soldier should be cognizant of the potential pitfalls he faces—even from those he believes share his goals.

- **Human Rights and Humanitarianism Are Not the Same**: It is common to think that humanitarianism and human rights are the same. But they are not the same, with many humanitarians ill at ease with the political and social engineering required to ensure that these human rights are maintained. It is critical for the military professional to be cognizant of the goals of the various NGOs with whom he is working—are they humanitarian; are they developmental; are they rights-oriented? Answering these questions (or even being aware that they need to be asked) is a critical first step in developing a work strategy with NGOs.

- **Not All NGOs are Alike**: NGOs can be divided into several categories, with each demonstrating some aspect of their willingness and ability to work with various state agents, along with their commitment to logic of appropriateness and consequence. This article has focused on two in particular: humanitarian vs. developmental and alchemical vs. emergency. There are, however, other distinctions that may be important and should be considered. For example, country-of-origin can have an impact, as American NGOs generally do not feel as strong a requirement to defend their independence in the same manner as European NGOs. Likewise, knowing an organization’s willingness to accept government contracts is another way to categorize organizations and evaluate their prospects for cooperation.

- **Context Matters**: Finally, in the past, humanitarian organizations have been “... quick to accuse donor governments of politicizing humanitarian action, but much slower in defining more precisely what kind of political intervention would be desirable.” Even this indeterminacy has a tendency to change in response to developments in the field. For example, Afghanistan and Iraq, where not even the Red Cross or Red Crescent are immune from attack, humanitarians have little or no alternative but to cooperate with members of the host government and various...
foreign powers, to include the military and private security firms. Furthermore, because state interests are often only tangentially engaged in cases of natural disasters (as opposed to wars and man-made disasters), humanitarian organizations may be more willing to sanction their participation—and even cooperate with these organizations. For example, following the 2004 Asian Tsunami even MSF (often reluctantly) worked hand-in-hand with the US Navy. But when state interests become engaged, even in the most peripheral manner, as was the case with the United States’ involvement in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake, humanitarians will again be wary of working too closely with the military or diplomatic representatives. Thus, when considering the prospects for NGO-military cooperation, the military professional needs to consider the nature of the crisis, the type of NGO, and critically evaluate both, not only through the lens of consequence, but also with a thought as to appropriateness. With these considerations in mind, the military and diplomatic representative may more effectively and efficiently achieve their ends—with or without the assistance and cooperation of their NGO counterparts.

NOTES

4. Admiral James Stavridis is one of the few military practitioners to worry that the humanitarian ethos might conflict with the military culture. Yet even ADM Stavridis believes that, as long as the military can keep the proper perspective between quick-fixes and building the health of the host country and region, there need not be a conflict between HA/DR and American national security goals. See James G. Stavridis, Partnership for the Americas: Western Hemisphere Strategy and U.S. Southern Command (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2010), 160f.


16. These observations are based on private communications with LTC Gingee Guilmartin after her last tour in Afghanistan.

17. Volker Heins, “How to Meet the First Public Obligation: Contending Discourses in Humanitarian Organizations,” *KSG Carr Center Working Paper* (Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, 2004), 20ff. The “Without Borders” organizations number well over forty, including the powerful and influential, like MSF, to those substantially less so, such as Clowns Without Borders, see http://www.clowns.org/.


19. De Torrente, “Humanitarian Action Under Attack,” 3. Anticipating this criticism, ADM Stavridis has countered that while advancing the political goals of the states is “an undeniable secondary benefit of conducting HA/DR . . . this should not be the primary focus.” Stavridis, *Partnership for the Americas*, 144.