Book Reviews


American Landpower and the Middle East of 2030 ................................................................. Michael R. Eastman

The Afghanistan Experience: Democratization by Force ....................................................... Cora Sol Goldstein

Strategy, Stability, and Security

COIN is Dead—Long Live Transformation ........................................................................ Matthew Ford, Patrick Rose, and Howard Body

Afghanistan: Strategy and War Termination ........................................................................... Christopher Tuck

The Futility of Force and the Preservation of Power: British .................................................... Daniel T. Canfield

Strategic Failure in America 1780-1783

The Internet, New Media, and the Evolution of Insurgency .................................................... Steven Metz
The Word That Does Not Exist**

One day a tired linguist working on the highly esteemed second edition of the 1934 Merriam-Webster New International Dictionary carelessly placed a slip of paper containing the abbreviations for the word “density” (“D. or d. Density”) on the pile of slips for words beginning with the letter d. Then another linguist, thinking the slip was in the right place but that the entry on it had been wrongly punctuated, pushed the first four letters together to form the word “dord.” He thoughtfully added the descriptive letter n for “noun.” Clearly “Dord” was a noun—it rhymed with “board,” “cord,” and “lord.”

The astute editors of the dictionary soon discovered the errant entry but decided to play a joke on the public and leave it in. They wanted to find out if anyone would catch the “mistake.” So, appearing in the august second edition of the 1934 Merriam-Webster dictionary, on page 771, in the right-hand column, sandwiched in between the words “Dorcopsis” and “doré,” is the following entry: “dord (dôrd), n. Physics & Chem. Density.”

“Dord” stayed in the dictionary through several printings, but was finally dropped when new editors took over.


**In memoriam of all those who felt a pedantic obligation to comment on word selection and usage in *Parameters* over the years.

From the Editor

In this issue . . .

With this issue, we are proud to present an eclectic tour de force of a number of the challenges associated with the conduct of land warfare in the twenty-first century. Our authors explore themes as diverse as the future of American interests in the Middle East beyond 2030 to the rationale for British military failure in America during the 1780-83 period, and as consubstantial as democratization and war termination strategies for present-day Afghanistan. We are also quite pleased we have an opportunity to share the varied and insightful views of several active duty military and a number of foreign authors with our readers. Michael Eastman leads the charge with his analysis of the possibilities related to the strategies governing the employment of American land forces over the next twenty years. “American Landpower and the Middle East of 2030” provides an in-depth view of the fiscal realities facing the Department of Defense and the resultant interservice rivalry. The author utilizes this strategic context to develop a rather pragmatic view of future land force requirements, while acknowledging many may criticize his motivation.

The future of Afghanistan and why the American-led project of democratization has faltered provides the underlying thesis for Cora Sol Goldstein’s “The Afghanistan Experience: Democratization by Force.” The author draws on America’s experience at the conclusion of World War II in transforming two formidable enemies, Germany and Japan, to analyze why we have not been as equally successful in Afghanistan. She presents a number of competing explanations for the Coalition’s failure to achieve its original political objectives. Goldstein’s examination reveals that small wars (Afghanistan), when compared to global conflicts (WWII), simply do not create conditions that are supportive of nation building. This is especially true when the occupied population does not feel a vested interest in the transformative agenda.

“COIN is Dead—Long Live Transformation” is the first of three articles in our thematic feature, “Strategy, Stability, and Security.” The article is coauthored by several distinguished analysts in British military affairs: Matthew Ford, Patrick Rose, and Howard Body. The authors base their thesis on the belief that transformation has proven its usefulness in the initial victories in Afghanistan in 2001 as well as during the recent Libyan conflict in 2011. They are equally as certain counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have proven less successful over the past decade. It is against this backdrop of operational experiences related to the initial defeat of the Taliban and the toppling of the Gaddafi regime the authors recommend that policymakers and defense professionals should confront what they term “defining moments” in an attempt to reassess the limits of national power, specifically, the application of military power. The authors see the key question facing Great Britain, and by extrapolation the United States, as being whether or not any nation should employ a “Western way of war” emphasizing stand-off capabilities, limited objectives, and short-term interventions; this new way of war should replace
the tools and techniques normally exercised in the more long-term and complex tactics and techniques associated with traditional COIN operations.

Our second article in the feature is also authored by another of our British colleagues, Christopher Tuck. “Afghanistan: Strategy and War Termination,” is the author’s attempt to answer four questions at the heart of conflict termination: who will win; is there an achievable peace; peace at what cost; and, can the war be terminated? Tuck believes it is not the fact that the Coalition executed “bad strategy” in Afghanistan that resulted in an inability to achieve a clear and attainable endstate. Rather, the author argues that despite a number of the difficulties associated with the current strategy, the continuation of the conflict is a direct reflection of a much larger phenomenon—it is easier to start wars than to end them.

Our final offering in this feature is Daniel Canfield’s perspective on the British experience in various campaigns in the American south during the period 1780 to 1783. The author believes “The War for American Independence,” when viewed from the British perspective, has extraordinary significance for contemporary practitioners of national and military strategy. “The Futility of Force and the Preservation of Power: British Strategic Failure in America, 1780–83” is Canfield’s analysis of British military and political failures during campaigns in the American southern colonies. He reminds readers that these campaigns deserve greater attention than they have received, primarily due to the fact that in a mere two generations following this conflict America replaced Great Britain as the leader on the world stage. Canfield points to the irony of America’s ascendency, with its political, economic, and military costs that bear a remarkable similarity to those that once plagued her colonial master. He closes with a warning to America’s policymakers and strategists—British strategic failure in America should serve as a powerful reminder that long-term interests of the state can never fall victim to fear, a false sense of honor, or an overinflated view of what is militarily possible.

Our final article in this issue is authored by one of the journal’s stalwart supporters, Steven Metz. Dr. Metz’s “The Internet, New Media, and the Evolution of Insurgency” provides readers with insight regarding the motivation and capabilities of modern-day insurgents. The author builds his thesis on the history of various insurgencies and their attempts (out of weakness) to shift the focus related to conflict away from domains where they are at a disadvantage (conventional military) to those where morale and psychological characteristics matter more than tangible power. It is here where the insurgent attempts to achieve three enduring objectives: the insurgency must survive, it must strengthen itself, and it must weaken the structure or state it is opposing. Metz analyzes a number of factors that make networked insurgencies more prevalent in the contemporary security environment: the large ungoverned regions of the globe that provide insurgencies with anonymity and cover during their gestation; the marked decline in the use of insurgents as proxies since the end of the Cold War; and the number of new technologies and the systems for utilizing them—particularly the Internet and new media. The author leaves
the reader with a warning that the prevalence of dispersed, networked, trans-
national, terrorism-centric insurgencies that rely on the swarming tactics and 
operations associated with the utilization of technology, is both bad and good 
news. Bad in that such organizations are extremely difficult to defeat. The good 
news is these insurgencies are unlikely to attain decisive victory.

The “Book Reviews” feature again offers expert appraisals of an array 
of contemporary literature of interest to senior military, defense professionals, 
and academicians. Stephen Blank leads the charge with his review of Roger R. 
Reese’s Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought: The Red Army’s Military Effectiveness 
in World War II; Ambassador Louis J. Nigro Jr. examines Joseph Nye’s The 
Future of Military Power; John Coffey analyzes Strategic Vision: America and 
the Crisis of Global Power by Zbigniew Brzezinski; Charles Allen looks at 
Bridging the Military-Civilian Divide: What Each Side Must Know About The 
Other—And About Itself by Bruce Fleming; and many more. These and the 
accompanying reviews are bound to have readers heading for their favorite 
bookstore or literary outlet. – RHT
American Landpower and the Middle East of 2030

MICHAEL R. EASTMAN

The Proverbial Debate

As our current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down, political deliberations in this country return to a familiar pattern. Intent on “not re-fighting the last war,” a debate about future military strategy dominates the discussion. As in the past, the debate is sharpened by a budget ax suspended over the Department of Defense. The services anticipate funding cuts so deep as to allow for only one strategic approach to survival. And, as in the past, many approach the problem as bureaucrats defending turf, rather than as strategists objectively creating a military that will best serve the nation.

These discussions risk overshadowing some of the most fundamental considerations necessary for developing a sound strategy—which threats will our nation most likely face and what will the military we retain be capable of doing. Even in a fiscal environment that foreshadows major reductions, elements of sound strategic planning remain invaluable. As military professionals, we need to examine threats to our national interests, current and future, and offer our best advice as to how these challenges should be addressed. If nothing else, the civilian leadership needs to be advised of those things that can and cannot be accomplished (without great cost or unacceptable risk) as a result of their decisions.

This article frames a response to one future role of American land forces by examining the Middle East over the next twenty years. It begins by highlighting our enduring national interests in the region. It then considers potential threats to these interests, current and future, and attempts to assess their likelihood. Finally, those scenarios that require American ground forces are identified, along with the implications of these decisions. The intent is to provide a strategic perspective in a debate too often clouded by budgetary concerns and unnecessarily framed as an interservice, zero-sum game.

The Problem with Predictions

Any effort to forecast future conflicts is inherently a questionable endeavor.1 If the past is any indication, the strategist is far more often wrong

1 Colonel Michael Eastman is currently serving as Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Army. He most recently served as an Army War College Fellow at the Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C.
than right on the specifics. The work is doubly in jeopardy when the attempt is tied to a particular service and vulnerable to concerns of parochialism and bureaucratic interests. This article acknowledges these challenges, examining as it does the role of landpower in the Middle East for the next two decades from an Army perspective. This is not an attempt at perfect prediction nor are ground forces offered as the military panacea for all future contests in this region. There are, however, vital national interests at stake in the Middle East for the foreseeable future, and a wide range of threats to these interests.

While informed observers may argue about the probability of one threat or another actually occurring, there is a general consensus regarding America’s interests and the potential threats. There is little dispute that demand for petroleum will increase with the industrial expansion of China and India, or that demographic pressures and an overwhelmingly youthful population will increase political pressures on Middle Eastern regimes. The latent questions, then, are which of these threats requires a capability uniquely resident in American ground forces, and what does that mean for the Army in the current fiscal environment?

While it may be impossible to predict with certainty the actions of a potential adversary, the experience of the last several conflicts has shown American ground forces, and the Army in particular, provide the nation with a set of capabilities that simply cannot be achieved solely from the other domains. Whether as a demonstration of American political intent through boots on the ground, a deterrent against the largely land-based forces of this region, a training partnership with current and future allies, or a force seasoned by a decade of war, American ground forces fill a vital and complementary role in the suite of options available to this nation in times of adversity.

While there is bound to be disagreement about the powers of prediction, perfect foresight is not the goal. Instead, we should seek to identify a range of likely challenges the nation may face as a basis for weighing decisions related to capabilities inherent in the future force. Whether or not these specific challenges come to fruition is at least partly impacted by an adversary’s calculations regarding America’s ability to prevent or counter them.

The United States’ Vital Interests in the Middle East

The 2010 National Security Strategy identifies four enduring national interests:

- The security of the United States, its citizens, and US allies and partners.
- A strong, innovative, and growing US economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity.
- Respect for universal values at home and around the world.
- An international order advanced by US leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.
When the overarching goals of national security, prosperity, values, and international order are considered in the context of the Middle East, three vital interests emerge that will remain relevant decades into the future.

Any discussion of US strategic interests in the Middle East begins with ensuring global access to oil. In the 2011 World Energy Outlook, the International Energy Agency projects the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) will supply nearly half of all global demand by 2030, up from 42 percent today. Much of the growth in demand will come from the developing economies of China and India. Despite domestic actions taken over the next few decades to reduce American reliance on foreign oil, the majority of our trading partners will remain dependent on a commodity concentrated in the Middle East.

These projections make stability and security in the region a precondition for the successful functioning of international markets. Even the perception of a disruption to the flow of oil will have global consequences, damaging international economies and directly impacting the prosperity of America and its allies. As such, it remains in our national interest to ensure stability across this region, not only because the United States requires OPEC oil, but also because the global free market system depends on access to this crucial commodity.

A second vital national interest in the Middle East is the disruption, dismantling, and defeat of those extremist networks that have the intent and capability to threaten the United States or its allies. Many terrorist organizations trace their origins to this region, where they have taken full advantage of popular dissatisfaction, dysfunctional governments, and ungoverned territories to create bases of operation, recruitment, and training. The radical Islamist component of these groups is intrinsic to their appeal, making their continued presence in the Middle East a reasonable assumption for future years.

A third related interest is denying terrorist organizations and their proxies access to weapons of mass destruction. Possession of nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons would enable these groups to perpetuate violence on a spectacular scale. Controlling the spread of these weapons, along with the knowledge required to produce them, remains a vital national interest. For this reason, continued efforts to limit the proliferation of these weapons to regimes opposed to the United States, such as Iran, remain a strategic objective.

There are unquestionably additional interests for the United States in the Middle East. For example, the spread of democratic values and respect for basic human rights, the continued participation of Turkey as a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partner, and defense of Israel as a democratic ally in the region. While important, these impact the development and execution of military strategy only in the sense that they are components of vital interests already discussed.

This fact remains true for two fundamental reasons. First, many of the specific regional interests of the United States have a temporal component that makes their utility in the development of future strategy problematic. Second, while the defense of universal human rights and the promotion of democracy
have long been at the heart of America’s national interests, the military is less effective in achieving these interests than are a number of the other components of national power. Although partnership with regional militaries or the potential isolation of adversaries certainly contribute to our moral and ideological objectives, they primarily do so through preventive actions aimed at ensuring stability.

The Middle East of 2030 and Beyond

It is extremely difficult to forecast the future trajectory of events in this region. Lacking perfect foresight, the strategist can only survey what is known of events and actors and make probabilistic assessments of how things will evolve. To be certain, short of assuming an outbreak of stability in the Middle East (which seems wildly irresponsible as a matter of policy regardless of how desirable this may be), one needs to examine current trends and potential threats impacting vital national interests.

First among these is the continued importance of petroleum to the global market. More than half of the world’s oil supply will reside in this region, with Iraq’s production increasing to meet and perhaps even exceed all other nations except Saudi Arabia. At the same time, countries not currently endowed with an abundance of petroleum are unlikely to discover it. Given the ever-increasing importance of oil over the next several decades, this shortage of such a critical resource has numerous consequences.

Middle Eastern countries whose economies rely almost exclusively on energy exports for revenue will have little incentive to diversify. Patronage and the redistribution of oil revenues, whether in the form of social welfare or government patronage, will remain the dominant practice. Development of a viable middle class will be retarded, and the wealth gap between social strata will persist fostering popular dissatisfaction. A secondary result of the reliance on oil exports will be the growing inability of OPEC members to manipulate production for political gain. Relying on petroleum revenues to secure governmental power while having to financially placate a disenfranchised population, political leaders will be unable to accept large fluctuations in production. Consequently, these pressures make threats to close the Straits of Hormuz ring hollow, as such an option would be the equivalent of political suicide for regional powers. Any short-term damage to the global market would be more than offset by domestic unrest in the initiating countries, and in all probability meet with incredible resistance from OPEC members whose own survival relies on the flow of this commodity.

The rise in prices that always accompanies growing demand will also have a dramatic impact on the poorer countries in the region. As their neighbors become wealthier, the lack of comparable markets, a commercial middle class, and modern transportation infrastructure will leave many nations even further behind. The resulting popular dissatisfaction will be exacerbated by other regional trends that threaten to destabilize the entire region.
Demographic projections indicate that by 2030 more than half the population of the Middle East will be under the age of 34, a figure exceeding that of the developed world (see Figure 1).

![Population Age Distribution (2030)](image)

**Figure 1.** 2030 Aggregate Population Age Distribution (Middle East and the Developed World). Source: United States Census Bureau International Population Database, 2012.

This “youth bulge” promises to challenge even the most efficient of governments as demands for education, social services, and upward mobility are met with limited opportunities, silence, and repression. Governments that rely heavily on oil revenue redistribution will be hard pressed to meet the needs of an increasingly interconnected society that is only too aware of standards of living in other parts of the world. Those that favor a more radical interpretation of Islam are likely to focus their dissatisfaction on external forces, blaming Western society as the source of all their problems. With few prospects for positive improvement in their social status, we are almost certain to witness the continued emigration of intellectual capital. Those unable to flee will provide a reservoir of potential recruits attracted to the message of radical Islam and eager to vent their frustration.

The evolution of popular uprisings throughout the region represents a third general trend impacting the Middle East for the next several decades. As recent events have demonstrated, predictions of a regional shift toward forms of democratic institutions are premature at best. There is undoubtedly some level of commonality with recent protest movements against ineffective or repressive government. The manner in which affected regimes have responded, however, along with internal divisions within protest groups, make a result favoring Western democracies unlikely.
The instability associated with nations attempting to transition between various forms of government is one of the most pressing factors in identifying future threats. Multiple studies have demonstrated that transitioning to a democratic form of government, even if loosely defined as achieving stable representative government, is a process often requiring 20 to 30 years. More troubling, states undergoing either a transition to democracy or backsliding toward greater autocracy are far more likely to go to war than those with a stable government.\(^9\)

Which Middle Eastern countries ultimately adopt a representative form of government is, therefore, less important than the instability that accompanies these transitions. With numerous nations in the early stages of transition, the likelihood of conflict has to be considered quite high in the coming decades. While there is evidence some of these states may eventually succeed in their quest for representative government, it does not necessarily bode well for regional stability in the interim. There is also a high probability that even a representative government in a nation such as Egypt or Syria will retain an anti-Western orientation in keeping with the prevailing popular views of its citizens.\(^10\)

A nuclear Iran represents the fourth major variable impacting American national interests in the region. Despite a continuing effort to undermine Iran's nuclear program, it is quite probable they will develop a number of low-yield weapons within the next decade. This reality poses at least two distinct challenges for America and other Western democracies.\(^11\) Emboldened by the possession of a nuclear weapon, Iran will feel secure from invasion. The regime will be increasingly prone to exert pressures on neighboring states as it attempts to expand authority over the Shia populace in the region. While it is unlikely that Iran will conduct any cross-border invasions or engage in overt interstate war, it will still experience many of the same pressures of demographics and economic unrest as the remainder of the region. Unable to meet the demands of a restive populace, the Iranian regime will likely focus attention outward to distract citizens from problems at home. Operating under the belief that nuclear weapons prohibitively raise the stakes for any intervention, the Iranians will remain a persistent force for instability across the region.

The possibility that Iran might be willing to share nuclear technology with terrorist groups should also enter into any strategic calculations. Although the risks of state-sponsored nuclear terrorism are not lost on the Iranian regime, there are still significant challenges associated with preventing the transfer of weapons and nuclear technology to nonstate actors.\(^12\) Barring massive governmental reform, divisions between the Iranian military and political leadership, along with the opposition to the United States and the West in general, make unsanctioned weapons transfer an ever-present threat.

Finally, given the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran on their doorstep, a number of the more advanced Gulf States should be expected to initiate weapons programs of their own. The dynamics of such arms races are only too well known, as is their tendency to create instability and miscalculation. The diversion of government funding and focus on weapons programs will
distract regimes from providing for basic societal needs, further exacerbating discontent across the region.

Consideration also needs to be given to how major powers will engage the Middle East in the coming decades. As China and India increase their demand for oil, it is only logical these nations will pursue a more active role in ensuring access to this vital resource. While currently lacking the strategic influence enjoyed by the United States, Chinese military investments are clearly directed at increasing their ability to project power. On the one hand, this increased interest in the region presents an opportunity for burden-sharing, as both China and the United States will benefit from a stable Middle East; however, if American forward presence is significantly reduced, a possibility is created for foreign economic and military interests to fill the void. Should America's future relations with these emerging international powers deteriorate, the result may be the ceding of US influence in the region, actions that could have lasting ramifications.

**The Enduring Utility of Landpower**

The potential for instability in the Middle East will only increase over the next several decades. Unlike the ten years that witnessed the massive commitment of American forces in Iraq, future years will be less likely to require a sustained ground campaign. United States vital interests as defined in this article will not lend themselves to interventions for the purposes of promoting regime change or the establishment of democratic institutions; the absence of what some have termed “wars of choice” should not be mistaken for a reduction in the role played by land forces in defense of America's enduring interests in the region. There are significant roles for Army and Marine forces in the Middle East, roles that will remain relevant throughout time as part of our national effort to promote stability and achieve strategic objectives.

First among these is the importance of demonstrating American commitment and resolve. The role of the military in the Middle East cannot be understated. As national institutions, the armed forces of the region hold significant political influence. They serve myriad roles as forces for stability as well as agents of repression, unconstrained by the constitutional limitations that define the role of militaries in Western society. In its attempt to promote stability and prevent conflict, one of the more effective ways America exerts influence is by building partnerships with the armed forces of potential allies. Not only do these relationships open channels of communication and reduce opportunities for miscalculation, but they also tend to have a professionalizing effect on the militaries involved.

The fact that the armed forces of the Middle East are predominantly land-based should also not be discounted when developing military-to-military relations. Statistics show that across the Middle East, ground forces constitute approximately 87 percent of all military forces (see Figure 2).
The United States needs to retain sufficient ground forces to ensure a relevant, productive relationship with these land-force components. A reduced forward presence is certainly a sound policy based on the expected strategic environment; however, America cannot allow this to result in loss of interaction between its military and those of the region. Efforts to improve the effectiveness of regional armed forces also serve as a potential buffer against the hegemonic ambitions demonstrated by Iran. These military-to-military relationships frequently result in partnerships that provide the United States with local intelligence networks that directly impact America’s ability to counter terrorists resident in the region.

A component of this counterterrorism mission for Army forces is the targeted disruption of terrorist organizations based throughout the Middle East. Secure, persistent access throughout the region is not guaranteed once American forces complete their withdrawal. Absent continued partnerships and an operational footprint in key states, the complexity of future counterterrorism operations increases dramatically. Without the ability to maintain a forward ground presence, precision strikes remain one of the few options available to national policymakers, but the ability to detain terrorists and leverage any intelligence will be lost without the participation of ground forces. Perhaps even more damaging, the moral legitimacy associated with remote
drone and air strikes has come under ever-increasing criticism throughout the international community. Reliance on cross-border remote strikes, whether from drones or aircraft, will erode support for American goals and ultimately undermine the accomplishment of national objectives.

Major interstate war will arguably be the least likely source of instability in the Middle East in the next few decades. Iran’s aspirations for regional leadership, however, along with the demonstrated tendency for regional powers that are suffering political duress to focus on external threats as a means of distracting the populace from the unrest at home make war in the Middle East a real possibility. Along with efforts to partner with regional militaries, the United States needs to retain highly capable and readily deployable ground forces capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating regional aggressors. American dominance of the air and sea is not likely to be challenged for the foreseeable future. As a means of deterring aggression and possible combat between regional militaries, however, relying solely on long-range precision platforms greatly reduces the strategic and operational options available to our national policymakers.

Increasing urbanization with the penchant for warring factions to blend into the civilian population vastly increases the challenges associated with future warfare in this region. There is little doubt American airpower will remain capable of inflicting unacceptable damage and rapidly defeating any invading force. These capabilities and recognized dominance do not necessarily translate into victory against the wide range of military options that are much more likely than armored warfare. Whether the task becomes the separation of belligerents, enforcement of a zone of neutrality, or the defeat of insurgent forces, American military options need to encompass the full range of responses beyond precision strikes. Recent Israeli experiences against Hezbollah and Hamas demonstrated that airpower alone is ineffective against the hybrid forms of warfare that are increasingly commonplace in the Middle East.

Reliance on local forces backed by American airpower, though often advocated as a cost-effective option, also entails specific risks. As demonstrated most recently by operations in Libya, the United States and its allies risk losing the ability to shape the outcome of even a minor conflict without a sufficient and persistent, ground presence. The importance of creating and maintaining stability in the Middle East argues against the employment of American military capability unless accompanied by a capacity to set conditions and manage a positive result.

Finally, the ability to rapidly deploy large numbers of ground forces provides policymakers and strategist with a number of strategic options. As a demonstration of political intent, there are few acts a president can take that demonstrate American resolve more than boots on the ground. The commitment of ground forces capable of operating across the spectrum of combat can in and of itself prevent conflict from escalating without necessitating the destruction of an adversary’s military or infrastructure. While some number of these forces can and should be resident in the reserve component, the requirement to rapidly
deploy capable ground forces demands a credible percentage be retained in the active force.

**Where Do We Go from Here?**

By all indications, conditions in the Middle East over the next few decades appear bleak. Just as the global economic importance of the region reaches its crest, demographic and political pressures combine to promote instability on a scale not seen in recent history. When this instability is placed in the context of the aspirations associated with a nuclear-armed Iran and the pernicious presence of international terrorist organizations, ensuring stability in the region will require a concerted effort by all agencies of the United States and its allies.

Developing the appropriate military strategy for the Middle East begins with an evaluation of our enduring national interests. Limiting American interests to those that are truly vital results in a relatively short list. The danger lies in incorporating goals that either have proven unachievable or do not directly impact America’s security, prosperity, or values. Even when developing a strategy that narrowly defines our vital interests, it is blatantly obvious there are several critical missions that can only be achieved by capable ground forces. With regional stability as the primary strategic objective, the importance of preventive measures cannot be overstated. The United States has already made a major investment in regional stability through its efforts in Iraq. While far from perfect, we should not squander these gains but capitalize on them in the pursuit of lasting stability.

Maintaining and expanding partnerships with regional militaries will strengthen national bonds, increase communication, and minimize the opportunities for strategic miscalculation. At the same time, professionalizing our allies’ militaries serves to deter regional actors who may be inclined to influence the local populace. As America’s network of forward bases disappears, there is ever-increasing pressure to maintain relationships as a means of gaining access and the intelligence required to counter terrorists operating throughout the region. Finally, it is in America’s strategic interest to retain military ties to the Middle East. Accepting a reduced forward presence need not equate to the dissolution of relationships, particularly as other major powers will have increasing incentives to fill the void left by America’s withdrawal. With ground forces constituting the overwhelming majority of the military organizations in the Middle East, it is only logical America’s Army remains resourced and trained to accomplish US military objectives in this region.

The Army, as part of the joint force, will serve as a credible deterrent to interstate conflicts in the region. America’s air and naval forces, by their inherent dominance, make the reemergence of classic conventional warfare extremely unlikely. Their utility against other forms of warfare, however, whether an insurgency or a hybrid threat that operates among an urban population, will be greatly diminished unless accompanied by highly capable ground forces. Because the regional threats detailed earlier in this article make low-level
conflict increasingly likely, it remains in America’s interest to retain a force capable of deterring, and, if necessary, defeating any military threat.

As we consider what military forces should be retained to defend US interests in the Middle East, the answer that evolves is neither a pure counter-insurgency force nor one weighted toward stand-off precision fires. Instead, the nation should retain a balanced force capable of operating across the full spectrum of conflict. This in no way undermines the continued prudent investment in air or sea power. An honest assessment of the threats throughout the Middle East and the capabilities required to counter them argues for a significant ground force capability. The global importance of the Middle East through 2030 demands a ground force capable of partnering with and training allies while deterring and defeating any land-based threat.

NOTES


5. Ibid.


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**Article Submission Guidelines**

*Parameters* welcomes unsolicited article submissions.

- **Scope.** Manuscripts should reflect mature thought on topics of current interest to senior Army officers and the defense community.

- **Style.** Clarity, directness, and economy of expression are the main traits of professional writing; they should never be sacrificed in a misguided effort to appear scholarly. Theses, military studies, and academic course papers should be adapted to article form prior to submission.

- **Word Count.** 4,500 to 5,000 words not including endnotes.

- **Format.** Double-spaced Microsoft Word (.doc) or Rich Text Format (.rtf) file with one-inch margins and numbered endnotes. Twelve-point (12pt) Times New Roman font. We do not accept Portable Document Format (.pdf) files.

- **Biography.** Include a brief (90 words or less) biographical sketch highlighting each author’s expertise.

- **Submission.** Send submissions as an e-mail attachment to: usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@mail.mil. Include “Article Submission” in the Subject line and each author’s mailing address, phone number, and e-mail address in the body. When there is more than one author, denote the author who will act as the primary point of contact.

- **Evaluation Process.** The review process can take anywhere from three to eight weeks from date of receipt.
On 7 October 2001, the Bush administration launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to dislodge al Qaeda forces, neutralize the Taliban in Afghanistan, and decapitate their respective leadership. President Bush insisted that the United States was not at war with the Afghan people or with Islam, and the Afghan civilian population was not identified as the enemy. Therefore, the Pentagon attempted to minimize civilian casualties. OEF toppled the Taliban regime, but did not eliminate the Taliban influence in Afghanistan. The Taliban, although expelled from power, still preserved connections with the rural Pashtun.

Following the fall of Kabul in November 2001, the American agenda for Afghanistan rapidly metamorphosed into a nation-building project. In theory, the reconstruction and democratic reform of Afghanistan offered an opportunity to transform one of the poorest countries on earth. Afghanistan had a 90 percent illiteracy rate, one of the highest infant mortality rates in the world, and an average life expectancy of just over forty years. The living conditions for women were particularly harsh and cruel, since the Taliban had restricted their access to education, health care, and work. President Bush justified nation-building in Afghanistan in moral and political terms. After liberating “[Afghanistan] from a primitive dictatorship . . . we had a moral obligation to leave behind something better. We also had a strategic interest in helping the Afghan people build a free society . . . because a democratic Afghanistan would be a hopeful alternative to the vision of the extremists.”

The idea of liberation played an overwhelming role in President Bush’s postwar strategy for Afghanistan. The Bush administration assumed that once freed from the shackles of the Taliban tyranny, the Afghan population would embrace the Western agenda of reconstruction and institutional development. The Western allies put in place an interim government in Kabul led by Hamid Karzai, and
The loya jirga approved a new constitution in 2003. The International Security Assistance Force, under British command, began training a new Afghan army, and the United Nations developed a humanitarian assistance plan as well as educational initiatives to combat illiteracy and increase educational opportunities for girls and women.

It is evident the ambitious American-led project of democratization faltered. After eleven years of combat, the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies have drastically modified their objectives in Afghanistan. President Obama decided to withdraw the majority of American forces by 2014, and his administration has narrowed the aims of American intervention in the country. The Obama administration’s goal is to leave behind native military and police structures that in principle should prevent al Qaeda and other terrorist groups from operating with impunity. Why has the United States been unable to accomplish its original objectives in Afghanistan when it was able to radically transform two formidable enemies, Germany and Japan, following World War II (WWII)?

Several competing explanations have been advanced to explain this failure. David Edelstein, Chair of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, claims that military occupations succeed only if they occur in a “threat environment” in which the security, survival, and integrity of an occupied territory is menaced. According to Edelstein, in the absence of a strong and believable external threat, the desire for self determination is inevitable, and the emergence of a significant movement of resistance, unavoidable.2 Dov S. Zakheim, the former Undersecretary of Defense, claims the Bush administration seriously underfunded the reconstruction of Afghanistan because it had become increasingly focused on Iraq.3 In fact, Afghanistan received less assistance per capita than did postconflict Bosnia and Kosovo, and the budget for the reconstruction of Afghanistan amounted to less than half of what the United States spent in Iraq. Jason Lyall, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, attributes the Afghanistan failure to bad planning, and blames the Bush administration for creating a weak and over-centralized Kabul government that does not have real political authority.4 Stanley N. Katz, Professor in Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, and others, claim that a project of democratization by force cannot succeed in an underdeveloped society without significant endogenous experience in democratic constitutionalism.5 Seth Jones, political scientist at RAND Corporation, emphasizes the difficulty of state-building in a country that lacks the tradition of a strong central government, and where “power has often come from the bottom up.” He asserts the number of coalition troops in Afghanistan was never sufficient to ensure law and order, and this fact led to a security vacuum permitting the emergence of the insurgency.6 Although these explanations are plausible and may to some extent be correct, it is this author’s contention that the main reason why the United States failed to radically transform Afghanistan is the type of war that preceded the occupation phase. OEF, a limited counterterrorist war, left intact the capacity of the occupied society to react against the foreign
invader. The American experience in Germany and Japan suggests that, in the absence of ideological and political congruence between the occupied and the occupier, democratization by force can only have a chance of success in the aftermath of a war that results in the catastrophic defeat of the enemy. WWII was maximally destructive and brutal, and violence was often indiscriminate. In WWII, the Allies not only destroyed the enemy armies but also deliberately targeted the civilian population of Germany and Japan. When the war ended with the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers, the Germans and the Japanese were in a state of psychological paralysis and war weariness that made them compliant. The magnitude of defeat had multiple effects:

- It diminished the risk of resistance and armed insurgency.
- It allowed the military governments to achieve and maintain a monopoly of violence, information, and propaganda in the postwar.
- It enabled the occupiers to implement their revolutionary political and ideological agenda.

The absence of insurgency permitted the process of reconstruction and reeducation to proceed unchallenged. In the case of Afghanistan, there was no ideological congruence between the occupiers and the occupied, and the war was deliberately designed to minimize collateral damage. There were relatively few civilian casualties, and OEF did not destroy the multilayered bonds between the rural Pashtun population and radical Islamist militants. When the Bush administration began the process of reconstruction and democratization, the NATO allies struggled with the discrepancy between their agenda and the aspirations of the Afghan population. The transformative postwar project faltered because OEF had not created the context of possibilities in which a military occupation could impose a lasting and radical political agenda on a nonreceptive population.

The case of Afghanistan exemplifies the challenges associated with attempting to democratize a reluctant population by force. Small wars aimed at regime change do not create the conditions for executing such ambitious agendas as nation building. The decapitation of the regime’s leaders or the transient defeat of a guerrilla movement does not necessarily lead to popular support for a program of radical change inspired by the victors. A military occupation following a war with limited violence will exacerbate nationalism, sectarianism, and militarism, passions that fuel resentment and the violent rejection of a foreign agenda. In Afghanistan, the presence of the Western allies, and their attempt to impose ideas of governance, first generated skepticism, then political resistance, and finally the emergence of a full-fledged insurgency. NATO forces became involved in a counterinsurgency operation that inevitably led to human rights violations and unacceptable excesses. This resulted in the consequent loss of the moral high ground that supposedly inspired the original occupation, and led to the collapse of the transformative agenda.
Germany and Japan

The occupation of the Axis powers were not improvised affairs. The nature of the enemy was the subject of intensive debate prior to the declaration of war against Germany and Japan. Psychological, sociological, anthropological, cultural, and political analysis of the German and Japanese regimes intensified after 1942. Even before Pearl Harbor, the US Army created the School of Military Government to train military officers on the complex tasks of conducting military occupations. This initiative expanded rapidly after the Casablanca Conference in January 1943. The American military occupations of western Germany and Japan were revolutionary. While in endogenous revolutions extreme violence continues throughout the consolidation period, the violence associated with the American transformative occupations occurred before the occupations. In WWII, the Allies demanded the unconditional surrender of the Axis, and to attain this strategic objective they used their complete arsenal to destroy the German and the Japanese armies, cripple their war industries, and create havoc among the civilian populations. The Allies occupied Germany and the United States occupied Japan after a hugely destructive war in which none of the belligerents abided by the present-day Western rules on the treatment of civilian populations.

The consequences were catastrophic. The American forces who occupied both countries found a landscape of physical devastation. Two eminently developed and urban societies had been decimated. The Germans and the Japanese were psychologically shattered by the magnitude of defeat and struggled to survive in an environment characterized by social dislocation and political anarchy. Following the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers, the American military governments were able to institute a revolutionary program of political, ideological, and cultural change. The dimension of the German and Japanese defeat permitted America to develop transformative occupation agendas without fear of armed resistance. Even though large sectors of the German and Japanese populations were initially resentful of the allied victory and adhered to the ideological tenets of the defeated regimes, they accepted the new normative principles imposed by the occupiers. In both Germany and Japan, the cult of ultranationalism and racism was suppressed, and the success of American political, cultural, and educational reforms is underlined by the fact they did not reemerge once the countries became independent and sovereign.

Much of Germany had been reduced to rubble. By the end of the war, a quarter of the German population had been killed or taken prisoner. More than five million German soldiers had lost their lives, leaving more than a million widows. Eleven million German soldiers had been taken prisoner by the Allied forces. The Anglo-American strategic air campaign had caused 600,000 civilian deaths and wounded 900,000. Münster, Lübeck, Ausburg, Köln, Bremen, the Ruhr industrial region, Berlin, Hamburg, and Dresden had been subjected to punishing air raids. The bombing of Dresden had caused between 25,000 and 30,000 deaths, and the 27 to 28 July 1943, air raid of Hamburg had resulted in 42,600 civilian deaths. The Soviet invasion of Germany was bloody and
merciless, and the battle for Berlin alone resulted in 100,000 civilian deaths. More than seven million people were left homeless. The Nazi Party and the German civil administration collapsed, and the German currency ceased to exist. There was no police, no public transportation, and communication networks had been obliterated. There were severe shortages of food, coal, gas, and electricity. The situation was aggravated by the flow of millions of Germans returning to Germany—those escaping from the former eastern territories, demobilized soldiers, and the recently liberated survivors of Nazi camps. The German population was weary, dispirited, and in shock. Civil society was totally disrupted, and it was the Allied presence that provided stability and prevented a total collapse of order and descent into a Hobbesian world.

In Japan, the situation was similarly catastrophic. Two million Japanese soldiers and close to one million civilians had been killed by the end of the war. The deliberate air bombing of the main Japanese cities resulted in 400,000 civilian deaths. Every Japanese city, apart from Kyoto, had been targeted by the American air force. Tokyo was first bombed on 18 April 1942. In mid-February 1945, the US Air Force conducted 2,700 sorties against Tokyo and Yokohama, and on 9 March, 334 B-29s launched a major incendiary attack against the capital that killed 83,000 Japanese civilians, injured 100,000, and left 1.5 million homeless. On 23 to 24 May, 500 bombers dropped 1.5 million incendiaries, sparing neither residential nor industrial areas. In fact, casualties from the carpet bombing of Tokyo and Nagoya with conventional explosives rivaled those from the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with atomic bombs. The systematic air campaign left millions of civilians injured, sick, and malnourished, and nearly nine million people were homeless. The Japanese army was shattered and the institution disgraced. The Japanese industrial sector was in shambles—one third of all industrial machine tools were destroyed and four-fifths of the Japanese commercial fleet had been sunk. Defeat had left Japanese society fractured, ashamed, and disoriented.

Germany and Japan were not liberated—they were occupied as defeated nations. The Americans were not merely interested in the capture, punishment, or proscription of the leaders of the genocidal enemy regimes, but rather in the radical ideological reeducation of the civilian populations who had willingly accepted or tolerated them, and who had been involved in the racist and expansionist projects of their respective governments. For decades, the German and Japanese societies had been indoctrinated in an ideology of extreme and extremist ultranationalism, and were influenced by antidemocratic, illiberal, racist, and militaristic traditions. In the case of Germany, the defeat in World War I (WWI), the Russian Revolution, the Versailles Treaty, and the Weimar experience, created a fertile ground for political radicalism. Hitler capitalized on this violent discontent and emerged as the popular leader of a police state built on extreme nationalism, ultramilitarism, antisemitism, and terror. In the case of Japan, the country’s ultranationalist, militaristic, autocratic, nationalist, and imperialist tradition was exacerbated in 1926 when Emperor Hirohito took power. From then on, the Japanese government engaged in a massive nationalist
and racist propaganda campaign to justify its expansionist agenda for the control of Asian resources. Japan waged WWII as a holy war of the superior Yamato race against China and the Allies.

In 1945, the American political project for Germany and Japan included the complete restructuring of the political culture, the ideological tenets, and the institutional framework of both countries. In both occupations, the idea was to transform nationalist, racist, militarist, and authoritarian societies into non-aggressive liberal democracies allied with the United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067 (JCS 1067), the military directive that informed the American occupation forces in Germany until 1947, specified the aims of the American occupation as denazification, democratization, demilitarization, and economic decentralization. JCS 1380/15, the directive that informed the American military government in Japan, stipulated a similar agenda of reconstruction and reform. It instructed the Supreme Command of the Allied Forces (SCAP) in Japan, General Douglas MacArthur, to change Japan from a feudal, racist, and militaristic empire into a peaceful democracy allied to the United States. SCAP was to democratize, disarm, demilitarize, and implement economic reform (the deconcentration of the Japanese zaibatsu.)

Although in both cases the occupation governments led a process of revolutionary reform that went against prevalent structures and mores, the Americans did not confront armed resistance. In Germany, during the first weeks of the occupation, the US Army underlined its power by conducting surprise raids looking for hidden weapons, which occasionally culminated in executions that served as public warnings. In Japan, the Americans engaged in preemptive displays of force. For example, after Japan surrendered, a continuous parade of B-29 super-fortresses, naval bombers, and fighters flew over the country to intimidate the population. The day in which the document of unconditional surrender was signed, a flight of 462 B-29s darkened the sky over Tokyo Bay. The catastrophic nature of the defeat, and the continuous threat of violence, allowed the Americans to enforce their rules, orders, and policies on malleable populations who did essentially what was demanded. In 1945, the United States had 1,660,000 troops in Germany; by the end of 1946 the number had been reduced to 200,000. In November 1945, there were 386,000 American troops stationed in Japan, but by mid-1946, given the lack of resistance and insurgency, the number dropped to approximately 150,000.

In the absence of resistance, the American military governments started the process of physical reconstruction while simultaneously advancing their political and ideological agendas. The Office of Military Government US (OMGUS) and SCAP were able to guarantee security, feed the population, avoid sanitary disasters, restore public transportation, and ensure an adequate supply of oil and carbon. In Germany, the US Army first, and then OMGUS, embarked on a massive campaign of purging, censorship, propaganda, and iconoclasm. During the first month of the occupation, the US Army carried out the confrontation policy, and forced thousands of German men, women, and children living in the vicinity of German concentration camps to tour the
premises, to bury corpses, and to attend funeral services for the dead. In the first stage of the occupation, American rhetoric emphasized German civilian complicity with the crimes of the Third Reich. This stress on German collective guilt waned rapidly, but the denazification and demilitarization campaigns continued. The Americans outlawed Nazi political, military, and repressive institutions, banned Nazi, nationalist, and militarist propaganda, and tried Nazi leaders and military commanders involved in crimes against humanity. Nazi racial laws were eradicated from German legislation, and Nazi premises, property, assets, and loot, were seized. The display of Nazi uniforms, parades, flags, and symbols was banned. Street names, public monuments and statues, and symbols associated with Nazism and militarism were destroyed or removed. OMGUS made the entire adult population in the American zone and sector fill out Fragebogen, detailed political questionnaires. In July 1945, 80,000 Nazi leaders were arrested, and 70,000 Nazi activists were fired from the civil service. By 1 June 1946, more than 1,650,000 Germans—approximately one of every ten persons in the US zone—had been investigated, and 373,762 (nearly one fourth) removed from their positions. Eighty to eighty-five percent of teachers were dismissed for political reasons, and university faculties were purged. This process amounted to a revolution from above to radically change German politics, culture, and self-perception.

Although Hitler’s popularity waned in the last months of the war when it became obvious that the war had been lost, the catastrophic defeat of the Third Reich did not automatically denazify the Germans. American intelligence surveys from 1945 to 1949 indicate that many Germans still harbored antidemocratic feelings. One year after the end of the war, only three in ten Germans in the American zone and sector were consistently prodemocratic, according to OMGUS estimates. Polls taken in September 1946 indicated fifty-five percent of respondents in the American zone, and forty-four percent in the American sector of Berlin, still believed National Socialism “was a good idea badly carried out.” In December 1946, OMGUS intelligence analyses found “an increase in antisemitic feelings among the German people.” In May 1947, OMGUS intelligence analysts reported increased German hostility against the American presence in Germany, increased nationalism, increased political apathy, increased contempt toward Germans working for the US military, and increased antisemitism and ultranationalism. This reality puts in perspective the significant effort that was required to reform German society and culture, and to suppress the open allegiance to Nazism, militarism, antisemitism, and ultranationalism. American control, not simply German conviction, blocked the immediate reemergence of public expressions of Nazism, militarism, and antisemitism in occupied Germany.

The postwar occupation of Japan was also a revolutionary process. General MacArthur ruled the country as the American viceroy and exerted unrestricted authority over the Japanese population. His actions, as well as those of his subordinates, were unappealable and beyond criticism. SCAP transformed the role of the emperor and reshaped religion in Japan. The emperor was
kept as the symbolic head of government, but was forced to renounce his divinity. Hirohito became a figurehead devoid of political and religious power, a puppet of the military government. This was a radical departure from tradition, because Japan had a state religion, Shinto, in which Hirohito was the highest priest, the representative on earth of the sun goddess, the “race-father,” and the commander-in-chief of the imperial Japanese armed forces. MacArthur outlawed Shinto, and dissolved the hitherto uncontested alliance between church and state that had been one of the foundations of modern Japanese ultranationalism. In 1947, a small group of lawyers from the government section of SCAP wrote a new constitution for Japan. This document replaced the 1889 Japanese constitution, a fundamentally antidemocratic document (allegedly a gift from the gods), that concentrated all power in the hands of the emperor and his ministers. The old constitution codified racism, militarism, authoritarianism, and imperialist dogma, and limited franchise. The new constitution was in many ways more progressive than the American. It mandated the strict separation of religion and state, abolished the patriarchal household system, guaranteed civil liberties, religious freedom, and women’s equality, gave women legal and voting rights, and established the Peace Clause. In fact, SCAP controlled every facet of Japanese life—information, propaganda, politics, finances, economics, education, law, science, culture, trade, taxation, trade unions, and military intelligence. SCAP’s censorship was massive and all-encompassing. For example, the Japanese were forbidden from discussing Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and all visual evidence of the consequences of the air bombing campaign against Japan was sequestered and sent to Washington, D.C. SCAP officers removed militaristic influences from every aspect of Japanese life. Military and paramilitary organizations were disbanded, and military equipment destroyed. Military officers and civil servants who had directly participated in the design and execution of imperial war policies were arrested and tried for war crimes. Existing political parties and associations came under SCAP control, and the bureaucracy, police, and judicial system were purged. Japanese cultural life, from film to literature, was screened and censored. Approximately 201,845 persons were purged between 1945 and 1948.

Afghanistan

OEF was a high-intensity conflict, short in duration and waged with precision-guided munition, special operation forces, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel. The air campaign, intense as it was, was limited to conventional military targets, that were few. The air war (7 October to 9 December 2011) caused between 2,500 and 3,000 civilian deaths. In December 2001, another 640 to 800 civilians were killed as a result of American ground operations. After the battle of Mazar-e-Sharif, on 9 November 2001, the Taliban regime crumbled, and on 9 December 2001, the Taliban were expelled from Kandahar. Many of the surviving leaders of al Qaeda and the Taliban managed to retreat to their Pakistani sanctuaries, while their disbanded forces blended into the Afghan civilian population. By the time of the demise of the Taliban
regime, 0.014 percent of the Afghan civilian population had been killed by allied military operations. The percentage of civilian casualties in Afghanistan is similar to those of the American interventions in Grenada in 1983 (0.045 percent), in Panama in 1989 (0.04 percent), and in the Gulf War in 1990 to 1991 (0.016 percent). It is evident the vast majority of the Afghan population was not directly affected by OEF and emerged from the war neither traumatized by defeat nor convinced of the inevitability of radical exogenously imposed change.

In Afghanistan, the Americans tried to transform a tribal, ethnically divided, illiberal, and undemocratic society into a functioning democracy. Similar to Germany and Japan, large sectors of the Afghan population did not want to be educated, reformed, and administered by the invaders. Yet, contrary to the cases of Germany and Japan, the Afghan population was neither decimated nor compliant, and the Taliban still constituted a real political option in much of the country. OEF had not created a context auspicious to the consequent nation-building program, yet the Bush administration saw the “reconstruction” of Afghanistan as a political opportunity to expand American soft power in the Muslim world, and transformed a counterterrorist operation into a military occupation theoretically committed to sweeping moral, political, and educational reforms.

The American-led transformation project was well received by sectors of the small urban elite, mostly born and educated under the Communist regime of President Mohammad Najibullah, but not by the rural Pashtun majority. The large Pashtun majority in the rural areas, motivated by religious or ideological convictions, fear of Taliban reprisals, distrust of or outright opposition to the Karzai government, and resentment of the foreign occupation, offered a good breeding ground for the insurgency. In particular, the socially reactionary Pashtun did not welcome the Western agenda. Their attitude toward the deposed Taliban regime was complex and ambiguous. The Taliban succeeded in maintaining order through the rigid implementation of the Sharia. In the case of women’s rights, for example, the Taliban simply codified into law the traditional practice of treating women as second class citizens. It was obvious, from the very beginning of the NATO military occupation, the invaders’ conception of law and order and of political reform was not congruent with the aspirations of many Afghans. The occupiers’ ideological and cultural package for Afghanistan clashed with the mores of the land, and its lofty objectives underwent a process of attenuation and degradation.

In 2002, the Taliban started their guerrilla war against the coalition forces and the weak and corrupt Kabul government. The small number of coalition forces was unable to find and destroy the huge caches of hidden arms spread across Afghanistan. Pakistan offered a sanctuary, and the porous border between the two countries allowed the bidirectional flow of people, weapons, and intelligence. By 2003, Taliban insurgents controlled much of rural Afghanistan and were able to carry out suicide missions and assassinations in the cities. The Taliban gained political traction by establishing local underground governments with civilian administrations that collected taxes
and operated schools and Islamic courts. They had functional links with war lords, rural strongmen, and farmers, and were able to establish law and order at the local level. The 2004 general elections extended Karzai’s tenure, but the country was already destabilized by the Taliban insurgency that harassed Western forces, derailed reconstruction efforts, and terrorized Afghan cities and rural areas. The number of Afghan civilians killed by the Taliban rose systematically after 2006.

The coalition forces waged a counterinsurgency war while implementing, with increasing difficulty, a nation-building project in the midst of violence and increasing hostility towards the Western allies and their political objectives. This was a certain recipe for failure, because effective physical and political reconstruction is impossible in a context characterized by insecurity. The NATO forces had the almost impossible task of fighting a guerrilla movement with deep connections with the rural population, while simultaneously trying to make their program of reforms compatible with the local hierarchies and customs of Afghanistan. The coalition forces used violence with great restraint on the assumption that this would gain the good will and acceptance of the civilian population. They also dropped the idea of forcing radical cultural and ideological change in Afghanistan, and instead stressed the need for cultural sensitivity training for their own soldiers. The allies did not attempt to impose the strict separation between religion and state and accepted the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. In other words, the United States and its NATO allies progressively reduced their expectations and did not challenge the ideological and cultural tenets of the Afghan population that did not fit with democratic liberalism.

In November 2009, given the rising wave of insurgency, General Petraeus convinced President Obama to commit an additional 30,000 American troops to Afghanistan. Even with the surge, the military situation continued to be critical, and in 2011, President Obama and the leaders of the NATO nations were forced to redefine what success meant in Afghanistan. The president ordered the withdrawal of 10,000 troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2011, and announced that another 23,000 would be leaving by the summer of 2012, and the remainder of combat forces by 2014. In the new paradigm of reduced expectations, the task of the NATO forces in Afghanistan is to achieve a modicum of stability.

Conclusion

A transformative military occupation targeted at the radical political and ideological restructuring of a society is akin to a revolution from above carried out by a foreign power. The military government involved in a transformative occupation acts as a revolutionary organization that takes control of the invaded country. It removes the vestiges of the preexisting government, dismisses the previous authorities, dismantles the police and security services, and presides over the judicial and the educational systems. The occupation government monopolizes the use of force, information, and propaganda, and excludes
people, ideologies, and organizations that represent actual or potential threat to their revolutionary agenda. Accordingly, it represses, purges, censors, and proscribes. Social revolutions of this magnitude imply the radical redesign of social mores and governmental institutions according to the tenets of the victors.

Military occupations are likely to engender resistance, hostility, and nationalism. Opposition to a military occupation may be reduced if there is either significant ideological congruence between the occupier and the occupied, or if the occupied population has been so devastated by the preceding war that it is unwilling and unable to resist. The German occupations of Austria (1938-45) and northwestern France (1940-44) exemplify the dynamics of an occupation where there is a significant degree of ideological congruence. In Austria, there was widespread popular support for annexation—Austrian antisemitism was strong and pervasive even before the Anschluss, and many Austrians aspired to be part of the German economic recovery touted by the Nazi regime. Even when the military situation deteriorated for Germany, faith in Austrian-German integration under Hitler’s leadership persisted. The support for the Third Reich and its murderous antisemitic policies diminished only in the last months of the war.

In 1940, when the Wehrmacht conquered France, many French were deeply disenchanted with liberalism and the democratic system of government, and were eager to give the Germans the benefit of the doubt. France had had fourteen different governments between 1933 and 1939, and in 1940 the mood was anti-Republican. The Nazis found a deeply divided country, polarized between the extreme right and the extreme left, both antidemocratic. The French right, Catholic, antisemitic, fanatically anticommunist, and antisocialist, had a long history of grievances against the Republic, dating back to the French Revolution and peaking with the Dreyfus Affair. Hitler’s 1933 victory in Germany not only energized the French extreme right, it caused fissures in the Parti Communiste Français. Important Communist leaders left the Party attracted to the idea of a pan-European national socialist revolution. The German occupation offered the anti-Republican majority a chance to imagine a radically new country freed from the shackles of politics as usual. During the first two years of occupation, even though Hitler considered the French culturally and racially inferior, many French imagined a Franco-German partnership once the Nazis won the war. Preexisting ideological congruence allowed the Nazi occupation governments in Austria and France to make radical political, legal, and social changes and conduct genocidal policies with minimal resistance and with the acquiescence, or collaboration, of the occupied.

When there is no ideological congruence between the occupier and the occupied, a transformative military occupation government can operate successfully if the population of the defeated country has been physically and psychologically shattered by the magnitude of the preceding war, and cannot organize a nationalist insurgency. During WWII, the Allies were driven by an unflinching commitment to strategic and tactical objectives, and targeted both the enemies’ armies and their civilian populations. The number of civilian and
military casualties, the number of prisoners taken, the level of physical destruction, and the total institutional and political collapse of Germany and Japan, left the vanquished populations disconcerted, powerless, subdued, and malleable. Even in the absence of ideological congruence between the American occupiers and the occupied populations of western Germany and Japan, the American military governments did not have to confront military insurgency, and were able to implement radical programs of social and political engineering. OMGUS and SCAP developed their agendas of change even when the objectives of the ideological and political revolution clashed with the ideological and political tenets of the deposed regimes. In occupied western Germany and Japan, the Americans banned or reformed preexisting political and legal institutions, parasitized those bureaucratic frameworks that were deemed useful, and banned all expressions of militarism, nationalism, and racism. They manipulated, directed, and controlled German and Japanese political and cultural life by overt and covert methods with an admixture of punishment, threats, negotiations, and cajoling. Negative policies were complemented with positive measures designed to provide the German and Japanese populations with new political, cultural, and social paradigms. The absence of insurgency allowed the American military governments to impose their revolutionary political, social, economic, cultural, and ideological changes while engaging in the urgently needed physical reconstruction of the devastated countries.

In those cases where there is no ideological congruence between the occupier and the occupied, and where the occupied population has not been reduced to passive impotence, the occupying power can either resort to genocidal violence attempting to preempt the emergence of an insurgency or be prepared to deal with resistance and armed rebellion. The German occupation of Czechoslovakia (1938) and Poland (1939), and the Soviet occupation of Poland (1939), illustrate the first alternative. The Nazis and the Communists killed tens of thousands of military officers, scientists, intellectuals, artists, teachers, doctors, priests, and writers, in order to eliminate potential leaders of an insurgency. Extreme genocidal violence, however, does not automatically solve the problem of insurgency, as the Nazis learned in Poland with the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising (1942) and the Warsaw Uprising (1944). Afghanistan illustrates the second alternative. There was little ideological congruence between the Western alliance and the occupied, and the Taliban regime was deposed with minimal civilian suffering. In this case, the occupation forces adopted a military and political strategy targeted at winning the “hearts and minds” of the Afghan noncombatant population. This strategy has met with limited success because insurgency emerged and the transformative project was derailed. NATO forces found it increasingly difficult to impose law and order, guarantee security, and monopolize information and propaganda, the essential prerequisites for radical ideological, institutional, and political change.

Small wars do not create the conditions for nation-building projects when the occupied population is uninterested in, or hostile to, the transformative agenda. OEF defeated the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, but much of
the rural Afghan population, essentially untouched by the war, was reluctant to adopt the NATO agenda of political and social reforms, enabling the Taliban to reorganize their clandestine networks, rearm, and provide a political alternative. This led to the rapid emergence of resistance, insurgency, and anarchy, and to the resultant collapse of American plans for the transformation of Afghanistan into a functioning democracy. The Afghanistan experience indicates small wars targeted at regime change do not create the context of possibility for the success of transformative military occupations and should not be followed by occupations aimed at nation building.

NOTES
9. A large deployment of troops and the disregard for collateral damage does not necessarily result in a successful transformative military occupation. The USSR waged a much more destructive war in Afghanistan (more than one million deaths, over five million refugees) but the Soviets failed to defeat the Taliban.


22. Ibid., 105.


Donald Rumsfeld was right. Force transformation works. The techniques that led to the initial victories in Afghanistan in 2001 were precisely those that produced success in Libya in 2011. Small-scale deployments of special forces backed by precision strike and deep attack capabilities used to support an allied indigenous armed group proved an effective military tool for achieving specific strategic outcomes. In contrast, the results of large-scale troop deployments as part of counterinsurgency (COIN), stabilization and nation-building activities over the past ten years in Iraq and Afghanistan have been less definitive. Despite intensive investment in blood, treasure, and military effort, the precise long-term outcomes of these two campaigns remain unclear and will be open to debate for years to come. This challenging operational experience has, however, highlighted some necessary and enduring truths about the use of military force. Despite great advances in military technology and the increasing sophistication with which organized violence can be applied in a range of situations, all warfare remains characterized by uncertainty; there exists no silver bullet that can guarantee enduring political success from the barrel of a gun.

The approaching end of the combat mission in Afghanistan in 2014 presents a potential watershed for the way in which the United States and her coalition partners, including Great Britain, seek to apply military power considering what has been learned in the first decade of twenty-first century conflict. This moment is significant in two respects. First, it provides a full stop (temporary or otherwise) to the recent western experience of large-scale, effort-intensive, counterinsurgency operations. Second, it brings with it the potential...
to reshape and reinvest military power through new concepts of operation, national strategies and priorities, and force structures to better meet ongoing and emerging global security challenges.

Against the backdrop of operational experience spanning the toppling of the Taliban to the removal of Gaddafi, British policymakers, defense professionals, and academic commentators and their contemporaries in western nations need to confront this defining moment in an attempt to reassess the limits of national power, influence, and endurance, and identify how the “military lever” can be optimized to deliver future strategic and political effect. For Britain, a nation that retains global interests, a key question in this reposturing is whether the country should employ a revised and revisited “Western Way of War,” emphasizing stand-off warfare, limited goals, and short-term intervention; or seek instead to further enhance the tools and techniques to undertake complex warfare among the people.

If the former option is selected, then orienting the levers of British military power toward a model centered on intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR), special forces, deep strike capabilities, and limited intervention might be appropriate. However, considering the emphasis in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) on early (upstream) intervention intended to prevent rather than cure conflict, it does not at first glance look like a path the United Kingdom (UK) is seeking. UK Defence appears instead to be cutting a new path between several schools of thought. On the one hand, experience suggests that British armed forces need to orient toward effectively engaging in conflicts that look like those it has fought over the past 10 years. On the other hand, a challenging financial context and new cross-government policy guidance, enshrined in the recently released Building Stability Overseas Strategy, emphasizes the ability to influence human security to increase UK security and interests at home and abroad. This requires improving how one conducts various types of defensive engagement, undertakes stability operations, postconflict reconstruction, and, if necessary, activities by proxy (with another nation’s forces), creating a new paradigm for the application of military power overseas.

Accepting that existing experience, policy, and capabilities all appear to be stretching British defense thinking in a number of directions, this article seeks a different approach to the perspectives previously outlined. Instead of focusing exclusively on aspects of military strategy that emphasize ends and means, the objective is to examine the ways in which the two might be linked. The proposition made is that only by comprehending the ways in which military capabilities are used, can an understanding be generated that informs and delivers future policy by linking specific resources to achievable goals through the tangible implementation plans that are the fundamentals of strategy. Having achieved this, it becomes easier to avoid the trap of reapplying transformation or COIN-like solutions to every new scenario, and opens the possibility that new situations should be dealt with on individual terms. The intention of this article is, therefore, to analyze recent British military experience and current
policy requirements and to offer a framework for considering the ways in which future interventions might be more adequately understood and undertaken by military means.

Accepting the guidelines of the Building Stability Overseas Strategy as a starting point, it can be anticipated that British military power post-2015 will still be required to address a broad set of challenges related to state weakness, political instability, and human insecurity. These threats will require a wide-ranging set of responses appropriately applied to the specific cases involved. Against this requirement, it is important to recontextualize discussions regarding COIN and transformation. In particular, it is necessary to get away from associating transformation purely with high intensity operations against a peer adversary, and relating the underlying principle of the modern evocations of COIN with a state-building agenda focused on human security. While the recent short-term success achieved by NATO forces in Libya during the summer of 2011 points to a potential reemphasis on a light ground footprint, short duration interventions, using high technology platforms to support local actors in the prosecution of mutually convenient strategic aims, this article seeks to develop a broader perspective and cautions against any simplistic pendulum swing in military conceptual thinking on both sides of the Atlantic. Many lessons of the difficult wars in Iraq and Afghanistan retain relevance beyond the confines of effort-intensive COIN campaigning for Britain and her key allies. Defense organizations and armed forces will need to reflect deeply on both approaches in framing a new set of responses to future threats.

The starting place for tackling this assessment is the development of insight into how the conflicts of the past decade have been understood in terms of a “liberal peace” and how this notion influences and constrains the ways in which military force can legitimately be employed by the United Kingdom and her allies. We then consider the vulnerabilities, shortcomings, and opportunities related to the ways in which military power might be applied in the future given the lessons of the last 10 years. Finally, we explain implications for the refinement of the manner in which British military power can be applied in a contemporary operating environment, within the context of current British policy.

The Liberal Peace

In the introduction to the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, the Secretary of State for Defence, George Robertson, described the British as an “internationalist people” who “want to give a lead.” Repeated in the sentiments of Tony Blair’s 1999 Chicago speech, the United Kingdom has, in the intervening 10 years, tended to describe its foreign policy and armed forces as constituting a “force for good.” Following the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, however, the military intervention for cosmopolitan purposes has come under sustained attack. This is especially the case for those scholars who take a critical perspective and argue the goal of emancipating large numbers of the world’s disenfranchised has been subverted by a Western ideological agenda.
Depending on how the involvement of the intervening power is interpreted, interventions aimed at the production of a liberal peace may be seen either as a benign effort to protect human rights and security, or appear neocolonial, exploitative, and focused on asserting the interests of the intervener. It is against this background that the recent UK emphasis on upstream intervention and postconflict stabilization needs to be understood, and the question that ought to be asked is to whom do the advantages of stability accrue? For critical academic scholars, imbalances in wealth and unequal access to international institutions such as the UN Security Council produce an international order that favours the interests of the developed world. This permits Western powers to impose alien forms of governance and liberal capitalist economics on indigenous populations resulting in the exploitation of local inhabitants.

Within the context of national strategy, however, the moral content of a policy can be separated from the cost/benefit calculations required when deciding to intervene abroad. If the UK chooses to pursue morally worthwhile outcomes such as human security, then the issue becomes whether the means employed are commensurate with the objectives sought. For those who advocate an emancipatory policy of human security, the ends do not justify the means. It is perfectly legitimate, according to this view, to adopt an altruistic foreign policy, but the indigenous population cannot be used as a means to an end in order to achieve the desired outcome. Deploying military capability for the purposes of producing stability is, therefore, only acceptable within such a conceptual framework if the ways and means are kept subservient to the ends pursued.

In this respect some elements of British military doctrine clearly resonate with the ambitions of the human security scholars who advocate a moral outcome. For example, the existing British approach to stabilization and COIN, as described in JDP 3-40 Security and Stabilization and AFM Volume 1 Part 10, Countering Insurgency, takes some of its language from human security discourse. The overriding goal can be seen as a security model where the military act as guarantors for the process of political and socio-economic reconstruction with the intention of defending the “other” rather than defending “against the ‘other’.”

The problem is that even though the language of British policy and doctrine highlight the protection of the people from the insurgent, operational realities have required military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan to progressively rely on a suite of more coercive techniques, kinetic and nonkinetic, in their efforts to suppress local resistance and achieve strategic outcomes satisfactory to Western powers. Recent experiences of nation building under fire have severely exposed the practical limitations of embedding human security perspectives in the rationale for, and approach taken to, overseas military operations. As Adam Roberts has noted, “the very ideas of rebuilding the world in the Western image, and of major Western states having an obligation to achieve these tasks in distant lands—whether by unilateral or multilateral approaches—may come to be viewed as optimistic.”
Consequently, even as coalition operations in Afghanistan start to transition to partnership and security force assistance, the extent to which it will be possible to talk about human security while executing coercive measures is open to doubt. The rhetorical tensions between the goal of building a liberal peace and the use of military force in efforts to achieve this outcome have not gone unnoticed in other parts of the world. Brazil and India, for example, have recently voiced their concerns about the way Western powers have, in their view, applied force selectively. In the case of Libya, Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri, the Indian High Representative to the United Nations, observed, “Libya has given Responsibility to Protect a bad name.” This in turn has influenced the politics of the UN Security Council, reflected by the manner Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa voted in relation to the recent uprisings in Syria. It might not have been a surprise that Russia and China vetoed a resolution on Syria in October last year. That Brazil, India, and South Africa abstained from supporting an intervention is, however, indicative that a multipolar moment in international relations has arrived that may not be sympathetic to the kind of contradictions that occur when coercion forms a necessary part of the methods used to produce human security.

**Military Vulnerabilities**

Even as the strategic context in which intervention might take place now appears to have changed, Britain’s armed forces have become more sophisticated in applying the techniques of COIN and stabilization at the tactical level. In this respect, part of the ambition has been to reconcile the need to engage local insurgents, but do so in a manner that does not unhinge the campaign by producing counterproductive moral, psychological, and collateral effects on the population. As a result, a key lesson that emerged from recent British operational experience is the acceptance that, in interventions intimately concerned with shaping local conditions and actors, understanding local context is critical. This is an issue of obvious importance when considering the conduct of operations among the people, such as the British campaign in Helmand Province in Afghanistan. But the challenges associated with adequate contextual understanding have equally impacted the outcomes and consequences of recent operations conducted in the form of military transformation.

For example, in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 were required to fight for the intelligence and associated information necessary to prosecute offensive operations, despite possessing total air superiority. No respite from the friction and chaos of warfare was found in substantial technological advantage, liberally applied, during the overthrow of Saddam Hussein; an understanding of the local conditions required to determine long-term strategic success eluded foreign forces operating in strength on the ground for a number of years. Emerging coalition strategy did not, initially, take into account the complexity of post-Saddam society, and many early decisions only served to encourage an escalating cycle of violence. From a doctrinal point of view, this revealed the critical weaknesses in the arguments made by those who believed it was
possible to map military cause to political effect in an Effects Based Approach. Indeed, the inherent flaws in subsequent attempts to adapt this approach to the ambiguous social, political, and military dynamics of the twenty-first century by infusing traditional military planning and decisionmaking approaches with the conventions of complex adaptive systems were ruthlessly exposed by the Israeli experience in Lebanon in 2006.

In light of these experiences, it is widely appreciated that generating the understanding necessary to optimize military power relies on far more than access to a greater number of intelligence assets and surveillance capabilities. Collectively, the aims of British defense policy and the arms of its delivery are richer and stronger as a result. But to quote the nuclear strategist Bernard Brodie, the problem remains that to deliver success, “good strategy presumes good anthropology and good sociology.” Acknowledging and addressing the need for local understanding, itself a demanding requirement, is a crucial factor in shaping an effective application of military power. Equally, however, any lack of understanding may be viewed as a key vulnerability.

In any number of respects, the ongoing campaign in Helmand Province demonstrates the British military since 2006 has shown considerable adaptability in responding to the need for integrating local contextual input, constraints, and structures into the planning and execution of military activities among the people of Afghanistan. Organization, doctrine, and mindset have been reshaped by the requirement to merge political acumen, cultural appreciation, and human understanding with the traditional application of military power. A note of caution is, however, required. British involvement in Afghanistan now surpasses a decade, and the intensive military campaign in this particular province is in its sixth year. Even after extensive British and coalition efforts to improve the collection, fusion, and assessment of a wide range of intelligence and information sources, the linkages between actors at the strategic and tactical level, between the Taliban, al Qaeda, local communities and national governments such as Pakistan have proven hard to identify, and their impact on local outcomes in Helmand have proven difficult to influence. Even in late 2011, the former International Security Assistance Force commander General Stanley McChrystal noted a frighteningly simplistic view of the country remained and was crippling the NATO war effort.

In reviewing the implications of this imperfect picture of Afghanistan, there comes a realization in terms of the ability to gain and leverage local understanding, British defense has never had it so good and perhaps never will it have it so good again. Developing a range of opportunities in which to apply military power selectively and effectively at the local level and in a strategic context where restraint is necessary and information and understanding may be (at least initially) scarce will prove critical to ensuring UK military actors do not merely constitute another source of insecurity, despite efforts to the contrary. This reality holds a range of implications for the manner in which policy goals are externalized, and the process in which military means must be
shaped and applied to achieve them in the human-centric operational environment of the future.

**Military Power Post-Afghanistan**

Bearing in mind the strategic and tactical limitations previously outlined, how might military power be applied post-Afghanistan? One indication may lie with Operation Ellamy. Initially, at least, NATO’s efforts in Libya were successful. On further analysis, however, the operation reveals the limitations and vulnerabilities previously elaborated. From a military perspective, human security considerations slowed down the tempo of rebel operations as NATO forces sought to avoid unnecessary collateral damage. At the same time, a proliferation of Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) assets did not necessarily prevent the unintended use of precision munitions to strike targets that were inappropriately identified. Finally, as a recent UN report reveals, from the perspective of human security, NATO involvement did not stop either the Gaddafi or opposing Mistrata thuwar (rebel) forces from engaging in arbitrary killing, detention, torture, and sexual violence.

Given the strategic context, the lessons from the last 10 years and the challenges outlined, it would appear the most pressing requirement is for a sufficiently granular appreciation for what is happening on the ground so that an appropriate intervention can be made at a suitable time. In this respect, what 10 years of COIN operations have demonstrated is that larger deployments of forces can be used to saturate a locality and greatly assist the process of gathering a rich baseline of information through framework operations. This can then be corroborated against intelligence provided by ISTAR assets and, in turn, lead to the targeting of insurgents, or engagement with specific local leaders and power brokers. At the same time, these operations serve to protect and persuade the civilian population that COIN forces can effectively manage their security. Such an approach is, however, financially costly and resource intensive, and if the twin elements of framework and targeted operations are not properly integrated, the result can be a counterproductive use of force.

At the opposite end of the spectrum, light footprint strike operations, or those mounted at short notice in response to a particular crises, do not have the luxury of evaluating the richness of local understanding that intensive deployments have the potential to provide. Remote surveillance capabilities simply cannot provide the detailed knowledge associated with the basic motivations and agenda of local actors, information that is critical to shaping success: why they fight and whether they might be willing to work with the intervening forces. In such circumstances, and as the recent deployment of British intelligence, special forces, and ultimately a stabilization response team to Libya suggest, there is a recognized need to get people on the ground to find out what is happening. If after 10 years of intervention in Afghanistan, however, the understanding of the local context remains problematic, as a result, developing the kind of contextual understanding necessary to shape and influence indigenous events
and actors over the course of operations presents an even greater challenge. Alternative methods in which appropriate local and specific understanding can be developed and leveraged in a range of interventions should be considered in an effort to optimize the application of military power in future operations.

In this regard, and keeping in mind the restructuring of UK military capability as part of the ongoing defense reform, it may be necessary to develop options that will aid the British military in building, mentoring, and operating alongside indigenous forces. It will be necessary to generate a mutual understanding of US concepts and doctrine, such as Foreign Internal Defence (FID) and Security Force Assistance (SFA), for which there currently are no UK equivalent, is key. As well as providing indigenous resources for operations, these approaches have the potential to develop additional sources of situational awareness that can offset shortcomings in local understanding within the intervening forces. In any number of circumstances, a natural advantage can be accrued by simply working through, rather than against (or in the abstract of), local organizations and actors. There are, however, reputational, legal, and potentially moral challenges that arise from adopting these approaches. Given recent changes in the permissiveness of the broader international community toward western military interventions, considerable care needs to be exercised to ensure policymakers understand the various forms of assistance for local security forces and organizations may well be explicitly interpreted as using the local population for one’s own objectives rather than developing a moral and humanitarian response.

Emerging UK policy and the characteristics of the contemporary operating environment suggest British military power will need to be applied with or through local actors to achieve national aims and objectives at the international level. It should be clearly understood that local agendas and the rationale for such interventions may not always combine harmoniously. The language used to describe British foreign policy needs to be consistent with the actions taken on the ground. Balancing explicitly stated goals with the various methods in which the levers of power are applied in conjunction with local actors will become increasingly important if national defense strategy is to be successful. In this respect, using the language of “Responsibility to Protect” and human security may make it possible to gain the necessary international approval to support such interventions. But a failure to relate the language of these international objectives to the military strategy may prove counterproductive and harmful in the long term for British influence overseas.

**Conclusion**

This article has taken a different approach to previous studies that investigated the options for applying military power in the complex human-centric conflict environment that UK forces and their allies are likely to face in the post-Afghanistan era. Instead of focusing exclusively on strategic ends and means, the objective has been to consider the ways in which Britain’s armed forces have been utilized during the past 10 years, with the goal of assessing
insights impacting future strategic options. Combining this assessment with the emerging implications of the recent UK defense review provides a range of potential options in which Britain’s military power might be applied to meet national policy aims, while identifying implications impacting the United Kingdom’s ability to achieve future strategic effect.

First, if the United Kingdom’s national objective in being a “force for good” is to have any validity, the rhetoric associated with this policy needs to be closely aligned with the available means, the adopted ways, and the achievable strategic ends. The ends and means of strategy, whether through inappropriate application of force or unsound political rhetoric, should never be allowed to become discordant. Second, Britain’s ability to apply military power selectively in a wide range of contexts within the future operating environment needs to be carefully reviewed and developed. Transformation and modern evocations of counterinsurgency represent an attempt to apply military power as effectively as possible within the context of specific policy objectives and operational circumstances. Transformation has opened strategic possibilities in specific operational contexts, most notably in Afghanistan in 2001 and Libya in 2011. COIN, when properly resourced and applied, has the ability to provide an effective tactical response in addressing population-centric challenges associated with instability and state weakness. But its inability to deliver tangible political objectives at the strategic level within the bounds of a human security agenda has, however, been exposed by recent experience. As such, neither approach can provide a panacea for future strategic challenges.

It is in this context the reexamination and expansion of the ways in which British power is applied is both timely and necessary if British military forces are to be successfully postured to meet the requirements of future operations and international policy. The selective application of a wide range of military “ways” across the spectrum of requirements, ranging from “coercion” to the “provision of human security,” will be greatly improved by the deliberate integration of country-specific knowledge in decisions related to interventions. This is critical if the future exercise of British military power within the full range of operations is to be optimized and justified to the indigenous and international communities that have influence over the parameters and outcomes of overseas interventions. Lastly, against this backdrop, ongoing attempts to define a coherent British strategy to employ military power, in conjunction with other levers of powers, in an attempt to achieve national objectives through greater engagement on a global scale are to be encouraged. The experience of exercising military power in the first part of the twenty-first century suggests, however, that “context” and “consequence” should be the watchwords.

**Notes**


7. General Sir David Richards, the UK Chief of the Defence Staff, is quoted as saying that, “While Afghanistan is not the template on which to base the future, it is most certainly a signpost for much of what that future might contain”. See “Army Chief General Sir David Richards: Afghanistan Must Be Our Top Priority,” *The Telegraph*, June 8, 2010.

8. United Kingdom (UK) Department for International Development, UK Ministry of Defence, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Building Stability Overseas Strategy (2011); Nick Carter and Alexander Alderson, “Partnering With Local Forces: Vintage Wine, New Bottles and Future Opportunities,” *RUSI Journal* 156, no. 3 (June 2011). In addition, the British armed forces must continually regenerate the capability to undertake major combat operations.


33. Ibid.

34. The official estimated cost for operations in Afghanistan in FY2011-12 is just over £4bn. This compares with the official cost of operations in Libya of £212m. This official figure has been disputed and some cost estimates place the Libya intervention at between £850m and £1.75bn. The total cost for British operations in Afghanistan since they started is not known but has been estimated in excess of £18bn. “Defence Committee—Fifth Report: Ministry of Defence Main Estimates,” House of Commons, July 19, 2011, (London: The Stationery Office), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/1373/137302.htm (accessed April 15, 2012); “Defence


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Why has ending the war in Afghanistan proved to be so problematic? In theory, the decision to end a war should be relatively straightforward. One or more of the belligerents determine whether or not it is worth continuing the conflict and, as long as at least one of them decides that continuing to fight is not worth the investment, peace is offered and the conflict terminates. Clausewitz encapsulates this rational, commonsense approach to the ending of war when he asserts: “Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow.”¹ By this logic, and in the context of Afghanistan, the strategic dilemma associated with how and when to end the war could have been avoided by engaging in a rational cost-benefit analysis: how much has the war cost and what is the value of the objectives we were pursuing? Once the former exceeded the latter, then the Coalition should have struck a deal with the Taliban and left Afghanistan. Instinctively, of course, we know that the decisions involved in ending a war cannot be as simple as this rational cost-benefit analysis. But, why is that so?

One powerful argument blamed the ambiguous protraction of the Afghanistan war on the West’s failure to comprehend and apply the principles of classical strategic theory. Since in principle it should be no more difficult to end a war than it is to start one, theoretically one need only adhere to the precepts of an effective strategy to bring about the rational and purposeful end to an armed conflict. The “bad strategy” argument views the difficulty associated with ending the war in Afghanistan as a failure to understand, or apply, the principles of effective strategy—such as a clear and attainable end state, adequate means or unity of effort—as a consequence of an emerging “strategic illiteracy.” The argument presented is the West has been “out-strategized” by its opponents.² This article argues a different thesis: that, notwithstanding some of the evident difficulties associated with the strategy adopted in Afghanistan, the war there is a reflection of a much longer standing phenomenon—it is easier to start conflicts than it is to end them.³ The fact that Afghanistan is one of many such examples of problematic, protracted conflicts suggests that, in addition to a range of specific difficulties associated with the peculiarities of the nation,
there may be a range of broader structural challenges that contribute to making the purposeful termination of a conflict an inherently problematic activity. Put another way, wars can be difficult to end even when conscious, rigorous effort is made to try and realize the best strategic practices.

This article addresses two themes: the recurrent structural problems associated with ending a war, and how they have contributed to undermining Coalition attempts to terminate the conflict in Afghanistan. In doing so this author will investigate the significance to war termination of four questions and the challenges associated with answering them: who will win; is there an achievable peace; peace at what cost; and, can the war be terminated? Taken together, the complexities surrounding the answers to these four questions suggest, whatever the quality of one’s strategy-making, there are recurrent structural factors present to a greater or lesser extent in all armed conflicts that constrain the strategies that can be conceived and executed. If strategy is the art of the possible, then many of the problems we have experienced in Afghanistan result not from strategic illiteracy or a lack of understanding of what needs to be done, but rather from inescapable dilemmas and contradictions inherent in almost any attempt to end a conflict. If these problems are, in fact, inherent to the activity of ending all wars, then whatever lessons we think we might learn from our experiences in Afghanistan for the formulation of strategy, our challenges there will be open to repetition in the future.

Who Will Win?

One of the fundamental requirements for ending a war is that the belligerents’ views on the outcome begin to converge: this might be simultaneous pessimism that the conflict has degenerated into a “mutually hurting stalemate”; or it may be a tacit recognition that one or other of the sides cannot be stopped from winning. In either case, the fundamental point is that while any of the key belligerents believe that it is possible to improve their position in the future by continuing, achieving peace is problematic. Even if a belligerent believes that its position is likely to deteriorate, in the short to medium term, a belief that circumstances may improve in the long term will encourage either side to continue the conflict. Often this convergence can occur rather quickly, such as occurred in the Six Day War of 1967. In the majority of cases, however, this convergence occurs only after a prolonged period—witness the longevity of many recent counterinsurgency campaigns. The answer to the question “who will win” amounts to an assessment of how one is faring and how the future looks. In other words, it is an evaluation of whether war is accomplishing a belligerent’s objectives. The difficulties with answering this question explain why so many conflicts are prolonged; in essence, performance in a particular conflict is not self-evident.

In theory, one might expect armed conflict to result in a fairly rapid process of strategic learning by both sides. The intense competition associated with war can be expected to permit belligerents to quickly assess their opponent’s objectives, costs associated with the war, and relative strength of either
Christopher Tuck

side. Indeed, conflict may be the only forum in which information can be credibly communicated between the protagonists.\textsuperscript{5} It is this type of information that will permit both sides to assess their progress. In theory, a conflict should end when both sides agree on who has won or lost or who has the greatest potential for winning or losing.\textsuperscript{6} In reality, these judgments are extremely difficult. Calculations regarding progress in a war will depend, among other things, on the metrics used to measure success. Thus, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was able to argue in March 2011 that the Coalition had made undeniable progress in Afghanistan by citing two criteria: the expansion of areas defined as secure, and the demoralization of the Taliban.\textsuperscript{7} One difficulty, though, is finding appropriate metrics with which to measure progress in a conflict and then deciding how best to measure them—should one measure success through military objectives such as casualty rates or territory gained, or should the focus be on political, economic, or social benchmarks? Military objectives are easier to calculate but success through the use of military power needs to be evaluated as a political concept: success is the attainment of the political objectives toward which the use of military power is directed.\textsuperscript{8} War, however, is nonlinear; there is no reliable relationship between the scale of military activity and the level of political success.\textsuperscript{9}

The problem of assessing progress in war is complicated by the fact that such calculations are future-focused; one needs to know not only how they are doing now but also how to extrapolate this knowledge into future trends.\textsuperscript{10} Unfortunately, the accuracy of predictions about the future cannot be verified until the act occurs.\textsuperscript{11} Given the wide range of metrics and methodologies for assessing them it is entirely possible for belligerents to “talk past one another” on issues of current and future prospects. It is possible that both sides will believe they are winning or at least think their circumstances will improve if they persevere.\textsuperscript{12}

In any case, since war is the realm of chance, even reasonable calculations can be upset by game-changing factors that invalidate existing assumptions on the prospects for success. For example, history has numerous examples of opponents who lost a conventional war, but sustained the fight by transforming to unconventional warfare as a means for changing the nature of the game, invalidating the more conventional metrics utilized to measure success.\textsuperscript{13} Finally, because of a lack of uncontested and objective facts related to the question of whether war is working, there is a tendency for those analyzing the conflict to substitute beliefs for facts, rendering the basis of a belligerent’s war termination calculations subject to the power of particular narratives or rhetorical constructions: “peace with honor,” for example, or “no negotiation with terrorists.”\textsuperscript{14} These rationalizations challenge the capacity of states to plan and execute a particular strategy; at the foundation of any effective strategy is a mechanism for feedback and assessment—a belligerent needs to be able to reflect on the execution of its ends, ways, and means relationship if it is to know whether it is succeeding and whether some or all of these elements require adjustment.
The preceding discussion is central to the challenges associated with Coalition strategy development in Afghanistan. The introduction to this article noted the challenges in Afghanistan are not primarily the result of strategic illiteracy but derive from the difficulty in formulating an effective strategy. For the Coalition, one of the crucial difficulties has been the fact that there has been no consensus on whether the war is working. In complex nation-building contexts, traditional concepts of military victory need to be replaced by what Professor Robert Mandel refers to as “strategic success,” a concept that encompasses “inter-related informational, military, political, economic, social, and diplomatic elements.” The metrics used to measure success need to reflect all of these dimensions if they are to adequately capture the breadth of activities required for true success. In consequence, the range of potential metrics with which to measure success is vast, given that Coalition strategy in Afghanistan encompasses such tasks as protecting the population; creating effective governance; encouraging socio-economic development; and enhancing the Afghan security forces.

These challenges are compounded by the questions of whether one focuses on the local, regional, or national level of governance; whether the focus is on key trends, and, if so, over what time period; what geographic area one may favor; and how data should be categorized. Varying decisions on these issues can produce radically different conclusions related to conditions in Afghanistan. For example, in relation to national versus local economic conditions, nationally, Afghan gross national product (GNP) tripled to $12 billion in the period between 2002 and 2006. Locally, however, such figures are meaningless in measuring the experience of ordinary Afghans. In 2009, less than half the Afghan population had income of more than $100 a month. Various polls indicate a growing perception that economic opportunities are worsening. What would appear to be a simple and valid metric becomes a morass.

In Afghanistan, there has been a wide range of difficulties impacting measures of success. There are, for example, process challenges related to the fact there are multiple organizations gathering data, including the US government, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization/International Security Assistance Force (NATO/ISAF), the United Nations (UN), and nongovernment organizations. Each agency or organization often focuses on different metrics or analyzes them in different ways, interpreting the data in a more optimistic or pessimistic manner. Often institutional and bureaucratic factors shape preferences related to certain factors. The political scientist Anthony King notes that, despite the rejection of such measures by senior British officers in Afghanistan, there is a recurrent tendency for British units to measure the success of their 6-month tours in relation to body counts or the number of major operations undertaken. There are key gaps in available data—more contested regions, for example, are more problematic when attempting to gather data. In particular, there are difficulties obtaining data related to the Pakistan border areas, resulting in a serious difficulty for what is recognized as an Afghanistan-Pakistan (AfPAK) conflict. Even where there is sufficient data, it can be difficult to
interpret. The author and political scientist Anthony Cordesman notes: “It is far easier to quantify what is easily measured than to quantify what is relevant.” Relevant data relating to factors such as the quality of activity, its longevity, or its effect on perceptions can be difficult to objectively discern.

Other challenges are created by the relationship between metrics. Framing a set of relevant metrics is difficult enough—framing a set of metrics that weigh, deconflict, integrate, and relate military, political, economic, social, political, and informational activities and objectives is a completely separate issue. Because they are interrelated, a minimum level of success in each dimension may be required for achieving overall success. It may be difficult, however, to achieve success simultaneously across the entire spectrum of the conflict. Indeed, the case may well be that success in one dimension appears mutually exclusive of success in another. For example, military objectives may be achieved at the expense of political objectives and vice versa. This problem has been a recurrent feature of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the past. In Afghanistan, the trade-offs are even more complex because of the breadth and variation in objectives. For example, pushing forward on goals for social transformation such as greater gender equality creates political difficulties from Afghan traditionalists; drastically increasing the size of the Afghan security forces shows progress in building the capacity of the Afghan government, but it can come at a cost locally where security forces are often perceived as partial, corrupt sources of insecurity. Paradoxically, success in one dimension may require accepting a measure of failure in another if the worst aspects of these incompatibilities are to be avoided. If, as some have argued, the key challenge in Afghanistan is defining a realistic notion of success “somewhere between ideal and intolerable,” how much failure is acceptable? In 2010, 59 percent of Afghans listed corruption as their key concern (even more than security). At the same time, however, the authors Chaudri and Farrell note that corruption is also the “bedrock of the Afghan government”; without the capacity to use such inducements, many local administrators would be unable to govern effectively. So, what level of corruption represents success in reconciling the competing needs of the perceptions of ordinary Afghans and the practical needs of the Afghan government?

Cumulatively, the lack of objective metrics with which to judge the progress in Afghanistan has a number of effects on assessing the performance of the Coalition’s strategy. One effect has been the tendency to fill gaps in our knowledge with beliefs—for example, to assume the Taliban are always unpopular. Another effect has been to encourage the use of analogies in assessments of strategy as a replacement for metrics, especially the use of experiences in Iraq to inform judgments on the effectiveness of particular strategies in Afghanistan. Another impact has been to avoid for as long as possible the creation of symbolic metrics of failure, such as the withdrawal of forces. As evident in recent years, once the debate on the drawdown was initiated, Coalition leverage in Afghanistan declined. The difficulty in defining objective metrics for success has encouraged the use of rhetorical metrics—metrics
that sound plausible but are divorced from any obvious means of measurement. For example, Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal argued to senators before assuming command in Afghanistan that new goals were needed and that, in consequence, “the measure of effectiveness will not be the number of enemy killed. It will be the number of Afghans shielded from violence.”

One of the clear difficulties faced by the Coalition in Afghanistan are the challenges associated with assessing which elements of our strategy are succeeding, which are failing, why, and whether continuation of the conflict might improve the Coalition’s chances for success. This problem has afflicted the academic debate related to the strategy in Afghanistan. Even when elements of the strategy embody similar assumptions (for example, that Coalition success is problematic; that a scaling back of obligations might be required; that the Afghanistan and Pakistan issues are inextricably linked; or that the Afghan government is part of the problem), the prescriptions differ. Initiatives could include negotiating with elements of the Taliban; jettisoning democratization as a goal and focusing on a workable Afghan government; or, instead, prioritizing multilateral solutions that include Iran and decentralization of the Afghan state. Ambiguities surrounding metrics have a direct and profound impact on policymakers. The challenges associated with measuring progress bedevilled President Obama’s Afghanistan strategy review, mainly because it proved difficult to assess which aspects of the existing strategy were performing, which were not, and what milestones might be set to measure any alternative.

This resulted in a view over the years (maybe the correct one) that it was possible to win in Afghanistan or, at least, not to lose badly if we remained there but adjusted elements of the strategy. The British author and politician Rory Stewart observes a recurring mantra, an “astonishing chanted liturgy,” regarding the views of consecutive ISAF commanders: “Each new general in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2011 suggested the situation he had inherited was dismal; implied that this was because his predecessor had the wrong resources or strategy; and asserted that he now had the resources, strategy, and leadership to deliver a decisive year.”

This recurring rhetorical construction is directly attributable to the lack of objective evidence related to whether the strategy was succeeding; it did provide, however, the basis for continuing the conflict.

Is There an Achievable Peace?

The fact that success and failure in war is often not self-evident is one dynamic that creates a propensity to continue the fighting; it was simply not clear if we were winning or losing, and this ambiguity left open the possibility for future success. There is a second critical issue that encapsulates another powerful set of factors that make war termination problematic. This question is whether there is any possibility to achieve peace? Even if belligerents conclude the conflict is not succeeding this does not necessarily mean it will result in a political compromise. The decision to terminate a conflict requires at least a chance that some viable solution does exist, even if no specific political solution is offered. Viable political solutions require both sides have some objectives
that are compatible and realizable. Lacking these conditions, belligerents will continue to fight even when they believe doing so has ceased to provide an opportunity for victory.\textsuperscript{35}

The difficulty in visualizing an acceptable way out of war normally occurs in value-based conflicts. In conflict, the objectives pursued by belligerents can be divided into two types: interest based or value based. Interest-based conflicts tend to be disputes over tangibles (such as territory) and feature a basic level of common understanding between the belligerents about the nature of their dispute and the rules by which it can be resolved—the Cabinet Wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries would be an example. On the other hand, value-based conflicts are far more focused on intangible sources of dispute such as beliefs, or competing nationalisms.Value-based conflicts often involve goals that are highly ideological and intensely held; they are often needs-based or transcendental and driven by deeply held mental images of the opposition.\textsuperscript{36} In value-based conflicts, the belligerent is more likely to place an importance on achieving objectives than on the costs incurred.\textsuperscript{37} For this reason, value-based wars associated with identity or secession appear to be more difficult to resolve than issue-based conflicts that are often based on economic and political tangibles.\textsuperscript{38}

Afghanistan might appear to be an issue-based conflict; a war of choice: a nation-building intervention in another country focused on counterterrorism, establishing democracy, the rule of law, or a market economy; a conflict quite distinct from the zero-sum war of survival that normally drives value-based conflicts. There has, nevertheless, been a strong value-led dimension to the Coalition’s commitment in Afghanistan, particularly from a US point of view. It is a conflict in which the costs of failure were portrayed as profoundly negative and the benefits of victory as extensive and enduring. The foundation for this was provided by the 9/11 attacks on the United States and served as a catalyst for the invasion of Afghanistan. It was the Global War on Terror that provided the broader context in which the cost-benefit calculations related to Afghanistan were then positioned. The Global War on Terror, and by extension the war in Afghanistan, was presented in essentialist terms by US policymakers: the enemies were relentless; the threat posed was a direct and dangerous one; the struggle against these forces was a vital one for the long-term security of the United States.\textsuperscript{39} While President Bush’s justification for the intervention in Afghanistan incorporated a number of objectives, such as democratization, building a free society, and establishing an ally in the war on terror, a core and recurring theme was the link between the war in Afghanistan and the Global War on Terror.\textsuperscript{40}

The difficulty in developing a successful strategy for Afghanistan has been the fact that, as long as the strategic objectives are posed in essentialist terms and victory has been portrayed as absolutely necessary, a range of alternative strategies examining any possible compromise has been excluded. Words alone do not make a conflict value-laden. But President Bush’s characterization of the Afghan war in value-based terms resonated with the American public,
and, indeed, elsewhere, resulting in high levels of support for the conflict in the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and other nations. In contrast to the war in Iraq, Western public opinion tended to view the initial intervention in Afghanistan favourably.\textsuperscript{41} In the United States, at least, there continued to be the belief that the original decision to invade Afghanistan was correct even if there was growing criticism as to how the campaign was conducted.\textsuperscript{42} Indeed, while President Obama attempted to reshape US foreign policy rhetoric, the net effect of his efforts was greater attention on Afghanistan rather than less. In trying to distance himself from President Bush’s focus on Iraq, he argued that it was Afghanistan that was the real frontline in the struggle against terrorism.\textsuperscript{43} While the Obama administration has dropped the term Global War on Terror, the administration continues to stress the threat to US vital interests posed by international terrorism and the centrality of Afghanistan (and its relationship with Pakistan) as an integral part of that threat.\textsuperscript{44}

Given the value-based dimension of the war in Afghanistan, it is not difficult to discern why there was always a tendency to persevere, even if the military results were ambiguous and the range of acceptable strategies constrained. The value-based aspect of a conflict cannot simply be turned off by the government. The objectives imputed to the struggle in Afghanistan are high; the sacrifices of citizens and soldiers are sanctified by the importance of those objectives; and the escalating costs are justified in terms of vital interests. Given the existential nature of the struggle, as it was initially presented, dissent could be delegitimized as unpatriotic, pro-al Qaeda, or antimilitary.

Movement in relation to relieving a portion of the value-based elements of the strategy has clearly been discernable. In March 2009, President Obama articulated more defined goals that focused on the defeat of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, although the associated objectives continued to span a complex array of nation-building activities in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{45} At the same time, debate emerged surrounding the value of adopting more limited objectives, such as a de facto partition of Afghanistan\textsuperscript{46} or at least developing a narrower measure of success focused on “security and stability in local terms and not the conversion to Western values and an idealized concept of democracy.”\textsuperscript{47} A willingness to accept more limited objectives resulted in a serious debate over the validity of limited approaches, such as Vice President Joe Biden’s “light footprint” idea, embodying special operation forces and remote attack.\textsuperscript{48} In particular, the preconditions directed at negotiations with the Taliban, including the requirement they accept the Afghan constitution and dissolve all ties with al Qaeda, were dropped.\textsuperscript{49} The Obama administration moved to a “fight, talk, and build” strategy in which negotiation is a crucial plank.\textsuperscript{50} The notion that some of the Taliban constitute actors legitimate enough to negotiate with represents an important symbolic shift from value-based thinking.

\textbf{Peace at What Cost?}

Even assuming that a belligerent comes to believe that his position in a war is likely to deteriorate over the long term and an acceptable political
compromise is conceivable, there are obstacles that may encourage the continuation of the conflict. These obstacles are reflected in the third vital war termination question: peace at what cost? The costs referred to by this question refer to the giving up of wider objectives that are indirectly linked to the conflict in question. Put another way, winning the war may become only one (and sometimes not even the most critical) of the reasons to continue fighting. The truth is that war often supports policy goals associated with the political survival of governments or the prestige and credibility of a state. Often in these circumstances, fighting may become an end in itself.

Domestically, a number of political actors derive side benefits from a conflict, whether they be economic, political, or psychological—terminating a war may incur substantial costs. A leader’s personal stake in the progress of a conflict may be quite high given the fact that success or failure in the conflict may have a direct impact on their prestige and survival. Elites who might otherwise negotiate or accept a settlement will fear internal opposition from rivals or constituents who would view any negotiations as a sellout, act of treason, or an indication of incompetence and mismanagement of the conflict. It is not unreasonable to expect the leadership might lose power as a result of opposition by those constituencies who expect current policies to be defended to the bitter end. Such a settlement can be a powerful blow to the self-esteem for a particular leader, especially when the leader has based his image on the success of the state. This is especially true of leaders closely associated with the decision to go to war. They are likely to fear any settlement that cannot be portrayed as victory. Leaders may be unwilling to countenance peace until all options have been tried and failed. Even then, they may insist on continuing to fight through fear of punishment. Certain domestic contexts can be problematic in this respect; for example, when leaders are charismatic populists who rely on heroic achievement, a call for peace without victory can be career (and possibly life) threatening. Cumulatively, the compromises required for peace can make selling a victory a difficult proposition. This explains why leadership tends to change when the time comes to formalize the peace.

For the reasons outlined, any attempt at compromise risked serious damage to the political fortunes of those associated with the Bush administration. President Bush’s hawkish foreign policy was a political asset for much of his tenure. As the architect of the war, and having been involved for such an extended time in arguing for its necessity and the viability of long-term success, a major shift in his administration’s policy was unlikely. The Bush administration returned again and again to the idea that, despite the rising costs, progress was being made and victory remained a possibility. In speeches, President Bush asserted that “we are winning the war on terror”; “we have seen the turning of the tide”; “we are making progress”; and “We will not waiver, we will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail.” It not surprising, then, that dramatic changes to the United States’ war termination strategy only evolved once the Bush administration had been replaced.
Externally, states continue to fight because, even if they are not winning, ending a conflict might weaken political commitments given to various allies or undermine the deterrence directed at adversaries. War may, therefore, be useful in the context of a broader struggle; in other words, the leadership may feel the costs associated with the current conflict need to be weighed against its overall value. Perhaps the conflict serves as a source of information or in sending messages related to the belligerents’ resolve. Governments in conflict are inclined to shape the perceptions of multiple audiences on issues related to resolve, willingness to compromise, or a willingness to sustain the costs of the conflict. These issues can become especially pernicious because they have a circular logic—the longer a war continues, the more political capital is invested, and the more politically damaging any failure can be, so the greater the incentive to persevere in the hope that something positive might materialize—perseverance that often increases the costs associated with failure. Paradoxically, the prospect of negotiations may itself extend conflict; a good example is when belligerents continue to fight beyond the initial objectives or pre-established limits in the hope of creating a more secure postwar environment. Such a situation may develop when one side is trying to create bargaining chips for future negotiations. In such cases, these new or expanded interests often decrease the sensitivity of the belligerent to the associated costs of continuing the fight.

These imperatives help explain the nature of the war in Afghanistan. Defeat avoidance, because of the belief that this would have damaging repercussions for US policy, has become one of the themes in arguing for perseverance. In July 2010, Senator Joseph Lieberman, Chairman of the Homeland Security committee, argued that defeat in Afghanistan would energize extremism “all around the world . . . . And it’ll be a tremendous cutdown in America’s prestige and credibility in the world.” Such arguments related to credibility and prestige are powerful because they have an intuitive logic and are difficult to objectively disprove. The prestige argument is particularly powerful because, as author Stephen Biddle notes, a rapid withdrawal from Afghanistan would carry with it a set of risks that would be hard to predict or control. There is the possibility that a rapid withdrawal might be accompanied by “nightmarish imagery” deriving from the collapse of the existing Afghan government.

**Can the War be Terminated?**

Even assuming that the costs of peace were judged as acceptable, there is a final obstacle that must still be overcome if a conflict is to end. This obstacle is embodied in the question “can the war be terminated?” Even when the leaders of a nation or faction have decided that the conflict should be terminated and they are willing to accept the costs of peace, the question remains as to whether the peace can be accepted by political constituencies whose cooperation is required to effect the termination of the conflict. This issue is essentially a question of political autonomy—to what extent is the leadership of a belligerent beholden to other constituencies?
Sometimes the decision of a single leader is the same as that of the state as a whole. In 1991 Iraq capitulated because Saddam Hussein made that decision. In general, though, most leaders rely to a greater or lesser extent on a variety of political actors in order to exercise power. This may be the electorate, media, oligarchs, military, allies, or other political factions. Autonomy has internal and external dimensions. Internally, peace has to be sold to those groups that keep the leadership in power; for example, the governing party or political allies.\(^{69}\) Domestic politics can be decisive in war termination calculations.\(^{70}\) In fact, war termination often constitutes one of the most divisive and problematic policy changes for decision makers mainly due to the intense emotional, psychological, and political issues associated with conflict termination. It can result in an extreme polarization of views within a society, especially if the outcome of war is less favorable than what was expected, or some deeply held national values are challenged.\(^{71}\) Externally, when a war has been internationalized, peace has to be sold to other “war-oriented actors,” allies or sponsors for either side, or third parties whose agreement or acquiescence is required to produce an acceptable settlement.\(^{72}\) Power is relevant to this problem; a belligerent’s strategic leverage over war-oriented actors may be crucial if the objectives one wishes to achieve are at odds with those of other actors. Where one party lacks strategic leverage over its allies or other war-oriented actors it may face a challenge from an “intractable ally,” a situation where an ally obstructs any feasible settlement.\(^{73}\)

Taken in this context, the challenge for the Coalition is the structure of the conflict in Afghanistan, which has linkages between intra- and extra-Afghanistan conflict dynamics—Afghanistan constitutes only part of a larger regional conflict.\(^{74}\) Peace in Afghanistan is conditional on the cooperation of its neighbors.\(^{75}\) The recognition of this arrangement is reflected in the articulation of the AfPAK concept—a concept embodying inextricable linkages between the politics associated with the conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and at the same time recognizing that resolving the former requires the resolution of issues in the latter and vice versa.\(^{76}\) The autonomy problem is one the United States has only a limited capacity to influence when it comes to other “war-oriented actors.” This is most readily seen in America’s relationship with Pakistan, an ally but one with deep reservations regarding US policy in the region.\(^{77}\) At the same time, the United States has become increasingly willing to criticize Pakistan’s ties to elements of the Taliban.\(^{78}\) Pakistan’s relationship with the Taliban is ambiguous. While Taliban and Pakistan forces have been involved periodically in heavy fighting, Pakistan has been inclined to sustain links with the Taliban. This relationship is based on Pakistan’s view that Afghanistan is a major player in their conflict with India. From Pakistan’s perspective, the Karzai government is pro-Indian; from the Indian point of view the Taliban are seen as a potential Pakistan-sponsored catalyst for their conflict in Kashmir.\(^{79}\) But the autonomy problem extends to other actors. There are a wide range of regional actors whose cooperation or at least acquiescence is required to construct a comprehensive strategy for a stable peace; these include Russia,
China, Turkey, India, and Iran. While many of these actors are not friends of the Taliban, they are suspicious of US intentions in the region. They are also suspicious of each other; Iran and Pakistan have a long history of conflict with regard to Afghanistan. All of these challenges have made it much more difficult for the United States to develop a comprehensive strategy. Nor have allies proved as malleable as the United States might have hoped. For example, it has been clear since at least 2009 that the United States’ NATO allies were focused on withdrawing their forces from Afghanistan, irrespective of whether the Americans approved or not.

Internally, the key autonomy issue is linked to public opinion, although its effect on the entire scope of government policy has proven paradoxical. It might be assumed that, in small wars, public opinion plays a key role in bringing an end to the conflict once the costs begin to mount. In Afghanistan, however, the war was generally popular for a long period of time, creating incentives to continue the fight—the government had a high degree of autonomy to continue the conflict aided by public support of nearly 90 percent. Additionally, events in Afghanistan were largely removed from public scrutiny by the controversies surrounding the Iraq war and its aftermath. The administration wished to continue the fight, and there was little internal opposition to prevent them from doing so. Despite a shift in public opinion related to the war, President Obama’s autonomy within the domestic parameters associated with Afghanistan questions was more limited than one might suppose. Part of the rationale for the intransigence in US policy related to Afghanistan was caused by the manner in which the administration was able to draw on the rhetoric associated with the war on terror. The administration was able to draw on preexisting ideas and policies articulated as far back as the Reagan presidency. President Obama was successful in shifting the nature of the debate to the larger issues of the Afghan war and away from issues such as troop strength. This focus on the broader political questions associated with bringing an end to the war was possible because the president was able to reduce the Pentagon’s role in the decisionmaking process and successfully replace some key personnel.

Domestic political conditions remained problematic, however, even after 2008. As late as September 2009, polling reflected mixed views on the Afghanistan conflict. A poll in September 2009 had 43 percent in favor of withdrawing forces from Afghanistan as soon as possible, but 50 percent thought US troops should remain until “the situation had stabilized.” One of the more interesting facts was that 76 percent of those surveyed still saw the possibility of the Taliban regaining control of Afghanistan and they viewed that possibility as a major threat to the well-being of the United States. Thus, even the Obama election victory did not represent a ringing mandate for withdrawal from Afghanistan. Another difficulty was the structure of the opposition to the war. There was a high degree of consensus among the elite liberal establishment related to the belief that Afghanistan was a just and potentially winnable war. This was especially true among academics and political commentators. While 37 percent of Democrats wanted US forces to remain in Afghanistan,
support for staying the course was almost twice as strong (71 percent) among Republicans. Given this situation, the prospect of terminating the Afghan war by means of significant concessions risked reinforcing the traditional perception of the weakness of the Democratic Party on the issue of defense, giving the Republicans a platform from which to attack the president. In addition, any precipitous withdrawal from Afghanistan would generate friction from a substantial minority within the Democratic Party that supported the war, making cooperation on other major issues even more problematic for the president. Indeed, as a response to the possibility of appearing weak, President Obama and the Democrats used Afghanistan as the means with which to balance their criticism of the Iraq war. This position permitted the president to enhance his attack on the Bush administration’s Iraq policy with promises to “get tough” in Afghanistan.

At the root of President Obama’s problems lay the fact that the rhetoric of President Bush resonated with the American people. The development of a strategy for Afghanistan, its motives, costs, and benefits established under the Bush administration was a powerful influence, not because it was based on incontestable fact but because it was socially acceptable. As the political scientist and author Richard Jackson notes, the war on terror had become “culturally and materially embedded within US politics and society.” In the short term, the scope for rhetorical innovation, of radical changes in the narrative, was limited. Afghanistan was viewed at its inception as a just war and any unpopularity stemmed not from a collapse in the perceived validity of the broader war on terror argument, but from a public perception that the war on the ground was being lost. Even if the war in Afghanistan had become unpopular, the conflict was still inextricably entwined with a broader threat narrative that continued to be effective. By the time President Obama took office, the war on terror debate, its language, logic, analogies, and metaphors had become normalized; he was trapped by the core assumptions prevalent among the American public. For this reason, the president continued to assert that he would do whatever it takes to defeat the Taliban, an approach accompanied by parallel moves—troop surges, the extension of drone operations, and an expansion of activities in Pakistan.

**Conclusion**

The challenges associated with operations in Afghanistan have not been primarily due to any strategic illiteracy; they are problems directly related to war termination. The problems experienced by the Coalition have been witnessed in any number of other wars, both recent and past. Examining the situation from an historical perspective, Afghanistan is far from unique. The war theorist and author John Vasquez notes that there is a tendency for wars to become sticky or stabilized; in other words, belligerents often continue to pursue war beyond the point at which, with hindsight, it might have ended. Indeed, policy stability may be self-reinforcing; cumulatively, mutually reinforcing problems associated with the four questions analyzed in this article may lead to what
the authors Stanley and Sawyer term “negative duration dependence,” i.e., the longer wars continue, the harder they are to terminate.96

Professor Chaim Kaufmann notes that in such circumstances only major shocks can alter policy, “Change only occurs when a particular experience is too salient to be ignored, too unambiguous to be discounted, and so squarely in conflict with the prior belief that it becomes cognitively cheaper to abandon the belief than to try to resolve or to tolerate the inconsistency.”97 In Afghanistan, however, there has been no single shock of such a magnitude that it has revolutionized the war termination debate. Change has come incrementally. In a sense, the death of Osama bin Laden had a catalytic effect, allowing the United States to distinguish between its struggle against al Qaeda and its fight with the Taliban.98 In this particular case, President Obama has been able to refocus metrics for success by redefining the metrics according to what has already been achieved. In this respect, following bin Laden’s death, the Obama administration has made a concerted effort to focus the public on its successes in disrupting al Qaeda.99 But even in this context, bin Laden’s death merely reinforced an existing trend in the gradual narrative bifurcation of the Taliban and al Qaeda.

The primary difficulty in Afghanistan is the problem of answering the question “how are we doing?” The complexity of the policy goals has made it difficult to discern whether the Coalition has been succeeding or not, and which of our ends, ways, and means has been successful. On its own, this problem might have resulted in an early end to the war; or, at least, a reassessment of ends, as well as relooking the ways and means. The answers to the remaining key war termination questions (is there an achievable peace, peace at what cost, and can the war be terminated) have resulted in a strategy of protraction in the hope that something positive will turn up. The value-based aspects of the war in Afghanistan made it difficult to consider any legitimate outcome other than total victory. The political costs of compromise have grown for those who initiated the war in terms of the domestic political credibility of Coalition decisionmakers and the international prestige of the states involved. Even when willingness to compromise on specific goals has emerged, the United States government has demonstrated a lack of internal and external autonomy capable of constructing a viable alternative. Beating ourselves anew with the birch branches of Clausewitz will not produce miraculous solutions to these challenges. Indeed, these issues reinforce Colin Gray’s point that “strategic thinking is difficult; indeed, strategy is so difficult to do well that it is remarkable that it is ever practiced successfully.”100

Notes
2. See, for example, Paul Newton, Paul Colley, and Andrew Sharpe, “Reclaiming the Art of British Strategic Thinking,” *RUSI Journal* 155, no. 1 (February 2010): 44-50.


24. For a discussion of the difficulties in matching political and military priorities in Afghanistan, see King, “Understanding the Helmand Campaign,” 311-332.


27. Cordesman, Analyzing the Afghan-Pakistan War, 6.


38. See, for example, Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” International Security 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996): 136-175.


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43. Trevor McCristen, “Ten years on: Obama’s War on Terrorism in Rhetoric and Practice,”
44. Ibid., 787-788.
50. “Secretary Clinton’s Opening Remarks.”
53. Ibid., 8-9.
68. Biddle, Christia, and Their, “Defining Success in Afghanistan.”
70. Ikle, *Every War Must End*, 84.


Ibid., 71-80 and 89-90.


Miller, “Endgame for the West in Afghanistan,” 11.


Rashid, “How The US Intends to End War.”


Miller, “Endgame for the West in Afghanistan,” 16.

Pew Research Center, “Public Support for Afghanistan War Wanes.”

Biddle, Christia, and Their, “Defining Success in Afghanistan.”


Miller, “Endgame for the West in Afghanistan,” 2.

McCristen, “Ten years on,” 786.

Ibid., 788.


The Futility of Force and the Preservation of Power: British Strategic Failure in America, 1780-83

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The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and the commander have to make is [to] establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive. ¹

—Carl von Clausewitz

In the spring of 1763 Great Britain, basking in the warm afterglow of decisive victory in the Seven Years War, presided over a vast and unprecedented global empire. The small island nation seemingly, and rather suddenly, found itself without peer—enjoying a level of military and political hegemony not seen since the days of the Roman Empire.² It was a unique, albeit fleeting, position. In the span of a mere twenty years, the world’s preeminent global power, despite enjoying a considerable advantage in almost every conceivable category used to calculate military potential, found itself disgraced and defeated by a start-up nation possessing a markedly inferior conventional military capability. Crippled by a grossly burgeoning national debt, diplomatically isolated, and politically divided at home, the North Ministry became embroiled in a protracted and unpopular global war that its policymakers and military leaders seemed incapable of understanding—much less winning—until it was far too late.³

The War for American Independence, especially if viewed from the British perspective, retains extraordinary significance for contemporary practitioners of national and military strategy. The conflict contains many valuable and exceedingly relevant insights regarding the rise, prevention, and challenges of insurgency, the perils of a people’s war for a foreign power, and the

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absolute imperative of a thoughtful, coherent, and proactive national strategy that integrates all instruments of national power prior to, not just after, the commencement of hostilities. The British experience also provides timeless lessons regarding the difficulties of balancing ambitious political ends with limited military means, civil-military relations, and sustaining national will in democratic societies during protracted and unpopular wars. Finally, the conflict serves as a conspicuous example of the potential for irregular warfare to thwart the application of conventionally superior military force and thereby decide or influence the political outcomes of wars and campaigns. In that regard, Great Britain’s experience in the War for American Independence provides an important prologue for many of the contemporary challenges associated with the application of coercive force in a postcolonial and postnuclear world. While predicting the future remains problematic, the United States should, in all likelihood, expect both the character and conduct of its future wars to more closely resemble that of the American revolution, albeit from the British perspective, than those of a bygone era where industrialized nation-states waged near-total wars of annihilation.4

This article uses an abbreviated examination of the Southern Campaign (1780-82) to explore the principal causes of British strategic failure in the War for American Independence. The subject demands more attention than it traditionally receives, especially from the nation that has, in the span of a mere two generations, overtaken and largely assumed Great Britain’s once dominant role on the world stage. America’s ascendancy, however, has not come without cost. Ironically, several of the major political, economic, and military challenges confronting the United States today bear a remarkable similarity to those that plagued her one-time colonial master.5 Chief among them is perhaps the most daunting and perplexing military issue of our time—how to translate supremacy on the conventional battlefield into enduring political success in an age of austerity and limited war.

In a conflict full of dubious assumptions and missed opportunities, the pinnacle of British political and strategic miscalculation occurred in the South.6 Though overshadowed by the dramatic events at Yorktown, the consistent and simultaneous application of both regular and irregular warfare during the Southern Campaign proved decisive. It, more than anything else, broke the political will of the loyalists in the region, helped wrest control of the Southern Colonies away from the British, and contributed, in no small way, to Britain’s eventual decision to abandon the war altogether. Ironically, the campaign produced no singularly decisive battle. Nor did it conform to the “traditional” view of limited dynastic warfare.7 Instead, American success was slowly sequestered, not seized, by Major General Nathanael Greene’s astute integration of conventional and unconventional forces in pursuit of a definitive political, not military, victory. The British, of course, made many crucial errors. Whether the Americans won the Southern Campaign or the British lost it remains an intriguing historical question significantly beyond the scope of this article. Greene, and his fellow patriots, however, realized what a host of
British commanders and their political masters in Whitehall could not—the war in the south, like the Revolution itself, was a complex, unconventional, and violent political struggle for the loyalty and allegiance of the American population writ large. It could not, and would not, be decided by the application of conventional military force alone.\textsuperscript{8}

**The Devolution of British Strategy**

In December of 1774, a presumptuous King George III boldly asserted, “The New England governments are in a State of Rebellion. Blows must decide whether they are to be subject to this country or independent.”\textsuperscript{9} With the clairvoyance of hindsight, however, the British decision to employ force in the spring of 1775 rested on two fundamental miscalculations. First, the authorities in London, both civilian and military, underestimated the fighting qualities and irregular capabilities of the American militia.\textsuperscript{10} Second, most, if not all, of these same men, severely misjudged the extent and veracity of popular support the patriot cause enjoyed, not just in New England, but throughout the thirteen colonies.\textsuperscript{11} Fiscal and political constraints in London demanded a quick and efficient termination of the conflict in America. An emphasis on the former, however, precluded a realistic and prescient understanding of the latter. The result was an overly sanguine view of the actual political situation in the colonies and the adoption of a British military strategy that, though it considered the alternative of a naval war, remained wedded to the promise of decisive battle until the twin disasters of Saratoga and the subsequent signing of the Franco-American alliance in February 1778 forced a dramatic reordering of priorities.\textsuperscript{12}

The Americans, too, initially miscalculated. The wave of revolutionary enthusiasm that crested with the British evacuation of Boston and signing of the Declaration of Independence gave way to the harsh reality of Washington’s near destruction at New York and the stark realization that “native courage” and revolutionary zeal alone could not secure independence.\textsuperscript{13} Unlike his British counterparts, however, Washington demonstrated considerable pragmatism in the face of necessity.\textsuperscript{14} Although he longed for a “conventional” victory against British regulars, by September 1776 Washington curtailed his initial strategic designs in favor of a Fabian approach focused on the enduring political, not military, objective: “We should on all occasions avoid a general action, and put nothing to risk unless compelled by a necessity, into which we ought never to be drawn.”\textsuperscript{15}

The British never fully reconciled their faith in decisive battle with the fact that Washington, after barely escaping from New York in the fall of 1776, had no intention of giving it. Deeply flawed strategic assumptions combined with chance, the tyranny of distance in the age of sail, and episodes of tactical blundering precluded the destruction of Washington’s fledgling continental army and led to the unconscionable surrender of General John Burgoyne’s entire command at Saratoga in the fall of 1777.\textsuperscript{16} Worse, France’s formal entry into the war in March 1778 transformed the suppression of an internal rebellion into a global conflict.\textsuperscript{17} Suddenly, Great Britain, for the first time in 150 years,
found herself without the aid or support of a single European ally while engaged in a dangerous and rapidly escalating war with her ancient Bourbon rivals.\textsuperscript{18} Operations in America, particularly for the Admiralty, became secondary to defense of the British Isles and larger economic interests in the Caribbean. Accordingly, in the spring of 1778, the North Ministry assumed a defensive posture in America.\textsuperscript{19} Diplomatically isolated and forced to react to the imminent threat of French sea power, the government recalled its Commander-in-Chief in America, Major General William Howe, ordered the evacuation of Philadelphia, and grudgingly dispatched the Earl of Carlisle on a desperate, and poorly timed, attempt to secure peace with honor in the colonies.\textsuperscript{20}

By the close of 1779, however, it became increasingly clear that Great Britain, despite an enormous expenditure of blood and treasure, was losing the war.\textsuperscript{21} The revolutionaries maintained tenuous, but effective, control over the vast majority of the colonial population. British forces, by contrast, found themselves confined to the coastal enclaves of New York, Long Island, and Savannah, under the constant and very real threat of a menacing French fleet. More importantly, four years of military paralysis, France’s entry into the war, and a steadily deteriorating strategic situation emboldened a vocal and increasingly effective political opposition in the House of Commons.\textsuperscript{22} The 1778 naval crisis followed by Admiral Keppel’s court martial, the failure of the Carlisle Peace Commission, and the raucous parliamentary inquiry into Sir William Howe’s generalship produced a series of inimical public debates that exposed a pattern of ministerial blundering and an ominous break down in civil-military relations.\textsuperscript{23} The events cast a long shadow on the government’s planning and conduct of the war and unleashed a torrent of political blame and recrimination that very nearly toppled the North Ministry.\textsuperscript{24}

The government’s tenuous and slowly eroding support in Parliament forced a tacit reversal of military policy. Only by insisting that the war for America could still be won, not with an endless and expensive supply of reinforcements buttressing a failed strategy, but rather by harnessing dormant loyalist strength to champion a new one, could the Ministry maintain the requisite political support to continue the war.\textsuperscript{25} The idea exploited long-standing, though increasingly questionable, assumptions about loyalist strength in the south and conveniently nested with the government’s plans to shift the seat of the war to the Caribbean.\textsuperscript{26} In December of 1779, Howe’s successor, Lieutenant General Henry Clinton embarked the majority of his army in New York harbor and sailed for Charleston, long viewed as the key to political control of the southern colonies and an important port for future operations in the West Indies. The seizure of Charleston, intended to relieve pressure on loyalist forces operating in Georgia, also constituted the initial phase of a larger “southern strategy” designed to ignite a counterrevolution in the Carolinas by reestablishing royal government and recruiting loyalist militia, supported by a small number of British regulars, to defend it.\textsuperscript{27} In many ways, the belated adaptation of a “pacification” strategy, conceived in the caldron of wartime domestic politics vice the crucible of deliberate military design, represented Britain’s last best hope.\textsuperscript{28}
Unfortunately for the British cause, it was bungled in execution by an increasingly dysfunctional Ministry that continued to see and hear what conformed to its concerted view and a bold and audacious commander who stubbornly clung to the chimera of decisive battle until it was far too late. 

**The Seizure of Charleston**

On 1 February 1780, a powerful expeditionary force under the command of Sir Henry Clinton landed on Simmons Island, thirty miles south of Charleston. By late March, Clinton, with approximately 12,000 troops, crossed the Ashley River and laid siege to the beleaguered city. Isolated and cut off, Major General Benjamin Lincoln reluctantly surrendered the city and its 5,500 defenders on 12 May. The disaster at Charleston, by far the greatest calamity to befall any American army during the war, emboldened the loyalists and nearly broke the back of the patriot cause in South Carolina. Clinton moved quickly to restore British authority. He organized provincial militia units and initially implemented a liberal pacification policy, whereby the majority of former patriots were paroled and allowed to return to their homes.

By late May, however, Clinton and his naval counterpart, Admiral Mariot Arbuthnot, became increasingly concerned over reports of a French fleet headed for North America. As they hastily re-embarked for New York to counter the threat, the British Commander-in-Chief, still exultant in the wake of his stunning success at Charleston, made a fateful decision. Realizing his pending departure would dramatically reduce British troop strength in the Carolinas and that the benevolence of the crown’s original parole policies precluded the recruitment of enough locally raised provincial militia to make up the difference, Clinton suddenly reversed himself. On 3 June, he issued a new proclamation forcing paroled former patriots to swear an oath of allegiance to the King and, more importantly, to actively engage in supporting royal authority. The decision, born out of practical military necessity, constituted a grievous political miscalculation. While it was reasonable to expect a former Whig to give up the fight and return home, it was quite another matter to now force him to take up arms against his friends and neighbors.

**Victory Was Never Enough**

Cornwallis assumed command of the Southern Army on 5 June. He wasted little time implementing Clinton’s new policy and expanding British control over the region. With his seaboard bases at Savannah, Beaufort, Charleston, and Georgetown now secure, Cornwallis aggressively projected British expeditionary power deep into the country’s interior. He established a series of garrisons along the Saluda River westward to Ninety-Six and pursued the scattered remnants of the Continental army north along the Catawba River valley. On 16 August, Cornwallis, with just 2,200 troops, shattered General Horatio Gates at Camden and sent what remained of the demoralized American army scurrying across the North Carolina border toward Charlotte. Ironically,
though no organized Continental force remained in the Carolinas, the seeds of political disaster, long ignored or completely misunderstood, now sprouted in the wake of Cornwallis’s conventional success.32

Cornwallis’s army, even with the addition of a substantial number of loyalist militia, was simply too small to consolidate British authority over so large an area. Moreover, the combination of imperial hubris and the flawed implementation of Clinton’s pacification policies ignited an insurgency that quickly metastasized into a ruthless and bloody civil war.33 American guerrillas led by Thomas Sumter, Francis Marion, and Andrew Pickens attacked British outposts and threatened lines of communications.34 More significantly, while Cornwallis and his loyalist militia searched in vain for the remnants of Gates’ scattered Continentals far to the north, American partisans killed or intimidated large numbers of Tories, who suddenly found themselves outnumbered and unprotected.35

On 7 October, a motley collection of rugged American mountain men destroyed one of Cornwallis’s flanking columns, under the command of Major Patrick Ferguson at King’s Mountain. The Scotch-Irish Presbyterians of the Watauga region established a semiautonomous community in the mountains of western North Carolina after the Battle of Alamance in 1771.36 They harbored no particular loyalty to either crown or the fledgling United States, but watched with increasing trepidation as Ferguson’s column, comprised entirely of loyalist militia, approached their homes. When the aggressive and head-strong British Major threatened to “burn the whole country” if the frontiersmen did not turn over the Patriot Colonel Isaac Shelby, known to be taking refuge in the area, over a thousand backwoods riflemen emerged seemingly out of nowhere and quickly overwhelmed the column.37 The British lost 1,125 men in the hour-long battle, including at least nine prominent Tories who were hastily tried and summarily executed. King’s Mountain marked a significant turning point in the war. The shocking reversal all but destroyed the loyalist movement in the region and forced a stunned Cornwallis, then on the outskirts of Charlotte, to beat a hasty retreat south into the Palmetto State.38

The Road to Guilford Courthouse

Nathanael Greene arrived in Charlotte on 2 December 1780. The former Quaker turned patriot inherited less than fifteen hundred disorganized and dispirited men.39 Upon his selection to replace Gates as the commander of the Southern Department, Greene undertook a detailed study of the topography and terrain of the region. He harbored no illusions, however, about the dismal prospects of defeating Cornwallis in a conventional military campaign. As such, Greene proposed “to equip a flying army of about eight hundred horse and one thousand infantry . . . and make a kind of partisan war.”40 On 4 December, he established communications with Francis Marion and other partisan leaders. Greene encouraged cooperation and implored patriot irregulars to provide intelligence and continue their subversive operations while he made plans and preparations to regain the initiative.41
In late December, Greene moved south and boldly divided his army in the face of Cornwallis’s superior force. On 17 January, Greene’s western detachment, commanded by Daniel Morgan, baited Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton into giving battle at Cowpens. The subsequent destruction of a second isolated British column in less than four months incensed Cornwallis, but did little to alter his thinking regarding the utility of conventional military force in a people’s war. As patriot militiamen simply melted back into the countryside, the enraged British general initiated a precipitous and ill-advised pursuit of Morgan that took him across the border and deep into western North Carolina.

Greene hastened north and consolidated his ragtag army but refused to give battle. On 26 January, a frustrated Cornwallis, now operating over extended lines of communications and unable to catch the fleet-footed Americans, decided to burn his army’s baggage. The move did little to improve his mobility relative to the Americans. Greene continued a cat-and-mouse game of provocation luring the British further north, while his partisans and militia continued to harass British foraging parties and communications. On 15 March, Greene, his ranks temporarily buoyed by an influx of militia, finally gave battle at Guilford Court House. The British held the field, but it was a classic pyrrhic victory. Over a quarter of Cornwallis’s army lay dead or wounded. Running dangerously low on supplies and realizing that another “victory” over Greene would destroy his emaciated army, Cornwallis left seventy of his most seriously wounded in a Quaker meeting house at New Garden, reluctantly turned his back on the Piedmont, and marched to the sea.

The paucity of loyalist support, not logistical difficulties, proved decisive in Cornwallis’s fateful decision to abandon the Carolinas. Throughout the campaign, Cornwallis stubbornly clung to the belief that a decisive tactical victory over Greene would liberate or somehow empower the crown’s many loyalist friends to join him. Guilford Court House finally shattered his naiveté. Reflecting on the indecisive nature of the campaign, a frustrated Cornwallis observed, “Many rode into camp, shook me by the hand, said they were glad to see us, and that we had beat Greene, then rode home again. I could not get a hundred men in all the Regulator’s country to stay with us even as militia.”

Cornwallis’s army limped into Wilmington on 7 April. Three days later, the dejected general wrote to Clinton in New York, “I cannot help but expressing my wishes that the Chesapeake may become the seat of the war.” Amazingly, even at this late hour, Cornwallis still thought “a successful battle may give us America.” Greene, however, did not wait idle as the British contemplated shifting operations to Virginia. By 29 March, he decided to “carry the war immediately into South Carolina.” As Cornwallis moved north toward his rendezvous with destiny, Greene and his American partisans returned to the very seat of British power in the South. Unlike Cornwallis, however, Greene’s objectives were political not military. Though he continued to lose battles, Hobkirk’s Hill on 25 April and Eutaw Springs on 8 September, he nonetheless succeeded in further eroding British authority and political support among the people of South Carolina. One by one, isolated British outposts scattered
throughout the interior fell to Greene and his partisans. By October, the tide of British expeditionary power that had once stretched to the mountains of western North Carolina receded to the coastal bastions of Charleston and Savannah.\(^{50}\)

**Defeat by Indecision**

When the unfathomable news of Yorktown reached London in November 1781, the American Secretary, Lord George Germain, grasping for the straws of an increasingly unlikely military victory, proposed raising a force of 28,000 men to hold the coastal enclaves of New York, Charleston, and Savanna.\(^{51}\) Similarly, in late December, the Governor of New York, James Robertson, pleaded for reinforcements and the resumption of offensive warfare in the north, arguing that “an army without hope of getting back America should not stay in it.”\(^{52}\) Unfortunately for the North Ministry and the thousands of loyalists in America it was the Governor’s tacit admission, not his call for still more troops in support of an expensive and increasingly desultory war, which more accurately reflected the political reality of a deeply divided Great Britain.\(^{53}\) Germain, long buffeted by an angry sea of political recrimination, finally resigned in early February. His replacement, Welbore Ellis, addressed a skeptical Parliament on 22 February in a desperate attempt to rally the fragile and rapidly eroding political support for the King’s policies. Remarkably, the Ministry, rekindling the strategic debate after the Saratoga disaster, now adopted a subtle variation of the opposition’s long-standing argument against continuation of the war:

As to the American war, it had always been his firm opinion, that it was just in its origin . . . but he never entertained an idea, nor did he believe any man in that House ever imagined, that America was to be reduced to obedience by force; his ideal always was that in America we had many friends; and by strongly supporting them, we should be able to destroy that party or faction that wished for war . . . . To destroy that faction, and assist our friends there in that desired object, was, in his opinion, the true and only object of the war. Whether that object was now attainable, was the matter . . . to be considered.\(^{54}\)

The opposition, vindicated by the Ministry’s tacit admission of failure and galvanized by a rapid and unprecedented influx of political defections, decided it was not attainable. On 27 February, the House of Commons formally denounced “the further prosecution of offensive warfare on the continent of North America, for the purpose of reducing the revolted colonies to obedience by force.”\(^{55}\) Less than a month later, the North Ministry collapsed under the weight of a protracted, unpopular, and, in the minds of most Englishmen, an ill-advised, poorly planned, and increasingly unwinnable war.\(^{56}\) On 27 March, the King, after briefly contemplating abdication, begrudgingly turned to the opposition who formed a new government under the leadership of the Marquis of Rockingham. The new Ministry quickly abolished the American Department and ordered the evacuation of New York, Charleston, and Savannah.\(^{57}\) In the process, the Rockingham Ministry accomplished what Washington’s intrepid army, even after it was augmented
by powerful French expeditionary forces and buoyed by the British disaster at Yorktown, could never do—it physically removed the world's dominant military power from America.

**War Turned Upside Down**

Insurgencies represent complex political, social, and military problems. They require an adroit, sophisticated, and flexible integration of all instruments of national power to defeat or prevent. It would be wrong to pin the crown’s failure in the South on Cornwallis alone, for the seeds of the British disaster in America lay deep and were sown many years prior by men occupying more influential positions. Yet, Cornwallis, like the vast majority of his British colleagues, fundamentally misunderstood both the nature and the character of the war in the South. He embarked upon an ill-conceived and tragically flawed campaign that focused, almost exclusively, on the physical destruction of an enemy army. Moreover, Cornwallis’s tactical and operational plans, while bold and audacious, were not in consonance with the spirit or intent of Clinton’s instructions or the shift in British strategy made necessary by France’s entry into the war. The Americans, by contrast, employed a decentralized strategy that concentrated, not on the annihilation of British military forces, but rather on securing the political and popular support of the indigenous population.

Throughout the campaign the British consistently overestimated both the extent and capabilities of loyalist support, failed to secure the local population, and seemed incapable of comprehending that the loyalty of the people trumped the quest for tactical glories. The destruction of unsupported Tory units at Ramsour’s Mill, North Carolina, and King’s Mountain, South Carolina, in 1780 stifled the further recruitment of fence sitters and sent a chilling message to would be loyalists. Though a significant percentage of the population were indifferent or actually harbored pro-British sentiment, Cornwallis, by and large, failed to secure it. Marauding Southern partisans prosecuted a shadowing, but effective, campaign of fear and intimidation that eventually cemented the loyalties and allegiance of the local population. Ironically, Cornwallis facilitated patriot political success by impetuously chasing Gates, and then Greene, into the strategically insignificant terrain of the mountainous southern back country and implementing flawed political-military policies that led to repressive acts of violence against the civil population under British control.

Greene and the Americans, by contrast, owed their success to the confluence of three principal factors. First, the terrain in the Carolinas, both human and physical, facilitated patriot operations. The region’s ambiguous political loyalties, restricted mobility, and challenging topography all leant themselves to the type of isolated, hit and run, small-unit tactics employed by Greene and his partisans. Second, Greene’s sophisticated comprehension of the relationship between military means and political ends precluded the destruction of his undermanned army, fueled the insurgency, and ultimately consummated his military endeavors with enduring political success. Lacking in tactical acumen, he nonetheless proved patient and pragmatic only giving battle when
the political or strategic gains clearly exceeded the tactical price. \[66\] Finally, the tenacity and fighting qualities of the Southern partisan proved decisive. The patriot cause inherited an exceptional cadre of experienced and committed irregulars. Thomas Sumter, William Moultrie, Francis Marion, Issac Huger, and Andrew Pickens organized and led small, but highly effective, partisan units. These men, all veteran Indian fighters, possessed in-depth knowledge of the local terrain and had long ago mastered the unconventional methods of irregular warfare. For many, including both Sumter and Pickens, their visceral hatred of the British cemented their loyalty to the patriot cause and ensured that there would be no turning back.\[67\]

The war in the South was not won or lost on the conventional battlefield. American success was the product of a complex, unconventional, and violent political struggle for the loyalty and allegiance of the southern population. American partisans, operating in countless towns and villages and employing methods of political coercion that would appear unconscionable to us today, proved decisive. While it seems unlikely that a man of Greene’s Quaker upbringing would have openly condoned these draconian tactics, many of which bear a striking similarity to the abhorrent, but nonetheless, classic, insurgent tactics used in Algeria, Vietnam, and Iraq, he most certainly knew they were being employed. Not long after his arrival in the South he noted with a considerable degree of resignation:

There is not a day passes but there are more or less who fall a sacrifice to this savage disposition. The Whigs seem determined to extirpate the Tories and the Tories the Whigs . . . . If a stop cannot be put to these massacres, the country will be depopulated . . . as neither Whig nor Tory can live.\[68\]

Operating over a century and a half prior to Mao, Greene and his partisan colleagues mastered the quintessential elements of guerrilla warfare. He possessed the presence of mind and clairvoyance of thought to employ a hybrid combination of conventional and unconventional methods in pursuit of a decisive political, not military, outcome. Greene realized, through a strange combination of necessity and serendipity, what Cornwallis could not—the Southern Revolution was a violent internal political struggle between the Tories and Whigs of the Carolinas. It may be doubted today, with a considerable degree of legitimacy, whether the British, burdened with the global responsibilities of empire and shackled by the tyranny of distance in the age of sail, could have ever prevailed in the face of such a complicated and unconventional undertaking.\[69\] It appears certain, however, that the conflict in the South constituted a type of warfare that Cornwallis and his political masters in London were unprepared to confront and, most assuredly, failed to comprehend until it was far too late.\[70\]

**Conclusion: The Futility of Force and the Preservation of Power**

Admittedly, the selective use of history is dangerous, but a careful examination of the principal causes of British strategic failure in America offers
a series of profound lessons for the exercise and preservation of US national power in an age of austerity and limited war. First, an overreliance on tactical prowess, manifested in the false hope of decisive battle, constitutes a poor substitute for a thoughtful, coherent, and proactive national strategy that integrates all instruments of national power prior to, not just after, the commencement of hostilities. Great Britain, not unlike the modern United States, was a seafaring nation not a dominant land power. Endowed with the blessings of geography, the United Kingdom traditionally exercised strategic patience combined with sea power, economic leverage, and forward-thinking diplomacy to compensate for the inherent limitations of its ground forces. All three of these enlightened and far-sighted national policies failed or were never fully developed during the War for American Independence.

Once hostilities commenced, the British government consistently struggled to achieve unity of effort across a compartmentalized and nonintegrated ministerial system. The fragmented nature of the imperial bureaucracy eventually resulted in an increase in the power and influence of the American Department. This did not, however, ensure cross-departmental integration or the development of a prescient national strategy to deal with the problem of rebellion. Britain’s senior military officer, Adjutant General Thomas Harvey railed at the prospect of using the British Army to subdue America, “it is impossible to conquer it with our British Army . . . . To attempt to conquer it internally by our land force is as wild an idea as ever controverted common sense.” Harvey was not alone. While most officials in the British government agreed that force could be used, there was considerable divergence of opinion on whether it should be. Similarly, many senior political and military leaders advocated a maritime strategy based on economic pressure and British sea power, believing the rebellion would eventually fall under its own weight.

Such sage political-military advice, however, fell on deaf ears, hijacked, in large measure, by the vocal remonstrations of several colonial governors who fueled the false belief that the rebellion was the work of a vocal minority of “turbulent and seditious” individual political agitators. Similarly, several influential ministers advanced equally irresponsible myths of martial superiority. Sir Jeffery Amherst, for one, boasted that he could, with just 5,000 men, sweep from one end of America to another. Likewise, Lord Sandwich of the Admiralty declared that the Americans would run at “the very sound of cannon . . . as fast as their feet could carry them.” The North Ministry eventually turned, despite the warnings of its senior officer in America, General Thomas Gage, to the one element of national power it could control and employ in short order—the military. In retrospect, it could legitimately be argued, that Great Britain’s strategic leaders lost the war for America before it ever began.

The British experience with irregular warfare, particularly in the South, constitutes a second and exceedingly relevant lesson for the contemporary United States. The American Revolution differed significantly from the traditional dynastic wars of the eighteenth-century. Though there were compelling elements of the latter that gave the conflict an appearance of conventional
interstate warfare, in reality, a loose confederation of patriot militia and political leaders, cementing the loyalty and allegiance of their fellow countrymen in countless towns and villages, not the application of regular military force, proved decisive. An important, if generally underappreciated, phenomenon clearly articulated by the late Walter Mills:

Repeatedly it was the militia which met the critical emergency or, in less formal operations, kept control of the country, cut off foragers, captured British agents, intimidated the war-weary and disaffected or tarred and feathered the notorious Tories. While the regular armies marched and fought more or less ineffectually, it was the militia which presented the greatest single impediment to Britain’s only practicable weapon, that of counter-revolution.82

Britain’s army, like that of the modern United States, was trained, organized, and equipped to seek decisive battle with a like opponent, operating under the traditional political-military construct of the Clausewitzian trinity.83 This paradigm, while applicable in conventional interstate conflict, proved woefully inadequate for the challenges and nuance of intrastate warfare waged against an extra-legal political entity.84 While British tactical acumen proved effective militarily, it could never, in and of itself, secure the loyalty or allegiance of the population. The creation of numerous provincial units like the Queen’s Rangers, Tarleton’s Legion, et al. reinforces the idea that several British tactical and operational commanders, over time, came to appreciate the reality and the complexities of the type of war upon which they were engaged.85 The development of British strategy, however, struggled to catch up to the facts on the ground.86 Ultimately, the British Army, not unlike the employment of US forces in Vietnam, proved neither an adequate shield for the loyalist population nor a terrible swift-sword capable of destroying a fledgling, but increasingly capable, Continental Army. Thus, in waging a war it was not intellectually prepared to fight, the British Army lost the opportunity to fight the war it knew how to win.87

Finally, British strategic failure in America serves as a powerful reminder that the long-term interest of the state must not fall victim to fear, honor, and an overinflated view of what is militarily possible or wise.88 Throughout the war the British, “made their plans to suit their understanding of the rebellion and that understanding was shaped consistently by ignorance and by wishful thinking.”89 America can ill afford to be provoked or deluded into making a similar mistake in the twenty-first century. A great nation, to remain so, must employ superior strategic thinking and foresight to avoid the perils of desultory warfare or the necessity to exercise superior force in the first place. The tragedy for the United States is not that it lost the Vietnam War or now finds itself mired in expensive, protracted, and irregular conflicts like Iraq and Afghanistan, but rather, in the process of usurping Great Britain as the economic, political, and military leader of the free world, it seemingly forgot a series of lessons it once taught.90

British strategic failure in America, not unlike the French in Algeria, the United States in Vietnam, or the Soviets in Afghanistan, demonstrated the
futility of limited conventional military force to solve what was essentially a political problem and terminated, only belatedly, with a somber realization that the country’s long-term interest demanded the preservation of her national power, vice the short-term and perpetual expenditure of it, in pursuit of a political objective that was in no way commensurate with the costs. Unwilling to destroy the colonies in order to save them, British military strategy became a reluctant prisoner of deeply flawed strategic assumptions, a government that failed to determine a realistic and militarily attainable political objective, and a blatant inability to accurately determine the kind of war upon which the nation was engaged until it was far too late.

Viewed in this light, the Southern Campaign represents not so much the separate and distinct phase of the war it is so often portrayed to be, but rather, it reflected the logical byproduct of years of political miscalculation and the devolution of a military strategy that increasingly came to rely on a “pacification” strategy, predicated on the promise of loyalist support, to compensate for a paucity of both forces and political will to continue a controversial, expensive, and increasingly unpopular war. It also represented a belated, though certainly unstated, admission that blows alone, or more precisely, the chimera of decisive battle, could not secure the loyalty and allegiance of an ambivalent or hostile people, numerous, and armed. In the process, the British learned that battlefield brilliance seldom rescues bad strategy; there are, in fact, limits to what military force can achieve, and national leaders who base their plans and policies primarily on hope and a stubborn belief in the sanctity of their own concerted views, if wrong, can lead a nation to disaster. Contemporary practitioners of the profession of arms should neither hold the British in contempt nor hypocritically criticize their strategic failure in America; rather we should learn from it—ex preteritus nostrum posterus.

Notes

2. For the extent and challenges associated with the precipitous rise of British hegemony in the wake of the Seven Years War, see Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 503-506, 516-517; Brendan Simms, Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire, 1714-1783 (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 501-531.
3. John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 115. Fiscal pressures played a significant role in both the cause and termination of the War for American Independence. Great Britain’s national debt nearly doubled, rising from 80 to 140 million pounds, during the Seven Years War. Similarly, during the War for American Independence, the national debt exploded from 130 million pounds in 1775 to nearly 240 million pounds by 1783.
4. In many ways the evolution of warfare could be seen as unwinding in the aftermath of the apogee of the Second World War and the introduction of nuclear weapons. One only need look at the decidedly mixed record of conventionally superior forces in the post-World War II era for evidence of this counterintuitive phenomenon. The apparent impracticality of “conventional” interstate warfare is briefly addressed in Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London:


16. For the British Army’s emphasis on decisive battle, see Matthew H. Spring, *With Zeal and with Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America, 1775-1783* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 18-23.

17. An appreciation for Britain’s global responsibilities remains a paramount, if underappreciated, prerequisite for understanding the strategic direction and outcome of the war. It also constitutes the dominant theme of Mackesy’s critically acclaimed, *The War for America*. See, in particular, 181-186, 262-266, 279-297, 301-318, and 510-518.


20. Black, *War for America*, 151-154. The “terms” the North Ministry empowered Carlisle to make shattered two decades of political intransigence and represented a dramatic and radical reordering of the imperial system. Parliament ceded its right to tax the colonies save for the regulation of trade and granted the Americans direct representation in the House of Commons. In short, it gave the colonists everything they asked for prior to the commencement of hostilities, but withheld the...


29. Black, *War for America*, 219. In assessing Cornwallis’s temperament and conduct of the Southern Campaign, Black observed: “The earl clearly had no time for pacification, as his later actions in India and Ireland were to show. Instead he continued to seek decisive battle.” For a more sympathetic interpretation of Cornwallis and his generalship, see Franklin B. Wickwire and Mary Wickwire, *Cornwallis: The American Adventure* (Boston: Mifflin, 1970), 170-193.


34. Ibid., 360. Also see, Treacy, *Prelude to Yorktown*, 13-19.


43. Treacy, *Prelude to Yorktown*, 123.
47. Ibid., 11.
52. Royal Governor of New York, James Robertson to Lord Amherst, December 27, 1781, quoted in Black, *War for America*, 236.
53. Ian R Christie, *The End of North’s Ministry, 1780-1782* (London: Macmillan, 1958), 267-298, details the political crisis in the immediate aftermath of Yorktown. For the interplay of domestic politics on the planning and conduct of the southern campaign, see 261-266.
56. Ibid., 299-369.
90. For informed critiques of the “American way of war” and how it pertains, or fails to pertain, to the contemporary and future operating environments, see Colin Gray, *Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006); Antulio J. Echevarria, *Toward an American Way of War* (Carlisle Barracks, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, 2004); and Weigley, *The Partisan War*, 1. Weigley’s observations, written nearly forty-two years ago, remain particularly insightful.


92. Translation is “From our past, our future.”
The Internet, New Media, and the Evolution of Insurgency

Steven Metz
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Introduction

Insurgency, like war, has an enduring nature and a changing character. It remains a strategy entailing violence used by the weak and desperate against a power system. Often (but not always), this pits a nonstate or proto-state organization against a state. Out of weakness, the organization using a strategy of insurgency attempts to shift the focus of conflict away from domains where the state or other power structure is particularly strong, particularly the conventional military. Insurgents seek to make domains decisive where morale and other psychological characteristics matter more than tangible power, recognizing these characteristics even the odds to a certain extent. The enduring nature of insurgency includes three core functions: an insurgency must survive, it must strengthen itself, and it must weaken the power structure or state.

How an insurgency accomplishes these three objectives constitutes the changing character of the phenomenon. Throughout the long history of insurgency there have been multiple types or models. Today, three exist in various parts of the world. One is the proto-state. Derived from the Maoist movements of the twentieth century, this is often considered the gold standard for any insurgency. In this model, an insurgency weakens the state through guerrilla attacks, terrorism, subversion, and psychological operations while it simultaneously serves the functions of the state in areas it controls. By demonstrating that it can provide better services than the existing state, it hopes to win support and eventually replace the existing government. This type of insurgency was particularly effective in peasant societies where active popular support mattered greatly; hence, the insurgents and the state competed for that support. In the classic Maoist method, final victory comes when the insurgency is the equal of the state politically, militarily, and economically. The organizations created

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by Mao and his best student—Ho Chi Minh—ultimately won conventional military victories over the Chinese and Vietnamese and were immediately prepared to assume the role of the state.

The second model—and one which is more controversial among insurgency theorists—is nonpolitical. Rather than seeking to replace the state, this type of insurgent simply wants to weaken the state sufficiently to be free of its control. Normally, it is the insurgent’s intent to practice some form of organized criminal activity. Like organized crime everywhere, these insurgents seek passivity more than active popular support. The methods of such insurgents, though, are quite similar to the politically focused insurgent. Mexico today is one example of this while some other insurgencies that began life as proto-state insurgencies eventually devolved into nonpolitical or what might be called commercial insurgencies. Examples of these include the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in Colombia, Shining Path in Peru, and a number of African movements.

The third model consists of insurgencies that hope to replace the state but, because they are unable to control significant territory, approach the goal of destroying the state and replacing it in a sequential rather than simultaneous manner. Their initial focus is destruction. Again, active support is less important than passivity. They use a dispersed, networked organization and rely on the swarming method of attacks dominated by terrorism rather than guerrilla or conventional military operations. To augment their ability to survive and increase their own strength, they develop an important transnational dimension. Since traditional, Maoist style insurgencies seek to carve out, administer, and govern “liberated areas,” they are intimately connected to specific locales and populations in those locales. Because networked insurgencies do not seek or are unable to develop liberated areas which they administer and govern, they are less intimately linked to specific locales and populations. They can shift their area of operations to different parts of a country or even to other countries with little effort.

There are a number of things that make networked insurgencies prevalent in the contemporary security environment. One is the increased effectiveness of state security services. Proto-state insurgencies, particularly in their early stages, required ungoverned or poorly governed regions in which to establish their state-like organizations, including their guerrilla and, in some cases, conventional military capability. They needed the state to be unaware of their existence or at least to not take them seriously during their gestation period. Today, both the field of vision and operational effectiveness of state militaries make this difficult (but not impossible) to attain. The second reason is the decline in the use of insurgents as proxies. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, China, funded, equipped, trained, and supported insurgents as a method of indirect aggression against the West. This aided insurgent organizations in addressing the asymmetry between themselves and the state they sought to replace, making the proto-state model feasible. Today, external support for insurgencies still occurs but at a much lower level than
during the Cold War, making the proto-state model infeasible in the majority of cases. Even insurgents who would like to emulate Mao or Ho simply are unable to do so, and thus gravitate to other forms of insurgency. The third factor supporting networked insurgencies in today’s strategic environment is the number of new technologies and systems for utilizing them—particularly the Internet and new media—that have made the dispersed, networked, transnational, and terrorism-focused organizations more effective and survivable and, therefore, more prevalent.

**Insurgent Use of the Internet and New Media**

When discussing the use of the Internet and new media by insurgents, we are actually discussing three separate but closely linked items: technology, systems for utilizing this technology, and a culture that influences how technology and systems operate. All are well known to anyone living in a moderately advanced nation or city around the world.

Foremost among the technologies is the Internet which is simply a system of devices and technologies used to exchange digital information. The second key technology is mobile communications which permit the exchange of information to take place. The third are technologies to digitize data so it can be exchanged, particularly digital still and video cameras, along with the software to capture, alter, and share high quality images and video. This technology is now quite cheap, easy to acquire, and relatively easy to use. Until recently the technology to create high quality images and video was expensive and extremely complicated, thus limiting the number of users who could master it. It required extensive training. Since those individuals and organizations with the resources to purchase this expensive equipment and undergo the training to utilize it were relatively few, states knew who they were and often could control them. Today, images and videos are created and distributed via “decentralized networks of users who can incrementally improve (them) by applying personalized skill sets.” The old, industrial method of production required training workers who then built to standards under the supervision of a hierarchy. Distribution was executed in a similar manner. The new technique is “crowd sourcing,” a collective process where self-inspired and often self-trained participants are involved, and quality control is via collective evaluations (commonly known as the “wiki” process after the Internet encyclopedia Wikipedia). In the broadest sense, the initial costs associated with being an information creator—whether it involves education, research, or physical equipment—are significantly lower than in the past, permitting more people, some with nefarious intention, to assume the role.

The system for the exploitation of new technology includes the World Wide Web, e-mail, file-sharing programs such as peer-to-peer networks, chat rooms, blogs, microblogs (most famously Twitter), instant messaging, short message services on mobile phones, social networking (most famously Facebook, but including thousands of other forms), cloud file storage and sharing
like Drop Box and Google Documents, photo sharing web sites such as Flickr and Photobucket, and video sharing such as YouTube and Google Videos.

The third component—and the one which makes the Internet and new media useful to insurgents—is the culture that supports its use. Technology itself did not create the culture, but it amplifies various trends, characteristics, and aspects. One important dimension of this is anti-authoritarianism. Young people, who are the most likely to embrace the Internet and new media, are naturally anti-authoritarian, particularly at this time in history when traditional structures for the exercise of authority have broken down. The Internet and social media add to this environment by allowing those with anti-authoritarian feelings to communicate with others who share their beliefs, capitalizing on what Audrey Cronin calls “a global explosion in chaotic connectivity.”

Digital connection reinforces anti-authoritarian attitudes because those who hold these beliefs do not feel they are alone. In a broad sense, the world is witness to “the emergence of a visually-oriented, ideologically impulsive Internet culture with the means to rapidly and collectively plan and act.” In some societies this can lead to the development of the transnational hacker or hacktivist communities but it can also, with proper leadership, lead to the establishment of insurgent organizations. Phrased differently, it provides the psychological and attitudinal raw material for insurgents to exploit.

The Internet helps fill the authority vacuum left by the decline of traditional structures and the inability of the state to replace them. The challenge for twentieth century insurgents was to overcome the passivity and deference to authority among the peasantry, to stir them to action by overcoming the belief that they owed an obligation to the state but the state did not owe one to them. Today’s insurgents do not face passivity and deference. Web-skilled youth inherently believe that the state has an obligation to them, to include the provision of services, education, and employment. The challenge for insurgents then is to organize, operationalize, and sustain the preexisting anti-authoritarianism. It is a matter of channeling an existing propensity to action rather than creating it. This is an important concept since much of the thinking regarding counterinsurgency is based on traditional and increasingly obsolete notions of authority as portrayed in the concept of legitimacy, which is often defined as an attribute of the state.

The culture of the Internet is depersonalizing and insurgents can exploit this fact. Organized violence always requires depersonalizing the enemy in an effort to overcome the natural reluctance to kill. The inherent depersonalization of the Internet facilitates this. Video games may contribute as well, making violence seem unreal and camouflaging its real cost. For many terrorists, their victims are simply characters in a game rather than real, living beings.

This blurring of the distinction between reality and a virtual world is a central component of Internet culture. For some who are immersed in this culture, it is difficult to distinguish their online, virtual life from their real one. In extreme cases, the virtual life dominates. Insurgents who use the Internet and social media for recruitment often exploit this phenomenon, portraying...
an idealized, alternative reality imbued with moral clarity in a grand struggle
between good and evil. This appeals to those lost in a depersonalized, virtual
world. And just as there are no real costs for failing in a video game, these
recruits can convince themselves that there are few or no personal costs for
undertaking violence, whether it is mass murder or some other form of terror-
ism. The fact that it is easier to recruit terrorists who will complete a mission
before reality of the act sets in and, therefore, only need a brief period of intense
commitment rather than the extended commitment of a guerrilla, forces the
modern insurgent to rely on terrorism as the preferred form of conflict. Terrorist
recruits perform their acts before the commitment erodes. Terrorism is not
necessarily more effective than guerrilla operations, but it is easier to create
and sustain in the contemporary security environment.

It takes a special person to become an insurgent, to undertake the per-
sonal danger and hardship it entails. For traditional insurgents, finding those
rare people was difficult. Because they make it easy, cheap, and safe to initiate
contact with a large number of people, the Internet and new media greatly
increase the ability of insurgents to find the type of recruits they are seeking.
Once potential recruits express an interest in chat rooms, discussion boards, or
by e-mail, insurgents can screen them and begin the recruitment process and
integration into the movement.

The culture of the Internet and new media are also changing the tradi-
tional notion of credibility. For much of human history (and still in a number
of societies), credibility is determined by affinity. The more affinity between
the audience and the source of information—friends, family, clan, tribe, sect,
religion, race, ethnicity—the greater the credibility of the information. As US
forces in Iraq discovered, empirical evidence was less important than affinity in
shaping an explanation of an event. In the modern age, credibility also derived
from the authority of the source. Certain institutions are considered credible,
normally because of the procedures they use to derive information and posi-
tions (fact checking, peer review, due process, etc.), because they represented
traditional authority (monarchy, church) or because of the personality of the
individual who represented that authority.

On the Internet, information and ideas move with such rapidity and in
such complex ways, it is impossible to identify or gauge the authority of a given
source. Information may have been passed through hundreds, thousands, or
even millions of individuals and locations via e-mail, online discussions, blogs,
web pages, tweets, and so forth. No one will be able to identify its origin. The
criterion for credibility thus becomes the inherent receptivity of the receiver.
People assign credibility to information or positions that reinforce their exist-
ing beliefs, in most cases, because they cannot gauge the authoritative nature of
the original source. Anyone who has engaged in political debate sees this—for
many people pointing to a web page that supports their position is validation
enough. The Internet and new media are rife with myths which sometimes
subside and then reappear at unpredictable times. No idea, no matter how delu-
sional, suffers a final death in the virtual world. This aspect of Internet and new
media culture is a boon for insurgents, especially in societies with a proclivity to believe anything that portrays the state as repressive, nefarious, corrupt, evil, or inept. And these are precisely the sort of places where insurgency takes root. Because the original source of the information is not known, audiences assign it credibility based on their general attitude regarding the state. When this attitude is negative, negative information becomes inherently credible.

Since one of the defining features of insurgency is the desire to center the struggle in the psychological realm where any material weakness of the insurgency is less debilitating than if it were in the conventional military realm; the culture of the Internet and new media afford insurgents great opportunity. Insurgents utilize specific technologies based on their perceived usefulness, its ease of use, and the risk involved. Part of the appeal of the Internet and new media for insurgents is the low cost and lack of barriers to its use—any number of potential recruits already possess the technology and know how to use it. The extensive numbers of people in cyberspace and virtual worlds also provide a degree of security. This is particularly important during the early, vulnerable stages of an insurgency. (Not unlike animals, most insurgencies die in childhood). By using the Internet and new media, nascent insurgencies reach widely dispersed audiences of potential recruits, supporters, and allies at a very low cost, and with less chance of discovery. As Brian Petit phrased it, “borderless social mobilization allows like-minded groups to coalesce digitally with less risk than the traditional early, vulnerable stages of building a resistance movement.”

Given the huge amount of digital information constantly flowing, it is difficult for security forces to distinguish between serious threats and trivial ones. This lack of clarity affords insurgents a degree of protection. They may not be “amongst the people” but they are within the matrix.

The early stages of most insurgencies involve as great an internal struggle as an external one. Various factions and cliques compete for power and engage in conflict with each other. The Internet provides a venue for such conflict, permitting factions and cliques to “conduct ideological debates or even personal disputes.” While crafting a coherent movement, insurgents no longer need a sanctuary where they can iron out their differences as the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks did in London and Switzerland, or the Vietnamese communists did in Paris and Moscow. In fact, Cori Dauber calls the Internet “the new Afghanistan” for violent extremists. Internet-powered insurgencies can draw recruits and support from around the world, particularly if the instigators use transnational ideologies rather than purely local or nationalistic ones. The only prerequisites are Internet access and emotion. Both are abundant in today’s uncertain strategic environment.

In addition to organization-forming and network building, insurgents find the Internet and new media useful for fundraising. This is critical given the decline in (although not the end of) state sponsorship for insurgencies. Fundraising may take the form of soliciting donations from sympathizers or diasporas or, increasingly (as state security services pressure donators), involvement in online crime such as credit card fraud, identity theft, and other scams.
The Internet and new media also provide insurgents with a greatly expanded and more secure capacity for training, operational planning, and intelligence gathering. As Timothy Thomas notes, it provides “anonymity, command and control resources, and a host of other measures to coordinate and integrate attack options.” Iraqi insurgents, for instance, used Google Earth to identify targets and infiltration/exfiltration routes. Other violent groups have found target maps, diagrams, and images online. The relatively low cost, ease, and safety of online training and planning guides the insurgent toward an increased reliance on terrorism mainly due to its inherent ease of organization online when compared with a guerrilla operation. This is particularly true if the terrorist is deemed expendable. An organization minimizes the training it expends on an individual who will only perform one mission. These individuals normally do not want or need extensive, person-to-person contact or bonding. Online training is depersonalized, cheap, and easy. It becomes relatively painless for insurgent leaders to send individuals they have not met on a suicide mission. Hence, insurgencies are becoming terrorism-focused not because this is a particularly effective way of attaining their strategic objectives, but because the resources available lend themselves to such a strategy.

**Effects Impacting the Insurgent’s Use of Internet and New Media**

What, then, does all this mean? In the broadest sense, the extensive use of or reliance on the Internet and new media drive insurgencies toward the adoption of a dispersed, networked, transnational, terrorism-centric movement, one that relies heavily on swarming tactics and operations. This type of insurgency has probably existed throughout history but only now does it have the tools to be effective. The Internet and new media allow such insurgencies to be acceptably effective at the three core functions of survival, strengthening itself, and weakening its enemy. With regard to networks in general, Arquilla and Ronfeldt note, “To realize its potential, a fully interconnected network requires a capacity for casting dense information and communications flows, more so than do other forms of organization.” Today’s technology is capable of supporting an ever-expanding information flow. It has also reduced transmission times and cost, allowing dispersed units or organizations to communicate, coordinate, and swarm, either to targets or to successful narratives. By acting with some degree of effectiveness even without central command and control, insurgencies as a movement are more survivable because they are not vulnerable to decapitation of their leadership. The destruction of any one node or even a small number of nodes in the organization is not debilitating.

The Internet and new media allow insurgencies to broaden their base by aggregating anger, frustration, and resentment inherent in many societies. Twentieth century insurgencies became powerful by aggregating local grievances which were always present in these societies. They did so by using face-to-face or traditional communication processes (writing, radio, etc.). These types of activities served as a constraint since potential supporters had to be contacted in person. The Internet and new media make it easy and cost
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effective to contact a much larger group of angry, frustrated, resentful individuals. While the proportion of these supporters who are moved to action may be small, the large number of individuals contacted means that the aggregate size of the force that is moved to action can be significant. This is the same strategy behind e-mail spam or scams: even though the number of recipients who respond in some manner may be small, the fact that the spammers and scammers contact thousands or millions of individuals at a low cost makes the enterprise worthwhile. The Internet and new media are particularly useful for insurgent leaders during major strategic shifts within the movement such as the creation of an insurrection that will serve as a precursor or catalyst for the insurgency, the transformation from insurrection into sustainable insurgency, or when initiating efforts to regain the strategic initiative or stave off some impending threat.

Mobilization based on the Internet and new media is often fueled by raw anger and resentment more than a specific and complex ideology—it has broad appeal. These emotions can give insurgents the ability to surge. When facing an unpopular regime, they can rapidly mobilize an extensive opposition with the hope of overloading the regime’s response capability while goading it into a major mistake. Such an emotional response does not, however, automatically guarantee the beginning of an insurgency. The case of Iran suggests that a brutal and effective regime may quash an insurrection before it becomes an insurgency. Egypt and Tunisia, likewise, suggest that fragile regimes may collapse rather quickly, making insurgency unnecessary. But Libya and Syria suggest that once an insurrection is mobilized, at least partially, by the Internet and new media, it has the potential for developing into a full-scale insurgency. The more dependent a regime is on outside support that can be manipulated via the Internet and social media, the more critical these capabilities become to the insurgents. Of course, the more pervasive the Internet and social media in a particular nation, the greater the chances are that the insurgents will utilize them. Egypt and Tunisia were more vulnerable to Internet and new media opposition because their former regimes were more dependent on external support than the regimes of Iran, Libya, or Syria.

Once an information-rich insurrection is transformed into an insurgency, the multiplicity of connections and communications among individuals and groups makes it difficult to control and predict the effect of a given narrative. This makes the psychological domain of insurgency, which is always critical, much more complex than in the past. The days when insurgents or counterinsurgents could identify a handful of key themes and simply promulgate them in word and deed are long past. Because it is so much easier to communicate with any number of audiences, it becomes harder to gauge the impact of that communication, causing insurgents to craft multiple, even conflicting narratives. When one or more of these initiatives appear to be having some desired effect, the insurgents can reinforce and amplify them. This is not linear strategy in the traditional sense of predicting the most effective way of
attaining a desired end, but a strategy of complexity based on trying numerous activities simultaneously to see which ones work.

A strategy of complexity allows purposeful (but not strategic) action by networks comprised of diverse nodes that are often motivated by subideological factors such as anger or frustration. Internet and new media-based insurgencies do not need (and cannot attain) unity of purpose, but only unity of action. As Marc Sageman notes, “The mass nature of Internet communications encourages sound bites and reductionist answers to difficult questions. Drawn to their logical conclusions, these views encourage extreme, abstract, but simplistic solutions without regard to the reality and complexity of life.”

The use of the Internet and new media by insurgents can be depicted as a continuum: at one end are the traditional insurgencies which simply use these capabilities as a force multiplier. For example, the Taliban is beginning to make greater use of information technology. Younger, technology-savvy insurgents use laptop computers, mobile phones, digital cameras, and global positioning system (GPS) devices for urban reconnaissance, often driving around Afghan cities with dashboard-mounted webcams. These videos are then used for targeting and operational planning. At the other end of the spectrum would be insurgencies created with the Internet and new media relying almost exclusively on the terrorism-focused, swarming methods derived from the utilization of these capabilities. Almost all twenty-first century insurgencies fall somewhere on this spectrum.

Conclusions

The prevalence of dispersed, networked, transnational, terrorism-centric insurgencies relying heavily on swarming tactics and operations is both bad and good news. The bad news is that such organizations are extremely difficult to defeat and eradicate. The Internet and new media cannot be quashed and it is impossible to fully overcome anger and frustration, particularly among the younger population. Because they are networked and transnational, these insurgencies can survive the destruction of a large number of their nodes. Like an Internet myth, they may appear to be dead only to reappear at some unpredictable place or time. Ultimately they cannot be defeated, only managed. Even if it made sense to approach twentieth century counterinsurgency as a form of warfare with the objective of a decisive victory, it makes no sense to approach twenty-first century ones in that manner. “Victory” over twenty-first century insurgents will be as meaningless as victory over the phenomenon of criminal gangs. If one gang is beaten into submission, it normally reemerges in a similar or even identical form, largely due to the fact it is impossible or exorbitantly expensive to alter the social, political, cultural, and economic system that spawned them initially.

The good news is that dispersed, networked, transnational, terrorism-centric insurgencies utilizing swarming tactics and operations are unlikely to attain any decisive victory. This type of organization is much more likely to suffer decisive defeat, at least if it does not have major outside support. They
simply cannot mobilize, focus, and control sufficient power to overcome a state that is capable of sustaining its morale and coherence. Again, a major exception to this relationship may be a state dependent on outside support. If a networked insurgency can erode such support, the state will, in all likelihood, fail (though the insurgents are then likely to lapse into internecine conflict since, in most cases, unlike the Maoist insurgents of the twentieth century, they are not structured to assume the power and functions of the state). Perhaps the most prevalent model for these groups will be Internet and new media-driven, nonviolent insurrections struggling against states that are dependent on outside support, such as Egypt and Tunisia. It is not clear whether these insurrections would have mutated into actual insurgencies had the Egyptian and Tunisian governments fought back.

Insurgents inevitably emulate success. In the twentieth century, when the proto-state Maoist approach was successful, others emulated it. Some succeeded, some did not. Today, insurgents and potential insurgents continue to copy each other. The challenge for the United States, particularly the Army, is to develop counterinsurgency concepts, doctrine, organizations, and leaders which are capable of countering the ongoing variegation of insurgency. The “one size fits all” concept has to be abandoned, whether it applies to a particular form of insurgency, one that treats Maoist insurgencies as a universal model, or of a counterinsurgency, the idea that protecting the population and strengthening the state are the keys to success. Ultimately dispersed, networked, transnational, terrorism-centric insurgencies can only be managed, not defeated, in the traditional sense of the word. Programs for dealing with criminal gangs may provide a better analogy than warfighting, which provided the base line for the original US counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine in the mid-twentieth century. The sooner America’s Army and the rest of the US government accept this, the better they will be at countering these challenging foes.

Notes


2. The concept of commercial insurgency is introduced Steven Metz, The Future of Insurgency (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1993). It has been revived, largely because of the conflict in Mexico. For example, Volume 22, no. 5, of the journal Small Wars and Insurgencies dealt with what the editors called “Criminal Insurgencies in Mexico and the Americas: The Gangs and Cartels Wage War.”

3. The parts of the world without cell phone coverage are shrinking daily. Even large sections of the most backward parts of the world like Somalia have service.


7. The tendency to consider anything that casts the state in a negative light is certainly not limited to the sort of states prone to insurgency—it exists just as much in the United States as anywhere.


11. Much analysis of insurgency underestimates this because it focuses on mature, late-stage insurgencies.

12. Weimann, Terror on the Internet, 141.


16. Dauber, YouTube War, 16-17.

17. Weimann, Terror on the Internet, 111-114.


Editor’s Shelf

Throughout the journal’s history we have utilized this feature to provide readers with knowledge of books that for one reason or another have not made their way into the formal review process. The feature has also afforded the journal’s staff the opportunity to bring new works to our reader’s attention in a timely manner. Of the hundreds of books we receive annually for review, only a limited number ever make their way to the “Book Reviews” section of the journal. For all those readers who, as me, characterize themselves as bibliophiles, we apologize. Apologize, in that, as a quarterly publication we are truly limited in the number of reviews we can actually provide. We are, however, fortunate in this feature to make available an eclectic array, demonstrating a broad diversity of thesis and authorship.

As America’s military casts greater attention on the Asia-Pacific region, we are once again reminded of the critical importance associated with “jointness” and the ability of US Armed Forces to accomplish their assigned missions. To truly understand this relationship, one needs to have some insight into the history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Our friends at the Joint History Office have answered that call. Steven L. Rearden’s Council of War: A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1991 draws on a combination of primary and secondary sources to provide a fresh examination of the organization from its origins in World War II through the end of the Cold War. Following on earlier works of the Joint History Office, Rearden presents a broad view of the history of JCS activities, both in war and peace, while affording the reader with unequalled insight into America’s military history. The book is a must for any student of military history and national security policy.

Two of America’s most respected military historians have joined forces to provide readers with a truly remarkable edited work detailing the history of “hybrid warfare.” Williamson (Wick) Murray and Peter Mansoor’s Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present explains that hybrid warfare has been around since the beginning of time. The editors present nine historical examples of hybrid warfare, from Rome to the present day, giving readers a contextual understanding that this type of warfare is not new or unique. Great powers have been confronted by foes utilizing a combination of regular and irregular forces on a regular basis throughout history. The editors have assembled what can only be described as a “world-class” group of authors. Each chapter is not only insightful and informative, but provides some of the best descriptions of the history of warfare available.

A topic that has supported a number of recent headlines and talk shows is the role that senior military officers and their equivalents play in the modern strategic environment. The eminent author, political scientist, and statesman Carnes Lord bases the book’s thesis on the belief that a number of America’s combatant commanders and their equivalents in the civilian sector have taken on the role once reserved for Roman and British leadership, that of “proconsul.” The author provides a historical analysis of the phenomenon of proconsulship and how it has manifested itself in American history. Proconsuls: Delegated Political-Military Leadership from Rome to America Today begins with an
examination of such great men as Leonard Wood in Cuba and William Howard Taft’s exploits in the Philippines. Lord traces the works of any number of these larger than life personalities throughout history to the present day, concluding with the likes of L. Paul Bremer and David Petraeus in Iraq. The book is rich with insight as to how these proconsuls affected American security policy. One of the blurbs on the book’s cover succinctly captures the value of this work with the assessment, “Like it or not . . . these statesmen were proconsuls on something like the Roman model, and they are not likely to be the last of their kind dispatched abroad by the government of the United States.”

In today’s uncertain and volatile strategic environment, nonproliferation is once again becoming a major concern for governments around the globe. Just how effective America has been in controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) since the end of the Cold War serves as the thesis for Joseph R. Cerami’s splendid work *Leadership and Policy Innovation—From Clinton to Bush*. The author, a distinguished lecturer in National Security Policy and Director of the Public Service Leadership Program at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, provides readers with a an entirely new view of the policies and leadership responsible for countering the proliferation of WMD during the last decade. He examines patterns of organizational leadership and policy innovation on the part of those responsible for developing and implementing initiatives designed to counter WMD during the Clinton administration. This insightful analysis of international relations and public administration provides the reader with greater understanding of how such complex policies are developed. This book is a must for any student or practitioner of American foreign policy in times of crisis or uncertainty.

*Understanding War in Afghanistan* is an intellectual primer on the war in that nation by Joseph J. Collins, one of America’s foremost military minds. The author has studied the conflict in Afghanistan for over three decades, both as a soldier and academic. Collins intends his work to provide military leaders, civil servants, diplomats, and students with the intellectual basis for study or assignment in Afghanistan. He presents a straightforward treatise essential in preparing one for any military or governmental assignment in the region. Likewise, students and scholars will find the monograph provides an unparalleled foundation for future study. Collins presents an insider’s view of the land and its people, the history of the nation, and an assessment of the situation (military and political) during the 2002-10 period of the conflict. This concise presentation is without doubt a valuable reference for any leader or scholar desiring a greater understanding of one of the more violent and inhospitable regions of the globe. This work should be part of the predeployment planning for individuals, military or civilian, going to Afghanistan. It certainly would not hurt if a few members of the US Congress also happened to read the piece. – RHT
Roger Reese has already established himself as an outstanding historian of the Soviet Army. In this impressive book, Reese takes on one of the major questions of that army’s history, namely the motivation of its fighting men and women in World War II or, as the Soviets and post-Soviet states still call it, the Great Fatherland War. It is no longer the case that we do not acknowledge this theater as the decisive one of the war in Europe, and that here as nowhere else in history we encounter all the terrors and awesome spectacle of total war.

Because this war was the greatest trial of the Soviet system, closely following the revolution and civil war of 1917-21, and because of the scope of the Soviet Union’s victory and sacrifice, this war has become the object of a sustained and ongoing campaign by that government for historical memorialization. The Soviet Union and its successor states have deliberately fashioned a heroic narrative to explain the sacrifices of the war, the valor of the Soviet people, and the consequences of victory. This campaign of official mythmaking quickly attached itself to the question of why Soviet soldiers fought despite the terrible mismanagement of their commanders, the huge number of prisoners taken by the Nazis and their allies, and despite a generation of brutality by the Stalinist regime. Easy answers such as they fought for their homeland, for Stalin, for socialism, or it was the Nazi atrocities that drove people to fight all possess some element of truth; however, after reading Reese’s description of the human dimension of the war, the reader will better understand it in all of its unadorned complexity.

Now that archives and memoirs have been opened, as was never the case under Soviet rule, it is possible for scholars like Reese to remind us that human motivations, whether we examine one man or the masses, never are simple or uniform. People who had every reason to resent and reject the regime volunteered or were mobilized as the case may be. Similarly, many who had reason to fight for the Soviet way of life sought other alternatives. Undoubtedly, the Soviet regime and its mass media missed no opportunity and spared little in its attempt to convince Soviet citizens of the rightness of its cause, resulting in a highly partisan and restricted information campaign to motivate its citizens. But even when allowing for the propaganda campaign and the influence such intangibles as Stalin’s persona, socialism, or other more mundane motivations, it is clear the Soviet people were not an undifferentiated mass of heroic patriots as the nation’s propaganda machine contended.
To be certain, heroic valor and endurance were abundant, tragically all too abundant given the nature of the regime for which people struggled. Nonetheless, they were and should remain to be seen as human beings not plaster saints. Reese goes a long way in addressing the question of the Red Army’s motivation while revealing the genuine complexity that underlay the motives of its soldiers, sailors, and airmen (and women) in all their diversity and complexity. Similarly, the author effectively points to the diversity of motivation that sustained unit cohesion and military effectiveness in spite of all the disasters of 1941-42 and the associated suffering of all Soviets. In demythologizing the war, Reese gives back to the Soviet people something of which both Hitler and Stalin sought to rob them—their humanity and complexity. For this readers should be grateful.

The Future of Power

by Joseph S. Nye Jr.

Reviewed by Louis J. Nigro Jr., US Ambassador (Retired), author of The New Diplomacy in Italy

Anyone who tells you that America is in decline or that our influence has waned, doesn’t know what they’re talking about.
—President Barack Obama, 26 January 2012

This monograph presents Professor Nye’s current reflections on the nature of power in international affairs and how states and nonstate actors will manage (or mismanage) the power available to them in the future. The author artfully blends theory and history, concept and concrete example to make his case. His conclusions are sensible, centrist, and unsurprising. Among other things, he makes an important contribution to our understanding of current trends, especially in his analysis of the debate over whether or not the United States is “in decline,” either relatively or absolutely, in international affairs.

Joseph Nye has been making important contributions to American foreign and national security policy and policy debates for decades. As a University Distinguished Service Professor and former dean of Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology (1977-79), chair of the National Intelligence Council (1993-94), Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (1994-95), and the author of many influential books, he has been one of the most prominent and consequential of the nation’s public policy intellectuals. His theory of “soft power” introduced a new and useful concept to the panoply of political science tools for understanding the international system.

With The Future of Power, Nye makes yet another important contribution to understanding how the international system works by updating his views on power while providing a refined version of his signature concept of soft power,
offering significant arguments in the debates related to questions of America’s alleged decline, and prescribing the use of “smart power” to US policymakers and implementers. As in so many of his previous efforts at explication, including his outstanding textbook, Understanding International Conflict: A Guide to Theory and Practice, Nye’s writing in The Future of Power balances simplicity and accessibility with scholarly precision and documentation.

Nye divides his exposition into three parts. First, in four chapters on “Types of Power,” he describes the nature of power in international affairs, and deals with military, economic, and soft power in detail.

Second, in two chapters on “Power Shifts,” he educates his readers on the difference between power transition from one nation-state to another or others (a familiar historical process) and power diffusion from nation-states themselves to nonstate actors (a new phenomenon born of globalization and the information revolution): “the problem for all states in today’s global information age,” Nye says, “is that more things are happening outside the control of even the most powerful states.”

For this reviewer, Nye’s take on the “American declinism” debate is a key strength of the book. This debate got front-page news coverage as a result of news reports that President Obama’s statement in his State of the Union Address (quoted above) was inspired by neoconservative strategic thinker Robert Kagan’s new book, The World America Made, which strongly opposes the view that American power and influence is on the decline in the international arena.

Nye carefully analyzes the elements of the argument related to the debate regarding American decline, denying that of possible competitors (Europe, Japan, Russia, Brazil, India, and China) only China can be considered a serious contender for the title of top nation. Nye shows how enduring US international advantages—viable alliances and partnerships, economic adaptability, flexibility and innovation, significant soft power attractiveness in the culture and ideology of an open society—make predictions of American’s decline far too pessimistic and unrealistic. Nye asserts that, despite major problems and obstacles, the US domestic front provides ample reason to believe the United States has the capacity to maintain its current international leadership position. This is based on continued prosperity and a constant national sense of purpose, as the United States exploits alliances (with states) and networks (civil society, the internationalized information society) in the twenty-first century. Finally, in a chapter titled “Smart Power,” Nye tries to define how to exercise power to accomplish foreign and national-security goals, specifically addressing the American policymaking and policy-implementing elite.

As a practical matter, Nye’s chapters on the nature of power in international affairs, the military, economics, and soft power, respectively, will be useful if assigned by educators as authoritative reading for classes on this crucial subject. As noted, Nye’s chapter on “American Declinism” will be highly useful in classes that deal specifically with America’s international role in the twenty-first century, especially when considered in relation to the rise of China.
Book Reviews

Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power
by Zbigniew Brzezinski

Reviewed by John Coffey, retired Foreign Affairs Officer at the US State Department

Is America up or down? Will China eclipse America as the world’s hegemon? What is the shape of the global landscape emerging in the twenty-first century, and how should the US chart its course in this new world? These questions of critical moment are addressed by the eminent scholar and practitioner of statecraft, Zbigniew Brzezinski, in Strategic Vision. His book invites comparison with Robert Kagan’s recent work, The World America Made. While Kagan calls for a muscular defense of a historically unique liberal world order made by America, Brzezinski offers a new strategic vision for a world where American dominance is no longer attainable.

According to Brzezinski, our interactive, interdependent world is marked by a shift in geopolitical power from West to East, with the rise to global preeminence of China, India, and Japan. This redistribution of power is accompanied by the mass political awakening of previously repressed peoples in the Arab world and Central or Eastern Europe. These trends portend instability, yet human survival requires global cooperation. Europe is a spent political model for the world taking shape, and US global supremacy is no longer possible. American society still appeals to the world’s peoples, provided it can revitalize itself and adopt a new strategic vision.

Brzezinski ascribes greater significance to the nation’s domestic problems than does Kagan: a crushing national debt; a financial system driven by self-destructive greed; widening inequality; decaying infrastructure; a citizenry ignorant of the world; and a gridlocked political system. The author denounces America’s Iraq and Afghanistan imperial wars and repeats the canard that President George W. Bush’s global war on terrorism fostered anti-Islamic sentiment, tarnishing our international reputation. In fact, the Bush administration scrupulously tried to avoid this. On 17 September, six days after 9/11, President Bush visited the Islamic Center in Washington to assure members that America understands the vast majority of Muslims are peaceful and that we are at war with radical jihadist terrorists, not Islam. The President and his aides reaffirmed that message in numerous speeches and remarks.

Surveying the world “after America,” Brzezinski predicts not Chinese dominance, but instead, like Kagan, a chaotic multipolar world where several roughly equal powers compete for regional hegemony. This conflict will jeopardize international cooperation and the promotion of democracy while placing the fate of the global commons up for grabs. East and South Asia will be the flashpoints of geopolitical rivalry with Japan, India, and Russia wary...
of a rising China. Brzezinski states as axiomatic that the United States must avoid military involvement or, quite differently, any conflict on the mainland between rival Asian powers. The United States, he argues, should accept Beijing’s preeminence on the Asian mainland and its emergence as Asia’s leading economic power. We should balance this by maintaining close ties with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, and Indonesia, as well as by cultivating cordial relations with India. Brzezinski entertains cautious optimism that continued modernization and prosperity of a peaceful rising China will foster political pluralism and make it more amenable to the international democratic mainstream.

What role will America play in this new world? Brzezinski advocates enlarging the West by drawing Turkey and Russia closer to the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization while balancing Asian rivalries through a cooperative partnership with China that reconciles it to its Asian neighbors. This realistic strategy, he claims, promotes a “revival of the West and facilitates the stabilization of the East within a broader cooperative framework.” Looking beyond 2025, the author envisions a larger configuration of the West that includes Turkey and Russia. Casting an eye further ahead, this realist rhapsodizes about the “gradual emergence in the decades ahead of varied forms of a universal democratic political culture.”

What should we make of a realist strategic vision calling for integration in a world riven by the centrifugal forces of nationalism and sectarian, racial, and ethnic animosities? Seventy years ago George Orwell wrote, “One cannot see the modern world as it is unless one recognises the overwhelming strength of patriotism, national loyalty . . . one must admit that the divisions between nation and nation are founded on real differences of outlook.” Nowhere is this truer today than in the Muslim world. Nonetheless, Brzezinski attributes European, especially French and German, reluctance to absorb Islamic Turkey into the West to an ambivalent or ambiguous state of mind about an unassimilable alien culture. Europeans have had enough of the elite EU project, ignoring Eurocrats and repudiating it whenever given the opportunity. The Euro debt crisis has frayed already tenuous bonds and proved that Greeks will never behave like Germans any more than Sicilians will behave like Chinese. Moreover, the EU, already suffering enlargement indigestion, has had enough of Muslim immigrants. Small wonder that France and Germany, Europe’s largest countries with populations of 65 and 81 million respectively, are loathe to merge with 80 million Muslim Turks.

Prospects for drawing Russia into a Western embrace appear no more auspicious. Brzezinski concedes numerous obstacles, not least the absence of the rule of law and the current power elite’s opposition, thwart the political modernization of Russia necessary for genuine collaboration with the West. Yet despite whatever the intelligentsia and Dmitry Medvedev may tell Brzezinski in their private chit-chats, the odds are long against regime change in this “wild country,” as Ambassador Michael McFaul indelicately called it. The Russian regime is fragile and contains the seeds of its own destruction. Russia depends
entirely on energy exports and has failed to modernize its Third World economy. Systemic corruption and secrecy in decisionmaking about policy and personnel matters block necessary political and economic reforms. Reforms are not possible without loss of political control. Corruption is the political glue holding the regime together, but exposure of corruption would destroy the criminal syndicate ruling the country. The regime’s survival requires its suicide.

If a larger configuration of the West, including Turkey and Russia, is pie in the sky, a Sino-American partnership likewise strains the bounds of optimism. One need not exaggerate the Chinese threat to give due weight to the potential for regional conflict in Asia, particularly in the South China Sea. Brzezinski warns against American military involvement on the mainland between rival Asian powers. We can presume, however, that thoughtful observers agree with former Defense Secretary Robert Gates’s admonition that “any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should have his head examined.” The only plausible scenario for US military action in Asia is a high-end naval, air, space, or cyberspace engagement. Gates outlined the forward deployment of the US military across the Pacific Rim to maintain maritime security and open access to international waterways. US forces will become more geographically distributed and operationally resilient, extending from Northeast to Southeast Asia and into the Indian Ocean.

Finally, what does Brzezinski mean by a “universal democratic political culture?” Does he express the American ethnocentric belief that the peoples of the world all want to be like us rather than vent their own passions and appetites? The author’s democratic universalism ignores peoples’ political culture—their values, habits, customs—and the propitious material circumstances that make decent, stable, effective self-government possible. His vision suggests merely some form of electoral democracy, head-counting, which produces not the blessings of Western liberal democracy, but the ability of 51 percent of the people to control the other 49 percent. A post-American world without the United States imposing order will be a nasty, brutish place, not a harmonious, universal democratic culture. Ironically, *Strategic Vision* offers an unrealistic vision of a post-American world.
While many treatments of civil-military relations focus on the exchange between appointed and elected officials with their uniformed senior military officers, this book examines the gap between American military culture and the civilian society it serves. The author is no stranger to the critique and provocation of the military establishment. While not inside the profession of arms, Dr. Bruce Fleming has the unique perspective of a civilian academic with long-standing engagement in a sector of the US military. Fleming has served over 25 years as a tenured professor of English at the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis. An author of several books and recipient of writing awards, in this work he tackles thorny issues in a pedantic style that belies his passion for the subject. Fleming’s opening line offers, “It’s critically important in a democracy to encourage open thinking about how to improve its military.” This statement rings true after more than a decade of conflict and the transition to an era of uncertainty for America’s security forces.

Fleming crafts the book in an organized and deliberate manner to support his case that the US military-civilian gap does indeed exist. He then goes on to explicate the factors that allowed the gap to widen in the twenty-first century. A scholar well-versed in philosophy and literature, Fleming provides a primer on values and virtues, commonly touted as differentiating factors between military members and civilians in American society. He counters that belief with, “the military as a whole has no separable virtues, morals, or religion. All it has is technical virtues, pragmatic morality, and generalized, nondivisive religion.” Because of mutual misperceptions of each other’s roles, society has provided the military with the aura of monopolies and a degree of autonomy (in some cases, with undue deference) in how it conducts business. Fleming offers that the role of the military is that of the hammer to be wielded by the hand of democracy. He cautions that, too often, the military perceives itself as responsible for directing when, where, and how the hammer’s blow is to be struck. In doing so, the military forgets it is not the hand of civilian disposition.

Readers may come away from this book like a punch-drunk fighter. Fleming provides a series of blows—jabs, hooks, and haymakers—that may or may not connect, but have the military reader ducking. What is the nature of war, virtue, religion, and human sexuality? And why should these questions matter to our military? He skewers the sacred cows of military virtue and
values, which have permitted the military to maintain its self-image as being above and superior to that of American society.

Naval Academy students in Fleming’s classes must leave feeling uncomfortably confused but invigorated by the challenges to the taken-for-granted assumptions and beliefs integral to military culture. Readers external to his classroom experience might incorrectly charge Fleming with being racist, sexist, homophobic, and anti-Christian.

The author does not deny the need for diversity but is at odds at how the military goes about achieving it, especially for the service academies. He is against establishing policies and de facto quotas to ensure correct representation of the general population at the various academies. He is especially critical when the administration denies applicants who are more qualified the opportunity to attend. In the same light, he asserts the very nature of warfare and the inherent masculinity required to prosecute war effectively does not support women in the ranks since they significantly impact the male bonding process. Allowing openly gay members, he holds, would have the same adverse effect. In these instances, Fleming is decidedly not politically correct as he contests changes in the military that mirror changing attitudes in the general society. Many service academy graduates will raise an eyebrow as the author unabashedly targets their sports program, which he believes allows less qualified student-athletes into the academies.

The weakest sections of the book are Fleming’s accounts of conflict with Naval Academy leaders. While he presents these incidents as illustrations of his themes, military readers may discount them as whining or attempts to get back at his superiors (this is part of their culture). Discerning readers will acknowledge such incidents occur with administrators who function within bureaucracies and others who may see themselves as institutional stewards.

*Bridging the Military-Civilian Divide* is necessary reading for military leaders at company-grade and above. The tendency within the military will be to dismiss out of hand the questions and challenges posed by Fleming. That would be a mistake. It is essential that members of the profession of arms are able to intelligently engage in a discourse and have a clear understanding of the profession and its role in service to the nation.
In *Top Secret America*, authors Dana Priest and William Arkin explore the “intelligence-military-corporate apparatus” that has grown into a sprawling universe of its own since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. With Priest as primary author and Arkin serving as chief researcher, the two have expanded a four-part series of articles they first published in the *Washington Post* in 2010. The result is an in-depth account of the enormous complex of organizations and agencies that have emerged in the decade since 9/11 to defend the country from the threat of terrorism. The purpose of the book is to promote debate about whether or not the response from the government is in the best interest of state security or has been conducted at the expense of individual liberties and democratic values. As the authors contend, “Only more transparency and debate will make us safe from terrorism and the challenges faced by the United States.”

The rise of the new American security state, which is the book’s subtitle, is the result of the overwhelming growth of the security industry and its vested interest in perpetuating the cycle of fear that 9/11 engendered. One of the book’s overarching themes is that such growth has not translated into greater security. As evidence, the authors cite cases such as US Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan’s shooting rampage at Fort Hood, Texas, in November 2009, as well as Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s failed attempt to ignite an explosive device hidden in his underwear on a flight bound for Detroit, Michigan, in December 2009. In these and other cases, the authors assert that “lack of disciplined focus, not lack of resources,” resulted in the failure of intelligence and security officials to detect the emerging threat. On a larger scale, such a lack of focus led to the colossal intelligence failure of 2011, namely the Arab Spring. The intelligence community’s inability to unearth the “dynamic political change sweeping across the Middle East” left American policymakers completely unprepared to promote acceptable alternatives. That no one is actually in charge should be a cause for concern among policymakers and citizens alike.

Acting on the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, Congress approved and the president signed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) in December 2004. The IRTPA established the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and gave its leader responsibility over all intelligence matters. National policymakers viewed this as a necessary measure to rectify the perceived failure of the intelligence community to connect available information from various organizations, to include the CIA and FBI, that might have prevented the 9/11 terrorist attacks. As noted in *Top
Secret America, the IRTPA failed to give the DNI authority over all intelligence matters, a key distinction that continues to impede the effectiveness of the position. As Priest and Arkin note, the passage of the IRTPA revealed the members of the intelligence community did not want to “give up the power they had over their budgets, personnel, and mission, and neither did the many congressional committees that supervised them and funded them.” It also revealed no one was willing to take on the entrenched interests that have resulted in an intelligence apparatus that, as of 2010, was 250 percent larger than it was on 10 September 2001. The estimated budget is approximately $80.1 billion for the intelligence community, but it does not include the $58 billion for the Department of Homeland Security, created in the aftermath of 9/11. As the authors assert, this growth has come “without anyone in government seriously trying to figure out where overlaps and waste were.”

This lack of visibility extends to the controlled access programs (CAPs) run by the CIA as well as the Pentagon’s special access programs (SAPs), which exist to give their respective organizations additional protection against unauthorized disclosure. As the Director of National Intelligence James Clapper stated, “There’s only one entity in the entire universe that has visibility on all SAPs—that’s God.” While the authors note that DOD has the bulk of the access programs, just as it has more than two-thirds of intelligence assets, the authors do not distinguish among the various types of CAPs and SAPs. The authors emphasize the lack of visibility on the vast number of programs and the fact that only a handful of senior government officials known as “Super Users” have access to them, which further compounds the problems the intelligence community faces in information sharing.

Another theme of Top Secret America is that policymakers are flooded with marginally informative and redundant conclusions, and major challenges exist in processing the enormous volume of intelligence gathered. Data is often
outdated by the time it arrives to the appropriate decisionmaking entity, thus making it essential to develop an efficient processing, exploitation, and dissemination cycle capable of culling the most essential intelligence elements. Unfortunately, the emphasis appears to be on the development of technology and equipment rather than the means that direct such technology to the proper end.

One final theme in *Top Secret America* that warrants consideration by intelligence policymakers is the erosion of civil liberties for the alleged sake of security, a central concern of the authors. Priest and Arkin emphasize this theme repeatedly, contending “people seem not to notice the incremental changes taking place across the country, the eroding of privacy and the tabulation of personal information in government hands.” In spite of claims by advocates of greater security, the authors cite numerous instances of unwarranted surveillance and harassment of innocent individuals and groups at the hands of federal, state, and local officials. Thus, in the authors’ view, it is time to “close the decade-long chapter of fear, to confront the colossal sum of money that could have been saved or better spent, to remember what we are truly defending,” and in so doing usher in a new era of “openness and better security against our enemies.”

At 277 pages, *Top Secret America* flows smoothly across the political and military spectrums and from the national to local levels. For many readers, the book’s strength will be found in the ability of the authors to highlight the defining characteristics of *Top Secret America*, namely “its enormous size, its counterproductive duplication, its internal secrecy, and its old-fashioned, hierarchical structure.” However, in the process of making their point, the authors’ advocacy tends to become redundant and unbalanced. Those in the intelligence, counterterrorism, and homeland security arenas emerge as automatons in a hidden world or a sleepless place that ingests endless volumes of information that, in turn, is presented at acronym-laden, unemotional briefings. The authors contend today’s intelligence-security world has become a living, breathing organism, one that is impossible to control or curtail. While there is a great deal of validity in such claims, there is little or no recognition of successes in the areas the authors attack, nor is there much in the way of recognition of individuals who have performed admirably and worked selflessly in defense of America. The authors could have provided such recognition without diminishing their central themes. Nevertheless, *Top Secret America* does emerge as a powerful story that makes for essential reading for those interested in the shape that America’s future security will take. For America’s policymakers, it does not necessarily provide solutions, but it does provide warnings that should not go unheeded.
This reviewer must confess to a keen sense of anticipation when I first picked up a copy of Ostkrieg: Hitler’s War of Extermination in the East. The Eastern Front during World War II is one of the few remaining areas of the conflict that still holds the possibility of new discoveries for the serious student of military history. This is due primarily to the information coming out of the Russian military archives since the collapse of the Soviet Union, while the corresponding German archives have already been heavily mined and contain few surprises.

This context should be kept in mind when deciding whether to purchase this book. As the author admits in the preface, the book is not a work based on primary research, but rather represents a synthesis, an integrated narrative, based on research by historians from several Western countries, particularly Germany. Indeed, the author’s bibliography is most impressive and relies heavily on German-language sources. Therein lies the book’s strength as well as its weakness.

The almost-exclusively German focus serves the author well in dealing with such questions as the ideological underpinnings of Hitler’s campaign in the East. He skillfully lays out the notion that Hitler’s dream of Lebensraum for the German people could only be realized at the expense of the Slavic and other peoples inhabiting the western part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). This was certainly convenient, as Hitler had long before singled out the Soviet Union as the nexus of a worldwide Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy. More grounded in reality was the belief that only by colonizing the area west of the Ural Mountains, Germany’s India, could Hitler hope to achieve the economic wherewithal to sustain Germany in a final showdown with an American-led coalition and avoid a repeat of the German collapse of 1918.

These calculations also determined the timing of the attack. Fritz makes a good case that Hitler, stymied by British intransigence in the West, had only a very narrow window of opportunity in 1941 to destroy the Soviet Union before the United States could lend its enormous weight to the Allied cause. Time, as the author stresses throughout the work, was always against Hitler and Germany’s ability to quickly dispose of the USSR; it eventually forced him into a losing struggle against a much more powerful coalition.

Fritz does a commendable job in examining what this meant for the various nationalities inhabiting Hitler’s projected colonial empire—tens of millions deliberately starved so that the Ostheer and the German nation might
eat, as well as the more direct methods of extermination that eventually succeeded this plan. This aspect of the book will inevitably invite comparisons with Timothy Snyder’s *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin*, which will remain the gold standard in this area for many years to come. Fritz’s focus is inevitably narrower in terms of time and place, although this should not be held against him.

Unfortunately, the author’s approach, which he freely admits is told from the German perspective, is less conducive to a balanced understanding of the strictly military aspects of this gigantic struggle. This is due to his heavy reliance on German-language sources, which lead him to view the ebb and flow of combat from a distinctly German point of view. Such an approach hobbles the book from its very inception and recalls some of the books published during the first postwar years, when our appreciation of the Eastern Front was permanently skewed by the memoirs of such German generals as Manstein and Guderian.

Indeed, the very organization of the book reflects this lopsided version of events. Of the book’s 10 chapters, the first two deal with the overall strategic situation preceding the war; Hitler’s political, economic, and racial motivations for the invasion of the Soviet Union; and the German preparations for the attack. The next two chapters chronicle the German army’s fortunes in the East from the start of the invasion on 22 June 1941 to the eve of the Soviet counteroffensive in early December, or fully a quarter of the book’s text. Chapter 5 deals with the Ostheer’s struggle to contain the Red Army’s counteroffensive, while Chapter 6 covers the German advance during the summer campaign of 1942 to the Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad. Thus, of the book’s 395 pages dealing with military operations, 221 pages, or 56 percent, cover the period when the Germans were primarily on the offensive.

Once the initiative passes to the Red Army, however, Fritz hurries to bring the book to its inevitable conclusion, as if he had unconsciously absorbed the upbeat narrative of the Ostheer’s offensive period, while imbibing the grimmer picture (at least for the Germans) of the war’s final two years. Chapter 7, for example, quickly disposes of the Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad, the German Sixth Army’s death agony, and the failure of the German offensive at Kursk. Chapter 8 skims over the events of the German retreat in Ukraine to the spring of 1944, while Chapter 9 attempts to encompass the numerous Soviet offensives from the summer of 1944. Finally, Chapter 10 manages to cram in the Red Army’s winter offensive of 1945 and the culminating operation to take Berlin, but you get the picture.

Unfortunately, by abandoning any pretense of being a balanced account of the war, the author becomes, in effect, a prisoner of his sources, much to the detriment of the overall narrative. Thus *Ostkrieg*, while moderately successful as a political-ideological analysis of the war in the East, ultimately fails as military history.
Jeffry Wert’s *A Glorious Army* is an insightful command study of the senior leadership in the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia from the summer of 1862 until the summer of 1863, a crucial time in the American Civil War. Focusing on General Robert E. Lee and his well-known subordinates Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson, James Longstreet, J. E. B. Stuart, A. P. Hill, and others, Wert shows how a cadre of talented military professionals led their force of valiant, if disorderly, soldiers to a virtually uninterrupted string of battlefield successes until their reversal in the fields near Gettysburg in 1863.

Wert’s account presents a conventional—if often challenged—argument that the keys to Lee’s operational and tactical success were his aggressive nature, his subordinates’ abilities, and his opponents’ excessive caution or outright incompetence. Like many historians in this camp, Wert agrees with Lee’s assessment that the Confederacy needed an aggressive strategy because of its inferior numbers and resource base. The South could not outlast the North in a defensive war of attrition, and needed spectacular military success to get those people in the Union to allow the South its independence. This aggressive approach, Wert claims, was desperately needed. Lee assumed command of the Army of Northern Virginia in June 1862 when the full might of the Union Army of the Potomac was poised on the outskirts of Richmond. The Confederate army had just been repulsed in its efforts to relieve the capital, but Lee’s way of war rescued Richmond by forcing a Union withdrawal in the Seven Days Battles. Lee’s repeated seizure of the strategic imitative allowed his Army to nearly destroy the forces of John Pope in the Second Battle of Manassas, invade Maryland, and escape largely intact after the chaos of Antietam. In December, Lee’s forces won a relatively easy victory against a bungled Federal attack at Fredericksburg, and in the following spring Lee’s audacity led to his greatest triumph against astounding numerical odds at Chancellorsville. These successes were costly, however, as key subordinates (particularly Stonewall Jackson) were lost, and the army suffered immense casualties. Wert emphasizes that, despite the costs, these victories boosted élan and confidence in the Confederate Army, and solidified morale throughout the South. Gettysburg, however, brought Lee’s string of victories to a halt when the very aggressiveness and confidence that had brought so much success instead resulted in shattering defeat.

Students familiar with the Civil War will find little new in Wert’s book. The account is in many ways classic top-down, flags-and-generals military
history. He relies heavily on well-travelled primary sources and Civil War memoirs, and quotes liberally from scholars like Douglas Southall Freeman, Gary Gallagher, and Robert Krick, who have all gone this way before. This is, however, a good introductory work for students of the art of command or those looking for a good survey of this critical period and theater of the Civil War. The accounts of battles and campaigns are relatively clear, and the profiles of the Confederate leaders are in-depth and quite revealing in their humanity.

That being said, Wert is not afraid to take a stand on some contested issues within Civil War historiography. Though he is full of effusive praise for the Confederate leaders’ accomplishments in the face of such overwhelming odds, he highlights critical mistakes, even in their greatest tactical victories. Such mistakes were especially detrimental because they increased Confederate casualties and prevented Lee’s army from ever really crushing their dogged opponents. Given the South’s objectives and limited manpower, such shortcomings were potentially deadly, and he portrays Lee’s frequent disappointment when Union forces, though badly beaten, managed to escape to fight another day. Wert freely castigates Lee for his occasional mistakes, such as the wide dispersal of his command in hostile territory prior to Antietam, and for the overconfidence and lack of respect for his enemy that led to the Pickett’s Charge debacle at Gettysburg. Though he praises Lee’s effective subordinates, none of them escape entirely unscathed. Wert downplays the tactical reputation of “Stonewall” Jackson, for example, instead praising his ability to drive and motivate the men in his command. He highlights Longstreet’s abilities, but also points out Longstreet was not above embellishing events in his memoirs. Worshipful partisans of the Confederate military pantheon may be troubled by the tarnish Wert puts on some of his portraits.

At its heart, this is a story about individuals and personalities. If there is any great flaw in A Glorious Army, it lies in Wert’s occasional detours into moments of flowery, romantic prose that clash awkwardly with what is generally an effective narrative of real human beings struggling amidst the chaos and inhumanity of warfare in the Civil War era. Lee, his lieutenants, and their Army were able to accomplish an astounding series of triumphs, but at great, and ultimately futile, cost.
In recent years, there has been a growing conviction in popular scholarship for a more pragmatic and *longue durée* approach to the study of the formation of the modern Middle East. In so doing, there have been many noteworthy—and some not so noteworthy—contributions to the field. Most center around the post Great War mandatory system and tell the story of the resulting states in relation to their European tutors. Scholars are beginning, however, to address the role of the long-neglected Ottoman Empire in this narrative and examine how the death of this once great empire actually shaped the region. It is with this idea that Daniel Butler begins his survey, attempting to show that the configuration of states we call the Middle East is as much a product of Ottoman machinations while the empire existed as European ones after its demise.

Butler begins his survey by outlining in broad strokes the contours of the formation and expansion of the Ottoman Empire. It is regrettable the author included this foundational chapter, because it marks the weakest section of the book. There are some glaring factual errors—his claims that the Ottoman Empire was some fourteen hundred years old being the most egregious. Mistakes such as these demonstrate an author trying to do too much, without possessing the necessary foundation to execute this part of the book. This sort of essentialism is all too common in monographs where the author attempts to synthesize huge swathes of history; however, given the author’s stated aim is not a discussion of the origin and high-water mark of Ottoman rule, but its decline, this error can be forgiven.

Where this work really shines is when Butler compresses the time period and digs deeply into the material. His lead-up to the Great War makes for an interesting examination of the interactions of the Great Powers and the precipitous military build-up between the navies of Great Britain and the German Empire. Likewise, his discussion on the various campaigns as they pertained to Ottomans, once hostilities began, is detailed and lively written. His descriptions of the Ottoman Grandees and their dealings with their European counterparts read as fascinating character studies, and his analysis of the historical outcomes are authoritative and logical. The Ottoman triumvirate of Ismail Enver Pasha, Ahmed Jamal Pasha, and Mehmet Talat Pasha really comes alive, and the author pays close attention to them, from their highs as power brokers...
in the Committee of Union and Progress after the 1913 coup to the ignominy of their deaths roughly a decade later.

One element that is all too common in works appearing in this genre though, is the lack of even an attempt to utilize primary source materials from the Middle East or to tell the Ottoman story from an Ottoman-centered perspective. While Topkapi Serai archives are currently closed to the public, making access to some critical official and diplomatic records difficult, often the voice of these narratives is decidedly European. We should laud Butler for his attempt at constructing a narrative that speaks from the Turkish point of view. While his bibliography is overwhelmingly constructed of European language sources, there are (as mentioned above) some critical biographies of Ottoman notables included. Though this is a European driven narrative, the Ottoman Empire does not appear as a passive—although not mute—witness to the events in which it was to participate, but rather as an active participant in its own downfall.

In the title of this work, the author suggests he will tackle the creation of the modern Middle East that emerged from the rubble of the Ottoman Empire, but there is very little of this element in the work. This is the Ottoman Empire’s story and the book concludes with the treaties that ended the allied occupation of the Anatolian peninsula and the formal dissolution of the old empire. We see little commentary on the arcs and trajectories of the various kingdoms and states that would arise out of her wreckage. Interested parties should look to new entries to the market such as James Barr’s *A Line in the Sand: The Anglo-French Struggle for the Middle East, 1914-1948*; Efraim Karsh’s *Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789-1948*; or even the now well-aged but still excellent narrative in David Fromkin’s *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*.

In conclusion, aside from the unfortunate first chapter, there is much that is praiseworthy in this work. Butler is able to successfully straddle the line of an Ottoman work without forgetting the Ottomans. If one is looking for a lively and easily read book describing the death throes of the Ottoman Empire and its conduct prior to and through the Great War, then look no further. If one is looking for a work that leverages the formation of the modern Middle East into the equation, then some other works are likely better choices. With those caveats in mind, in the realm of nonspecialist literature on this critical period of Middle Eastern history, this book is a good option.
In 2009, the Eisenhower Presidential Library revealed the prolific historian and Eisenhower biographer Stephen Ambrose fabricated interviews he claimed to have had with the former president. Ambrose’s biography of Dwight D. Eisenhower had long been regarded as the definitive biography because of the author’s unique access to the 34th president. The discovery of Ambrose’s deception has made his biography suspect for both scholars and leaders seeking to understand Ike, while opening the door for new and more genuine appraisals of the former president. Jim Newton offers one such appraisal with a new biography of Ike in *Eisenhower: The White House Years*. The author of the previous work, *Justice for All*, a historical account of Chief Justice Earl Warren, is the latest Eisenhower biographer seeking to rehabilitate the image of a supposed caretaker president. Contrary to contemporary critics like Marquis Childs, who portrayed Eisenhower as “indecisive and lazy, stodgy and limited . . . a weak president,” Newton argues Ike was “certain, resolute, and, though respectful of his advisers, commandingly their boss.” In offering the thesis that President Eisenhower was an active leader in his administration, Newton builds upon the work of diplomatic historians and political scientists, notably Fred Greenstein, and does so in a very sympathetic fashion. As the title suggests, however, the author delivers not so much a biography of President Eisenhower but a biography of his presidency.

The story begins with Ike’s childhood and passes rapidly through adolescence, tracing his path to the United States Military Academy, where Ike was both average and memorable.”An assignment in Texas followed graduation, where he met Mamie Doud. They married, welcomed and then lost a son, and decamped for Panama, where Eisenhower served under the tutelage of mentor General Fox Connor. That apprenticeship on the perimeter of the American empire kept Ike out of troop command in World War I. In the interwar period he served a second apprenticeship under the gimlet eye of General Douglas MacArthur. Service with MacArthur in Washington and later in the Philippines made Eisenhower wary of theatrics. When war broke out in 1941, General George Marshall selected the young general to head the War Plans Division on the Army Staff and then, ultimately, to lead Allied forces to victory in Europe.

The author covers all of this background rather quickly, driving the narrative toward Eisenhower’s presidential years, which comprise 85 percent of the biography. The theme throughout is Ike’s search for a “middle way,” an attempt to steer policy between perceived extremist positions on the political right and left. Seeing as *The Middle Way* is the title of Eisenhower’s presidential papers, it is an easy assertion to accept, though there are holes in every story.
Newton gives cautious credit to Ike for his civil rights record, asserting that by supporting Attorney General Herbert Brownell, the president was practicing a calibrated strategy for easing racial tensions in the fullness of time. A more critical biographer might interpret Ike’s record on civil rights as an abdication of presidential responsibility to enforce the law.

Other domestic topics include Eisenhower’s appointments to the Supreme Court, the administration’s assertion of executive privilege, and the president’s refusal to confront Senator Joe McCarthy during the height of the Red Scare, where Newton asserts “nothing was inevitable, even Ike’s break with McCarthy.” Eisenhower did confront accusations of socialism by his own party for supporting the highway bill and the construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway, underscoring the fears of communism that were rampant in the 1950s. The internal politics of the administration are addressed in detail, including the close partnership between the president and John Foster Dulles, as well as the more complicated relationship Ike forged with his young vice-president, Richard Nixon.

The administration’s foreign policy receives more in-depth treatment, from the development of a national security strategy centered on massive retaliation in the Solarium exercise to the conduct of covert operations against Iran and Guatemala. Irritated by French military misdirection during World War II, Ike rebuffed French pleas for assistance in Indochina in 1954, refusing to use American combat power to underwrite a “frantic desire of the French to remain a world power.” Eisenhower employed strong-arm diplomacy against allies France, Britain, and Israel during the 1956 Suez crisis and a more conciliatory diplomacy with hostile China over the straits of Taiwan. The most important diplomatic relationship was between Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and Eisenhower, a relationship that may have eased Cold War tensions had it not fallen apart in the wake of the 1960 U2 incident. Interestingly, an administration that sought to influence global affairs, led by a famous general, deployed American troops only once on a peace-keeping mission in Lebanon. The litany of international affairs drawing American attention over the course of the Eisenhower presidency supports Newton’s argument for a reimagining of the 1950s as a deceptively eventful decade, kept under control by a president who actively worked to keep the nation on an even keel.

According to the author, President Eisenhower found an effective middle way and won the United States the peace it enjoyed over the course of his presidency. He made progress on advancing civil rights, supported his able subordinates, contained the growth of the American defense establishment, and did it all with little loss of life. Eisenhower: The White House Years is well written and researched, with sufficient endnotes and a full bibliography. Jim Newton draws from a wide variety of sources, including the Eisenhower Library and interviews with Ike’s son, John Eisenhower. Newton also makes use of newly discovered documents to explore the drafting and evolution of the president’s famous farewell speech. The biography is sympathetic to Eisenhower throughout—where others have criticized Ike’s record on civil rights, Newton offers
cautious credit; where others have been critical of Ike’s generalship, Newton is complimentary; where others have indicted Eisenhower’s relationship with wartime driver Kay Summersby, Newton is inclined to forgive. Despite these partialities to his subject, the book is well worth reading. It is suitable for scholars and senior members of the defense establishment. As a single volume treatment of the Eisenhower presidency, it is invaluable, especially for understanding the context of decisions made in both foreign relations and domestic policy.

The Age of Airpower
by Martin Van Creveld

Reviewed by Richard L. DiNardo, Professor for National Security Affairs, United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College

Ever since the Wright brothers demonstrated the possibility of flight in a heavier-than-air aircraft, airpower has become a standard feature of military operations, especially those conducted by the United States. Any number of air forces have been the subject of numerous works, especially those of Germany in World War II and its American and British opponents. Noted military historian, critic, and professional controversialist Martin van Creveld has now tackled the subject in a broad way with his latest work, The Age of Airpower.

Van Creveld takes the long view in a largely chronological fashion, beginning with the first employment of aircraft in a military manner, starting with the Italians in the Italo-Turkish War of 1912. The first major test of the potential of airpower was a World War I (WWI) challenge that the air forces of all the major combatants passed. Once it became clear airpower was here to stay, the major military powers turned to the question of how to incorporate air forces into their existing military. In many cases, incorporation meant the creation of an independent air service, closely linked to the emerging theories regarding the criticality of command of the air proposed by such thinkers as Giulio Douhet.

To his credit, Van Creveld does not limit his discussion to regular air forces. He includes extensive narration and commentary on the development and expansion of naval-air and its most common expression, the aircraft carrier. Here the author concentrates the majority of his attention on the two preeminent powers in this arena—Japan and the United States.

Van Creveld provides a fairly conventional discussion of the conduct of World War II and the air warfare, including naval operations. He fails, however, to note one of the great ironies of airpower theory and practice. The original airpower theorists proposed the use of aircraft and strategic bombing to avoid a repeat of the costly attritional warfare that was a hallmark of WWI. In actual practice, though, air warfare became the ultimate example of attrition warfare. Germany and Japan both lost control of the air because the Allies were able
to kill or disable pilots and other aircrew faster than they could be replaced. Van Creveld points out the doctrine of strategic bombing in actual practice fell short of expectations, mainly due to the limitations of the aircraft used, at least until the advent of the Boeing B-29, which the author classifies as the first true strategic bomber.

The emergence of atomic weapons is covered in depth. Van Creveld implies, correctly, that the development of atomic and later nuclear weapons did little to change the actual conduct of warfare. Rather, the specter of atomic and nuclear weapons had a greater impact on whether or not a country went to war.

Equally important was the advent of jet technology. The impact of jet propulsion over the long term, he suggests, has been deleterious to air forces. As time has passed, the expense involved in developing new generations of jet aircraft has become prohibitive. At the same time, the higher performance of jet aircraft, especially in terms of speed and endurance, poorly suits them to specific employment, especially close-air support and counterinsurgency—two missions air forces do not like anyway. The emergence of nuclear weapons reduced the likelihood that strategic bombers would be employed in a strategic attack role, given the possibility of escalation; this was especially true during the Cold War era. With the two major super powers veritably off limits because of the nuclear threat, bombers could not be used to any real effect in the proxy wars that were a hallmark of the Cold War, mainly due to a dearth of strategic targets. Thus, air forces found themselves facing situations like Vietnam, where strategic bombers were often utilized against tactical targets. This brings Van Creveld to the conclusion that airpower, especially jet-powered aircraft, has proven of limited utility in conflicts since World War II.

Aside from traditional kinetics, Van Creveld examines several other types of airpower, including helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft in transport and reconnaissance roles, and the later technology of missiles and drones. In regard to the latter, he sees drones as the future of airpower, since drones are cheaper than piloted aircraft, be they land or naval based. His comments will provide much grist for conversation in the Pentagon.

The book does have flaws. Van Creveld, for example, eschews any discussion of the German V weapons, stating they were the province of the army, an assertion that is only half true. While the V-2 was indeed the German army’s program, the V-1 belonged to the Luftwaffe. While Van Creveld has an excellent grasp of the literature, there are times when he might have done better to reacquaint himself with an archive or research library, as opposed to resorting to such dubious sources as Wikipedia®. Finally, there are times when the author falls into an old and unfortunate trap, making statements that are simply obnoxious or, at best, infelicitous, particularly with regard to women. Occasionally, Van Creveld tends toward sheer snarkiness, which undercuts the value of his argument. Finally, Van Creveld is too much a believer in the rational actor school of strategic decisionmaking. In the section on World War II, for example, Creveld states it was simply crazy that Germany and Japan ever thought they could win. That misses the point; Adolf Hitler and Hideki Tojo believed they could win and
that is why they went to war. Additionally, Van Creveld is too quick to minimize the danger of a nuclear armed Iran. Despite its flaws, this book should be read by those military professionals and historians who are interested in airpower and its future.

1781: The Decisive Year of the Revolutionary War
by Robert L. Tonsetic

Reviewed by Dr. J. Boone Bartholomewes Jr., Professor of Military History, US Army War College

Robert Tonsetic offers an examination of the year 1781, which he calls the decisive year of the Revolutionary War. While one might debate whether that was the decisive year—as opposed to say 1776 that saw both the political transformation of the war and the all-important survival of Washington’s army—1781 was indisputably one of the most significant years of the war. Tonsetic covers both northern and southern theaters and examines strategic, operational, and tactical level events.

The year opened with a rebellion in the Pennsylvania line that might have been fatal to the cause of independence, however, it ended with the British defeated in all but the formal sense of a treaty. The strategic seat of the war moved from New York, New Jersey, and Philadelphia to Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia. The year 1781 opened with battles in the Carolina backcountry at Cowpens (17 January) and Guilford Courthouse (March 15). Although each side won a battle, the British winning the big one, the combination proved disastrous for the Crown. Cornwallis headed for the safety of the coast and ended up at Yorktown waiting for the Royal Navy. In an act of joint and combined cooperation, the Americans’ new ally France provided both an army and a navy to help isolate and besiege Yorktown. Meanwhile, the Americans managed to lose the battles but still recover control of the Carolinas and Georgia. The year ended with Cornwallis’ surrender and the Americans in control of their country, with the exceptions of New York City, Charleston, Savannah, and outposts on Lake Champlain and the Great Lakes. The political debate in London to end the war lasted into 1782, and the Treaty of Paris was not signed until 3 September 1783, but the war was over in all but the most formal sense by the end of 1781. That is a good story, and Tonsetic tells it well.

There is always tension in a survey like this about the ratio between generalities and details. Similarly, in a book about one year of a long war, there is also tension between providing or assuming background knowledge about the historical and strategic setting. Authors grapple with what needs explanation and what the audience should already know. Tonsetic handles these tensions ably. He moves the reader nimbly from broad brush to detailed descriptions,
and a person likely to read this book will probably have the background knowledge the author assumes about armies and politics during the Revolution. The book is interesting and readable; however, a few points deserve mention.

One such point is the Battle of the Capes (5 September 1781). That naval engagement between the British and French fleets off the Chesapeake Bay was critical to the eventual success at Yorktown and tremendously more important to the war than Hobkirk Hill or Eutaw Springs. Although Tonsetic discusses the battle and acknowledges its significance in about a page of text, it comes off as a sideshow. In fact, the Wikipedia entry on the battle is longer, more detailed, and better documented.

Tonsetic provides the reader seven maps—three at the operational level (eastern coast, northern theater, and southern theater) and four tactical (Cowpens, Guilford Courthouse, Eutaw Springs, and Yorktown). While the seven are well chosen, and the publisher rather than the author probably established the limit, four or five more would have been helpful. Maps contribute a great deal more to a book’s success than any collection of pictures.

From an academic perspective, the book is light on endnotes, and does not cite or acknowledge some obvious and important sources. For example, the Rhode Island Historical Society for several years (ending in 2005) collected and edited thirteen volumes of *The Papers of General Nathaniel Greene*. While these are priced beyond the grasp of the individual, good academic libraries have them. Since Greene was one of the main characters in the story of 1781, one expects to find material from this excellent collection. More generally, Tonsetic uses some primary sources, but most of the bibliography is secondary material. Since the audience seems to be the general public, this is not as egregious as it would be in a primarily academic work.

Overall, the book is worth reading. Its strength is its breadth—it covers matters that full histories of the war ignore or mention only in passing. That breadth, however, is limited to military events, so those with interests in political, economic, diplomatic, and the social aspects of the year will find scant satisfaction. That should not be a surprise. The book is about the decisive year of the Revolutionary War, not the decisive year of the Revolution. That distinction also clarifies the issue of decisiveness that opened this review. From a military perspective, 1781 was the decisive year of the Revolutionary War.
The ostensible purpose of this book is to provide the reader with opinions from a “small group of ethnographers from four different countries, each with a variety of experiences studying war, violence, the military, and the state” in an effort to examine the relationship between anthropologists and the national security state. It becomes clear, however, from the first page of the introduction that bias, coupled with a startling lack of a rigorous methodological approach, prevents this edited work from being much more than a politically motivated collection of opinion essays.

The book is replete with postmodern and postcolonial references. Constant allusions from multiple authors to neocolonial wars, American empire, hegemonic militarism, among others betray the roots of the deep-seated biases inherent in the subfield of cultural anthropology. The fact that this work is, for the most part, little more than a collection of politically motivated opinions emanating from the School for Advanced Research Annual Seminar further dilutes any academic rigor. These biases are magnified by the fact that a number of authors end up relying on the opinions of polemically inclined anthropologists and anthropological blogs, such as those of Roberto Gonzalez and Hugh Gusterson, along with the web blog Zero Anthropology. What borders on the almost humorous is the fact that authors are so unaware that their chapters are presented as impartial attempts to explain the intersection of social science and military endeavors. At least Gusterson admits in one of his articles deriding the Human Terrain Systems (HTS) that cultural anthropology is academia’s most left-leaning discipline and that many come to this field with a prejudice related to war and warfare.

There is, indeed, something interesting about this book, but it is not what the authors intended. For example, when the reader examines Chapter 8, “Anthropology, Research, and State Violence” by Israeli anthropologist Eyal Ben-Ari, the book takes on an entirely different focus. Instead of providing an insightful, probing work exploring the intersections of anthropology and the military, the book provides a glimpse into the tribal narrative cultural anthropologists have weaved for themselves. Richard Geertz first referred to these cultural webs in his book *The Interpretation of Cultures,* but many of the authors in this volume are unaware of the cultural web that ensnares them. Ari illuminates this perception by pointing out the liberal political bias presentation in this work and within anthropology as a whole. He argues that a mythical conception of the allegedly horrible use of American anthropologists in the
Vietnam War led many in the field to distrust any collaboration with the military. In fact, several authors note that anthropological groups have attempted to remove anthropologist collaborators from the field. German anthropologist Maren Tomforde highlights the fact the American Anthropological Association does not stand alone in its attempts at ending academic careers.

Besides a liberal bias, Ari argues American anthropologists suffer from a peculiar form of arrogance and engage in what might be characterized as “colonization of the mind.” Ari came to realize he had better luck publishing in American anthropological journals if he used the coda of postmodernism along with a healthy dose of America bashing. It is interesting to note there are numerous references to the George W. Bush administration and none are positive. Ari worries that American anthropological dominance at conferences and in professional journals will continue to influence the work of anthropologists outside the United States.

It is with this understanding of these innate biases that R. Brian Ferguson’s chapter on the HTS concludes “the capacity of HTS is helping to build cannot be seen as being in the interests of the indigenous peoples of the world—the people to whom anthropology is most responsible—unless their interests coincide with the incorporation into a neoliberal US empire.” So, too, is Laura McNamara’s chapter on interrogation techniques used by the Bush Administration, which she dubs torture. She believes such acts permit “a unique perspective on the dynamics through which America is made, unmade, and remade.” Her chapter is placed in the proper context after reading Ari’s chapter with its postmodern, anti-Bush context.

One would be hard pressed to recommend this work on its academic merits. This book, however, is a great read for anyone interested in understanding academic ivory towers. It is also an integral window into the current state of cultural anthropology.
Off the Press


