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Special Commentary: Insights from the Army's Drawdowns
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From the Editor

This issue of the US Army War College Quarterly opens with a special commentary, “Insights from the Army’s Drawdowns,” by Jason Warren. Perhaps the most important of his insights is the Army has traditionally mitigated the negative effects of drawing down by emphasizing greater education and professionalization, and can do so again.

Our first forum, Strategy & Policy, features three contributions examining strategy at different levels. The lead article, “Rebalancing the Rebalance,” by Michael Spangler, urges the United States to consider instituting new bilateral security initiatives with China, and China’s neighbors. Economic cooperation is proceeding at a rapid pace in the Asia-Pacific region, but it is not yet balanced with greater security cooperation. The second article, “Strategy Versus Statecraft in Crimea,” by Lukas Milevski, frames Western Europe’s response to Russian aggression in the Crimean crisis as a clash between statecraft and strategy, respectively. The author claims the latter generally has an advantage over former, but his framework may be problematic. Regardless, the comparison raises important questions for contemporary strategists. The third contribution is “Eisenhower and US Grand Strategy,” by Raymond Millen. Millen contends President Dwight D. Eisenhower made innovative use of focused discussion groups and a re-designed National Security Council to create a consensus for developing a US grand strategy capable of dealing with the Soviet threat. While the process Eisenhower implemented clearly deserves some credit for the coherence of US strategy, readers may ask whether his professional experience and personal skill deserve even more.

The second forum, Private Contractors & Military Professionals, offers three articles addressing an essential aspect of the changing nature of warfare—the composition of contemporary militaries. For some, the increased use of private contractors in (or near) the battle-space marks a return to warfare as practiced prior to the rise of standing armies, when states often contracted for military forces rather than maintaining their own. Scott Efflandt’s “Military Professionalism and Private Military Contractors,” reviews how the concept of professionalism has changed due to greater reliance on private contractors. In “Special Operations Forces and Private Security Companies,” Christopher Spearin considers how private contractors might contribute to an ever expanding global special-forces network. Birthe Anders’ “Review Essay,” brings readers up to date with the growing body of research concerning private military contractors and security companies.

This issue of the Quarterly offers two broader review essays, and one review forum. “The Rise and Continuing Challenge of Revolutionary Iran,” by W. Andrew Terrill discusses the leading scholarship explaining both the fall of the Shah and Iran’s decline. Douglas A. Mastriano’s “The Great War: One Hundred Years Later,” brings four of the most important books on the origins of the First World War into sharper focus. Even in this, the centennial of the war’s outbreak, interest in the conflict still runs high; but as Mastriano shows, many of its questions remain unanswered. Deadly Consequences by Robert L. Maginnis rounds
out our book reviews; three experts comment on what they see as truly deadly and truly consequential in this highly controversial work. ~AJÉ
Special Commentary

Insights from the Army's Drawdowns

Jason W. Warren

Abstract: This article provides five insights extracted from discussions concerning the Army's long history of drawdowns. Perhaps the most important take-away is the Army can, and should, use the current drawdown constructively.

With the termination of the recent campaign in Iraq and the winnowing of forces in Afghanistan, the US military faces a drawdown of standing force structure and capabilities. The policy debate concerning how best to carry out this force reduction, however, lacks proper historical perspective. Twenty-four civilian historians and military professionals recently offered such a perspective by focusing on previous drawdowns over the span of American history. Beginning with a consideration of the cyclical nature of drawdowns and whether a crisis mentality is warranted in such periods, three major questions emerged. Was the attempt to preserve military effectiveness during drawdowns contradictory to traditional American values? Given the reoccurrence of force reductions in American history, how did the military best preserve combat capabilities? What was the relationship between the regular standing Army and militia/National Guard forces, and how did these reflect broader attitudes towards the military? Insights from the discussions follow.

1. The drawdown of American forces has been a cyclical part of the nation’s military experience.

Whether they allowed colonial forts to fall into disrepair or furloughed hundreds of thousands of battle-hardened Union troops after the US Civil War, Americans historically have tightened their financial belts at the conclusion of major conflicts. This attitude reflects traditional Anglo-American values dating back to the late-Middle Ages in England. Latent fears of regular armies surfaced before the Revolutionary War with both the Quartering Act and the Boston Massacre. Americans carried these attitudes forward into the twenty-first century.

The debate over the US military establishment has never been a purely rational one with biases inherent in the American cultural framework. Concerns over previous drawdowns have not run counter to traditional American values, and have not always been justified even by initial combat effectiveness. For example, the Kennedy/Johnson administrations reversed conventional drawdowns of the Eisenhower era in time to create the most competent US Army ever to engage in the initial battle of any war up to 1965. American forces also met with initial successes in 2001 and 2003 after a decade of drawdowns, paralleling the...
US experience nearly forty years earlier. However, American forces have not always reconstituted effectively for battle. Significant drawdowns left the Army unprepared for initial campaigns in the early 1790s against Native Americans, the War of 1812, the US Civil War, the Spanish-American War, both World Wars, and the Korean War. Significantly, these wars ended in American military victory, indicating the initial risk of fielding forces based on reduced military infrastructure, though costly in “first battles,” has often been acceptable in terms of overall strategic costs. Put differently, US foreign policy and national strategy objectives often exceeded military means. There was unanimous agreement among conference participants on this point.

2. Competition between the Regular Army and National Guard (militia) has always been part of the American military discourse.

A number of scholars highlighted the historical importance of this competition. This debate is both rational and irrational as it stems from Anglo-Americans’ historic preference for “virtuous” militia over “suspect” standing armies, while overlooking the sometimes poor initial military performance of militia/National Guard forces. A serving officer’s presentation detailed how the relationship between active and reserve components works best in a complementary (but not interchangeable) arrangement. This complementary nature was largely evident in Afghanistan and Iraq, which reversed the mutual animosity that appeared during the Gulf War. American attitudes changed during the Cold War to consider active component forces as “citizen-soldiers,” in a manner once reserved only for National Guard/militia forces, thus the American public conflates the two components. The advent of the all-volunteer force in 1973 solidified this outlook. Two participants indicated the importance of reserve components increased with the termination of the draft and the unlikeliness of its reconstitution, as well as the continuing question of the eligibility of women for selective service. The apparent irreversibility of the all-volunteer force and the merging of the active component’s reputation with that of the reserve components changed the nature of the discourse over the roles and perceptions of both components.

3. The Army has historically focused on education and professionalization as mitigating factors during drawdowns.

Participants agreed unanimously on this point, and as one historian from the conference put it, “education is a hedge against uncertainty.” The early 1800s witnessed the creation of West Point to address performance shortcomings, and the impetus after the War of 1812 was for a more professional officer corps. In the decades after the Civil War, Emory Upton and William Tecumseh Sherman attempted doctrinal and educational reforms. Sherman established Fort Leavenworth as the Army’s intellectual center during this period. Operational failures in the Spanish-American War led to the establishment of the US Army War College in 1901. At the conclusion of World War I, which was followed by a significant military drawdown, the Army again focused its attention on educating and broadening the next crop of officers, such as Dwight
D. Eisenhower, Douglas MacArthur, and George S. Patton. With only a skeleton standing army after 1921, leaders emphasized intellectual preparation and solving complex problems in Army schools instead of commanding troops. The Army’s culture of the post-1950 era, however, shifted to emphasize tactical training at the expense of education and broadening. With a large-standing force to combat communism, leaders sought troop command and training assignments. The officer corps de-emphasized broadening and education as a way to achieve high command. For instance General William Westmoreland, who eventually rose to become Army Chief of Staff after Vietnam, never attended professional military education. Three scholars argued the military’s talent-management system, which reflected management principles of the earlier Industrial Age, has been inadequate. There were few systematic attempts to connect an officer’s education with future assignments. A number of participants said drawdown periods have often been fertile ground for “mavericks,” whose theorizing about armor and the integration of other new technologies in the interwar period, paid dividends in World War II. Similar hypothesizing about the structure of Army forces during the 1990s laid the basis for the contemporary modular force.

4. Drawdowns have frequently resulted in cuts to headquarters elements, enabling forces, and niche capabilities that have been detrimental to future operations.

Four participants discussed headquarters reductions at the conclusions of the World Wars, Vietnam, and the Gulf War, which created gaps in critical billets. As with Combined Joint Task Force 7 in Iraq, a lack of a tailored headquarters led to failed operations (and contributed to the Abu Ghraib incident). After early disasters in North Africa during World War II, General Eisenhower created the equivalent of a land component command. The initial crisis in Korea caused General MacArthur to advocate (successfully) for an increase of Army corps headquarters from one to eight. At the outbreak of the Gulf War, the Army had reduced US Army Central (3rd Army) staff to one-quarter capacity, which was not unusual for the All-Volunteer Force, as General Creighton Abrams had set the precedent for reducing various Army headquarters in the post-Vietnam era. This reduction resulted in a much slower build-up during Operation Desert Shield. Of course, the quantity of headquarters personnel relates directly to increased missions, as smaller staffs have been sufficient in peacetime.

Three scholars argued niche capabilities should not fall victim to drawdowns. Cutting them has created shortcomings, such as failure to develop an adequate tank corps or submarine fleet during the interwar years. Maintaining an Army amphibious capability post-1945 proved critical in Korea and Panama. More recent cuts to enablers such as logistical units and military police (or placing the majority in the reserve components) has been fraught with risk. One of the biggest issues for planners leading up to the Iraq War was a lack of line-haul trucks (rented mainly from Kuwaitis) to move heavy equipment to assembly areas. This lack of equipment literally dictated where operations could be conducted and with what forces. The US capability for power projection through “setting the theater” relies on such enablers. Traditional allies can offset capabilities lost during drawdowns. This offset occurred during the
late-19th and early-20th centuries, for instance, when the British fleet and merchant marine cooperated with limited US naval forces.

The historic precedence for maintaining brigade combat teams as the bedrock formation of the Army stems from George Washington’s Continental Army, which relied on brigades commanded by brigadier generals in combined arms teams (infantry, artillery, and dragoons). Its heir, the “Legion” of the early 1790s, also relied on a combined arms brigade model. Four scholars discussed the cadre and expansible Army concepts for which the brigade (or its subordinate elements) has often been the building block. Employing a cadre concept in past eras, the Army eliminated the lower skill levels, while maintaining a mid-ranking cadre in the institutional Army that served as leadership in reconstituted units. Cadre maintained basic leadership and training skills by serving in training billets. In the 1820s, Secretary of War, John C. Calhoun, enacted a similar option known as the “expansible Army,” where cutbacks reduced units’ junior-enlisted personnel, while retaining sergeants and officers. After Vietnam, General Abrams instituted “roundout” battalions and brigades, in which designated reserve component forces filled active component formations. There is also precedence for long-service professionals manning more technical functions requiring extensive experience, such as the War Department bureaus manned by the Regular Army during the Civil War. One historian noted America’s transition to an Information-Age economy, but reequipping units would prove more problematic than in past conflicts.

5. Conventional capabilities have been a better investment over past drawdowns than technological panaceas and unconventional forces.

A number of scholars noted technical and tactical transformations have improved tactics and in some cases operations, but “revolutions in military affairs” have not led directly to victory. Clausewitz maintained war’s nature is dependent on the interplay of social, political, and military forces, rather than on new technologies and tactics. Changes in the means of fighting — whether nuclear, cyber, or special operating forces and airpower — have not altered the relationship of variables fundamental to war. Although Information-Age technology proved critical early in Afghanistan and Iraq, it was indecisive in both instances. Once Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters dug elementary fighting positions, special operations forces required Northern Alliance and US infantry formations to conduct conventional fire and maneuver to dislodge them. In Iraq, urban conditions and the need to interact with Iraqis during the population-centric counterinsurgency phase of operations required large conventional capabilities. Special operations forces are also dependent on conventional Army force structure, such as rotary-wing, intelligence, security, medical, logistics, and quick-reaction forces — the very enablers often ignored during the calculation of forces in planning. Atomic weapons, prevented a major clash between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, did nothing to deter war more generally, as Korea, Vietnam, and many other conflicts demonstrate. Presenters noted the foundational nature of conventional army capabilities, often in support of joint or allied forces, during every major conflict.
These five insights may prove useful to today’s military and political leaders who face the daunting prospect of reducing US military capabilities. If leaders can take any solace from history, it is that drawdowns have proven to be a cyclical part of the American military experience, and as irrational as the debate may become, the US military, especially the Army, has often rebounded to meet future challenges.
Rebalancing the Rebalance

Michael Spangler

ABSTRACT: Since late 2011, the United States has pursued a policy of “rebalancing toward Asia,” taking steps to expand its already significant role in the region. However, Washington has failed to check—and may have unwittingly provoked—new Chinese measures to erect multiple layers of security around contested areas in the South and East China Seas. The United States should, therefore, consider new bilateral security initiatives with China and its neighbors to ensure security cooperation catches up with economic cooperation in the dynamic Asia-Pacific rim.

“If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success.”

Confucius, Analects 13.3

Beginning in late 2011, the Obama Administration unveiled its intention to rebalance US military, diplomatic, and economic efforts to the Asia-Pacific region. Initially described as a “pivot,” this term was subsequently changed to “rebalance,” to describe more aptly the repositioning of mainly military assets from a then 50-50 percent to a 60-40 percent split, favoring the Asia-Pacific over the Atlantic side of the world by 2020. In President Obama’s November 2011 address to the Australian parliament, he emphasized the US policy goal is to ensure “the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping [the Asia-Pacific] region and its future.” In practice, the Asia-Pacific theater was slated to gain a rotational US Marine Corps detachment (already deployed to Australia) and an additional US carrier group: one aircraft carrier, seven destroyers, ten littoral combat ships, and two submarines, along with reconnaissance assets. In contrast to the limited permanent-base approach of the 1980s, the US military rebalance relies upon rotational deployments through several host-nation port facilities. As Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Amos explained, dispersing US forces beyond a few large bases makes them a harder target for ballistic missiles.

addition, rotational deployments are more cost-effective by using air travel to rotate military personnel, while the power of the rebalance is augmented by US foreign military sales to the region.6

Scholars such as Christopher Layne have relabeled the US rebalancing strategy as “off-shore balancing” - an attempt to contain the rise of a potential hegemon, such as China, by relying on global and regional power balances to attain that goal. As Layne explains:

- Economic limitations are pushing the United States to reset priorities, withdrawing and downsizing its forces in Europe and the Middle East and concentrating its military power in East Asia.

- By reducing its military footprint in the Middle East, the United States may decrease the incidence of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism directed against it. Safeguarding the free flow of Persian Gulf oil can be ensured largely by naval and air power.

- America’s comparative strategic advantages rest on naval and air power, not land power, to manage security issues in Asia.

- Off-shore balancing is a strategy of burden-sharing with Pacific Rim allies to protect freedom of navigation in East Asia.7

Consistent with the above interpretation, the US Defense Strategic Guidance announced in January 2012 the United States will no longer size its forces for long-term, prolonged stability operations (such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan) while projecting power in areas that are challenged by “asymmetric means,” notably, anti-access and area-denial environments in the South and East China Seas.8

Close on the heels of President Obama’s announcement, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton amplified the importance of the Asia-Pacific region, where half of the world’s population resides, indicating its development is vital to American strategic and economic interests. As she noted:

Open markets in Asia provide the United States with unprecedented opportunities for investment, trade, and access to cutting-edge technology. Strategically, maintaining peace and security across the Asia-Pacific is increasingly crucial to global progress, whether through defending freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, countering the proliferation efforts of North Korea, or ensuring transparency in the military activities of the region’s key players.

The rebalance strategy, as described by Clinton, proceeds along six tracks: (1) strengthening bilateral security alliances; (2) deepening America’s relationships with emerging powers such as China; (3) engaging with regional multilateral institutions; (4) expanding trade and investment;
(5) forging a broad-based military presence; (6) and advancing democracy and human rights.\textsuperscript{9}

The rebalance to the Asia-Pacific thus demonstrates US leadership, acknowledges the economic importance of the region, and highlights freedom of navigation and military transparency as strategic goals. In light of such comprehensive, transparent, and compelling security justifications, one might ask whether the rebalance has had the salutary effect of assuring friendly and allied countries while deterring China as a potential adversary in the region?

This paper argues the regional shaping benefits of the rebalance have not yet materialized, and odds remain low they can be realized in the absence of new efforts. In particular, China has become increasingly assertive of its claims to disputed maritime territories in the East and South China Seas, and remains committed to a relatively high rate of military spending to project its power into the region in the coming years. At the same time, some countries, notably US allies, Japan and the Philippines, have become more vocal in their objections to Chinese maritime claims and more convinced of their need for American military support as maritime disputes unfold. Indeed, US allies appear to perceive the rebalancing as designed to put them on a more equal footing to resolve their disputes with China -- and not leave them to face rising Chinese power alone.\textsuperscript{10} It is therefore incumbent on Washington to manage the contradictory aims of the rebalancing strategy more effectively: militarily bolstering allies while fostering peaceful cooperation.

**Phase One: 2011-2012**

**Rebalancing Perceived as Military**

From late 2011 through 2012, the United States took the following concrete steps to implement its rebalancing initiative:

- Created a new Pentagon office, the Air-Sea Strategy Office, in November 2011, to refine the concept of a new joint air-sea battle (first broached in 2009) to counter anti-access, area-denial operations, principally in the Pacific.\textsuperscript{11}
- Announced new troop deployments to Australia, new naval deployments to Singapore, and new military cooperation with the Philippines;
- Emphasized American military presence in the Asia-Pacific would be increased, become more broadly distributed, flexible, and politically

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\textsuperscript{10} J. Kugler and D. Lemke, *Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of the War Ledger* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996) discusses the likelihood of conflict between states sharing a perceived parity or balance of power.

• Made progress in negotiations to form a multi-national Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement.13

Most countries in East and Southeast Asia were publicly receptive to a stronger US commitment to the Asia-Pacific region. Regional powers such as Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia took pains, however, to avoid choosing sides between the United States and China. On the other hand, the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore explicitly welcomed greater US presence in the region. Tellingly, the Philippines, along with Vietnam, remain embroiled in a protracted, intense dispute with China over maritime and territorial claims in the South China Sea. Singapore as a small city-state, and Japan, Taiwan and South Korea as long-standing allies appear to have embraced the US initiative as a stabilizing influence in the region.14

China’s initial reaction to the rebalance initiative was carefully measured in official media and harshly critical in non-official media. Many unofficial commentators, including military academics, asserted the United States had unveiled the initiative as a new post-Cold-War conspiracy to “contain” China as a rising power, and heir-apparent to the former Soviet Union, as a potential adversary of the United States. Indeed, some commentators argued this “conspiracy” could eventually align China and Russia more closely together in joint economic and defense efforts to mitigate US-led containment efforts.15 To date, most Chinese bloggers remain vociferously nationalistic and critical of the US rebalancing policy, although government-employed commentators may be covertly shaping this ostensibly public phenomenon.16

**Phase Two: Defanging the Rebalancing Initiative**

In the lead-up to and aftermath of their June 2013 summit, Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping ushered in a new phase of the initiative characterized by repeated calls for moderation. Chinese officials noted there were “no fundamental, structural, or irreconcilable differences” between the two countries. Chinese military leaders also stressed that, as the rebalancing initiative evolved, the United States has placed less

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13 The twelve negotiating countries are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam. Some countries expressing interest in TPP include South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Colombia, and Costa Rica. China, despite its initial opposition, has more recently shown interest in considering eventual TPP membership. Vicki Needham, “China’s Interest Grows in Joining an Asia-Pacific Trade Deal,” *The Hill*, September 17, 2013.
emphasis on military initiatives and on China as a focus for the US policy.\textsuperscript{17}

Partly reflecting these moderating influences, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Major General Zhang Zhaozhong described China’s growing military activity in the South and East China Seas as a “cabbage strategy” in a May 2013 television interview.\textsuperscript{18} This strategy seems aimed at “defanging” the rebalancing policy by putting in place concentric circles of Chinese fishing boats, fishery administration ships, maritime enforcement vessels, and warships (resembling a layer-by-layer cabbage wrap) around disputed maritime areas in the China Seas. The goal of the strategy is to assert China’s sovereignty over these areas via a slow accumulation of small incremental changes, none of which in itself constitutes a \textit{casus belli} but together substantiate China’s claims of sovereignty over the long term.

Another way to look at this strategy is to imagine a Chinese game of \textit{weiqi}, the popular Asian game of black-and-white pieces in which two opposing players strive to surround the other. China’s July 2012 establishment of Sansha City on a Paracel island seized by force from Vietnam in 1974 was the precursor of its new \textit{weiqi} games with the Philippines and Japan. Repeated Chinese navy standoffs with Philippine Coast Guard vessels at Scarborough Reef from 2012 to 2013, and its imposition of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the Japanese-claimed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in November 2013, are recent moves in these games. China’s imposition of its ADIZ prompted South Korea, in turn, to expand its own ADIZ into Japanese and Chinese ADIZs in December 2013.\textsuperscript{19} Clearly, the busy East Asian coastal seas, with their presumed underwater natural resources, are becoming hot points of potential military conflict.

Indeed, as Robert Ross predicted in late 2012, the rebalancing initiative has become a self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby US policy “unnecessarily compounds Beijing’s insecurities and feeds China’s aggressiveness, undermines regional stability, and decreases the possibility of cooperation between Beijing and Washington.”\textsuperscript{20}

**Phase Three: 2014-? Uncertainty**

To address China’s concerns and to strengthen the cooperative engagement, Brookings Institution fellows Jonathan Pollack and Jeffrey Bader made several US policy recommendations in January 2014:

- Ensure budget cuts do not affect the rebalance;
- Complete Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations in the first half of


2014 and support China’s eventual entry;
• Encourage China’s economic reforms by, *inter alia*, completing a bilateral investment treaty with China by 2016;
• Support Japanese security efforts while urging Prime Minister Abe to avoid stirring up fractious historical issues that undercut Japanese relations with China and South Korea;
• Support negotiation of a code of conduct in the East and South China Seas to de-escalate territorial disputes.\(^{21}\)

Unfortunately, events since the publication of their Brookings article put in doubt the likelihood most of their policy prescriptions will be implemented in the near term. On the budgetary front alone, US Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Katrina McFarland has stated the rebalance was being reconsidered in light of budget pressures.\(^{22}\) Chinese commentators also asserted the US budget sequestration begun in 2013 will likely prevent the United States from committing enough resources to the rebalancing, thereby transforming the initiative into a “strategic retreat.”\(^{23}\) Indeed, Pacific Air Forces Commander General Herbert J. Carlisle has acknowledged resources have not yet been made available to key elements of the policy due to other commitments.\(^{24}\)

Just as important, President Obama’s State of the Union Speech in January 2014 did not mention Asia-Pacific issues ranging from Sino-Japanese tensions to larger concerns over maritime disputes and the potential for an East Asian arms race. US Secretary of Defense Hagel’s April 2014 visit to Beijing, however, did prominently acknowledge those tensions. Secretary Hagel criticized China for unilaterally establishing its ADIZ in the East China Sea without conferring with Japan and its other neighbors. “That adds to tensions, misunderstandings and could eventually add to, and eventually get to, a dangerous conflict,” Hagel noted, while emphatically wagging his finger in a joint press conference with Defense Minister and PLA General Chang Wanquan.\(^{25}\) PLA Major General Zhu Chenghu, a military academic, later dismissed Hagel’s remarks as “groundless,” suggesting the United States believes “whatever the Chinese do is illegal, and whatever the Americans do is right.”\(^{26}\)

In the lead up to Secretary Hagel’s visit, China decided to exclude Japan from the international fleet review of the upcoming PLA-hosted Western Pacific Naval Symposium, bringing together Pacific-rim countries. Since Japan will not participate in the fleet review, the United States has also decided not to take part in a show of support, according


to press reports.27 These events do not bode well for casting the Western Pacific Naval Symposium as a venue for working out an acceptable code of military practice to manage potential conflicts in the region. A number of years ago, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium developed a voluntary Code for Unalerted Encounters at Sea. However, the Chinese have refused to accept any revisions to it, even though they acknowledge their use of parts of it. China takes exception to the use of the word “Code” in the title since it implies a “legally binding force.”28 Moreover, the Code for Unalerted Encounters at Sea does not address other basic issues although it constitutes a good start to defusing potential confrontations between navy fleets.29

As President Obama embarked on his April 2014 trip to Japan, Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines, the official Chinese Xinhua news agency underscored Beijing’s sensitivity about his stops in Tokyo and Manila: “The United States should reappraise its anachronistic hegemonic alliance system and stop pampering its chums like Japan and the Philippines that have been igniting regional tensions with provocative moves.”30 To date, Chinese media have chosen to spotlight these “hegemonic” US defense treaty obligations rather than equally firm American enjoiners for the disputants to settle their maritime claims peacefully.31 Just as important, press coverage by US allies has failed, so far, to highlight American emphasis on peaceful dispute-resolution. Instead, foreign media dwell on the rebalancing strategy as leaving military options on the table to counter China’s long-term intentions. Chances for miscalculation and conflict have, therefore, risen on both sides. It is striking that shortly after President Obama returned to Washington, Vietnam issued a stiff warning to Beijing about new Chinese oil drilling moves near the Paracel Islands; and Chinese vessels reportedly rammed Vietnamese vessels in those waters, provoking anti-Chinese riots in Ho Chi Minh City’s foreign investment area.32

Rebalancing the Rebalance?

Against the backdrop of rising tensions in the East and South China Seas, Chinese scholars generally expect the United States to delay or slow down the military rebalance in order to accommodate US budgetary strictures and to preserve enough strategic military assets to address seemingly chronic problems in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Northeast Asia. Professor Liu Feitao of the China Institute of International Studies argues the United States may increasingly focus on an “economic rebalancing” effort, such as expanding the Trans-Pacific

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29 CUES is inadequate because China asserts that military activities in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) are subject to its approval. Until China agrees that its EEZ is not to be treated as territorial water, CUES is irrelevant, offering only a partial solution.
Partnership and promoting military sales, to help sustain a scaled-back effort.33

At the same time, Liu maintains the United States “will increasingly try to control Asian territorial disputes through legal means and multiple channels.” Highlighting Washington’s unsuccessful attempt to ratify the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea during President Obama’s first term, Liu predicts US policy:

...will undertake similar [multilateral] efforts and bring legality into the forefront of dispute intervention. The United States will try to turn multilateral mechanisms like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus and the East Asia Summit into acceptable platforms to discuss territorial disputes.34

It is likely Chinese policy makers will continue to reject US efforts to promote multilateral fora and international norms as means to work out China’s emerging maritime disputes in the Asia-Pacific. Beijing is, so far, rigidly committed to addressing these disputes “reasonably and peacefully” with its neighbors only on a bilateral basis. Chinese leaders also seem adamant about refusing to recognize the “authority” or “expertise” of international bodies, such as the international arbitration panel currently reviewing the Sino-Philippines dispute as a result of a unilateral Philippine request in early 2013.35 Few Chinese academics, military or otherwise, are swimming against this tide and calling for a critical reappraisal of China’s bilateral approach.36

A New Initiative

Given this apparently intractable stalemate, the United States should consider encouraging its treaty partner, the Philippines, to take the lead in launching bilateral negotiations with Beijing on the resolution of conflicting maritime claims in the South China Sea. The United States should no longer insist on multilateral fora and legalistic platforms against which China harbors deep suspicions regarding their fairness and track record.37 Indeed, since China’s land border disputes with its neighbors have largely been worked out, through bilateral talks, Beijing is highly likely to hew to what it knows. China may calculate it can exert

34 Ibid. Also see Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s article, “Securing the Rule of Law at Sea,” Project-Syndicate, June 2, 2014. Prime Minister Abe advocates the use of ASEAN’s 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea as a multilateral basis for resolving maritime issues.
36 This stance could change in the future, if Chinese academics believe China’s defense has succeeded in gradually strengthening its maritime claims and altering the international order to its benefit. At present, however, Chinese elites generally reject the “international order” as a set of rules created by the victors of World Wars I and II without meaningful Chinese (and developing world) input.
37 Interestingly, China has (1) recognized the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea as the key legal framework applicable in the Arctic and (2) acknowledged the “sovereign rights” of Arctic littoral states there, the latter apparently consistent with China’s own maritime claims in the East and South China Seas. See J. Kapyla and H. Miklola, “The Growing Arctic Interests of Russia, China, the U.S., and the European Union,” Finnish Institute of International Affairs Paper no. 133, August 2013, http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/347/the_global_arctic/.
finer control over such negotiations, in terms of both content and pace, by conducting them on a bilateral basis.38

For its part, Manila may wish to supplement its ongoing arbitration case with a bilateral negotiation approach to demonstrate its commitment to the peaceful resolution of its maritime disputes. In an effort to establish consistent standards and precedents to serve as the basis for resolving other disputes, the Philippines could also exchange notes regularly on its negotiations with China and its neighbors. This measure will ensure the talks can inform and encourage other countries to initiate similar measures in the future. It is key that Manila’s talks not give Beijing any preponderant advantage by isolating or leveraging the Philippines against other disputants. In other words, this weiqi-like diplomatic negotiation can be completed as China’s future negotiation partners consult with each other.

An information-sharing approach to Sino-Philippine talks would also help ensure the terms of the agreement (including the delimitation of maritime borders and resource exploitation) are worked out consistently, while checking off necessary security objectives, ranging from protocols for military and law enforcement encounters at sea to the establishment of procedures and hotlines for military exercise notifications and the avoidance of military confrontation. Other countries such as Vietnam, Japan, and South Korea may later elect to pursue similar negotiations with China, to resolve inter-connected defense and resource management issues just as critical to their own economic development and to foreign relations with their neighbors.39

In addition, separate Sino-American talks could aim to avoid another “USS Cowpens” situation in which Chinese and US military vessels nearly collided in the South China Sea in December 2013.40 A US defense official underscored the importance of establishing communication protocols to prevent such accidents in the future: “Sustained and reliable communication mitigates the risk of mishaps, which is in the interest of both the United States and China.”41 In short, China, the United States and their Pacific-rim neighbors can jointly pursue Sun Tzu’s dictum, “To be prepared for any contingency is the greatest of virtues.”42

38 Malaysia follows a bilateral course with China and appears committed to accommodating China’s maritime claims while pursuing cooperative initiatives with China including joint maritime exercises beginning in 2014. Vietnam has, so far, had mixed results in pursuing bilateral talks with China, both sides having agreed on their land border and maritime rights in the Gulf of Tonkin, but not on the sensitive Paracel and Spratly Islands disputes. See K. Bradsher, “China and Vietnam at Impasse over Oil Rig in South China Sea,” New York Times, May 12, 2014. As a result, Vietnam is considering the filing of an international arbitration case against China, similar to that submitted by the Philippines in 2013. K. Kwok, “China Wants to Avoid Court over Maritime Disputes, Says Vietnam Official,” South China Morning Post, June 2, 2014.

39 In the absence of any meaningful progress on maritime issues, Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam could begin to cooperate more closely on defensive measures in the South China Sea. See “Australia backs U.S., Japan against China,” Inquirer Global Nation, June 3, 2014. However, implementing such defensive measures should be preceded by utilizing both bilateral and multilateral diplomatic means to explain the measures to China and to seek a peaceful resolution. H.B. Minh and B. Blanchard, “China Sells Vietnam for Hyping Up South China Sea Oil Rig Row,” Yahoo News, June 18, 2014.

40 Carl Thayer, “USS Cowpens Incident Reveals Strategic Mistrust between the U.S. and China,” The Diplomat, December 17, 2013.

41 Ibid.

Managing Blow-Back

The US sponsorship of Sino-Philippine talks concerning South China Sea raises some serious questions. First, would such a US action undermine US preference for multilateral negotiations and frameworks? Does such a bilateral strategy ultimately play into the hands of a rising China seeking to use its growing economic clout to impose its will on small countries by dividing and overwhelming them in serial order? Finally, would the bilateral approach be interpreted by China as a sign of US weakness in standing by its treaty partners in East Asia? Some critics would answer these questions affirmatively, arguing Washington should eschew a bilateral approach and simply stay the course in deterring Beijing by accelerating the implementation of military rebalancing measures coupled with a more vigorous definition of US treaty obligations.

The basic answer to these criticisms is Washington and its partners can and should accommodate several complementary initiatives in their effort to pursue a peaceful resolution of East and South China Sea disputes. By reviewing China’s concerns in bilateral fora, the United States and its partners open new avenues capable of leading to a break-through in the resolution of these disputes. Moreover, progress on the bilateral front does not undermine, deny, or contradict any multi-lateral or international framework, but rather creates new opportunities to bring those organizations and platforms into the talks and to incorporate them into bilaterally accepted decisions. Such progress does not signal a lack of resolve on the parts of the United States and its allies -- but a flexibility to exhaust all possible channels before imposing specific red-lines that could trigger the use of military power.

Conclusion

To maintain the momentum of its rebalancing policy, the United States must help bridge the growing impasse between American-led multilateral and Chinese bilateral efforts to resolve Asian-Pacific maritime disputes. Indeed, it may also be vital for the United States to recast the strategic thrust of its rebalancing initiative. Sino-American progress on key issues has been made over the past few decades by pursuing a constructive, systematic engagement process that works through issues on a flexible, cooperative, and pragmatic basis. Drawing on this historical theme of “constructive engagement” means recasting the inherent thrust of the rebalance -- harnessing it to the purpose of "catching up" security cooperation with economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. In this way, the rebalancing initiative may be better labeled as “keeping pace” to match international security cooperation with robust economic activity within the Pacific Rim.

It is far from an easy task for the United States to persuade the Philippines and other regional actors to enter into a complicated bilateral talks with China. Such talks will require Washington to walk a tightrope between Realpolitik and normative diplomacy, the former characterized by bilateral agreements and the latter by calling for international integration within a multilateral approach. Throughout, Washinngton will need to emphasize both the inviolability of its treaty obligations to its

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allies and the value of accepted international legal norms, as Pacific Rim nations are encouraged to conclude inter-locking bilateral maritime arrangements with China.

Bilateral talks may evolve over time into trilateral ones with the United States encouraging parties to stay on a constructive track and avoid increased tensions and hostility. American support could assure allies they risk little -- and may make more headway -- by acknowledging China’s reluctance to engage with multilateral institutions. The alternative to this tri-bilateral hybrid approach seems both short-sighted and dangerous: pursuing a waiting game that juxtaposes growing military forces, posits mutually exclusive economic interests, fuels nationalistic over-reactions, and inadvertently risks a new arms race hampering the development of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.
Abstract: The March 2014 annexation of Crimea may be interpreted as a contest between Russian strategy and Western statecraft. The respective natures of strategy and statecraft differ substantially, which predetermined the parameters and outcome of the Crimean crisis. This makes an excellent case study of the interaction between strategy and statecraft, and shows why strategy trumps statecraft in direct confrontations.

Even as Russia continues to undermine eastern Ukraine with provocateurs from within and massed troops from without, it is fair to say the Crimean component of the ongoing Ukrainian crisis has concluded. This clearly important historical event will be mined for further insight into Russian foreign policy, as well as statecraft and international relations, for years to come. Contemporary commentary on the crisis ranges from blame to the vociferous defense by Russia’s premier international propaganda arm, Russia Today. Academics blogged throughout to consider political, economic, and other implications in real time as the crisis developed.

With Crimea now annexed by Russia (even though questions about Russian intentions toward the rest of Ukraine continue), it is possible to step back and consider the crisis as a whole. Why and how did Russia so easily impose its will upon the course of events? Why did the statecraft practiced by the Western powers appear so weak and anemic?

This article suggests the dynamics and outcome of the Crimean crisis were determined by disparate assumptions and methods of thinking on the part of the West and of Russia. The West practiced statecraft. Russia entered into Crimea anticipating the need for strategy as classically understood—using force to gain its political ends though ultimately their threat of force sufficed. This difference between statecraft and strategy dominated the entire affair. To illustrate the importance of this distinction, the respective natures of strategy and statecraft will be explored as lenses through which to examine the crisis. Finally, because strategy and statecraft differ so significantly, the real and anticipated post-crisis consequences of statecraft will be considered, even though that statecraft now no longer opposes strategy in any immediate sense.

Strategy and Statecraft: Respective Natures

Although classical strategy is a subset of statecraft, their natures are different. The nature of strategy differs significantly from that of statecraft, even though both ultimately subscribe to André Beaufre’s proposal that “[a]ny dialectical contest is a contest for freedom of action.”


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However, strategy approaches the question of freedom of action differently from statecraft, a divergence stemming from the fundamental assumptions and ways of thinking which respectively underpin the two, particularly concerning the role of military force. It is because of the sheer difference between the nature of force, on the one hand, and all other instruments of political power, on the other hand, that one must make a clear distinction between the threat or use of force and the employment of all other political tools. This difference renders many modern definitions of strategy obscure by implying functional equality between all instruments of power. Strategy, in its classical sense (as a concept solely dedicated to understanding and mastering military force) when employed side-by-side with the wider concept of statecraft, adopts the natures of the instruments available.

Force and its political utility are thus the primary concerns of strategy. Colin Gray has defined strategy as “the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy.” Threatened (or actual) violence is, therefore, the first instrument in the strategist’s toolkit. Such threat of or use of force may well be reciprocated by the opposing party, giving rise to the adversarial, reciprocal nature of strategy. Beaufre has similarly defined strategy as “the art of the dialectic of force or, more precisely, the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute.” A strategic mindset focuses on directing violence in a context where the other party is likely to respond in kind. But for what purpose?

Clausewitz clearly understood the purpose of force, encapsulating it in his definition of war. “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” A strategist uses force to impose an unwelcome situation upon his enemy. The American admiral and strategic theorist J.C. Wylie similarly asserted “the aim of war is some measure of control over the enemy” and further clarified “control sought in war should be neither so extreme as to amount to extermination…nor should it be so tenuous as to foster the continued behavior of the enemy as a hazard to the victory.” The threat, or actual use of force is meant to be converted to a non-violent purpose or end. “[T]his dilemma of currency conversion is central to the difficulty of strategy.” This difficulty is, of course, eased when force does not actually have to be used.

Statecraft is the use of power in international relations. As the larger idea, it subsumes strategy within it. However, statecraft beyond the realm of strategy rests upon contrasting assumptions and ways of thinking, being typically conducted via diplomacy, “a field where success, in the last analysis, was best assured by agreements that provided mutuality of advantage.” It tends, therefore, toward persuasive means of achieving political objectives, though as a whole statecraft constitutes a spectrum ranging from persuasion to coercion. Yet, even coercive diplomacy is

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3 Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, 22.
closer to diplomacy than to strategy. “Coercive diplomacy needs to be distinguished from pure coercion. It seeks to persuade the opponent to cease his aggression rather than bludgeon him into stopping. In contrast to the crude use of force to repel the opponent, coercive diplomacy emphasizes the use of threats and the exemplary use of limited force to persuade him to back down.” Coercive diplomacy, thus, overlaps with strategy to some extent—the primary difference stemming from how force is understood.

One may engage in coercive diplomacy, or at least attempt to do so, without understanding the nature of military force as an instrument, or the nature of strategy. Such use tends to rely on force as bluff. If force must actually be employed in coercive diplomacy, it is frequently ineffective. This is an important distinction because “[t]he declaration of war, and more immediately the use of violence, alters everything. From that point on, the demands of war tend to shape policy, more than the direction of policy shapes war.”

The principal differences between strategy and statecraft are the sets of fundamental assumptions and ways of thinking respective to each. Strategy is by definition adversarial and seeks victory; whereas statecraft is merely competitive and seeks common ground and agreement, even within the coercive use of force. Most writing on strategy assumes the presence of a reciprocating enemy; most writing on statecraft assumes common ground may be found and reached through diplomacy and persuasion. Their accepted mechanisms to resolve conflict differ fundamentally, giving strategy the advantage due to the respective images each side of the conflict has of the other. The mindset of the strategist is thus at odds with, perhaps even opposed to, the manner of thinking inherent in most of statecraft. Moreover, their mutual interaction has not been extensively investigated. What happens when one political actor enters into a confrontation with strategic assumptions, and his opposite with the assumptions underpinning statecraft? The Crimean takeover of March 2014 makes an excellent case study not only of such a confrontation, but of why statecraft fails in the face of classical strategy.

The Crimean Crisis

The Crimean crisis began with a Russian move. Yanukovich ordered snipers to shoot into the crowds at Maidan (Independence) Square. When this act of violence inflamed the protestors’ passions rather than suppressing them, he fled or, as reported by Ukrainian investigators, was perhaps abducted to Russia. Russian armed forces thereafter moved into Crimea, an invasion that violated the sovereign territory of another

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8 Ibid., 189.
state. Together with Russian and pro-Russian paramilitary forces, they besieged Ukrainian army and navy posts and attempted to disarm those inside, limiting their freedom of action. Thereafter, Russian armed forces largely remained a tactically latent threat but one being up by constant reinforcement. Ukrainians did not resist with force, which suited Russian purposes. After all, as Clausewitz noted, “[t]he aggressor is always peace-loving…he would prefer to take over our country unopposed…To prevent his doing so one must be willing to make war and be prepared for it.”10 The result in Crimea was a foregone conclusion as soon as Ukraine had chosen not to reply to the Russian invasion with armed force. Ukrainians were not willing or able to make war, rightly or wrongly, and so could not prevent the loss of Crimea.

The result of the crisis was a foregone conclusion because the Russians understood a basic tenet of strategy: “[T]he ultimate determinant in war is the man on the scene with the gun. This man is the final power in war. He is in control. He determines who wins.”11 Russia established control in Crimea through its military and paramilitary presence. It is immaterial that this presence did not begin causing bloodshed and inflicting casualties upon Ukrainian armed forces in the region; control had been established.12 With this move, Russia had achieved two conditions. First, it had unambiguously demonstrated its political resolve by going to the extreme of introducing military force into the situation, a resolve unlikely to be shaken by countermeasures short of force. Second, the end result could not be in doubt as long as Russian forces remained. They would have prevented Ukraine from exercising its sovereignty in the region in any case, with or without bloodshed, much as the United Nations and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe were prevented from entering Crimea to observe the situation.

Having imposed control over the future of Crimea, Russia could allow the slower-acting non-military instruments of political power to guide the peninsula toward its fate. Russia could afford to take its time because it was already in effective control of Crimea, a control which further amplified the efficacy of its slower non-military tools. This fact also gave the false impression that the crisis could still be resolved through western statecraft in some manner other than that desired by the Kremlin. Russia employed two primary non-military instruments to consolidate its hold on Crimea: propaganda, as conveyed internationally by Russia Today as well as across large swaths of eastern Europe by Russian media such as the First Baltic Channel; and local and imported pro-Russian supporters in Crimea, who took over the power structure and bent it to Putin’s will.

Russia has disseminated propaganda in Ukraine for years through print media, television, and radio. It has deep roots in Ukraine and many, particularly in the south and east of the country, may read, watch, or listen only to Russian media for all their news consumption. For example, in 2009 Russian newspapers accounted for 66.7 percent of all those circulated. This “creates a threat to Ukrainian national security

10 Clausewitz, On War, 370.
11 Wylie, Military Strategy, 72.
12 Russian forces did slowly assault border posts in Crimea to evict the guards and their families, and gradually assaulted all Ukrainian army posts after the conclusion of the internationally unrecognized referendum.
due to the aggressive informative policy of some Russian TV channels in relation to Ukraine and its citizens.\textsuperscript{13} This aggressive information flow aims to influence Ukrainian policy toward Russia, such as by agitating against joining NATO and promoting the Russian language as an official language while casting a defamatory shadow by accusing various Ukrainian center-right parties of ultra-nationalism or even fascism.\textsuperscript{14} Russian propaganda, therefore, lent local legitimacy to its invasion of Crimea; and reciprocally the Russian invasion of Crimea lent credence to its propaganda. Why else would the Russian armed forces be in Crimea, save to protect ethnic Russians from the Ukrainian government?

Russia’s supporters in Crimea, its second non-military tool, were— and are—led by Sergey Aksyonov. He illegitimately assumed power in Crimea largely due to the presence of Russian forces. He was allegedly supported by fifty-five of the sixty-four invited delegates, of the one hundred who normally make up the legislature. Yet controversy persists as to whether a physical quorum was reached. A number of the delegates alleged they were not actually present—“at least 10 votes...were cast for people who were not in the chamber.” The utility of latent force becomes apparent, given that Aksyonov received only four percent of the vote in the most recent election in Crimea in 2010.\textsuperscript{15} This practice has been the pattern in Crimea throughout the crisis. Gallup conducted a public opinion poll amongst the residents of Crimea in May 2013, which revealed 23 percent of Crimea’s inhabitants believed the peninsula should be separated from Ukraine and ceded to Russia. This actually indicated a downward trend, as 33 percent held such views in 2011.\textsuperscript{16} Yet the results of the internationally unrecognized referendum in Crimea indicate over 95 percent voted for joining Russia. Only the threat of Russian force enabled these results, based in large part on widespread propaganda and further rigging of the outcomes.

Ultimately, once Russia had introduced armed force into Crimea, it was virtually impossible for it to fail to annex it, barring an effective armed response from Ukraine or the West. When this move was not forthcoming, the game was up—and Russia had won Crimea through non-military instruments whose utility and effectiveness was entirely premised upon the presence of Russian forces.

The enabling and strengthening effect that the presence and threat of Russian armed forces in Crimea had on other Russian tools of political power may be contrasted with the weakening effect that same threat of force had on Western statecraft. The Western practice of statecraft throughout the crisis has been primarily based upon rhetoric and appeals to international norms and laws, as well as upon targeted sanctions against individuals in Ukraine, Crimea, and Russia. To a lesser but ever increasing degree, the West has also acted to shore up the confidence

\textsuperscript{13} Gatis Pelnēns, ed., \textit{The “Humanitarian Dimension” of Russian Foreign Policy Toward Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and the Baltic States}, trans. Rihards Kalniņš (Riga: Center for East European Policy Studies, 2009), figures on Russian media share 295, quote 293.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 295.


of the easternmost constituents of NATO—Poland, the Baltic States, Romania—through closer military cooperation. Most of the West’s actions have not, however, had much bearing on the course of the crisis.

Western statecraft throughout the early days of the Crimean crisis was variable and evidenced differences of opinion between the United States and Europe, as well as among European countries themselves, on the necessary level of stringency suitable for any response. Responses consisted largely of diplomatic and legal rhetoric, and varying degrees of condemnation. Most spoke out in support of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and deplored the introduction of armed forces into Crimea in Ukraine as illegal and against the Budapest Memorandum of 1994; at times these statements were balanced by calls for Ukraine to respect the minority rights of ethnic Russians. The West largely considered the Russian intervention to be both illegal and against common norms enshrined in international law. Vladimir Putin, however, insisted his actions aligned with international law, in part because he denied the presence of any Russian forces in Crimea, save for those allowed by treaty on their leased naval base at Sevastopol. Moreover, he attempted to contrast this practice with what he considered the Western approach.

Our partners, especially in the United States, always clearly formulate their own geopolitical and state interests and follow them with persistence. Then, using the principle “You’re either with us or against us” they draw the whole world in. And those who do not join in get ‘beaten’ until they do.

Our approach is different. We proceed from the conviction that we always act legitimately. If I do decide to use the armed forces, this will be a legitimate decision in full compliance with both general norms of international law, since we have the appeal of the legitimate President, and with our commitments, which in this case coincide with our interests to protect the people with whom we have close historical, cultural and economic ties.17

Russia rebuffed all of the West’s diplomatic and legal rhetoric. Having already established the facts it desired on the ground, and in doing so having created the crisis, Russia could afford to ignore the West’s rhetoric. That rhetoric could not change the parameters of the crisis unless it influenced Russian political and strategic decision-making, which, as Putin’s words clearly indicate, was not likely.

Similarly, economic considerations were unlikely ever to deter a territorially and demographically nationalistic Russia. Putin would well have known that Crimea constituted a net cost to Ukraine of $1.1 billion a year and would for Russia as well. Moreover, Crimea’s entire infrastructure is geared toward a northward connection with Ukraine rather than an eastward connection toward Russia, requiring further investment.18 In this context of expected economic costs for Russia, the West also raised the possibility of economic sanctions in its rhetoric and, eventually, also in its actions. Economic pressures generally work slowly, and rarely take effect directly against military units in the field. Sanctions were, thus, never likely to influence the outcome of the

crisis, unless they swayed Russian political decision-making in Moscow. Their slow pace has begun affecting Russia only after the annexation of Crimea.

The presence of Russian forces in Crimea, and the political will behind it, largely muted much of the West’s practice of statecraft. The approaches the West and Russia took in relation to Crimea reflected their respective political wills. Russia had the will to employ force, and therefore also had the will to ignore the anticipated consequences of Western statecraft, though it also attempted rhetorically to mitigate those consequences. The West had no plausibly effective levers with which to pry Crimea away from Russia short of the use of force, but it was not nearly as invested in the status of Crimea; and, therefore, practiced statecraft, even though such a course of action could never change the outcome. If the West had had the will to maintain Crimea as Ukrainian territory, it also would have practiced strategy—and war would have resulted. Strategy thus trumped statecraft both in defining the range of possible outcomes in Crimea, and in ensuring the actual end result as well. Western statecraft, due both to its slow escalation and to the nature of the instruments used and actions chosen, has become more about punishing Russia for its action in Crimea than trying to prevent or reverse what occurred. Actions taken to reassure Poland and the Baltic States are also meant to deter Russia from considering similar interventions. These wider, punishing, effects of the Western reaction will now be considered as one final aspect of statecraft and its interaction with strategy.

**Post-Crisis Consequences**

In conflict, statecraft and strategy are mismatched, as the former generally cannot overturn the latter due to the natures of their respective instruments. Strategy, focused on force, is about consequences and conclusions. Strategy must end; sooner or later force must be lifted. “It is the threat of damage, or of more damage to come, that can make someone yield or comply. It is latent violence that can influence someone’s choice—violence that can be withheld or inflicted, or that a victim believes can be withheld or inflicted.”\(^\text{19}\) It may also achieve effects quickly—indeed, the rapid achievement of effects is usually supremely desirable, as strategy assumes the mutual imposition of damage.

Statecraft, by contrast, usually employs means which take effect only slowly. Economic sanctions mean nothing if implemented for a single day. Statecraft is also, like strategy, about consequences. But unlike strategy, statecraft is less about conclusions than about continuation. The coercive tools of statecraft may come to an end if the policy goal is achieved, but persuasive or rewarding instruments do not necessarily conclude. For this reason western statecraft has taken on the character of imposing punishment after the end of the crisis rather than of preventing it from reaching the conclusion desired by Russia. Economic pressure and diplomatic isolation are long-term instruments which comprise the major elements of Western statecraft for punishing and restricting Russia, alongside NATO’s military reassurance of its easternmost constituents.

One aspect of the West’s diplomacy—in both rhetoric and action—was the threat of diplomatic isolation. All cooperation between NATO and Russia has been suspended, including a joint mission to escort chemical weapons out of Syria.\(^{20}\) However, diplomatic isolation is not an instrument which can achieve effects quickly—if at all. It impinges upon the target’s freedom of action during the time it is in effect and therefore increases the difficulty of accomplishing foreign policy goals. It can only sway the target’s policies if the increased difficulty and costs of achieving policy outweigh the benefits of the policy itself. For this reason, diplomatic isolation must be sustained even to have a chance at achieving effect. Yet even difficulty fulfilling policy does not guarantee actual change in policy. Moreover, not all are in agreement with the aim of diplomatically isolating Russia. Russia’s fellow BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) members have diplomatically supported it, denouncing the West’s rhetoric and asserting Russia’s right to attend the G20 (Group of Twenty) summit in Brisbane in November 2014.\(^{21}\) The BRICS are also in the process of establishing institutions whose functions parallel those of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, a sign that Russia’s ability to practice statecraft has been only partially damaged. This partial isolation will provide even less possibility for effect. Given its stated foreign policy goals of looking after ethnic Russians beyond its borders, Russian foreign policy is unlikely to be influenced by diplomatic isolation in any case. Indeed, some observers have drawn parallels between Russia’s actions in Crimea in light of these foreign policy goals and the Soviet Union’s old Brezhnev Doctrine.\(^{22}\)

The West targeted sanctions against blacklisted figures in the former Ukrainian and current Russian governments, as well as some oligarchs who support them, although Putin had reportedly already pressured some to repatriate their assets in previous years. To date, the sanctions themselves have not aimed to damage the whole of the Russian economy, but they suffice to interfere with some aspects of Russian diplomatic and commercial activity, such as blocking Bank Rossiya transactions and reinforcing Russia’s diplomatic isolation. The resulting instability has led to fear in the financial markets and capital flight. The ruble has also fallen, causing Russian companies, which hold foreign currency debts amounting to over half a trillion dollars, to struggle to pay their debts.\(^{23}\) To date, these sanctions have failed to influence Russia’s policy toward Crimea and Ukraine, although outside observers suggest Russia may face recession if the financial and economic pressure continues.\(^{24}\) Of all the long-term results of Western statecraft, the economic consequences in Russia may be among the most important for its future freedom of

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action. Not only do they require Russia to focus more on economic problems than on foreign policy goals, but they weaken Russia’s ability to maintain its hard power and to fund its soft power. As Paul Kennedy noted in 1989, “the historical record suggests there is a very clear connection in the long run between an individual Great Power’s economic rise and fall and its growth and decline as an important military power (or world empire).” Only time will tell whether the economic consequences for Russia will be so great or not.

Military reassurance of NATO’s eastern constituents has occurred through a handful of ways. Its Baltic and Polish air policing contingents have increased substantially with supplementary fighters and refueling aircraft from various countries. Discussion has also begun concerning the opening of a new air base, possibly in Estonia, and the adaptation of one port to suit NATO naval vessels, possibly in Latvia. Poland has also requested 10,000 troops to be based on its territory. Explicit confirmations of adherence to NATO’s article five have also been made by highly placed officials and ministers both within the alliance structure and from some member states; and consultations between the United States and NATO’s eastern members have increased in frequency and visibility. Although this military reassurance has been an important aspect of the west’s statecraft throughout and after the Crimean crisis, it has had no bearing on the course of the crisis itself. Rather, its purpose, besides reassuring the most potentially vulnerable members of NATO, has been to deter potential future Russian incursions into those countries. As with all attempts at deterrence, it is impossible to know whether it will succeed. Whether or not Russia may be deterred from undertaking interventions similar to the one in Crimea, such military reassurance has likely affected—and limited—Russia’s future freedom of action. Yet, despite this real effect, NATO’s military reassurance is the least painful of all the elements of Western statecraft, because it does not directly influence Russia, its diplomatic position, or its economic strength. Although this military reassurance response was fairly muted at the beginning, it has become one of the main pillars of Western statecraft surrounding the crisis.

Western statecraft has necessarily been practiced even after the end, through fait accompli, of the Crimean crisis; the nature of the instruments available to statecraft to achieve effect must be employed over a much longer duration. Because the crisis ended before Western statecraft could possibly become effective, statecraft has taken on a character meant to punish Russia and deter it from taking such actions in the future. This change of character from prevention and resolution to punishment and deterrence was due to the shift in context, as Russia effectively annexed Crimea. This is an almost inevitable result of any conflict between the practice of statecraft by one polity and the practice of strategy by another, because strategy generally achieves quicker results through the threat and employment of force to impose one’s will upon the other party.

26 Bruno Waterfield and Tony Paterson, “Ukraine Crisis: Poland Asks NATO to Station 10,000 Troops on its Territory,” Telegraph, 1 April 2014.
Besides statecraft’s need for more time than strategy, its practice by the West has also been fuelled by the ongoing activities in Ukraine’s eastern portions. The crisis and context, however, have changed from the Crimean focus in March. Throughout the spring and summer of 2014 both Western and Russian statecraft have mutually opposed each other, while Ukraine began practicing strategy through military action against the separatists in the east. Russia’s statecraft-based interventions have failed to restrain Ukraine’s strategic actions, much as the West’s statecraft failed to overturn Russia’s strategy in Crimea. Moreover, Ukraine is making progress against the separatists in the east by finally employing force without regard for Russian statecraft, thereby upsetting Russian policy.

Conclusion

Russia and the West approached the Crimean crisis from fundamentally different assumptions and modes of thinking. Russia acted strategically, thereby instigating the crisis, and the West responded with statecraft. Russia ultimately won in Crimea thanks to its choice of approach—though this is not to argue they would not have won if the West had acted strategically as well, for the choice of approach also gives insight into relative political will and operational capability. Russia did not practice strategy in its reciprocally adversarial form only because no one actively resisted Russia’s invasion with armed force—but it had entered Crimea with the assumptions, ways of thinking, and desire to impose its will upon the other party which characterizes strategy as opposed to statecraft.

Edward Luttwak has identified the apex of strategic performance as “the suspension, if only brief, if only partial, of the entire predicament of strategy.”27 The predicament of strategy is the enemy and his independent will and capability to act against one’s own purposes. The apex, therefore, is the removal of the enemy’s ability, however temporarily, to influence outcomes. Judged by this narrow standard, Russia’s actions in Crimea represent an effective strategy. Russia did not have an enemy in Crimea. Even Ukraine did not fight Russia. The West practiced statecraft; it explicitly discounted the threat, or actual use of force, as publicly announced by Obama and a number of other officials throughout Western countries. The West, therefore, could not influence the outcome of the crisis, it could (and can) only impose punishment after the fact in an attempt to preclude any such future interventions by Russia. This latter point, which may become an important factor for Russia in the longer term, represents the only disadvantageous consequence to Russia of its actions in Crimea; these otherwise have been de facto accepted. Russia’s practice of strategy in Crimea was exemplary, but its choice to do so may eventually incur crippling costs arising from Western statecraft—though this remains to be seen.28

28 The Russians acted much as the elder Helmuth von Moltke preferred, combining a strategic offensive with a tactical defensive. The strategic offensive puts pressure on the other party to act to reverse its losses, but the tactical defensive places the burden of initiating the bloodshed on the opponent.
In any direct clash between a political actor practicing strategy and one practicing statecraft, strategy will always win in the short term. The polity employing force asserts its political will to enforce its political goals in the face of resistance. Moreover, the polity which employs force first establishes the parameters both of the conflict and of its possible results, unless subsequently out-strategized and outfought. Strategy, through the threat and use of force, also allows for quick action. Statecraft simply cannot achieve effects with the means available to it within the time limit set by an opposing strategy. Non-military instruments cannot directly challenge force in an immediate sense.

As a final point, because the inability of statecraft to challenge strategy effectively in an immediate situation, one might suggest employing force in Crimea against the Russians would have been acceptable according to one of the tenets of just war theory. The tenet of last resort requires that “[w]e must not take up arms unless we have tried, or have good grounds for ruling out as likely to be ineffective, every other way of adequately securing our just aim.”29 This is not to argue a war over Crimea would have been a just war. Rather, such an unequal contest as between strategy and statecraft suggests when one side uses force, even if it remains latent, every means and method available to statecraft is likely to be ineffective. The policy question thereafter must be to determine which course of action is most palatable: accepting either the reciprocal employment of force, or a change to the status quo wrought by unilateral force? This time the West has chosen to accept Russia’s unilateral change to the status quo in Crimea. Will it in the future be faced with a similar choice?

ABSTRACT: Dwight D. Eisenhower infused deliberate planning processes into US grand strategy. Due to lack of consensus regarding how to address the Soviet threat, Eisenhower directed the formation of a six-week exercise (Solarium) to study three alternative strategies. Upon completion of the exercise, the National Security Council crafted the Basic National Security Policy over a period of three months, reviewing it annually and revising it as the international security environment changed.

As remarkable as it may seem, the only time the United States has had a formal grand strategy was during the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration. While some might scoff, recalling the National Security Council Report (NSC) 68, Flexible Response as implemented by President John F. Kennedy, and a host of other doctrines associated with presidents, none of these came close to assessing the strategic environment, developing and vetting various strategic options, and articulating an overarching strategic concept that promoted and protected US interests in a purposeful manner.

A product of the US Army’s deliberative planning process, President Dwight D. Eisenhower brought a wealth of executive experience, organizational skill, and knowledge of strategy development to the White House. His first fundamental task as president was to design a National Security Council system to serve his leadership and management style needs. Once the NSC mechanism began to function in March 1953, Eisenhower had a system that provided him and the NSC with integrated staff work, education on the issues, and meaningful debate—all of which cultivated strategic thinking.

The development of the Basic National Security Policy (BNSP) was a much more involved process than many consider. It began with a six-week exercise (the Solarium Project), studying alternative policies to counter the Soviet objective of world domination. Upon completion of the exercise, the real work began with the NSC Planning Board and NSC Staff providing drafts over the next three months for NSC discussion. The final product was NSC 162/2—the BNSP. Contrary to popular speculation at the time, the BNSP continued to evolve throughout the Eisenhower administration as the strategic environment changed. The final section of this article explores some of the mischaracterizations and realities associated with the BNSP.

Project Solarium

While the Eisenhower Administration immediately began work on a national security policy (NSC 149/2, 29 April 1953), consensus remained
elusive.\footnote{Robert R. Bowie provides the most comprehensive account of the BNSP development. Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, \textit{Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Meena Bose provides an excellent synopsis of the New Look strategy development. Meena Bose, \textit{Shaping and Signaling Presidential Policy: The National Security Decision Making of Eisenhower and Kennedy} (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1998), 19-41.} Of course, similar divisions over national security policy had erupted in the Truman Administration, but Eisenhower initially thought he could avoid this recurrence through NSC deliberations.\footnote{Report to the National Security Council by Executive Secretary (Lay), “NSC 149/2,” 29 April 1953, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/pg_305.} Still, fundamental differences remained. For example, while Eisenhower was in general agreement with Truman’s containment strategy as reflected in NSC 149/2, Secretary of State Foster Dulles was dissatisfied with it, urging a more aggressive policy to contract Soviet power and influence; Republican congressmen opposed it because it implied a large defense budget; others wanted even greater defense expenditures to challenge the Soviet threat directly.\footnote{Robert R. Bowie, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Interview by Robert Gerald Livingston, Philipp Gassert, Richard Immerman, Paul Stegy, Charles Stuart Kennedy, February 18, 2008, The National Archives And Records Service Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.}

The problem was not just a matter of consensus; other factors warranted a more comprehensive review of national security policy as well. The death of Stalin in March 1953 created uncertainties pursuant to Soviet designs, especially after the Kremlin’s rebuff of Eisenhower’s “The Chance for Peace” speech on 16 April 1953. The Korean War continued with no diplomatic breakthrough in sight. The autocratic, populist governments in Iran, Guatemala, and Egypt were candidates for Soviet opportunism. And at this stage of the Cold War, the advance of the Communist bloc appeared to be gaining momentum. Clearly, the United States needed to address these emerging national security challenges through a deliberative process.

Accordingly, on 8 May 1953, Eisenhower met informally with key advisers Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles (Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA]), George Humphrey (Treasury Secretary), Bedell Smith (Undersecretary of State), C. D. Jackson (Special Assistant for Cold War Psychology Planning), and Robert Cutler (Special Assistant for National Security Affairs) in the White House solarium to discuss the nature of the Soviet threat. During the discussion, Eisenhower proposed the formation of an exercise to “analyze competing national strategies for dealing with the Soviet Union.” Eisenhower suggested forming three study teams from State, Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to examine the following alternatives over a six-week period: continuing containment, drawing a line around the Soviet bloc, and diminishing the Soviet empire, particularly in Eastern Europe. Thus was born Project Solarium.\footnote{Bowie Interview, The Association For Diplomatic Studies And Training, March 15, 1988, 15, http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Bowie,%20Robert,%20R.toctoc.pdf; Bose, \textit{Shaping and Signaling}, 29; Bowie and Immerman, \textit{Waging Peace}, 123-125.}

Aside from the general desire to reexamine national security policy, Eisenhower had three ulterior objectives with the Solarium exercise. Foremost, he wanted to “provide a counter to his secretary of state’s pessimism and more unilateralist proposals,” in particular Dulles’s public platform that the United States “regain the foreign policy initiative, seek
a free, democratic, and unified Germany, and even ‘roll back’ communist control from Eastern Europe.” Second, he sought to bring together some of the best thinkers and most experienced individuals to explore dispassionately (and free from public scrutiny) the three most feasible approaches for the desired policy outcome. With access to the full array of intelligence tools, participants could debate among themselves and other teams during the preparation phase and argue their positions in front of the National Security Council. In short, he wanted to educate the participants on the issues at stake. Finally,

The Solarium exercise served important administrative purposes—enabling Eisenhower to learn from and to brief his newly appointed national security officials and providing a common awareness of his purposes and expectations, a starting point for policy deliberations, and guidelines for action in the event of a crisis.

In addition to these objectives, Eisenhower had a more expansive design for the NSC system: fostering a sense of teamwork among NSC officials and encouraging the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to think as a corporate body, rather than succumbing to service parochialisms. As Eisenhower was fond of saying, “The plans are nothing, but the planning is everything.” This design was infused in Solarium.

With these seeds planted, Eisenhower directed the formation of an NSC working committee (Robert Cutler, Bedell Smith, and Allen Dulles) to select a panel of five experts, provide the president’s guidance regarding the terms of reference, select the members of the three teams, and specify the parameters of each alternative for study. Accordingly, each team would study its assigned alternative strategy.

With a real belief in it just the way a good advocate tackles a law case—and then when the teams are prepared, each should put on in some White House room, with maps, charts, all the basic supporting figures and estimates, just what each alternative would mean in terms of goal, risk, cost in money and men and world relations.

The panel of experts (General James Doolittle—chairman; Robert Amory; Lieutenant General Lyman Lemnitzer; Dean Rusk; and Admiral Leslie C. Stevens) drafted the “precise and detailed terms of reference for each alternative.” Since expertise was crucial to team member assignments, Eisenhower took particular interest in the selection process.

6 Ibid., 11-12, 30.
7 Ibid., 10.
10 Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 125.
He personally enlisted the services of the National War College for its facilities, staff and administrative support, and temporary assignment of additional senior officers in support of Solarium. Naturally, strict secrecy complete with a cover story was mandated to give the teams time for study and reflection.\textsuperscript{12} Completing its task on 1 June 1953, the Doolittle Committee provided the teams with National Intelligence Estimate No. 65 (along with supplemental intelligence and studies) and the terms of reference memorandum, which included 15 framework questions, assumptions, and each team’s policy alternatives for study.\textsuperscript{13}

In the meantime, Eisenhower shaped public opinion on national security policy with a national radio and television address on 19 May 1953. Similar to the themes expressed in his Inaugural Address and State of the Union message (among other speeches), Eisenhower stressed that national security policy must reflect a patient, steadfast commitment to a long-term strategy rather than reacting impulsively to every perceived threat. He warned that attempts to create complete national security would require substantial mobilization, the effects of which would create a garrison state mentality. In his judgment, a balanced military with sufficient force ceilings coupled with alliances would provide the necessary security for an enduring defense. He concluded that his administration would remain dedicated to deterring war rather than war-fighting—a theme which has always resonated with Americans.\textsuperscript{14}

From 15 June to mid-July, the three study teams developed their alternative strategies. Team A, led by George Kennan, used NSC 153/1 (Restatement of National Security Policy, 10 June 1953) as the base document for analysis, which was a revision of the containment strategy. According to Kennan, the task of his team “was to clarify the general outlook of a new political administration and to prod a lot of people in the Washington bureaucracy—military and civilian—into taking a new look at the things we [the United States] had been trying to do, to see whether they could improve on the previous performance.”\textsuperscript{15}

According to Robert Bowie (Chairman of the State Department’s Policy Planning Board and a member of the NSC Planning Board), Team B under Major General James McCormack was tasked:

(1) to complete the line now drawn in the NATO area and the Western Pacific so as to form a continuous line around the Soviet bloc beyond which the U.S. will not permit Soviet or satellite military forces to advance without general war; (2) to make clear to the Soviet rulers in an appropriate and unmistakable way that the U.S. has established and determined to carry out this policy; and (3) to reserve freedom of action, in the event of indigenous Communist seizure of power in countries on our side of the line, to take all

\textsuperscript{12} Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State, “Project Solarium,” May 20, 1953, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d66.


measures necessary to re-establish a situation compatible with the security interests of the U.S. and its allies.\textsuperscript{16}

Finally, Vice Admiral Richard Conolly’s Team C looked at a more assertive rollback strategy, which Bowie summarized: “(1) to increase efforts to disturb and weaken the Soviet bloc and to accelerate the consolidation and strengthening of the free world” and “(2) to create the maximum disruption and popular resistance throughout the Soviet Bloc.”\textsuperscript{17} The Doolittle Committee informed Team C that it was aware this course of action carried a high risk of igniting a general war, but the team was not to examine a preventive war strategy because Soviet advancements in its nuclear forces made this option problematic.\textsuperscript{18} The committee might have added that preventive war also contravened American strategic values.

On 26 June 1953, each team presented its line of thinking in a plenary session (that is, a dress rehearsal), which helped the teams articulate their findings and listen to the other teams’ presentations.\textsuperscript{19} Subsequently, the teams made their presentations to the NSC on 16 July, after which Eisenhower expressed how impressed he was by the staff work and the presentations, stating they were the best and most persuasive arguments he had ever experienced. From Bowie’s perspective, “No president before or after Eisenhower . . . ever received such a systematic and focused briefing on the threats facing the nation’s security and the possible strategies for coping with them.”\textsuperscript{20}

At the end of the presentations, Eisenhower shared his thoughts in the form of initial guidance:

- The only thing worse than losing a global war was winning one; there would be no individual freedom after the next global war.

- To demand of a free people over a long period of time more than they want to give, one can obtain what one wants only by using more and more controls; and the more one does this, the more one loses individual liberties and becomes a garrison state (American model).

- The American people have demonstrated their reluctance after a war is ended to take the necessary action properly to occupy the territory conquered in order to gain our legitimate ends. What would we do with Russia, if we should win in a global war?

- The United States has to persuade her allies to go along with her, because American forward bases are in the territories of US allies.

- To obtain more money in taxes, there must be a vigorous campaign to

\textsuperscript{16} Bowie and Immerman, \textit{Waging Peace}, 126; The other members were Major General J. R. Deane, James K. Penfield, Philip Mosely, Calvin Hoover, J.C. Campbell, and Colonel E. S. Ligon. 
\textsuperscript{17} Interview with Bowie, Episode 7: \textit{After Stalin}.
\textsuperscript{18} Bowie and Immerman, \textit{Waging Peace}, 126.
\textsuperscript{19} Notes Taken at the First Plenary Session of  Project Solarium, Washington, June 26, 1953, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d75.
\textsuperscript{20} Bowie and Immerman, \textit{Waging Peace}, 127, 137, 139-140; Bose, \textit{Shaping and Signaling}, 33.
educate the people—and to educate the people of US allies.  

According to Bowie, Eisenhower made it clear the Solarium exercise was not an end in itself but only “input to making strategy.” Accordingly, the President instructed Cutler to have the NSC special staff and the Planning Board integrate the primary parts of all three reports into a draft policy paper as a starting point for NSC discussion. The concept paper titled “Proposed New Basic Concept,” rendered the three presentations into five key components for NSC study and comment:

- A capability for a strong retaliatory offensive, a base for mobilization, and continental defense;
- Creating strong, friendly groupings centered on Western Europe (including [West] Germany) and on Japan in the Far East;
- Restricting U.S. foreign aid to such groupings and designated other free nations;
- Defining where Soviet bloc aggression would trigger general war;
- Taking selected aggressive actions of a limited scope, involving moderately increased risks of general war, to eliminate Soviet-dominated areas within the free world and to reduce Soviet power in the Satellite periphery.

After receiving initial comments on this paper, Cutler returned to the Planning Board, presenting a paper titled "Points for Consideration in Drafting New Policy." Thus, began the policy formulation process in earnest.  

The Basic National Security Policy

The development of the Basic National Security Policy (BNSP) spanned from 30 July to 30 October 1953 with the adoption of NSC 162/2. Resolving policy splits (irreconcilable differences)—in regards to defense spending, threats to the economy, the proper course for reducing the Soviet threat, the question of redeploying US forces abroad, and the issue of reducing foreign assistance—were the central issues of NSC discussions and presidential decisions. Political scientist Mena Bose and Robert Bowie noted that NSC 162/2 was an amalgam of the best features of the three study teams. It confirmed Team A’s framework of containment to resist Soviet aggression and domination of countries outside its sphere, but it would not interfere with Soviet internal political and economic structures. While it rejected Team B’s circumscribed line as a statement of US policy, it did advocate the use of military force, to include nuclear weapons, against Soviet military aggression in Europe. Lastly, it adopted Team C’s use of propaganda and covert actions to exploit Soviet problems and complicate governance in Soviet-dominated countries. Even with the completion of NSC 162/2, policy split issues continued to arise in discussions, signifying that though the BNSP was...
accepted policy, the NSC continued to seek improvements through subsequent security policies and reviews of the BNSP.\textsuperscript{25}

It bears noting that development of the BNSP coincided with US demobilization following the Korean War armistice on 27 July 1953. From his experiences as Chief of Staff of the Army during the precipitous post-World War II demobilization, President Eisenhower wanted a balanced restructuring of the military forces to meet Cold War challenges, but without incurring exorbitant military expenditures. Unlike previous post-war demobilizations, the size and composition of the US armed forces would be based on a rationally considered national security policy, and not political parochialism or whim.

Popularly coined as the “New Look” strategy, Eisenhower described the policy as a “horizontal analysis,” aligning national security requirements with necessary military capabilities without regard to service parochialism. The analysis included nuclear retaliatory forces, deployed forces overseas, forces to secure strategic sea lanes, forces to protect the continental United States from air attack, and reserve forces. Eisenhower explained that the assessment called for a reallocation of resources to rationalize national defense. Thus, the administration placed greater emphasis on deterrent forces through improved nuclear capabilities, better delivery systems, and increased air defense capabilities. Active duty combat units would modernize with emphasis on greater readiness and mobility, decreased manpower, and lower readiness for the reserves. In short, the post-Korean War realignment meant an increase in Air Force capabilities, downsizing of the Army, and a slight decrease in the Navy and Marine Corps.\textsuperscript{26}

The evolution of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and delivery systems required the NSC to review and revise the BNSP annually. As a consequence of these reviews, supplemented occasionally by outside consultative committees (namely, Killian, von Neumann, and Gaither), the NSC revised NSC 162/2, first with NSC 5810/1 (5 May 1958), and finally with NSC 5906/1 (5 August 1958), each showing the evolution of strategy as the strategic environment changed.\textsuperscript{27} Each BNSP recognized the Soviet and Chinese communist threats, which were devoting military and economic power in support of an expansionist foreign policy. Each BNSP acknowledged the growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, but underscored the US unequivocal commitment to deterrence as an appropriate response. Each BNSP assessment concluded that the Soviets did not seek to start a general war but were committed to continuing political division and subversion of the free world. NSC 162/2 judged that deterring Soviet designs would profit the United States in the long run as the Soviet regime experienced “the slackening of revolutionary zeal, the growth of vested managerial and bureaucratic interests, and popular

\textsuperscript{25} Bowie and Immerman, \textit{Waging Peace}, 144-146; Bose, \textit{Shaping and Signaling}, 34-41; Bowie said that Eisenhower placed great worth in covert action and propaganda against the Soviet hold on its satellites in Eastern Europe and in countries where the Soviets were trying to extend their influence, like Iran and Guatemala. Covert action was not used against the Soviet Union directly and was used sparingly. CNN \textit{Cold War} Episode 7, Interview with Bowie: “After Stalin”; Jim Newton, \textit{Eisenhower: The White House Years} (New York: Doubleday, 2011), 128-129.

\textsuperscript{26} Eisenhower, \textit{Mandate for Change}, 449-451.

pressures for consumption goods... [as well as] the growing strength of the free world and the failure to break its cohesion and possible aggravation of weaknesses within the Soviet bloc.” The overarching expectation was that successful containment would ameliorate Soviet behavior or it would collapse from its inherent contradictions. While NSC 5810/1 acknowledged nuclear parity was inevitable, it specifically rejected preventive war as a means of forestalling parity, implying it contradicted Western strategic values. Instead, the document regarded nonmilitary initiatives, such as arms control, as more pragmatic. NSC 5906/1 resolved that future conflicts were more likely in underdeveloped countries, so the United States needed an appropriate means to prevent or keep them from escalating. Here, economic and military assistance received greater attention. All three policies formally recognized that maintaining the trinity of a vibrant economy, free institutions, and American morale was a national security imperative.

Despite charges the New Look depended overly on massive retaliation for the West’s national security, the BNSP was actually intellectually agile. Eisenhower intended that massive retaliation apply only to deterrence in Europe—not everywhere. In NSC 162/2, defense of the free world would depend on the maintenance of a:

> [S]trong military posture, with emphasis on the capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power... U.S. and allied forces in readiness to move rapidly initially to counter aggression by Soviet bloc forces and to hold vital areas and lines of communication... and a mobilization base, and its protection against crippling damage, adequate to insure victory in the event of general war.

Eisenhower recognized the limitations of the US nuclear arsenal, especially once the Soviet Union neared nuclear parity. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke recalled the president addressing the issue with the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “We’ve got to have a military force that can handle any situation. And that means, in a small situation we’ve got to have the proper equipment and proper plans to it, and it doesn’t mean that we will have to launch for everything.”

Accordingly, NSC 5810/1 addressed the need “to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the arsenal... to consider them as conventional weapons from a military point of view... to provide flexible and selective capabilities for general or limited war, as may be required to achieve national objectives.” Adapting to changes in the strategic environment, NSC 5810/1 underscored the need for a flexible response, in which

28 NSC 162/2, 5.
29 NSC 162/2, 2, 4; NSC 5810/1, 2, 4, 8; NSC 5906/1, 7-9.
30 NSC 5810/1 sought to extend this trinity to other free world states. NSC 162/2, 6, 14-16, 17; NSC 5810/1, 3, 9-12.
31 In regards to the famous Dulles speech on massive retaliation, Bowie said it was Eisenhower who had written the sentence that caused confusion. He had not intended it to mean massive retaliation would be used anywhere. Nonetheless, it was Eisenhower who wrote it, not Dulles. Interview with Robert Bowie, Episode 7: “After Stalin.”
32 NSC 162/2, 5.
34 NSC 5810/1, 4.
US military readiness would serve to counter local threats. If deter-
rence failed, US expeditionary forces in conjunction with indigenous
and allied forces would defeat local aggression. The final BNSP, NSC
5906/1, also emphasized flexible response and was formally provided to
the incoming John F. Kennedy administration for study.

The BNSP placed great value on collective defense and providing
economic and military assistance, not only to allies but also to vulner-
able states in key regions as an alternative to their accepting Soviet aid
and entanglement. Another essential element of the security policy was
investment in research and development without fielding weapons or
equipment other than prototypes. This approach not only minimized
military expenditures, but also ensured the military would have the
most modern and sophisticated equipment in the event of sustained
hostilities.\(^35\) Moreover, the BNSP served as the foundational policy for
the development of supporting policies and strategies within the gov-
ernment bureaucracy (for example, departments, agencies, and bureaus).

What is unique about the development, implementation, and revi-
sion of the BNSP is the fact that no other presidency has devoted such
focused discipline, energy, and thought to US national security strategy.

Separating Myth from Reality

Not everyone agreed with the policy conclusions of the BNSP,
regardless of its rational approach. The most prevalent charge was
that military cuts weakened US national security. Army Chief of Staff
General Matthew Ridgeway, for one, disagreed passionately with any
reductions in the Army, believing anything less than a large standing
army would increase the probability of war. Ridgeway never specified
the size needed to deter communist aggression, but in view of the mil-
lions in Soviet ranks (not to mention China), a very large standing force
in his opinion would be needed for an indeterminate number of years.\(^36\)
Eisenhower reasoned that alliances buttressed by nuclear forces were
sufficient to deter Soviet overt aggression. Because US commitment to
allies was based on several forward-based divisions, naval and air power,
as well as forward deployed nuclear weapons, the Soviets could never be
certain that even minor aggression would not escalate into general war,
including the use of nuclear weapons; to underscore this uncertainty,
Eisenhower never revealed under what conditions he would use nuclear
weapons—this uncertainty was the cornerstone of credible deterrence.\(^37\)
Hence, containment of the Soviet bloc relied on a holistic deterrence of a
diverse nuclear arsenal, collective defense, sufficient conventional forces
held at high readiness, a robust mobilization base, and a strong economy.

The starkest difference between Eisenhower and Ridgeway (and
Ridgeway’s successor General Maxwell Taylor) was in perspective.
Ridgeway’s focus was on fighting wars; Eisenhower’s focus was on deter-
rning them. To him, a general war would be catastrophic regardless of
who the victor was.\(^38\) Ironically, General Maxwell Taylor, was “struck

\(^35\) NSC 162/2, 7-8, 11-16; NSC 5810/1, 6-7, 8-13.
\(^36\) Matthew B. Ridgeway and Harold H. Martin, Soldier: The Memoirs of  Matthew B. Ridgeway
\(^37\) Evan Thomas, I
ike’s Bluff: President Eisenhower’s Secret Battle to Save the World (New York: Little,
\(^38\) Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 179, 200.
by the breadth of its [the BNSP] language and the degree of departure from the dogma of Massive Retaliation, writing a supporting paper in October 1955 titled *A National Military Program* introducing the concept of flexible response. Like Ridgway, Taylor took issue with what he deemed excessive manpower cuts, which he felt undermined the flexible response aspects of the BNSP. Specifically, Taylor wanted a capability to fight small brushfire wars even in Europe, an idea which appalled Eisenhower because it undercut deterrence in Europe.

Robert Cutler recalled the Pentagon’s main complaint with the BNSP was the lack of specificity, permitting subordinates to interpret policy as they liked. Cutler countered that this complaint was a ploy to resist policies the Pentagon did not like. Cutler had a point, since the mandate of the NSC Operations Coordinating Board was to assist in the coordination of presidential policy decisions, provide policy clarifications, and elicit feedback from the government bureaucracy on policy implementation. This was undoubtedly true, but the Pentagon abhorred the budget restrictions imposed by the BNSP, so its argument was decreased military spending meant decreased security. Since the BNSP was a classified document, the Eisenhower administration could not counter public accusations without disclosing the classified details of the policy. Therefore, military officials, politicians, and pundits could mischaracterize the contents of the BNSP to further their own agendas.

During the period of demobilization and reorganization of the military, criticism was unavoidable as partisans denounced favored service cuts, military installation closures, or lost defense contracts. Eisenhower pointed out that peacetime readiness was unprecedented for all three services, and that his proposed defense budget was three times that of Truman’s pre-Korean War budget. The president also counseled critics not to become prisoners of unwarranted fears, demanding large conventional forces to intervene in every possible conflict. Specifically, Eisenhower insisted on maintaining “an adequate but not extravagant defense establishment over an extended period of time (perhaps, half a century) . . . that we do our best to create a national climate favorable to dynamic industrial effort.”

Eisenhower often repeated that, as opposed to the Soviet maintenance of 175 divisions in Europe, the United States maintained twenty divisions, five of which were stationed in Europe. Against this correlation of ground forces, two or even ten more US divisions would not make much difference. Hence, a nuclear—instead of conventional—deterrent would have to serve to prevent a general war in Europe.

Apparently, this ratio was a myth Eisenhower conveniently allowed to perpetuate. The purported Soviet conventional superiority was vastly exaggerated, a fact the president most likely knew but never divulged.

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40 Taylor wrote that the administration clung to the strategy of Massive Retaliation throughout Eisenhower’s Presidency, stating “it was doubtful whether either the Soviets or our allies believed that we would use our retaliatory power for anything other than to preserve our own existence.” Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet*, 61.
43 Ibid., 451-454.
Instead of 175 combat-ready divisions, the Soviets maintained approximately 50, which was equivalent to NATO’s strength.44 It suited the commander-in-chief’s purposes to preserve this fiction for two reasons: the truth would likely induce the European allies to relax defensive efforts; worse, near conventional parity might encourage the Pentagon to clamor for conventional superiority and roll-back strategies. Below the threshold of a general war in Europe, Eisenhower reasoned that the size of US ground forces was sufficient to fight and win small wars, but also warned that “seeing danger behind every tree or bush” was an unwarranted fear of threats rather than a national security strategy. He refused to turn America into an armed camp in a myopic quest of absolute security.45

The underpinnings of American national security, however, transcended the parochialism of the service chiefs. Eisenhower waged a multidimensional struggle to curb military expenditures because he understood the multi-ordered effects of large conventional forces. The military-industrial complex (Congress was complicit in this relationship) as articulated in his farewell address needlessly diverted revenues, scientific pursuit, and intellectual thinking away from the betterment of democratic society. If left unbridled, the United States could descend into an Orwellian state of perpetual conflict. Thus, nuclear deterrence dovetailed with the vision of the New Look by limiting the size of conventional forces.

Eisenhower never highlighted the flexible response features in the BNSP publicly because these features were inherently destabilizing. It was a nuanced argument. A flexible response policy was beguiling, promising that expansive conventional forces would enhance national security by permitting the United States to counter the full spectrum of aggression. Yet it signaled to the Soviets that the United States might be willing to fight a conventional war in Europe rather than offering an automatic nuclear response, thereby increasing the probability of conflict through miscalculation. Greater conventional capabilities incentivized policymakers to gravitate towards military solutions because increased investment in the military clamored for its use, because they promised silver bullet solutions to otherwise complex problems, and because they offered senior political and military leaders with a way to counter lower-level aggression with less risk of escalation. Perhaps, but military solutions tend to gravitate towards adventurism and entanglement in local conflicts—conflicts which the New Look vision sought to avoid because this was a realm in which the Communists held the initiative. Even a prudent president, following the logic of a military solution, could find himself fighting the wrong war, at the wrong place, and against the wrong enemy.46

The development of the BNSP was intimately tied to the NSC mechanism, which the president painstakingly organized. The cultivation of

45 Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 451-454.
strategic thinking set the Eisenhower administration apart from other presidencies. Eisenhower’s NSC mechanism serviced the president with the information and diverse viewpoints he needed to optimize decisions regardless of circumstances and obstacles. Like other presidents, Eisenhower devoted his speeches, messages, and addresses to inspire and inform both domestic and foreign audiences, but they were based on a process of staffed initiatives, discussion, and practical feedback. Strategy and policy formulations are often tedious, unexciting work, and while the substance is vitally important, it is unlikely to excite the imagination. However, without a foundation of rationally derived policy, inspirational speeches do not just amount to more than hot air; such rhetoric can lead a nation to rash policy decisions or even a national disaster, create social unrest as rising expectations are not met, and result in frivolous spending. In short, inspirational speeches do not necessarily translate to good policy.

A crucial benefit of the Eisenhower NSC mechanism lay in the continuity of policies, procedures, and knowledge for successive administrations. Through the NSC mechanism, the government bureaucracy could provide an orderly continuity of information and processes on national policies and strategies for new administrations, permitting a seamless transition. Fully acquainted with the system, the government bureaucracy could continue to fulfill the needs of a new administration without pause. Through the NSC system, successive administrations could access information on old reforms, initiatives, and studies as a check on new ideas that are bound to crop up in a new administration. Lastly, the new president could adapt the NSC mechanism to his leadership and management style once he became familiar with it, but keeping the fundamental parts intact.

Conclusion

The Solarium exercise was an essential start point for the development of the BNSP. As this article has demonstrated, the exercise was highly organized with the NSC working committee and the Doolittle Committee developing the terms of reference for the three study teams. As a useful insight, such preparations permitted the three teams to study their policy alternatives with the full support of the engaged agencies and without distractions. Solarium also demonstrated Eisenhower’s deep involvement in the process and the derived objectives he desired.

As Eisenhower stated at the end of the exercise, the process had just begun, with the BNSP formulation phase lasting another three months. Accordingly, multiple drafts of NSC 161 by the NSC Planning Board, NSC deliberations on each draft, and the final NSC 161/2 illustrate the deliberative process which epitomized the Eisenhower NSC system. More importantly, the NSC reviewed the BNSP annually and revised it when the strategic environment changed.

While the New Look strategy was much maligned and mischaracterized throughout the Eisenhower administration, it did set the foundation for US Cold War strategy. Eisenhower believed avoiding a general war was the surest way to persevere over the Soviet Union in the long term. Accordingly, a balanced military with high readiness and buttressed by alliances would be sufficient to deter the Soviet bloc and
safeguard against Communist miscalculation. Despite the near hysterical claims of Soviet domination, there was no bomber, missile, or industrial gap. American missile and space programs were much more robust than their Soviet counterparts, creating the nuclear triad, intelligence surveillance satellites, and the NASA space program in far greater numbers and sophistication. The administration accomplished these without crash programs and immense budget expenditures. Eisenhower’s policy successes were a result of superb organization, the deliberative process, and his cultivation of strategic thinking.

Eisenhower weaved his political philosophy into the BNSP. Economic prosperity through the free market, protection of democratic institutions and American morale, and adherence to Western values represented the strategic pillars of the US grand strategy which cultivated American prosperity, freedom, and optimism. Hence, these pillars—not an excessive military-industrial complex—eventually paid off with the collapse of the Soviet political system.
ABSTRACT: The post-9/11 use of private security companies in a combat role has credentialed them in the workplace, public arena, and legal system, thus meeting Andrew Abbott’s criteria of an emerging profession. Fiscal challenges and global instability will likely perpetuate this condition and in so doing change the US military profession and its associated civil-military relations that underwrite the all-volunteer force.

As the United States concludes two long wars while facing increasing internal fiscal problems, its government must make tough budget choices. The first decisions will identify the prudence of reducing military expenditures; however, subsequent decisions as to how the Department of Defense should implement these reductions will become problematic. In this environment political leaders seek to rely on current military overmatch to justify budget cuts that reduce near-term readiness. At the same time, they program the remaining monies against science and technology to achieve future overmatch, all while satisfying their constituents. The processes required to make these decisions rely heavily on impartial professional military advice. The robust field of contemporary research on the military profession has largely used functional models to examine and evaluate the military profession. By applying Andrew Abbott’s established systems model of professions, this paper argues the use of private security companies in overseas combat theaters has changed the scope of the US military’s professional jurisdiction. Because jurisdiction serves as an indicator of the trust relationship between society and the military, this boundary shift could foretell a change in civil-military relations and the associated viability of the all-volunteer force. After establishing the context of the problem and defining the military profession paradigm, this article explains how private security companies are contesting the US military’s preeminence. It concludes by recommending an expanded view of the risk associated with military budget decisions so as to preserve the all-volunteer force.

With the end of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a heightened risk of perpetuating the historical pattern of post-war decline of the US military. The end of a conflict is often marked by social fatigue with war and a desire to reap peace dividends. In the 20th century these combined pressures typically yielded a reduction in the military’s budget, resulting in a degraded force structure and a decrease in quality of the defense establishment. The full effects of such reductions frequently become apparent at the start of the next conflict, when the US military is found inadequately sized, burdened...
with old equipment, and trapped with an ill-suited doctrine.¹ Unlike past interwar periods, contemporary actions short of war (such as regional security and “mil to mil” exchanges) as well as the need to restructure the force for other forms of conflict besides counterinsurgency, will place a significant peacetime operational demand on the military. To save monies and reconcile these tensions, national leaders will debate how best to fund the competing demands of force structure, near-term readiness, and long-term modernization. There are no easy answers; it is a debate about where to assume the risk of under-resourcing. This is not a new conundrum for America; historically, the employment of short-term contractors mitigated associated risks until resources increased and allowed the military to adjust and negate its need. This pattern was broken in Iraq and Afghanistan, as contractor use in general, and private security companies in particular, did not proportionally decline.

The quality of the US military profession defines the nature of civil–military relations, which is the cornerstone of an effective American all-volunteer force. Therefore, identifying and understanding how private security companies compete with the military profession is important for two reasons. First, it adds context from which to assess the ongoing Department of Defense’s campaign to increase the professionalization of the military. Second, senior civilian and military leaders can understand how an unrestrained reliance on private security companies as risk mitigation affects the military profession’s long-term capabilities, responsibilities, and relationships with society.

Defining the Military Profession

Sociologists generally define a profession as an occupation with both theoretical and practical knowledge that conducts special training and self-regulates its members and is thus credentialed by society with special authority.² Continued fulfillment of these expectations allows society to renew the profession’s authority and autonomy. Society credentials two agents with the authority to employ lethal force—law enforcement and the military. The military profession serves society by molding an institution—capable of managing violence toward policy ends—that ensures the members maintain technical currency, doctrinal relevance, a culture subservient to the state’s authority, and reflects civilian values.

The 21st Century US Military Profession

In 2012, the Secretary of Defense recognized the indicators of a strained military profession, and, anticipating the latent detrimental effects from ten years of war, instructed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take remedial action. The resulting campaign encompassed all military departments by calling for a “Rededication to the Profession
of Arms” (RPA). Their efforts are intended to improve organizational effectiveness (over efficiency) and in so doing maintain society’s trust and preserve the pattern of civil-military relations enjoyed since the advent of the all-volunteer force. With a volunteer force, society represents the sum authority granted by three groups of actors—civilian chain of command, public at large, and servicemembers—with whom a trust relationship must be maintained. The RPA explicitly recognizes the importance of these three relationships yet the program follows precedent by addressing just one relationship—the nurturing of the profession by strengthening servicemembers’ trust.

Peter Feaver’s application of Agency Theory to recent US civil-military relations explains both the difficulty and necessity of maintaining all three relationships. As such, the military (agent) and civilian leadership (principal) reconcile discreet objectives by aligning their interests. Historically, the dilemmas have centered on how the military profession would dissent with civilian leadership. As private security companies become alternative agents to apply lethal force for the state a competitive situation emerges. The presence of multiple agents becomes a disincentive for civilian leadership to align its interests with the military and in doing so weakens the military’s relationships with civil leaders and the public. In this type of environment, the Rededication to the Profession of Arms’ single focus on one of three relationships becomes inadequate to strengthen the US military profession.

**Part of a System of Professions**

The challenge for military and civilian leaders in the current environment is to strengthen the profession of arms to ensure adequate military capacity responsive to the state. Recent scholarship suggests the military profession can be better understood with the application of a systems paradigm. Abbott argued that professions form a complex and dynamic social system in a competitive environment where they will adapt or disappear based on their relative performance of work. This system is influenced not only by its own processes but also by larger social forces and other individual professions which also change in response to the same social and environmental forces.

In contrast to the functional models of Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz which measured a profession by its ability to develop and apply abstract knowledge, Abbot’s systems model gauges the

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5 Don M. Snider, *Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 11-13.


strength of a profession by the breadth, scope, and social value of its work—the greater these characteristics, the larger its jurisdiction. In his model, a change of professional jurisdictions results when the demand for the services provided by a profession increase faster than the profession can respond. When this happens, either emerging professions or other existing professions complete the work instead. The outcomes of such jurisdictional challenges are not fixed, but are heavily influenced by the type and nature of the response of the actors within the system.9 The current jurisdiction of the military profession reflects the actions of its members as well as its history as part of a larger system of professions.10

The fall of the Iron Curtain in 1991 was a watershed event for the US military profession as the all-volunteer force encountered two conditions for the first time: (a) core task expansion as the military undertook peacekeeping missions, and (b) an American desire for a “peace dividend” that reduced the Army end strength from 780,815 to 495,000.11 To mitigate the shortfall in manpower, the Army developed the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program.12 The consequences of this shift remained masked until the 1990s when the demand for forces in the Balkans resulted in the Army ceding some jurisdiction for base support operations, first to the Joint Force and then to contractors in an effort to husband resources for combat operations.13

The subsequent recognition of an inadequate force structure, as well as a desire to harness a perceived Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), and increase Department of Defense efficiency by introducing market competitiveness, created significant environmental change. Accordingly, Office of Management and Budget Circular 76 accelerated and expanded the scope of contractor utilization across all the Department of Defense to increase military capability without raising end-strength.14 The magnitude of the consequences that resulted from increased outsourcing became evident early in Operation Iraqi Freedom when the contractor-to-servicemember ratio became 1 to 10 (an increase from 1 to 50 for Desert Storm in 1991).15 While the military was arguably more cost efficient, the reduced force structure proved inadequate for the military to train itself and coalition partners, or protect the force on the modern noncontiguous battlefield.

Prior to this expansion of contractor roles and duties, jurisdictional competition over military work was framed in one of three relationships. First, competition was framed as interservice rivalry within the Department of Defense—a condition for resolution by civilian authority

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10 As an example see the emergence of USAF fighter pilots as detailed by Brian J. Collins, “The Officer Corps and the Profession,” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 45 (2007), 110.
based on expert knowledge of each service.\textsuperscript{16} Second, scholars detailed intrastate jurisdictional competition between governmental agencies—such as the Department of State.\textsuperscript{17} Lastly, jurisdictional competition occurred transnationally where the US military competed with other militaries to perform international missions—such as counterterrorism training.\textsuperscript{18} As the Global War on Terror progressed, additional second order effects of contracting became more apparent. A fourth competitive relationship emerged where private companies began to compete with the military for jurisdiction over its core task—the employment of lethal force. In 2004, Deborah Avant argued that the Army’s:

\begin{quote}
... ready use of contractors for tasks that are crucial to both the development of the profession in the future and to the success of new missions [such as stabilization], however, has generated competition between the Army and private security companies over who will shape the development of the future professionals and has degraded the Army’s ability to undertake successful missions on its own.\textsuperscript{19}
\end{quote}

The increased use of private security and training companies in a combat zone sanctioned other agents to compete for a portion of what was previously the US military profession’s sole jurisdiction.

\textbf{Jurisdiction Competition}

Abbott’s research identified that the competition for professional jurisdiction can occur in three arenas and result in five outcomes. Jurisdiction competition occurs in the arenas of legal action, public opinion, or in the workplace, and with each actor when and where they perceive an advantage. Because these jurisdictional conflicts can produce conflicting decisions (i.e., when the normative workplace behavior does not reflect public perception or the law), final resolution takes time.\textsuperscript{20} During the period of jurisdiction contest, work and task quality varies as no single profession can fully police the participants. The allocation of resources and the social need for consistent task fulfillment ultimately force resolution of competing jurisdiction claims, but this takes time and is marked by contention and task failure. An analysis of the jurisdictional competition and the settlements related to the use of private contractors indicate the state of the US military profession.

\textbf{Claims for Military Jurisdiction}

During the Global War on Terror, private security contractors comprised roughly 10 percent of the contract workforce in Iraq and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{21} Private contractor duties are limited by law to those deemed “defensive in nature” such as providing security for sites,

\textsuperscript{19} Deborah Avant, “Losing Control of the Profession Through Outsourcing?” in \textit{The Future of the Army Profession}, 272.
\textsuperscript{20} Abbott, \textit{The System of Professions}, 59-63.
convoys, select personnel, and special escort.\textsuperscript{22} While this scope of work sounds benign, defensive duties placed private security companies at critical points of US counterinsurgency doctrine as it strived to secure and maintain legitimacy with the populous. On the modern battlefield the nominally weaker enemy attacks (with little cost) public officials, supply lines, and base camps to destroy the public's confidence in the local and national governments’ ability to secure its population and infrastructure. In this environment, US contractors comprise 25 percent of the US personnel killed in action in Iraq.\textsuperscript{23} An armed security contractor was 1.5 to 4.8 times more likely to be killed in Iraq or Afghanistan than US uniformed personnel.\textsuperscript{24} In 2009, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) recognized the magnitude and ramifications of contractors on the battlefield and published a report that stated contract security personnel who are assigned to protect an embassy from attack would likely be considered combatants, “as would private security providers assigned to protect military supply convoys from insurgents because their purpose, although defensive in nature, would affect hostilities and could require engagement with enemy forces.”\textsuperscript{25}

In addition to the number of contractors being greater than any time in American history, the duration, and scope of their role is likewise without precedent. While previous force design decisions deliberately increased the role of contractors on the battlefield to improve efficiency, Avant contends the Global War on Terror increase “was a tool to fill the mobilization gap created by poor judgment about force requirements after 9/11.”\textsuperscript{26} With the absence of a precedent to govern contractors as combatants and the absence of guidance for the US government to stop using private security companies, there is no reason to expect private security contractors to retire from the workplace—the new battlefield—and disappear. According to Abbot, this condition where actors perform similar work in the same environment inherently invites competition in the arenas of legal, public opinion, and the workplace.\textsuperscript{27}

**Legal Jurisdiction**

Allegations of abuse and war crimes by private security contractors during the Global War on Terror have led to a series of Congressional hearings, investigations, and legal measures in an attempt to establish oversight.\textsuperscript{28} Contracted forces, such as private security companies, work in a contingency area and “operate under three levels of legal authority: (a) the international order of the laws and usages of war, resolutions of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{24} Schwartz, *The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors*, 8-12.
  \item \textsuperscript{27} Abbott, *The System of Professions*, 59-60.
\end{itemize}
the United Nations Security Council, and relevant treaties; (b) U.S. law; and (c) the domestic law of the host countries.” This condition allows for jurisdictional claims in three different legal systems, whose respective authorities remain largely unchallenged and without codification. Prior to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2007, legal precedent held that civilians acting within a combat zone during “time of war” were subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the legal authority of the military profession.

The changes in the 2008 NDAA required the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the US Agency for International Development to establish a memorandum of understanding that specified the responsibility of the parent department to investigate and refer possible violations of the UCMJ or the Military Extraterritorial Judicial Act (MEJA)—in the case of civilians. The expanded application of the MEJA to a combat zone required the Department of Justice be notified if a civilian employee (to include those of a private security company) is suspected of having committed a felony. This 2008 NDAA instituted two changes. First, it removed private security contractors employed in a combat zone by other governmental agencies and civilian contractors from military oversight and investigation authority. Second, it removed the military’s legal authority to enforce professional standards against those security contractors it employed. By omission, this division of legal jurisdiction moved some private security companies completely outside any US oversight as:

...some contractor personnel who commit crimes might not fall within the statutory definitions described [above], and thus might fall outside the jurisdiction of U.S. criminal law, even though the United States is responsible for their conduct as a matter of state responsibility under international law.

Public Jurisdiction

The websites of private security companies such as Academi (formerly Blackwater, then Xe), DynCorps and Triple Canopy illustrate private security companies’ open declaration of their qualifications and their offer of an alternative to traditional military forces. In a free market society, however, the public contests for jurisdiction are often more oblique and insidious. The highly publicized stories and detailed investigations associated with the role of private security contractors in Fallujah and Nisoor Square (Baghdad), Iraq are public examples of the new combat role of private contracting companies. The acceptance of news and periodical stories of private contractors as warriors on the front lines provides a third indicator of the ongoing security companies’

29 Elsea, Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, 5.
30 The John Warner National Defense Act 2007 made provisions for those contractors employed by DOD to be subjected to UCMJ jurisdiction. This authority remained largely untested, as any exercise of this law would likely be challenged as unconstitutional or superseded by subsequent legislation. See Shearer, The U.S. Government’s Employment of Private Security Companies Abroad, 23.
31 Elsea, Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, 19.
33 Elsea, Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, 18.
public claims for jurisdiction over state-sanctioned application of lethal force. Lastly, and arguably most compelling, private security companies maintain publicly they are more cost effective (as a result of no long-term obligations to the institution or the workforce) and timely (rapid mobilization) than the military. Private security companies publicly claim immediate cost savings without a counterargument as to the long-term effects on military force structure and capabilities.

Because the eroded US military jurisdiction has not yet produced a crisis, public efforts to restore the military profession’s jurisdiction have not been compelling and thus are ineffective. For example, national security scholars Fontaine and Nagl concluded:

Most experts agree that contracting out logistics and construction activities tends to result in significant cost savings to the government, while more skilled labor—and private security functions in particular—tends toward parity with the cost of using federal employees.

While these and similar findings challenge the economic rationale for private contractors, such findings do not resonate with the American public in a manner that encourages strengthening of the military profession.

The use of private contractors and the subsequent erosion of the military profession’s jurisdiction resulted from the inability of the military to meet an increase in demand for operational forces—not from an attempted cost savings measure. The debate on the level of resourcing required by the military to protect the profession’s jurisdiction over its core competency—and sustain the pattern of US civil-military relations—lacks a public audience. In this instance, the military may be a victim of its own success. The trust relationship between the military and the public is now so strong tactical success is taken for granted, with little regard by civilian leaders or the public for the profession’s requirements beyond having sufficient resources.

**Workplace Jurisdiction**

The current military to civilian contractor ratio of 1:1 in the Global War on Terror reflects the degree of privatization that has occurred within the Department of Defense. It is accepted and expected that civilians now perform tasks previously accomplished by uniformed personnel. This ratio reflects the increased number of nonmilitary personnel performing security operations for the US government. At the end of the Iraq troop surge in 2009, the Department of Defense and the Department of State employed 16,263 private security personnel in Iraq and 5,062 in Afghanistan. For perspective, the totals are equivalent to

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36 Hammes, “Private Contractors in Conflict Zones,” 2.

37 Elsea, Schwartz, and Nakamura, Private Security Contractors in Iraq, 36.


39 Department of Defense figures as of March 31, 2009, Commission on Wartime Contracting, At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (June 2009), 62.
six Brigade Combat Teams. With 2010 beginning the operational withdrawal of US forces from both theaters of war, private security company personnel totaled over 28,000 and represented over 10 percent of the total contractors employed by the Departments of Defense and State in Iraq and Afghanistan. These trends indicate significant incursion by private contractors into the workplace and that the jurisdictional claim of these contractors has expanded—rather than contracted—as US military involvement in a combat zone declined.

**Jurisdiction Settlements**

Competition between professions requires each to adapt and secure its jurisdiction or become a bureaucracy or occupation. Conversely, adaptation by an emerging profession or a challenger produces the means to claim a jurisdiction in legal, public, or workplace arenas. These claims, in turn, produce five types of settlements, arranged on a continuum. First, one of the actors can be awarded full jurisdiction in a zero sum gain arrangement. Second, one of the actors can be subordinated to the other. Third, the claim could be divided among the actors with each becoming a formal profession, independently responsible to society. Midway between a formal division and subordination lies the intellectual settlement, where one profession retains authority and responsibility for the abstract knowledge while competitors operate on an unrestricted basis. The final settlement type—and least enduring—is advisory jurisdiction. Such arrangements grant one group independent authority to interpret another profession’s actions as its jurisdiction (i.e., the clergy may interpret and explain the larger meaning of medical conditions to patients). Recent jurisdiction settlements resulting from competition in the three arenas illustrate the ongoing challenges to the US military profession.

**Full Jurisdiction**

In the 2009 NDAA, Congress expressed that:

...private security contractors should not perform certain functions, such as security protection of resources, in high-threat operational environments, and that DOD regulations should ensure that private security contractors are not authorized to perform inherently governmental functions in an area of combat operations.

This legal directive acknowledged the military had come to rely heavily on private contractors to complete its mission and required the Department of Defense to reconcile the intent of the law with conditions on the ground. It presented a nuanced interpretation that did “not prohibit the use of contract personnel for security, but . . . limits the extent to which contract personnel may be hired to guard military installations.”

The same legislation also specified that the “Combatant Commander has the authority to decide whether to classify security functions as

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42 Snider, *Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions*, 69-77.
44 Ibid., 16.
commercial.” In theory this caveat allows military commanders some degree of authority to protect the US military’s professional jurisdiction based on their ability to define the scope of security tasks suitable for contract work.

In reality, senior commanders (the agent) met political leaders’ (the principal) expectations to “do more with less,” by resorting to private contractors. The increased use of such contractors allowed commanders to remain under theater of operation force-level caps and have sufficient combat power to achieve the mission. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the numbers of such personnel did not count against “force caps” or troop strength limitations, and thus minimized the public exposure as to the level of US involvement. Despite the intent of the legislation, senior leaders were placed in an ethical dilemma—use private security contractors to meet the workplace requirements for security with reduced troop levels, or employ only the authorized number of US military professionals (as the state’s sole agent of lethal force) and risk mission failure/increased casualties.

**Subordination**

The enactment of the 2008 NDAA intended to give the military oversight of private security contractors but did little to enable the US military profession to defend its jurisdiction for two reasons. First, the military cannot write or execute security contracts for the multitude of other government agencies—such as the Department of State, and private companies that employ private security contractors in a combat zone—so there is no clear subordination of authority. Second, the large demand for contractors during the Global War on Terror had the compounding effect of overwhelming the work capacity of the government’s contracting officers. Military contracting professionals lacked the capacity to respond to the anticipated demand foreseen in the military reduction of the 1990s. Consequently, the military had to hire private security companies to hire sufficient contractors.

**Divided Settlements**

Some political leaders recognized that in some instances effectiveness over efficiency is appropriate and thus granted the military the legal authority to avoid being forced to outsource its own demise. For example, Presidential Policy Letter 11-01 allows any agency or department to in-source any capability they determine is essential to performing core missions regardless of comparative costs. While well intended, the policy does not address the root problem of inadequate Department of Defense capacity to meet a sudden increase in demand. Moreover, these prescriptive attempts to divide and define jurisdiction in order to protect the military profession remain subject to interpretation in the workplace. For example, because of the large presence of military and contract personnel working on the same task in the same environment, migration from one profession to the other is not uncommon.

46 John P. Carrell, *Government Contractors – Do We Really Need Them?,* 4-5.
48 Ibid., 12.
The greater the resources or legitimacy of one profession as compared to the other, then the greater the propensity for personnel to join the competing profession, which in this case forces the US military to incur significant second order costs and loss of social capital.\(^{49}\)

**Intellectual Settlements**

The 2011 National Defense Acquisition Act (Section 833) mandated “third-party certification processes for determining whether private security contractors adhere to standards for operational and business practices” (currently under development).\(^{50}\) This legal action moved the authority to conduct lethal force training for combat operations outside the military’s jurisdiction and sanctioned the associated development of abstract knowledge to competing nongovernmental professions. The initial migration of uniformed personnel to private security companies made for great congruence of the governing abstract knowledge; however, the demand for contractors drove many companies to meet manpower and cost savings by employing large numbers of people from other nations who have no association with, or training from, the US military profession. For example, in 2004 private security companies in Iraq employed approximately 30,000 personnel from over 30 countries.\(^{51}\)

**Advisory Settlements**

The military profession briefly held jurisdiction over private security companies via the National Defense Act of 2008 which required all Department of Defense, Department of State, and governmental agencies employing these contractors to comply with DOD Instruction 3020-50.\(^{52}\) However, market forces made this settlement brief as other legal actions, such as NDAA 2011, nullified the provision by clouding the combatant commander’s ability to enforce this law with competing sets of guidance, such as references to an industry standard.

**Conclusion**

An examination of the recent roles of private contracting companies during the Global War on Terror indicates they are actively and passively contesting the US military profession’s jurisdiction over its core task—the authority to employ lethal force as the agent of the state. The US military profession is under assault in all three arenas: the workplace (predominantly), the legal system, and the public. Since this contest is without precedent it is not surprising that the jurisdictional settlements to date have been inconclusive and contradictory, thus leaving the final outcome undetermined.

\(^{49}\) Fontaine and Nagl, *Contracting In Conflicts*, 18; also Burk, “Expertise, Jurisdiction, and the Legitimacy of the Military Profession,” 56.


There are two countervailing arguments to these findings. First, private security contractors are numerically niche players whose involvement is strategically insignificant. Second, the problem is self-correcting at the end of conflict demand for these contractors will decrease. Accepting these counterarguments is not wise for three reasons. In regards to the former, the magnitude of contractor involvement is strategically significant as are the consequences of their actions—regardless of aggregate numbers—as shown by the actions in Nisoor Square. As to the latter, the pattern of private security contractor involvement is not self-correcting as evidenced by the patterns established in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Lastly, other research on the use of security contractors in combat zones has come to critical conclusions about cost efficiency, congruence within COIN doctrine, and organizational ethics.

Recommendations from previous scholarship included increasing military capacity to negate the need for security companies, severely restricting them to locations where rule of law prevails, and increasing Congressional oversight of them. While valid structural recommendations, they are either too narrow or unrealistically broad, and risk repeating past mistakes. In the absence of deliberate effort, the erosion of the US military’s jurisdiction can be expected to continue. At issue here is not the military profession’s jurisdiction per se, but how to nurture the profession so it can ensure future military effectiveness. The answer to this question must recognize that because the four services are subordinate to civilian leaders, they cannot be solely responsible for the US military profession in today’s environment. Additionally, current operating environment and domestic fiscal constraints dictate the United States will almost certainly have to continue to use private security companies.

Thus, the current fiscal debate among military and civilian leaders as to whether to assume risk with short-term readiness or long-term technological superiority is a false dichotomy. The concept of risk in the ongoing “build down” must be expanded to include an institutional dimension to recognize second order detrimental effects to the military profession. Decisions based solely on efficiency arguments related to near-term cost and future program development timelines do not provide for a military profession of sufficient caliber to protect and nurture the all-volunteer force. As an alternative, requisite military fiscal decisions should be informed by their effect on services’ core jurisdictions, and implemented with deliberate settlements to protect them. This is a new approach and requires additional research and a larger shared sense of responsibility.

Abstract: This article examines the potential role of private security companies as part of a global special forces network. It reveals three factors that may influence the utility of such companies: (1) the industry's largely defensive focus; (2) the implications of serving a humanitarian and development clientele; and (3) the challenges of retired special forces personnel moving to the private sector.

Western states frequently use the word “network” to describe contemporary military dynamics. Not only are special forces beneficiaries of this reference, they are often proponents for it. These forces are ideally suited for networks given their “specialness” and flexibility at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. They have a relatively small footprint, whether in the context of budgets, “boots on the ground,” or with respect to much larger and more expensive conventional forces.

While these factors are often beneficial, national special forces organizations recognize their quantitative and qualitative shortcomings, especially as they increasingly become a “force of choice.” Thus, there is a perceived need to develop a network of like-minded actors. The US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has led the way in response to these pressures and, relatedly, to the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. For instance, the objective of 2012 International Special Operations Forces Conference was to solidify USSOCOM’s prominence and allow others to “gain a better understanding on how to become active members of that network.”

Similarly, in 2013, the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), alongside experts and practitioners from other countries, held a conference on “The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment.”

While these ventures are, in part, about international interoperability, they are also about reaching out and understanding other, non-national, players such as private security companies. Indeed, these firms participated in the JSOU endeavor. Conceiving them as part of a

1 To facilitate readability, the term “special forces” is used here instead of “special operations forces” or “SOF,” and does not refer to a specific country’s command or organization, unless indicated. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Canadian Department of National Defence or the government of Canada.


3 The irony is that some of these developing ties between national special forces may be bureaucratic and rule-based rather than based on relationships, thus potentially negating network flexibility. The author wishes to thank Dr. Jessica Glicken Turnley for raising this point. Please see Jessica Glicken Turnley, “Implications for Network-Centric Warfare,” JSOU Report 06-3 (Joint Special Operations University, March 2006).
global special forces network speaks both to the seeming ubiquity of the private security industry and the challenges special forces, especially the US variety, currently encounter. Such a conception, however, also raises some questions. What are the assumed and actual links between these forces and private security companies? Are the ways in which these firms construct security a hindrance or an asset to special forces?

This article answers these questions. First, the article identifies linkages and similarities between these two actors. It underscores why one might think private security companies are appropriate for this network. The goal is not to rehearse the various supply, demand, and ideational rationales contributing to the rise in prominence of both—others have done this sufficiently. Instead, the article illustrates the unique organizational character and people-centric nature of each actor. It also reveals that although companies are increasingly seen as security experts in their own right, there are significant relationships with special forces.

The article’s second part is inspired by a recent assessment concerning how nodal security dynamics have to be “imagined before they can be enacted.” This article’s goal is not to advocate. Instead, it is to consider how firms might enhance special forces given their “strategic interests, tools, resources, and ways of thinking.” In so doing, the article moves beyond replacing military forces with private security organizations as was often the case in Iraq and Afghanistan. Rather, it examines the prospects for independent cooperation and interaction and what private presence, made real through contracts with other types of actors, means for special forces.

As such, this second part focuses on three matters. One, it reveals how, because of the industry’s largely defensive focus, firms exercise a particular form of territorial control on behalf of corporate clients—a type of control that differs from the approach of special forces. While the private security company stance helps businesses function, the security and welfare of local populations is not its immediate concern. This shortfall may, or may not, affect the desired outcome from the perspective of special forces. Two, it contends that, although private security companies may draw their skillsets and notions of professionalism from the state, they also rely on other actors. In particular, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) provide private companies both financial opportunities and enhanced status as legitimate security actors. However, appealing to such an audience may reduce the likelihood of private companies interacting with special forces due to sensitivities. Finally, it is plain that the movement of military personnel to the private sphere

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6 Similarly, the article does not consider the operational and strategic implications stemming from this state employment. Indeed, assessments of private security company activity range from the positive to the negative. See, for example, Erik Prince, *Civilian Warriors: The Inside Story of Blackwater and the Unconquering Heroes of the War on Terror* (New York: Penguin Group, 2013); Swiss Peace, *Private Security Companies and Local Populations: An Exploratory Study of Afghanistan and Angola*, November 2007.
places manpower policies under stress. Just as states responded earlier this century with retention measures that pressured defense budgets, similar measures may again be warranted as the fear of special forces burnout grows and the private sphere alternative remains.

Organizing for Violence

Special Forces

Historically, conventional commanders have often pushed special forces to the periphery. This trend speaks to Jeffrey Legro’s description of military cultures: “[B]eliefs and norms about the optimal means to fight wars are important because they have a pervasive impact on the preferences and actions of both armies and states.”

Conventional forces’ concerns are evident in several ways: (1) special forces take skilled manpower away from conventional forces; (2) they conduct “sideshow operations,” though their increasing prominence and importance in the contemporary environment may be leading to attitudinal change; (3) “specialness” implies that conventional forces are somehow not special, and; (4) as both a cause and effect of organizational separation, they feature social dynamics with a lower degree of formality compared to conventional forces. It is telling that, in a pejorative fashion, special forces have been referred to as “private armies” because of their relative independence and unique attributes.

As such, these organizations stand apart from conventional elements in following attributes: (1) quality is better than quantity; (2) they cannot be mass produced; (3) competent special forces cannot be created after emergencies occur; and (4) humans are more important than hardware. Focusing, for now, on the latter attribute does not mean these forces are anti-technology. Instead, to borrow an old phrase, technology equips special forces; they do not man the technology. Special forces in Iraq and Afghanistan capitalized on technologies characteristic of the Revolution of Military Affairs, and its reliance on unmanned aerial vehicles, intelligence infrastructures, and stealth capabilities. Technology helps them stand out as “special” and assists them in completing their often sensitive tasks.

In contrast, conventional forces are usually organized, defined, and distinguished by, or around, certain military platforms such as tanks, aircraft, and ships. This difference is more than functional adaptation

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9 Finlan, Special Forces, 4.
10 The author would like to acknowledge a reviewer’s point that with post-Cold War downsizing, increasing emphasis has been placed on “quality over quantity” in the US Army. This comment likely relates to more than doing “better with what is left” in conventional forces; it speaks to increased professionalization and socio-political rationales about when and how force is to be applied. In this vein and in the larger Western context, conventional forces may increasingly be developing SOF characteristics, at least at the tactical level. Anthony King, The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
and recognition that humans need machines to operate in austere environments like the sea and air.\textsuperscript{12} It is representative of an “armament culture,” a normative predilection among Western states favoring capital-intensive militaries over labor-intensive ones.\textsuperscript{13} The formative cultural effect is no small one because, as Alastair Finlan describes, “military institutions have artificially created the reality that permeates the day-to-day life of its personnel, from the social space in which they work to the psychological realm that binds them together.”\textsuperscript{14} At state level, the pursuit and possession of expensive military platforms goes beyond merely responding to the capabilities and challenges offered by adversaries. These instruments of violence symbolize modernity; they are indicative of membership in the prestigious club of statehood.\textsuperscript{15}

The fact that special forces are becoming increasingly important is significant because of some high hurdles. During the Cold War, some scholars suggested weaning Western militaries off their “baroque” military technology would demand nothing less than “institutional change at every level: within the armed forces, within the wider geopolitical system, within the defence industry, and within the economy as a whole.”\textsuperscript{16} Today, though “big” armies, navies, and air forces are far from gone; the trends and developments mentioned earlier underscore change. While these solutions did perceive change through the rise of less hierarchical, less capital-intensive structures and relationships, they emphasized the labor-intensive alternative largely in terms of mass. Special forces, in contrast, follow the principle that “quality is better than quantity.” As we shall see, this qualitative emphasis resonates among private security companies.

\textit{Private Security Companies}

Whereas special forces are, for some, at the edges of the state’s infrastructure to apply sanctioned violence, private security companies stand outside the structure altogether. While they possess many military skillsets, they are not permanent or official fixtures in a state’s apparatus. These companies, as a result, can tap into the neoliberal rhetoric of commercial firms being adaptable, innovative, and cost effective compared to state actors. They also tap into the rationales that other actors should increasingly be responsible for their own security.\textsuperscript{17} Hence, firms access a client-base beyond the state, one that includes international organizations, NGOs, and corporations. It literally pays, therefore, to be on the outside.

Unlike other commercial fields, however, being on the outside is controversial and politically contested. To be sure, civilians have an

\begin{footnotes}
\item[12] The author would like to acknowledge a reviewer’s point that the US Army also advocates “equipping the man.” Indeed, unlike naval and air forces, there exists a tension within armies among the infantry, artillery, and cavalry/tank forces.
\item[14] Finlan, \textit{Special Forces}, 85.
\item[16] Mary Kaldor, \textit{The Baroque Arsenal} (London: Andre Deutsch, 1982), 220.
\end{footnotes}
important role in military operations. Acknowledging longstanding practice, Article 4A of the Third Geneva Convention (1949) recognizes the legality of civilians accompanying armed forces. Yet while mercenaries were once commonplace, functional developments related to training and equipment and normative shifts regarding who should apply violence, and to what ends, led to their decline over the nineteenth century. Indeed, we can now speak of an “anti-mercenary norm.”18 A private security company’s use of violence, therefore, does not fall neatly between binary distinctions: (1) the aforementioned convention and the Law of Armed Conflict; (2) strategic studies and international relations studies which privilege states and their militaries; and (3) Weberian bureaucratic notions about the role of the state vis-à-vis legitimate violence. The challenge for private companies, as we shall see, is how to be recognized as important security actors, and be conceived as legitimate in security activities, while skirting the pejorative mercenary label.19

Like special forces, private security companies are not platform-centric. One can approach this principle from two angles, the first being cost. With sophisticated, high-technology military platforms doubling in price perhaps every seven to eight years, most firms are not financially able to absorb purchase, basing, operating, and maintenance costs. If profit streams are uncertain and costs not recoupable, firms will adopt a service rather than hardware model to reduce overhead.20 Some experts describe commercial dynamics this way: “Additional personnel and equipment are only procured on a case-by-case basis—usually after a contract with a client has been signed—allowing these firms to run their operations with limited capital outlays.”21 In addition, relying on smaller weaponry and utilizing personnel not optimized for (and limited to) operating certain platforms arguably allows for greater commercial opportunities.22 For the second angle, states have long dominated the management and dispersion of major weapon systems for both geo-strategic reasons and to ensure state control over the possession and movement of weapons deemed significant (recall the armament culture above).23 In short, military entrepreneurism is strongly bounded by economic disincentives and state control; platform availability for private security companies is constrained.

20 Kaldor, The Baroque Arsenal, 193; Armin Krishnan, War as Business: Technological Change and Military Service Contracting (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), 151, 171.
Relationships

It is important not to overdraw the distinction between states and private security companies, at least in terms of expertise, because “private security actors often obtain legitimacy precisely from their connections to the state.” 24 Put differently, security professionals are individuals, “who gain their legitimacy of and power over defining policy problems from trained skills and knowledge and from continuously using these in their work.” 25 Indeed, notions of the industry’s professionalism often draw explicitly on previous service for and training by the state. In fact, a trade-marked logo for the firm Triple Canopy is “Quiet Professionals, Still Serving.”

Here a number of the “organic” connections between state-organized special forces and private security companies are evident. First, upon retirement, many special forces officers have formed their own companies. For example, Sir David Stirling, one of the British Special Air Service’s (SAS) founders in the Second World War, established Watchguard International in 1967, arguably the precursor firm to today’s industry. As well, Alastair Morrison, decorated for his part in the 1977 Mogadishu Luftansa hostage rescue, upon leaving the British SAS, formed Defence Systems Limited. This firm was one of the formative parts of ArmorGroup. Gordon Conroy, a former Australian SAS commander, created Unity and former members of the Swedish Special Forces created Scandinavian Special Projects (now Vesper Group) and Scandinavian Risk Solutions. Similarly, Triple Canopy and Trident Group derive their “parentage,” in order, from Delta Force and US Navy SEALs.

Second, if not forming companies, officers, particularly those of high rank, often accept executive leadership positions. For instance, General Peter Schoomaker (retired) and Admiral Eric T. Olsen (retired), both one-time USSOCOM commanders, serve on the boards of directors for DynCorp International and Mission Essential respectively. Similarly, Lieutenant-General Sir Cedric Delves and Major-General John Holmes, two retired former British DSOs (Director Special Operations), are correspondingly directors for Olive Group and Erinys. As another example, Brigadier Aldwin Wight, formerly head of the British SAS, worked as the Deputy Chief Executive Officer of Kroll Security International. Finally, firms often locate their offices and recruitment centers near special forces bases. Vinnell has offices close to USSOCOM in Tampa and Military Professional Resources, Inc., and K2 Solutions, Inc., are close to Fort Bragg, the home of US Army Special Operations Command. AKE and GardaWorld, among others, have offices around Hereford, home to the British SAS.


This special forces cachet in the private security industry has both functional and associative rationales. Functionally, special forces personnel frequently come with desirable skillsets: advanced educations, language abilities, and considerable field experience. What is more, the small team organization characteristic of special forces translates well in the private security context. It promotes self-reliance in challenging environments, especially those in which back-up forces, whether they are from the public or private sphere, may not be forthcoming. It values flexibility and innovation in tasks such as close protection. Similarly, an appreciation of austere environments helps firms in advising clients about travel routings and securing their facilities.

As for association, the link between special forces and private security companies serves to substantiate firms and heighten their allure. While not all companies possess a special forces pedigree, examinations of contractors reveal that many transfer their professional understandings and standards to the private sector. Claiming this pedigree, therefore, helps to instill in the minds of potential clients that the industry does possess security expertise and that it is a heralded expertise. Indeed, experts such as Finlan note that special forces hold a dominant place in Western culture and in appreciations of military expertise. They worry that descriptions of these forces as the “perfect soldiers” advance a mythology rather than an accurate picture of reality. Nevertheless, this image is a marketing boon for firms. It allows Rubicon International, for instance, to reflect on its SAS-trained personnel: “[T]hey are the crème de la crème.” In this vein, the observation underscoring Maersk’s reputation as the “Tiffany of shipping companies,” is that it only hires companies employing former US Navy SEALs.

Private Security Companies and Special Forces

Control

Though Western states increasingly wish to pursue strategic objectives in many parts of the world through less costly political and economic means (indeed, US Special Operations Forces alone are in as many as 75 countries), different forms of territorial control, and their associated benefits and tradeoffs, are clear. As one scholar noted, the control of territorial space relates to three components: “[O]ne may deny control to others, one may take it for oneself, and one may subsequently exercise it.” In a context in which special forces are less and less

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27 Arguably, special forces personnel, particularly those with considerable experience, may be more attuned to the development and value of networks compared to conventional personnel. The author recognizes Dr. William Mitchell of Royal Danish Defence College for this observation.


30 Finlan, Special Forces, 5–7.

operating in support of, or alongside, an intervening conventional force, emphasis is on the first component in the direct sense, made plain in the inability of adversaries to secure key personnel and infrastructure.\textsuperscript{32} The second component is problematic, especially over time, because of limited numbers and it follows the third is even more difficult. It is only indirectly, through Foreign Internal Defense measures (FID), that local security sectors are mentored, often by special forces, to control space across the three components. In sum, for Paul Rogers, endeavors such as those stressing special forces are, at best, “liddism... keeping the lid on rather than reducing the heat.”\textsuperscript{33}

When considering how territorial control is exercised in a global special forces network, private security companies do offer a different approach. Firms emphasize the “one may subsequently exercise it” aspect because of the industry’s defensive focus. While private security companies arguably first came to prominence in the 1990s because of South Africa’s Executive Outcomes, a firm that controlled space in all three manners, the industry has developed a strong defensive identity. Past analysis has revealed the various ingredients instilling the defensive mindset: (1) the desire of private security companies to avoid the pejorative “mercenary” label and its “offensive” activities; (2) the wish of clients to deny that they use mercenaries; (3) the underscoring by state clients and their militaries, particularly, that there are certain things the private sector does not do; and (4) the iterative development of codes of conduct, best practices, and operating principles by industry, states, and nongovernmental organizations.\textsuperscript{34} Admittedly, these firms do employ violence. Yet, there is a doctrinal difference for private security companies between the defensive and the offensive: “Operations in which forces await for the approach of the enemy before attacking” over “Operations in which forces seek out the enemy in order to attack him.”\textsuperscript{35} Put differently, companies exercise control in support of their clients; they benefit from others first taking control.

Such an approach would not necessarily preclude firms working for corporate clients to share intelligence with special forces in country. But it would mean that they would not be operating too far away from their compounds and clients, and doing so in a defensive mode. While control of territory might be more permanent compared to direct special forces action, the security constructed by private security companies might be just as limited in scope.

Moreover, when looking at corporate clients, especially those working in extraction industries, they not only operate in sometimes unstable environments, they are strategically interested in a resource in the first instance rather than in a people. These two may combine

\textsuperscript{32} Lukas Milevski, “Fortissimus Inter Pares: The Utility of Landpower in Grand Strategy,” \textit{Parameters} 42, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 7


geographically, or people may migrate to seek protection and opportunity, thus providing a potential locus for governance expansion or hearts and minds activities. However, this may not always be the case. Additionally, extraction efforts may be good for a state’s tax base, but they do not necessarily mean that significant numbers of people will receive the required resources or physical protection. Without other beneficial factors, when security is made both a commodity and set spatially, there will be winners and losers as Peter W. Singer describes: “[N]ot only are the worst threats deflected from the privately protected areas, but also those portions of society that cannot afford protection have to rely on declining, unstable, or nonexistent public means.” Similarly, Anna Leander identifies a resulting “Swiss cheese” approach towards security. Though companies may not have created these gaps, it is likely they will remain unfilled as security provisions serve particular purposes with particular targets. These private security companies’ responsibilities and techniques arguably equate to a different variant of liddism on their own. In imagining a special forces network that includes private security companies, this may, or may not, be part of the desired outcome from the perspective of special forces.

**Contact**

It is debatable, however, whether firms might interact with special forces in all instances, thus impacting the efficacy of a global network. While scholars have warned that the very flexibility of networks means that relationships between nodes are transitory and ad hoc, there is also the possibility that nodal connections will be denied in the first place.

To explain, among the range of clients, relations with humanitarian and development NGOs are among the most sensitive. While surveys have found that a significant number of NGOs utilize contractors for security reviews if not for protection, many organizations will not publicly acknowledge their interactions with these companies. Analysts and NGOs alike have identified a number of concerns. The former’s adoption of a “hardened” security mindset, especially one involving weaponry, cuts against longstanding protective techniques (e.g., consent, following the humanitarian ethic, living in solidarity among the people in need, etc.). There is fear that private security companies may usurp NGO roles or adopt the humanitarian moniker disingenuously. There is also worry that these companies may impact negatively upon NGO

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37 Singer, _Corporate Warriors_, 227.


independence and neutrality given their relations with other clients, both in and outside of a country of operations.  

Nevertheless, private security interactions with NGOs have several rationales as captured by José L. Gómez del Prado, the former chairperson of the United Nations Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries: “Counting humanitarian agencies as clients has multiple advantages for such companies as enhancing their reputation, providing distance from the mercenary label, and gaining a foothold in a potentially lucrative market.” Building on this, in crass economic terms, with the rising insecurity of NGO personnel in recent years (though the catalysts for this augmentation are a source of debate), private security companies may be an alternative security solution. Moreover, just as special forces are now a focal point with the major interventions of the 21st century winding down and Western governments applying themselves less but still desiring to manage risk, one might also see increased reliance on NGOs. At the extreme, one might witness the return of another form of liddism: the 1990s “humanitarian alibi” featured reliance on NGOs so states could avoid taking essential political measures. Just as this alibi sparked some of the initial interest in NGO and private security company interactions, contemporary developments may see its heightening.

As a result, companies with, or desiring of, a humanitarian clientele may set limits on the degree to which they would interact with special forces given the tensions inherent in private security company dynamism discussed earlier. Firms, as noted elsewhere, relate to “the worlds of the military, the business world and the humanitarian NGO”. While private security companies may easily move among these “worlds” and may evoke different imagery depending on the audience, they will ultimately be judged by their actions. Given, as Ken Livingstone and Jerry Hart offer, that “[d]eveloping a positive and attractive image is central to the private security sector’s bid for professional status,” respecting the


concerns of humanitarians is valuable. Private security company interaction with special forces through a nonclient relationship would lead to a collision between these worlds, one which might bring about further closing of the humanitarian space rather than at least contributing to its stabilization. The potential for NGO independence to be compromised and for special forces to influence humanitarian action through companies would be problematic factors at best in terms of advancing a global special forces network. Put differently, firms may have derived some of their skillsets from the state, but one cannot assume that they, in all cases, are still serving state endeavors to the letter.

**Manpower**

While one might argue that the recent expansion of special forces the world-over means that this node is healthy, this stance is debatable. USSOCOM leaders, for instance, revealed in 2011 that since 11 September 2001, though the command’s manpower had doubled, the actual number of personnel overseas had quadrupled. Additionally, with conventional forces withdrawing from Afghanistan, the expectation is that special forces’ responsibilities will increase. The growing quality of life issues and fear of burnout, not only among the US SOF community but also in those of other allied countries, are significant concerns. They underscore the network emphasis noted at this article’s beginning.

However, emphasizing private security companies as part of the special forces network may exacerbate the very pressures USSOCOM and others wish to alleviate. Certainly, on the one hand, security professionals may be able to move among the nodes, bringing their expertise with them but also conforming to the operational boundaries of individual nodes. A 2010 RAND study even suggested employment with a private security company might be viewed as part of an overall career path for military personnel. On the other hand, when considering the aforementioned special forces attributes, zero-sum dynamics are evident with personnel movement from special forces to the private sector. If quality is important, if mass production is out of the question, and if standing forces are required to house experience and maturity, the potential for private employment, alone or alongside other factors, creates a vacuum difficult to fill. At the very least, it upsets the honed small team dynamics drilled over time (and at considerable expense to state coffers).

In the not so distant past, burnout concerns coupled with private security opportunities catalyzed special forces retention efforts. These efforts attempted to deny companies of manpower for the sake of self-preservation; governments were tasking special forces to do more

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47 Humanitarian space: an environment where humanitarians can work without hindrance and follow the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and humanity. Christopher Spearin, “Private Security Companies and Humanitarians: A Corporate Solution to Securing Humanitarian Spaces?” *International Peacekeeping* 8, no. 1 (Spring 2001), 22.


and more in major interventions involving conventional forces. As an example, in the United Kingdom, SAS personnel received a 50 percent pay increase in 2006. Also in 2006, Canada increased allowances for JTF2 personnel. Later, in 2009, Canada replaced the JTF2 allowances with a Special Operations Allowance covering a wider range of Canadian personnel. As for the United States, officials employed both the carrot and the stick over the first decade of the 21st century. There were stop-loss years preventing the retirement of certain military personnel and the then Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, even mused about noncompete clauses in government contracts that would dissuade firms from luring active duty military personnel. There also were initiatives focusing on retirement benefits, salaries, bonuses, and educational incentives.

Today, USSOCOM recognition that private security companies are potentially part of a larger network implies that the genie cannot be stuffed back into the bottle. Companies have a perceived utility (though one should note the limitations and boundaries identified above). However, the special forces highlighting of private security companies reinforces the status of these firms as legitimate security actors and it arguably draws further attention to the industry as an employment opportunity. With burnout fears returning, this time because special forces are increasingly working in lieu of, rather than alongside, conventional forces, attention may again turn to additional remuneration and other retention measures. Although care needs to be exercised, especially given the sky-rocketing costs of conventional military platforms, the heavily special forces-reliant alternative made real through a networked approach may not necessarily be at low expense—a troubling point for political and military officials in an era of austerity.

Concluding Remarks

In 2012, Andrew Krepinevich of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments offered this observation, one arguably applicable across the Western context: “Just as defense budgets are declining, the price of projecting and sustaining military power is increasing and the range of interests requiring protection is expanding.” The augmented reliance on special forces, and in turn the advancement of a global network in light of the resulting pressures, stem from such analysis.

This article suggests there are many connections—almost genetic links—between special forces and private security companies in the larger network. It is increasingly recognized there are social networks among different national special forces that allow for cooperation and integration. Some go so far as to suggest there is a wider special forces

50 In the US case, for instance, the author already notes the bonus matrix, effective February 23, 2012, which emphasizes SOF specialties. Similarly, there was the 2011 internal “sensing” study on quality of life issues. See http://www.militaryhub.com/article.cfm?id=409; Gregg Zoroya, “Special Ops Commander Vows Better Life for 66,000 troops,” USA Today, February 16, 2012.

If private security personnel indeed transfer their professional standards and norms to the private sector, one might argue private security companies are perfectly suitable for a global special forces network.

However, this network resides in the wider context of security governance. States and their special forces are important, but they are not necessarily dominant in all cases. By deemphasizing state activism, one can reveal the varying dynamics by which security is made real, in what ways, and for whom. Thus, in order to realize what firms might have to offer, one must consider the following: (1) how contractors construct security and for what reasons; (2) how they rely on others for both commercial opportunities and legitimacy enhancing arrangements; and (3) how the personnel linkages between special forces and private security companies may impinge on the former in an era of austerity and increased special forces usage. As indicated above, the private security defensive focus, the importance of relations with NGOs, and zero-sum manpower dynamics together highlight a lack of universal congruity vis-à-vis special forces. Certainly, a lack of shared vision and tactics may facilitate complementarity, but it may also reinforce division. This possibility builds upon the opinion offered by one retired US General that “[t]he profit motive never aligns 100 percent with the public interest.”

While there clearly are limitations and challenges in considering private security companies as partners in a broader special forces network, one should not completely discount the possibility. Instead, such networks should not be viewed as crystallized, but rather as phenomena in which the nodes “simultaneously cooperate and compete within the field of security delivery.” Incorporating private security companies as part of this network should be done with eyes wide open.

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55 Carmola, Private Security Contractors, 30.

Private Contractors & Military Professionals

Private Military & Security Companies: A Review Essay

Birthe Anders
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Abstract: Research in private military and security companies has matured over the last fifteen years. This essay reviews past research and identifies three areas needing further attention; progress in these areas is critical for guiding security and defense policies and establishing effective regulations.

Private military and security companies became a topic of research in the early 1990s, and is a matter of great interest for academics, journalists, and practitioners alike. While much progress has been made in studying this diverse industry, the field has many avenues that could benefit from further research. This article reviews past research and suggests a way ahead. It first identifies the major approaches taken thus far: the field has matured greatly; researchers have moved away from studying the industry as a whole, and now focus more on non-state clients and individual contractors and services rather than state-sponsored contracting. Second, the article identifies the field’s most pressing research concerns, as well as how they can be pursued. Individual research projects are too often disconnected; establishing formal research networks among interested universities would facilitate cooperation and foster joint projects. Additionally, regular exchanges between practitioners and academics would greatly improve the quality of research output, and help to educate those working with private military contractors.

Prior Approaches

The field of private military and security companies is a relatively young one, though it evolved quickly over the last fifteen years. During that period, five general themes characterized the research: (1) the nature of the industry, (2) normative and ethical concerns (e.g., what should or should not be outsourced, with how much governmental control, and whether the use of armed contractors in lieu of soldiers was ethical), (3) the impact of private military contractors on civil-military relations and states control of violence, (4) non-state contracting, and (5) laws and regulation.

The field is clearly concerned with more than just armed security contractors. Obviously, the potential of armed contractors to use deadly force has given rise to important considerations regarding regulation and oversight. However, non-combat services—such as intelligence, security training, logistical support, and risk assessments—are also part of the industry. In fact, the term “private military companies” has evolved into broader terms such as “private military and security companies”

1 The more inclusive term “private military and security company” is shortened hereafter to “private military contractors” for readability.
and “private security companies,” an evolution which also reflects developments within the industry. For instance, the first private military contractors to come to public attention in the 1990s were Executive Outcomes (South African) and Sandline International (British), both of which offered combat services. However, as mentioned above, the industry now offers a broader range of services. Similarly, academic research once used typologies that categorized types of companies based on their proximity to the battlefield. Nonetheless, while distinguishing between private military companies and private security companies may work in theory, it remains difficult in practice. Contractors or firms develop different profiles based on the types of services they offer and their clients. Most prefer to call themselves “security” companies to avoid negative connotations associated with the term “military.”

Research activity in private military contractors has taken place in three chronological periods or waves: (1) from 1998 to 2003, (2) from 2004 to 2009, and (3) from 2010 to 2014. The first wave tried to describe the larger industry of contracting basic military services, and make sense of its evolving role in warfare. Discussion typically centered on the rise of contractors as non-state armies, and the potential end of the state’s monopoly on legitimate violence.

The second wave of research began after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and focused on the US government’s use of contractors. It was more concerned with finding solutions to practical problems than theoretical or normative issues. As the number of contractors decreased in Iraq, the “Iraq bubble” burst and the industry began to explore new markets in anti-piracy operations, maritime security, humanitarian assistance, and

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3 This does not mean there is no market for this – but offensive action is not a service offered by PMSCs. Sarah Percy makes a convincing argument about why companies moved away from selling combat services. Sarah Percy, Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), see especially Chapter Seven.


other areas. The third wave commenced in 2010 and was characterized by themes that were more specific in nature, such as contractors’ self-perceptions, mental health, and gender issues. A growing number of researchers also began addressing military-contractor cooperation. This research encompassed attitudes of soldiers towards contractors, their views about becoming contractors, contractor motivation, and military professionalism.

While the main clients of contractors have been the governments of the United States and United Kingdom, the United Nations and many non-governmental organizations have also bought security services from private military contractors. In 1997, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan provoked public outcry by suggesting the organization ought to hire private security companies to carry out peacekeeping tasks and to administer refugee camps. However, the idea did not garner much support. Nonetheless, researchers found that some UN bodies have indeed contracted services from private military contractors, though not to the extent suggested by Annan. Non-governmental organizations are very cautious about admitting to the use of private security contractors, but they too have availed themselves of the industry’s services.

American scholars have been particularly good at adopting a practical “they’re here to stay so let’s deal with it” attitude, and the field could stand more of this way of thinking. To be sure, ethical and normative concerns are important. However, more research is needed in what is

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13 For some of the challenges to PMSC-NGO cooperation, e.g. difference in their institutional culture, see Birthe Anders, “Tree-huggers and Baby-killers: The Relationship between NGOs and PMSCs and its Impact on Coordinating Actors in Complex Operations,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 24, no 2 (2015): 278-294.
already a reality for many contractors and those working with them. Unless the United Kingdom and United States change their thinking about using private military contractors, the industry is here to stay. That, in turn, means the use of contractors needs to be regulated appropriately; yet, aside from spikes of interest following controversial incidents, little has happened regarding regulations. Many aspects of the business, such as importing weapons into a war zone, are already tightly regulated.14 However, the crucial issue is enforcement of existing laws and regulations. In 2013, a new association was established that will monitor compliance with the “Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers.” Signatories have committed to a wide range of principles governing the use of force, weapons training, selection and management of personnel, and the prohibition of torture, slave labor, and child labor.15 Currently, more than seven-hundred companies have agreed to the principles, among which sixty-four are US companies.16 While the association is not yet functional, it promises to have procedures for addressing complaints, and to conduct field visits. The US Department of State has announced it might make association membership a prerequisite for the award of contracts, which in turn signals confidence in the association’s potential utility.17

The next wave of private military contractor research must study specific aspects of contracting through greater data collection rather than theoretical analysis; it must also intensify the dialogue with industry, government, military, and non-governmental organizations.

Avenues for Further Research

Which issues warrant further research depends on one’s perspective; clients will have different questions and knowledge requirements than academics. Nonetheless, future research would do well to address three areas:

1. Individuals and non-state clients and their cooperation in the field;
2. The expansion of research methodologies, especially the range of comparative case studies;18
3. The establishment of research “clusters” or networks and the facilitation of regular academic-military dialogues.

First, greater examination of the “soft” end of contractor services (the health and well-being of individual contractors, their personal costs, and general effectiveness) would complement previous state-centric research. Non-state clients—such as shipping companies,
non-governmental organizations, and development contractors—are interesting to compare to governmental clients; and non-state contracting has practical implications for military forces. When non-governmental organizations contract for security services, their choices can affect their partner organizations in important ways.

Second, scholars must open a broader dialogue about research methods. Most researchers employ a mix of document analysis and qualitative methods, with infrequent quantitative surveys. But we need a debate concerning how to analyze interview data, how to construct surveys, and how to build on previous research. Most research projects are stand-alone attempts to address specific questions. However, building on previous research findings would give other outputs more footing. Furthermore, future research would benefit from comparing a broader range of countries to identify their contracting choices and how effective they are in specific situations. These points are, of course, made from an academic perspective—I would certainly invite a debate about the kind of research needed from a practitioner perspective.

Third, too much research potential will be wasted if it is not better connected, transnationally and across disciplines. Formalized networks have been established, but these consist of scholars working on very different aspects of the industry. While this was a useful first step, the further evolution of research networks could form research clusters. For instance, a “government contracting cluster” could formally link researchers working on state outsourcing and facilitate development of future projects. The same approach is conceivable for the other topics mentioned above, such as contracting by non-governmental organizations, maritime contracting, laws, and regulations. It would also be beneficial to include experts from fields not directly concerned with private military contractors. Management scholars might have something interesting to say about emerging contractor markets; psychologists and sociologists might offer insights into contractor motivations and self-understanding; and regional experts could contribute to our knowledge of political, social, and legal conditions in specific countries. In addition, research programming that is more comprehensive would benefit scholars by offering easier data collection; it would also help practitioners by facilitating their access to scholars working on similar sets of problems.

Regular dialogues help scholars stay in touch with what practitioners consider important. A case in point is a recent meeting between the “Private Military and Security Research Group” of King’s College, London, and the faculty and students of the National Defense University’s Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy. Both parties benefitted from an afternoon’s candid exchange. Military officers learned about ongoing research and preliminary results before these were published. Researchers gained insights into working with contractors in different field environments. But such exchanges should be routine, not extraordinary.

To conclude, research in the field of private military contracting has matured significantly in recent years. It has evolved from early efforts to describe and understand the entire industry to address previously neglected issues, such as private maritime security and the motivations of the individuals involved. As an emerging field, it would benefit from a more coherent research agenda. Comprehensive programming and
research clusters will be crucial to efforts to consolidate the field and to ensure it informs the security and policy areas most effectively.
This commentary is in response to Robert A. Johnson’s article “Predicting Future War” published in the Spring 2014 issue of Parameters (vol. 44, no. 1).

The Joint Force Must Get Better at Understanding Combinations, Employing Asymmetry, Evaluating Risk

The article “Predicting Future War” by Robert Johnson provides a compelling vision for the types of challenges future forces will face and the military implications of those challenges. Although “tours of the future” like those found in the article are important, I believe it is critical the military step back and understand the cultural reflexes and biases we must cultivate in order to address those emerging challenges. Straight-line analysis of trends and their implications may drive us to solutions that are wrong or incomplete. Instead, I would advocate a broader view so the force as a whole can come to terms with these challenges in a coherent way.

Strategic competition is always a back-and-forth affair. The US approach to warfare over the last several decades has deeply impressed potential adversaries and is encouraging speedy military innovation around the world. This innovation is confronting the Joint Force with an array of emerging military challenges and threatening to obsolesce, or make irrelevant, parts of the US defense establishment. From anti-access challenges in the Pacific, to “masked warfare” in Eastern Europe, to evolving irregular and insurgent challenges throughout the Middle East, adversaries are adapting to the “US way of war” and testing new approaches to limiting American influence and reach.

Although always difficult in a bureaucracy as large and complex as the Department of Defense, we have to think hard about building a Joint Force (through conscious design) with keen appreciation for evolving strategic challenges and threats. The Chairman notes 80 percent of the Joint Force of 2020 is essentially decided. Thus, what we do about the remaining 20 percent can potentially have disproportional impact on the success or failure of our future military. Perhaps even more critical is what we do in doctrine, education, organization, training, and leadership – in essence, the mental and social “software” that orients and orchestrates our military capabilities. To get this software right, the military should be thinking more deeply about the nature of these key mental investments to ensure military change is positive, opportunistic, and occurs on our terms, not an adversary’s. Coding this mental software also suggests now is the time to step back from individual weapons or programs and think more broadly about the context within which future conflict will take place. I see this contextual discussion taking three distinct, yet related paths.
First, we must work to understand better the complex threats and challenges driving military change. Calling it complex is not good enough; we must clarify this complexity if we do not want to miss the mark. For me, this complexity is about combinations. Today, we face novel combinations of threats from an array of adversaries. These threats frequently transcend neat or tidy categories, cutting across land, sea, air, space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum, while being distributed or reaching across broader geographic ranges. Each military service tends to have a well-defined range of responsibilities in which its competence and professionalism are unrivalled. Adversaries, unable to confront superior capabilities within service domains, are experimenting with combinations of overlapping capabilities capable of cutting across seams or boundaries between services, or avoid them altogether.

Second, these novel combinations of challenges, threats, and adversaries require novel combinations of power in response. To encourage a future military capable of such combinations, we have to think about the assembly and employment of complementary mixes of government, civilian, and military power, which are at once confounding, irresistible, surprising, and unexpected, to our adversaries. If we do this well, it will set the stage for affordable and numerous new capabilities, such as small, swarming robotics capable of taking advantage of the emerging intersection of twenty-first century engineering, manufacturing, and information technologies. Furthermore, this mental approach will assist in mitigating the vulnerabilities of our own expensive or hard-to-replace capital assets and overcome the potential limitations of a force too exquisite to risk using. Before a war, a convincingly flexible force will serve to deter more effectively. During war, it will be central to victory.

Third, we must better understand how to evaluate and mitigate risk by integrating vulnerability assessments more comprehensively into all aspects of our thinking. Risk is inherent every time military power is employed. However, we often forget the true measure of power in the international system is the ability to change the behavior of another at reasonable cost. Critically, we need to get better at uncovering flaws in our initial assumptions about military problems, and at articulating the consequences of specific military actions or approaches. Not all problems are dangerous, not all dangers are pressing, not all emergencies are soluble, and not all solutions are affordable. The defense intellectual must understand how the US military is able, under modern warfighting conditions, to provide political leaders flexible military options capable of uniting strategy and tactics in a world of limitations. In a world characterized by powerful adversaries and perhaps less ample US military capabilities, it is critical we cultivate a sense of risk management across the future force.

Our institutional inability to think thorough contextual issues, such as those I have described above, tends to discount future costs. We default to easy decisions, such as protecting legacy structure, end strength, or top-line budget, and put off difficult choices until they are beyond the point at which they can be optimally solved. The great strategic thinker Colin Gray is well known for articulating the idea that war is about context. Putting contextual discussions at the beginning of our future force development activities will help to position the Department
of Defense and the nation as a whole to seize opportunities rather than – as is so often the case – be driven by institutional inertia or by reacting to a more visionary, forward-looking adversary’s plans.

Dr. Johnson’s article surfaces a number of challenges the future force will face, some will be right, some will be wrong. Critically, however, I suggest we must understand how – in a world most agree is (as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is fond of saying) “complex, uncertain, and increasingly dangerous,” we cultivate the mental agility to prepare where we can, and adjust to unanticipated conditions when we must.

The Author Replies

Robert A. Johnson

Mr. Jeff Becker advances ideas that are close to my own and I do not detect any fundamental disagreement between us, but rather an injunction to develop our responses to future trends. We share a critical view of the term “complex,” which Mr. Becker rightly points out is overused. His observation that it is merely a question of combination, perhaps in unexpected ways, is spot on. He encourages action “across the seams or boundaries between Services”; our own “novel combinations” and the cultivation of “mental agility.” In this we are on the same page. Mr. Becker urges the armed services to: “better understand the cultural reflexes and biases we must cultivate,” but I would only caution here we also might better understand our usual reflexes in order to mitigate against our tendency to reach the wrong conclusions. I am also a little uncertain if we always get the formula for assessing risk right. Risk is an inevitable facet of war and cannot be avoided, but he rightly enjoins us to assess cost, which, in fact, is a far better metric. Mr. Becker correctly deduces that to get our mental “software” right, “the military should be thinking more deeply about the nature of these key mental investments to ensure military change is positive, opportunistic, and occurs on our terms, not an adversary’s.” In this, he is absolutely right.
The Rise and Continuing Challenge of Revolutionary Iran

W. Andrew Terrill

In early September 1978 the Shah of Iran flew over a churning crowd of anti-government demonstrators in a helicopter, and was shocked and alarmed by the size of the demonstration. Turning to the pilot he asked incredulously, “What have I done to them?” (Buchan, 167). The pilot refused to answer, but the Shah was badly shaken by the popular hatred directed against him. He never recovered from the realization that his nation had turned against him, and he quickly became indecisive, apathetic, and withdrawn. In the last days of his regime the Shah realized he had developed no large popular following and the Iranian public was showing nothing but contempt for his very real record of economic achievement, which he used to help justify the monarchy. He was also weakened by his chronic lymphocytic leukemia (diagnosed in May 1974), although this cancer was not the primary reason for his inability to continue leading the state. Iran’s Prime Minister later told US Ambassador Sullivan, “You must know this and you must tell your government. This country is lost because the king cannot make up his mind” (Buchan, 202). How Iran descended into this sorry state and then further descended into a bloody and vengeful revolution is the subject of a number of recent books, some of the most important of which are considered here.

The Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty

Retired Financial Times correspondent James Buchan begins his study with a good overview of the Pahlavi family’s royalist regime which was established in 1925 by a semi-literate cavalry officer and carried on by his son Mohammad Reza (Iran’s final Shah) from 1941 until 1979. Shah Mohammad Reza pursued rapid economic development while expanding the authoritarian nature of his government. This strategy was based on the flawed belief that strong economic progress would stifle concerns over a corrupt and repressive government. The Shah was baffled by the public’s indifference to material progress under the Pahlavi regime, telling a Western diplomat that “I have done more for Iran than any Shah for 2,000 years” (212). Yet most of the public felt that such advances had nothing to do with them. Instead, they were much more focused on the Shah’s megalomania and the arbitrary but sometimes very ugly repression by the...
Savak security service. In explaining the Shah’s failure to relate to the Iranian public, Buchan also notes that the Shah’s psyche had been scared by several nearly successful assassination attempts, which encouraged him to withdraw into a security cocoon. To make matters worse, he was also enormously susceptible to the flattery of his aides who shielded him from uncomfortable facts and constructive criticism. In this sterile environment his delusions flourished.

Buchan also vividly illustrates the intensity of the public’s alienation as the Shah’s regime headed toward collapse. In last years of the Shah’s rule, large segments of the Iranian public appeared willing to believe any rumor about him as long as it was sufficiently sinister. A key turning point was the 1978 Rex Cinema arson fire where around 370 people were killed in a movie theater. After the revolution, the new government established that Islamic activists acting on their own had started the fire, but at the time it was widely believed that regime agents were responsible and attempted to blame the Islamic opposition. The Shah received no benefit of the doubt in the case of this odious crime, perhaps because so many ordinary people had such negative experiences with Savak throughout their lives. Few Iranians believed that either the Shah or Savak had scruples about the death of innocents. An even more powerful example occurred when a 1978 earthquake struck the ancient town of Khorasan killing 20,000 people. Immediately after the event, rumors quickly began circulating that the regime was allowing the United States to stage underground nuclear weapons tests in the desert regardless of the negative consequences for the Iranian people.

The Shah’s faltering response to the uprising also undermined the possibility of serious military actions against the revolutionaries. Rather than present himself as a strong and decisive leader, the Shah allowed his military to flounder without providing them with any kind of vision for victory. Over a 10 month span soldiers were told to fire their weapons into the air but to do nothing more serious to confront demonstrators, due to previous overreactions by the military. Some units eventually chose to abandon their bases to the revolutionaries rather than defend them with nothing more than empty bluff. Moreover, as the revolution progressed the army increasingly faced the danger of disintegration, and the government viewed conscript troops as prone to desertion and changing sides. Lacking empowerment and mindful of their own uncertain futures, the military command announced that it would remain neutral in the struggle between the Shah’s government and the revolutionaries, a position Buchan characterizes as a rank absurdity that led to the military’s rapid surrender. With unmistakable contempt, Buchan states, “So ended the Pahlavi army in a defeat so rapid and comprehensive, one searches in vain for its like whether in modern or ancient history” (240).

While the Shah was showing weakness and vacillation, his main adversary Imam Ruhollah Khomeini was behaving very differently. Shrewd, manipulative, and absolutely committed to Islamic Revolution, Khomeini did not back away from confrontation, nor was he squeamish about the loss of Iranian lives in the ongoing struggle. He had total credibility as an uncompromising enemy of Israel and the United States, the

latter of which he accused of seeking to steal Iran’s dignity by treating it as a vassal state. Shortly before his arrest and exile to Iraq in 1963, he stated “Let the American President know that in the eyes of the Iranian people, he is the most repellent member of the human race” (95). Almost by accident, Khomeini was tremendously empowered by the events leading up to his return to Iran after 14 years in exile. From abroad he was able to reject the slightest movement toward compromise with the regime, while jeering at other clerics who failed to attack the monarchy with sufficient venom. In this environment, Khomeini achieved a stunning level of empowerment as audio cassettes of his harsh and uncompromising sermons circulated throughout the country. Buchan states that after the Shah was driven out of Iran, Khomeini did not simply come home as a hero. Rather, he returned as a “messiah.”

Once in power, Khomeini quickly moved to consolidate the revolution while seeking to appear above the fray of post-Imperial politics. Many of Iran’s most important early power struggles were played out during the Iran-Iraq War with Khomeini strengthening the regime in the face of a foreign enemy. By October 1981 all the principal offices of state, with the exception of the prime ministry, were in the hands of Khomeini loyalists from the Qom seminary. Yet while the Iran-Iraq War presented opportunities for consolidating the revolution, Iran gained little from eight years of extremely bloody fighting. In the last battles of the war, Iranian forces fought with valor but failed to defeat the Saddam Hussein regime in the face of superior Iraqi weaponry. Buchan ends this study with death of Khomeini followed by a brief epilogue on the longevity of the Islamic Republic, which has continued to survive all of the challenges it has faced.

Waging Revolution and Consolidating the Revolution

Michael Axworthy’s Revolutionary Iran is another valuable study that offers a great deal of insight on both the revolution itself and the post-revolutionary Islamic Republic. Axworthy was the head of the Iran Section of the British Foreign Office from 1998-2000 and is currently a senior lecturer at the University of Exeter. In this study, he gives a solid description of the rise of the Palavi monarchy, while consistently asking what social groups chose to support the Shah and why they did so. Axworthy also seeks to understand why the regime lost its legitimacy, and how the new regime established its authority and sought to maintain significant levels of popular support.

In some of the most important analysis within this book, Axworthy considers the clash between Iranian self-identity and the American cultural presence in Iran, which some Iranians increasingly thought was smothering them. Many Iranians viewed American culture as self-confident and brash, presenting itself as indistinguishable from modernization. This challenge was

sometimes viewed as a form of cultural aggression or “Westoxification” (Gharbzadegi) that confronted the self-identity of Iranians. This concept is detailed in a study published in 1962 by Iranian author Jalal Al-e Ahmed. Al-e Ahmad did not directly attack the West, but rather expressed concern over the uncritical way in which Western values and ideas were treated by many Iranian educators and elites. Al-e also drew upon an analogy by Molana Rumi involving a crow which saw a partridge and was impressed by the elegant way that the other bird walked. The crow repeatedly attempted to imitate the partridge, but did so awkwardly. It was never was able to duplicate the partridge and eventually forgot how to even walk like a crow. The crow, like many Iranians, had lost its identity in exchange for accepting a caricature of foreign values.

Juxtaposed against this perceived Western cultural onslaught were Iranian religious values and traditions. Iran’s version of Twelver Shi’ite Islam had been the state religion since 1501 and is acknowledged as central to Iranian history and identity. It was sometimes seen in opposition to the pre-Islamic historical heritage presented by the Shah as the foundation of the Palavi monarchy. Challenging the Shah’s narrative, Khomeini insisted that the regime’s pre-Islamic symbols and allusions were blasphemy and that monarchy was abhorrent to the Prophet. This vocabulary continued to be used following the success of the revolution when the Shah’s supporters were routinely referred to as “idol-worshippers.” Moreover, in his conflict with Khomeini the Shah had only a limited reservoir of religious legitimacy since his monarchy was not formally linked to religion, and he did not officially rule by divine right despite attempts to appear pious. Rather, Iran’s 1906 Constitution directly stated that the Shah’s sovereignty was derived from the people as a power given to him in trust, and therefore not as a right bestowed directly by God.

Axworthy agrees with Buchan that the Shah’s regime had made tremendous economic progress by the mid-1970s, but that he was also becoming more authoritarian. As the Shah grew increasingly self-confident, his rule became more autocratic, and his previously declared aspirations to democracy faded. Correspondingly, Savak men went into libraries and bookshops throughout Iran to remove copies of the Shah’s 1960 book Mission for My Country, as its statements about freedom and democracy had become “out of date.” The Shah no longer wished to be held accountable for previous promises to democratize, and this change did not go unnoticed by the educated middle classes. Additionally, anti-royalist sentiment grew among bazaar merchants, religious students, and lower middle class workers, who found their economic aspirations frustrated by pervasive corruption, cronyism and rising living costs. Making matters worse, the Shah fundamentally misunderstood the entire revolutionary movement, assuming it was foreign-inspired and perhaps foreign-controlled. The primary culprit in these conspiracy theories alternated between the United States, the United Kingdom, and particularly the Soviet Union.

The other side of the revolution involves the opposition to the Shah and the question of why Khomeini rose out of the myriad of anti-government forces to take power after the Shah was driven out. One reason, already noted by Buchan, appears to be Khomeini’s total commitment to opposing the Shah. Some Iranian secular liberals were encouraged by the real and tangible concessions that the Shah offered...
as the regime faltered, but Khomeini and his followers were implacable. Khomeini's utter self-confidence and total commitment to the destruction of the regime marked him as a revolutionary and not a politician. Khomeini consequently treated alliances with moderate oppositionists as temporary conveniences to be discarded as soon as possible since these groups could never be trusted. Rather, the leaders he brought to power were his former religious students, including Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ali Khamenei, Saeed Khalkhali, and especially Mohammad Beheshti, who died in 1981. Khomeini's surviving son, Ahmad, was also a key political player in the revolution and the early Islamic Republic. Khomeini wanted to work with the popular President Bani-Sadr, but only if Bani-Sadr capitulated completely to Khomeini's vision of Islamic government. He did not want the clergy to be seen as governing alone, but was prepared to tolerate that perception rather than accept actual power-sharing. Unwilling to acquiesce to these terms, Bani-Sadr fled the country in 1981, narrowly escaping arrest.

The revolutionary leaders also moved to reshape Iranian society. Regime opponents were placed on trial for capital "crimes" such as being at war with God and spreading corruption on earth; charges that could mean almost anything. Another crime was eclecticism which essentially involved polluting the ideology with non-Islamic ideas (especially Marxism) for the organization of society. In response to pressure against them from government-sponsored revolutionary Komitehs, leftist revolutionaries fought back hard with terrorism. On June 28, 1981 a bomb detonated at the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) headquarters killing 70 regime leaders, including the brilliant and influential Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti. The Iranian revolutionary government responded with mass arrests of leftists and a campaign ruthless enough to finally marginalize these forces in the competition for power. Later, in surveying the upheaval, Khomeini's disgraced former student Ayatollah Hosein Ali Montazeri stated, "The people of the world thought our only task here in Iran was to kill" (300).

Axworthy identifies the end of the Iran-Iraq war as a spiritual and psychological crisis for Khomeini, who believed that God had inspired and guided him to continue the war against Saddam Hussein. According to Axworthy, "Khomeini believed he had polished his soul to the point that his mind had become an instrument for the performance of God's will on earth" (282). He expected Iranian forces to seize the holy city of Karbala in Iraq and perhaps even Jerusalem as the result of a God-inspired decision to continue the war after the Iraqis had been driven from Iranian soil. Khomeini's pathological certainty, effective during the revolution, ran into a wall of reality in the late 1980s as the opportunity to defeat Saddam Hussein deteriorated. In early 1988 it became clear that vanquishing Iraq was no longer plausible and a staggeringly large number of Iranian lives had been sacrificed for a victory that God was apparently unwilling to grant. In the face of this reality, Tehran leadership painfully came to the conclusion that the United States would not allow them to win the war. Washington would instead indirectly support Saddam to the extent he needed, while continuing to deny Iran access to modern weapons and spare parts for US military equipment purchased by the Shah's government. According to his son Ahmad, Khomeini was totally broken by the cease-fire agreement implemented after a series
of successful Iraqi offensives. Almost immediately after accepting the agreement, Khomeini fell into a severe depression and lost his ability to walk. He never spoke in public again and died on June 3, 1989 after a heart attack following surgery for stomach cancer.

Following Khomeini’s death, the future of the Islamic Republic was entrusted to a number of his key supporters and aides, the most important of whom were Rafsanjani and Khamenei. In the aftermath of Khomeini’s death and the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the key contradiction in the governance of revolutionary Iran again became problematic. This was the tension in Islamic Republic’s constitution between the principles of Islamic rule and democracy. Were the Iranian people children that needed to be guided by the clergy regardless of their own aspirations (an attitude not unlike that of the Shah), or where they citizens who had a right to a role in choosing their government? This issue has never been permanently resolved in the Islamic Republic. These tensions rose following the election of reform candidate Mohammed Khatami with 70 percent of the vote in 1997.

Khatami’s overwhelming electoral victory against establishment candidate Nateq-Nuri seemed to set the stage for serious reform and perhaps even democracy, but this did not occur. Iranians blamed the hardline right for blocking reform, but they also blamed Khatami for being unwilling to fight forcefully against the hardliners. Khatami believed in dialogue to resolve conflict, though it rarely led to redress. Young people were particularly disillusioned with Khatami’s leadership failures, consequently providing the groundwork for the rise of Mahmud Ahmadinejad, a populous politician with a flair for crude anti-American and anti-Semitic rhetoric. Ahmadinejad came to power at the time the reform movement was demoralized. The voters did not know much about him, and his outsider status and lower class origins may have led to his election. Unfortunately for Iran, his eight years in power led to a series of economic and diplomatic disasters.

The Shah’s Personality, Values, and Mistakes

Abbas Milani’s brilliantly-written *The Shah* agrees with many aspects of the previous studies on the causes of the revolution, but as a biography considers the monarch’s life and personality in much greater depth. Milani is a distinguished Iranian-American scholar, who has previously authored a number of books on Iran including an excellent biography of one of the Shah’s longest serving prime ministers, Amir Hoveyda. Although, as a young man Milani served time in the notorious Evin Prison for opposition to the Shah’s regime, he has nevertheless produced a remarkably insightful, nuanced, and objective biography. This powerful study fully captures the tragic irony of a modernizing monarch seeking to disregard the growing political sophistication of his subjects. In a strategy that would have been perfectly reasonable 150 years ago, the Shah felt society owed him a debt of gratitude for the economic progress and freedoms that he had “given them.” Iranians, touched by modernity, considered such freedoms to be only a small portion of what they regarded as their inalienable rights.

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Milani maintains that the Shah believed his monarchy could be a powerful force to push a traditional society into the modern age. The Shah promised to build a “Great Civilization” based on a modern economy, with Iran playing an important role in the world. Milani also agrees with the previous authors that the Shah became increasingly authoritarian in the later years of his regime due to a belief he had been politically strengthened by Iran’s economic progress. Milani views this issue as key to the Shah’s downfall. The contradiction Milani emphasizes is that modernity demands a knowledgeable citizenry. The Shah helped to create an Iranian middle class, which then sought some degree of political power. The Shah never convincingly articulated why this was unacceptable and did not make much of an effort to offer a serious theory of why monarchy was suited to Iran’s modern situation. Rather, he made the shallow claim that monarchy is a “natural system” which was deeply rooted in the “Iranian mindset” (275), which ironically he had helped to change. He attempted to use grandiose monuments and imposing public events, such as the 1971 Persepolis celebration of 2,500 years of monarchy, in lieu of offering a coherent argument that legitimized his rule.

According to Milani, the Shah was neither an efficient dictator, nor a believer in democratic empowerment willing to accept the constitutional constraints on his power. The Shah’s decision to back away from democratic reform appeared to be based on the quadrupling of oil prices. With this much money at his fingertips, the Shah felt he could buy loyalty with resources rather than by providing political rights. In cases where oppositionists were not won over by economic advances, the Savak secret police force was prepared to use an iron fist, although such instances were expected to be increasingly rare over time. Despite the Shah’s certainty, this strategy failed. A major reason was rampant corruption that flowed down from the Shah’s family to a network of officials throughout the country. Milani maintains capitalism needs security, rule of law, and the force of the market to flourish and develop. The middle classes that the Shah helped create from petrodollars wanted democracy and the opportunity to move forward without dealing with a massive and entrenched class of parasitic and corrupt officials.

Milani’s analysis vividly underscores the Shah’s ignorance of his own society. He believed that the clergy could never be the driving force behind the defeat of the monarchy. The Shah spoke of the clergy’s “little, empty, and antique” brains (295) and assumed that he could manipulate them to do what he wanted. In this regard, the Shah saw the clergy as an ally against communists and hoped to use religion to retard the growth of domestic Marxism, which he regarded as a greater threat than any the clergy could present. Such policies allowed the clergy and their nimble network of organizations an opportunity to expand and dominate the public domain. As the revolution moved forward, only the clergy were
able to organize and mobilize the population in ways that could actually challenge the regime. The Shah not only failed to see this problem coming, but refused to believe the mullahs really led the revolution even after it occurred.

In the Shah’s view the entire opposition movement was the result of a conspiracy of outside forces against him. He sometimes changed his mind about who masterminded the conspiracy, but he never wavered in his belief that foreign conspiracy was at root of the revolution. After flying over the massive demonstrations against him mentioned earlier, he met with British and American officials and informed them that he held their governments responsible. He ordered his top oil negotiators to give the West what it wanted to stop the revolution. Later in exile, the Shah indicated his belief that it was Soviet and Iranian communists who masterminded his fall. There was almost no foundation for this belief. The only master spy the KGB maintained in the Shah’s government was Iranian General Mogharebi who was uncovered and arrested in 1977. After his capture, the Soviets had virtually no serious assets in Iran. Milani maintains the KGB in Iran was a weak and often incompetent organization.

After the Shah fled Iran, his short time in exile before his death was abject misery. His leukemia continued to progress and very few countries were prepared to host him and thereby alienate the new Iranian government. Milani describes the ex-Shah as a “dying man, ‘un-kinged’ and hounded by terrorists,” who “was denied even the dignity of a quiet corner to die” (426). The outcome of the Iranian revolution was also tragic since the fall of the Shah’s regime led to a form of “clerical despotism” that was significantly more repressive than the rule of the Shah (434). People risking their lives on the street for democracy found themselves with a very different form of government. Milani sees this sad development as having occurred for a number of reasons. Beyond the organizational skills of the clergy and their status as authentically Iranian, Milani sees a brilliant strategy by Khomeini to conceal anti-democratic plans. He was also fortunate to have many Iranians project their own values upon his nebulous image. Khomeini hid his ultimate goal and true ideology and took on the guise of a democratic leader. Ironically, the decades-old ban on his books made them unavailable to Iranian readers or critics. Thus many of Khomeini’s most extreme ideas were unknown to the people in the streets challenging the Shah in his name. Milani notes the “strange reality that nearly all advocates of modernity formed an alliance against the Shah and chose as their leader the biggest foe of modernity” (436).

The Threat of Iranian Nuclear Weapons

Kenneth Pollack has produced a different kind of book on Iran, but it is also a work worthy of comment. Pollack’s book does not address the Iranian revolution but instead serves as an insightful and comprehensive analysis of the current debate over Iran’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons. This book is of such clear importance that one could desire that all U.S. policy-makers be required to read it before making any decisions on Iran, especially those relating to war. Pollack is a realistic and reasonable scholar who has put together a deeply thoughtful study, weighing various options open to the West regarding the problem of
Iranian nuclear weapons development. He provides an unvarnished overview of the current Iranian regime, which he considers rational but also “aggressive, anti-American, anti-status quo, anti-Semitic, duplicitous, and murderous” (302). Currently, Pollack favors a policy of containment directed at Iran, although he notes that military measures may become a better option in the future as circumstances change.

Pollack presents a strong case that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program, and not exclusively interested in civilian nuclear power. He notes that the Tehran leadership has been unable to explain why uranium enrichment plants are placed in deep underground shelters for a civilian program, nor why Tehran did not follow the more economical and conventional approach of importing enriched uranium from abroad to fuel their civil power reactor. The Iranians have likewise been unable to explain their preference for nuclear power as opposed to using their vast reserves of natural gas to meet domestic energy needs. Iran has only one functioning civilian nuclear power plant, a 1,000-megawatt reactor at Bushehr, which did not come on line until 2011. Tehran has shown only limited interest in developing more civilian power reactors, and instead is focused on a program of enrichment, which could eventually produce weapons grade uranium. According to Pollack, this approach is how a military program rather than a civilian program, is organized. He also notes that while Tehran has not yet sought to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), likely in fear that such action would provoke additional sanctions or even military attack.

One of the most refreshing aspects of this book is that Pollack’s tough-minded views on the Iranian regime have not led him to lose perspective and exaggerate the dangers presented by future Iranian possession of nuclear weapons. Rather, he states that such an outcome is to be avoided, while also declaring that, “[t]he world will not end the day after Iran detonates a nuclear warhead or acquires the wherewithal to break out of the NPT” (80). He further cautions against the temptation “to indulge our worst fears when it comes to the Iranian nuclear threat” (80). Pollack maintains that the United States and its Middle Eastern allies will face a serious problem if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, but this is a threat that can be managed without war in most circumstances. He further notes that there are different levels of nuclear proliferation and it is unclear at what level the current Iranian leadership could be contained if it approaches a nuclear capability. He suggests that Iran may be seeking a limited breakout capability, whereby the components for a nuclear weapon are in place and can be assembled on relatively short notice in time of crisis. This effort would probably take place in conjunction with an Iranian withdrawal from the NPT. A much more dangerous threat is that Iran would withdraw from the NPT and then deploy an array of deliverable nuclear weapons throughout the country.
These systems would then be in place during a crisis, and Iran could use them as a source of intimidation. Still, Pollack understands that the United States is vastly more powerful than Iran and that weaker states almost inevitably back down in situations of escalating dominance.

Pollack suggests that at the present time, the least appealing options for dealing with Iran may be military strikes by Israel, the United States, or both countries. According to Pollack, Israel cannot destroy Iran’s nuclear infrastructure with the conventional weapons in its current inventory. To set back the Iranian nuclear program significantly, Israel would have to destroy the hardened underground centrifuge plants at Natanz and Fordow, the latter of which appears invulnerable to Israeli conventional ordinance. If Israel attacked alone, the results would be limited, while Tehran would be able to renounce the NPT by using the strike as political cover. Such an attack would fatally undermine International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of Iranian nuclear power and international sanctions. Iran could also fire its non-nuclear ballistic missiles, although it is unclear what their targets would be and the amount of damage they could do. Covert Iranian attacks including cyberwarfare and terrorism could be assumed, although some US officials claim the West is “already at war with Iran” in the cyber domain, and oil prices could also rise dramatically (149).

Many of the same problems presented by an Israeli attack on Iran would also be present if the United States launched an air campaign against the Islamic Republic, though there would be key differences. Unlike Israel, the United States has the capability to present a much more serious threat to the Iranian nuclear infrastructure, and the outcome would be different in this kind of attack. The US Air Force has 30,000 pound conventional Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) bombs that can only be carried by large bombers, such as the B-2, which Israel does not possess. In a US attack against Iran, MOPs could potentially destroy the Fordow facility, but even this result remains uncertain. The Fordow enrichment plant may be hardened to the point that non-nuclear ordnance could not destroy it under any circumstances, potentially leaving this centerpiece of the Iranian program in place even in the aftermath of a forceful US conventional air attack.

Pollack notes that wars are inherently unpredictable and often evolve in ways their authors never intended. He suggests that US air strikes against Iran could start an escalatory process that ultimately pushes the United States into an invasion of that country. For example, if US air attacks failed to destroy all significant Iranian nuclear sites, Washington could be faced with abandoning the effort without meeting its goals or expanding the war. US leaders could also be hard pressed to end the war if key Iranian nuclear sites remained intact and Iranian missiles had scored an important victory akin to damaging a US aircraft carrier, resulting in significant loss of life. Beyond air strikes, a ground war with Iran, should it occur, is nevertheless a potential nightmare scenario. Iran’s conventional military may be small, weak, and technologically challenged, but it has treated resisting a US invasion as primary mission and is capable of inflicting meaningful casualties. Many more US ground forces would be required to subdue Iran, with its many paramilitary forces, than were used in the 2003-2011 Iraq War. Moreover, if the Iranian regime was ousted and the United States decided to occupy
the country, Pollack suggests that an occupation force of around 1.4 million troops would be needed, and that the ability of such a force to create any kind of meaningful future for the Iranian people remains in serious doubt.

In contrast to military strikes, Pollack supports a policy of containment, which he calls “the strategy that dare not speak its name” due to widespread hostility to the term. According to Pollack, “containment” has become confused with “appeasement” whereby the United States will confine itself to symbolic gestures that allow Iran to build and then expand a nuclear arsenal. He suggests this misunderstanding is unfortunate, and containment is a strategy to be applied when the United States does not want merely to appease a nation, but is also unwilling to attack and occupy it. Pollack states that while containment is often viewed as primarily defensive it also has offensive components. The United States has been practicing various forms of containment against Iran since 1979 and has employed both passive and assertive aspects of the strategy.

One of the key building blocks of a containment strategy is economic sanctions. Currently, there is extensive evidence of the impact of sanctions against Iran, though the economy is not in danger of collapse. Pollack admits that intensifying sanctions will be difficult. He suggests that so little is left for the vertical escalation of sanctions that any further intensification will need to focus on horizontal escalation that brings more countries into the effort. Another building block of containment is deterrence, including extended deterrence to protect US allies. This strategy includes deterrence by denial which involves convincing an adversary not to take an action because it is bound to fail to achieve its goal. There is also deterrence by punishment in which Iran is forced to pay a high price for serious acts of aggression. Pollack also notes that it will be critical to continue to develop and deploy theater defense missiles in the Middle East to help deter Iranian missile attacks by raising the possibility that they will be ineffective, while still inviting painful retaliation.

In one of the most controversial sections of this work, Pollack indicates that Western leaders may be able to negotiate a comprehensive deal with Iran, but would not obtain everything that they want. Pollack maintains that for the West to negotiate a solution with Iran “we are going to have to make concessions regarding the Iranian uranium enrichment program” (141). He states that Iran will not plausibly agree to do away with this capability altogether. Any negotiated settlement would therefore leave Iran with some breakout capability, particularly should it choose to withdraw from the NPT and refuse to accept international inspectors. For this reason, Pollack suggests that any deal with Iran should suspend, rather than eliminate, the sanctions. If the Iranians cheat on an international nuclear agreement, the mechanisms already established by the Security Council would move quickly to deprive the Iranians of all fruits of that agreement. Such a recommendation seems reasonable. The Iranian public has already responded with real hope to the limited relaxation of sanctions experienced under the interim nuclear agreement, and the prospect of returning to even tougher sanctions cannot help but demoralize the country no matter how often the leadership fulminates about self-sufficiency and steadfastness.
he Great War is fixed in collective memory as a war of rigid battle lines and trench warfare. However, it was far from so simple. It was marked by almost continuous open warfare on the Eastern Front, while the Western Front witnessed myriad phases including maneuver warfare, breakout strategies and battles of attrition. Additionally, few wars experienced so many Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMAs) entailing the employment of machineguns, airplanes, chemical warfare, and tanks. Strategic leaders were faced with a complex strategic dilemma: how to beat an ever adapting foe, and how to integrate and employ new technologies on the battlefield.

Yet, there was considerably more to this war than battlefield innovation. The First World War was a clash of empires that transformed societies, changed governments and even created new nations, such as Syria and Iraq. Despite the upheaval left behind by this terrible war, it is all but forgotten by large segments of society. Adding to this dilemma is that many of the books written about the Great War are dry histories focused on the movements of armies. Due in part to this, the First World War is an untapped subject with a potentially large audience, especially as we commemorate the centennial of this cataclysmic struggle. To fill this historiographical gap, dozens of books are being published to take advantage of a surge in interest in this often over-looked struggle. The focus of this review is to consider four of these books that address the causes and events that triggered the war.

**July 1914: Countdown to War**

Sean McMeekin’s *July 1914* is a rare addition to the new Great War Centennial books recently published. In *July 1914*, McMeekin grapples with the diplomatic and political machinations that led to the outbreak of this tragic war in an understandable and dramatic fashion. The book begins with the fateful assassination of the Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince, Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo by a Serbian nationalist. From that tragic beginning, McMeekin unveils how this triggered a European political crisis that led to the outbreak of the First World War.

*July 1914* literally gives a day by day description of each political move and countermove by the Europe’s five great powers. McMeekin takes the reader to London, Paris, Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg to hear the discussions, the political discourses, strategy and the hidden agendas of the Russian Czar, the French President, and the German Kaiser, the British King, the Austro-Hungarian Emperor and their chief diplomats. McMeekin personalizes these scenes with dialogues that come alive. Knowing the outcome of the July 1914 crisis, one feels frustrated at the many missed opportunities that could have averted war, while reading McMeekin’s well crafted scenes.
McMeekin also paints a chilling picture of the European political and social condition. As Europe rapidly heads on a collision course with war, two of the most important players, France and the United Kingdom were distracted by domestic events and because of this, miss the gravity of the July crisis. Throughout the month of July, the French were consumed by a sex/murder trial that reached to a former Prime Minister. Because of this, the French press and public took little note of Franz Ferdinand’s assassination and even less notice of the growing political crisis that culminated in the First World War.

Meanwhile, across the channel, McMeekin tells us that the UK was consumed by Ireland and discussions related “Home Rule.” Because of this, McMeekin implies that the British were slow to formulate a coherent diplomatic policy in approaching the July crisis. McMeekin also paints the British as being out of touch and pursuing a neutral approach to the troubles on the European Continent. Had the British declared a firm policy to defend the borders of Belgium early on, McMeekin implies, this would have been enough to deter German aggression. It was with this goal in mind that Czar Nicholas of Russia told the French Ambassador on July 20, “Unless she has gone out of her mind altogether, Germany will never attack Russia, France and England combined.” (McMeekin, 148). Yet, the British remained circumspect and coy about their policy until it was too late.

The central theme for McMeekin’s book is that Germany was not responsible for the war. He sums up this point by saying, “…far from ‘willing the war,’ the Germans went into it kicking and screaming as the Austrian noose snapped shut around their necks” (McMeekin, 405). He goes on to place the preponderance of the blame on Russia and its July 25, partial military mobilization order. Although this is not new scholarship, and assigning guilt for who actually started the war is up for debate, McMeekin does a fine job of making his case, although, downplaying German guilt via its “blank check” to support the Austro-Hungarians in whatever course they pursued.

McMeekin’s description of the diplomatic maneuverings is gripping and he does a superb job of making a complex confusing story understandable. Adding to this readable prose is that the book contains considerable research outside North America. One of the biggest criticisms of American scholarship is the research rarely includes documentation from European archives. McMeekin, residing in Istanbul, has used his geographic location to craft a well-researched book. However, there are some reasons for caution when reading the book. From a scholastic point of view, its weakness is the dearth of endnotes. McMeekin provides engaging dialogue between the key European leaders and diplomats throughout the book. Yet, he averages only one endnote per page. This leaves the reader wondering just how much is actual history and how much is speculation, or his filling the gaps to tell an interesting
story. With this caution, *July 1914* is worth reading by strategic leaders who can see how domestic distractions (as in the case of the UK and France) can blind a nation to impending doom and, even more so, how personal relationships can make the difference between peace and war.

**The War that Ended Peace**

Margaret MacMillan’s book, *The War that Ended Peace*, is yet another attempt to understand the factors that led to the outbreak of the First World War. MacMillan’s approach is rigorous and convincing as she describes the diplomatic, political, military, economic and societal environment of Europe and the United States during the decade (or more) before 1914. The book opens with the 14 April 1900 Paris Universal Exposition and the excitement that it signified for a prosperous and peaceful future. MacMillan uses this event to describe in some detail what message each national display at the expo is sending to Europe and the world. For example, we are told that the Austrian pavilion was opulent and regal, signifying the rich history of the Hapsburg dynasty, while the German display denoted some level of exhilaration at being Europe’s newest power, while, tastefully hinting at a naval rivalry with Great Britain (which would be a chief contributor to the UK’s participation in the war).

*The War that Ended Peace* builds upon the promise and excitement of the 1900 Paris Expo to describe that much of Europe’s elite viewed itself as sophisticated, believing “...that a general war was simply inconceivable in the modern world.” (27) Europe’s elite had every reason to embrace the idea that state-on-state war was a thing of the past on the continent as the nations were economically interdependent. Most experts at the time agreed. MacMillan drives this point home by paraphrasing a prewar writer, “...even if Europe was so foolish as to go to war, the resulting economic chaos and domestic misery would rapidly force the warring nations to negotiate peace.” (634)

Yet, despite the elite’s belief that war in Europe was obsolete, MacMillan brilliantly illustrates that not everything was as it seemed. Rather, imperial interests tended to clash with those of the other powers. One example is how the Austro-Hungarians sought to dominate the lands in southeastern Europe lost by the receding power of the Ottomans. Yet, the Russians would not sit idly by as the Austro-Hungarian Empire overran vast regions of Slavs, of whom Russia saw itself as the supreme protector (in addition to Moscow’s obsession with securing a warm water port). Such rivalry triggered several Balkan Wars and foretold the eventuality of a larger European war.

Then, there was the rise of Imperial Germany that began in 1870. Although new to the European power game, Germany quickly snatched
up swathes of colonial land in Africa, Asia and the Pacific. In an impres-
sively short period of time, Germany constructed a navy seemingly
destined to uproot the UK’s role as the dominant seapower. Although
at the pinnacle of its power, the United Kingdom felt threatened by
the increasing militaristic policies of Germany as well as the bombastic
rhetoric of its Kaiser. *The War That Ended Peace* describes this dilemma:
“Political scientists might say that the fact Germany and Britain found
themselves on the opposite sides in the Great War was foreordained, the
result of the clash between a major power feeling its advantage slip away
and a rising challenger. Such transitions are rarely managed peacefully”
(58).

Despite such brilliant insight, MacMillan’s book warrants caution.
At times, the author interjects a curt paragraph attempting to compare
some event or circumstance from the pre-war geo-political situation
with a contemporary issue. An example is when MacMillan unconvinc-
ingly compares the Austrian response to the 1914 assassination of Franz
Ferdinand with how the United States and United Kingdom responded
to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The logic of such a comparison is difficult to
grasp. Such attempts by the author to compare a pre-1914 event to some-
thing in modern times were unconvincing and seemingly an attempt to
vent a leftist political view rather than providing relevant insight to her
argument. Such forays into fancy detracted from an otherwise excel-
lent and well-researched book. Another concern is the author tends to
gloss over the ramifications of the United Kingdom’s incoherent foreign
policy in the crisis leading up to the war. Arguably, had the British
declared early they would stand by France and not tolerate an invasion
of Belgium, they would have deterred the Kaiser, as the German plan
was contingent upon British neutrality. Yet, MacMillan, though willing
to make illogical leaps in comparing Franz Ferdinand’s assassination to
9/11, fails to provide any insight into the ramifications of British prewar
diplomacy. Most scholars agree, had London declared a firm policy early
in July 1914, perhaps the greater European war could have been avoided.

The Sleepwalkers

*The Sleepwalkers* is yet another retelling
of how the European powers stumbled
into the Great War. Christopher Clark does
a superb job making sense of the complexi-
ties leading to the war. Simply put, Clark
tells us that there is no easy explanation
as to how sophisticated European leaders
unleashed a torrent of carnage across the
continent. Yet, *Sleepwalkers* weaves together
a story of intrigue and diplomatic failures
going back several decades, and helps the
reader grapple with how Europe ended up
in a bloody world war in 1914.

*Sleepwalkers* begins not in 1914 Sarajevo,
as many such works do, but rather in 1903 in
Belgrade where Serb military officers assassinate their king and unleash
a coup. Thus, begins the road to Sarajevo. Yet, there is more to the book
than trouble in the Balkans. Clark desires the reader understand the
geo-strategic environment that set the conditions for the First World War. In particular, *Sleepwalkers* points to three key events that radically affected the balance of power in Europe and played the central role in setting the conditions for global conflict.

The first, according to Clark, was the German victory over France in the 1870 Franco-Prussian War. The defeat motivated France to seek every opportunity to “contain” Germany. This aim, according to *Sleepwalkers*, ultimately caused the bi-polarization of Europe, with everything hinging on Russia. Early on, this delicate balance of power was brilliantly managed by Germany’s First Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, who recognized the danger inherent in a multipolar Europe operating from a bipolar point of reference. However, his retirement in 1890, combined with increasingly bombastic behavior from Kaiser Wilhelm II, put Germany in a precarious state, and prevented it from pulling Russia into its camp. Instead, France prevailed, and generously gave Russia money to modernize its army and national infrastructure with this, Paris could count on Russian help if it came to another war with Germany.

The second key event *Sleepwalkers* suggests was the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War. The war was a crushing defeat for the Czar, and blunted his ambitions in the Far East. St. Petersburg then focused its attention on the Balkans, which, according to Clark, amplified its importance in 1914.

The third key event was the 1911 Italian-Turkish War, which Rome used to wrestle Libya and other colonies from the Ottoman Empire. The war was the signal to the Balkan’s diverse ethnic groups to move against the Ottomans. Clark sees a direct correlation between the Italian-Turkish conflict and the Balkan Wars that forever changed European geopolitical strategy.

Clark brilliantly weaves together how international relations, regional conflict and the problem of the security dilemma conspired to draw Europe into a catastrophic war. His linkages to national strategy and current events are among the best of any book on the causes of the Great War. Yet, Clark goes on to demonstrate that, even on the brink of war, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, could have prevented or contained the conflagration. However, Grey failed to demarcate British policy clearly regarding an invasion of Belgium. Clark agrees with most modern scholarship that, had Grey done so, the Germans would not have attacked France and the conflict would have been another regional conflict instead of a world war. A century later, national leaders still struggle with telegraphing clear foreign policy goals in the face of aggression. The lesson from *Sleepwalkers* is prevarication and lack of clarity when facing disturbances to the international order could cause events to rapidly spin out of control.

The Making of the First World War

*The Making of the First World War* does not fit well with the previous books discussed. Beckett is less concerned with the causes of the Great War, and instead focuses on the seminal events or decisions that shaped nations and societies during and after the war. Despite this divergence from the causes of the war, the book includes several chapters related to the beginnings of this cataclysmic conflict worthy of discussion.
The Making of the First World War begins with a forgotten major decision in Belgium. Dubbing it a turning point of the war, Beckett brilliantly recounts the circumstances and effects of the Belgium decision to flood the Flemish plain between Nieuport and Dixmude. This act, Beckett argues, prevented the Germans from advancing to the channel ports and thereby ensured the survival of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF).

Beckett’s chapter on the Ottoman Empire covers an event that shaped the early half of the war. Here, the author argues the 11 June 1913 assassination of the Turkish Minister of War, Mahmud Sevîk Pasha, set the conditions for the Ottomans to join the war due to the elevation of a pro-German faction in the government. Beckett then suggests this single act prolonged the war by two years by having the Ottoman Empire enter the fray on Germany’s side.

The final chapter in The Making of the First World War related to the beginning of the conflict contends with the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Focusing the discourse largely on Emperor Franz Joseph, who Beckett says, represents the legacy of his empire in many ways. Yet, despite ruling over a vast, and diverse population, Franz Joseph is portrayed quite fatalistic when he decided to lead his empire to war, saying, “If the monarchy has to perish, then it shall perish honorably” (115). Perish it did, thanks in large part to the “war-mongering” of Franz Conrad von Hötzentoff, the Austrian army’s Chief of Staff. Perhaps more than any member of Franz Josephs’ cabinet, Hötzentoff is described as pushing the emperor into war. Beckett describes von Hötzentoff as a fanatical adherent of Social Darwinism, who zealously believed the empire would prevail due to its superior culture and education.

In the remainder of the book, Beckett does a superb job describing other transformational events or experiences that shaped various regions and nations. This includes a brilliant chapter on Australia’s identity, the Russian Revolution, the Balfour Declaration and the rise of Israel, and several other interesting topics. The book, however, has its challenges. I was disappointed by the lack of academic rigor as evidenced by a dearth of endnotes, averaging only one per page. Also disappointing was the lack of more expansive international research, normally not an issue with a British author.

Compounding these deficiencies is there are too many chapters related to the United Kingdom’s experience in the war (four dedicated solely to this); while there are none on France or Italy. One of the four chapters was on the impact of the “First Public Screening of The Battle of the Somme. Although ascetically interesting, the chapter floundered and made one wonder if there were not more significant strategic events that should have been in this book rather than this one. Furthermore, Beckett ignores the importance of the Canadian contribution and how their war experience forged a national identity arguably more than the
Australian experience at Gallipoli. Beckett lost a chance to discuss the Canadians at Vimy, or how they spearheaded the BEF offensive during the 100 Days Campaign of 1918. Canadian historians often assert that British writers downplay their contribution to the war, and Beckett seems to carry on that tradition by completely ignoring them.

Conclusion

The offerings arriving on the bookshelves during the Centennial of the First World War includes a mix of serious academic studies, to lighter dramatic presentations of the causes and triggers of how the struggle began. To be sure, the public has a great opportunity to grapple with the legacy of the First World War, which arguably we are still living with today. From the creation of Syria and Iraq, to the demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, to the application of airpower, to the mechanization of warfare, that cataclysmic experience has changed the modern world. Each of these works contributes to giving the public an opportunity to appreciate how the Great War shaped our world. It is my earnest desire that these books breathe renewed interest on both sides of the Atlantic in this important epoch of world history.
Encyclopedic in scope and inductive in method, Sir Lawrence Freedman’s grand volume: *Strategy: A History*, presents the fruits of a life-long exploration into the meaning and utility of the concept of strategy. In many respects an intellectual voyage of discovery, Freedman begins by describing the evolution of strategy through its pre-Napoleonic history and then, in turns, explores its development and use in three distinct provinces: military, revolutionary-political, and business-corporate. In the grand tradition of his British predecessors who wrote during the age of exploration, Freedman casts a perceptive and discerning eye on the territory he surveys. The result is a trove of keen observations and insights owing much for its success to Freedman’s lucid and engaging prose.

While acknowledging the word “strategy” did not come into common usage until the early part of the nineteenth century, Freedman takes the view that strategy in the sense of “practical problem-solving” is as old as history (72). He thus begins his excursion (Part I) with observations on the interrelationships bordering communities of chimpanzees; proceeds to review examples of strategy in the Hebrew Bible and the world of Classical Greece; reviews the canonical texts of Sun Tzu and Machiavelli and completes his examination of the origins of strategy with a review of Milton’s *Paradise Lost*. A clear dichotomy emphasized throughout this opening section and one reappraised to good effect in other sections of the book is the difference between strategies based on force and strategies based on guile; in other words – strategies of strength or strategies of cunning.1 Subsequently, however, particularly after considering the advent of the *levée en masse*, Freedman concludes “[o]nce warfare moved to mass armies with complex organizations, there would be limits to what could be achieved by means of guile. The emphasis would be on force” (65).

And so in Part II, “Strategies of Force,” the modern history of military strategy is charted beyond way-points recognized by students: decisive battle; wars of annihilation or attrition; maneuver; the indirect approach; deterrence; guerilla warfare; counterinsurgency and a myriad of others. Here, as well, broader concepts such as geopolitics; continental, maritime, naval and air power; and game theory with its special relationship to nuclear strategy, are also analyzed. Although the main contours are familiar terrain, the history and theory covered in this section are viewed frequently from a unique vantage point revealing fresh insights. An example is the observation that, while Clausewitz recognized the

1 This dichotomy also is highlighted in Charles Hill, *Grand Strategy: Literature, Statecraft, and World Order* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010)
subordination of war to policy, the prevailing assumption at that time was “a political victory would naturally follow a military victory” and further “[i]f the assumption was wrong, then strategy’s focus on military affairs was insufficient” (94). The point is prescient with a continuing relevance to modern day strategic challenges.

In Part III, “Strategies from Below,” Freedman chronicles in detail the political strategies of radicals and revolutionaries including Marx, Gandhi, Che Guevara and others. In the American domestic political context he surveys the political strategies of Martin Luther King, the Civil Rights movement, as well as other individuals and causes over the last several decades. While decidedly underdogs in the political process, each individual or group struggled to mobilize political forces in efforts to cause radical change or overthrow existing political elites and make a claim on political power. For most national security professionals, this section represents less familiar terrain made more challenging by the surfeit of biographical detail that at times clouds more salient perspectives on strategy. Nevertheless, some essential points relevant to strategy in any context may be gleaned. Among them is the significance of marshaling popular opinion in support of an ideological or political strategy, by means of, as Freedman notes (quoting Harold Lasswell) “the management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols” (339). This point has modern echoes in discussions over “strategic narratives.” Freedman ends this section with some poignant observations about electoral politics in the United States and the party strategies related to the “permanent campaign.”

In the final section of field observations Part IV “Strategy from Above” Freedman surveys the extensive literature on business strategy noting the volume of this literature now exceeds that on military strategy. The search for strategy in business, based on the developing “science of management” throughout the 1950s and 1960s, led to the relentless pursuit of optimal solutions based on mathematical precision and calculation. Strategic planning became paramount in large corporations. Later, when results based on strict rationality proved less satisfactory than expected, a backlash against rigid planning models ensued. In a vignette reflecting this changed view, Freedman cites former General Electric CEO Jack Welch, who cited approvingly a letter to the editor in Fortune magazine condemning strategic planning as an “endless quest by managers for a paint-by-numbers approach, which would automatically give them answers” (504). Subsequent popular approaches to applying the strategic lessons of history’s great military commanders to the business environment (The Leadership Secrets of Attila the Hun, for example) also seemed to deliver less than advertised as the basis for sound business strategies.

It is in the final chapter of this section where we begin to see, having explored the nature of strategy in three distinct areas, the process of induction moving us from observation to generalization. Referring to an article by Henry Mintzberg and James Waters, Freedman identifies a major dichotomy in the field of business strategy as that “between deliberate or emergent strategies” (554). Is strategy a rationally calcu-

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lated plan, developed at higher echelons and provided to subunits for implementation, or, rather, a product of fluid decision-making described by Mintzberg and Waters as “a pattern in a stream of decisions[?]” Freedman’s answer to this question is one of the central themes of the book and is therefore worth tracking in some detail.

As early as the book’s opening epigram, the offhandish quote from the heavyweight prize-fighter Michael Tyson: “Everyone has a plan ‘till they get punched in the mouth” (ix), the reader is aware of the author’s skepticism for likening strategy to a calculated plan. This theme winds throughout the main sections of the book - throughout the fields of military, political and business strategy. From von Moltke’s famous dictum, “no plan survives contact with the enemy” (104) to Jack Welsh’s dismissal (noted above) of efforts to fashion a “paint-by-number” approach to strategy, Sir Lawrence Freedman casts doubt on the idea of strategy as the prescriptive result of a rational calculation and direction. Indeed, titles of several of the book’s chapters: “The False Science”; “The Myth of the Master Strategist”; and “Formulas, Myths and Propaganda”, indicate a central objective of Freedman’s book: to de-mythologize the idea of strategy as a master plan. By the end of the book, having observed this to be the case in those domains visited, Freedman concludes: “The various strands of literature examined in this book all began confidently with a belief that given the right measures demanding objectives could be achieved on a regular basis. […] In all three cases, experience undermined the foundations of this confidence” (608).

Sir Lawrence Freedman identifies two basic obstacles to strategy as a rational progression of deliberate steps: the essentially conflictual nature of the strategic environment, and the role of chance and unpredictability. On the first point, given that strategy typically involves interaction with willful opponents or competitors, predicting how they will act/react introduces a significant element of uncertainty into strategic calculation. Further, as the second point suggests, chance and unpredictability bedevil any future-oriented efforts to plan and act. Taken together, these points call into question the very nature of strategic planning and strategy making.

Is strategy then an illusion, “not worth an empty eggshell,” as suggested by the ant-strategist Leo Tolstoy (98)? Counseling skepticism, but not fatalism, Freedman’s answer seems to be “not necessarily.” Although difficult, and demonstrably not the result of a perfectly rational process, strategy, Freedman concludes, is still important and necessary. He counsels: “…we have little choice but to identify a way forward dependent on human agency which might lead to a good outcome. It is as well to avoid illusions of control, but in the end all we can do is act as if we can influence events. To do otherwise is to succumb to fatalism” (622). In this respect, Freedman’s answer to the question of whether strategy is a deliberate or emergent process reflects Mintzberg’s view: “strategy formation walks on two feet, one deliberate, the other emergent” (555). Seen in this light, the simple shorthand of strategists: the ends-ways-means construct, appears too linear and must be grounded in a broader understanding of chance, contingency, and uncertainty. We are reminded of Murray and Grimsley’s observation on Clausewitz’s remarkable trinity (emotion, chance, and reason). “Although Clausewitz
intended this trinity to describe the nature of armed conflict, it applies with equal relevance to the conduct of strategy in peace as well as war.”3 The creative strategist is thus free to roam throughout the realms of chance and probability, all the while focused on strategy as an instrument of policy.

Like any good volume on exploration, Freedman’s *Strategy* is full of suggestions for profitable follow-on voyages. One such potentially productive route for exploration is Freedman’s association of strategy and power. In the book’s preface he provides a brief definition of strategy as a political art: “the art of creating power” (xii). In political science, “power” is a fundamentally contested concept with understandings ranging from “power over resources” to “power over outcomes.” Freedman recognizes this essential distinction in a discussion of revolutionary politics (372-373) but a more detailed discussion of power, and strategy as the art of creating power, could have been beneficial. Indeed, in previous work, Freedman focused on the relationship of power and strategy to good effect.4 Tellingly, in this work, in addition to examining the concept of power, Freedman defined strategy as “the art of creating power to obtain the maximum political objectives using available military means.”5 Given the scope of the book under review, a working definition of strategy as “the art of creating power to obtain the maximum ______ objectives,” where the blank might be filled in alternately with the words military, political, or economic, would seem fitting. Adding the concept of objectives to the definition precludes criticism that strategy as simply “creating power” would amount to no more than a purposeless accumulation of resources. Recognizing at an early point the conception of strategy in this book is “governed by the starting point, and not the end point” (xi), it nevertheless seems that strategy requires both. In fact, Freedman concludes as much later in the book when discussing strategy as a process of managing emerging variables: “[t]his does not mean that it is easy to manage without a view of a desired end state. Without some sense of where the journey should be leading it will be difficult to evaluate alternative outcomes” (611). The central idea of strategy that emerges from the book is one that is part plan, part process - a combination of rational calculation and adaptation to evolving conditions. This notion is summarized agreeably in the letter to *Fortune* magazine quoted by Jack Welch and noted by Freedman: “Strategy was not a lengthy action plan. It was the evolution of a central idea through continually changing circumstances” (504).

*Strategy: A History*, is a grand exploration and at times takes the reader through uncharted terrain. The book’s concluding chapters (Part V, “Theories of Strategy”) offer not so much theories of strategy making derived through inductive observation, but rather thoughts on how recent scholarship in cognitive psychology and philosophy might help frame scripts or strategic narratives useful in advancing the process of making strategy. Here, as throughout, the observations are keen and suggest many areas for potentially productive follow-up. Early in the book,

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5 Ibid., 283.
observing that “apes were astute when it came to working out power balances” (8), Freedman suggests forming coalitions is a time-honored and effective strategic approach. Given his focus on the relationship between strategy and power, additional work on the concept of balance of power, and its importance in strategy particularly, would be useful.

For the arm-chair traveler (or arm-chair strategist, as the case may be) Sir Lawrence Freedman’s voyage of discovery through the world of strategy is enriching and thought-provoking. One hopes he remains intrepid and continues to help fill the “blank spots” on our mental maps. One such important spot that receives increased attention is the province of “grand strategy.” Should Freedman embark to explore this domain one would be tempted to sign on as a deckhand.

**The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective**  
By Hew Strachan

Reviewed by Dr. Richard Swain, COL US Army Retired, Lawton, OK

This book, a collection of papers composed over a ten-year period, is subject to multiple legitimate readings. Some British reviewers have seen it simply as a critique of contemporary British and American military policy. However, the theme announced by the author, the Chichele Professor of the History of War at Oxford, is an exploration of “strategy, what we understand by it, and how that understanding has changed” (4). That seems to be the proper basis for evaluation.

Strachan indicts Huntington’s *Soldier and the State* with corrupting professional-political dialog in both the United States, where he acknowledges it may reflect Constitutional norms, and in the United Kingdom, where he argues it does not (76-77). Indeed, much of the book is engaged with criticism of institutional arrangements for strategy formulation in the United Kingdom and United States. Not surprisingly, the author is better informed about the complexities of the former than the latter; he probably overstates the influence of the Weinberger and Powell doctrines, while understating the role of the National Security Council system and the effects of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. He undergirds his arguments with what he sees as a corrective to an overly Anglophone reading of Clausewitz (5) and Thucydides (257).

The most prominent idea in the *Direction of War* is the argument that the understandings of policy and strategy have become so confused the distinction between them has been lost, largely to the detriment of strategic practice. In part, this confusion has been the result of the intensification of wars in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, critically in the First World War, when the higher direction of war in the form of grand strategy came to comprehend the mobilization of all national (and allied) means in pursuit of military victory. This result was compounded after the Second World War by the speculative theoretical flights of deterrence theorists, mostly American academics.
The greatest insight in Strachan's argument lies precisely in his separation of policy and strategy as distinct and diverging influences with often conflicting logics, both of which must be accommodated by the policy maker and strategist. He does this first by pointing to the need to set strategy in the context of the adversarial nature of war; doing so corrects for what he indicts as overemphasis on the instrumental function of war derived from Clausewitz's statement that “war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means” which first appears in a Note of 10 July 1827 and later in Book I, “On the Nature of War.” This is not, he reminds us, “a statement about the nature of war.” It is a statement about the use of war, something made clearer, he feels, in Book VIII, “War Plans.” He then expands on this point with the Policy-Politics distinction, more or less glossed by Clausewitz's use of the German term **Politik** for both. “Politics,” he reminds us, “are inherently adversarial… Policy has a more unilateral thrust… a policy… remains a statement of one government's intent… War,” he concludes, “is therefore no longer the unilateral application of policy but the product of reciprocal exchanges between diverging policies” (13).

In short, Strachan restores competitive reciprocity to the practice of national strategy, which, in turn, accounts for the unpredictability of strategic outcomes that reflect not the logical extension of one's own efforts but the sum of conflicting efforts of all actors to achieve diverging goals. Later, looking back at Winston Churchill and Alan Brooke in World War II, he observes that the policy maker and strategist must be concerned with “what to do each day in the light of that day's events, of the situation on the ground and of real-time intelligence” (242-243). Evolving strategic possibilities can require changes in policy even as they conform with it. The effect of this on policy makers should be increased modesty about the predictability of strategic effects; and on strategists, increased attention to the need for continuous reassessment and adjustment, notably something Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen addressed in his March 3, 2010 Landon Lecture at Kansas State University.

A collection of related essays does not a treatise make and it is probably a mistake to read this one as though it does. Written over time, for diverse purposes, the essays may address common themes, but even reworking does not remove discontinuities in thought that result from new insights or limitations imposed by the essay form. Strachan is surely right to point out that the instrumental use of war suggested in Clausewitz's note of 1827, and Book I of *On War*, has sometimes been misunderstood as a statement of some organic condition rather than a requirement for war's rational use. In a more comprehensive treatment, the author might be free to begin with deeper reflection on the implicit distinction between strategy as a noun, defined more or less as a program or pattern of actions intended to achieve some purpose, associated as it must be with a predictive theory of success; and strategy (-making) as an activity or verb, sensitive to the fluid and unpredictable outcome of the clash of opposing wills and actions by multiple actors.

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This is the distinction, after all, which creates the contrast the author highlights between On War’s Book I and the discussion of war-making in Book VIII, both of which include the “instrumental” insight of the 1827 note.

American readers should take seriously Strachan’s critique of Huntington’s half-century old thesis on civil military relations, in light of the quarter-century experience with the results of the Goldwater-Nichols Act within the NSC System. Finally, a great deal of thought must be given about whether the notion of strategy can still be limited to the use of military forces, on which Strachan insists, or whether, as a practical matter, the concept has been more expansive for over a century and is likely to remain so because of the requirements of contemporary and future conflicts. It is notable the Lawrence Freedman’s recent book Strategy, A History (Oxford, 2013) considers the applicability of the idea in business writing, perhaps clarifying the concept by generalizing its use.

This collection is in many ways a journal of the author’s own journey of learning over a ten-year period in which he moved from the writing of traditional military history to the role of policy advisor. It is a valuable book that succeeds in reframing the idea of strategy and offers numerous insights into its practice in the direction of war.
Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War
By Robert M. Gates

Reviewed by Dr. Steven Metz, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute

Duty is Robert Gates’ second volume of memoirs and covers his time as Secretary of Defense in the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations. Few people are better versed in how Washington works (or doesn’t work) than Gates. He spent twenty-seven years in the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Council before becoming the only Secretary of Defense asked to stay in office when the White House changed hands between political parties. Because of this, the book’s released caused a major stir, particularly in Washington.

Gates’ anger and unvarnished opinions about senior policymakers and elected officials, including some still holding office drew the most initial attention. While he respects the two presidents he served, Gates indicts Washington’s hyperpartisan climate in general and Congress in particular which he describes as “Uncivil, incompetent in fulfilling basic constitutional responsibilities (such as time appropriates), micromanage-rial, parochial, thin-skinned, [and] often putting self (and reelection) before country.” He is particularly disdainful of Senator Harry Reid, Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi, and Vice President Joe Biden, at times resorting to unnecessary low blows as when he sarcastically writes that Biden “presumed to understand how to make CT (counterterrorism) work better than Stan (McChrystal)” even though Biden was talking about policy and strategy and General McChrystal’s expertise was at the operational level of war.

Like any memoir, Duty does not weigh all sides of the story equally but concentrates on explaining Gates’ position on key issues, particularly the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. One theme that will appeal to military readers was Gates’ fierce dedication to the men and women in uniform, particularly those in combat zones. Time after time he excoriates the Department of Defense for its preoccupation “with planning, equipping, and training for future major wars with other nation-states, while assigning lesser priority to current conflicts and other forms of conflict, such as irregular or asymmetric war.” At times this compelled him to take things into his own hands. He proudly recounts his efforts at forcing improvements in the care of wounded warriors and jamming through production of Mine Resistant, Ambush Protected (MRAP) armored fighting vehicles and increased intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.

The crush of managing two wars and the daily operations of one of the world’s largest and most complex organizations left Gates little time for broad questions about American strategy. But there is also no indication in Duty that he would have done so even if given the opportunity. For all of his talents, Secretary Gates was not a strategic visionary. For instance, there is no indication that he seriously questioned the assumptions that justified US involvement in Afghanistan even during
the Obama administration’s major review of US strategy. Gates, like the rest of the administration, accepted the idea that without a major American effort, the Taliban would regain control over large parts or all of Afghanistan and again provide a base for al Qaeda; and that al Qaeda wanted to restore its base in Afghanistan, and having this would increase the chances it would pull off another September 11-level attack on the United States or US targets abroad. The failure to scrutinize the basic assumptions of American strategy (or to mention such scrutiny if it did take place) is a puzzling omission since by the time of the Obama strategic review, much of the American public and Congress had begun to doubt whether the security gained by US military involvement justified the monetary and blood costs. There are times when policymakers must grapple with big strategic issues rather than the most immediate ones. This did not happen while Gates was Defense Secretary.

While Gates did succeed in holding off congressional pressure and buying additional time for his military commanders, the fact that neither Iraq nor Afghanistan are likely to be seen as strategic victories for the United States should send a stark message to the US military. The United States treated its conflict with a transnational, nonstate enemy as a war less because doing so was most effective than because the military was the most powerful tool available. This problem has not gone away. Today the United States remains organized to use its high-tech and high-quality forces to fight relatively short, politically unambiguous campaigns against other conventional militaries. It is not organized to fight transnational nonstate enemies, whether ideological ones like al Qaeda or criminal syndicates, even though every indication is that this sort of conflict will persist. Gates understood this but there was little he could do other than implore the rest of the US government, particularly the State Department, to provide additional resources for Iraq and Afghanistan.

Through herculean and even heroic efforts, Gates helped prevent Iraq and Afghanistan from becoming utter fiascos. He was not, however, able to turn them into strategic successes or do more than nudge the Department of Defense in a new direction. But then no one else could have, and probably no one could have done more to stave off disaster than Gates did. The Department of Defense and American national security strategy were not demonstrably better after his leadership, but they also were no worse. Ultimately, Duty holds grim but important lessons for the Army’s current and future strategic leaders: they will face a hyperpartisan political climate and missions that devolve to the military less because it is designed for them than because it is the least bad option. As they read Gates’ memoirs—and all should—most will share his anger and frustration but, like Gates himself, most will also be determined to make the best of it they can.
First, understand that this is a book about a unique form of leadership at the strategic level, in the words of the author a “generic political phenomenon seemingly never to have been systematically studied and which remains a neglected – indeed, virtually an unrecognized – topic of scholarly investigation and analysis.”

Thus, as the title states, the author’s attempt is to provide such a systematic inquiry into the role of our “proconsuls,” Skirting scholarly debates about an American empire while using their language, he further defines: “the core of the proconsular function is political-military leadership…that in the best of cases rises to statesmanship; its chief challenge is the coordination of civil and military authority in the periphery and the alignment with political-military leadership at the center.” Few authors could attempt such a broad inquiry into uncharted scholarship, but Professor Lord is imminently qualified to do so, and as we shall see, does so with remarkably fine results. With two earned doctorates (Yale-classics; Cornell-political science), over a decade in the national-security policy arena in Washington in the 1980s and 1990s (National Security Council; Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs; Distinguished Fellow at the National Defense University), and three previous books in the field, he was uniquely qualified for such an inquiry.

While the background is drawn from Rome, the focus of the book is clearly on America as a modern democracy and great power – “an effort has been made to include at least some discussion of all of the most important figures who can plausibly be identified as proconsuls in the properly functional sense of the term, from Spanish-American War to the present [2012].” The most prominent among them are General Leonard Wood and William Howard Taft in Cuba and the Philippines in the early twentieth century; MacArthur in the Philippines, Japan, and Korea from 1936-1951; General Lucius Clay in Germany in the late 1940’s; the intelligence operative Edward Lansdale in the Philippines and Vietnam in the early 1950s; Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and General Maxwell Taylor in Vietnam in the early 1960s; General Creighton Abrams, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and William Colby in Vietnam in the late 1960 and early 1970s; General Wesley Clark in the Balkans in the late 1990s; Ambassador L. Paul Bremer in Iraq in 2003-04; and General David Petraeus in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2006 [to 2011].

Each era, along with its American proconsuls, is presented in the richly documented detail expected from an eminent scholar and practitioner of our national security affairs. But to this reader it is not the individual analyses that are most informative for our work today and into the future. Rather, it is the synthesis that Professor Lord brings in the final chapter(s) when he gets to the “so what?” question: “Is proconsular leadership a good thing?” His main conclusion is unremarkable in
its barest statement—“...that delegated political-military leadership had been a significant independent variable in American national security decision-making from the end of the nineteenth century to the present; or more simply stated, that it has made a strategic difference.” But when he develops this thesis in two broad directions by drawing from the chapters of research, we see the major contribution of his endeavor in the book.

First, with respect to individual proconsuls the author presents what he considers to be a “respectable balance sheet”—“It reflects, above all, the high caliber of these men and others like them who have served the American Republic in high office since the nation’s emergence as a great power. They were more than mere imperial functionaries. Though not lacking in personal ambition, they were both American patriots and change agents who seized opportunities available to them to shape or steer national policy in the best interests of the United States and what it stands for. In this regard they exercised leadership in the proper sense of that term.”

After enjoying the more recent and familiar eras on that balance sheet—Clark in Kosovo; Bremer in Iraq; Petraeus in the Middle East—and setting them alongside the less familiar—MacArthur in the Far East; Clay in Germany, and Lodge, et al. in Vietnam—it strikes me that the author is a bit too generous in his overall assessment. In contrast, his individual assessments are correctly negative in several cases, well-documented and convincingly analyzed.

But it is the second broad direction in which he generalizes that I believe most readers will find very fruitful insights for the current period of defense reductions and beyond. In his discussion of whether or not the institutions, cultures, and processes of national security decision-making and policy implementation, and particularly as they enable the proconsular role, are as functional as they might be, he strongly reinforces the current consensus. He ruefully notes that while proconsular leadership in the proper sense of the term seems to call for unity of command in the field, the fundamental problem facing American proconsuls is that political and military decision making have long been institutionally split, and still remain so even after the Goldwater-Nichols reforms of 1986. Here Professor Lord is quite correctly critical, indeed skeptical, in his assessment: “There is no easy solution to his problem.” That said, however he does include a very thoughtful set of ruminations on the urgent necessity to rethink fundamentally the role of our regional unified commands, and as well the often-adapted Unified Command Plan which defines them.

While no book can be extended to all of the logical implications of its main thesis, I find one omission to be worth noting. Given his own experiences and the richness of the research into individual proconsuls, their successes and failure, it would have been helpful for Professor Lord to have advanced his own ideas on the needed professional development of such future leaders, both civilian and military. To this reader, it is but one more area in which Professor Lord’s conclusion is apt: “Suffice it to say, proconsular leadership, which so plainly offers danger as well as opportunity, is an instrument in need of adult supervision at the imperial center.”
These two books approach the same topic, the all-volunteer force, from different analytic perspectives. While the term all-volunteer force is meant to include all armed services, the focus of these works is the service with the largest manpower component, the United States Army. Preserving the nation’s security is a critical issue in this age of fiscal austerity facing the US government amid the struggles within the Congress, its political parties, and the executive branch. The challenge is to manage the national debt while providing for the security of American citizens. All indications point toward significant near-term reductions in Department of Defense budgets with resulting cutbacks in manpower, modernization, and readiness. The US military consumes over fifty percent of the discretionary spending of the federal government. Absent existential threats, it should be scrutinized for funding cuts.

Laich retired as a major general in the Army Reserve after 35 years of service; he held command at colonel and flag officer ranks. Bacevich graduated from West Point and was commissioned an armored officer; he rose to command the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Upon military retirement, Bacevich earned a Princeton PhD and recently retired as a professor of history and international relations at Boston University. Ironically, both authors have inherited Smedley’s syndrome from “War is a Racket.” Bacevich opens Chapter 8 with the description of a senior officer who, “in retirement defects…calling into questions officially sanctioned truths…[after] a decade of unquestioning subservience to the national security state” (115).

In this case, the “officially sanctioned truth” is the success of the all-volunteer force as a highly professional force, vastly superior to the conscripted force it replaced in July 1973. Laich and Bacevich served in the Vietnam-era draft Army, then during the presumptive validation of the all-volunteer force in the Persian Gulf War. National security professionals and military members of the touted all-volunteer force will find portions of these books difficult to accept since their core identities and motivations are under assault. Military readers will probably find convenient scapegoats in the civilian and political leaders whom they believe tend to overcommit the force—or with the citizens who go shopping while service members go to war on their behalf.

In Skin in the Game, Laich offers a simple framework with which to evaluate the all-volunteer force—fairness, efficiency, and sustainability. His assessment is presented rhetorically, and he offers the following disclaimer in the Preface: “This book is not intended to be a rigorous
academic product or a reference source. In fact, it could be characterized as a very long op-ed piece intended to promote dialogue” (xiii). The reader must keep this disclaimer in mind as Laich provides a brief summary of the development of the all-volunteer force at the close of the Vietnam War, which he regards as a political expedient of President Nixon. Most informative is his presentation of the rationale conveyed by the Gates Commission, which Nixon directed to examine the alternative to conscription. Along with the objectives, assumptions, and nine objections for the all-volunteer force, Laich provides his view of the “reality” that has transpired over the past four decades since the all-volunteer force’s inception. Laich believes that the all-volunteer force is not fair since people across the social economic spectrum do not serve equally (all-volunteer force soldiers are “poor kids and patriots”). It is also inefficient because the Army has outsourced some logistics and security competencies to private corporations to conduct its recent operations. Lastly, the all-volunteer force is not sustainable because of prohibitive personnel costs required to recruit and retain active component service members. Those costs include paying for rehabilitation from combat wounds and psychological trauma as well as retirement pensions.

Bacevich’s *Breach of Trust* provides a much more scholarly treatment; it continues the arguments of his previous works *The New American Militarism* (2005) and *Washington Rules* (2010). Bacevich asserts that the American way of life and its quest for global preeminence has placed the nation in a perpetual state of conflict and war. In protecting and projecting US values, national leaders have chosen the military instrument of national power by default, which in turn requires global presence of its force. The establishment and evolution of the all-volunteer force enable this presence. For the US political elite, the all-volunteer force is the blunt instrument for asserting preeminence: For senior military officers, the all-volunteer force has become the manifestation of a professional force with the prized autonomy that it entails.

To quote Shakespeare’s Hamlet, “ay, there’s the rub!” Bacevich contends that the Departments of Defense and the Army have aligned with societal views of race, gender, and sexual orientation (most recently with the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”). Thus, the American public has little interest or concern about its military, apart from the feel-good patriotic fanfare at sporting events and occasional encounters with uniformed service members at airports. The all-volunteer force, with its complementarity with the National Guard and Reserve forces, was designed to link US forces with the American people, such that employments of the military would be noticed, felt, and supported by the public. Alas, that has not been the case, as Rachel Maddow has documented in *Drift: The Unmooring of American Military Power* (Parameters review, Summer 2013).

With less than one percent of the US population currently serving, the all-volunteer force has become separated physically and socially from the American people.Repeatedly, the civilian political elite has succumbed to the temptation to assert US preeminence and then used the nation’s impressive and available military force without constraint or accountability. While several national polls reflect a US military held in high esteem, Bacevich contends that it has not been effective in winning current wars and has abrogated elements of its professional jurisdiction
to private security organizations. He foresees a bleak future characterized by “more needless wars or shadow conflicts sold by a militarized and irresponsible political elite; more wars mismanaged by an intellectually sclerotic and unimaginative senior officer corps; more wars that exact huge penalties without yielding promised outcomes…” (190). Bacevich decries the warrior-professional who has supplanted the citizen-soldier through the “conversion of military service from collective obligation to personal preference [for service]” (79). Accordingly, Bacevich charges the nation’s political elites, senior military officers, and disengaged citizenry with a breach of trust with American service members.

Both authors buttress their arguments on the founding documents of our nation—The Declaration of Independence and The US Constitution. They refer frequently to the principle of no large standing forces. They assert that greatly reduced numbers in the armed forces would limit leaders’ desire and ability to launch military operations. To man the forces needed for peacetime engagement, the authors offer alternatives to the all-volunteer force, but they are equally pessimistic about the viability of military conscription. Laich proposes a hybrid of a draft lottery for the reserve component with the option of enrolling in college Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs. Bacevich suggests a two-year requirement for national service that would enhance citizens’ sense of obligation to contribute to their nation. Any form of mandatory service would have to provide safeguards against the inequities that have plagued past conscription programs. All citizens must bear equal risk and share the burden of service.

It is appropriate to evaluate the viability of the all-volunteer force after its inception forty years ago—especially as we face the uncertainty of future decades. The strategic question remains a philosophical one: “What do we want the role of the United States to be in the world?” The answers to this fundamental query determine the role of U.S. armed forces, its composition, and the capabilities required to secure national interests. To inform such discourse, national security professionals and military members should consider the arguments and recommendations presented in these two works. Our nation can ill afford a breach of trust between its citizenry and those who serve to secure their collective interests.

Generals of the Army: Marshall, MacArthur, Eisenhower, Arnold, Bradley
Edited by James H. Willbanks

Reviewed by Major General David T. Zabecki, PhD, USA (Ret.), Honorary Senior Research Fellow, War Studies Programme, University of Birmingham (UK)

In 2013, the United States Mint issued a set of commemorative coins honoring the only five officers to achieve the five-star rank of General of the Army. The half-dollar coin features Henry H. “Hap” Arnold and Omar N. Bradley. The dollar features George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Douglas MacArthur appears on the five-dollar gold piece. Authorized by an act of Congress that was sponsored by the US Army
Command and General Staff College Foundation, the reverse of all three coins depict designs relating to Fort Leavenworth and the Staff College.

Generals of the Army was written as a companion piece to that special set of coins. Edited by Professor James H. Willbanks, the General of the Army George C. Marshall Chair of Military History and Director of the Department of Military History at CGSC, the book contains a chapter on each of the five-star generals, with an emphasis on their Fort Leavenworth experiences. The first chapter, “Officer Education and the Fort Leavenworth Schools, 1881-1940,” by Jonathan M. House, is an excellent capsule history of mid-level officer education in the US Army. That chapter alone is worth the price of the book. Volumes have been written about each of these US Army legends, and all but Marshall published their own memoirs. Yet, this handy little single-volume reference provides a tightly written set of profiles for comparing these five very different careers. Those careers also intertwined in different and sometimes ironic ways.

Douglas MacArthur never really attended a Leavenworth school; nor did he formally serve there as an instructor. He did serve as the commander of an engineer company at Leavenworth, and while there he lectured informally at the General Services School and the Cavalry School. Perhaps the most controversial of the major figures of American military history, MacArthur was the only general officer to serve in three major wars (World Wars I and II and Korea). He also reached five-star rank as a field marshal in the Philippine army several years before the rank existed in the US Army.

George C. Marshall never held a command in combat, but he is widely recognized as the “Organizer of Victory” in World War II. After the war, he went on to serve as Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense. He received the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in establishing the Marshall Plan for the recovery of Europe. Thanks to his foresight, Germany today remains one of America’s staunchest allies in the world. In 1906, Marshall attended the Infantry and Cavalry School (shortly renamed the School of the Line). Graduating first in his class, he was selected to attend the Staff College, and then served for two more years as an instructor in the Staff College’s Department of Engineering. Although MacArthur was far senior in terms of rank and time in the service, Marshall was the first army officer appointed to the newly established five-star rank in December 1944—one day after the promotion of Admiral William D. Lahey, chief of staff to President Roosevelt. As Secretary of Defense, Marshall in April 1951 supported President Harry Truman’s decision to relieve MacArthur from his command in Korea. Marshall also was the only five-star officer who was not a military academy graduate.

Dwight D. Eisenhower was convinced that his career was on a dead-end track after he was not assigned overseas during World War I. Nor had he even attended an officers’ branch school. But thanks to the mentorship of Major General Fox Conner, Eisenhower attended CGSC during 1925-26, and graduated first in his class. During the interwar years, Eisenhower as a major and then a lieutenant colonel served as MacArthur’s aide-de-camp, first when MacArthur was Chief of Staff of the Army, and then when MacArthur went to the Philippines. During World War II, Eisenhower’s rise in rank was meteoric, from
his promotion to colonel in March 1941 to general of the Army on 20 December 1944. The fact that his former aide received his fifth star only two days after MacArthur received his, always seemed to be a sore point with MacArthur. At one point in late 1951, MacArthur was also seen as Eisenhower’s primary competition for the Republican presidential nomination.

Hap Arnold was the last promoted of the four original five-star officers authorized by the Congress for the army. The commander of US Army Air Forces during World War II, Arnold also was a semi-official member of the ad hoc Joint Chiefs of Staff. Trained as a pilot in the school established by the Wright Brothers, Arnold was a life-long advocate for military aviation. He also had the least promising interwar career of any World War II senior general. He received less-than-stellar evaluation reports and, after the court-martial of General Billy Mitchell, Arnold was exiled to a number of make-work assignments in remote places. On top of that, he thoroughly hated his time as a student at CSSC and even considered retiring from the army early because of that experience. Yet he persevered and ultimately presided over history’s biggest expansion in military aviation. Two years after the US Air Force became a separate service in 1947, Congress approved changing Arnold’s rank to General of the Air Force.

Omar N. Bradley was the last American officer promoted to five-star rank. During World War II, Congress authorized only four five-star positions each for the Army and Navy. But with the conversion of Arnold’s rank to General of the Air Force in 1949, the Army could argue it had one allocation left. As the commander of the 12th Army Group during World War II, the Chief of Staff of the Army succeeding Eisenhower in 1948, and the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Bradley was the natural choice. He was promoted to General of the Army in September 1950. Like Eisenhower, Bradley did not serve overseas during World War I. Unlike Arnold, Bradley valued his time as a student at CGSC, and after graduating he went on to Fort Benning as an instructor at the Infantry School, where he came to the attention of Marshall who was then the assistant commandant of the school. In February 1941, Bradley was promoted to brigadier general, seven months ahead of Eisenhower. As Chairman of the Joint’s Chiefs of Staff, Bradley supported President Truman’s decision to relieve MacArthur, an officer who was already a brigadier general in June 1918 when Bradley was still a captain.

More than sixty years after the last US Army officer was promoted to five-star rank, Fort Leavenworth remains the crossroads of the US Army’s officer corps, and almost every senior officer in the last hundred years has come through one of the Leavenworth Schools. Those who made it to the five-star level lived in a far different world strategically and politically than we do today, and the institution they served has likewise changed in many ways. Yet there remains a core foundation to the Profession of Arms that is timeless, and today’s offices can still learn much by studying the careers of those who preceded us—especially these five.
Over the past sixty years, the US military has gotten into the habit of planning in an unconstrained environment, whether in developing budgetary requirements or planning for contingencies. This luxury is no longer feasible. As Winston Churchill is purported to have said, “Now that we are out of money we have to think.” It is in this context that Moises Naim’s, *The End of Power*, should be considered. Moises Naim is an eminent scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former editor of *Foreign Policy*. His recent book is a thought-provoking and insightful examination of the changing nature of power in today’s world.

As the title suggests, *The End of Power* suggests that traditional notions (and levers) of power are outdated: power isn’t what it used to be. As the extensive literature on globalization has pointed out, power is becoming more diffuse and accessible. In the complex and volatile world today, brute force is often ineffective or counterproductive. Traditional icons in the exercise of power, from presidents to popes, are increasingly constrained in their ability to translate power into desired outcomes. As Robert Zoellick mentioned in his Wall Street Journal review of this book, “seemingly powerful actors in societies have a harder time getting things done.”

Naim begins with a discussion of power, how to conceptualize it, use it, and keep it. He does a nice job summarizing the Weberian conception of power and how bigger became better with regards to the exercise of power. Max Weber, a famous German social scientist, suggested states were those entities that maintained a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within a prescribed boundary. He also advocated stronger, hierarchical bureaucracies as the mechanisms for states to exert authority and power. Naim explains how this Weberian structure, so successful after World War I, has begun to crumble. Even as the concentration of power is increasing in some sectors, the ability to use it to achieve a desired outcome and the probability of retaining it is more volatile and uncertain than ever.

Perhaps the most interesting portion of the book is the typology Naim establishes to categorize how power has transformed with globalization and other recent changes. This typology discusses a tripartite revolution against the conventional notions and effectiveness of power: more, mobility, and mentality. The “more” component expounds upon the growth in actors, ideas, and world population. All of these factors complicate the possession and exercise of control by more traditional actors, such as states. In Weber’s world, barriers to entry and the
efficiencies of scale reduced the number of potential actors in critical sectors such as governance and industry. In today’s world, those barriers have been reduced and the same structures that provided economies of scale have often hindered the ability to adapt quickly to changing situations. The “mobility” revolution refers to the expansion of options. Not only do people and things have greater ability to traverse the globe, so does information. This revolution has contributed to the reduction of the barriers to entry discussed above and has allowed a greater number and diversity of the actors to interact on a local, regional or global level. Finally, Naim discusses the “mentality” revolution. This development, closely related to the first two, discusses how rapidly ideas and norms can proliferate, changing expectations and traditional social contracts. Again, the revolution is antithetical to the hierarchical structures of power touted by Weber.

Naim’s argument fits nicely with a much older debate captured by Jeffrey Issac in his classic, “Beyond the Three Faces of Power: A Realist Critique.” In that article, a distinction was made between the “power to” and the “power over.” The three “M” revolutions have increased the ability of everyone, including nonstate actors, to exert power in ways that were unimaginable in the past (power to). Inversely, these same revolutions have decreased the ability of traditional power brokers, such as states and armies, to exercise or sustain power over other actors (power over). In addition, power has to be considered within the social structures within which humans interact. Thus, the ability to understand and explain is as important as the ability to do something about the physical phenomenon. This context coincides with Naim’s call for a “framework to help make sense of the changes taking place.”

Overall, this book is well-written and readable. Though much of what is described is well-known, Naim ties it together in an original and thought-provoking manner. For those interested in the role of landpower, this book provides some exceptional insights in conceptualizing the roles and functions of the US Army and Marine Corps. If power is so dispersed and the problems more complex, how should the Army define its role? Certainly, the military must retain the ability to dominate other state-based military threats to ensure the nation’s survival and to promote the vital interests of the country. However, what type of force structure is needed to give our national leaders the flexibility they need to respond to the VUCA international system in a resource constrained environment? If you accept Naim’s conclusions, perhaps the Army’s fight to maintain end strength is not a realistic or affordable approach given the “more, mobility, and mentality” revolutions.

This book is also worth reading for foreign policy enthusiasts and senior political and military leaders who are struggling to develop effective policies and strategies during times of fiscal constraint. As the traditional sources and structures of power decay, senior leaders, policymakers, and strategists have to adapt. Leaders have to be more comfortable with a lack of direct control. Success will reside in the ability to monitor and shape ideas associated with the mentality revolution from the lowest to the very highest levels. Hypocrisy and mistakes will be quickly identified and disseminated by various actors. While the military should retain those capabilities where it maintains a comparative advantage, such as strategic mobility, it must look for more alternative
solutions to the problems at hand. Knowing the limitations of military power might be just as important as knowing its capabilities.

**Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama**

by Stephen Sestanovich

Reviewed by Colonel Michael J. Daniels, student, US Army War College

The recent spate of writing decrying the decline of American power and influence centers on issues of domestic decay and turmoil, with the view that the United States has somehow lost its way in the world. Some authors argue these domestic political, economic, and social challenges have hamstrung the current administration in pursuing the kind of aggressive, engaged foreign policy needed in this volatile time. Stephan Sestanovich, author of *Maximalist*, shows the current challenges of the Obama administration are not new, but part of a cycle that can be traced back to the post-World War II Truman administration.

Sestanovich is a former US diplomat, who served under both Presidents Reagan and Clinton. He is currently a professor of international relations at Columbia, as well as a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Sestanovich has written a highly-readable and thorough history of US foreign policy since 1947. The book does not offer much in the way of new research or detail. However, the author succeeded in repackaging previous works and incorporating a great many anecdotes to retell this story with a slightly new twist. It is a worthy addition to US foreign policy scholarship, and should be read by any serious student of diplomatic history, or for anyone in a position to advise on or craft future foreign policy.

The book expands on the author’s earlier thesis, regarding the “maximalist” tradition in US foreign policy, one advanced in a Spring 2005 article in The National Interest. Sestanovich, describes foreign policy and diplomacy in a continuum cycling between periods of maximalism and retrenchment. One criticism of the book is the author never defines these two terms, which are so central to his argument. The reader quickly summarizes that maximalism equals overreach, with retrenchment the “do less” corollary that follows when America must pick up the pieces. The author details the approach administrations have taken cycling between these two extremes: the maximalist Truman followed by a retrenching Eisenhower; who is then followed by maximalist Kennedy/Johnson administrations; then by a long period of retrenchment under presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter; the maximalism of Reagan; a pause in the cycle under presidents George H.W. Bush and Clinton; the maximalism of George W. Bush; and finally this current period of retrenchment under President Obama.

A few unanswered questions linger below the surface of a linear story long on narrative but short on analysis. My central criticism is the cycle is described as far too simplistic. Can any administration be categorized as purely maximalist or retrenching? The author concedes most administrations made decisions and set policies that ran counter to the general direction of their foreign policy. These decisions were almost always influenced by external events, beyond the influences of
the president and his team of advisors. Sestanovich was unable to categorize the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations cleanly for these very reasons, and the author notes it was not President George W. Bush’s initial intent to be a maximalist. The second- and third-order effects of policy decisions are often to blame for these shifts. The decisions of our partners and allies, unforeseen world events, and black swans such as 9-11 are also responsible for shifts in focus. Campaign rhetoric and an administration’s “going-in position” rarely survive first contact with future realities. The author would have been better served to incorporate more of this dynamic into his analysis, and to examine why presidents seem so often to misjudge or fail to anticipate events that shake their preferred interrelationship with the world.

Sestanovich spends most of the book examining the foreign policy realm of presidential decision making, and what drives administrations to “go large” or “go small” when pursuing national interests and exporting American values. This examination is interesting but it is also incomplete. Sestanovich, like many other scholars, fails to account for domestic political dynamics and issues that influence our ability to act globally. It is as if the author believes international credibility trumps domestic will. This Innenpolitik—Realpolitik interplay and tension—best explained in Peter Trubowitz’s book Politics and Strategy, is ground-zero for grand strategic development. Just as unforeseen events abroad can derail foreign policy, so too domestic challenges will often cause an administration to be more inward-focused. Sestanovich’s argument would have been strengthened by acknowledging this relationship and implicitly weaving more examples throughout his narrative.

The author’s lack of detailed analysis weakens his argument that the United States must remain actively engaged in the world, and be more a maximalist than a retrencher. Sestanovich never convinces the reader why a more balanced and pragmatic policy position, similar to that taken by the Obama administration, can be an effective, or at least a suitable course for present realities. These criticisms aside, Maximalist remains an excellent history of US foreign policy, and provides yet another lens through which to view presidential decision-making in the modern era. Future policy makers, politicians and strategists would do well to take note.
In *Treasury's War*, Juan Zarate, a former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crime and federal prosecutor, earnestly presents an insider’s view of the US Treasury’s response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In all, this book is an important, enjoyable and often contradictory history vital to understanding the contemporary US practice of financial-based power projection, and the Treasury’s new role in national security.

The author begins with a brief introduction to the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which is “the US government’s primary tool for going after the assets of enemy regimes” domiciled within Washington’s jurisdiction, as well as prohibiting American citizens, banks, or businesses from transacting with Specially Designated Nationals, (individuals, businesses, groups or entities) sanctioned by law. North Korea, Cuba and Iran were all subject to lawful economic sanctions, administered by Treasury prior to 9/11.

Mr. Zarate’s “Treasury tale” begins after 9/11 with three lawyers, Treasury General Counsel David Aufhauser, his Deputy George Wolfe and Chief Adviser Bill Fox, crafting the contours of what would become Executive Order 13224, authorizing Treasury to designate administratively the financial enablers of terrorism and, more importantly, those associated with them. Zarate, a Senior Advisor to the Undersecretary of the Treasury for Enforcement, ran the Executive Office for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, which was combined with the Treasury Office of Intelligence and Analysis, making him the first Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes.

With the stage set, the book’s second half details Treasury’s warfare. Directed by Executive Order 13224 and armed with section 311 of the Patriot Act (2001), Treasury began administratively designating enablers and associates of sanctioned entities in 2005. Weighing the risk of becoming an “associate” and losing access to US markets, many banks and insurance companies cut off relationships with sanctioned entities isolating them from the global financial system. Outside US legal authority or enforcement, designated entities were frozen out of global markets by international actions in what Zarate termed a “virtuous cycle of self-isolation.” By all accounts, it was highly successful. From there, Treasury was off to the races designating Iranian persons, banks and shipping companies, Lebanese banks, Al Qaeda, Al Shaabab and Taliban financiers, and Russian criminal networks, among others. Along the way, the Treasury became the center of gravity for US financial-based power projection and the de-facto, but explicit, system administrator for global finance.
Zarate’s history clearly conveys the intent of Treasury’s approach. As such, *Treasury’s War* should be required reading for policy makers. However, with a decade of on-the-ground policy implementation, *Treasury’s War* should be more than a triumphal recitation. Mr. Zarate’s assessments of the efficiency, efficacy, coherence and limitations of Treasury’s policy would have strengthened the book. The most serious, yet unspoken, limitation of Treasury’s approach is that it does not project power. It works by reduction, isolating US finance from designated entities and their associates. The logical endpoint of any such system is US self-isolation, not power projection. Secondly, created and administered by lawyers and prosecutors, Treasury’s approach maintains the petite fiction of domestic legality when, in fact, the policy was designed to operate beyond US legal jurisdiction where informal American diplomatic influence has failed. Additionally, much of *Treasury’s War* operates on an administrative basis, not a legal basis. The US government can designate entities administratively and is not required to demonstrate whether target has either specific knowledge or intent beforehand. Regardless of the legal terminology, framework, or perspective of the participants and their talk of pursuing international scofflaws, it is an exercise in US power projection not criminal enforcement. Lastly, the book leaves one Rubicon uncrossed. *Treasury’s War* describes systemic manipulation of the global financial system for US objectives. Systems are dynamic, adaptive, and adopt new equilibria as a result of interventions or shocks; otherwise they do not survive. The balance between specific intervention versus system regulation remains an open question.

The book’s last chapter, “The Coming Financial Wars,” looks at some emerging challenges to Treasury’s war and serves as the basis for Zarate’s *Parameters* article (Winter 2013-14). The author approaches the finite future of both the dollar as world reserve currency and American as financial hegemon with a touch of melancholy. This approach leaves unanswered the question of how the United States will continue to harness international financial self-interest to its national policy aims. He approaches networked asset creation—companies such as Facebook, Google, and Bitcoin, which create value by their network and network position and not of themselves—as problems to solve not horses to harness. It is a decidedly twentieth century perspective. To give Zarate his due, the epilogue of *Treasury’s War* contains nuanced musings on the role and limits of national power projection through financial means. Those questions and his answers deserve expansion into another book.

**Planning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare and the First World War**

By Nicholas A. Lambert

Reviewed by Sarandis Papadopoulos, Ph.D., principal co-author Pentagon 9/11 and Secretariat Historian, Department of the Navy

Naval power in the First World War seemingly served only defensive purposes. Fleets protected Entente trade, while German U-boats tried to stifle delivery of supplies. The Dardanelles campaign, the failed naval attempt to bypass deadlock in France and Flanders, sought to buttress Russia with equipment and keep it in the war. During the conflict,
this argument goes, blockade predictably weakened Germany slowly, but only four years of land warfare clinched victory.

Nicholas Lambert now convincingly argues the Royal Navy instead perceived “economic warfare” as a way to trigger quick collapse. Drawing from his 1998 _Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution_, Lambert traces the service’s understanding that a “close” blockade of German ports would be hopeless in the face of new mine, torpedo and submarine threats, but then sought other measures. After evaluating British vulnerability during the 1905 Moroccan Crisis, the Navy recognized economic warfare’s potential to deprive Germany of materiel and financing. Exploiting Britain’s central position at the world’s shipping, communications (telegraph cables), insurance (Lloyd’s) and banking systems offered to deter the _Kaisereich_ or quickly defeat it. By 1912 the Cabinet-level Committee on Imperial Defence had “pre-delegated” authority to embargo trade and credit to Germany, allowing initiation of sanctions the day war started on 5 August 1914 (178).

Once the world war began, however, market panic worked too well alongside these measures. The July war scare, with August’s tight wartime British controls, froze credit worldwide with investors buying gold or Sterling; every stock exchange closed (187). The plunging US dollar forced Treasury Secretary William McAdoo to shutter Wall Street for four months as the market for American cotton collapsed weeks before mid-term Congressional elections. Despite government guarantees for London banks’ payment instruments, “bills of exchange,” international commerce halted and employers laid-off workers, raising the specter of domestic revolution in many countries.

Economic warfare had run off the rails and the British pulled back to mitigate its consequences. The period to February 1916 saw arguments on limited blockade. For Lambert, the adversaries were the Admiralty on one side (albeit with differing views within the service), with the Foreign Office, War Office (Army) and Board of Trade (the economics and merchant shipping ministry) generally on the other. Each agency played a role in counting or controlling trade flow into Germany’s neutral neighbors, but faced difficulties in so doing. All leaders ultimately realized the lure of wartime profit was not limited to Swedish, Danish or Dutch re-export businesses, nor to American oil firms, but to British shipping companies as well. Economic warfare, a key ingredient of an “off-shore balancing” strategy some describe today, needed stringency to function, a non-existent commodity until 1916.

To be fair, politics compelled behavior contradictory to waging war. Merchant firms, and the Board of Trade, fiercely rejected government meddling in the free market even to prevent shipments to the enemy. Despite repeated reports of goods being re-exported to Germany, the Foreign Office sought to appease neutrals, hoping they would voluntarily stop trade with the Central Powers through quotas on cargoes. The War Office needed to mobilize arms and food, as well as conscript personnel, which threatened domestic British political stability (332). The Royal Navy intercepted blockade runners, only to see British Prize Courts refuse to “condemn” cargoes because ownership could not be proven, allowing the merchant vessels to resume passage even when carrying supplies the _Kaisereich_ needed. Atop it all, Asquith’s parliamentary coalition could collapse if any these constituencies withdrew support.
Only continued failure on the battlefield and the 1916 conscription crisis created the circumstances needed for economic warfare to begin in earnest.

Researched to the limits of remaining sources, *Planning Armageddon* is complex. It needs a close reading to master its myriad issues and many characters, civilian and military, whose roles changed over a decade. Cruiser operations for sanction enforcement are tangential here, more the backdrop to Cabinet debate and international diplomacy. But the book profitably uncovers key elements. Despite war’s public approval in 1914, British firms traded across the North Sea for eighteen months. Britain attacked the Dardanelles in 1915 not simply to equip the Czar’s armies, but to allow export of Russian wheat to stabilize domestic grain prices (320). Most centrally, in 1912 the British government authorized the Royal Navy to win a war quickly, a decisive “Schlieffen Plan” from the sea, (1) before its 1914 decision to put the British Expeditionary Force into France. That neither the navy nor the government it served properly calculated the measures needed to make economic warfare work reflected the real height of the goals they sought. Strategic planners seeking to arrange the same methods in future conflicts ought to read this book and bear such needs in mind.
The Cartels: The Story of Mexico’s Most Dangerous Criminal Organizations and Their Impact on U.S. Security
By George W. Grayson

Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, Distinguished Visiting Professor and Minerva Chair at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

The work, which was published at the end of 2013, draws upon very up-to-date Spanish and English language works, interviews, and email correspondence providing as current a picture as possible when it went to press. It is composed of preface and acknowledgements, introduction, ten chapters, thirteen appendices, notes, selected bibliography, and an index. Its chapters can be grouped into four basic themes, each of which will be discussed in turn. The first theme, comprising the introduction and Chapter 1, is that of the historical era when drug traffickers were subordinate to an autocratic state. It begins with the story of Mexican president Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) and his Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) successors through Ernesto Zedillo (ending Nov 2000). The rise of Miguel “El Padrino” Gallardo and the relationship of traffickers to the government are also discussed along with the fact that, if the rules were not followed, enforcer teams would be dispatched from Mexico City to levy PRI extra-judicial justice. The second theme, comprising Chapters 2-4, is that of the transitional era in Colombia, South Florida, and Mexico when the fortunes of the Colombian cartels waned and the Mexican cartels become ascendant. It chronicles the shift in cocaine flow from Florida to Mexico and then provides information on the Gulf, Los Zetas, Sinaloa, Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO), Juárez, La Familia (Knights Templars), and Arellano Félix Organization (AFO) cartels. Also covered is the National Action Party (PAN) policy shift—under Vicente Fox (Dec 2000-Nov 2006)—of no longer sending out governmental kill-teams to punish traffickers who got out of line. The resulting second-order effects, along with other factors, inadvertently contributed to the power balance reversal between the cartels and the federal government.
The third theme, comprising Chapters 5-6, focuses on the Calderón era (Dec 2006-Nov 2012). It is one of direct confrontation, with the cartels spurred on by the increasing national security threat they represented to the Mexican state. This second PAN administration’s approach, one with a kingpin strategy focus, reliance on the armed forces, and close coordination with the United States, is highlighted. The experiences of the Mexican military are also chronicled; as a mission for which they were ill prepared to undertake as well as the impacts, including human rights abuses, this has had on Mexican society. Military engagements (firefights and arrests) with municipal and state police forces in the pay of the cartels are also detailed. The final theme, comprising Chapters 7-10, is on the present administration of Enrique Peña Nieto (Dec 2012-Current). This new administration has engaged in campaign plays—like the stillborn Gendarmería Nacional program—and media spin, downplaying the extent of the cartel threat, to further its public image and Machiavellian agendas for the benefit of the PRI now once again in power. The increasing rise of vigilantism in Mexico is also covered within this theme along with the enablers of organized crime which include elements of the Church, banking and business interests, and Mexican state governors, whom (due to the executive-legislative impasse in Mexico City since the late 1990s) have increasingly gained in political power and wealth, resulting in their either looking the other way or directly colluding with the cartels.

Many of components of the work are highly informative and provide great insights into the relationships and animosities of the cartels to the Mexican government under the various administrations—both PRI and PAN—and to each other. Further, the writing benefits from Grayson’s approach to categorizing information in such a way that it is easily digestible. For instance, the table with the “Ten Commandment’s of ‘El Padrino’” (23) is extremely useful in showing the subordination of the narco-syndicates to the old PRI political machine. Of note from this table is how executions of opposing traffickers were to take place north of the US border, if possible (Commandment 4)—what we would call spillover. Yet, American civilians were not to be kidnapped, extorted, or killed either south or north of the border so as not to incur the wrath of the US government (Commandment 5). Other tables show us the differences between the drug wars in Colombia and Mexico (96), a general history of drug activities (228-232), and military desertion rates in Mexico—which between 1997 and 2012 number over two-hundred and twenty thousand personnel and beg the question how many of these individuals have gone over to the cartels (264).

Criticism, of what is otherwise an excellent overview of the recent history of the Mexican cartels and their interrelationship to Mexican politics, focuses on the fact that quite a few typos can be found within its pages; better proofing would have been beneficial. The work is also thin on analyzing cartel impacts on US security, making that part of the subtitle a misnomer. About two pages discuss corruption of US personnel (209-211) while the Mérida Initiative, from which the new PRI administration has distanced itself, is mentioned in more sections of the book (93-104, 175-176) additional analysis of its and other impacts seemed warranted. While it is recognized that Mexico is the major transit point of illicit narcotics flow into the United States and anything negative
taking place in Mexico—such as loss of territories, ongoing corruption and violence, and regional failure due to cartel activities may have a direct US homeland security impact—some sort of focused discussion of these threats vis-à-vis Peña Nieto’s policies in the conclusion would have been beneficial to the reader.

Still, in summation, The Cartels is a well-researched and highly readable work that would make for an excellent college textbook and be of interest to more general readers such as military officers and policy makers interested in this subject matter. The various tables and many appendices for organizing information are also useful. The work very much deserves its rightful place in both personal and college libraries next to other general works published on the Mexican cartels over the last few years.

Studies in Gangs and Cartels
By Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan

Reviewed by José de Arimatéia da Cruz, Professor of International Relations and Comparative Politics at Armstrong Atlantic State University, Savannah, GA and Visiting Research Professor at the US Army War College

Studies in Gangs and Cartels is written by two eminent scholars in the field of law enforcement and transnational criminal organizations. Robert J. Bunker was a Distinguished Visiting Professor and Minerva Chair at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College; while John P. Sullivan is a career police officer and an Adjunct Researcher at the Scientific Vortex Foundation, Bogotá, Colombia. This important work is the culmination of the authors’ works from the mid-1990s to the present with new chapters written specifically for this anthology. Readers will see the progression of gangs and cartels and their nefarious activities from third-generation or third-phase cartel typologies.

Studies in Gangs and Cartels addresses the broader challenges gangs and organized crime can present to states. (1) Gangs and cartels in the twenty-first century have become more than an annoyance to governmental authorities and law enforcement agencies. Crime and criminally illicit activities have become more global in scope and can destroy the social fabric of a society while also undermining the authority and legitimacy of a state. One only has to think of the current situations in Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil to realize the impact of criminal elements in society and its detrimental effects. As Bunker and Sullivan point out, “extending their reach and influence by co-opting individuals and organizations through bribery, coercion and intimidation to facilitate, enhance, and protect their activities, transnational criminal organizations are emerging as a serious impediment to democratic governance and a free market economy. This danger is particularly evident in Colombia, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, and other parts of the former Soviet Union where corruption has become particularly insidious and pervasive” (63). The traditional view of crime as a localized issue and therefore a concern only to the police on the beat is no longer valid in the twenty-first century. As Bunker and Sullivan argue, “rather than being viewed only as misguided youth or opportunistic criminals or, in their mature forms, as criminal organizations with no broader social
or political agenda, more evolved gangs and cartels are instead seen as developing political, mercenary, and state-challenging capabilities” (xi).

Criminal organizations and cartels are emerging phenomena of the third-generation street gang typology advanced in the Studies in Gangs and Cartels. According to Bunker and Sullivan, third-generation gangs have sophisticated political aims. “They operate—or seek to operate—at the global end of the spectrum, using their sophistication to gain and secure power, drive financial acquisition, and engage in mercenary-type activities” (3). This proliferation of street-level gangs across neighborhoods, cities, and countries is partially a consequence of the process of globalization, that is, the greater interconnection of the world due to advancements in transportation, economics, the death of distance facilitated by the internet, and interdependence. In the globalized world of the twenty-first century, gangs have become transnational when the following characteristics are present. First, the criminal organization is active and operational in more than one country. Second, criminal operations committed by gangsters in one country are planned, directed, and controlled by leadership in another country. Third, criminal organizations are mobile and adapt to new areas of operations. Finally, their criminal activities and enterprises are sophisticated and transcend borders (3-4).

In the globalized post-Cold War world of the twenty-first century, gangs and cartels represent a “new warrior class” (41). The “new warrior class” includes those individuals in society, part of the “bottom billion,” who have lost all hope of a better future and social advancement, and use force to partake in the spoils of society. As Bunker and Sullivan point out, individuals alienated from the rule of law will provide the basis of the new threat to the nation-state (41). As eminent military historian Marin van Creveld points it out in The Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict Since Clausewitz (1991), “in the future, war will not be waged by armies but by groups whom we today call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits, and robbers, but who will undoubtedly hit on more formal titles to describe themselves” (Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War, 197). As Paul Rexton Kan noted, “drug-fueled conflicts often produce a wartime economy alongside local disempowerment and steadily diminishing political stability and personal security” (Paul Rexton Kan, Drugs and Contemporary Warfare, 93). This new class of “warrior,” the disenfranchised of society, will likely fill the ranks-and-files of private military companies in order to participate in the spoils of war. Gangs and cartels in the post-Cold War international system, are “a potential conflict generator: not only do they contribute to violence in their home community, but given the confluence of a number of factors they could well emerge as a true threat to national security” (55). Examples of gangs and cartels as potential conflict generators abound, but the cases of Sierra Leon, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mexico, and Brazil are worth mentioning. Third-generation gangs and cartels are not only proliferating in the post-Cold War international system, but their methods and techniques in the war making process are also becoming more lethal and more daring. Gangs and cartels “challenge states in several ways. They undermine the rule of law, break the state monopoly on use of force, and foster corruption and insecurity” (186).
In conclusion, I highly recommend this work to students and academics in the field of political science and criminal justice as well as the military, especially the US Army, which may be called upon to address the drug trafficking in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil. I also recommend this work to law enforcement agencies dealing with the new disease of the twenty-first century: third-generation gangs and cartels. In the final analysis, it is wise to remember the words of Hannah Arendt: “The practice of violence, like all action, changes the world, but the most probable change is to a more violent world” (60).
Despite an awkward title, this book makes an indisputable case for interim law enforcement when a failed state is occupied (or liberated) by a military coalition. Robert Perito, a retired Foreign Service Officer, who had a tour with the Department of Justice International Criminal Investigative Training Program, argues that the United States should create a standing constabulary force to manage the disorder and violence in post-conflict situations, such as those encountered in the past few decades. He uses four case studies to illustrate the scope of the law enforcement problem: Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, he does not provide any detail or design for an American solution.

A description of the French Gendarmerie, Italian Carabinieri, and Spanish Guardia Nationale identifies national police forces that can be mobilized with cohesion and deployed as para-military formations to provide law enforcement and training. Such forces are normally under the control of each country’s respective Ministry of Interior, for which the United States has no counterpart. The US Department of Interior operates the Bureau of Land Management, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Forrest Service; it does not have a national police force. When the United States has contributed to an international police component, it has been an ad hoc collection of city police officers, deputy sheriffs, and highway patrolmen who lack common training, procedures, equipment, and rank structure.

In response to the Bosnian Civil War, a NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) was activated in 1995. Ambassador Holbrooke, the American diplomat who managed the Dayton Accords which led to IFOR, argued for an armed and forceful coalition police force. He was opposed by his European counterparts who did not want an aggressive police component in Bosnia without a new constitution and legal system within which it could work. Ironically, American military planners also objected to a robust police capacity that might compete with the military coalition going into Bosnia. The result was a modest, unarmed, ad hoc police component that arrived in Bosnia six months after IFOR intervened, with the capacity only to advise the abusive ethnic-based local police forces. The gap between the local police and IFOR occupation forces led to frequent violence and continued ethnic abuses, with IFOR military forces reluctant to take on police tasks.

In August 1998, the coalition deployed a 350-person police component (later expanded to 750) to Bosnia based around an Italian Carabinieri battalion that could take on more aggressive constabulary tasks, a proficient formation that might have been established earlier. When a smaller
coalition military force entered Kosovo in 1999 to provide stabilization, it included a comparable Italian Carabinieri battalion as a base for 350-person police formation to serve in the constabulary role.

In 2003, the Bush Administration dismissed lessons from Bosnia and Kosovo when it invaded Iraq without a police component to provide interim law enforcement or to help reform the Iraqi police forces. Officials in the State and Justice Departments knew better and argued for standing up an appropriate police component before the military invasion, but Secretary Rumsfeld and others in the Administration would not provide the funding and believed the Iraqis would use their liberation to reform the police on their own. When that did not happen and Ambassador Bremer fired 30,000 members of the Ba’athist Party and disbanded the Iraqi Army (400,000 soldiers), the American-led coalition encountered a perfect storm of violent instability for which it was ill prepared. Not until 2007 were the Italian Carabinieri again called upon to form a paramilitary police component to assist with stability operations.

In Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was deployed in 2002 with 5,000 troops and a modest German police element to help reform the Afghan police. When internal conflicts demanded more soldiers and police, the American military component quickly formed, trained, and employed additional army and police forces. The large scope of that program provided substantial numbers of Afghan police with limited training, which failed to make it an effective force. Both in Iraq and Afghanistan poor planning for the law enforcement followed by excessive police expansion without limited training produced an inadequate police force grappling with continued violence and instability.

Each case study makes a compelling argument for early planning in a post-conflict situation for a robust interim law enforcement component to provide stability, and to help rebuild and reform local police forces. Paramilitary police such as the Italian Carabinieri have proved effective for such a role. Perito laments the reluctance on the part of each coalition to provide military forces with the authority to exercise law enforcement. That seems to argue for the establishment of martial law by the military occupation force.

Perito’s plea to stand up an American counterpart to the Carabinieri is vague in design and not probable during a period of military austerity. But such a component may exist now in the American military structure. The United States Army has five deployable military police brigades and 16 military police battalions; in addition, there are about as many military police brigades and battalions in the National Guard and Reserves. There is a military police training brigade with three training battalions at the Military Police School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Properly packaged, large Army military police formations should be properly prepared to engage in the constabulary role identified.

In an era where post-conflict is engaged with coalition formations, it is improbable that the United States would take on such a task alone; thus, the Lone Ranger theme seems inappropriate. Nor is it probable that the Army would stand up a new single purpose constabulary formation while reducing force structure. It would make more sense to employ the military police formations the Army has now in better ways.
The importance of their tasks may be the best reason to protect those military police formations as Army force structure is reduced.

**Improving the U.S. Military’s Understanding of Unstable Environments Vulnerable to Violent Extremist Groups: Insights from Social Science**

By David E. Thaler, Ryan Andrew Brown, Gabriella C. Gonzalez, Blake W. Mobley, and Parisa Roshan

Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, Distinguished Visiting Professor and Minerva Chair at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

The research report *Improving the U.S. Military’s Understanding of Unstable Environments Vulnerable to Violent Extremist Groups* by the RAND Arroyo Center is a densely packed—yet extremely well executed—and timely work of great strategic interest to Army thinkers and students of irregular warfare. The Army sponsored this research under contract, and while drawing upon the social sciences, the product is meant ultimately to facilitate practical and proactive application by the United States and her partners. Specifically, it applies to “Phase 0” operations, that is, the pre-conflict phase that “minimizes both cost and the need for intervention with U.S. ground forces” (xiii).

The research is a great complement to the ongoing Office of the Secretary of Defense Minerva Initiative—though not a component of that program—and documents the progressive Center for Army Analysis commissioned study “Improving Understanding of the Environment of Irregular Warfare” from mid-2011 to mid-2012. I was very motivated to analyze and critique this report because its focus—the problematic issue of host environments creating and sustaining violent nonstate actors—played prominently in my earlier *Parameters* Winter 2013-14 essay.

The report identified twelve factors associated with environments vulnerable to conflict (key concepts only): (1) external support; (2) government is considered illegitimate or ineffective; (3) history of resisting state rule; (4) poverty and inequality; (5) local government is fragmented, weak, or vulnerable; (6) ungoverned space; (7) multiple violent, nonstate groups competing for power; (8) the level of government restriction on political or ideological dissent; (9) the level of consistency and/or agreement; (10) groups perceive faltering government commitment; (11) the capacity, resources, and expertise of violent extremist groups; and (12) social networks. These factors are said to be neither static nor disconnected. They and their interactions were then applied to two conflict case studies, selected by the sponsoring agency due to their familiarity, as proofs of concept—the Shining Path in Peru (1980-1992) and the Maoist insurgency in Nepal (1997-2006).

With the admission that “…measuring factors related to environments vulnerable to insurgency and terrorism is exceedingly difficult,” (47) the study then goes on to create metrics (quantitative and qualitative) for detecting and assessing factors along with metric justification and data sources (47-58). Seven key research findings are then provided in paragraph form (59-60) that go into Army doctrinal views on this subject matter and social science utility to irregular warfare. More
importantly for the warfighter—or in this instance the peacebringer, four action recommendations for the US Army defense community are then provided:

- Incorporate factors and associated metrics into irregular warfare-related analytic games and models.
- Evaluate levels of potential instability and extremist violence using the assessment scheme outlined in this report.
- Conduct research to probe and map overlays and interrelationships among factors in specific cases.
- Develop a prioritization approach based on the factors and assessment scheme that helps indicate where best to allocate analytic and security assistance resources (xv).

The report also offers appendices including the “Factor Matrix” and factor presence in the thirty RAND case studies and the useful inverse COIN factors (countermeasures to insurgencies) (87-88).

My impressions of the research report (written by a very talented and eclectic team of social scientists) are highly favorable. It was a joy to read and the recommendations are timely and well measured. Plenty of time, effort, and resources went into this project and it shows. This form of research is critical to our gaining a better understanding of the unstable environments that create and nurture violent extremist groups and other armed non-state actors.

A few impressions really hit the reviewer while analyzing the RAND report. What was found fascinating in the report is the inherent tension between old and new forms of insurgency. While the thirty detailed COIN case studies used for validation purposes all fall under the political insurgency paradigm, five of the factor examples are from Mexico and are cartel and gang—mostly Los Zetas—related (Factors 3, 6, 7, 9, & 11), which fall under the organized crime/criminal insurgency paradigm. This is a paradigm considered antithetical to more mainstream and traditionalist COIN perceptions. Further, while Factor 1 which addresses external support (eg. money, weapons) may be integral to political insurcelligencies, criminal actors draw their resources directly from the illicit economy such as narcotics trafficking, local taxation via extortion, and related activities. This variable is partially captured in Factor 11 concerning resources available to a group, but its importance appears to be understated especially when illicit economies in the tens of billions of dollars help to sustain such criminal actors.

Given that criminal entities are growing in strength and capability (as many regions of Latin America attest) it is the impression of this reviewer that follow-on research conducted by the Arroyo Center on unstable environments would greatly increase the relevance and utility of the product. It would be helpful to model the factors indicative to such threat groups along with the more traditional violent (political) extremist forms and the hybrid (convergence) entities now rising. Additionally, while the reviewer agrees that the two case studies set in Peru and Nepal were required for proof of concept purposes and were something the sponsoring agency requested, it is pretty clear that applying such analysis to the ongoing situation in Mexico—specifically to Los Zetas, Los
Caballeros Templarios, and the Sinaloa cartel—should be considered one option for the next logical step in its development.

Learning to Forget: US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq
By David Fitzgerald

Reviewed by David H. Ucko, Associated Professor, College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University.

In Learning to Forget, David Fitzgerald traces the effects of the Vietnam War’s legacy on the US Army’s understanding and approach to counterinsurgency. Fitzgerald, a Lecturer in International Politics at University College Cork, Ireland, broaches this topic chronologically, assessing first the role of counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War and then how the memory and lessons of that conflict shaped future institutional attempts to avoid, learn from, repeat, or even recall whatever it was that happened. The overarching argument is the memory of Vietnam has been neither static nor uncontested, but reinterpreted depending on the dominant context and personalities at any given time. The legacy, thus, remains “fluid and open to reconstruction” (210-211) and is used to justify a range of often incompatible arguments. As Fitzgerald implies, this historiographical tug-of-war reveals the long shadow the conflict still casts over the US Army as an institution.

The book’s strengths include its argumentation and structure; it is an eminently readable text. It weaves its way from Vietnam and the codification of its immediate lessons in the 1970s, to the re-encounter with irregular challenges in Central America in the 1980s, and then to the peace operations of the 1990s, and their relationship to the Army’s counterinsurgency legacy. The last two chapters consider the spectacular highs and lows of counterinsurgency during the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Throughout, counterinsurgency has most commonly been marginalized as an institutional priority and area of investment, a trend bucked only by “major traumatic events,” (206) most recently the fear of utter failure during the civil war in Iraq.

A second strength of the book is its measured tone and analysis. Fitzgerald has authored a sober and dispassionate study that resists the hyperbole and sensationalism typical of other related works. Perhaps Fitzgerald’s distance from the debate, as an Ireland-based academic, affords him the necessary perspective. Nonetheless, the nuanced take on this all-too-often overheated topic is refreshing and, also, necessary.

Third, the research is thorough and well documented in over sixty pages of footnotes. It is clear that Fitzgerald has consulted the relevant works, which he applies with due recognition of contending interpretations. The eye to detail and fastidious sourcing may be explained by the book’s origins as Fitzgerald’s own doctoral thesis, something evident in the book’s initial literature review and primer on methodology.

This last point relates also to one of the book’s two weaknesses. Whereas Fitzgerald’s analysis is commendably detached, one might wish he more often established his own view on controversial and divisive topics. He cites the dominant voices both for and against
counterinsurgency’s inclusion as a US military priority but refrains from presenting his own verdict. He covers the Iraq and Afghanistan wars well, but it is never explained why Fitzgerald thinks counterinsurgency succeeded in the former yet “failed to produce the tangible results it needed” in Afghanistan (198). Similarly, he presents all major interpretations of what went right and wrong in Vietnam, but it is difficult to glean what Fitzgerald himself, on the basis of his research, sees as the more convincing explanation.

Second, with the multitude of works now available on the US military’s engagement, aversion, and re-encounter with counterinsurgency, Fitzgerald’s contribution feels somewhat familiar. With the exception of a few added anecdotes and some notable sources, particularly in the first half of the book, the interpretation of past and present campaigns differs in no substantive way from previous accounts, be it Richard Downies’ Learning from Conflict, Robert Cassidy’s Peacekeeping in the Abyss, Richard Lock-Pullan’s US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation, or my own, The New Counterinsurgency Era, which covers similar ground and comes to very similar conclusions. Fitzgerald refers to these works in his introduction, but his implicit moving past and building upon the existing literature are not always convincing. The book’s novelty lies in its emphasis on how the memory of Vietnam, specifically, affected and was affected by subsequent events, but this focus is not consistent throughout and can, at times, feel contrived.

On this latter point, it is not obvious how Vietnam and its 58,000 US casualties related to the peacekeeping operations of 1990s; the discussions appear related to the far more recent traumas of Somalia and the limited US national interests at stake. Going further, the book establishes continuity between Vietnam and subsequent “military operations other than war” but never fully integrates the point made by Dale Andrade, that Vietnam was both a conventional and an irregular effort, and that US strategy had to counter a credible communist army along with a potent insurgent foe. Given this balancing act, how comparable (or even relevant) is Vietnam to the 1994-95 intervention in Haiti or the Bosnia campaign thereafter? Even the attempt to compare Vietnam with Afghanistan or Iraq faces serious problems, ones that the book may perhaps have benefited from broaching more directly.

On the whole, Learning to Forget is a well researched and superbly written addition to the ongoing study of counterinsurgency and the US Army. At a time of urgent reflection for the US Army, and the United States as a whole, Fitzgerald reminds us of the fluidity of historical interpretation and the unpredictability of what we actually learn. John Lewis Gaddis sees historians as mandated “to interpret the past for the purposes of the present with a view to managing the future but [critically] without suspending the capacity to assess the particular circumstances in which one might have to act, or the relevance of past actions to them” (The Landscape of History, 2002). Michael Howard’s paraphrasing of Jakob Burckhardt, cited by Fitzgerald, is therefore apt: “the true use of history, whether military or civil, is...not to make men clever for next time; it is to make them wise forever” (211). The book is recommended to all serious scholars of counterinsurgency, the US Army, and intervention.
One Hundred Victories: Special Ops & the Future of American Warfare
By Linda Robinson

Do not pick up this book unless you are looking for a general overview of US Army Special Forces conducting basic Foreign Internal Defense (FID) in Afghanistan. While an easy read with some entertaining stories, the book omits way too much to be of use to serious students of irregular warfare.

One Hundred Victories presents two main points as it spins the story of the successes, failures and challenges of Green Beret Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police Development (VSO/ALP). The author’s first proposition is that after Special Operations Forces’ (SOF) initial catastrophic successes in Afghanistan, SOF leadership failed to articulate a solid game plan to stabilize Afghanistan. Despite having the training, doctrine, and experience to do so, it allowed conventional forces, and itself, to focus on combat ops when Foreign Internal Defense and capacity building should have been the strategy. After years of chasing targets, in 2009-2010 the Army’s Special Forces finally remembered their way and led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) effort to build security capacity via VSO/ALP. In this endeavor, they fought against not only the Taliban, but also conventional units and senior leadership.

Robinson’s second main idea is that a key reason for failures in Afghanistan was SOF’s lack of a staffed, theater-level command capable of interfacing with its own and conventional units. Unable to channel the power of its mature, experienced and intelligent personnel, SOF could not seize the initial opportunity to shape Afghanistan’s strategy and this mistake hampered special operations throughout the war.

This second proposition has merit, but Robinson fails to articulate why SOF preferred to fight by “SOF tribe” rather than as a comprehensive whole, and tries to convince the reader the only relevant SOF mission is Foreign Internal Defense. By only telling 1/11\textsuperscript{th} of the story (there are eleven SOF critical activities), she misrepresents the challenges and complications of establishing a true unified headquarters. Her slant towards Green Berets, and their primary mission, is evident and prevents the reader from gaining a full understanding of the vignettes she uses throughout the book.

It is in her thesis that Foreign Internal Defense and capacity building are the keys to success in Afghanistan where Robinson’s biases really emerge, and where the book truly misses its mark. Despite repeatedly making the point that stability comes from developing Afghans, all her good tales focus on raids or combat. She gives short shrift to Military Information Support Operations, Civil Affairs, various non-military developmental organizations, and conventional force development initiatives.\textsuperscript{1} One Hundred Victories leads one to believe only SOF can conduct

\textsuperscript{1} One line on page 230.
Foreign Internal Defense, and the author accomplishes this by neglecting large swaths of the Afghanistan story while focusing on selected differences between Special Forces and other units. Lastly, it implies SOF leadership took the lead in turning the war’s focus from one of hunting Taliban to one of developing police. It does so despite significant evidence, both from Iraq and Afghanistan, that it was conventional leaders who had to pull SOF out of its direct action myopia and get it back into Foreign Internal Defense.

A final critique of this book is that it fails to address many of the questions it brings forward. A few examples include:

- Why did SOF lose its way in 2003? What factors, other than the lack of a sizable headquarters, caused it to forget Foreign Internal Defense and focus on direct action?
- Were the claims that Special Forces personnel became cowboys true? And what actions, other than relieving Major Gant, did anyone take to address this concern?
- What was the impact of lessons from Iraq toward how Afghanistan’s Foreign Internal Defense mission was fought?
- How much of an impact did the establishment of an Afghanistan-Pakistan buffer zone actually have on the war?

_One Hundred Victories_ is not a great action story. It is too flawed to provide significant strategic lessons, and the author has obvious biases that prevent a good historical analysis of the campaign in Afghanistan. This book is not worth the time of a professional strategic or operational leader.
Women in Battle

Deadly Consequences: How Cowards are Pushing Women into Combat

By Robert L. Maginnis

Will integrating women into combat units have “deadly consequences” for US national security? Three experts—Anna Simons, Anthony King, and John McKay—provide their evaluations.

A Review by Anna Simons

Deadly Consequences is a blistering polemic that provides plenty of facts, figures, and citations to those who oppose the idea of women being integrated into direct ground combat units. Maginnis does not mince words:

The incremental process by which the United States military decided to put women into direct-fire, close ground combat assignments has been deceitful. It is the work of political leaders who naively treat ground combat as an equal-opportunity issue and of military commanders who know better but are afraid to speak the truth about its adverse effects on readiness (p. 4).

Nor is it just the current Joint Chiefs of Staff Maginnis considers to be cowards. Essentially, any man who would let a woman serve in his place deserves scorn. As for why the Joint Chiefs and other senior military leaders merit particular opprobrium: in Maginnis’s view, they have succumbed to politically correct pressure. He identifies six myths any responsible senior leader has to know are untrue:

1) The new battlefield is woman-friendly.
2) Women are clamoring for combat duty.
3) Women are already effective at the front.
4) Good leadership defeats eros.
5) Women are perfectly capable of handling the rigors of combat.
6) Other countries put women in combat.

Maginnis fillets each of these myths, liberally borrowing from and updating others’ work. He then moves on to eight major risks the military will face should women be given direct ground combat roles:

1) Compromised standards.
2) Failure to match capabilities with job assignments.
3) [Women’s] Physical suffering.

Anna Simons is a professor of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School, and co-author of The Sovereignty Solution: A Commonsense Approach to Global Security.
4) Destruction of the warrior spirit.
5) Increase in sexual assaults.
6) Forcing women into combat.
7) Reduction of retention rates and decline of quality.
8) Subjecting women to the draft.

Unfortunately, when it comes to the risks vs myths, Maginnis occasionally shoots his own logic in the foot. For instance, early on in the book he mentions young people’s “hookup” culture and their penchant for alcohol and drug-fueled behavior. Midway through, he cites various studies that point to pregnancy rates among soon-to-be-deployed and deployed women. Not only does he stress that many pregnancies are unplanned, but women are clearly indulging in sex on board ships and in combat zones without using birth control. Yet, eight pages further he writes, “Men’s inclination to take risks in every aspect of life makes them better combat candidates” – as if women’s willingness to engage in unprotected sex is not risky behavior.

I mention this because while I agree with a number of Maginnis’s points, it is hard not to wince whenever he misfires or over-exaggerates. For instance, he lambasts radical feminists for wanting to “eviscerate the military” as a patriarchal institution, yet offers too little evidence for the anti-military and anti-war campaign he intimates exists. This is too bad. Because if he could offer a chapter (rather than scattered sentences’ worth) of proof that proponents are more anti-military than anti-male, he might actually win over more people – to include anyone who worries about national security or cares about the military as an institution.

Equally unfortunate may be Maginnis’s focus on the nature of combat rather than the nature of combat units. Maginnis invokes General Odierno to suggest that the counterinsurgency fights of the past decade may not presage the future, and while both men may well be right that the military had better (re)gird itself to be able to engage in a grimmer, more sustained, high intensity form of conventional combat, this could lead some readers to wonder what young men at outposts like Restrepo endured. Consequently, too, Maginnis misses making the point that wherever the US puts boots on the ground in the future, it is still likely to need to field small units capable of operating on their own in austere conditions. No question, physical standards will matter in such units. But so will group dynamics.

Because meeting physical standards represents a sort of Rubicon for entering the “boy’s club” of combat units, standards receive a great deal of attention. However, both sides in the debate may err in pinning too much on them. Opponents believe so long as standards remain high – and do not get gender-normed – few women will either want to serve in the combat arms or be able to make it through selection. Thus, certain Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) – they hope – will remain protected. However, the track recently taken by those who want all billets opened to women is to question the premise behind each standard. Proponents increasingly point out tasks are rarely undertaken by individuals alone; instead, every combatant belongs to a team, a platoon, or a squad. This means members in all units shift and share burdens and
can surely find creative ways to get the job done regardless of individual strengths.

But, not only do combat units exist to be sent into harm’s way—they, after all, represent the thin line in the sand between all of us and harm—they should never be presumed to be immune to casualties. Let a unit suffer casualties, and any burden-sharing that might have worked among individuals during a field exercise, or during practice, is bound to fall apart. This is inconvenient reality number 1. Inconvenient reality number 2 is that attrition requires members of combat units be considered interchangeable, even in the 21st century; thus, every member of a unit has to be capable of accomplishing the same essential tasks. At the same time, replacements have to be able to fit easily into the group. This introduces a Goldilocks challenge: the group has to be tight, but not so tight it cannot absorb new members and still function.

While Maginnis acknowledges the significance of cohesion, he does not dig very deep. He never explains the havoc that romantic, and not just sexual, attachments can wreak. Someone else will have to investigate and explain what makes a combat unit effective (or not). Maginnis prefers to concentrate on the physical and psychological rigors of combat instead. One way he does so is to describe battles in Najaf (circa 2004) and in Vietnam (which is somewhat curious given his earlier dismissal of counterinsurgency). Yet, no matter how graphically he tries to render both scenes (along with a shorter description of fighting in the Chosin reservoir), readers who are not already used to (or enamored with) reading about combat sequences are likely to remain unmoved.

Here is where, without necessarily meaning to, Maginnis exposes the real communications gap: how can he and other opponents make their arguments stick? How can combat veterans convince skeptics the presence of women really will be disruptive, and it will take away from—rather than add anything to—combat effectiveness? One might especially wonder how opponents of lifting the ban can make the case in light of the fact, as Maginnis points out, Hollywood and media depictions have helped convince many Americans that women are just as capable as men: just look at how well they have held their own in firefights.

Of course, no movie has yet been made depicting the ways in which a woman’s presence might actually wreck a unit or doom a mission, let alone what might happen should a female fail to uphold her end in a prolonged battle. Imagine, though, the subliminal impact such imagery could have, particularly if the plot was compelling and the acting realistic. Crime scene reenactments influence juries, which is why they are increasingly popular. Or, just consider Kony 2012.

Arguably, with the "right" kind of footage it might well be possible to shift public opinion dramatically away from wanting to see women introduced into direct ground combat units. Indeed, at this point in time, one or two well crafted YouTube videos could well have a more profound effect than any book will, no matter how vividly written.

Could Deadly Consequences itself be turned into a movie or a documentary? Certainly Maginnis’s book is a very easy read for anyone who already leans in his direction. However, in the next round (whether print or film), it would surely help the overall argument if all the sub-arguments were carefully presented and the tone were less inflammatory. In
Maginnis’s defense, his aim has clearly been to (re)sound the alarm and rally the base. Not only is time running out, but it is hard not to agree with him given the gravity of the military’s mission to protect us all, that Congress has a duty — nay, an obligation — to treat this issue with far more gravity and ecumenicism than it has thus far. In fact, that may be the most significant point this book makes.

A Review by Anthony King

The official silence following Leon Panetta’s rescission of the restrictions on women serving in the combat arms has been surprising, but it should not be taken as evidence of approval within the armed forces. On the contrary, informally, widespread dismay has been reported among many male combat veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan. Robert Maginnis’s engaging book, polemically subtitled "how cowards are pushing women into combat," might be read as a corrective to this silence. Incensed by Panetta’s decision and the pusillanimity of General Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Maginnis rejects the decision as jeopardizing national security.

Maginnis is not completely against women’s service in the armed forces. He honors Sergeant Leigh Ann Hester, the first woman to win a Silver Star, and numerous other female combat veterans (67): “Some women in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated valor under fire in protecting their units and themselves” (68). Yet, Maginnis does not take their combat performance as evidence that, in the future, a small number of exceptional women might also be able to serve in combat. On the contrary, he concludes his encomium with a decisive qualification: “We should celebrate their courage but not abandon logic by pretending that they are case studies of women successfully joining in sustained, conventional combat” (68).

This is the foundation of Maginnis’s entire argument. While women may have served successfully in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, these campaigns were low-intensity operations. “With some notable exceptions, counterinsurgency is best compared to high-intensity police work, not high-intensity conventional combat” (40). Since the United States is currently trying to reorient itself to conventional maneuver warfare, the prospect of a return to high-intensity war invalidates all the evidence about women in combat from Iraq and Afghanistan to justify a reprise of the central and long-standing objections to female service. Yet, some of the evidence he discusses is valid and interesting.

Predictably, Maginnis focuses on physical capacity. He cites a British military study which showed an increased rate of injury among women of 7.5 times when “training to the same standards” as men; “women could produce a much greater long-term medical bill for the Pentagon than men” (132). Problems of female hygiene and pregnancy are discussed at length.

Naturally, Maginnis highlights the issue of sex. For instance, under “Myth No.4: Good leadership defeats eros,” he notes that sexual
fraternization was endemic at Kandahar Airfield; “nothing [the] chain of command did could stop these nightly liaisons” (69). “As if consensual affairs weren’t bad enough, our armed forces also face an epidemic of sexual assaults” (71). Finally, Maginnis notes that women are at greater risk of sexual violence than men if taken prisoner; Private Jessica Lynch “now acknowledges that she was raped and sodomized by her captors” (146).

Maginnis’s arguments can be challenged and, in many cases, rebutted; some women are physically capable of combat, sex has not always been endemic to, or universally undermined, the cohesion of combat units, and men can also be sexual victims. Indeed, Maginnis admits some women are capable of passing even the most rigorous selection process uninjured: “I watched some Olympic-caliber women athletes run through the [SEAL] obstacle course better than certainly many of the SEAL candidates do” (112).

Yet, Maginnis’s argument collapses on a more fundamental point. Even if the next US conflict is a conventional interstate war, Maginnis is unjustified in dismissing the experience of combat troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. Operationally, counterinsurgency campaigns are less intense; they cannot be lost in a day. Yet, at the platoon and company level, on days when the enemy has been engaged, the fighting in places like Ramadi, Fallujah, Sangin, or the Korengal Valley seems to have been no less difficult and dangerous as anything the infantry of the Second World War or the Korean Conflict faced. At this level, the fighting provides the best evidence currently available on whether women can perform in combat; with important caveats, some of which Maginnis describes, the evidence suggests a small number of women can. Maginnis’s argument is based on an unjustified conflation of the levels of war.

Yet, his work remains useful, not least because it provides an insight into an increasingly strident and radical segment of United States society; the Republican and religious right. Thus, his valedictory acknowledgement is instructive: “Above all, I acknowledge my heavenly Father, without whom this book could never have been written” (198). Writing as a Christian, Maginnis is disgusted by a society, corrupted by liberalism and radical feminism, could have so disastrously ignored the sanctity of the female role as mother and wife and profaned the institution of the family: “It is no surprise that a culture that so degrades and devalues women is untroubled by sending them into combat. Americans once held women in high esteem, but, today, chivalry is practically dead. Respect for women went the way of marriage thanks to radical feminists who want to destroy that institution” (41). In this, Maginnis perhaps reveals his true objection to female integration. He also shows that perhaps the greatest obstacle to female accession may lie not in their physiologies but in contemporary American culture, which is increasingly polarized into secular and liberal versus conservative and religious factions.
Robert Maginnis’s book singularly examines the consequences of placing women in front-line infantry units. The author is a West Point graduate, a retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel with germane Pentagon experience, and a Senior Fellow for National Security at the Family Research Council. Deadly Consequences effectively synthesizes much of a debate informed by emotive conjecture, parochialism, and ideologically tainted discourse. An injudicious choice of title and sensational dust-jacket blurbs suggest, quite unfairly, that Maginnis advocates a limited perspective. Regretably, they demean the author, misrepresent what he convincingly argues, and are sure to alienate the broad readership the book deserves. His thesis merits considered study. In Maginnis’s view, proponents of female integration into front-line ground combat units falsely conflate the sociocultural tropes of “gender neutrality” and the “lifting of gender barriers” with the indispensability of combat effectiveness. The two phenomena are distinct and distinctly incompatible. He excoriates what he sees as pusillanimous, disengaged, and disingenuous behavior on the issue by senior civilian and uniformed leadership within the United States government. He singles out high level military leaders for censure for their facile pronouncements on the complex and poorly understood topic of placing females in front-line infantry units.

Deadly Consequences is an informative, nonacademic, lucid treatment of an important subject. There is commendable range in this book. An impressive amount of research went into it: Congressional testimony; interviews; pertinent United States and foreign government documents and studies; archival findings; and, contemporary and historical examples—a more nuanced examination of the Soviet Union’s (WW II) and Israeli (past and current) use of females in ground combat formations would have strengthened the book’s argument. Proponents of placing women into front-line infantry units either conveniently ignore or, in the shrillness of the moment, lose sight of a good deal of that background material. Maginnis cites authoritative medical research and findings giving evidence of the increased physical and psychological tolls (and concomitant short- and long-term medical expenses) associated with women compared to men in combat environments. He also examines the pernicious effects of sexual rivalries and the negative impact on unit cohesiveness.

One of the official US government documents Maginnis cites is the March 2011 final report of the Military Leadership Diversity Commission, From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st Century. Emblematic of much of the government’s official justification for integrating females into front-line infantry units, the report is a flawed document: the Commission’s purpose was not to consider the enhancement of combat effectiveness but rather to advocate guardianship under “demonstrated diversity leadership,” a fuzzy concept with no relevance to battlefield lethality. Further, the Commission’s findings are primarily based on the analysis of three nonauthoritative reports, omitting even passing reference to the 1992 Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed
Women in Battle: Deadly Consequences

Forces (also cited). The report significantly underrates the differences in strength and physical capacities between men and women. The issue of pregnancy is completely ignored. Any absence of evidence contradicting or challenging the Commission’s findings failed to prompt additional studies. Tellingly, the paucity of ground combat experience, notably of sustained—three or more days—close-in, ground combat experience, distinguishes the Commission’s membership. That critical expertise and experience was (and is) readily available and appears to have been ignored in selecting the Commission’s membership. Maginnis quotes several individuals who have given long and serious consideration to the issue well above the current level of debate. Further, the Commission premised its findings on the templates of Iraq and Afghanistan, disregarding high-intensity conflict. In addition, potential foes such as the People’s Republic of China and North Korea are not mentioned.

Maginnis traces incremental changes in institutional ethos brought about with the increasing integration of women into the military. The fact the all-volunteer force could not sustain itself without female volunteers, and their critical contributions, cannot be denied. But Maginnis also cites figures of a higher suicide rate among female veterans compared to male veterans.

In today’s culture, it is difficult to see how the issue will receive the impartial, objective airing it deserves. Nevertheless, Maginnis makes sound recommendations for addressing it. Foremost among these is Congressional hearings. According to Maginnis, there have been no full hearings in the House of Representatives on women in combat since 1979; and, none in the Senate since 1991. Deadly Consequences begs for more critical analysis.
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