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David Johnson opens our Spring issue with a Special Commentary, “Fighting the ‘Islamic State’ The Case for US Ground Forces,” in which he argues a “clear assessment” of the nature of war the United States is engaged in against the Islamic State will point to the necessity for using American ground troops.

Our first forum, Megacities: Pros and Cons, features three articles with opposing views regarding the importance of megacities in future warfare. The first, “The Case for Megacities,” by Kevin Felix and Frederick Wong, contends that megacities are becoming an increasingly important in tomorrow’s rapidly evolving strategic and operational environments. The US military will likely avoid combat in megacities whenever possible; however, Felix and Wong claim operating in such environments will not always be avoidable. To neglect preparing for them is, therefore, strategically unwise. Michael Evans challenges that view in “The Case against Megacities.” Evans maintains the megacities argument is an unproven hypothesis; rushing to embrace it is like replacing “population-centric counterinsurgency with population-centric megacity operations.” Doing so without careful research and analysis is, thus, ill-advised. William Adamson’s “Megacities and the US Army” argues the Department of Defense’s current urban strategy is “on an uncertain trajectory and is need of new leadership,” and the US Army is the right service to provide it.

The second forum Culture and the US Army, considers three themes of cultural significance to the Army. The first, “Learning from the Past, Looking to the Future” by Matthew Morton, offers a framework to aid strategic leaders in reflecting on the last decade of conflict in order to prepare themselves to offer the “best advice they can” in the future. The second article, “Ethics and Army Leadership: Climate Matters” by Charles Allen, examines the apparent lapse in ethical conduct among the Army’s leaders and their organizations, and critiques how the Department of Defense assesses ethical climates. The third, “Military Innovation and Military Culture” by Andrew Hill, highlights important flaws in some of the more popular theories regarding culture’s moderating effect on military innovation. He also offers two principal recommendations for creating a culture of innovation.

Our final forum is Changes in War’s Character, which offers two articles concerning new developments in contemporary warfare. The first, “The Individualization of American Warfare” by Glenn Voelz, contends the increased focus on targeting individuals rather than formations, and on identity rather than status, by US forces amounts to a subtle but significant alteration in war’s character. Whether and how long this change will persist remains to be seen. The second, “Small Forces and Crisis Management” by Benjamin Jensen, identifies a trend toward small, multi-domain forces that can facilitate compelling an adversary to do one’s will—short of escalating to major war; however, in his view, crisis management has not yet adjusted to this trend.

In our Of Note section, Daniel Glickstein takes yet another look at Why We Lost. ~AJE
Fighting the “Islamic State”
The Case for US Ground Forces

David E. Johnson

Abstract: This article argues counterinsurgency wars are not analogous to the challenges presented by the Islamic State. The United States needs to accept the nature of the war it is in, and undertake a clear and comprehensive assessment of the means necessary for strategic success. Such an assessment will make apparent the need to commit US ground combat forces.1

The rise of the Islamic State has forced policy makers to confront uncomfortable questions: What will it take to defeat the Islamic State? What is the nature of the current conflict against the Islamic State? Can the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), bolstered by US and allied air power, advisers, special forces – almost everything short of ground combat forces – defeat the Islamic State? The difficulty the Iraqis experienced in taking Tikrit and the recent abandonment of Ramadi should be instructive, as was the premature announcement by US Central Command of a coming ISF spring 2015 offensive to retake Mosul, which was followed by an admission that the ISF is not yet ready for the kind of fight Mosul would entail.2

Many have already commented on the need to have all US options on the table to defeat the Islamic State. Retired Marine Corps General James Mattis recently wrote US strategy should include ground combat forces “to achieve our war aims.”3 This article explains why US ground forces are not just a better option than the ISF, but absolutely necessary for achieving US policy objectives against the Islamic State.

Does Our Strategy Fit the War We Are In?

All students of strategy have had the ends-ways-means catechism drummed into them at some point in their education. Assessing the US strategy for the war with the Islamic State from this perspective is useful in reaching an understanding of what needs to be done to defeat the Islamic State. Additionally, it will illustrate the continuing challenges

1 This article is derived from my commentary in War on the Rocks which argues US ground forces are necessary to defeat the Islamic State, and that a crucial test would come with the battle to retake Mosul. This essay expands on that premise, even though it is being written as events unfold on the ground in Iraq. See David Johnson, “Means Matter: Competent Ground Forces and the Fight Against ISIL,” War on the Rocks, March 19, 2015. This essay incorporates much of this earlier commentary.


in post-9/11 strategy formulation and, in particular, the chasm between desired ends and deployed means.

President Obama, in his February 11, 2015 letter to the Congress requesting an Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) to fight the Islamic State, set forth clear “ends” for his strategy: “to degrade and defeat ISIL.” To this point in the fight against the Islamic State, the US “way” has been limited to “a systematic campaign of airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq and Syria” and supporting various anti-Islamic State security forces. American “means” are limited to air power, advisers, and US support to the Iraqis. The other means beyond US supporting forces—the “boots on the ground”—include the ISF, Kurdish Peshmerga and Sunni and Shi’a militias, the latter backed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Indeed, Major General Qasem Soleimaini, commander of the Iranian Quds Force, was at one point directing the offensive to retake Tikrit. This is problematic in terms of US strategy in the region, but also creates sectarian tensions with Iranians deeply involved in taking Sunni areas.

The AUMF explicitly states it “would not authorize long-term, large-scale ground combat operations like those our Nation conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan.” This is the fundamental flaw in conceptualizing a strategy for defeating the Islamic State in Iraq—seeing this new fight as similar in character to the past 14 years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq. Clausewitz is instructive when he stresses that war is “an instrument of policy. . . . This way of looking at it will show us how wars must vary with the nature of their motives and of the situations which give rise to them.” Quite simply, the United States needs to understand the war it is in and the adversary it faces in the Islamic State.

The Islamic State is not an insurgency like the United States fought from 2003 until its departure from Iraq. Rather, it is an aspiring proto-state bent on taking and holding territory. Thus, the centrality of “protecting the people” from the insurgents that is the cornerstone of US counterinsurgency doctrine—the “way” the United States eventually approached the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—is irrelevant to the Islamic State itself. Protecting the Iraqi population from the Islamic State is important, but that will be accomplished through conventional operations that destroy the Islamic State and seize the territory it currently occupies in Iraq.

To date, air power and limited Iraqi ground operations have degraded the Islamic State and put it at risk when it moves in the open. In response, the Islamic State has gone to ground in urban areas. This creates a new reality on the ground and a problem that cannot be solved through airstrikes alone, though retired US Air Force Lieutenant General David Deptula has argued that a stepped-up air campaign could defeat the

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5 Ibid.
Islamic State. Islamic State fighters are now able to conceal themselves in the terrain and amongst the people of the cities they occupy. They are more akin to Hamas in Gaza or the North Vietnamese Army in Hue than they are to an insurgency of the type we fought in Iraq and are fighting in Afghanistan. These urban areas are where the Islamic State will have to be defeated if the United States is to realize President Obama’s stated policy objective. US success is, therefore, inextricably linked to the success of ISF ground combat operations against the Islamic State in the difficult tactical environment of a densely populated urban battlefield. As currently structured, if the ISF fails, so does the US strategy.

**ISF Is Not the Army We Need**

If one accepts the fight against the Islamic State requires ground combat to defeat a conventional force that is holding territory, the crucial next step is deciding the appropriate “means” to execute that “way.” Although the administration continues to emphasize all options are on the table, the letter from the President to Congress requesting an AUMF specifically states “Local forces, rather than US military forces, should be deployed to conduct such operations.” Furthermore, the role of US ground forces is extremely limited in the AUMF:

The authorization I propose would provide the flexibility to conduct ground combat operations in other, more limited circumstances, such as rescue operations involving US or coalition personnel or the use of special operations forces to take military action against ISIL leadership. It would also authorize the use of US forces in situations where ground combat operations are not expected or intended, such as intelligence collection and sharing, missions to enable kinetic strikes, or the provision of operational planning and other forms of advice and assistance to partner forces.

Although some like General Mattis have argued for the need to include US ground forces in the fight, most have limited this discussion to providing advisors and tactical air controllers at lower levels to the ISF. John Nagl has been a consistent voice in this debate arguing:

> We are going to have to put those American troops embedded inside Iraqi units, in close support of those Iraqi units, in order to enable and empower them to expel the Islamic State from that country in a reasonable period of time. That’s not an occupation, it will be Iraqi troops doing the fighting, it will be American troops in close support, calling in airstrikes, providing intelligence, providing a number of the enablers and the logistical support...
that America is so good at, and it will enable the Iraqis to do the fighting and the dying. So I am talking about the total force of some 10-20 thousand American advisors—clearly, an insufficient number to occupy the country the size of Iraq, but sufficient to provide a steel spine that will provide support to an Iraqi military that collapsed under pressure last year and that has not been completely rebuilt, that cannot conduct this fight on its own.12

Thus, the central assumption—and the Achilles’ heel—in the current US strategy is this: with foreign training and assistance, the ISF will eventually be able to provide sufficient on-the-ground military means to achieve US strategic ends. The question yet to be asked and answered (without spin) is: What if the ISF cannot be trained and advised to achieve the level of competency necessary to roll back the Islamic State?

Ironically, the way the United States defeated Saddam Hussein in 2003—destroying the enemy through joint combined arms maneuver—is what is needed now. The flaw in the 2003 strategy was failing to plan for what would replace the Hussein regime and letting Iraq descend into chaos; but that is not the central issue now. There is an Iraqi government in place that the United States intends to sustain. Yet, debates about the way to defeat the Islamic State are frequently, and incorrectly, trapped in the counterinsurgency model of the past decade, as can be seen in this statement by Janine Davidson at a recent Council on Foreign Relations event: “the people in Iraq feel like this civil war has insurgency-like elements, meaning people are embedded among the people, [if] the fighters are embedded, then there are counterinsurgency-like approaches.” Max Boot, Davidson’s fellow panelist at the event, agreed: “I think a COIN [counterinsurgency] strategy is basically the only strategy that has any track record of success. And it’s not an easy strategy, but it’s the only strategy that has any track record of success in dealing with an enemy that is entrenched among the people.”13

Will the ISF be able to drive the Islamic State out of Iraq? Operations in Tikrit, which had to be stopped because of lack of progress and high casualties and could only resume once US airpower was employed, provide some indication of the lack of competence of the ISF for the task of defeating the Islamic State.14 Furthermore, the brunt of the fighting was reportedly done by Shi’a militias as the ISF was not up to the task. Nevertheless, the key test will be the retaking of Mosul, a much larger Sunni city of some 1.5 million residents. As already noted, doubts about the readiness of the ISF for this fight ostensibly pushed back plans for an offensive to take Mosul from this spring to an undetermined date in the future. There is likely to be a long wait: reports from US trainers indicate ISF is in bad shape. Lieutenant Colonel John Schwemmer, a US Army officer training Iraqis at Camp Taji in Iraq, was recently taken aback at the poor state of the ISF, observing: “It’s pretty incredible . . . I was kind of surprised. What training did they have after we left?”15 Finally, there appears to be doubt among at least some senior

14 Morris, “Iraqi Offensive for Tikrit Stalls as Casualties Mount.”
Iraqi officers whether ISF can take Mosul without US ground forces. Major General Najim Abdullah al-Jubouri, the individual selected by Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to command operations to liberate Nineveh, said: “I think it would be very difficult to defeat ISIS in Nineweh without American forces.”

There is reason for concern. The ISF that fled in the face of the Islamic State’s offensive in 2014 bolted because it was designed largely as an internal security force that “did little more than staff checkpoints.” The ISF could only operate effectively with significant US assistance when facing anything other than moderate-scale internal threats. It is incapable of the combined arms maneuver required to defeat the Islamic State. The tough urban fights in Iraq—Fallujah (2004) and Sadr City (2008)—were dominated by US forces with modest ISF participation. The battle for Basra (2008), while Iraqi conceived and led, required massive US assistance to succeed. The US ground formations in these key battles were not just “boots on the ground.” They were skilled, professional forces capable of something the ISF is not: the expert execution of highly synchronized joint combined arms operations. This competence is paramount in defeating determined adversaries and avoiding friendly and unwarranted noncombatant casualties and collateral damage. This is the ground force needed to defeat the Islamic State. US advisers cannot transplant these competencies into the ISF in a relatively short time, if ever, even if the ISF did not have all of its other challenges to overcome. Indeed, eight years of large-scale efforts from 2003 to 2011 failed to do so. Nor can it do the heavy lifting in intelligence, fires, and planning for the ISF; it is not capable of this level of sophisticated synchronization of joint combined arms.

The Singular Importance of US Ground Forces

The 2008 Battle of Sadr City is perhaps the most illustrative example of the capability chasm between US ground forces and the ISF—or almost any other military in the world, for that matter. In that battle the US Army’s 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, destroyed the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia in an intense ground fight. Sadr City contained over 2 million Iraqi noncombatants, with an estimated 6,000 to 8,000 JAM fighters operating in their midst. The problem was similar to that which forces trying to retake Mosul will face: How to defeat a relatively small number of fighters without wantonly killing the civilians amongst whom they are hiding and destroying the city. To reverse a famous quote reported by Peter Arnett during the Vietnam War, “How do you save the city without destroying it?”

In the Battle of Sadr City, the US Army created a condition intolerable to JAM by sealing off the city with a concrete wall and using the protected mobility and firepower of M1 Abrams tanks and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles to maneuver against JAM. This threatened

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JAM’s source of sustenance and it came out to fight US forces to stop the progress of the wall. When JAM fighters became visible they were destroyed with discriminate firepower. This is not unlike Israeli ground operations in Gaza during Operations Cast Lead and Protective Edge—competent ground forces, enabled by a joint system, can create conditions that force an adversary to fight at great disadvantage.

Simultaneous with the ground fight against the JAM militia, the 3rd Brigade executed a high-technology, complex hunt for JAM rocket launcher crews who were firing from Sadr City into the Baghdad Green Zone, where the US Embassy was located. The brigade staff, augmented by Air Force officers, integrated multiple intelligence means, unmanned aerial surveillance and attack systems (Predator and Shadow), Apache helicopters, Air Force fighters, and artillery to hunt and destroy JAM rocket launchers.

The ISF was also in the Sadr City fight, but it played a secondary infantry role, assisted by US advisers, focused on consolidating gains and occupying Sadr City once the fighting ended. That was all that could be expected of the ISF, because it could not execute synchronized joint operations, nor did it have the capabilities—the US military provided all the joint fires, technical intelligence, and overhead surveillance. While isolating Mosul might not be the best strategy, the fight for Sadr City illustrates the unique effectiveness US ground forces in orchestrating and executing a joint fight could have in the fight against the Islamic State.

Competent ground forces are fundamental to the joint force equation for finding and defeating adversaries. Attempting to impart this competence to another ground force is folly. The ISF of 2008, before then-Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki riddled it with crony appointments and corruption, was more competent than the ISF that fled from the Islamic State last year.

Still, it is unimaginable that the ISF of 2008 could have done what US forces did in Sadr City or Fallujah, for that matter. It took years of effort to create the ISF of 2008 and the adversaries they joined us in fighting were less formidable than the Islamic State. Why would we imagine the ISF ground forces will be able to take Mosul this year?

The Fallacy of the Advisor Option

This is a central fallacy in US advisory efforts in areas with ongoing conflicts. Our advisory efforts may create infantry formations that can operate within the context of a supporting US joint system that provides air, artillery, intelligence, logistical support—and ground combat forces. Advisors are essentially a link for the local security forces into that system, which also has US ground forces in the event of the need for reinforcement. This is essentially the system we had in Iraq during the surge. It is not dissimilar to the program of Vietnamization during the Vietnam War. So long as the South Vietnamese had access to US enablers, particularly airpower, they could endure as they did during the North Vietnamese failed Easter Offensive in 1972. Three years later, absent this US system and sustained security assistance support, the South Vietnamese military deteriorated and collapsed under a conventional attack by North Vietnam. In the case of the ISF, the Islamic State
(a much less significant foe than the North Vietnamese Army) was able to overrun much of Iraq. Finally, in the past when the United States built militaries that gradually became truly joint, combined arms-capable, the US army provided military assistance and forces in largely benign security environments for decades (e.g., South Korea). It strains credulity to believe we can create an ISF capable of effective operations in an urban area like Mosul in short order, even if we provide intelligence, planning, and fires.

The Perils of Sectarianism

Trying to take Sunni cities with combinations of Shi’a militias, Peshmerga, and ISF forces would also present another challenge. None of these forces would be trusted by the Sunni populations, which might therefore continue to support the Islamic State. Nor would they trust each other. In the eyes of the locals, US ground forces are least likely to have sectarian agendas and, thus, are potentially trustworthy—or at least honest brokers. The aftermath of the ISF victory in Tikrit reinforces this view. As Reuters reported, “the looting and violence in Tikrit threaten [Iraqi Prime Minister] Abadi’s victory. It risks signaling to Sunni Iraqis that the central government is weak and not trustworthy enough to recapture other territory held by Islamic State, including the much larger city of Mosul.” Future depredations against the Sunnis also risk exacerbating the already deep sectarian divides that would undermine a central pillar of our strategy in Iraq of creating an inclusive Iraqi government.

This brings us back to the importance of having the means to achieve our ends. If the ISF is incapable of defeating the Islamic State in the cities where ISIL fighters have gone to ground, then the only reliable means available are US ground combat forces. They have all the skills in joint combined arms warfare the ISF lacks. US Army armor and mechanized infantry formations should be at the heart of this joint task force, just as they were in Sadr City, to provide US forces with the mobile, protected, and discriminate firepower that will overmatch and quickly defeat the Islamic State. If the United States is unwilling to deploy ground combat forces, the end state of a “degraded and destroyed” Islamic State is at risk.

Capacity Matters—Two Recent Examples

Two recent cases when the United States chose to embark on a new strategy in the midst of failing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan provide lessons about the criticality of providing sufficient means. The first instance was when President George W. Bush announced on January 10, 2007 that he was sending 30,000 additional troops, including five more US Army brigades, to Iraq. Quite simply, the strategy of turning the war over to the Iraqis—“standing down as they stand up”—was not working. These surge forces were the critical to a new strategy for Iraq that made possible the establishment of a level of internal security that

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the Iraqis could maintain independently and allowed the United States to withdraw in 2011.\textsuperscript{22}

The second case is the increased commitment in Afghanistan that General Stanley McChrystal designed for the Obama administration in 2009. The ends for the campaign were clear: denying al Qaeda a safe haven, reversing the Taliban’s momentum, and strengthening the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government for the long haul. The ways were also understood—population-centric COIN. What was inadequate were the means allocated to achieve the strategy. According to US COIN doctrine, the number of security forces available to execute the strategy was insufficient and the ends of the strategy were not attained.\textsuperscript{23} Today, over four years after the surge in Afghanistan, the United States has had to revisit its plans to withdraw US forces from Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{24}

Moving Forward

There is understandable reluctance to deploy US ground forces to fight the Islamic State, given US experiences since 2003. However, the military objective against the Islamic State would not be nation-building or counterinsurgency, but rather removing the Islamic State from Iraq. The surest means of attaining this strategic objective is with the introduction of US ground combat forces and the necessary sustainment packages to support them. Politically, this will be extremely difficult both domestically and internationally, given likely Iraqi objections and the substantial Iranian presence in Iraq.

The most difficult political issue, however, is mustering American political will for a US ground commitment against the Islamic State. The President will have to make the American people understand why US ground forces are the only sure means available to achieve our national objectives. President Bush did this in 2007 for Iraq; President Obama did it 2009 for Afghanistan. It is, however, clear the American people understand the threat posed by the Islamic State. A recent CNN/ORC Poll found:

\begin{itemize}
\item[22] Peter Mansoor, \textit{Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War} (New Haven: Yale University Press). It was not just the five US brigades that changed the situation in Iraq during the surge. What mattered was the show of US resolve, which enabled the Sunni to stand up to Al Qaeda in Iraq, along with JAM leaving the field for its own, separate reasons.
\item[23] David E. Johnson, “What Are You Prepared to Do? NATO and the Strategic Mismatch Between Ends, Ways, and Means in Afghanistan—and in the Future,” \textit{Studies in Conflict & Terrorism} 34, no. 5 (May 2011): 383-401. See US Department of the Army and US Marine Corps, \textit{Counterinsurgency}, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 2006), 1-13, which notes: “Twenty counterinsurgents per 1000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective COIN operations; however as with any fixed ratio, such calculations remain very dependent upon the situation. . . As in any conflict, the size of the force needed to defeat an insurgency depends on the situation.” There is an ongoing debate about the relevance of these ratios. See, for example, Jeffrey A. Friedman, “Manpower and Counterinsurgency: Empirical Foundations for Theory and Doctrine,” \textit{Security Studies} 20, no. 4 (2011): 556-591. One could argue that they were not met across Iraq during the surge, but within Baghdad, considered by many to be the center of gravity of the war, there were approximately 131,000 US-Iraqi security forces in a city with a population of some 7,000,000, which came close to the doctrinal ratio. Interestingly, these ratios do not appear in the 2014 version of the US Army-Marine Corps FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5: \textit{Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies}.
\end{itemize}
Americans see ISIS as a bigger threat to the United States than Iran, Russia, North Korea or China. Overall, 68% say ISIS is a very serious threat, compared with just 39% who say so about Iran, 32% about North Korea, 25% on Russia and 18% on China. Nearly 9 in 10 see ISIS as at least a moderately serious threat.25

The argument to the American people for greater US involvement in the fight to defeat the Islamic State is straightforward: Absent the introduction of US ground forces, the success of the US strategy is inextricably tied to means—the ISF, Shi’a militias backed by Iran, and the Peshmerga—whose capabilities and competence for the task is questionable, as are for some of them their increasingly retaliatory methods against Sunnis. If the ISF fails, the Islamic State will receive a boost in prestige and recruiting appeal, thus increasing its threat to the region, US friends and allies, and possibly even the homeland. If we recognize the inability of the ISF to defeat the Islamic State, the alternative approach to employing US ground combat forces would be continued strategic patience and kicking the can down the road. This course is also problematic, given that it will surely increase an already sizable Iranian influence and presence in Iraq and create even more concern in the region about US commitment and credibility.

In the words of retired Lieutenant General Daniel Bolger, “a broad chasm gapes between what the United States accomplished and what it aspired to do in the wake of the 9/11 attack.”26 Why is that? My sense is that is the responsibility of the military to provide expert advice to civilians on the necessary means to attain policy ends is either not being fully expressed, being shaped in ways to make it palatable to the recipient, or being ignored because it conflicts with a broader policy agenda. Nevertheless, whatever the reason, it boggles the mind that a commander could offer a plan to the president for Afghanistan that failed to address the three critical mandates of our own doctrine: adequate security force to population ratios, denial of sanctuary for the adversary, and a legitimate host nation government. A “we will do the best we can with what means we get,” is something other than expert military advice and a formula for disaster.

But this caution was not put forward on Afghanistan. Indeed, the opposite happened. President Obama specifically wanted an answer to the fundamental question about the strategy: could it succeed with the forces the president was willing to commit and in the timeframe specified. Jonathan Alter, in his book *The Promise: President Obama, Year One*, writes that President Obama specifically addressed these issues with General David A. Petraeus, Commander, US Central Command and General McChrystal’s commander:

[President Obama]: I want you to be honest with me. You can do this in 18 months?

[General Petraeus]: Sir, I’m confident we can train and hand over to the ANA (Afghan National Army) in that time frame.

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Alter also writes that Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael G. Mullen agreed with General Petraeus’s assessment.27

Every war college student learns about the tools available to policy makers to meet strategic ends—Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence and Law Enforcement (DIMEFIL).” When the critical moment in a policy occurs that the other than military elements are not achieving the policy ends, policy continues, as Clausewitz reminds us, “with the addition of other means.”28 These means are military capability and capacity. Absent a rigorous and forthright assessment— and commitment— of the means required to accomplish the strategic ends policy will be placed at risk. This is the critical juncture we are rapidly approaching in Iraq and the broader Middle East.

It is time for strategic clarity. An ISF military failure against the Islamic State or a protracted delay in defeating the Islamic State could un hinge US policy in the region and provide the Islamic State with a significant boost in credibility. One option is to revise our policy goal to accord with the means we have devoted to the strategy: degrade and contain the Islamic State. Indeed, there are reasonable arguments regarding cultural, political, and military considerations for doing just that. If, however, our policy actually requires the defeat of the Islamic State, which I believe it does, then we need to provide the necessary means—competent US ground forces at the core of a joint, combined arms team—to realize our policy objectives.

The advance of the Islamic State into Iraq should also force a rethinking of our broader national security strategy and force posture. The central issue is this: desired policy outcomes in the fight against the Islamic State—and in the Middle East and elsewhere—are being compromised by the continued reluctance to put US “boots on the ground” in a direct combat role. In part, this is because of the current strategy of rebalancing to the Pacific to contend with a rising China. This is important, but it should not divert our attention from the rest of the world. The collapse of the Yemeni government, the chaos in Syria and Libya, an ever present threat in North Korea, and Russian adventurism in the Ukraine require a broader discussion about the military means necessary to attain US policy objectives worldwide. Air strikes, counter-terrorism with drones, and special operations raids against high value targets create immediate, but transitory effects—what has been termed by Israelis “mowing the grass.” They are also clearly less risky than committing ground combat forces. Nevertheless, while these stand-off and small-scale operations might attain short term political objectives, they most often do not achieve or support the longer term policy ends of creating enduring conditions of stability and security we seek in the world. Nor do they deter aggression and assure partners and allies. This is the role of US ground forces.

28 Clausewitz, On War, 605.
The decision to commit US ground forces to the war against the Islamic State will be extremely difficult for US policymakers, given the burden of our recent history in Afghanistan and Iraq. These counterinsurgency wars are not analogous to the challenges posed by the Islamic State. It is the job of military professionals to explain why the current ways and means in the war against the Islamic State will likely lead to policy failure. They must also tell those they advise that strategic success demands the commitment of US ground forces. These forces are not merely “boots on the ground,” but the competent professionals required to defeat the Islamic State. Accepting the nature the war we are in, understanding the way in which it must be prosecuted, and undertaking a clear and comprehensive assessment of the means necessary for strategic success will make apparent the need to commit US ground combat forces. The clock is ticking and the stakes are high in Iraq—and elsewhere.
MEGACITIES: PROS AND CONS

The Case for Megacities

Kevin M. Felix and Frederick D. Wong

ABSTRACT: We cannot know for certain what the future operating environment will be, but we must prepare for it. To date, the US military has not paid enough attention to the rise of megacities. This article argues the US Army must continue developing new concepts, capabilities, and ultimately solutions for achieving national security objectives within the current and future operational environments of the megacity.

The 2014 Army Operating Concept (AOC) defines the term complex as “an environment that is not only unknown, but unknowable and constantly changing.”1 It goes on to claim that “to win in a complex world, Army forces must provide the Joint Force with multiple options, integrate the efforts of multiple partners, operate across multiple domains, and present enemies and adversaries with multiple dilemmas.”2 Nowhere is this more crucial or difficult to accomplish than in the complex urban environment of a megacity. Such cities present the Army and joint force with a level of complexity for which they are not fully prepared. However, many opportunities exist for the Army and joint force to reinvigorate past research efforts, to consolidate learning, and to prepare the current and future force for operations in such environments.

Historical Context

Urban warfare is not a new phenomenon. For example, in the ancient Syrian city of Hamoukar, archeologists have discovered evidence of urban combat as early as 5,500 years ago.3 Throughout the ages, urban conflicts have tended to be more the rule than the exception. Previous wars centered on the sieges and defense of urban centers of all sizes, while large battles have for centuries been the exception rather than the rule. Contemporary reminders of urban warfare and its inherent challenges include the battles of Stalingrad and Aachen during World War II, Huế during Vietnam, and Grozny in 1994-1995, and again 1999-2000. There is little reason to believe future conflicts will not also require some form of urban warfare. As such, the Army’s capacity to engage, fight, and win major urban combat operations will determine the success of future operational and strategic endeavors.

The Battle of Huế during the Vietnam conflict reflected the tendency for urban combat operations to blend the levels of war, creating

2 Ibid.
the situation where tactical outcomes had significant strategic implications. Arguably, the bloodiest battle during the Tet Offensive took place in Hué, Vietnam’s third largest city, with significant operational, cultural, and spiritual significance. The Battle for Hué involved 26 days of intense street-to-street, house-to-house fighting against a determined enemy established in a defense-in-depth. Major urban combat operations occurred in the midst of a civilian population of around 140,000 people, and against an initial enemy force estimated at 7,500 North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) troops, later reinforced to a division-sized element. Facing them were three US Marine battalions and 11 Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) battalions. Although the United States employed Army units from the 1st Cavalry Division and 101st Airborne Division during the Battle of Hué, these forces focused on the outlying areas to prevent NVA reinforcement. The US Marines and ARVN conducted the majority of fighting inside the city.

When the fight for Hué ended, US and ARVN forces retook the city. The US military suffered 216 killed and 1,364 wounded, while the ARVN lost 384 killed and 1,830 wounded. Civilian casualties were around 5,800 people killed or executed by NVA/VC due to their political allegiances. Estimated enemy casualties were 1,042 killed and 4,000 wounded.5

Despite the tactical gains from retaking the city and repelling enemy forces across South Vietnam, the United States and Republic of Vietnam faced the strategic repercussions of having laid in ruins an estimated 80 percent of the city, with over 116,000 persons left homeless. Moreover, the Johnson administration lost the public’s confidence, and South Vietnamese confidence in its government declined further, worsening existing political issues adversely impacting US policy. In essence, the risk of winning the battle only to lose the war is significantly higher in an urban fight.

The Problem

Imagine if the US military had to conduct operations similar to Hué in a megacity, a complex urban environment over 100 times larger and with a population of nearly 10 million. Add in the challenges presented by subterranean, cyber, and space environments against a determined enemy, established in-depth, comprised of conventional and special operations forces, paramilitaries, and terrorist and criminal elements with access to a wide spectrum of advanced warfare capabilities. While urban combat operations are not new, a megacity presents old challenges at previously unimaginable scale and complexity.

Due to their increasing political, economic, and social significance, megacities represent strategic key terrain interconnected to national and even international centers of gravity. Megacities, due to their increasing number, geographical locations, and crucial strategic importance, are also the most likely environments where the US military will have to execute its missions.

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5 Ibid.
Despite the crucial importance of megacities, the US military has not yet made a concerted effort to prepare for combat in these ultra-complex environments. The operational challenge is in plain view, but the Army and joint community have barely begun to climb the steep learning curve. A requirement for additional in-depth research to determine how US forces could operate in and around such environments remains in many areas. Discovering optimal organizational structures, what specialized materiel and munitions are necessary, and how to best adjust leader development and training programs, are just some of the megacity challenges the US military must continue to address.

The Army Chief of Staff’s Strategic Studies Group recognized these shortcomings in its analysis of megacities conducted in 2013-2014, stating:

…the Army is currently unprepared. Although the Army has a long history of urban fighting, it has never dealt with an environment so complex and beyond the scope of its resources. A decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan has taught the Army that it must shape itself to the complex environment in which it is called to operate. This is a process that must begin now with megacities.6

To examine further what megacities represent in terms of military challenges and their implications for future military operations, this article addresses the following areas: the strategic context of megacities with regards to social trends; the characteristics of megacities; the operational challenges they present; and the current thinking is and what studies of megacities have revealed to date.

Strategic Context

Cities have long been the focus of culture, politics, economics, religion, and many other characteristics of civilization.7 Not surprisingly, the emergence of megacities and their massive increase in scale, population, and capacity to impact global events have magnified the already significant role of cities. Furthermore, the pace at which megacities are developing and enlarging is changing the strategic landscape faster than strategists and policymakers are coping with them. As described in a McKinsey Global Institute article published in Foreign Policy magazine, “…over the next two decades, the world will see a burst of urban expansion at a speed and on a scale never before witnessed in human history.”8 Such a vast urbanization at an unprecedented rate will cause societal disruptions and put stress on the global economic system.

Additionally, the era when the US could hope to avoid getting pulled into an “infantry eating” urban fight has passed. In the future, the combat environment US forces will most likely find themselves engaged in is an urban one. Avoiding major urban areas is usually the desired course of action, but the desirable is not always possible.

In a recent National Intelligence Council study, *Global Trends 2030*, social scientists and analysts assessed that by 2030, the estimated urban population will grow by nearly 60 percent, or 4.9 billion people, from 50 percent today. Urban centers already generate an estimated 80 percent of economic growth, a trend that will likely increase and continue to drive more social migration towards cities. This social migration will likely drive increasing demands for housing, public infrastructure expansion, food, energy, water, and other basic natural resources.

**Characteristics of Megacities**

What is a megacity? Aside from being significantly larger, what really distinguishes one urban area as a megacity? What makes Tokyo and Rio de Janeiro megacities, while Pittsburgh is not?

As a start point, the characteristics common to megacities and major urban areas are both physical (and virtual) across air, ground, sea, and subterranean domains. Physically, both possess buildings of varying size, age, and construction, complex networks of ground, air, and/or sea transportations, formal governance structures, and support infrastructures such as for power and water distribution. Both also have the virtual environments of cyber and space that affect information flow and informal governance structures, such as community activists and religious leaders. Additionally, both are likely to be globally interconnected to national and international economic centers of gravity.

Given these common traits, what then distinguishes megacities from major urban areas? The European Association of National Metrology Institutes (EURAMET) defined megacities as, “metropolitan agglomerations which concentrate more than 10 million inhabitants.” Other related studies conducted by RAND, McKinsey Global Institute, and the French Ministry of Defense’s *Strategic Horizons 2040* further describe the characteristics of megacities in terms of two major inter-related factors: explosive population growth and potential volatility.

Whereas population growth in major urban areas like St. Petersburg, Russia, remains steady in the low percentiles and ranges in the thousands over the course of several years, population growth in megacities like Jakarta is extremely rapid, running in the millions within that same time span. Rapid population shifts often lead to situations where the demand for jobs, public services, and other resources exceeds the capacity of existing physical infrastructure, and far outstrips the ability of many states to add infrastructure at the pace of population growth.

Megacities promote economic growth for nations and regions, but also represent potential nightmares of poverty, widespread disease, as well as crime and other related tensions. The effects of an already existing wealth disparity amongst social classes can be further complicated by infrastructure deficits, which often lead to ungoverned areas of urban

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decay (i.e. slums). These areas create opportunities for illicit activities, diseases, and economic dependence on governmental support.

Explosive population growth brings with it the potential for social unrest, and in a megacity is likely to have international repercussions. Megacities inherently contain the conditions for political unrest where populations split along ethnic or religious lines into “cities within cities.” Ineffective and/or corrupt state governance often results in the creation of informal power structures and safe havens for illicit and threat networks. For example, a lack of basic policing by the state in the poorer regions of a megacity may result in a black market economy run by a shadow government of criminal and/or terrorist networks. Furthermore, threats can hide and operate more readily, and, unlike the rural countryside, they have easy access to technology to mobilize support and coordinate activities.

The 2011 uprising in Egypt as part of the Arab Spring led to the end of President Hosni Mubarak’s 29-year regime in less than 30 days, and exemplified a situation where a megacity’s potential volatility set off a chain of events. On January 17, 2011, the video of an Egyptian man setting himself on fire outside Cairo’s parliament building after a dispute with local authorities over receiving his monthly coupons for subsidized bread went viral. The event proved to be tipping point of long-standing social grievances that galvanized protests in Cairo and Alexandria. Information technology access enabled the video’s mass distribution and mobilization of a broad-based coalition of opposition groups (e.g. Muslim Brotherhood) that began and sustained a succession of large-scale protests.

Despite Mubarak’s deployment of the military to restore his authority on January 30th, by February 6th the opposition leaders were holding talks with the Egyptian Vice President and on February 11, 2011, Mubarak resigned and surrendered his power to the military, ending his regime. In 2015, Egypt is still dealing with the political conflicts between Islamist and secular groups over government control, affecting regional stability in the Middle East and US foreign policy. As evident in Egypt as part of the Arab Spring, the global reach afforded through technology and the sheer mass of resources available in megacities afford threats a greater potential to escalate social unrest with local, regional, and potentially international impact.

Social migration trends indicate the movement from rural areas to cities will likely continue; life in urban areas, even in slums, is still better than rural poverty where there are no opportunities for economic advancement. Additionally, as inefficient as a poorly run megacity’s economic system may be, typically enough food arrives to feed populations of 10 million people or more versus the rural areas where such resources are unavailable. Likewise, even in slums there are economic systems that maintain at least minimal degrees of order, and minimally sufficient sanitation to avoid the entire area from becoming a giant cesspool.

Clearly, not all megacities are equal in this regard. Each possesses unique physical, political, and social characteristics. Shenzhen is not like Delhi, nor like Mumbai or São Paulo. Even cities within the same nation

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demonstrate numerous crucial differences; consider Los Angeles and New York City.

What distinguishes well-run megacities from poorly-run ones are their capacities for maintaining economic systems, effective governance, and resilience. The people of New York City demonstrated such resilience through their public resolve and emergency response operations following the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center in 2001, and Superstorm Sandy in 2012. In both instances, there was sufficient leadership and emergency response capacity to keep the city running and commerce flowing. The people of Tokyo demonstrated similar resilience in the wake of the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami that devastated key infrastructure and displaced hundreds of thousands of people. By contrast, a natural disaster in a megacity like Lagos, challenged by its own ethnic tensions and internal governance struggles, might plunge the Nigerian government into chaos due to the scale of death, disease, and ensuing reconstruction costs, resulting in regional and international economic consequences.

Operational Challenges Presented by Megacities

Megacities can be best described as systems of systems, comparable to a living organism. They are dynamic environments that change not only block by block, but day to day. While this is not a new idea, the magnitude of the challenge to gain situational understanding is significantly greater due to the complexity, density, and scale of the physical and human terrain. Future intervention within these unique environments will likely be brought about by their vulnerability to humanitarian crises and suitability as safe havens for threats to the United States and its allies.

Because of their interrelationship within a nation or region's centers of gravity, megacities will likely have greater strategic value beyond material military advantage. The following complex challenges require close coordination between tactical actions and strategic objectives:

- Regional and international interconnectedness and centers of gravity
- Extended urban infrastructures supporting dense, diverse populations
- Formal and informal sources of power
- Congested and constraining terrain
- Interconnected, embedded threats across super-surface, surface, subsurface, and cyber/space

Mission execution in one megacity would be tough; working in several across the range of military operations at the same time might be horrendous. The US military could be conducting combat operations in and around a megacity overseas while simultaneously, a natural disaster affects one in the United States, requiring extensive humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations, analogous to Hurricane Katrina and Operation Iraqi Freedom that coincided in 2005, but on a significantly larger scale. At a minimum, mission planning in and around such environments involves the following considerations.

Strategically, leaders and planners must consider the rest of the country and region when examining megacities. Regardless of the type
of military operation, a primary objective is to provide safe and secure environments to facilitate effective governance. US military forces will likely support broader efforts directed by the US government or other entities whose priorities may limit freedom of action (e.g., limiting collateral damage). Many of the problems associated with megacities are not isolated, and are likely interconnected with national or regional problems. Such planning considerations are comparable to maintaining the health of a whole body versus treating symptoms (i.e., megacity slums). As an example, efforts to improve megacities will likely increase urban migration, setting conditions for problems to recur. Planning efforts may have to include options to improve conditions throughout the rest of the country as part of a whole-of-government approach.

Additionally, megacities possess critical vulnerabilities that favor an attacker due to the magnitude of resources needed to “keep them running.” The effective disruption or denial of energy, water, and/or food supply through isolation of key infrastructure nodes could affect millions within the span of a few days. These vulnerabilities will be areas for the US military to exploit or mitigate, depending on its role as the attacker, defender, or occupier.

Operationally, a key consideration is the adversaries’ ability to attack and exploit United States and Allied military vulnerabilities from megacities due to the resources available and ability to hide and operate within the population. Adversaries will continue to employ both advanced and simple technologies to avoid US strengths, emulate US capabilities, disrupt US technological advantages, and to expand operations to the US homeland. US and Allied vulnerabilities also might include dependency on improved ports or intermediate staging bases to deploy and employ forces, as well as an inability to secure lines of communication through extended urban areas. Population congestion and/or a persistent threat environment may also prohibit basing, movement, and maneuver within urban areas. In addition to the physical urban terrain that would favor a defending conventional force, unregulated cities with poor social services also provide havens for other threats such as terrorists. While this is true of urban areas in general, the scale of a megacity will likely exceed military capacity to execute operations effectively.

Tactically, civil and environmental considerations will likely strain governance and law enforcement:

- Physical land constraints
- Energy, water, and sanitation demands
- Vehicular congestion
- Aging infrastructure
- Entrenched criminal networks
- Political corruption/gridlock

Modern-day buildings and dense shanty-towns provide ample cover and concealment for threats to maneuver, hide, and operate. Essentially,

megacities have the potential to be developed by defenders into hundreds, if not thousands, of individual mutually supporting fortresses and obstacles.\footnote{DiMarco, \textit{Attacking the Heart and Guts: Urban Operations through the Ages}, 21.}

Urban terrain significantly favors defense through streets, buildings, etc., that canalize maneuver and inhibit an attacker’s ability to mass effects. As a result, small-scale attacks are more likely to impact a significantly larger and more technologically advanced force. A few dozen landmines and some concertina wire employed as minefields in the desert would likely have minimal impact on a mechanized battalion’s ability to maneuver. However, in an urban environment those same obstacles would likely block units in a column formation, making them ripe for attack. While bypass opportunities will likely exist due to the number of side streets available or since a megacity’s scale exceeds a defender’s capacity, gaining situational understanding to employ multiple avenues of approach will be a challenge.

In addition to major combat operations, the planning considerations to execute and resource missions such as humanitarian aid and disaster relief are equally formidable. As a reference point, Hurricane Katrina in late August 2005 displaced upwards of one million people across multiple states in the US Gulf Region. The search-and-rescue and relief effort required the mobilization and employment of over 72,000 soldiers, sailors, and airmen across the Active, Reserve, and National Guard forces in conjunction with federal, state, and local agencies. US military forces supporting Joint Task Force Katrina helped distribute and manage the delivery of over 1.7 million gallons of water, 3.6 million meals, and 11.5 million pounds of ice, in addition to providing evacuation and emergency medical care for thousands of people.\footnote{James A. Wombell, \textit{Army Support to the Hurricane Katrina Disaster} (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009), 173.} The logistics to execute disaster relief operations was equally substantial, requiring the following resources just to sustain the Active component forces:

- 815,000 cases of Meals Ready to Eat (MREs)
- 215,000 lbs of ice
- 837,000 bottles of water
- 1.3 million gallons of fuel
- 142,000 gallons of potable water \footnote{Ibid., 174.}

A natural disaster in a megacity overseas, potentially impacting millions, would create a demand far exceeding both host nation support capacity and the distribution capability of any realistic initial US military response. Other considerations involve priorities of effort: would it be more advantageous to move international aid or focus on the host nation’s capacity? To what degree should US forces utilize non-state entities and organizations (e.g. tribal militias) that are more effective in providing security and essential services than the host nation? There are no easy answers to those questions.

For example, the initial US military response will likely not have the capacity to execute a humanitarian aid/disaster relief operation in...
a megacity unilaterally and require host nation interaction. However, a corrupt or ineffective host nation regime would likely hoard or skim off US humanitarian aid for distribution to its ruling elites, driving existing social tensions further towards violence or worse yet, increase the risk of loss of life due to privation and disease as experienced in Haiti 2010 from corrupt police and government officials. Conversely, US military utilization of an effective but ethnic minority runs the risk of the host nation interpreting the action as an endorsement of a political threat and strain US relations with the country.

The Search for Ideas

Studying the challenges that megacities present in order to turn new ideas into concepts capable of addressing urban operations is not new to the Army. In fact, megacities were the basis of Unified Quest in 2004. Prompted by dynamic changes in the operational environment, in particular the impact of technological advances and their global proliferation during the past 10 years, as well as enduring operational problems related to complex urban environments, the Future Warfare Division of the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) once again focused on megacities for Unified Quest 2014. Over 300 subject matter experts from across the military, government, academic, and scientific community participated in a series of studies and seminar wargames over the course of the year to reveal the following insights, operational approach ideas, and their implications for consideration:

Planning operations in and around the megacity must incorporate the capabilities of all unified action partners, requiring the Army to re-evaluate and modify current information sharing and communications interoperability procedures and regulations such as AR 380-5, Department of the Army Information Security Program and AR 380-10, Foreign Disclosure and Contacts with Foreign Representatives. Current trends indicate the United States will likely not unilaterally respond to an international crisis without support and authority from the international community. Some partners will remain traditional, such as government agencies, allied military forces, and the host nation. However, examining the megacity environment revealed the need for the Army to consider non-traditional partners as potential sources of support and not just opposition, even if some have an aversion to working with the military (e.g. non-governmental aid organizations) and some that US government may be averse to engaging (e.g. shadow governments, tribal militias). While many potential partners will be influential, they will also be the most difficult to understand. Timely, comprehensive coordination and information sharing to gain and maintain understanding and dialogue with these of types of partners will be vital, but likely remain contested under current policies and procedures such as the vetting process for releasing information that can take several weeks or even months.

Additionally, future land forces require the capability and capacity to gain and maintain situational understanding of the incredibly complex environment (physical, human, information, etc.) of megacities. The Army must therefore reconsider the units and capabilities allocated for its Regionally Aligned Forces to enable more persistent engagement and civilian-to-military planning in that region, in particular that region’s megacities, with intelligence collection capabilities adapted to the complex urban terrain. Mass collection and big data analysis will be critical to handle the volume of information, in addition to enhancing human intelligence capabilities, with an emphasis on developing social networks. The Army should consider either developing this big data/human intelligence analysis capability internally within its intelligence and cyber communities, or resourcing it through contracts supporting Department of Defense agencies.

Maneuvering in megacities involves crossing multiple physical and virtual domains simultaneously, requiring the Army, as part of the joint community, to re-evaluate current policy on offensive tactical level cyber towards developing that capability. Currently, the employment of offensive cyber is under US Code Title 50, *War and National Defense*, not US Code Title 10, *Armed Forces*. Granted, while having great potential, offensive cyber at the tactical and operational level also possesses several potential repercussions and unintended consequences if employed (e.g. cyber-attack affecting both enemy and friendly systems) and methods to accurately conduct battlefield damage assessment from a cyber-attack still need to be developed. Nevertheless, it remains highly likely adversary threats will continue developing and employing offensive cyber, and defensive cyber countermeasures will likely not be enough in the future.

The Army, in conjunction with the joint community, needs to develop more operational approaches to conduct missions in and around megacities to give commanders and their staffs more options. Current doctrinal models for conducting major combat operations in urban terrain apply methods consistent with a siege where the attacking forces isolate the city to “starve the defenders out” or attrition-based warfare where attacking forces seize control through street-to-street fighting against the defending force. While the Army has several capabilities suitable for urban operations, the Army needs options beyond either siege or attrition based approaches or bypassing because the scale of requirements presents a capacity challenge for future forces. The Army will likely not have enough force to seize an entire megacity and will have to focus on a specific mission area and apply different approaches for access and maneuver. Congestion in all domains will significantly impede traditional forms of movement and maneuver that may not even involve armed enemy threats; anti-access and area denial of a seaport or airfield could be achieved through sheer mass of humanity from displaced persons and refugees.

As an example, the following six proposed operational approaches for joint urban operations by the team supporting the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program at the Institute of Defense Analyses may warrant further examination towards concept development:

- **Precision Strike** involves the employment of highly accurate attacks through remotely delivered smart munitions, special operations direct
action, and/or ground attack by fire to destroy, fix, and suppress detected adversary capabilities from stand-off distance to isolate them from resupply and reinforcement sources without occupying ground.19

- **Nodal Capture** involves the control of critical nexus points (structural and non-structural) in the city to deny adversary sources of support and freedom of movement, and prevent contact between adversary forces.20

- **Nodal Capture and Expansion** builds on the Nodal Capture approach through leveraging control of the critical nexus points to facilitate capture of the entire city.

- **Soft Point Capture and Expansion** employs seizure of undefended areas of the city and uses them as bridgeheads for decisive, multiple attacks.

- **Segment and Capture** employs counter-mobility to fix adversary forces to the extent that they lose the ability to mass for offensive or defensive purposes and can be defeated piecemeal.

- **Nodal Isolation** is the approach to psychologically and/or physically seal off critical nexus points (structural or non-structural) from adversary forces to deny them sources of support and freedom of movement, and prevent contact between adversary forces.21

The search for ideas and their development into viable concepts, capabilities, and ultimately, solutions should be an ongoing process requiring extensive study, engagement, dialogue, wargaming and experimentation across the military, government, scientific, and academic communities. While not an easy task to accomplish, the operational necessity to prepare the future force outweighs the institutional challenges associated with collaborative learning efforts.

**The Way Ahead**

The operational challenges inherent in megacities are significant, and given strategic trends, somewhat predictable. The Army must conduct additional research to determine how US forces can and will operate in and around such environments and develop the means to execute as part of a comprehensive improvement of the current and future force. Essentially, megacities epitomize complexity through physical and virtual environments that are dynamic, interconnected, and congested while spanning multi-dimensions in a scale that exceeds military capacity. For consideration are the following proposed actions:

**Reflect and Assess**

As this article argues, the study of urban terrain is clearly not a new endeavor, nor is the idea of megacities. The Army has the responsibility to reflect on work of the past (JFCOM, and others partners), assess lessons learned, and carry that understanding forward through the development of running estimates of past learning. For instance, Unified Quest assessed its own internal work in 2004 before reinvigorating its efforts addressing megacities in 2014. This approach ensures the

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20 Ibid., S-3.
21 Ibid., S-4.
Army does not relearn in areas where there are volumes of data, and use resources wisely to focus learning into the future.

**Learn and Test**

Wargaming and experimentation remain critical virtual components in the Army’s modernization strategy: Force 2025 and Beyond Maneuvers is the Army’s Campaign of Learning. As described, numerous wargaming efforts of the past (Unified Quest 2004, 2014) have addressed megacities from a strategic and operational context, supporting concept development. The next step is to drive experimentation which, at the operational, down to tactical and entity-based level, can further expand capabilities development in the critical areas necessary to win in this multi-domain environment (surface, sub-surface, maritime, air, cyber, and space).

**Build**

The Army lacks appropriate live-training areas that properly replicate the scale required to train at both the operational and tactical levels, platoon and above, in a megacity. The Joint Readiness Center’s Shughart-Gordon complex is useful for squad and below training, but lacks the multi-dimensional requirements for training in a megacity. As part of the physical component of Force 2025 and Beyond Maneuvers, the Army must build a live training environment to support the operational force as new concepts and capabilities develop into doctrine, training and material and other Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, & Personnel (DOTMLP) solutions requiring appropriate “F” - facilities to insure units are prepared. US Forces Command is developing options but the effort is understandably challenging given the fiscal environment. It is also understandable that Congress, with tough budget decisions ahead, will choose to support more current issues rather than to fund more mid and far-term projects. Thus, the Army should consider funding through other means, such as public-private ventures or federal-state options that can create value not only for the military, but for the public and private service sector as well. Overall, this kind of investment has the potential to pay great dividends and will move the Army forward more quickly in this endeavor.

**Collaborate**

The Army is connected with many academic institutions and government organizations thinking hard about the challenges of dense urban spaces. The Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) Strategic Studies Group (SSG), Research, Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM), and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASAALT) are all working to link concept and capability development. However, the Army needs to create an even greater collaborative research network to increase overall urban research capacity. This will allow for quicker identification of the critical needs of the Army today and in the future. Learning and collaboration can also be increased more rapidly through relations with our Allies and partners.

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One example of a major opportunity for increased learning in this space is via collaboration with the Singaporean Army, and its access to the Urban Redevelopment Center in Singapore. This center includes advanced urban development ideas and an extensive terrain model of the entire country, which is an example of the kind of terrain model extremely useful for the Army’s table-top wargames, needed to develop and assess new operational approaches to this emerging strategic trend. Collaborative research networks can assist the Army in moving forward more quickly with insights to help develop concepts and capabilities necessary to operate in megacities of the future.

Establish

The Army must establish a Megacities Center for Advanced Research and Collaboration, composed of strategists, concept and capability developers, academics, scientists, and international partners, as part of either the core component of this center, or as part of an advisory panel uniquely focused on this challenge. While megacities are unique environments, and centers are normally organized around functions, this challenge is so significant it requires focused effort. This center would help develop operational theories and approaches, test them, and track academic progress at all institutions within the Army’s collaborative network. It would also work closely with operational commanders to educate them on the possibilities for satisfying their unique, geographically specific urban challenges through the integration of learning across the Army’s functional Centers of Excellence (Maneuvers, Fires, etc.). The center will also educate leaders and support their development, and increase focused learning through wargaming and experimentation. It could also establish professor and student exchanges with other partners and interorganizational labs and centers to create more engagement, thinking and solution development for the unique, challenging operational environment of the megacity.

Sustain

Finally, sustaining collaboration, learning and testing is important to ensure the Army is constantly assessing current assumptions and identifying new challenges within the operational environment, and new opportunities from the science and technology community. There are many tools to accomplish this task. Arguably, one of the most useful tools is Army Warfighting Challenges (AWFCs). AWFCs are enduring first order problems, the solutions to which improve the combat capability of the current and future force. This tool is proving very effective today in creating unity of effort around solution strategies within the Army’s Campaign of Learning. AWFCs will ensure sustained collaboration and drive unity of effort in support of concept and capability development for dealing with the challenges of the megacity.

Conclusion

Although efforts such as Unified Quest and studies by the Institute of Defense Analyses and other related organizations examined the challenges of urbanization and megacities over the years, the problems they identified were far from solved and still require extensive work. Megacities represent the most likely and most dangerous aspects of the
current and future operational environments, requiring the Army, as part of the Joint force, to develop new approaches, concepts, and, capabilities, and ultimately, solutions.

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**MEGACITIES: PROS AND CONS**

The Case *against* Megacities

Michael Evans

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**ABSTRACT:** Certain kinds of urban areas may become increasingly common for armed conflict in the 21st century. However, current notions that the megacity will emerge as a primary battlespace for advanced armies is an unproven hypothesis. US strategists need to avoid rushing to replace population-centric counterinsurgency with a paradigm of population-centric megacity operations. A preferable path is to develop a long-term and systematic interdisciplinary urban warfare lens based on careful research and analysis that is both historically informed and future-oriented.

*It has generally proved easier to demonstrate that defense has played an important role in many aspects of the city than to show that the city has played a role in military science.*


One of the major weaknesses of recent American strategy is its relative neglect of an urban imperative. The study of urban warfare continues to remain little more than a sub-field of strategic studies with a literature largely unrelated to the world of contemporary security policy.¹ For these reasons, it is a great pity the publication of the US Army’s June 2014, *Megacities and the United States Army: Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future* is such a disappointing attempt to invigorate the relationship between strategy and the city.² The report’s central premise that megacities – defined as cities with populations over ten million – now represent “the epicenters of human activity on the planet and, as such, they will generate most of the friction which compels future military intervention” is a selective interpretation of the highly complex process of 21st century global urbanization. Moreover, the suggestion that the scale of megacities “defies the military’s ability to apply historical methods” and therefore is “fundamentally a new operating environment to which the Army must shape itself and discover new approaches” is exaggerated. Such a view overlooks the continuing value of a body of post-Cold War military research, some of which was, ironically, commissioned by the US Army itself. A final flaw in *Megacities and the United States Army* is its typology, which by focusing mainly on a systems-analysis methodology illuminates the document’s neglect of


relevant research material on cities emanating from the long-established field of urban studies.3

In light of the above weaknesses, this article argues the US Army would be ill-served to concentrate overly on megacities as a primary strategic environment for three further reasons. First, megacities are not necessarily the principal urban areas in which American forces may be called upon to fight in the future. Rather, middleweight and smaller cities remain just as likely to provide important operational environments in the years ahead. Second, megacities are not sui generis; they do not represent a novel military phenomenon. The military processes of operating in any city are drawn from fundamentals of urban warfare tried and tested by land forces since at least the middle of the twentieth century. Future technological developments notwithstanding, most fundamentals of urban warfare are likely to remain relevant for general-purpose forces even in a conglomeration on the scale of a megacity. Third, the US Army needs to embed the study of megacities into a rigorous program of long-term urban war research that is both interdisciplinary in theory and interagency in practice. Such a program must systematically integrate military concerns with relevant aspects of municipal management, urban geography, and city planning.

Cities as Strategic Sites: The Growing Importance of the Middleweight City

In terms of demographic disposition, the greatest revolutionary shift of the first quarter of the twenty-first century is the movement of people from countryside to city. In 2007, half the world passed the benchmark of fifty percent of its population being located in urban areas while urban demography now grows at some 65 million every year – a breakneck rate of speed equivalent to the creation of seven new Chicagos annually.4 Not surprisingly, the urban revolution has spawned a debate on the meaning of this transition for the world’s future economic structure and geopolitical stability.5 For some analysts, mass urbanization is a prescription for growing anarchy, violent political breakdown, and ecological decline in the developing world. Pessimists foresee a coming era of “feral cities” in which conflict will be “crowded, connected and coastal” and occur in failed megalopolises from Karachi and Dhaka in Asia, to Kinshasa and Lagos in Africa.6

3 Ibid., 4-5, 8-9.
While such a dystopian future is certainly a possibility for some non-Western cities, much urban studies research tends to view the transition from a rural to an urban world as one of the twenty-first century’s most positive developments since it will drive economic growth and social mobility. Urbanization is seen by many scholars as a solution to alleviating long-term poverty and political instability in regions from Asia through Latin America to some parts of the Middle East and Africa. It is important to note that over 40 percent of urbanization is occurring in Asia, particularly in China and India. As Richard Dobbs has noted, “the new era of cities will actually be the era of Asian cities.” By 2025, 1.6 billion Asians – 50 percent of the global total will live in cities; nine of the world’s wealthiest twenty-five cities will be in Asia with Shanghai and Beijing expected to outrank Los Angeles and Paris, while Delhi and Bangkok will come to surpass Detroit and Barcelona. By the late 2020s, some $30 trillion, or 65 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP), will be generated by some six hundred cities, over a third of which will be in the developing world.

A crucial point for US military strategists to grasp is most projected urban growth in the developing world is not centered on a few megacity “population bombs,” but on a far more dispersed grouping of diverse middleweight cities whose populations range from between 150,000 to ten million. In 2011, the McKinsey Global Institute, a leading authority on global urbanization, observed:

Contrary to common perception, megacities have not been driving global growth for the past 15 years. In fact, many have not grown faster than their host economies and we expect this trend to continue. We estimate that today’s 23 megacities will contribute just over 10 per cent of global growth to 2025, below their 14 percent share of global GDP today . . . Instead we see the 577 fast-growing middleweights in the City 600 contributing half of global growth to 2025, gaining share from today’s megacities.

In 2012, McKinsey further identified an “Emerging 440” cities grouping projected to generate 47 percent of global growth, or $17.7 trillion to 2025 and beyond. Significantly, of this number, only twenty are categorized as megacities with the remainder being middleweight urban centers. Of these middleweights, over 200 are in China; fifty more are located in Latin America; while 39 are found in Africa and the Middle East. In many of these middleweight cities, growth is driven less by population density than by per capita GDP; the size of households actually tends to decline in many developing cities even while the number of households actually rises.

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8 Richard Dobbs, quoted in Susan Glasser, “Letter From the Editor,” Foreign Policy, no. 181 (September/October 2010): 1, emphasis in original.
Contrary to the US Army’s 2014 report, over the next ten to fifteen years, it is by no means inevitable that “megacities will be the strategic key terrain in any future crisis that requires US military intervention.” Instead, the real magnets for urbanization are a “new breed of vigorous middleweights.” For example, over the next decade, the thriving textile city of Surat in India and the Nigerian oil refining center of Port Harcourt are likely to become more important than megacities such as Mumbai or Lagos. None of this means new megacities will not develop from fast-growing middleweights – such as Chennai in India, Lahore in Pakistan, Tianjin and Shenzhen in China, or simply emerge from scratch in a “blank slate” high-technology or “smart city” approach.

However, the point for military strategists to grasp is that, in terms of long-term demographic migration, household size and income distribution, it is the maze of middleweight cities that are poised to be the key urban sites for the next two decades. An alternative structure of urbanization is rapidly emerging, and as the leading social scientist, Saskia J. Sassen, has pointed out, what really matters when analyzing cities is less their demographic size than their politico-economic influence both regionally and globally. In terms of such influence many middleweight cities are likely to become as strategically important as megacities and may even eclipse the latter in terms of economic power and geopolitical significance. By 2025, middleweight-city share of global GDP is expected to jump from 15 to 45 percent and their populations will grow from 430 million to 1.5 billion. Referring to West Africa, the McKinsey Global Institute notes, “we expect large middleweights and some small middleweights to outperform the region’s largest city of Lagos.”

While some writers, such as P. H. Liotta and James F. Miskel, view megacities as unprecedented phenomena. “overwhelmed, dangerous, ungovernable . . . unlike anything the earth has ever seen,” other analysts are more skeptical. As the urban specialist, Joel Kotkin, argues, “the rise of the megacity is by no means inevitable and it might not even be happening.” He points to the evolution of more dispersed urban migration in the developing world based on diversity rather than concentration. It is certainly true that recent patterns of city development are distinguished less by centralization than by decentralized clusters and networks such as those around the metropolis of Shanghai in the Yangtse River Delta in China. Sprawling megacities such as Mumbai, Lagos and Dhaka may well be shambolic, poverty stricken, and crime-ridden, but these features do not necessarily make them centers for future military crises. As Jonathan Kalan points out, given the variations

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13 Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Megacities and the United States Army, 5.
18 Ibid., 31.
at play in global urbanization, we need to beware simplistic representations of megacities as “the looming development crisis of this century.”22

On closer examination, megacities such as Mumbai, which appear to Westerners to be fragile tinderboxes, may prove to be far more complex, resilient, and functional when judged in terms of their indigenous dynamics. For example, despite its poverty and slum living, Mumbai, scene of a devastating seaborne-terrorist attack by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in 2008, has sought to focus on increasing social mobility by developing decentralized municipalities and promoting suburbism. Moreover, Mumbai contributes six percent to India’s GDP despite having only 1.5 percent of the national population.23 Similarly, Dhaka in Bangladesh, reputedly “the least livable city on the planet,” has a per capita GDP three times that of the average Bangladeshi peasant and is, in national terms, relatively prosperous.24 Finally, we should remember a city in crisis in one era is not necessarily doomed to a dystopian future. A good example is Medellin in Colombia which, in the 1980s and 1990s approximated a failed city dominated by drug lords, vast criminal networks and socio-political alienation. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, Medellin has transformed itself by reforming a civic leadership that overhauled policing and developed an innovative urban infrastructure program which increased the size of its middle class and reduced its murder rate by sixty percent.25

For the US Army, some cities may well become future operating environments. However, the idea that megacities will become a primary strategic environment for American land power is, to date, an unproven hypothesis. It may be an uncomfortable truth for the authors of Megacities and the United States Army, but in the years ahead megalopolises may be of far less strategic significance than clusters of decentralized, middle-weight metropolises. The available evidence certainly points to the need for military researchers to avoid falling prey to any single form of urban determinism.

Extending the Fundamentals of Urban Warfare

Contrary to the view expressed in Megacities and the United States Army, megalopolises do not “def[y] the military’s ability to apply historical methods” nor are they “fundamentally a new operating environment” that invalidates past research.26 Even a cursory examination of the history of industrialized urban warfare yields a set of enduring characteristics that must be studied by today’s military professionals irrespective of the size of any urban conurbation.27 These enduring characteristics include a dynamic, non-linear environment defying easy military command and

25 Ibid.
26 Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Megacities and the United States Army, 8.
control; the frequent fragmentation of combat due to the density and scale of modern city architecture; the importance of direct-fire weapons in clearing streets and buildings; the problem of large civilian populations in cities; the rapid absorption of troops in built-up urban areas; the psychological-physical strain on soldiers engaged in urban fighting; and the need for a combined arms approach to operations.28

None of these features is likely to be rendered obsolete in future years. After all, if one accepts that a megacity is itself an extension of a smaller or middleweight city, then, it stands to reason that urban military operations are highly unlikely to be conjured from scratch but are themselves extensions and applications of known methods. Despite steady technological advances in precision munitions, robotics, and thermobaric weapons, little that is revolutionary appears to be occurring in urban warfare operational research.29 Potential operations in megacities remain likely to differ only in scale and density from those of the past. Megalopolises will, like all city types, continue to confront military professionals with the time-honored challenge of “an endless variety of structures and facilities the seizure or control of which demands esoteric plans, programs, and procedures, since no two cities are quite alike.”30 For these reasons, most military planners of modern urban operations have wisely focused on the role performed by troops rather than the environment inhabited by them. It is no accident the armies that have succeeded in modern urban warfare – from the Russians in Stalingrad and Berlin through US forces in Manila, Hue and Fallujah to the Israelis in Gaza – have been general purpose forces with a high degree of experience in small unit tactics and combined arms operations.31

If the past of urban warfare remains important to understand, then the interdisciplinary research completed in the years between 1991 and 2004 represents yet another important foundation for future study. It is worth noting that military analysts such as Paul van Riper, Roger Spiller, Robert H. Scales, Alice Hills, and Robert C. Owen published findings on the role of the city in future warfare.32 Much of this work occurred in the early years of globalization and the information revolution, but it is notable for its intellectual rigor and insight and it deserves to be consulted closely in any project concerning the role of megacities in future conflict.

Accordingly, some of the main ideas of the urban warfare scholars of the 1990s and early 2000s are worth re-emphasizing here.

The British scholar, Alice Hills, whose 2004 book, *Future War in Cities* was a milestone in interdisciplinary urban warfare research, has highlighted the reality that military operations in cities remain highly diverse and heterogeneous. She argues that strategists have failed to provide an interdisciplinary, higher-level conceptual framework for policy makers and military practitioners:

> Developing a [Western] strategic understanding of urban operations . . . requires the reconciliation of contradictory and stressful relations, such as those existing between the security imperatives of coercion, warfighting and destruction on the one hand, and humanitarian relief, globalisation and technological development on the other. And it needs the imagination to look beyond current scenarios and interests.\(^{33}\)

For Hills, while a “strategic grammar of urban warfare” has emerged, a strategic logic determined by politics to guide future military operations in cities remains elusive.\(^{34}\) Other analysts in the years between the fall of the Soviet Union and the post-9/11 wars became concerned that populist notions of urban warfare would distort realistic research. Robert C. Owen warned Western military establishments against falling prey to a fascination with *Blade Runner*-style visions of “barbarian megalopolises,” which he believed owed more to Hollywood visions of dystopia than to hard-headed strategic analysis.\(^{35}\) Writing in 2001, Owen argued the real problem facing advanced militaries confronted by urban operations was the paradox that “the [non-state] groups most willing to fight in cities will have the least capabilities to do so, while the ones most able to fight large-scale urban battles will be least willing to do so.”\(^{36}\) Owen drew an interesting parallel between urban operations and maritime littoral warfare which has continuing resonance. He suggested a strategic approach to fighting in large cities might be fashioned from viewing these conurbations as “urban archipelagos” requiring skilled maneuver, containment, or isolation by joint forces.\(^{37}\)

Themes of containment and maneuver were also evident in the work of Robert H. Scales and Paul van Riper and are still useful to consider today. As former senior military practitioners, both writers sought to synthesize operational and strategic concerns in urban operations. Scales advocated a highly discriminate strategy of urban warfare embracing containment of cities and the exploitation of high-technology assets for selective strikes and the seizure of decisive points and nodes using joint forces.\(^{38}\) He suggested high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles and precision munitions used against point targets might deplete a surrounded city’s resources and wear down an enemy force’s will.\(^{39}\) Scales recom-

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34 Ibid., 244-246 and Hills, *Future War in Cities: Rethinking a Liberal Dilemma*, 26, 225.
36 Ibid., 29-30
37 Ibid.
mended an economy of force approach remarking that, in future urban military operations, strategic planners needed to be constantly aware of one central truth: “America’s treasure house of close-combat soldiers is only marginally larger than the New York City Police Department.”

Given contemporary challenges of downsizing and fiscal austerity this warning is arguably more relevant than ever. Similarly, van Riper, an experienced Marine general, was wary of grinding frontal assaults in urban warfare. He argued in favor of applying a “chameleon” style of urban maneuver in city fighting (blended movement into the city environment) using concepts such as “multi-spectral mobility” (the capability to move combat power rapidly through three-dimensional urban terrain); and “measured firepower” (integrating fire and movement within given rules of engagement).

By the mid-2000s, as America and its allies became engulfed by irregular conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, generic urban warfare research declined in the United States. Much of the urban conflict research agenda after 2004 was subsumed by the avalanche of material on counterinsurgency, the stabilization of fragile states, and hybrid warfare at the operational level of war. As a result, in 2015, the major problem facing military thinkers when considering urban military contingencies, namely synthesizing the variance and divergence of urban environments into a usable strategic framework for policy makers, continues to remain unresolved.

An Inter-Disciplinary Urban Lens

While an urban strategic lens remains underdeveloped in American studies of armed conflict, the solution to this challenge is not to turn the megacity into a single “unit of analysis,” but rather to study the etiology of city development. Such an endeavor requires a multi-disciplinary research program in which to situate analysis of varied cityscapes with their interactive spatial dynamics and heterogeneous populations.

In short, the real novelty in operating in twenty-first century cities lies less in new military methodologies for megacities than in the essential task of integrating and adapting established doctrine and concepts into a systematic interdisciplinary strategic-level engagement with the field of urban studies. As one major international study notes, “no single disciplinary perspective can capture the inherent complexities of using military force in urban areas.” The effort to develop an urban strategic lens needs to embrace military history, human geography and sociology; city planning and architectural design; municipal management procedures; criminology, policing and the employment of emergency services. Systems-theory as outlined by analysts such as David Kilcullen and favored in Megacities and the United States Army may have its uses. However, such an approach represents only one avenue of inquiry for researchers seeking to understand the military implications of the modern urban

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43 Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Megacities and the United States Army, 9.
44 Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Small Arms Survey: Guns and the City (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 188.
environment’s mixture of demographic and topographical features. It is this unique combination which makes any city environment multidimensional – at once a social organism, a human-made physical form and an economic system.

The integration of urban studies into strategy needs to be conducted with intellectual care and discrimination. Analysts need to distinguish between high-intensity crime by urban gangs and syndicates concerned with profit and forms of low-intensity warfare by armed urban activists driven by politics; and between mass-casualty urban terrorist acts on the Mumbai, Nairobi, and Paris models and well-organized and prolonged campaigns of urban warfare on the Hamas or Hezbollah models. Military strategists also need to treat current postmodernist ideas of a “new military urbanism” based on an ideology of Western “orientalism” that pits “their sons against our silicon” with skepticism. Such work owes more to the science fiction of Judge Dredd – in which megacities replace nations as the world’s dominant political units, and high-technology Street Judges battle low-technology urban hordes for supremacy – than it does to mainstream military art.

Integrating aspects of urban studies into strategic considerations has the potential to improve our knowledge in at least three areas relevant to future warfare: examining cities as strategic sites, understanding global and regional city variations, and deriving procedures for city operations from municipal principles of security control. In examining cities as strategic sites, military practitioners and policy makers need to begin to view metropolises as human conurbations reflecting all the complexities of large-scale urban planning. In effect, to master cities, the military strategist must assume much of the mindset of an urban planning executive. In city operations, control of civil infrastructure from water purification and electricity through garbage removal to securing medical infrastructure and public transport are all invested with strategic significance. If city operations are to be a common future environment for American and allied forces, then an urban strategic lens must be developed, which can help determine policy choices on the practicality and size of interventions in cities, formulate rules of engagement, and provide advice on the roles military forces might play in those urban contingencies.

The second area of relevant research, namely, assessing the global and regional variation between cities, has the potential to put megacities into a balanced strategic context. As already noted earlier, a diverse web of middleweight cities is likely to develop in regions such as Asia, Latin America, and Africa as a counterpoint to sprawling, ill-governed megalopolises. Such a process represents a complex pattern of urbanization and requires the closest strategic analysis by defense specialists. In

this area, military researchers can draw profitably on the work of a range of urban theorists. The latter include Robert Neuwirth and Thomas Sieverts whose work on “shadow cities” and the Zwischenstadt or “cities without cities” respectively highlights the replacement of many centralised urban conglomerations by clustered “city webs” in a checkerboard of dense enclaves and social networks.\(^5\) If the city is to be understood accurately as a future strategic environment, then the US Army must invest in research that distinguishes between the global city of influence, the megacity of sprawl, and the emerging middleweight city and between peri-urban, semi-urban, and inner-urban forms of human habitation.

A third area requiring military attention is a study of municipal principles of security control. Evidence suggests in decentralized conditions or in urban areas lacking governance, military efforts to control violence are best concentrated on creating municipal or community-level forms of security.\(^5^1\) For command and control purposes, military professionals can gain insights into cities by studying a law-enforcement typology of coercion, compliance, and voluntarism at local community level. Such a typology reveals control methods ranging from coercive “gated communities” and forcible disarmament; through compliance measures that involve community policing; to voluntarism involving amnesties and citizen neighborhood watch schemes.\(^5^2\)

**Conclusion**

The modern city remains the least understood of potential conflict environments, and strategic theory clearly lags behind military practice. However, classifying one form of urbanization in the form of megacities as primary strategic sites for future American military intervention is not viable. Indeed, such an approach may turn out to be misleading because global urbanization is highly diverse and is, in fact, producing far more middleweight cities than megalopolises. In the developing world, some of these vibrant middleweight cities with their migration clusters and economic hubs may come to assume more strategic importance than stagnant megacities with declining populations. Moreover, having just experienced over a decade of war, the US Army is now entering a period of downsizing and reorganization driven by the demands of domestic fiscal austerity. The American profession of arms therefore needs to be wary of replacing the controversial experiment of population-centric counterinsurgency with the equally untested hypothesis of population-centric megacity warfare.

The quickest way to degrade American combat power will be to deploy large numbers of troops into a megacity without a thorough examination of how the complex dynamics of global urbanization are likely to unfold.

When it comes to cities, large and small, security analysts need to understand there will always be a natural set of tensions between the general purpose role of modern landpower and the unique features of


\(^{52}\) Ibid.
urban environments stemming from the combination of demography and topography.

There are many diverse kinds of urban contingencies to consider in a wide-range of urban localities: from all-out combat operations through humanitarian relief and the creation of protected enclaves and evacuation corridors to littoral operations. Given such diversity, military professionals need to be careful they do not pursue any single avenue of research that might prove to be a policy cul-de-sac. A close study of the phenomenon of urbanization as a future conflict environment is justified, but a convincing case for the megacity as a primary strategic environment for US forces has yet to be made.
ABSTRACT: The urban environment is a known vulnerability for US forces, and it grows more acute as megacities increase around the world. This article describes past research and joint experimentation efforts concerning urban environments and identifies critical gaps for further research and experimentation. A more committed Joint Force constituency, led by the US Army, can lead to better readiness in this area.

The US Army is currently examining the topic of megacities and how to train, organize, and equip itself for successful operations in them. As a recent report from the Army Chief of Staff’s Strategic Studies Group stressed, “it is inevitable that at some point the United States Army will be asked to operate in a megacity and currently the Army is ill-prepared to do so.” As other authors have noted, Army researchers have determined megacities, urban concentrations exceeding 10 million people, will be the most complex environments for future land operations. Global growth trends also suggest the importance of such complex environments is increasing, “…since the places where people live are getting increasingly crowded, urban, coastal and networked, the wars people fight will take on the same characteristics.”

Given such trends, the Army is justified in asking whether current urban operating concepts and capabilities will suffice to accomplish future national security objectives. Numerous studies related to urban operations exist, all with different focus areas and outcomes, some of which are inconsistent or incomplete. In fact, as this article maintains, the current Department of Defense (DoD) urban strategy is on an uncertain trajectory and is in need of new leadership.

Until its closure in 2011, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) supported other geographic combatant commands advocating for, and developing, future concepts for joint warfighting. However, the closure of JFCOM and its inability to obtain approval of a Joint Capabilities Document stalled urban concept development. Perhaps JFCOM was never the best choice for this endeavor but merely a pragmatic one, given the Army’s preoccupation with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, DoD needs another organization to refresh its dated urban strategy and capitalize on JFCOM’s prior work.

1 Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Megacities and the United States Army: Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future (Arlington, VA: Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Megacities Concept Team, June 2014), 3.
What organization is best suited for addressing this projected challenge? Establishing yet another ad hoc joint task force is neither optimal or desirable. Giving responsibility to the Joint Staff seems misplaced because it is not charged with organizing, training, and equipping the force. Creating a joint program office is an option, but only desirable if one of the military services is willing to lead as the Joint Executive Agent. The Title X statute prescribes that the three services organize, train, and equip their respective forces. It is unlikely the Air Force or Navy would give priority to this effort. The Marine Corps contributes greatly to urban concept development; however, the Marine Corps as an amphibious force does not view urban operations as a core competency. Among the services, the Army provides the largest share of the capability and capacity for operating in urban environments. As the nation’s predominant land force, the task of reviving DoD’s dormant urban strategy logically falls to the Army.

**Originating Directives**

The 2014 Army Operating Concept (AOC) builds a narrative of future warfare describing urban operating environments as likely to have “significant impact on land force operations.” Clearly, land forces must prepare for all future operating environments and cannot organize, train, and equip exclusively for urban battle-spaces. Forces should be tailored to provide the maximum flexibility to deal with a wide range of operating environments, conflicts, and contingencies. The Army must transform current forces with new capabilities for urban operating environments. In short, the central problem for the Army is: how to balance envisioned requirements for urban operations with other future demands.

In 2000, a Government Accounting Office report stated: “despite a growing unease that the urban environment is a known vulnerability of US forces, DoD has not made a major commitment to dramatically improve urban capabilities.” It thus recommended, “the Secretary of Defense designate a focal point for developing strategy for improving US urban operations capability; identifying doctrine, training, and equipment shortcomings; proposing and prioritizing investments; and coordinating service and Joint efforts in this regard.”

In the wake of this recommendation and directives issued in the 2001 Defense Planning Guidance, US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) commissioned the Institute for Defense Analyses to develop a roadmap. This roadmap provides “directions to pursue in order to improve significantly the capabilities of future Joint Force Commanders to conduct military operations involving urban terrain.” The 370-page document took eight people, eighteen months to draft. The *Joint Urban Operations*...
Megacities: Pros and Cons


The Master Plan is a DoD-wide strategy from the Secretary of Defense to all DoD components. JFCOM became the DoD Executive Agent forming a Joint Program Office to lead DoD concept development and experimentation. Executive agency gave JFCOM technology-transfer authority allowing it to structure partnerships with industry, exchange technical data, make technology assessments, and collaborate on research and development efforts. Any organization charged with similar responsibility would benefit greatly from this type of arrangement.

JFCOM’s Urban Roadmap

JFCOM held a human-in-the-loop, concept-based experiment to explore new concepts in urban operations. This joint experiment, Urban Resolve, ran from 2004 to 2006. The Army Dismounted Battle Lab examined key elements of the Army Concept and Capability Development Plan using Urban Resolve as its capstone event for US Army Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) 2006 Experimentation Program. The exercise asked two questions:

1. How can we fight in urban terrain against an intelligent, determined, well-equipped adversary and win quickly without unacceptable casualties to ourselves or our allies, unacceptable civilian casualties, or unacceptable destruction of infrastructure? and;

2. How can we determine which concepts, materiel, tactics, techniques, and procedures are most effective for fighting in urban terrain?

Both questions remain relevant today - the latter particularly for the Army.

Following the exercise, conceptualizing an intellectual framework for further analytical and planning activities became a key task. The central problem became: “How to operate in an urban environment to defeat adversaries embedded and diffused within populated urban areas without causing catastrophic damage to the functioning of the society there.”

The moral imperative to protect noncombatants anticipates two additional doctrinal limitations for military forces: (1) minimize collateral damage to noncombatants; (2) preserve the urban network as much as possible so the human inhabitants not suffer needlessly.

JFCOM’s experimentation led to a Joint Integrating Concept which acknowledged: (1) “The distinctive features of cities – artificial terrain, human density, and supporting infrastructure – tend to negate Joint force strengths, and, (2) the future urban fight is – perhaps more than any other context of warfare – conditioned by the “battle of narratives” among combatants to secure legitimacy and authority in the eyes of a target population.”

Subsequently, Joint Publication 3.06, Joint Urban

8 Mike Postma (COL US Army), Urban Resolve 2015, Senior Executive After Action Review October 27, 2006, presented as part of After Action Review to Phase 2 of Urban Resolve 2015.
9 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
Operations (2013) grew from to the Joint Integrating Concept completed six years earlier.

Additionally, in 2008, the Joint Readiness Oversight Council reviewed a Joint Capabilities Document for Battlespace Awareness in Joint Urban Operations. This document mapped 212 tasks to achieve 12 capabilities; 141 of the tasks had one or more gaps. To identify possible solutions for closing these gaps, several analytic projects were proposed each with recommended sponsors. The council did not approve the document because proposed project sponsors, including the Army, were unwilling to participate.12

Shortly after the council’s decision, further urban experimentation stalled due to a shift in priority. The JFCOM Commander established a Joint Irregular Warfare Program Office, transferring primacy for urban operations and a portion of the budget to this new office. In 2011, JFCOM was deactivated, its documentation was archived, and staff realignments diluted its expertise and intuitional knowledge. Consequently, JFCOM experimentation has had little influence on Army decisions with regard to urban operations.

Army Megacity Experimentation

Besides JFCOM’s efforts, the Chief of Staff of the Army sponsored a series of “think-tank” exercises called, Unified Quest, which explored operations in megacities as part of its future study program in 2003. Unified Quest 2003 took a joint operational perspective for planning offensive operations in a fictional city of 17 million people defended by conventional, state-sponsored forces and popular forces.13 Notable insights included:

- The need for strong information operations;
- Special Operations Forces and indigenous allies are invaluable;
- Joint and Army sensors and precision strike weapons optimized for open warfare in uncluttered terrain are of limited value in cities;
- Stability and support activities will be inseparable from combat operations.

Following Unified Quest in 2003, the current version of Army Field Manual 3-06, Urban Operations, was revised. The new edition, published in October 2006, appears to need further review and updating.

In 2014, Army research fellows from the Chief of Staff of the Army’s Strategic Studies Group developed an appreciation for large urban populations by using case-study vignettes of megacities from around the world. Their white paper claimed megacities occupy strategic key terrain “making their stability necessary for global connectedness and order.”14 The paper continues, “The Army is currently unprepared…the Army must lead.”15

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14 Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Megacities and the United States Army: Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future, 5.
15 Ibid, 22.
Again in 2014, Unified Quest reassessed the issue of the US Army’s ability to conduct operations in megacities. This theme continues into 2015. Most of the observations made in 2014 focus on understanding the population, getting higher quality situational awareness information before and during operations, as well as a requirement to consider all aspects and methods of transportation. Concept development has focused on the operational environments: physical, social, and informational. ¹⁶

Other Experimentation and Research

Along with the Army Strategic Studies Group white paper, other joint and interagency work began in 2014. The Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment Program, an ad hoc group accepted by the Joint Staff, provides planning support to commands with complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinary solutions that are not within core service / agency competency. Solutions are being sought from across the US Government and academia.

In addition, a 2014 investigation explored megacities for Pacific Command. ¹⁷ The objective was to prototype a relevant, low-cost and effective method of producing early indication and tracking of the social, political, environmental, and economic sources of state and population fragility and failure in large urban environments. The intention was to provide a prototype assessment methodology broadly applicable to other commands and agencies. The Army now sponsors an off-shoot of the 2014 program through the Corps of Engineers.

The Urban Security Project is a methodology to develop geo-temporal map layers representing socio-cultural analysis indicators necessary for planning, assessment, and situational awareness. It uses spatio-temporal representation of populations and offers long-term monitoring of urban conditions. ¹⁸ Such analysis benefits ground forces during planning and execution of urban operations. One valuable resource for obtaining local information comes from indigenous law enforcement. The nexus of military ground forces and indigenous law enforcement further supports the Army as the pragmatic choice to implement urban strategy at the tactical level and test concepts in cities. Recent experience provides additional supporting evidence for designating the Army as executive agent.

The Army’s tactical familiarity with local law enforcement in Iraq provides another tangible and practical example of why the Army is best suited to lead urban operations. In most military operations, perhaps other than full-scale combat, land forces gain local knowledge and benefit from a close relationship with local law enforcement. Some resist the idea of US ground forces teaming with police forces. Corruption,

¹⁸ Charles R. Ehlschlager (US Army Engineer Research Development Center), interview with the author, December 3, 2014.
jurisdictional restrictions, and interference with military operations are some of the concerns. However, this reluctance must be overcome. Police forces provide “ground-truth” through their local knowledge and human intelligence through their informants. Just as a beat cop gains better situational understanding of neighborhoods, intelligence preparation of the battlefield must provide a keen sense of ground-truth. Indeed, indigenous police forces can become force multipliers when the US commits “boots-on-the-ground.”

Army Strategic Study Group researchers did not reference previous joint experimentation or joint concepts in their 2014 white paper on megacities; nor were Army researchers familiar with past joint work. The main reason for this omission was the demise of JFCOM, resulting in an incomplete integrative approach and inconsistent staff expertise.

JFCOM’s documents now reside in the National Archives. Knowledge from the results of past joint experimentation could prevent unnecessary duplication by Army staff officers now resuscitating urban concept development. Fortunately, lack of contextual, joint background is not slowing Army efforts.

The human domain and urban operating environments may redefine how the Army organizes, equips, and operates its formations and how it trains and educates its leaders. The Army is considering establishing an urban studies program, possibly at West Point, to educate leaders on societal and cultural nuances of the urban-based human domain. New Army leaders will enhance their cultural knowledge and language skills and refer to joint concepts that emphasize hybrid warfare, peace operations, and counterinsurgency as primary Army missions. The evolving paradigm is a big departure from the combined arms maneuver mantra mentioned earlier, “close with and destroy the enemy.”

Rather than a maneuver brigade combat team as the foundational organizing structure, concepts for conventional force formations in urban spaces could experiment with using tailored, smaller units possibly company-team size with embedded interagency and indigenous enablers. The full range of military operations into tactical urban operating environments could employ scalable, capabilities-based formations. The small unit organizing concept works well for Special Forces and is faster and easier to deploy to a theater, less cumbersome to maneuver and sustain in an urban environment, and values adaptive, flexible leaders – all current Army hallmarks. How willing are current senior Army leaders, raised on combined arms maneuver mantra, to invest in this new paradigm? The dialogue is intensifying now.

The Army as DoD’s Executive Agent

The 2014 Strategic Study Group white paper convinced Army leadership that megacities (a term no longer in vogue with many in the Army–dense urban population centers appears to be the preferred term now) are a challenge uniquely relevant to land forces. The 2014 Army Operating Concept envisions urban areas as central to the Army’s future

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operative environment.\textsuperscript{20} However, after 15 years of urban study, it appears US land forces are still vulnerable in those environments.

Given this premise, seeking DoD executive agency and the requisite authorities it provides is warranted. By pursuing executive agency Army leadership signals commitment to joint urban concept development and permits the Army to provide an integrative, functional leader for the Joint Force. The Joint Chiefs should promote the restoration of DoD executive agency for Joint Urban Operations and recommend shifting JFCOM’s former role to the Army. As Joint Executive Agent the Army should regain DoD authority, responsibility, and funding curtailed after JFCOM’s disestablishment. Updating DoD’s Joint Urban Operations Master Plan will result in better collective joint readiness under Army leadership.

Developing a narrative for a renewed urban strategy that resonates with senior DoD executives is a critical next hurdle. Army options for future structure and risk center on what kind of warfighting they will encounter. Army leadership should advocate for a Secretary of Defense approved urban campaign as part of a defense planning scenario to establish a valid program requirement in a future Army program objective memorandum.

The Army must evaluate urban force capability needs across the full range of military operations, determine how that capability differs from traditional conventional force needs for other operating environments, and make force development investment decisions to organize, train, and equip the force. However, there is a shortfall in solid analysis supporting assessment of force capability options and definition of Army requirements. Preparing for urban operations will become vital for land forces and should be the purview of the Army. Concept development within the Army transitions to Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and will become the responsibility of Army Capabilities Integration Center by June 2015.\textsuperscript{21}

Comparing JFCOM’s and the Army’s Approaches

Once the Army succeeds in establishing joint executive agency, it must resolve discrepancies between Army and joint concepts. Comparative analysis finds that with few exceptions, current Army Strategic Studies Group thinking aligns well with joint concepts. One example of a critical disparity between joint and Army concepts stems from an Army doctrinal requirement to isolate an urban area and to approach it incrementally from the periphery of the city.

In contrast, the Strategic Studies Group white paper stated, “For megacities, both of the assumptions [isolation and operating from the periphery] are flawed. By virtue of their scale, megacities cannot be physically or virtually isolated.”\textsuperscript{22} However, JFCOM’s experimentation validated the guiding principles— is isolation and control. A clear disparity


\textsuperscript{21} Patrick Mahaney, interview with author.

\textsuperscript{22} Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, \textit{Megacities and the United States Army: Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future}, 8.
thus exists between Joint and current Army concepts. This conceptual difference must be overcome.

This conceptual disconnect may be situational. Service doctrines must be broad enough to cover the full range of potential operations, yet flexible enough for commanders to adapt to ground truth. Urban environments come in many forms so there is no single, scalable solution.

Control of the entire city may not be a realistic objective and need not be an essential task. Stopping adversaries from damaging socio-cultural and financial networks and protecting other urban networks such as key city infrastructure may suffice. Future experiments must determine if, or how, Joint Forces could virtually or selectively isolate adversaries when physical isolation of an entire city is not achievable.

In addition, it may be wise not to fixate on population size as a qualifier for operational analysis. A megacity is but one variation of an urban system. Though an important metric for scale and determining force-size, population size does not drive force capability or technology requirements. Decision-makers should not restrict analysis to megacities – determining analytic priority should be threat-based. The determining factors for force capability this research recommends follow:

- Mission–humanitarian assistance, noncombatant evacuation, counterinsurgency, combat, etc
- Threat–terrorism, paramilitary, insurgency, state-sponsored conventional force
- Urban typology–highly, moderately, or loosely integrated, or some combination thereof
- Population density and fragility
- Physical built environment–subterranean, above ground (high-rise), infrastructure, etc
- Understanding how to manage the behavior of city inhabitants

Urban concept development needs analytic tools that support the development and visualization of these complex environments as part of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process. Industry and academia can contribute much. Modeling urban systems relies on field-based research, remote and local sensing, local networks, and big data analysis. With Combatant Command sponsorship research could commence now. The Strategic Multi-layer Assessment Program offers social science research and analysis techniques suited for urban shaping operations. One promising area is data collection. Techniques employing indigenous surveyors offer the most accurate information and should be expanded.

Urban Metrics Needed

As mentioned earlier, strategic landpower leadership promotes a security strategy focusing on the human domain to prevent war and shape security environments.23 It follows, then, that a security strategy...
based on the human domain and conflict prevention requires metrics to
gauge the effectiveness of shaping and engagement activities. Ultimately
metrics must reveal the will of populations. “Make the important meas-
urable,” as former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara reportedly
urged, “instead of making the measurable important.”

But, measuring prevention is difficult, if not impossible. How can
one prove or measure whether something was prevented from occur-
ing? Metrics tend to focus on inputs. Measures of effectiveness for
shaping and engagement activities are unclear and determined by indi-
vidual geographic commands.

Given the complexity and interconnectedness of urban environ-
ments, assessing the effectiveness of shaping and engagement activities
is impossible without first having an understanding of the desired
end state. This requires formulating likely objectives under a variety
of missions and then empirically determining factors most likely to
be associated with those objectives. In order for land forces operating
in populated urban spaces to achieve strategic effect, they ultimately
must rely on direct connections between real people – friendly, hostile,
and noncombatant. Current Army shaping activities reflect deterrence
through forward stationing and the Regionally Aligned Force initiative.
Neither focuses on cities, but both rely on the presence of land forces
for their deterrence value.

Land forces cannot adequately prepare for what they do not under-
stand, so some priority cities should become units of analysis. Now is
the time to identify candidate cities for developing specific urban-based,
human domain metrics. Each is unique. There is no better place to start
than in Korea.

Seoul, South Korea is a megacity which by Mutual Defense Treaty
the US will protect and defend. It is an excellent first candidate to develop
specific metrics for an urban operating environment. The rationale for
selecting Seoul is multifaceted. The Army presence in Seoul spans over
60 years. The Republic of Korea (ROK) and the US are in the process
of a historic transfer of operational control from US-led military readi-
ness and preparedness to ROK control. The ROK-US Alliance permits
superb cooperation for collaboration and study of urban environments.

The defense of the ROK requires a large commitment of land
forces. The 23 million people living in the Greater Seoul Metropolitan
Area constitute the economic, political, and cultural center of gravity of
a staunch US partner. Actions needed to defend Seoul could span the
full range of military operations. With approximately 200,000 US citi-
zens residing in South Korea, the vast majority in Seoul, noncombatant
evacuation of US citizens and humanitarian assistance for ROK civil-
ians under threat of attack by North Korean sleeper agents and Special
Forces would stress early contingency response.

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25 Janine Davidson (Former OSD Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, currently
Senior Defense Fellow for Policy with the Council on Foreign Relations), e-mail to author, January
22, 2015.
Contingency scenarios involving the North Korean regime link to Pyongyang, another excellent choice for assessment, although a far more difficult place to survey. The inhabitants of Pyongyang are loyal regime disciples, tens of thousands belong to the Pyongyang’s Supreme Guard Command and Kim Jong-un’s Bodyguard Corps. Clearly there are a plethora of candidate cities, but Seoul and Pyongyang, a priority for contingency planning, offer several practical advantages for initiating city analyses.

**A Way Forward**

A thorough qualitative understanding of urban operating environments should precede anticipated quantitative analysis. Charting a path forward requires accelerated attention to several areas. Defining a set of actionable tasks from the insights and lessons from the past 13 years of conducting urban operations, counter-irregular warfare, and a decade of joint urban concept development would be a worthy early deliverable for Army concept developers. To gain a better sense of how new research might treat capability gaps with objective analysis the effort needs a new roadmap. The following actions are thus recommended:

**Recommended OSD Actions**

- Restore JFCOM’s Executive Agent responsibility with the Army
- Support programming requirements by approving an urban campaign as part of a Defense Planning Scenario
- Designate cities as units of analysis

**Proposed Army Actions**

- Gain Joint Readiness Oversight Council approval for a Joint Capabilities Document
- Formulate likely Army objectives under a variety of urban missions
- Determine priority cities for analysis

In sum, JFCOM’s prior Joint Urban Operations mission is similar to the Army’s current challenge, the Army should become DoD’s Joint Executive Agent for urban operations. Ultimately, the Army must evaluate urban force capability needs across the full range of military operations, determine how that capability differs from traditional conventional force needs for other operating environments, and make force development investment decisions to organize, train, and equip the force.
As the black flags of the Islamic State appear in more and more places in Iraq, a new generation of officers will likely reflect on what has and has not been accomplished, and what is and is not possible through the force of arms. Conclusions about the recent era of conflict will affect US officers as they ascend to higher ranks and provide the best military advice they can to the nation’s civilian leadership. These future senior leaders should not allow emotion to affect their introspection. Future senior leaders must place their past service in a context that takes into account emerging historiography, time-tested military theory, and a holistic understanding of military history, as this foundation will allow them to provide better strategic advice.

This article explores emerging historiography before revisiting just a few of the military theorists who continue to transcend time. It will then offer a brief overview of American military history by examining the popular outliers in the conscience of military professionals before turning to what the US military has done more often. Penultimately, it offers recommendations for how senior military leaders should approach historiography as they consider the future, and how a grounding in history benefits them in the politically dominated realm of strategy. Last, this article suggests how to use historical context when providing advice and “speaking truth to power,” even when the message is not popular. As it has in the past, the US military will have to execute campaigns that lack strategic clarity or coherent policy objectives. Some campaigns will be, in the words of Andrew Bacevich, “fool’s errands.” However, armed with an inclusive view of the past, not just the highlight reel, future strategic leaders may be better able to fulfill their roles.

**Historiography**

Historiography matters because it shapes approaches used at professional military education (PME) institutions. Iconography and personal views present intellectual minefields students and faculty must navigate with civility even when dealing with interpretations of the increasingly
distant American Civil War. At one time, a walk through the halls of the US Army War College could have caused one to wonder who won the war, or how the profession has chosen to remember its past. Military professionals might have to work harder to distill the lessons of emerging narratives seeking to explain the less than decisive outcomes in Iraq and Afghanistan, events in which many of them participated. Easily digested Manichean explanations for enormously complicated issues deserve attention only in helping to define the extreme boundaries of the entire field. How the profession remembers the last decade of conflict will likely influence the way it approaches the use of force in the future. Remembering the past can be painful and complicated, as the Civil War illustrates, thus reminding the profession of the care it should take in capturing and interpreting various perspectives of recent events.

Anti-COIN

Gian Gentile and Douglas Porch each used historical analysis of a variety of campaigns to reach the same conclusion: counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine rarely works, especially in the context of carrying out tasks related to nation-building for a third party. To their credit, both authors offered these perspectives before the recent emergence of ISIL. Although there seems to be little stomach for another COIN campaign, Gentile, to be certain, offers his critique for the good of the profession. His overarching fear stems from the belief the nation might try a similar venture again should it follow Field Marshal Montgomery’s dictum that armed with a good plan (as prescribed by doctrine) and the right general, anything is possible. Gentile and Porch need not worry as current fiscal constraints have senior Army leaders more worried about the institution’s ability to carry out the full scope of its Title 10 responsibilities, at least about taking on another open-ended task in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Initial General Officer Introspection

In a recent article intended to generate dialogue and discussion, Lieutenant General Bolger (retired), takes his share of the credit for what he saw as the failure of American generalship during the last decade of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. Reminiscent of Harry Summers poignant recollection of his conversation with a North Vietnamese counterpart, Bolger attests to the tactical proficiency of the United States...
Army. Ultimately, this did not matter because of a failure at the operational and strategic levels of war. His Army was one built and trained for short, sharp, decisive wars, and not well suited for being “backed into” generational exercises in nation building. Bolger is disappointed in his and his peers’ willingness to accept a strategy of attrition rather than tell the truth as he sees it now. When the tools (means) did not match the task at hand (ends), they pursued a victory that always seemed to be just around the corner and, but for an additional bit of time, would be theirs.

The objectives given the Army were beyond the resources allocated to the task and military leaders met the nation’s strategic overreach with passive approval. The result has been “unlimited irregular conflicts with limited forces.” Not unlike Gentile and Porch, Bolger concludes there is little hope COIN will work unless the host nation wants it to work—a condition beyond the control of the United States and its generals. Bolger’s prescription, that the Army should return to what it does best—short, sharp wars against defined opponents—comes with its own challenges. The Army does not pick its wars, the nation’s civilian leaders do.

Pro-COIN

Peter Mansoor’s memoir of his service with David Petraeus provides readers chapter titles such as “A War Almost Lost,” as if the United States, because of the “Surge,” had attained its stated objectives using COIN doctrine. Petraeus’ “surge of ideas” thesis hardly acknowledges the foundational work underpinning his campaign, not to mention the decidedly different political context in which he waged it. Within Bolger’s construct, Petraeus is no hero since his successful surge of ideas did not deliver victory. Petraeus was the ultimate “just a little more time” general, but even a little more time was not enough for the Iraqis to establish a representative government capable of standing on its own beyond the redeployment of US forces. By attempting to set the record straight when the easy to digest surge-narrative was beginning to come under attack, the author illustrated the challenge of writing about events even as they continue to unfold in the media.

In 2014, it became clear even Petraeus, armed with the COIN manual, could not save Iraq from itself. To wit, Colin Gray has concluded the conduct of COIN, in the modern era, “reveals a history of

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10 Peter Mansoor, Surge, My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War (New Haven, CT: Yale, 2013), x. For example, Petraeus suggests it was his team that solved issues related to detainees as if none of his predecessors had addressed critical issues related to this topic. See Lieutenant General John D. Gardner (Ret) interviewed by Colonel Matthew D. Morton, Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group, Carlisle Barracks, PA, January 2, 2014, held at the Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, for a detailed explanation of the reforms that took place throughout 2005 and 2006, two years in advance of Petraeus’ arrival as the Multi-National Force Iraq commander.
12 Mansoor, Surge, xxvi.
persistent, or at least repeated political unwillingness to respect empirical knowledge of the past.”\textsuperscript{13} Simply put, COIN just does not work when the real tool or mechanism to achieve America’s ends depends largely on indigenous forces.\textsuperscript{14} With regard to historiography, \textit{Surge}, is an excellent example of assigning agency for ephemeral success too soon. Although there is much for readers to learn from Mansoor’s account, it does not offer an example of a path to victory. It does provide valuable insight to one phase of a war that has yet to achieve its intended objectives.

\textbf{The Limits of American Power}

In response to the recent era of conflict, Andrew Bacevich espouses the limits of American power.\textsuperscript{15} With the \textit{bona fides} of a soldier and a scholar, his work merits the attention of military professionals lest they too see all the world’s problems as ones military power alone can solve. In his review of Bolger’s book, Bacevich generally agrees with the author. Nevertheless, Bacevich notes Bolger’s failure to address more comprehensively the responsibility of senior officers when providing political leaders their military advice.\textsuperscript{16} In his mind, those senior leaders should heed the warning in the most recent edition of Reinhold Niebuhr’s classic, \textit{The Irony of American History}. Bacevich introduces the work with four truths worth considering: (a) the sin of American exceptionalism, (b) indecipherability of history, (c) false allure of simple solutions, and (d) the imperative of appreciating the limits of power.\textsuperscript{17} The nation has stumbled over these issues during the last ten years, and Bacevich reminds readers that stability, rather than remaking the world in the image of the United States, best serves the nation.\textsuperscript{18} Niebuhr, speaking enduring truth from the past, reminds all Americans, “the paradise of our domestic security is suspended in a hell of global insecurity.”\textsuperscript{19} Therein lies the rub for generals who must maintain paradise at home while acting abroad. Fortunately, for them, a dead Prussian soldier, who happened to be a bit of an intellectual, still offers sage advice on how to connect domestic and foreign interests.


\textsuperscript{14} Lewis Sorely’s, \textit{Better War} (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1999) suggests that General Abrams could have achieved victory in Vietnam if given more time to develop the South Vietnamese security forces.


\textsuperscript{17} Andrew Bacevich, introduction to Reinhold Niebuhr, \textit{The Irony of American History} (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2008), x.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., xvii.

\textsuperscript{19} Niebuhr, \textit{The Irony of American History}, 7.
Enduring Theorists through a Contemporary Lens

The stalwart military theorists of professional military education—Clausewitz and Sun Tzu—continue to be relevant even when examined through the lens of recent events. Future strategists should not discount them in the mistaken belief the true nature of war has changed. Just as historiography offers a lens to review historic events, some theorists continue to offer enduring advice with which to consider conflict. In his recent work, Reconsidering the American Way of War: US Military Practice from the Revolution to Afghanistan, author Antulio Echevarria argues there is no single American way of war. Unsurprisingly given his reputation as a scholar of Carl von Clausewitz, he concludes, “the American way of war was, and still is, thoroughly political.”20 He reaches this conclusion in the same manner Clausewitz used to draw his own conclusions about the nature of war, through the lens of historical analysis. Clausewitz offers the familiar:

No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in the mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its operational objective. This is the governing principle which will set its course, prescribe the scale of means and effort which is required, and make its influence felt throughout down to the smallest operational detail.21

Echevarria’s conclusion applies to all wars, not just the big ones with clearly defined objectives. Senior military leaders will continue to bear the responsibility for helping civilian decision makers understand what will be required to “achieve” their ends through war. They should remember civilians take the decision to go to war in a unique domestic political condition ever subject to change. As Clausewitz cautions, “certainly the exhaustion or, to be accurate, the fatigue of the stronger has often brought about peace. The reason can be found in the half-hearted manner in which wars are usually waged.”22 This is particularly important in the context of Echevarria’s other conclusion that the United States, in the past, sought minimalist solutions and resisted the expenditure of too many resources.23 Future generals should try to avoid the risk of imbalance between ends and means no matter how good they think they are at designing ways to balance the equation.

Sun Tzu through the Lens of Bolger and Tuchman

Bolger suggests the military has struggled to identify the real enemy of the nation’s stated objectives. Renowned author and historian Barbara Tuchman observed the US Army’s predilections contribute to its inability to know its enemy. In doing so, both authors allude to Sun Tzu’s dictum to know oneself and know the enemy to avoid defeat. At the beginning of an inflection point as the Army emerged from Vietnam, Tuchman spoke to the US Army War College in 1972. She addressed a blind spot in the American approach to war; it was the same one Bolger

20 Echevarria, Reconsidering the American Way of War, 2.
22 Ibid., 613.
23 Echevarria, Reconsidering the American Way of War, 135.
addressed forty years later. One passage bears full citation given its time-
less advice and recognition of American military habits.

In the arrogance of our size, wealth and superior technology, we tend to
overlook the need to examine what may be different sources of strength in
others….we now need another voice of wisdom to tell us, “Technology is
not enough.” War is not one big engineering project. There are people on
the other side—with strengths and will that we never bother to measure…
we have been drawn into a greater, and certainly more ruinous, belliger-
ent action than we intended [Vietnam]. To fight without understanding the
opponent ultimately serves neither the repute of the military nor the repute
of the nation.24

Bolger seized on the fact that recently the military has struggled to
identify the real enemy of the nation’s stated objectives. Simply, those
who shoot at American soldiers—the Taliban, Sunni insurgents in Iraq,
or the Mahdi Army—do not necessarily represent the enemy the United
States went to war to fight. They are enemies the United States created
along the way.25 A technological overmatch of opponents has not always
allowed the United States to discern its enemy well, especially when
the enemy chooses not to fight in a manner that serves the strengths
of the US military. Echevarria also points out that the United States’
historic reliance on technology allowed it to offset numeric advantages
as policy makers pursued strategies underwritten by just enough, but not
too much, means. While this worked historically, the proliferation of
modern small arms has changed the equation particularly at the tactical
level—the enemy now bears RPGs, not spears and crude firearms.26

A Holistic Approach to History

The study of history provides future generals means to learn vicari-
ously from the mistakes of others. Because history is replete with wars
fought with remarkable tactical and operational acumen, but which did
not achieve strategic victory, future generals should open their apertures.
The sweep of American military history is much broader than its most
well know wars—the American Civil War and World War II—which
dominate the canon of professional military education for good reasons.
Future strategic leaders ought not to forget history records victory in
the strategic column and does not award style points for tactical and
operational acumen. Were one to score Nazi performance during each
discrete year of WWII, most would accord Hitler’s generals victories in
1939, 1940, and probably a draw in 1941. Nevertheless, for all their bat-
tlefield success, they ultimately failed in the realms that matter, strategy
and achieving national objectives. One could say the same thing about
the United States in Vietnam.27 To be certain, “the ultimate outcome
of war is not always to be regarded as final,” and “the defeated state”

25 Bolger, “A 3-Star General Explains ‘Why We Lost’ in Iraq, Afghanistan.”
26 Echevarria, Reconsidering the American Way of War, 167-168, 170, and conversation with LTC
Matt Hardman (Hardman served as an airborne-infantry company commander in Afghanistan in
2003 and Iraq in 2004 and again in Afghanistan as a BDE Chief-of Current Operations in 2010-2011
and BDE XO in 2013. He currently commands an Airborne-Infantry Battalion). Hardman contends
that in his experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, squad versus squad fights are evenly matched until
the US force can employ its enablers. Gone are the days that a single Marine battalion was adequate
to maintain control or defend US interests in a Latin American country.
27 Gray, Defense Planning for National Defense, 14; Robert Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The
may only consider it “a transitory evil” until it can remedy the outcome at a later date; however Americans expect their generals to provide the nation more than ephemeral ends. Fortunately, the United States has a rich and varied military history, including many dark chapters that hardly qualify as the stuff of American exceptionalism, upon which to reflect as they contemplate future challenges.

Big and Exceptional—Outliers

The American Civil War and World War II are the outliers in American military history with respect to the objectives sought and the resources the nation was willing to expend to achieve them. The sweep of American military history is much broader than these arguably best known and often studied wars. Between 1861 and 1865, the United States fought its bloodiest war. The existential threat of Confederate rebellion resulted in the deaths of 360,000 Union soldiers. In defense of the institution of chattel slavery, the Confederacy was willing to sacrifice 260,000 soldiers. In total, preserving the Union and freeing four million African-Americans cost the nation 620,000 soldiers drawn from a population of 30 million. A proportional cost today would amount to no less than seven million dead Americans. Full mobilization of the Union effort took years. Once mobilized, generals such as Ulysses S. Grant and William Tecumseh Sherman translated the might of the nation into victory, but at great cost. One will not find even a hint of this kind of mobilization and expected sacrifice discussed in any of the nation’s guiding strategic documents today.

The Second World War continues to provide a nearly bottomless pit of issues for study ranging from tactical to strategic in nature, hence its utility in the canon of professional military education. In the modern era, it represents the closest approximation of Clausewitz’s concept of absolute war. The final Göttterdammerung inflicted by “Little Boy” and “Fatman” meant it would be the last global war on such a scale short of Armageddon. Nazi Germany had more than territorial ambitions as it sought to remove entire races of people from the face of the earth while losing four million of its own citizens. Its ally, Imperial Japan, lost two million people subjugating and defending the “Co-prosperity Sphere” it created. The Soviet Union lost more than twenty-five million soldiers and civilians resisting Hitler’s quest for Lebensraum. While the world collectively suffered an estimated 60 million deaths directly attributable to the conflict, the United States lost only 300,000 service members and suffered almost no losses at home. Nevertheless, the United States placed millions of citizens in uniform, fed and equipped its allies, and willingly suffered a degree of disruption in the lives of its 132.2 million citizens. A similar military effort today would require 18.5 million

28 Clausewitz, On War, 80.
soldiers to fill the Army’s ranks alone, not to mention what it would do to the paychecks of the wealthiest Americans should they be asked make a sacrifice on a par with their forebears to support such a force. Again, today’s guiding strategy documents do not allude to anything similar with regard to force structure or fiscal requirements to field such a force.

Since gaining independence, the United States used force 280 times between 1789 and 2009.34 In these instances, the nation only fought two wars to decisive outcomes, the two already mentioned, in which entire systems of government ceased to exist and unconditional surrender was the objective. George Patton, Jr. was correct, “Americans love to fight,” but they have only gotten the satisfaction of decisive victory two times.35

Beyond the Outliers

In contrast to the “big ones,” where everything was at stake and the nation responded accordingly, the American Army played a variety of roles in a wide range of military dramas. The Army, cast as an unrelenting underdog, against all reason defeated a global hegemon not once, but twice in less than fifty years. It served as the tool of manifest destiny by defeating Mexico and taking large swaths of territory by force and occupation until a fig leaf of postwar negotiation clarified what the defeat of arms already accomplished. The Army in support of the Navy, served as a tool in the hands of American imperialists determined to seize colonies—better the United States grab the Philippines from Spain lest the Germans get there first. In short, the Army did many things that looked nothing like short, or sharp, or even decisive. As always, the military responded to orders and with the exception of five instances, it did so without so much as a declaration of war.36

Vietnam

It is easy to forget the war in Vietnam was a limited war—despite the commitment of more than 500,000 troops and enough jet-era bombing to make the war in the air over Europe and Japan look amateurish in comparison. The main theater was in fact Western Europe where the threat of Soviet invasion remained constant. Recently, some pundits used the American experience in Vietnam as an analogy to the long slog in Iraq and morass that the United States once again found itself

unable to escape. Others did their utmost to disassociate the recent era of conflict with the last war America lost.37

However, in other respects, Vietnam provides an excellent example for considering the American approach to war in Iraq and Afghanistan. It continues to offer something for students inclined to study what is more likely than the exceptional conflicts discussed above. In Vietnam, the Army moved faster and generated more firepower than any time in its history. Every tactical movement was in effect a movement without a rear area during which the enemy might attack from any direction. Urban battles in Hue and Saigon afforded the rare opportunity to concentrate military efforts against what was normally an elusive foe who sought to avoid such battles since they led to disproportionate casualties. Despite the ability to mass effects in time and space, strategic victory remained as elusive in Vietnam as it did in Iraq. Despite the narrative suggesting the Army turned its back on Vietnam and never looked back, the reality was it learned quite a bit, just not the answer the Army was looking for in 2003, as it received the task to fight insurgencies in Asia in support of questionable governments.38

Vietnam as a Bridge

Historical research always bears the imprint of current events even if historians and uniformed strategists attempt not to look backward to events, but rather to see them from the perspective of the participants marching forward in time. To that end, Greg Daddis asked and answered an important question: is it possible to have a comprehensive strategy and still lose a war? In his largely successful effort to rehabilitate General William Westmoreland, he concludes, yes, it is.39 In arriving at this explanation, Daddis offers a number of observations relevant today, especially while reflecting on recent events. Westmoreland struggled to communicate the complexity of the situation in Vietnam. He realized military power and its application was but one facet of a problem requiring equal, if not more, attention on social and political ills in South Vietnam.40 There were no shortages of “can do” generals in Vietnam. General Paul Harkins promised in 1963 Saigon could lead its own war effort and that the United States would be starting to depart by 1965.41 Perhaps most importantly, the United States did a lot in Vietnam: it created an army, it did nation-building, and it fought homegrown insurgents from South Vietnam and conventional units from the north. Even so, the Army was unable to do all three tasks simultaneously to the levels demanded to achieve the nation’s overall objectives.42 Perhaps Bolger’s current frustration stems from the fact he knew all of this having taught history at West Point, but failed to see the parallels until the United

38 Citino, Operational Warfare, 226, 237, 246, 254, 264.
39 Daddis, Westmoreland’s War, xx, 14.
40 Ibid., 90-91.
41 Ibid., 163.
42 Ibid., 169.
States was already “backed in” to objectives beyond the grasp of the Army.

Conclusions on the Use of History

If there is but one lesson for future strategists to take away from their study of military history it is this: there are almost no instances of the United States successfully waging a war, signing a peace treaty, and immediately redeploying. There has usually been a gap between the attainment of an end by military means and the ultimate political outcome in the form of a peace treaty. An American way of battle dependent on technology and shock and awe cannot bridge the intervening gap.43 Soldiers conduct occupations. Even the American Civil War and World War II, with their decisive conclusions, demanded occupations to translate military victory into enduring end states.

Recommendations

Senior leaders and future strategists are entitled to their opinions and interpretations of the past, but their professional obligations demand they form them in a critical context. Rather than drinking their own intellectual “bathwater”—doctrine, white papers, professional military education curriculum, and professional journal articles—future senior leaders should look beyond this elixir as they attempt to reflect on what has occurred, how it is likely to be remembered, and how it might affect their approach to war. A narrow interpretation runs the risk of acting like self-imposed blinders in the search for the best advice in situations that do not lend themselves to a narrow base of understanding. In addition, as Daddis has shown with his recent work on Westmoreland and Vietnam, soldiers can continue to learn new things when considering a war gone awry. The glancing overview of emerging historiography is but the bow-wave of a larger body of evidence and interpretation to follow. Enduring theory should help underpin much of it as it travels its path into the American military conscience as part of a larger tapestry of corporate memory.

The Recent and Not So Recent Past

In Desert Storm, Colin Powell and his generation got the war they wanted, but the next generation of strategic leaders stung by the outcome of recent events may not be so lucky. Future strategists may lead the military anywhere along the spectrum of conflict, so it remains in their best interests to think hard about current scholarship emerging from the last decade of conflict. Gian Gentile’s concern the nation might be tempted to wage another counterinsurgency beyond the borders of the United States seems unlikely now. However, even Powell could not avoid it, albeit while fulfilling a very different role. Part and parcel of the emerging scholarship on the recent decade of conflict are the vicissitudes of political priorities, which speak to enduring nature of war and the utility of those who well captured it in theory.

43 Echevarria, Reconsidering the American Way of War, 175.
Political Context

Generals should never forget strategy will always be a slave to what is politically possible.\(^4^4\) What general would not want to refight the Civil War or World War II? Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt standout as great American strategists and more importantly, great political leaders who were able to convince the American people to go “all in.” As Bolger and Bacevich both describe in their own ways, American generals cannot expect their civilian leaders to be good strategists.\(^4^5\) Modern generals should rise to the task of fulfilling their professional obligations—rendering professional military advice—in all circumstances. Doing so will at times require them to assume the role of mentor, even within the context of their subordinated role as prescribed by the American construct of civil-military relations, but ever cognizant of the political conditions that directly affect their masters.

Moral Courage

Strategic thought demands the long view, not the best immediate work-around for the challenge at hand. Few generals became generals because they told their senior raters on a recurring basis that what their boss asked them to do was a bad idea. Generals get to be generals because they consistently demonstrated superior tactical competence, regardless of their discipline. In essence, they achieved missions in a fashion deemed superior to their peers. Getting the job done “now,” whatever that job might be, runs the risk of influencing a general’s temporal horizon. Clausewitz was not writing about tactics, he was writing about war with a big “W.” Understanding a broader sweep of history will help strategists adjust their temporal horizons.

Armed with a longer view, they should also be willing to share that experience in the role of a teacher. It surprised a senior general with years of experience in the Middle East that he had to spend so much time educating leaders, about “what was going on in one of the most complex battle spaces on earth.”\(^4^6\) Domestic political acumen does not necessarily equip senior civilian leaders with an adequate foundation for making strategic choices that rely heavily on military resources. As senior strategists, generals should embrace their role in the education process.

Uniformed strategists, with tact, ought to find their voices when their political masters are treading on the thin ice of exceedingly poor historical analogy as it relates to war. In some cases, they may have to help guide the conversation and process back to the path of strategy. It is particularly important that senior officers understand the history of their own profession, in a national context, if for no other reason than a little history can be a dangerous thing. Bush policy makers had it in their mind that invading Iraq was going to be like liberating France in


\(^4^5\) Although Bolger and Bacevich each say this in their own way, a conversation about the recent war in Iraq with Dr. Lance Betros, Provost, US Army War College, on the same topic inspired this part of the paper.

\(^4^6\) Senior Officer Exit Interview, non-attribution, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 20-21.
World War II. It was lost on them that unlike France, Iraq had no Free Iraqi Army in being, battle hardened and ready, or a legitimate government in exile with a string of battlefield successes to its credit, rather than a collection of expatriates and little else. Civilian policy makers are not required to study history, but Army officers are, and what they study shapes their outlook and understanding of war. Unfortunately, the senior officer who recounted these observations could not, or chose not to, find his voice and dispel his civilian masters of their misconceived assumption based on a wrongheaded interpretation of historical events. What flowed from these assumptions has been nothing less than tragic.

**Speaking Truth to Power**

Senior leaders should draw on what they have learned through experience, professional military education, and the self-directed study of history when the time comes to find their voice. History also offers senior leaders examples of their peers having the moral courage to speak truth to power. As Barbara Tuchman pointed out after Vietnam, the West Point motto of “Duty, Honor, Country,” that is, to follow orders unflinchingly, may no longer be the best policy lest the nation “undercut [its] own claim at Nuremberg and Tokyo,” when Nazis and Imperial Japanese went to the gallows using the same excuse. Recent history offers the example of General Eric Shinseki. Looking back a little further provides the example of General Matthew Ridgway. Shinseki gave Congress his best military advice. It just so happened that his best advice was not consistent with the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s view of the world and the coming war with Iraq. Rumsfeld’s efforts to discredit Shinseki have only enhanced his example of a serving officer rendering his duty regardless of the consequences. As Army Chief of Staff, General Ridgway paid an even stiffer price when he did the same thing. Ridgway’s sin was to speak out against the belief air power alone could play a decisive role in Vietnam in 1954, based on his interpretation of what it had accomplished in Korea. This advice put him at odds with the Eisenhower administration’s desire to test its “New Look” policy in a proposed attempt to save the French at Dien Bien Phu. Ridgway kept the United States out of Vietnam as the French lost, but he lost his job in 1955 in a forced early retirement. History suggests the advice rendered by both generals was probably correct. The occupation of Iraq required more troops than suggested by planners in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The introduction of air power in South Vietnam led to the commitment of ground forces.

**Conclusion**

Modern strategists would be wise to remember the observation of Colin Gray when he wrote, “It is no disgrace to fail in an attempt to

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48 Ibid.
49 Tuchman, “Generalship.”
51 Conrad Crane, “Killing the Vulture: The Impact of the Korean Airpower Experience on American Involvement in Indochina in 1954” unpublished manuscript, copy in possession of author used with Dr. Crane’s permission.
Culture and the US Army

achieve the difficult and demanding, but persistence in an effort to do the impossible is an affront to the Gods of strategy.”\(^{52}\) Doing more of the same in the same places, after a decade and billions of dollars, is unlikely to bring about a different result, nor will doing the same in new places with the same characteristics have much hope of achieving national objectives. High-minded notions of American exceptionalism should come with the same warning as “hope,” neither is a method.\(^{53}\) There was nothing exceptional about imposing dictatorships in South and Central America in the service of domestic political agendas any more than the hubris of toppling the regime in Iraq with an underlying assumption that it could be made right quickly and on the cheap.

How then to do it better? Emerging historiography, and to a lesser extent hagiography, will shape the way the Army as an institution remembers the recent era of conflict. It will influence future uniformed strategists who have never been to Iraq or Afghanistan although their service will carry baggage from those conflicts for years to come. Simple “surge” narratives have proven too good to be true, but at least some senior leaders have started the process of deep introspection, such as Bolger, and doing so have reminded the profession of the relevance of theorists such as Clausewitz and Sun Tzu as enduring touchstones for the profession of arms, particularly at the highest levels of service. The use of military forces in operations short of war will continue to demonstrate the nation’s values as it attempts to avert larger conflicts.\(^{54}\)

Fortunately, American military history provides a rich tapestry of conflict for consideration. Senior officers should approach this study in the context of understanding that the two most significant monuments of American martial pride are outliers. It seems unlikely that the United States will unleash the powers to terrorize entire civilian populations, conduct ethnic cleansing, or make the heavy hand of war touch the lives of men, women, and children in the nations that are the object of its military attention.

Therefore, as ever, it will remain the burden of the senior uniformed strategist to convey the art of the possible and the associated risk inherent in every variation of the use of force to achieve national policy objectives. This will never be easy, but studying the recent past as institutional memories form in the manner prescribed in this paper is far less expensive than the cost of blood and treasure already expended. The avoidance of a single “fool’s errand” would be something indeed.

\(^{52}\) Gray, *Defense Planning for National Defense*, 44.

\(^{53}\) Taken from the eponymous title of Gordon Sullivan’s, *Hope is Not a Method* (New York: Broadway Books, 1996).

CULTURE AND THE US ARMY

ETHICS AND ARMY LEADERSHIP: CLIMATE MATTERS

Charles D. Allen

ABSTRACT: As US news and media reports continue to expose unethical behavior within the American profession of arms, it is important to explore how Army leaders—and their organizations—have lapsed into questionable ethical conduct. This article addresses the tension between competence and character within the Army’s culture, offers lessons from the business world on ethical behavior and leadership, and critiques current Department of Defense (DoD) and Army approaches to assessing ethical climates.¹

US news and media reports continue to expose unethical behavior within the American profession of arms. Some observers may claim this exposure is nothing new. Recently, however, the Army revealed 129 commanders of brigades and battalions have been relieved since 2003.² Of that number, 25 were relieved in combat zones. More troubling (and paradoxically reassuring) is the Army’s disclosure that seven general officers were relieved and two court-martialed. In 2005, for instance, the four-star commander of US Army Training and Doctrine Command, General Kevin Byrnes, was relieved for disobeying a lawful order from the Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker. In addition, “since 2001, the Army vice chief of staff has issued 100 memoranda of reprimand, 147 memoranda of concern and conducted 45 verbal counselings of general officers” for myriad behaviors contrary to good order and discipline in the Army.³

This article explores how Army leaders and their organizations have lapsed into questionable ethical conduct. Among other things, such an examination enables one to discern lessons for senior leaders and stewards of the Army profession. Rather than offering tabloid exposés (there are plenty), the following analysis focuses on systemic organizational assessments and solutions to ethical situations, not on the details of any specific recent case. This article concludes with two recommendations for Army leadership: 1) develop evidence-based developmental programs on individual character and moral development, and 2) develop empirically validated research instruments to assess ethical climates as part of the DoD or separate Army organizational climate survey. Strong ethical foundations are essential for the Army profession and the nation it serves.

While the number of reported occurrences of unethical behavior is relatively small compared to a large DoD population of nearly 3 million

¹ This manuscript was initially prepared for and presented at a conference for the International Society for Military Ethics (ISME), October 12-15, 2014, University of Notre Dame, South Bend, Indiana.
³ Ibid.
active, reserve, and civilian members, even isolated cases receive a high
degree of media attention and undermine public trust in the profession.
As one reads the reports of investigations and courts martial, the root
causes of such behavior are invariably attributed to individual failings—
the senior leader’s lack of character and the lack of moral courage of
those around the leader to challenge questionable behavior. However,
these assessments rarely consider differing levels of analysis: individual,
organizational, and institutional.

Concerns about the Profession

In some cases, relieving high-level military officers was part of the
civil-military relations exchange, which often requires a delicate bal-
cancing act between civilian officials and uniformed officers. Striking
examples during the Global War on Terror are the cases of Commander
of US Central Command Admiral William “Fox” Fallon, Air Force Chief
of Staff General T. Michael Moseley, and Commander of US Forces and
International Security Forces Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal,
in their clashes with senior civilian leaders—the president and defense
secretary. Of greater concern are those cases in which behavior contrary
to professional ethics is the issue. There have been high-profile investiga-
tions of senior officers for violations of Joint Travel and Joint Ethics
Regulations like US Africa Command’s General William “Kip” Ward
(substantiated), and US European Command’s Admiral James Stavridis
(unsubstantiated). The media also took particular interest in the extra-
marital affair of retired General David Petraeus, the former commander
of US Central Command and later of International Security Forces
Afghanistan, as well as the court-martial charges for sexual assault by
Army Brigadier General Jeffrey Sinclair.

Accordingly, at the end of 2012, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta
initiated a review of general officer ethics. It included a survey of compli-
ance with standards put forth in several Department of Defense policies
such as the Joint Federal Travel Regulation, Joint Ethics Regulation,
Financial Management Regulation, other DoD Instructions, and cer-
tainly the Uniformed Code of Military Justice. In December 2013,
his successor, Chuck Hagel, ordered a second review to be completed
and briefed within sixty days. These perfunctory assessments of non-
compliance and violations by individual general officers and their staffs
did not reveal the deeper causes of these problems; thus, further actions
were needed.

To underscore the importance of understanding and resolving such
problems, in March 2014, Hagel appointed Rear Admiral Margaret
“Peg” Klein as his Special Advisor for Military Professionalism to
report directly to him on “issues related to military ethics, character, and
leadership.” Hagel charged Klein to “coordinate the actions of the Joint
Staff, the Combatant Commands, and each of the military services...on

4 Specific cases are addressed in Don Drechsler and Charles D. Allen, “Why Senior Military
Leaders Fail: And What We Can Learn from Their Mistakes,” Armed Forces Journal (July/August
Military Relations,” Parameters 41, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 86-100; and Charles D. Allen, “Lessons not
5 “Statement by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel Announcing His Senior Advisor for Military
DoD’s focus on ethics, character, and competence in all activities at all levels of command…[as] a top priority for DoD’s senior leadership.”

Professional Competency or Character?

After more than a dozen years in Afghanistan and Iraq, DoD senior leaders are concerned with the perception the competence of our senior leaders is valued over their character—especially with the ongoing series of senior officer misconduct—hence, the appointment of Klein. The reported misbehavior ranges from a combination of illegal, immoral, and unethical actions across services and components. In alignment with Hagel, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey stressed “the military must pay as much attention to character as it does to competence.” In his June 2013 graduation address to the National War College, Dempsey cautioned, “As with Vietnam, negative impressions about our character [during the Global War on Terror] eclipsed the courage and sacrifices of the many men and women who served honorably.” To document the nature and scope of the problem throughout the uniformed and civilian ranks, the Department of Defense published its *Encyclopedia of Ethical Failures*. One would expect the Army has its own compendium of ethical misconduct cases spanning the operating and generating forces in deployed and home-station environments.

Donald M. Snider, an expert on the nature and role of the Army profession, argues military leaders improperly focus “on developing individual and unit military competence, when it should have been all along more equally divided between developing their moral character and their military competence.” Journalists and government civilians alike have speculated “the military valued ‘competence over character’ during wartime, and that it needs to place a higher priority on personal rectitude.” Three criteria – competence and character combined with commitment — emerged from the Army Profession of Arms campaign as official doctrine, which specified the broad developmental goals essential for its members to be professional.

Initial Assessment and Remedy

In response to a 2012 Secretary of Defense directive, the Army conducted a review of senior-leader training with two objectives: 1) Review the current state of senior leadership training, particularly ethics training and character development, and 2) Consider the impact(s) of power and the dilemmas that arise from increasing levels of responsibility,

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6 Ibid.
12 Amaani Lyle, “Chairman Champions Character in Graduation Address.”
authority, and control. The Army’s findings claimed “Senior Leader character is not lacking…not a systemic problem” and there was not a “widely held negative perception of Army Senior Leaders based on interviews and focus groups.” These findings seem, however, to ignore other sources of information.

Assessments claiming there was no “systemic problem” or “widely held negative perception” lead one to conclude these ethical lapses have been no more than individual failings. Thus, the assertion that “Checks and balances are key—include front office staff, spouses, and IG [Inspector General], SJA [Staff Judge Advocate], CH [Chaplain]” to prevent incidents that could be seen as unethical behavior by senior leaders. The findings attribute as least part of the blame to those around the leaders. Accordingly, the review’s recommendations proposed three lines of effort: training the staffs of senior leaders, mentorship of senior leaders, and programs of assessment and feedback for senior leaders. Of these pillars, the Army has once again focused on training programs for individuals—not on education and self-development. That focus is problematic since training does not usually mean gaining new knowledge and exercising the reflection essential to development.

**Assumptions Regarding Individual Character Development**

The process, findings, and recommendations of the Army’s review of senior-leader training validate COL Brian Michelson’s concerns in his assessment of the Army approach to character development. Michelson, author of “Character Development of US Army Leaders,” examined Army leadership doctrine for its definition of character—“the sum total of an individual’s moral and ethical qualities”—and its expectation of leaders to be the “ethical standard bearer[s]” who set a proper ethical climate. Hence, Army doctrine implies an individual’s lack of character leads to ethical failings; accordingly, corrective actions should be focused on individual leaders. Michelson cautions against such a simple fix. Instead, he identifies and then questions three underlying assumptions for the Army’s institutional strategy:

- Army soldiers and leaders inherently know what is right and want to live ethically.
- Consistent ethical conduct develops strong character.
- Leaders will develop personal character commensurate with their increasing responsibilities through self-guided study, reflection, experience, and feedback.

Michelson extracts data from the 2010 and 2011 Center for Army Leadership’s Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL) reports, as well as from its report on Toxic Leadership, to effectively challenge each assumption. He then arrives at four conclusions, two of which inform this analysis:

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14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
17 Ibid., 31.
• The Army’s three primary assumptions about the development of personal character are questionable at best, are potentially seriously flawed, and should be immediately reexamined.

• The Army does not know, and cannot know with confidence, if the current method of character development will achieve its desired institutional goals.18

If the underlying assumptions in Army doctrine regarding individual behaviors cannot be validated, then developing strategies and plans on them is imprudent. Perhaps an examination of organizational factors is more appropriate. Such factors are organizational culture, organizational climate, and ethical climate, which can be used to gain a better understanding of the ethical issues within the Army. That understanding can be gained from findings in scholarly research in ethics, behavioral ethics, and ethical leadership.

The Call for an Army Ethic

Since the Army Profession campaign commenced in December 2010, there have been several calls for a statement of The Army Ethic.19 Army senior leaders have been aggressively acting on the recommendations from this yearlong study through several initiatives and programs. In the final report of the Profession of Arms campaign, now captured in doctrine, the Army Ethic encompasses the “evolving set of laws, values, and beliefs, deeply embedded within the core of the Army and practiced by all members of the Army Profession to motivate and guide the appropriate conduct of individual members bound together in common moral purpose.”20

In July 2014, Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno released “The Army Ethic White Paper.” It declares the “foundation of our profession is centered on trust…it will take every measure of competence and commitment to forge ahead and above all it will take character.”21 A one-page draft Ethic charges Army professionals to fulfill three roles, serve as “Honorable Servants of the Nation – Professionals of Character, [Army] Experts – Competent Professionals, [and] Stewards of the Army Profession – Committed Professionals.”22

Ethical Leadership: Learning from Business

General Dempsey’s release of “America’s Military—A Profession of Arms” to the joint force preceded the Army’s White Paper by nearly eighteen months. In it the Chairman asserted: “Our profession is defined by our values, ethics, standards, code of conduct, skills, and

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18      Ibid., 37.
22     Ibid., 11. “Army Experts” replaced “Military Experts” during the Secretary of the Army Symposium held in Fall 2014.
attributes;” furthermore, he designated “Leaders as the Foundation [to] Strengthening our Profession of Arms.”

Thus, both the Army Chief of Staff and the Chairman have included leader development among their top priorities. Appropriately, leaders in the grades of colonels and flag officers—and their civilian equivalents—are designated the senior stewards of the profession. They have special responsibilities: command of units, staff headquarters, and running the institution. They are also susceptible to what has been well-documented in organizational research: “Older and longer tenured managers had lower moral judgment than did younger and less experienced employees.”

Although current professional military education programs for field grade and senior officers provide instruction on the philosophies of ethics (teleology, deontology, and consequentialism) and moral reasoning, business and behavioral ethics scholars have introduced concepts such as “ethical fading” and “moral blindspots” into the military’s awareness.

Ethical fading occurs when lawyers “become inured to problems such as corruption in the justice system, and their ethical enthusiasm slowly dies.”

Before service members dismiss such findings from business organizations by citing stress and cultural value placed on mission accomplishment, they should attentively consider why moral reasoning has also been found to be “lower when individuals respond to work-related dilemmas compared to non-work dilemmas.”

Equally applicable to the military profession, a 2005 Business Ethics Survey cited the following five factors most likely to compromise ethical behavior:

1. Pressure to meet unrealistic business objectives/deadlines
2. Desire to further one’s career
3. Desire to protect one’s livelihood
4. Working in an environment with cynicism or diminished morale
5. Ignores that the act was unethical

Each of these factors could plausibly affect Army leaders’ ethical obligations to their organizations: “Protection of brand and reputation; The right thing to do; Customer trust and loyalty; Investor confidence, and Public acceptance/recognition.”

In 2013, Military Review published a special issue exploring threats to the Army Profession that would betray the trust of its constituents, clients, and stakeholders. In one of the articles, authors identified four components of trust from their literature review: “Credibility of competence, benevolence of motives, integrity with a

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27 Ibid., 956.
29 Ibid.
sense of fairness and honesty, [and] predictability of behavior.”

These components are inextricably linked to the character, competence, and commitment the Army expects of its leaders. While the senior stewards of the profession, Generals Dempsey and Odierno, recognize the value and need for ethics as an integral part of the culture of the profession of arms, it is imperative leaders also consider the lessons from business. The ethical challenges and obligations identified in the corporate domain are wholly applicable to our military’s obligation to sustain the trust vested in its profession.

**Institutional Culture of the Army**

As senior leaders seek to develop effective approaches to redress ethical misbehavior, voices of junior officers are joining the discourse on the Army profession. At the conclusion of Solarium 7—a gathering of one hundred captains at Fort Leavenworth—company-grade officers contributed to a change in the recently published Army Ethic White Paper. Rather than being “Trustworthy,” they aspire to be “Trusted Army Professionals.” As younger professionals, they experience first-hand the influences of Army’s culture captured in the annual surveys of the force.

Organizational scholar Edgar Schein defines culture as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems...that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.”

While the Army culture espouses commitment to the Seven Army Values (Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage) the perception within the force is that not all members are faithful adherents. The Center for Army Leadership recently reported integrity was the most frequently cited of the Army’s Values in assessing leader effectiveness. This finding is consistent with the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) results which found integrity and inspirational as the most universally desirable leadership characteristics among fifty-eight countries. Many of the organizational values in the business world apply across industries and national cultures. In this case, the same values are reflective of the Army culture and thus applicable to its leadership.

**Expectations for Ethical Leadership**

Clearly, as found in the GLOBE and IBM CEO studies, leaders of integrity are consistently sought and valued. While often conflated with moral and principle-centered leadership, ethical leadership is defined as

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the “demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct through personal actions and interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of such conduct to followers through two-way communication, reinforcement, and decision-making.”

Organizational scholars have found “employees’ perceptions of their supervisors’ ethical leadership were associated with followers’ willingness to report problems to management.” For the Army, this finding means the influence of its culture must drive self-monitoring and self-regulation of the Army profession. Thus, Army leaders should be models of ethical conduct, and service members should hold each other accountable.

The Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (2013) provides data about the willingness to report problems within the Army. Among uniformed officer and enlisted members, 81 percent rated leaders as effective in leading by example and building trust, while 8 percent disagreed. Of note, civilians rated 72 percent of their immediate civilian leaders as “effective in setting standards for integrity and character.” Center for Army Leadership researchers found this factor was “positively related to competency, leads by example, and demonstrating Army Values.” Some readers may be encouraged to learn that 78 percent rated civilian supervisors as effective in upholding ethical standards, while only 8 percent disagreed. Likewise, active duty uniformed members rated 85 percent of supervisors as effective with 5 percent disagreeing.

The cultural gap between civilian and uniformed members’ perceptions of leadership is revealed in the Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership findings. Among civilians, 75 percent agreed if they reported an ethical violation their senior would act to address it, while 12 percent disagreed. For uniformed members, 85 and 81 percent of active and reserve components responded positively, with 6 and 9 percent responding negatively. While any negative response is problematic, around 10 percent seems reasonable, if not acceptable.

In aggregate, the Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership provides indicators of the influences of the Army’s current culture. Further, it shows organizational culture is one of the antecedents to organizational climate, along with environmental factors and individual values. The data from uniformed and civilian members capture their perceptions of the ethical behavior of Army leaders. If leaders are seen as ineffectual in setting and upholding ethical standards, it is easy to understand why members of the profession would

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36 Ibid.


38 Ibid.

39 Ibid., 22.


be reluctant to report ethical violations. Such a culture would have an undeniable influence on behavior of leaders within Army organizations.

Organizational Climates within the Army

One consistent Army commentator on organizational climate has been LTG (retired) Walt Ulmer. In a 1987 article, he surmised the most probable source of unhealthy command climates to be “simply the lack of finely honed skills among senior leaders in diagnosing, creating, and maintaining the necessary climate for sustained excellence.”

Concerning ethics, Ulmer suggested junior officers “expect and are prepared to support high ethical standards but are sometimes confused, frustrated, and disappointed by what they see as unethical behavior on the part of some of their seniors.”

Given the emphasis the Army places on being a values-based institution, its leaders must remain aware of how those values are manifest in the day-to-day experiences of junior professionals. Rather than focusing primarily on individual senior leaders, assessing the collective view of ethics within Army units and activities is instructive. More appropriate is the focus on an ethical climate as “a shared perception among organizational members regarding the criteria...of ethical reasoning within an organization.”

In the past, specific focus on ethics as a component of command climate was limited to actions of Army company-level commanders within the first 90 days of assumption of command. Then a follow-on survey assessed effectiveness of action plans to address identified issues. As the Army sought to resolve challenges of leadership and unit morale during the drawdown of the 1990s, it introduced the Ethical Climate Assessment Survey (ECAS) in 1997, and then included it as an appendix to Field Manual 22-100 Army Leadership. Developed by the Army, it has four components with associated questions: Individual Character—Who are we?; Unit/Workplace Policies & Practices—What do we do?; Unit Leader Actions—What do I do?; and Environmental/Mission Factors—What surrounds us? Clearly, this survey focused on the company commander as the standard setter within the unit. Its questions are pertinent. Unfortunately, the ECAS is not valid as a research instrument: it was not rigorous in measuring what it was intended to measure. Rather, it offers a first-look “freebie” assessment for junior unit leaders and the Army of a given unit’s ethical climate.

Not surprisingly, as General Walter Ulmer noted in 1998, the Army was behind in measuring organizational climate. He suggested its senior leaders embrace the optional ECAS. Ulmer noted “[had] a climate survey been routinely administered, many of the derogatory headlines of 1997 might have been avoided, or the severity of the problems attenuated by

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43 Ibid., 15.
44 Ibid.
45 US Department of the Army, Army Leadership, Field Manual 22-100 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Department of the Army, 1997).
timely command intervention.” His advice rings true for the Army of today—especially since established and validated assessment instruments have been available for the Army.

One such instrument is the Ethical Climate Questionnaire (ECQ) developed by Bart Victor and John Cullen. Their initial research sought to identify the types of ethical climates in organizations. They identified five types:

- **Instrumental**: Decisions based on selfish interests (individual/group)
- **Caring**: Emphasis on care and concern for others
- **Law and Order**: Adherence to external criteria—professional codes
- **Rules**: Governed by policies, rules, procedures developed within organization
- **Independence**: Members have wide latitude to make own decisions

While the original research focused on organizational categories, subsequent analysis discerned these as five dimensions of ethical climate capable of being assessed independently. More recent research has identified five different ethical climate type groups or clusters. This new grouping combines Law and Order with Rules and adds Efficiency as “the degree to which employees are expected to place efficiency above all other issues.” In one study, researchers found that a climate characterized by high scores in Instrumental and low scores in Law & Rules, Caring, and Efficiency was correlated with increased likelihood of ethical dilemmas and ethical non-compliance. Likewise, researchers also identified climate types that were correlated with positive outcomes, such as either correspondingly high assessments in Law & Rules and Caring combined with low assessments in Instrumental and Independence, or high assessments in Independence and Efficiency. Climate researchers have noted that patterns of relevant dimensions will differ with types of organizations, even within a particular industry. Given its import, it is unfathomable that neither the Army nor Department of Defense have valid assessment tools for ethical climates.

**DoD Approach to Ethics Issues**

During the DoD review of ethical training programs, it became clear each armed service has its own approach to climate assessment, relying on various instruments, processes, and requirements. In December 2013, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel mandated all commands above company grade and across the armed services conduct an

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51 Ibid., 47.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid., 36-37.
organizational climate survey. Subsequently, DoD suggested the use of the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) Organizational Climate Survey (DEOCS). Like the ECAS, the DEOCS has four components reflecting specific areas of interest: Military Equal Opportunity (EO), Civilian Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO), Organizational Effectiveness (OE), and Perceptions of Discrimination/Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault Prevention & Response (SAPR).

The DEOCS also gives organizations the opportunity to add a section to address local concerns. Unlike the ECAS, it is not a purely developmental instrument provided to individual leaders for their self-management and improvement. Its results are briefed to the rater of the commander or activity leader. Appropriately, the DEOCS data will be aggregated for trend analysis within services. While it has the advantages of a readily available and standardized assessment tool capable of providing a common baseline, it does not specifically address ethical climates within the US military. It appears DoD has once again succumbed to seizing what is known and readily available, rather than seeking the most appropriate tool for the task. Given the current scrutiny of senior leader ethics within DoD, it would be prudent to include an instrument like the ECQ as an ethical component of the DEOCS.

Army Approach to Ethics Issues

To their credit, Army senior leaders have persisted as stewards of the Army Profession with the establishment of the Center for the Army Profession and Ethics (CAPE), the implementation of the Army Profession Campaign, and the publication of first-time doctrine for the profession in ADRP-1. The CAPE Master Army Profession and Ethics Training (MAPET) program to “train-the-trainers” has been well received within the operational and functional force. CAPE is also charged with developing, refining, and publishing The Army Ethic for the June 2015 edition of ADRP-1. The Army Chief of Staff’s use of Solarium 7 with junior officers and the Army Profession Symposium with general officers and their sergeants majors demonstrates the Chief’s focus on socializing and embedding these efforts within the Army culture. Army Secretary John McHugh hosted a similar symposium last fall for over one hundred civilian leaders in the Senior Executive Service. A review of recent articles in Military Review and Parameters, as well as US Army War College research papers, shows renewed interest in character and moral development for Army members—both uniformed and civilian. For example, analysis of the “Values-to-Virtue” gap has been offered to better align virtuous behavior with espoused Army Values. Emerging themes focus on building moral courage through developmental programs that enable members to “ethically accomplish the mission despite adversity, obstacles and challenges.”

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However, Army leaders must also consider the untested assumptions challenged by COL Michelson as well as his conclusions. At the core of the Army’s current approach is the inference that ethical failures are the results of individual shortcomings, so more training will fix the problem. Research from the field of behavioral ethics provides substantial evidence to the contrary. Consider that “Organizational culture and practices also can normalize unethical behavior, so that organizational members’ unethical acts are committed thoughtlessly. In such situations…considerations of ethics never enter into the cognitive, affective, and behavioral process leading up to unethical acts.”

As Schein notes, it is important to understand that culture is neither right nor wrong, but it may be misaligned with the environment and stated organizational principles. And misalignment leads to poor and unacceptable performance by individuals and the collective. Critically important, culture influences the day-to-day behavior of individuals in their organizational context.

Given that organizational climate is localized and linked to leaders, the ethical climate set by leaders “in which they convey ethical expectation, implications, and consequences” does “help employees make sense of behaviors that are morally equitable and morally inequitable.” Thus, ethical climates should be routinely monitored to strengthen the organization, including the profession. Snider clarifies the profession’s quest: “Ultimately, virtuous behavior that is self-motivated and policed by the individual and the institution is the goal.” Strategic leaders establish and influence culture, so they should understand specific organizational climates, especially the ethical climate within Army organizations. When ethical leadership is demonstrated as the norm among organizational members, the conditions for a positive ethical climate have been set. Use of the ECQ within the Army to determine the ethical climate type and accompanying outcomes (positive and negative) would enable senior leaders to be proactive rather than reactive to ethical incidents.

In its doctrine, the Army recognizes the value to be gained from the social and behavioral sciences. Its Human Dimension Concept calls for the “Use [of] cognitive, physical, and social assessments that measure abilities,” to enhance individual and organizational development along those specified components. Given the Army’s inherently lethal capabilities, building ethical resilience “to cope with and overcome adversity in optimally ethical ways” is of paramount importance for the profession of arms.

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Training is Not Enough

Without doubt, the Army knows how to train. Training programs, however, are necessary but not sufficient to address the current challenges. Ethical climates provide leading indicators of potential problems, but unfortunately they are not assessed in the Army. Despite the central roles of honor codes in cadets’ lives, US service academies’ training in morals and values have not precluded periodic scandals within those esteemed institutions. Rather than identifying purely individual failures, post-mortem analyses have identified organizational cultures and climates from which ethical dilemmas have emerged. The final report on the West Point cheating scandal in 1976 cited “unrestrained growth of the ‘cool-on-honor’ subculture at the Academy, the widespread violations of the Honor Code, the gross inadequacies in the Honor System, the failure of the Academy to act decisively with respect to known honor problems, and the other Academy shortcomings.” 62 In effect, cadets and their leaders had become “numb” and “blind” to espoused ethical principles. Nearly forty years later, it appears the findings of the Borman Commission are still applicable to the larger Army and the other services.

Regardless of the drive to inculcate core military values of honor and integrity, other service academies have not been spared from ethical scandals over the succeeding decades. The United States Naval Academy endured its own honor scandal in 1994 with the revelation that 134 midshipman cheated on a take-home exam. In 2012, the United States Air Force Academy reported nearly 80 of its cadets cheated on an online test. Clearly training is not enough. Special Advisor for Military Professionalism Admiral Klein asserted “Training is about five to 10 percent of we how develop our character” as she addressed the Navy’s Recruiting Training Command on ethics and professionalism. 63

Unethical behavior extends well beyond academic cheating to the mistreatment of others by sexual harassment and assault. As the 2005 report of the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault & Violence at the Military Service Academies concludes:

...the leadership, staff, faculty, cadets and midshipmen must model behaviors that reflect and positively convey the value of women in the military. In addition we recommend the Academies use modern survey and management tools on a permanent basis to provide information to oversight bodies.” 64

A decade later, this conclusion compellingly affirms the implicit principles of leadership, values, ethical behavior as well as the need to assess and monitor climate and culture of military organizations, however elite.

A Way Ahead for the Profession

Army strategic leaders are the senior stewards of the profession—those entrusted with an invaluable national asset. Accordingly, they shape and influence culture as well as set direction for the force by establishing

priorities aligned with the Army’s ethical principles. These principles are captured explicitly in The Army Ethic. Senior leaders should direct two actions:

First, collaborate with and use research from social and behavioral sciences to develop evidence-based developmental (training and educational) programs with measures of effectiveness for individual character and moral development.

Second, incorporate or develop empirically validated research instruments to assess ethical climates and include them as part of the DoD or separate Army organizational climate survey. Accordingly, the Center for Army Leadership (CAL) and the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) should adopt current climate methodology to its assessment of the Army’s organizational climate and its ethical climate. The Army has a categorical obligation to develop and use valid techniques and instruments, making it imperative that valid assessment instruments are developed and administered throughout the force.

Currently, the services are using the DEOCS, which is designed to address particular areas for which the secretary of defense is responsible to provide reports to the Commander-in-Chief and Congress: the current area of focus is Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR). As the DEOCS has evolved, each service will have a service-specific component of the survey of up to 25 questions (currently at 16 questions). Understandably, OSD would like to maintain consistency in data collection and reporting—however, the short-term focus precludes inclusion of other important areas like the assessment of ethical climates within the service. The survey of ethical climates will provide leading and reinforcing indicators of the four DEOCS components of EO, EEO, OE, and SAPR.

As OSD designated DEOMI as its proponent to administer service climate surveys, an executive agent should be assigned to research and develop ethical climate assessment instruments that are valid within the services and across the Department of Defense. This may entail taking existing instruments, such as the ECQ, and testing their validity and applicability to service populations. If existing assessment instruments are not generalizable to the service, then research efforts must be undertaken to develop either service-specific or DoD-wide instruments. Each service has its own research activities—for example, ARI—that could be directed to develop a research-based assessment. Once the instruments are developed, OSD must provide new or modify existing policy for its administration within the operational force and across the services. Within the Army, its Commanding General, Training and Doctrine Command (CG, TRADOC) has designated CAL as the proponent for surveys like the CASAL.

Conclusion—Leaders as Stewards of the Army Profession

Senior leaders do matter. They play a critical role in every organization, especially the Army. Only the senior stewards of the profession can design and implement the changes needed to meet the US military’s ethical challenges. For the today’s military profession, the 2005 Defense
Task Force conclusions should be modified to provide direction and guidance.

The Army’s organizations should have leaders at all levels who understand the strength of the Army’s culture; they should redress the unbalanced focus on competence that is contributing to a weakening of the trust the Army needs from its members and the society it serves. Effective assessments and programs aimed at developing ethical climates will enable leaders to take the necessary actions to make the Army the trusted profession our nation needs.
ABSTRACT: This article examines the significance of culture as a moderator of innovation, and criticizes monolithic accounts of military resistance to innovation. It then describes a dimension of military culture focused on the concept of the ideal combatant, and how that concept relates to innovation. Military culture can be improved by: (1) engineering the competitive context for innovation, and (2) creating career paths in which new kinds of personnel have a means of advancing, while preserving enduring organizational values.

For modern militaries, innovation is not a scientific or technical problem; it is an organizational challenge. Some observers of innovation speak of “revolutionary” versus “evolutionary,” or “radical” versus “incremental” innovation. These approaches to innovation predict the success or failure of an organization’s adoption of something new based on how difficult the technology is to adopt. Such constructs are flawed, because they treat as an independent variable (the organization’s difficulty in adopting whatever it is that is new) the very thing we are trying to predict, the theoretical equivalent of a dog chasing its tail. Furthermore, the magnitude of a technological advance is not a good predictor of whether an organization will struggle with it. Militaries may succeed at rapidly adopting new platforms that involve major technological change, yet fail (or be unforgivably slow) to adopt innovations that are incremental improvements. Terms like “radical” and “revolutionary” have little use when applied to predicting the organizational response to an innovation.

Bureaucracies thrive on consistent, standard approaches to resolving familiar problems. Militaries are bureaucracies that depend on standardization of tools, training, methods, and organization. Innovation subverts this standardization and consistency, first, in the exploration of a new approach (the introduction of variance into the system), and then (if the innovation is successful enough) in the eventual replacement of the existing approach throughout the organization. The generalization of an innovation requires organizational change, which in turn may require cultural change. “Culture” is a notoriously vague term, sometimes used as a catch-all to account for behavior in organizations that is

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not otherwise explained. It is difficult to describe in practical, tangible terms.

Organizational researcher Edgar Schein has proposed a compelling description of organizational culture:

> A pattern of basic assumptions—invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration—that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to these problems.²

Schein’s great insight is to focus attention on aspects of organizational behavior strongly associated with problem-solving and adaptation. To understand an organization’s culture, Schein invites us to focus on things associated with what has worked in the past, and to examine the symbols, norms, values, behaviors, etc., that constitute these things. In other words, culture is a theory of what works. This definition has great significance for understanding innovation.

Militaries are societies unto themselves, with their own sociology, history, values and beliefs. Military culture is built on these principles of shared history and values. Operational and strategic concepts of “what works” in the military context are entwined with principles of social status and individual identity; consider the Air Force’s difficulties in reconciling the increasing operational capabilities of unmanned aircraft with its pilot-centric values, or the tortured logic of the Navy’s continued reliance on the aircraft carrier as its central offensive asset, or the Army’s continued devotion to the heavy fight. Innovation is not simply—or even mostly—a question of capabilities and resources. Military innovation not only affects the way wars are prosecuted, but also changes the order of military society, altering the relationship between the soldier, sailor, marine, or airman and the organization. Elting Morison writes,

> The opposition, where it occurs, of the soldier and sailor to [innovation] springs from the normal human instinct to protect oneself, and, more especially, one’s way of life. Military organizations are societies built around and upon the prevailing weapons systems. Intuitively and quite correctly the military man feels that a change in weapons portends a change in the arrangements of his society.³

This article examines the individual element of military culture as it relates to innovation. This perspective is necessarily incomplete. Military culture is not just about individuals. It also exists at the strategic level (what Carl Builder ably termed concepts of war), and even at the national level.⁴ The focus of this essay is the “cultural concept of the ideal combatant,” that is, assumptions underlying the role of a human being in warfare—what makes an effective commander or subordinate, and what the proper basis of the relationship is between the two. When innovations align with a military organization’s concept of the ideal combatant, the natural tendencies of the organization can be trusted to succeed in developing and implementing the change. However, when the innovation does not align with the concept of war, or when it undermines

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assumptions about what makes an effective commander or subordinate, leaders should expect that the innovation will be resisted.

This article helps leaders anticipate resistance to innovation rooted in a misalignment between the current concept of the ideal combatant and the new concept underlying an innovation. If leaders understand the nature of this resistance, they will be better positioned to develop appropriate responses to it.

Military Culture and Innovation

The Conservative Culture Hypothesis

Some explanations for military resistance to innovation claim there is something in the essence of the military milieu or the military mind that is antithetical to change. Williamson Murray describes this view, “Military institutions exist in a culture of disciplined obedience in which soldiers, sailors and airmen must remain steadfast in the face of terrifying conditions… But disciplined organizations rarely place a high value on new and untried ideas, concepts and innovations.”5 This can be termed the “conservative culture hypothesis.” Samuel Huntington employs this hypothesis when he describes the “military mind” as one that views the world through the lens of “conservative realism.”6 An effective military emphasizes order, obedience, hierarchy, division of function, and the supremacy of the society over the individual. “Society” can mean both the micro-society of the military and the society of the state the military man or woman is sworn to protect. Military organizations are constantly reinforcing their ties to the past, which serves two purposes. First, military organizations value ceremony and tradition, emphasizing the distinctness of the military community and imbuing its members with a stronger sense of collective identity. Second, militaries value the knowledge of history, which, as Moltke said, is “the most effective method of teaching war during peace.”7 One can learn valuable lessons from the experiences of others, using it to develop principles and concepts for potential future application. Therefore, military organizations are hyper-attentive to what has worked in the past, further strengthening the military’s culture. According to the conservative culture hypothesis, the classic military virtues of obedience, self-sacrifice, collectivism, devotion to tradition and knowledge of history are strengths in preparing for and fighting war, but liabilities when the organization is seeking to change.

The conservative culture hypothesis of military resistance to innovation is supported by some findings from broader studies of innovation in other organizations.8 The hypothesis appropriately focuses not on the strength of the military culture, but on its content. It is incorrect to suggest a strong culture necessarily inhibits innovation. We must
know something about the content of the culture to make that claim. Organizations with strong cultures may be innovative if their cultures encourage behaviors supporting innovation. For the military, the conservative culture hypothesis posits that its cultural content stifles innovation. For example, militaries emphasize the good of the group over the individual, which discourages individual departures from group norms. Military norms tend to be task-oriented and convergent (focused on narrowing options and meeting mission requirements) as opposed to idea-oriented and divergent (focused on developing good ideas and expanding the range of ideas under consideration). Finally, militaries value uniformity over diversity. Members of the military may come from diverse backgrounds, but diversity is suppressed because personnel must be substitutable, a necessary condition in an organization whose members are subject to sudden and violent death. The conservative culture hypothesis suggests all of these characteristics (collectivism, convergent thinking, uniformity, etc.) militate against effective innovation in military organizations.

However, the conservative culture hypothesis has two problems. First, it treats innovation as a monolithic phenomenon, when in fact successful innovation is a process during which a given aspect of the culture may be both a strength and a weakness, albeit at different stages. The conservative culture hypothesis focuses on the content of military culture that inhibits the generation of innovative ideas, but it does not consider that the same characteristics that may hinder the emergence of ideas (for example, a strong deference to authority) would facilitate their implementation. The military is an execution-oriented culture, and military organizations will effectively implement innovations that receive organizational endorsement. Thus, the notion innovation will improve if the group’s norms for uniformity and convergence are diminished is true only if that attenuation affects the organization during idea generation and not implementation.

The second, more significant, problem with the conservative culture hypothesis is that it offers no explanation as to why militaries have different responses to different innovations. As mentioned above, many good ideas do emerge in military organizations, with the responses ranging from enthusiastic acceptance to fanatical rejection. To understand this difference within the military context, it is not enough to say the military has an anti-innovation culture.

Cultural Resistance to Innovation

To understand whether a military will struggle with an innovation, we must look beyond the technological challenges and examine the relationship between an innovation and the culture. How does the innovation align with the organizational concept of an ideal combatant? How does the innovation align with current cultural assumptions in terms of honor, the delegation of authority, and the tolerance for variation and the desired degree of uniformity? How does an innovation affect how commanders lead, how subordinates obey, or how individual combatants prepare for and fight wars? This link between an innovation and the social structure of the military is the “cultural concept of the ideal combatant.” While the content of this concept is complex, this article highlights three characteristics especially relevant to innovation:
1. **The conduct of honorable warfare**: how the organization values physical courage in the context of war, and how it views the morality, justice and fairness of various weapons and effects; e.g., the use of submarines or landmines, or the acceptability of civilian casualties.

2. **The delegation of decision-making authority**: how much the organization delegates or centralizes the decisions to use force, modify a military asset, alter a plan, or call on supporting assets, for example.

3. **The degree of regularity in military assets, and the tolerance for differences among those assets**: how much a leader accepts variation in equipment, training, effects, etc.

**Honorable Warfare and Resistance to Innovation**

The first element considered in this analysis is the organization’s idea of honorable warfare. Honor is an inextricable component of the military profession. It is an expression of many characteristics of military culture—obedience, courage, duty, self-sacrifice, tradition, fairness and justice, and treatment of non-combatants. How does an innovation align with ideas of honorable war? Consider three components: courage, justice, and violence against civilians.

For the first seven thousand years of civilization, physical courage was an inherent characteristic of all warfare. To kill, a combatant had to be in a position of some vulnerability. Yet the nature of this courage evolved over time in response to changes in warfare. The courage of a pilot in the Second World War differed from that of a soldier in the United States Civil War, which differed from that of a knight in the Hundred Years’ War. One is not necessarily more courageous than the other, but the value of each type of courage is highly dependent on context. Continuous-aim gunnery revolutionized the accuracy of naval gunfire; Elting Morison describes how these improvements changed the nature of physical courage required for naval warfare: “The fourteen-inch rifle, which could place a shell upon a possible target six miles away, had long ago annihilated the Nelsonian doctrine… [It was] not that men were no longer brave, but that 100 years after the battle of the Nile they had to reveal their bravery in a different way.”

Every generation in a military organization develops a unique sense of the courage required in war. What was courageous behavior in a prior conflict may be reckless or futile in a later one. Yet military cultures will try to resist an innovation that upends their principles of honorable warfare before succumbing to the logic of a new weapon. Courage and recklessness are contextual, and the technology of war is crucial to that context. A Royal Navy commander with the “disposition to close” during the Napoleonic wars might perform well in battle, but such behavior would be suicidal in engagements with German battleships during the First World War. An innovation that alters the calculus of courage also changes the social context of war, and will therefore be resisted by the organization.

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Unmanned aircraft provide a striking illustration of this dynamic. As discussed above, the character of aerial combat changed dramatically in the decades following the Second World War, but because every generation of pilot remained susceptible to a sudden and violent death in the air, they shared a common identity. The operators of a remotely piloted UAV remain conspicuously outside of that fraternity, despite the fact the machines they pilot have more in common with modern piloted attack aircraft than do first and second-generation fighters. What is different about operators of UAVs? They attack from positions of relative safety. In many cases, the ground crews supporting the drones are at greater risk than the drone pilots. UAVs undermine one of the core assumptions of the community of attack pilots—to be an effective pilot, you must face danger. The initial response of that community—ridicule and rejection of drone operators—was entirely predictable.10

Since innovations often change the nature of courage required of combatants, they also change the conditions of susceptibility of a combatant to violence. Note that the innovation may increase or decrease a combatant’s susceptibility. The issue is how the innovation affects a generation’s concept of justice in conflict—how much risk combatants should assume and whether they have the ability to fight back. The advent of submarines created a fundamental problem for naval strategists: how to exploit the capabilities of the platform while adhering to the rules of surface warfare. The ultimate answer—one cannot—was preceded by several attempts to control the use of submarines. The London Naval Treaty (1930) was an attempt by the United Kingdom, the United States, Italy, France and Japan to regulate submarine warfare, forcing submarines to abide by “prize rules,” requiring crews of merchant vessels be placed in safety before their ships may be sunk.11 Such exercises in restraint are usually overcome by the expediencies of war, but in the meantime they hinder exploration of affected technologies and the integration of those technologies into broader operational concepts. It is probably not coincidental that militaries had fewer qualms about unrestricted submarine warfare after advances in antisubmarine defenses (sonar, depth charges, aerial surveillance) improved the odds for the surface combatants.

To the degree that innovations undermine existing assumptions about fairness in war, they are likely to be resisted. The reaction to innovations that reduce risk in the defensive or the offensive is more ambiguous. It seems a military’s response to such changes largely depends on whether it enjoys an advantage under the prevailing way of war. An innovation that significantly increases risk in the offensive (machine guns, for example) is likely to be resisted by militaries with favorable offensive capabilities under the existing competitive system.

The ideal combatant does not kill indiscriminately. Innovations may change the degree to which the effects of war are felt by non-combatants. Military organizations develop rules or procedures to determine acceptable civilian losses in pursuit of a military goal, yet technology changes the variables in this calculation. Militaries seek to limit civilian

casualties, and innovations that allow for greater precision in effects (such as guided munitions or improved surveillance) are likely to be embraced. However, some innovations decrease military control over collateral damage, and in such cases, militaries may struggle to adapt.

The great challenge is that resistance to innovation on moral grounds is often appropriate. (Consider the United States military’s abandonment of offensive chemical and biological weapons.) The military profession is not simply tasked with executing humanity’s wars; it also helps to determine what kinds of wars humanity will accept. Nuclear weapons are history’s most powerful example of this task. But “the bomb” remains a fact of the global military environment, despite its grotesque character; until that changes, nuclear weapons should be susceptible to innovation. However, from the moment of the *Trinity* test on July 16, 1945, the military profession has struggled with how to think about them. The condition of US nuclear strategy almost seventy years after *Trinity* attests to these challenges.

More often, innovations that run afoul of a military’s concept of honorable warfare are not such stark moral challenges, but more subtle deviations (such as Morison’s example of naval gunnery). In such cases, it is not at all clear that the resistance to such innovations is good for the future effectiveness of the organization. In general, innovations that reduce military control over the effects on civilians are resisted.

**The Shifting Balance of Control over Decision-Making**

The second aspect of the concept of a combatant is the optimal delegation of authority to make decisions. What is the appropriate balance between detailed orders, procedures, etc., and the exercise of individual initiative? In war, it is necessary for commanders to exercise control over their forces, but it is also necessary for subordinate units to interpret orders in light of changing conditions on the battlefield. Carl von Clausewitz captured this tension when he wrote, “Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult.”12 Worded less poetically, simplicity in conception and simplicity in execution are not the same. The optimal balance between a commander’s tight control and a subordinate’s freedom to adapt is not fixed, but changes over time as the context of war changes. Innovation can alter the balance in either direction.

Consider the authority to decide whether to attack hostile ground forces from the air, particularly when the enemy is in close proximity to friendly units. In the absence of communications technology, the pilot must have the authority to decide on his or her own whether (and where) to attack. However, when communications put a pilot within reach of an air controller or some other coordinating mechanism, the pilot must cede some of that authority. In that case, innovation nudges the balance of authority in favor of greater command and control.

The evolution of infantry tactics in response to rapid-firing artillery and machine guns offers an example of the opposite effect—innovations prompting greater delegation of authority to subordinates. The slaughter of infantry advancing in close order over open ground required that

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armies adopt a different means of assault, advancing by small groups, using protective fire and moving in and out of cover. This tactic puts infantry units out of contact with their commanders during crucial moments of battle, and requires that junior non-commissioned officers assume more authority in directing others and making tactical decisions.

Whichever direction the innovation pushes the balance, any alteration is likely to cause some social upheaval. However, the eternal and abiding desire of commanders is to reduce the fog and friction of war. Innovations that shift the balance in favor of greater transparency and more direct control of their forces are therefore likely to be viewed more favorably than those that shift greater responsibility to subordinates, however necessary the transition of authority. The historian Michael Howard, in an account of the evolution of European military strategy leading up to the First World War, described how the French high command initially embraced fire-and-maneuver tactics (based on the experience of the British in the Boer War), only to reverse itself. Howard wrote, “Such tactics demanded of the ordinary soldier a degree of skill and self-reliance such as neither the French nor any other European army (with the possible exception of the Germans) had hitherto expected, or done anything to inculcate, either in their junior officers or in their other ranks.” The conviction that turned the French high command back to close-order assault was its belief in the absolute necessity of maintaining contact between officers and infantry comprised mostly of conscripts in the event of general mobilization. Howard imagined the question leaders posed to themselves, “How could these lonely, frightened men, deprived of the intoxication of drums and trumpets, the support of their comrades, the inspiration of their leaders, find within themselves the courage to die?” Innovations that shift greater responsibility to subordinates will be resisted more strongly than those that do the opposite.

The Desire for Uniformity and the Need for Differences

The preference of military organizations for greater predictability on the battlefield also informs the third and final variable in this discussion of the concept of an ideal combatant: the desired degree of regularity and the tolerance for differences. How much does a military organization value consistency in equipment, training, and procedure for similar personnel and units? Military organizations value predictability (knowing what effects can be achieved by a given military asset, for example) and substitutability (knowing that a replacement asset can achieve those same effects). Both are improved by standardization. Commanders are comforted by the idea that the choice of unit A or unit B is not a choice between two units with meaningful differences in equipment and training—when commanders articulate their intent, units will execute that intent with similar means and methods. This uniformity improves predictability. It is also necessary for substitutability. A unit whose deployment ends or is rotated out due to losses can be replaced by a unit with similar capabilities. Of course, there is no such thing as perfect predictability and substitutability, but militaries do what they can to reduce uncertainty in these areas. At the extreme, the ideal

14 Ibid., 50.
combatant, whether a commander or a subordinate, is replicable across the entire organization. How tolerant is the organization of variations in equipment, training and procedure? Meaningful innovations may require staged adoption, particularly if the employment of the innovation is not yet fully understood. That means the organization must introduce variation and diminish uniformity, not a prospect military leaders relish. Furthermore, there is great potential for learning from uncontrolled variance in member behaviors.

During the first year of the United States Civil War, the Chief of Ordnance of the Army, General James Ripley received numerous reports regarding the effectiveness of Spencer and Henry rifles. These breech-loading, repeating rifles, though less accurate than some muzzle-loaders at great distances, were accurate at ranges less than 200 yards and greatly increased the potential rate of fire for an infantryman using one—with the Henry, at least sixteen rounds before reloading, compared to two or three shots per minute for a competent soldier using a muzzle-loading weapon. The math was compelling, but not to Ripley, who, in a letter to the Secretary of the Army in December, 1861, explained his objection to purchasing more than a small number of the weapons for field trials:

> The multiplication of arms and ammunition of different kinds and patterns, and working on different principles is decidedly objectionable, and should, in my opinion, be stopped by the refusal to introduce any more unless upon the most full and complete evidence of their great superiority.\(^{15}\)

For General Ripley, the repeating rifles introduced an unacceptable degree of variation in ammunition and arms, as well as the requirement to issue much more ammunition to soldiers using Henrys and Spencers. His response captures the way the military virtue of uniformity becomes an impediment to adopting significant innovations. What advantage would the Union have gained through the broad fielding of Henrys and Spencers, coupled with training in controlled rates of aimed fire (for Ripley’s concerns about ammunition were not entirely baseless—a panicked soldier could exhaust his ammunition in minutes)?

Within the United States military, the degree of uniformity varies both across services and branches within services. The more interconnected a combatant or unit is with a broader system of resources, the less tolerant is the organization for departures from standard equipment and procedures. The Navy and the Air Force operate complex, interdependent platforms, and small deviations can result in significant displacements in their systems. This makes staged adoption much more challenging—requiring more central coordination. However, the Army, the Marine Corps, and Special Operations forces, in particular, have greater latitude for exploring the effects of innovations in the operational context. With small-scale or modular innovations, an organization can do partial fielding or field experimentation. The more novel a weapon or tactic, the more field experimentation is required. Yet even effective demonstrations may result in the rejection of the innovation if the organization deems the results cannot be generalized.

In war, military personnel try new things in response to operational challenges, and the organization tolerates this experimentation because

it (usually) values tactical and operational success more than it does rigid adherence to standard procedure. During peace, this tolerance for uncontrolled experimentation (in the form of uncontrolled modifications of equipment, procedures, etc.) is much diminished, and hinders innovation.

A military’s ideal concept of a commander, a subordinate, and the proper relationship between them are partially determined by ideas about honorable war, of the proper delegation of authority, and the appropriate degree of uniformity in the organization. Innovations that challenge these ideas can be expected to encounter resistance. In summary, military organizations will tend to resist innovations that:

- Challenge existing notions of the nature and use of physical courage
- Unfavorably change the balance of risk in the offensive or the defensive
- Reduce control over the effects of military operations
- Decentralize decision-making
- Reduce the uniformity and substitutability of military assets

Leaders who recognize the ways in which an innovation is misaligned with the dominant concepts of honorable warfare, decision-making control, and regularity in military assets will be better positioned to set the right conditions for change.

Leading Cultural Change, or Managing It?

When an innovation is incompatible with dominant cultural concepts, successful innovation leadership involves three key tasks: (1) identifying the assumptions of the role of the ideal combatant that underlie an innovation, and the extent to which those new concepts align with the existing culture; (2) demonstrating that new assumptions that are misaligned with the prevailing culture will improve the organization's performance in the kinds of conflicts it anticipates; and (3) persuading the organization that the new concept of a combatant is not a rejection of the enduring values of the organization. This is a decidedly heroic view of the role of the leader in leading innovation, in the face of cultural resistance. But how realistic is it?

Innovation leadership in the military is constrained by three enduring characteristics of the military environment: (1) the need to innovate in peacetime, (2) the control of military leaders over the instruments of innovation; and (3) the system of internal development and promotion of officers.

Although militaries exist for war, they operate more frequently (at least in the modern era) in times of relative peace. This means militaries need to imagine and to manufacture wartime conditions during times of peace. War is the most persuasive and unforgiving of all competitive contexts. As the saying goes, “the enemy gets a vote,” and the enemy is very good at identifying and exploiting gaps between the full tactical, operational and strategic possibilities of war and the military’s partial understanding of those possibilities. The organization’s natural resistance to embracing an effective innovation will not alter an enemy’s exploitation of a stubborn adherence to ineffective approaches. For example, when allied bombers lacking long-range fighter escorts suffered 20 percent
losses in two raids against Schweinfurt in August and October, 1943, the notion bombers could protect themselves through mutually supporting fires seemed conclusively refuted. The allies suspended deep penetration raids, only resuming them when longer-range escorts became available.\textsuperscript{16} But such stark facts are not naturally created in times of peace. The key is creating conditions in peacetime that reveal the essential qualities of a new problem, or the opportunities inherent in a new configuration of technology, procedure, or technique. This is a leadership responsibility. But engineering such conditions requires a willingness to challenge established concepts, bringing us to back to military leadership.

Military leaders control the use of resources for the purpose of exploration and innovation. Military innovation is deliberate and planned. The US military has units devoted to experimentation, but the experimentation tends to occur within an established framework, and, crucially, it focuses on resolving the problems presented by that framework, as opposed to discovering and solving problems unacknowledged by that framework.\textsuperscript{17} In the decade before the First World War, the British Army struggled to incorporate the machine gun effectively into its operating concepts, largely because the Army’s conceptual problems were framed in terms of offensive operations. The extraordinary and transformational character of the machine gun as a defensive weapon was therefore poorly understood.\textsuperscript{18} Furthermore, because militaries are both public and authoritarian organizations, the entrepreneurial use of military resources for unplanned experimentation and innovation tends to be discouraged (to put it lightly) in peacetime. (Note that these constraints are relaxed in wartime, when the unsanctioned modification of government equipment is common.)

Finally, as a result of the modern system of officer development and promotion, senior officers tend to achieve their positions because they (1) have the individual characteristics the organization desires in its leaders, and (2) served as officers in the positions valued under the existing culture. Their careers are reflections of prevailing concepts of honorable war, the delegation of authority, or the degree of uniformity. If the prescription for overcoming resistance to innovation is that senior leaders undermine or abandon the strategic culture and values upon which they have built their careers, the organization is likely to be disappointed. This is the paradox of innovation leadership: senior military leaders are best positioned to create an environment that allows the organization to discover and validate new ways of doing things, but they are ill-suited to the tasks of identification, demonstration and persuasion that are core to innovation leadership.

Given these three conditions—the need to innovate in peacetime, control of leaders over the means to innovate, and the internal system of leader development and promotion—heroic leadership may not achieve the innovation results the military needs. Indeed, when an innovation is

\textsuperscript{16} Donald Miller, Masters of the Air: America’s Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War Against Nazi Germany (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2007), 195-205.

\textsuperscript{17} This roughly corresponds to what the philosopher Thomas Kuhn termed “normal science.” See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: 50th Anniversary Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 24-27.

\textsuperscript{18} Tim Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900-1918 (Winchester, MA: Allen and Unwin, 1987), 62-70.
misaligned with the culture, leadership will more reliably stifle change than encourage it. Yet leaders lead directly and indirectly. In innovation, direct leadership involves the use of authority to validate problems and direct resources to the solution of those problems. It is deliberate. However, such deliberate approaches tend to reinforce, rather than challenge, existing cultural assumptions. The data and reasoning driving deliberate, top-down innovation leadership are themselves products of the existing culture. When an innovation is aligned with the culture, the organization can be trusted to manage the innovation well—whether it’s managed from the top-down or the bottom-up. When the two are not aligned, however, the leader must create conditions in which the organization’s culture can change.

Military innovations that solve problems not yet validated will be ignored or deprived of resources, more so during periods of fiscal constraint. Indeed, the most significant innovations may not solve validated problems, beginning on the periphery (or entirely outside) of the organization’s dominant culture and strategy (e.g., carrier aviation), as solutions in search of problems. Strategic military leaders are uniquely positioned to create conditions such that organizations discover and validate new military problems.

**Recommendation 1: Engineer the Competitive Context of Innovation**

In peacetime, leaders are responsible for engineering the organizational context to create conditions enabling inductive innovation—the discovery and validation of new military problems. Indirect or “emergent” innovation leadership involves the management of the competitive context for innovation. Whereas deliberate innovation leadership relies on the omniscience of the senior leader, emergent approaches use the full scope of the organization to explore and exploit new possibilities. The competitive context is the way in which the organization identifies the problems of competition it wishes to solve, and how it allocates resources across the set of potential solutions to those problems. The assumptions upon which a culture is based are changed through the demonstration of viable (and preferable) alternatives; the competitive environment in which a new approach is evaluated provides the context for this demonstration. Every war game, every simulation, every conflict that involves other nations, every examination of strategy (even in fiction) is an opportunity to discover something new.

**Recommendation 2: Teach Officers How to Challenge Their Assumptions**

Exploration and experimentation is pointless if we have not determined what information would cause us to question our assumptions. Change happens when the old idea is invalidated by new facts, and a new idea replaces it. Although improving military education may be a commonplace recommendation for critics who have run out of ideas, it is nevertheless foundational to learning how to learn. This requires nothing less than a commitment to educating leaders about the character and sources of knowledge—epistemology. We are rarely aware of the typical, self-preserving, responses that we have to dissonant information. Our tools for gathering and analyzing data become more powerful every year, yet our understanding of the fundamental logic and methods of research is not keeping pace. Throughout the continuum of officer
education, we must learn and re-learn the core principles of epistemology: logic, scientific reasoning, and research methods. In order to create conditions for this change, leaders should understand what constitutes a refutation of dominant concepts of war and the role of combatants in it. This is about teaching officers how to learn, how to change their minds, and how to embrace complexity.

**Recommendation 3: Give Officers Paths to Success**

Two powerful mechanisms through which leaders change culture are (1) the allocation of rewards and status, and (2) the recruiting, selection, retention, and promotion of leaders. Significant innovations present leaders with personnel management challenges. When a change in the way a military fights creates a new job, how does that job fit into the organization’s existing framework for retention and promotion? Advanced militaries have elaborate systems for rewarding good officers, and for signaling to those officers (and to their peers) who in the organization has been identified as having potential for senior positions. In the 1920s, the US Navy successfully managed the addition of an entirely new (and large) part of the officer corps—naval aviators. This success rested on the astute decisions of Admiral William Moffett, who ensured aviators served in positions that required knowledge of surface warfare, and that non-aviators could command aviation units.

Thus, although naval aviation posed a serious challenge to the dominant concept of naval warfare, the naval aviation community came to be seen as a part of the broader community of naval officers, one that supported the core values of the US Navy. This delicate balance between revolution and conservation is exceedingly difficult to manage, and Admiral Moffett stands out because of how well he struck that balance. He was at various times opposed both by the traditional Navy community, and by the aviators. His core policies can be summarized as follows. First, he ensured naval aviators could achieve flag officer positions by requiring them to develop proficiency in the broader community of naval leadership. Second, he created conditions in which traditional naval officers interacted with and led aviation units, enabling them to see the new capability within a broadened framework of naval warfare.

Admiral Moffett’s achievement was built on a simple principle: he remained focused on the idea that naval aviation was an instrument of naval power; this helped him avoid the trap of confusing technology with identity. One of the greatest challenges to military innovation is the way that military professionals over time derive their professional identity from the technologies with which they interact, as opposed to the effects those technologies are intended to achieve. Significant military innovation often requires professional identity be divorced from platforms, and tied to higher-level concepts of operations. Yet such disruption must preserve the organization’s enduring values. No new military community will survive if it is seen to be opposed to these beliefs and values.

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19 Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 246.
Conclusion

 Courage, honor, authority, control, predictability—these are powerful military concepts. Innovations that appear to subvert them stand little chance of success. In peacetime, significant military innovations inevitably run up against the dominant concepts of the role of the combatant, and provoke organizational responses that range from simple resistance to deliberate deception. Leaders who understand the culture of the organization will be able to anticipate such responses. Furthermore, through officer development and education, fostering informal experimentation, organizational design, and systems of officer promotion and retention, leaders can build structures and career paths that protect new approaches when they are most vulnerable to the dominant paradigm. One of the greatest responsibilities of strategic military leadership is fostering a context in which good ideas have a chance to develop into effective means and methods of war. The future depends on it.
Abstract: Since 9-11, the United States has embarked on a decade of doctrinal and technical innovations focused on defeating networks and individual combatants rather than formations. This article examines this evolving model of individualized warfare within the context of current debates over the appropriate role of military landpower in an age dominated by persistent threats from non-state actors and unconventional adversaries.

In late 2014, the United States reached a milestone of the 500th non-battlefield targeted strike. Beyond the numbers, this event is notable as one example of a new mode of state warfare based on military power being applied directly against individual combatants rather than formations. These so-called “targeted killings” are perhaps the most vivid example of the individualization of American warfare, particularly the Commander-in-Chief routinely reviewing and approving strikes against named combatants, a phenomenon “without precedent in presidential history.” However, this operational trend is by no means limited to high-level counterterrorism efforts. It represents a more systematic disaggregation of national security threats and the adoption of an individualized approach to military targeting that has dramatically transformed the American way of war. Within this paradigm, the targeting of “high value individuals” and networks has replaced conventional force engagement as the driving force of recent doctrinal change and technical innovation.

As the defining operational experience for a generation of junior leaders, this new mode of warfare reflects the culmination of a decade of tactical lessons, doctrinal adaptations, technical advances, and changes to the institutional cultures of the US military. Indeed, since 9-11 the US armed forces have “developed the fusion of operations and intelligence for the purpose of hunting high-value targets into a high art.” Yet even as these methods have been widely applied, there remains insufficient analysis as to their effectiveness and utility as an element of US military


This article describes the catalysts driving the individualization of American warfare and considers the implications for future national security strategy and the Army.

A Post-Westphalian Logic of Warfare

The rise of individualized warfare stands in stark contrast to the preceding Cold War era where focus of operational planning, intelligence analysis, and doctrine centered primarily on the conduct of large-scale conventional warfare against nation-state adversaries. The transition is even more profound as a departure from the foundational presumptions of the “Westphalian” system that defined the context of state warfare for over three hundred years. The end of the Thirty Years War was notable as the transition point from the age of private mercenary conflicts towards a modern construct of warfare in which combatants became instruments of the state, acting on behalf of political sovereigns rather than fighting for individual gain. This period also marked the “depersonalization” of conflict as soldiers assumed collective identities as members of professional armies. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s seminal treatise on political power articulated the significance of this transition, noting modern warfare was no longer a “relationship between one man and another, but a relationship between one state and another, in which individuals are enemies only by accident, not as men, nor even as citizens, but as soldiers.” This shift provided the intellectual foundation for legal categorizations supporting the concept of lawful combatancy and the treatment of prisoners, wounded soldiers, and civilians on the battlefield.

As the Westphalian system depersonalized warfare, soldiers became “generic” members of their national armies in terms of legal status and appearance. Geo-political boundaries and national affiliations determined the application and scope of wartime protections, while uniforms emerged to distinguish soldiers from civilians and to provide the operational context for lawful targeting. Within this mode of warfare, the treatment of soldiers became status-based, meaning that privileges, obligations and rules of engagement were no longer linked to individual identity but rather to the soldiers’ generic status as part of a state formation. This convention has come under challenge as a result of recent conflicts waged by “unprivileged enemy belligerents,” disqualified from the privileges of combatant status as a result of joining or substantially supporting non-state armed groups in the conduct of hostilities. The ambiguous status of these combatants has led to a revolution in the logic

4 A recent paper by Austin Long, “Whack-a-Mole or Coup de Grace? Institutionalization and Leadership Targeting in Iraq and Afghanistan,” *Security Studies* 23, no. 3 (July 2014) offers a useful overview of recent scholarship on the topic and thoughtful examination of leadership targeting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Separately, there is a significant body of literature on Israeli use of targeted killings and methods of precision targeting, particularly in relation to operations in Gaza. While potentially useful as a comparative case study, that discussion is beyond the scope of this article.


8 For elaboration on this concept see Gabriella Blum, “The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers,” *Journal of Legal Analysis* 2, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 115-147.
of military targeting and a shift towards highly individualized assessment of threats. This new operational paradigm reflects a personalized form of warfare where the legitimate use of military force has become “tied to quasi-adjudicative judgments about the individual acts and roles of specific enemy figures.”

**Doctrine and Individualized Warfare**

The individualization of American warfare is readily apparent in contemporary doctrine and operational practices, specifically in applications of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies. Debates over these war-fighting theories have led to doctrinal incoherence with regard to specific methods; however, on a conceptual and operational level they share the important commonality of systematically individualizing the adversary. One of the early lessons of campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan was “conventional warfare approaches often were ineffective when applied to operations other than major combat, forcing leaders to realign the ways and means of achieving effects.”

The central challenge, as the Army’s targeting manual notes, was in “contrast to major theater operations where the purpose is to find and destroy ships, tank formations, or infrastructure, the most difficult task in insurgencies is finding the enemy.” Over the last decade the US military has demonstrated remarkable adaptability towards this end, marked by a major evolution in doctrinal methods and war-fighting approaches focused on the problem of identifying and targeting individual combatants. While counterinsurgency doctrine pointedly emphasizes a broad range of governance and stability measures, much of the tactical focus in recent campaigns gravitated towards highly refined kinetic and non-kinetic targeting efforts designed to “identify and separate the reconcilables from the irreconcilables.” This effort included aggressive efforts to identify key actors within insurgent networks and conduct kill/capture operations against top-tier targets. Over the last decade, doctrinal methods evolved in direct response to these operational priorities and strategic approaches.

The “find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate” targeting approach evolved specifically as the preferred methodology for identifying and engaging high-value individuals. US forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan applied this find-and-fix approach with great success against insurgent networks and terrorist cells. In Iraq, these network-based targeting approaches were used to develop “all-source intelligence to provide situational awareness of the local environment, its social

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13 One may arguably identify precursor models of individualized targeting in the Phoenix Program from Vietnam or from other counterinsurgency examples. However, these cases are significantly different from recent US experience in terms of the scope of application, as well as the broader intellectual, technical and doctrinal impact on war-fighting strategy.
14 Also sometimes referred to as F3EAD.
networks, key decision-makers, and their motivations,” most famously applied during the successful effort to track, target, and kill terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In Afghanistan, such individualized approaches were used extensively in targeting insurgent networks, resulting in a five-fold increase in raids between 2009 and 2011 designed to capture or kill high-level insurgents. Beyond targeting active combatants, similar methods were applied against drug producers and criminal networks as a means to undermine financial support to insurgencies. Over the last decade, this find-and-fix approach has migrated into conventional targeting doctrine and the Army’s institutional training programs. Attack-the-Network theory (AtN) offers another example of the doctrinal trend towards individualized warfare. This theory emerged specifically for defeating improvised-explosive-device networks in Iraq and Afghanistan, and over time has been applied to a broad range of missions such as tracking Joseph Koni and Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, analyzing the spread of Boko Haram influence in Nigeria, and understanding threat finance patterns of narcotics networks in Latin America.

Both find-and-fix and Attack-the-Network methodologies reflect an evolution in analytical approaches related to the adoption of Social Network Analysis for military targeting. Application of Social Network Analysis to complex networks predates recent campaigns with significant scholarly research dating back to the 1960s, notably Stanley Milgram’s early work on network theory and structural disintermediation. Admiral Arthur Cebrowski’s influential “network-centric warfare” expanded the notion to distributed sensor systems and precision targeting; however, he did not conceive of such methods being used specifically against individual combatants. These concepts were more directly articulated in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt’s, Networks and Netwars, where they described the rise of non-state actors organized as decentralized networks. Under the guise of “fourth generation warfare,” William Lind, T.X. Hammes and others, foresaw such networks and individual actors supplanting the state as primary drivers of a new security environment, an idea later sensationalized by Thomas Friedman’s thesis on “super empowered individuals.”

Operational Social Network Analysis techniques were introduced directly in the influential 2006 publication of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, and have since matured into a foundational component of doctrinal
thinking. These techniques provided the framework for identifying individual roles, organizational positions, and influential actors within given networks. At the tactical level, Social Network Analysis supported the practical need for conducting “pattern of life” analysis, identifying associations, habits, locations, movement routes, financial transactions, and overall visualization of network dynamics down to the level of individual actors. Information obtained from this network analysis often focused on personalized details such as physical descriptions of suspects, their biographic histories, familial relations, biometric data, and forensic evidence in support of operational targeting.

The recent emergence of Identity Intelligence (I2) and methods for personality-based targeting offers another example of the doctrinal evolution towards individualized warfare. Identity Intelligence is not an intelligence process, per se, but rather tailored products derived from the fusion of identity attributes (biologic, biographic, behavioral, and reputational information) into operational planning processes. Identity Intelligence integrates the technical disciplines of biometrics, forensics, document and media exploitation, with other all-source data for the purpose of “connecting individuals to other persons, places, events, or materials” and analyzing patterns of life. Only in the last few years has Identity Intelligence matured as part of recognized doctrine; however, its use in support of military operations evolved rapidly due to the challenges of identifying and targeting individuals in environments where positive identification has been problematic due to unverifiable documentation or intentional evasion. Recognizing these challenges, the DoD formally established biometrics as a core function in 2012 and directed combatant commands to integrate biometrics into mission planning.

What is remarkable about the evolution of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism practices is the degree to which operational targeting has not only become individualized, but also personalized through the integration of identity functions. The greatest weapon of insurgent networks in Iraq and Afghanistan was anonymity, specifically the ability of fighters to blend in with, and disappear into, local populations. Population-centric approaches of counterinsurgency, therefore, placed Identity Intelligence activities at the center of efforts “to positively identify, track, characterize, and disrupt threat actors.” In Iraq the targeting of high-value individuals became closely integrated with

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23 Identity intelligence (I2) appeared for the first time as part of US doctrine in October 2013 as part of the updated version of US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Intelligence*, Joint Publication 3.0 (Washington, DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 2013).


26 US Joint Chief of Staff, *Counterinsurgency*, Joint Publication 3-24 (Washington, DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 2013), XVI.
efforts against broader facilitation networks (finance, recruitment, training, logistics, media, command and control). This integration included non-kinetic targeting against specific individuals using such methods as leaflets, “most wanted” posters, text messaging, and hotline tip numbers to create a “spotlight effect” for denying insurgents access to particular operational areas. Identity Intelligence tools and techniques were also integrated into a wide range of missions dependent on the ability to identify and distinguish specific actors on the battlefield such as focused raids, checkpoint and area security, border control operations, and detailed mapping of “human terrain.” In sum, the commonalities among these diverse missions are doctrinal approaches and war-fighting techniques focused on the lowest common battlefield denominators of identifying and targeting individual combatants.

Technology and Individualized Warfare

The individualization of warfare has been fueled by several key technical innovations over the last decade, including advances in persistent surveillance, standoff precision strike, data analytics, biometrics, and forensics capabilities. These tools directly enabled what has been described as a “patient and relentless man-hunting campaign” waged by the US military against non-state actors. Certainly, the most visible technology of this new mode of warfare has been the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones. Prior to 9-11, their operational use was limited primarily to reconnaissance missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan; they were not tested as a weapons platforms until early 2001, and then were rapidly adapted for kinetic targeting in Afghanistan. Early in the campaign, General Tommy Franks called the Predator “my most capable sensor in hunting down and killing al Qaeda and Taliban leadership.”

These platforms soon emerged as a central component in the military’s high-value targeting programs, and their number increased more than 40-fold between 2002 and 2010. In Afghanistan there were a total of 74 military drone strikes during all of 2007; yet by 2012, that number averaged 33 strikes per month. Over time, improved sensors and software packages enabled analysts to “recognize and categorize humans and human-made objects,” providing unprecedented real-time surveillance and detailed granularity for targeting individual combatants. Perhaps more significant has been the degree to which such drone strikes “have gone from a relative rarity to a relatively common practice” as a tool of US counterterrorism. Indeed, unclassified estimates suggest
over 98 percent of non-battlefield targeted killings over the last decade have been conducted by these platforms.\(^{34}\)

However, the expanded use of persistent surveillance introduced new challenges for analysts with a deluge of sensor data making it “nearly impossible to track and identify suspicious activities and potential security threats solely through human analytical processes.”\(^{35}\) A separate analytical challenge has evolved from the need to collect and interpret different signatures from those of the doctrinally coherent, state-based adversaries of the Cold War era. Analysts must now process and correlate multiple streams of disparate, unstructured data such as cell phone numbers, biographic data, digital communications, biometric signatures, and forensic evidence in support of lethal and non-lethal targeting. This requirement has produced new data processing techniques specifically designed to leverage Social Network Analysis methods, including tools such as Analyst Notebook and the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS), enabling data integration and advanced network analysis. Other database systems employed in Iraq and Afghanistan, such as the Combined Information Data Network Exchange, a massive repository of tactical reporting, evolved in response to the immense data processing challenge of analyzing insurgent activities, individual identities, and operational patterns.

Of all the technical advances emerging in recent years, biometrics and forensics are perhaps the most vivid examples of the central role of technology in waging individualized warfare. The need to verify identity and distinguish adversaries from the larger population led to the expansion in the use of biometric systems on the battlefield.\(^{36}\) As with drone technology, there had been no significant operational use of biometrics by the US military prior to Iraq and Afghanistan. In early 2001, the Army began developing the Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT), offering an initial capability to collect, match and store biometric and personal identifying information. The first major combat employment of biometrics occurred in 2004 by Marine Corps units in Iraq where the technology was used to quarantine an insurgent safe haven in Fallujah through biometric screening.\(^{37}\) Use of this technology grew as part of the 2007 “surge” as the primary means of identity verification and separating insurgents from the larger population. Biometrics, linked with operational forensics, was also used extensively for analyzing and penetrating cells employing improvised explosive devices, and by the end of operations in Iraq the US had compiled a biometric database of some 3 million files on Iraqi citizens.\(^{38}\)

Similarly, in Afghanistan, over 7,000 biometric collection devices have been employed in support of detention operations, execution of


high-risk warrants, and targeted raids against identified insurgents.\textsuperscript{39} Between 2004 and 2011, US forces collected biometric data on more than 1.1 million individuals - equivalent to roughly one of every six fighting age males - and used this data to identify thousands of known enemy combatants.\textsuperscript{40} This measure was of particular importance in Afghanistan, a country with limited institutional capacity for identity verification, few birth certificates, drivers’ licenses and citizenship documents, exacerbated by an active black market in forged identity papers. For similar reasons, biometric technologies have spread to other theaters where identity cannot be reliably verified by available documentation, such as counter-piracy operations in East Africa.\textsuperscript{41} As an Identity Intelligence specialist at the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command explained, “biometrics puts a uniform on the enemy” and enables the categorization of actors even in the absence of traditional status-based signatures.\textsuperscript{42}

Expeditionary forensics is another technical area that evolved rapidly in direct response to the shift towards individualized warfare. Forensic tools and analysis supported evidenced-based targeting methods used to individualize, identify, associate, and scientifically link people, places, things, intentions, activities, organizations, and events. In late 2004, US forces in Iraq began collecting battlefield forensic materials to identify suspected insurgents by cross-referencing evidence with detainee biometrics in support of follow-on targeting and prosecution. By 2006, this capability expanded to include numerous expeditionary forensic facilities analyzing ammunition, clothing, latent fingerprints, and DNA, among other materials. By 2010, the United States had deployed a total of seven forensic laboratories to Iraq and eight to Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{43} During that year alone, expeditionary forensics enabled the capture of over 700 high-value individuals associated with improvised explosive devices, or suspected terrorist and criminal activities.\textsuperscript{44} According to one report, this fusion of forensic and biometric information into actionable intelligence directly enabled “precise fires to shape the operational environment, including supply chain interdiction, counter-threat finance operations, information operations, cache destruction, and the capture of high-value individuals.”\textsuperscript{45} The task force responsible for detainee operations in Afghanistan estimated that some 70 percent of key individual targets captured on the battlefield had been

\textsuperscript{39} David Pendall and Cal Sieg, “Biometric-Enabled Intelligence in Regional Command–East,” \textit{Joint Forces Quarterly} 72, no. 1 (January 2014): 70


\textsuperscript{42} Antonia Greene, “Including Biometrics in Deployment Training Helps Soldiers Identify the Enemy,” \textit{Army}, April 30, 2012.


\textsuperscript{44} Oliver Herion, “Expeditionary Forensic Support to Joint Force Commanders: What Changes or Considerations are Warranted?” (Quantico, VA: US Marine Corps Command and Staff College, April 2012), v.

Changes in War’s Character

The introduction of biometrics and forensics technologies has revolutionized the way we identify and target combatants. A study by the Army Audit Agency similarly concluded that the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan had revolutionized expeditionary forensics and operational use of latent fingerprints and DNA, in particular. In sum, the introduction of these technologies enabled a fundamental paradigm shift in targeting whereby combatants were no longer “generic” soldiers on the battlefield, but rather targeted as individuals based on identity attributes and evidentiary analyses (see table below).

### Key Characteristics of Industrial & Individualized Warfare

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Industrial Warfare</th>
<th>Individualized War</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Context</strong></td>
<td>Westphalian; professional armies fighting as political proxies with defined geo-political objectives; recognizes <em>Jus in Bello</em> constructs</td>
<td>Post-Westphalian; individual combatants fighting for ideological causes and ambiguous objectives; challenges <em>Jus in Bello</em> constructs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adversary Characteristics</strong></td>
<td>State armies comprised of “generic” professional soldiers applying doctrinal methods and a depersonalized, bureaucratic logic</td>
<td>Non-state entities; “unprivileged” combatants using anonymity for operational advantage; idiosyncratic, highly personalized networks</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Operational Environment</strong></td>
<td>Contested primarily in the physical domain (land, sea, air, space); engagements within a contiguous, linear battle-space with explicit operational boundaries</td>
<td>Contested primarily in the informational domain (influence and identity); spatially and temporally unbounded; fusion of military and domestic security spheres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theories of War-fighting</strong></td>
<td>Influenced by traditional tenets of maneuver warfare, mass, firepower, destruction of enemy forces and seizure of key terrain</td>
<td>Influenced by counterinsurgency and counterterrorism doctrines; stability concerns, governance, and population-centric approaches</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Analytical Approach &amp; Tools</strong></td>
<td>Order of Battle analysis, doctrinal templating, traditional Indications and Warning, conventional ISR and technical signatures</td>
<td>Social Network Analysis, Attack the Network, Identity Intelligence, biometrics and forensic signatures, document and media exploitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Targeting Paradigm</strong></td>
<td>Status-based targeting against units, formations and equipment</td>
<td>Identity-based targeting against individuals, cells and networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objectives &amp; Measures of Effectiveness</strong></td>
<td>Physical attrition/destruction of the adversary war-fighting capability; predominantly quantitative assessment - units destroyed, terrain seized, kinetic effects and technical BDA</td>
<td>Slowing the regeneration of key leadership and operators; predominantly qualitative assessment - kill/capture high value individuals, measures of network centrality, influence and cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Success Criteria &amp; End State</strong></td>
<td>Defeat of adversary military force compels political capitulation, orderly demobilization and repatriation of combatants</td>
<td>Risk mitigation rather than military victory; legal limbo for detained combatants and fighter recidivism presents enduring challenge</td>
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Policy Imperatives and Strategic Choices

While new doctrine and supporting technologies have provided the methods and tools of individualized warfare, ultimately this paradigm shift resulted from specific policy preferences and strategic choices in response to the threats posed by non-state actors. The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) established the initial legal context for waging war against individuals and geographically dispersed networks with broad language authorizing the use of force against “nations, organizations, or persons.” CIA Director John Brennan articulated what might be considered the “trickle-down” logic of this approach, describing how these methods have gradually expanded to wider networks of individual actors, noting that “in this armed conflict, individuals who are part of al-Qaeda or its associated forces are legitimate military targets.” Yet this strategic approach has expanded far beyond “leadership strikes,” and now reflects a new paradigm of war waged by “precise attacks against individuals” as the centerpiece of US counterterrorism approaches in Pakistan, Yemen and elsewhere.

The trend towards such individualized approaches seems a logical path for a liberal democracy dealing with the threat of terrorism while balancing the rights of citizens. Public discomfort with profiling techniques in the aftermath of 9-11 created political pressure to focus targeting against individuals with legitimate connections to terrorism rather than applying categorical measures against entire suspect groups (racial, ethnic, religious, or otherwise). More recently, public outcry over broad application of domestic intelligence gathering by the NSA suggests similar disapproval of dragnet-like approaches to counterterrorism. However, Americans have expressed few reservations with focused intelligence collection and lethal targeting based on evidentiary approaches and presumptions of culpability, thus presenting few political liabilities.

Beyond the domestic audience, international opinion has also pushed the US toward an individualized, and increasingly personalized approach to warfare. Perhaps the best example has been the broad condemnation of US “signature strikes” directed against detected patterns of adversary behavior, or signatures, rather than specific individuals. This approach closely resembles conventional targeting methods applied against formations, equipment and facilities where technical signatures generally offer reliable categorization of intended targets. However, this technique has produced numerous incidents of misidentification and unintended civilian casualties with significant political repercussions, notably in Pakistan and Yemen, but also during military operations in

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Iraq and Afghanistan. In response, the Obama administration has reportedly moved towards increased use of “personality” strikes only against confirmed individuals in order to avoid diplomatic fallout from unintended causalities. This process has been formalized by the creation of a “disposition matrix,” a dynamic, individualized targeting database consisting of biographies, locations, associations and operational profiles of high-value targets. The administration has also suggested a policy preference for capture and prosecution of individual suspects, when feasible.

In terms of military strategy, the individualization of warfare has also exposed an inherent tension between traditional military activities and law enforcement functions when today’s targeting packages have more similarities with police arrest warrants than with conventional targeting folders of the Cold War-era. During the later phases of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, high-value targeting increasingly involved such “evidence-based” methodologies, relying on identity verification and forensic science to produce probable-cause-like adjudications as the basis of actionable intelligence. One observer noted, the find-and-fix paradigm evolved into a “police-like investigate, arrest, convict” model of non-lethal targeting. Indeed, the current preference for such individualized approaches will continue to obfuscate traditional concepts of state warfare and raise difficult procedural questions as technology enables ever-greater disaggregation of the battlefield—and increasingly personalized targeting methods.

Challenges for the Future

The US response to threats from non-state actors has evolved into a new mode of warfare placing the individual combatant at the center of the analytical and operational challenge. The question remains as to whether this paradigm shift represents a transient diversion from the military’s traditional focus on large-scale conventional conflict, or if the experiences of the last decade will have a lasting influence on approaches to land warfare and development of future capabilities and doctrine. Certainly the Army’s natural inclination suggests a return to familiar ground of thinking about, and preparing for, conventional land force engagements. However, the catalysts of individualized warfare may not allow a full return to more traditional operating methods. The recent National Intelligence Council Global Trends report depicts a near-future security environment characterized by terrorism, subversion, sabotage, insurgency, and criminal activities; while others predict continuing outbreaks of “hybrid” wars similar to the ongoing conflicts in Syria and Ukraine. The commonality among these diverse scenarios is that they

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56 Lamb and Munsing, Secret Weapon: High-Value Target Teams as an Organizational Innovation, 53.
are all likely to involve targeting against decentralized, individual combatants who use anonymity to operational advantage.

However, current operations against the Islamic State may well prove a frustrating test case for the effectiveness of individualized targeting in the absence of significant ground forces and robust local intelligence networks. Unclassified reports of target selection during the early phases of Operation Inherent Resolve reveal patterns closely resembling conventional approaches, with a clear majority of strikes focused on facilities, fighting positions and vehicles, and far fewer against specific individuals and key leadership. Yet, even success in this effort may have a potential downside. As the military continues to identify and strike individuals from greater distances and with higher accuracy, it should be expected that adaptive adversaries will move towards locations (megacities) or modes of operation (cyber) where US targeting advantages are less asymmetric.

While there is little debate as to the awe-inspiring tactical efficiency of US techniques for waging individualized warfare, it is less certain these methods have been effective in achieving larger political objectives. The perpetual regeneration of terrorist threats inside Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia offer little evidence these techniques have been fully successful as a centerpiece of counterterrorism strategy. Likewise, deteriorating conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest limits as to what these approaches deliver to counterinsurgency efforts. The inherent ambiguity in the data raises the more difficult question as to whether one can evaluate the utility of specific tactics and tools separately from the overall strategic outcomes they produce. As General H. R. McMaster, Director of the Army’s Capabilities and Integration Center, has cautioned, “targeting does not equal strategy.” This area should one be of continuing research and professional debate.

As President Obama recently observed during an address to National Defense University, “we must define the nature and scope of this struggle, or else it will define us.” Indeed, this has been the case for an entire generation of soldiers socialized under this operational paradigm and now highly skilled in the art of waging individualized war. As one senior US officer recently noted, the task of “putting warheads to foreheads” has become a core military function. The challenge ahead will be creating a context whereby the experiences and tools refined over the last decade can evolve and mature as an integrated component of full-spectrum operations. The risk is that this expertise will be lost in a rush back to focus on conventional warfare, or marginalized as some exotic, niche function within a narrowing scope of strategic utility for American land forces.

The goal should be full integration of these capabilities into a flexible landpower concept enabling rapid transition along the operational continuum from conventional conflict against state adversaries to


60 President Barrack Obama at National Defense University, May 23, 2013.
individualized warfare in hybrid scenarios against non-state actors. To this end, several specific recommendations are offered.

**Recommendations**

First, ensure that the technical capabilities refined over the last decade continue to evolve even in the absence of a persistent operational targeting mission. The challenge of future hybrid scenarios, such as the situation in Ukraine, will be in detecting and exploiting non-standard signatures and data sources (cyber, open source, social media, biometrics and forensics) and integrating them with conventional collection streams in support of situational awareness and targeting. This task will require continuing advances in data processing and tools for analyzing large amounts of unstructured information with the ultimate goal of cross-domain integration, automated tipping and queuing, and improved network visualization. These represent enormous technical challenges that cannot wait for the next crisis.

Second, continue efforts to empower soldiers down to the lowest level with real-time integrated data from national level sources. Current biometrics technologies represent one useful example where a squad leader on patrol can rapidly access national-level watchlist information and biographic data on a subject encountered during tactical questioning. Within the contemporary threat paradigm there is no clearly bounded battlespace; therefore, an individual of interest encountered in a combat zone may also have relevance to a customs agent at an international airport, a police officer conducting a routine stop in Tucson, or a counterterrorism analyst at the CIA. Bureaucratic interests, technical barriers, and over-classification must not inhibit robust information sharing between such entities. Informational empowerment downward to the tactical level must be the ultimate goal so situational awareness is not limited to the operations center.

Finally, continue to integrate concepts such as Identity Intelligence and Network Analysis fully into the doctrinal canon and operational usage. By all indications, various forms of hybrid or irregular warfare will persist in the near future. These scenarios are likely to include lethal and non-lethal targeting against networked entities operating in ungoverned spaces with weak identity regimes and adversaries determined to leverage anonymity for operational advantage.

The techniques of individualized warfare and need for identity verification on the battlefield will only grow in importance. The Army, in particular, cannot afford to squander the hard lessons it has already learned about waging this kind of war.
ABSTRACT: Widely available precision strike platforms, increasing weapons costs and systemic constraints on major war are altering how military actors prepare for future conflict. As the costs increase and the utility of fielding massed formations decreases, actors seek speed and surprise to force decisions short of escalating into costly major wars. The character of conflict is therefore evolving to favor small, multi-domain forces, which will require a new approach to crisis management.

Multiple US military services are experimenting with how to use smaller formations for missions ranging from crisis response to forced entry. The Unified Quest 2014 exercise, the deep futures war game run by the Army Capabilities Integration Center, featured units engaged in what the new operating concept refers to as “joint combined arms maneuver” in a megacity. Bold Alligator 2014, the annual multinational littoral warfare exercise, experimented with smaller amphibious assault formations operating from Joint High-Speed Vessels and dry cargo ships, as well as long-range raids using MV-22 Osprey. The force under examination was a composite, linking distributed units with a “fly in” command echelon.

Other nations are also beginning to experiment with smaller, multi-domain (i.e., air, sea, land, cyber) formations designed to fight short, intense conflicts. As part of an ongoing conventional force modernization since 2008, the Russian military is fielding modernized brigade combat team formations and smaller battalion tactical groups. Based on lessons learned from the near-war with Pakistan in 2001, and the ongoing challenge of balancing China, India is testing integrated battle groups and formations able to launch short-notice attacks beneath the threshold major theater war. The trend extends to armed proxies. As

seen in Crimea in 2014, and in ongoing Iranian support to groups like Hezbollah, regional powers are arming their proxies with increasingly sophisticated weapon systems.

Despite different core missions and mandates as well as external threats, multiple security actors are clearly signaling preferences for smaller, modernized “joint” forces. What do these initiatives tell us about potential changes in the character of modern war? Are the reforms simply local adaptations to anticipated conflicts, or do they indicate a larger pattern?

This article analyzes the trend towards smaller, multi-domain force capabilities in global and regional powers. It argues that the character of contemporary conflict is being changed by the proliferation of precision strike and associated command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems combined with an assumption that conflicts will be fought beneath the threshold of major war. These forces are altering how officers imagine future war. As result, military thinkers appear to be developing new concepts and forces substituting speed and multiple domain maneuver for mass on the battlefield. The end result may be a new theory of victory. Multiple nations are planning to use smaller, modernized combat formations to signal their capabilities and gain advantage in a crisis, and if necessary, fight and win short wars either directly or through proxies.

Character(s) of War?

Analyzing emergent trends across armed forces is an old idea in military studies. Helmuth von Moltke the Elder (1800 – 1890) hypothesized the changing character of war was a function of how new material conditions, from railroads to telegraphs, changed the speed of mobilization and the character of war. Reflecting on his time, Moltke observed, “a change in the tactics of all branches” based on the fact that “. . . the firepower of an infantry platoon [today] surpasses the range and destructive effect of the case-shot of a six-pounder cannon.” Despite their differences, Russian military theorists Marshal Aleksander A. Svechin (1878-1938) and Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky (1893-1937) believed the material conditions of the industrial age called for a departure with the Jominian conceptualization of ground maneuver prevalent since Napoleon. Major General J.F.C. Fuller, architect of Plan 1919, sought a science of war based on technology and mysticism. William McNeill’s seminal work, Pursuit of Power, examined how material factors from


technology to economic activity and the environment created different modes of warfare and a unique specialization of violence.\(^9\)

After the Cold War, numerous scholars and practitioners sought to define the character of what former Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan called, “post-industrial warfare.”\(^10\) Observing the complexity of conflicts in West Africa and the Balkans in the early 1990s, Robert Kaplan argued there was a breakdown in the old state order leading to a new era of struggles defined by resource competition, pandemics, urbanization, demographic shifts, and state failure.\(^11\) Former British Army General Sir Rupert Anthony Smith suggested modern war reflects the shift from the paradigm of industrial war to “war amongst the people.”\(^12\) In industrial war, the utility of force, to use General Smith’s expression, was total. Accordingly, the theory of victory was the mass mobilization of society in order to defeat the armed forces of the enemy state - conventional military force aligned with clear political objectives. The emergent paradigm after the Cold War was ‘war amongst the people.’ Here the theory of victory shifted from mass armies seeking decisive victory on a clearly defined battlefield, to a test of wills between rival populations. Military force was not decisive. Rather, the utility of force was establishing conditions for long-term conflict resolution, a concept captured in current US Army doctrine.\(^13\)

The question becomes which forces of change coalesce to produce a paradigmatic shift in warfare. Borrowing from the Marxist concept of modes of production, Mary Kaldor hypothesized a new mode of warfare in which globalization internationalized intrastate identity conflicts leveraging illicit economic networks and guerilla tactics.\(^14\) Similar to Kaldor’s modes of warfare, William Lind and Thomas Hammes suggested distinct, identifiable generations of warfare paralleling larger technological changes. Modern war was in the fourth generation, involving the use of all available networks (e.g., social, economic, political) to compel an adversary.\(^15\) As seen in Russian actions in Crimea in 2014, these conflicts can be a hybrid mixture of conventional capabilities and irregular warfare conducted through proxies.\(^16\)

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The Current Character

For emerging powers like China and India, there is a perception that future conflicts will be fast, limited, and conducted by high capability, professional formations. Since the late 1990s, Chinese military planners have developed a vision of local wars waged by elite forces that strike first and seek a quick victory. Building on Jiang Zemin’s 2002 guidance for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to win local conflict rapidly and decisively under conditions of xinxihua or “informationized warfare,” each Chinese service laid out aggressive modernization plans. According to an earlier PLA study, “on the high-tech battlefield, annihilating enemy vital forces and arms can no longer be achieved by simply adding numbers of forces, planes, tanks and artillery pieces.” Major General Zhang Shiping, Deputy Director of War Theory and Strategic Studies at the Academy of Military Science, defined these reforms as “the transformation from mechanization to informationization... from a defensive pattern to an offensive pattern.” Conceptually, some observers assessed the reforms as shifting the focus from wars of attrition to quick campaigns, from an emphasis on defensive operation to offensive operations, and from absorbing blows to operational preemption.

Since 2004, Indian defense circles debated the extent to which the military should adopt a more offensive posture to deter Pakistan. Through the “Cold Start” doctrine, a war plan envisioning a series of joint strikes by integrated battle groups twenty kilometers into Pakistan, the Indian military hoped to create a more agile and precise instrument of war. Such an instrument would allow India to deter, and if necessary, attack Pakistan, as a reaction to, or to prevent, a Pakistani or Pakistani-backed limited attack on India. Indian planners believed a mix of diplomatic pressure and nuclear escalation increased the importance of smaller, high capability joint formations able to strike inside Pakistan on short notice. To back Cold Start and other offensive, limited war concepts, the Indian military embarked on a $100 billion, ten-year modernization program. The reforms also included upgrading the Pakistani air force to fifth-generation fighters and building a navy capable of projecting...

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17 The focus on this treatment is on conventional conflict. It does not look at hybrid warfare or referring to Russian actions in Crimea what Eastern European and Baltic scholars are calling “new generation” warfare.


power—in the words of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh—“from the Hormuz to the Malacca Straits.”

In the United States, Cold War-era interdiction campaigns and Soviet military theory are the historical foundations of the emerging preference for smaller, joint precision forces. Starting with experiments in Vietnam in the 1970s and later Assault Breaker experiments led by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the United States experimented with an integrated battle network of strike and C4ISR assets. This move led Soviet military thinkers to theorize about a “reconnaissance strike complex” that would give conventional munitions the same effects as nuclear weapons. Between the 1990/1991 Gulf War and the air interdiction operation in Kosovo in 1999, the United States rapidly accelerated its use of different types of precision strike and ISR assets toward what Russian Major General Vladimir Slipchenko called “sixth generation warfare.” Today, this network enables missions ranging from global strike to distributed ISR operations.

Yet, the state’s monopoly on precision strike proved short-lived. By 2006, even non-state actors like Hezbollah demonstrated the ability to engage an IDF Corvette with a Chinese-designed C-802 Anti-Ship Cruise Missile. China and Russia both maintain high-end precision strike capabilities and a supporting constellation of space-based ISR assets. Concerns over these near-peer capabilities animate Joint Staff interest in concepts and systems able to counter future anti-access/area denial threats to US power projection.

Furthermore, a greater number of states are using proxies armed with high-end capabilities to advance their interests. Although proxy warfare is an age-old practice, actors like Russia and Iran increasingly use their proxies to wage “hybrid warfare.” These groups benefit from the proliferation of high-end capabilities allowing “irregular groups” in Eastern Ukraine to operate advanced surface-to-air missiles and, in the case of Hezbollah, launch anti-ship missiles. The use of irregular proxies for crisis brinkmanship is not limited to traditional weapons or combat alone. For Martin Libicki, capabilities from drones to cyber technologies enable a new form of “non-obvious” warfare that enables

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27 Global strike and distributed ISR operations are part of USAF doctrine, see: https://doctrine.af.mil.


29 Ibid., 13-15.

30 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operational Access Concept (Washington: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012)
states to conceal their involvement.\textsuperscript{31} With respect to Russia, NATO refers to a new strategy of “ambiguous warfare” leveraging covert action and cyber-attacks.\textsuperscript{32}

Just as the costs of hitting a target decrease for most modern militaries and their proxies, the price of force modernization is increasing. Compare the costs of the F-18 Super Hornet and the F-35C, the US Navy’s replacement. The unit cost of the older F/A-18 Super Hornet is $57 million compared to nearly $130 million for its replacement, the F-35C.\textsuperscript{33} As platforms become more expensive, states have to make hard choices about their investments. While new systems like the F-35 promise superior capabilities, the sheer cost per unit restricts the ability of even the United States, whose defense budget dwarfs that of most other nations, to field mass formations.

The costs of large, conventional forces are increasing. Yet, the frequency of major theater war is decreasing. Most countries, especially in an interconnected world, are concerned about the negative consequences of long-term conflict. As seen in the collapse of the ruble since the Ukraine crisis and capital flight from Russia during the 2008 Georgian conflict, international investors are war wary. Through diplomatic pressure and financial flows, any actor seeking a purely military solution to a problem faces diminishing returns. In such a world, competition and militarized disputes do not go away. Rather, there are incentives for crisis brinkmanship and preparing for short wars waged by small joint combined arms teams or proxies.

\textbf{Toward a New Theory of Victory}

As seen in the previous examples, the proliferation of precision strike, increasing weapons costs and systemic constraints on major war alter how military actors approach operational art and prepare for future conventional conflict. As the cost and utility of fielding massed formations decreases, actors seek speed and surprise in an effort to achieve victory, that is, force a decision, short of escalating to costly major wars. Furthermore, there appears to be a growing appreciation for the utility of employing relative force ratios in multiple dimensions. This idea first emerged in early concepts for integrating rotary wing aviation into the Marine Air-Ground Task Force in the 1950s (e.g., single weapons system concept) and in theorizing Special Forces (i.e., relative superiority).\textsuperscript{34} A military can achieve the effect of a 3:1 ratio even against a numerically superior opponent by attacking along multiple domains and presenting a foe with multiple dilemmas, a concept captured in the idea of

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{31} Martin Libicki, “The Specter of Non-Obvious Warfare,” \textit{Strategic Studies Quarterly} 6, no. 3 (Fall 2012).
\end{itemize}
cross-domain synergy. This evolving set of assumptions produces a preference for speed and multi-domain maneuver.

The new Army Operating Concept, *Win in a Complex World*, calls for “expeditionary maneuver” and “joint combined arms” to present “our enemies and adversaries with multiple dilemmas.” The concept places a premium on operating “across multiple domains” and developing “situational understanding through action while possessing the mobility to concentrate rapidly.” The Chief of Staff of the Army is pushing for a “professional force that is able to provide expeditionary, decisive landpower tailored and scaled to perform missions.” Through Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) connected by a global landpower network, the Army will gain the situational awareness and access points to achieve a “capability overmatch.” As stated in the Army Operating Concept, “to retain overmatch, the Joint Force will have to combine technologies and integrate efforts across multiple domains.” As seen in the 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command Task Force Talon deployment of the High Altitude Area Defense battery to Guam and Pacific Pathways regional exercises with the 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, setting the theater to achieve potential overmatch requires demonstrating the ability to re-posture capabilities.

The idea of using speed and multi-domain maneuver to destabilize a numerically superior adversary is at the heart of Marine Corps doctrine. In the US Marine Corps, the new operating concept, *Expeditionary Force 21* calls for smaller, “special purpose” Marine Air-Ground Task Forces operating from a mix of shipping and partner nations. These tailorable forces will be deployed forward and able to respond rapidly to evolving crises ranging from embassy evacuation, to arraying forces in theater to deter future aggression. The US Marine Corps is also experimenting with a new Distributed STOVL [short take-off, vertical land] Operations (DSO) concept that envisions employing F-35B to “activate a shifting network of expeditionary airfields, tactical landing zones and forward arming and refueling points with the intent

37 Ibid.
of complicating enemy targeting solutions." At the Infantry Officer Course, the capstone exercise has second lieutenants launching airborne raids with V-22s to destroy enemy air defenses and seize an airfield. The mission involves multi-domain coordination with simulated F-35s using Samsung tablets. Students in the Advanced Studies Program at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College synthesized these concepts as a new approach to distributed maritime operations that envisions a wider range of expeditionary operations including using land forces for sea denial and new shaping activities.

The US Air Force and Navy are also examining ways to use tailor-made strike packages with multi-domain overmatch potential. The Navy is exploring a new concept, “distributed lethality” that envisions “dispersed formations” or “hunter-killer surface action groups.” The architects envision these formations achieving better multi-domain integration with the Marine Corps in order to, “provide persistent presence that can influence and control events at sea and in the littorals, applying the right capability to the right target for the joint-force commander.” US Pacific Command is testing the evolving AirSea Battle concept (now called Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons, JAM-GC), including most recently, Valiant Shield 2014, a combined air, sea and cyber exercise involving land and carrier based aviation assets. Separately, the Air Force is conducting proof-of-concept exercises to test “Rapid Raptor,” deploying detachments of F-22s with all support personnel and material on C-17s to friendly air bases on short notice.

Over the last fifteen years, the Air Force has also developed leap ahead capabilities for remote split operation (RSO) using remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) in support of both Joint Special Forces Task Forces and conventional ground units. While many of these systems and ideas, including rapid deployment and airborne raids, are old, they are being envisioned at lower echelons and in new contexts.

Other countries are also seeking fast, scalable multi-domain capabilities. Since 2000, the Indian military has conducted exercises in the Arabian Sea integrating air, sea, and land task forces designed to blockade Pakistani ports and launch small amphibious operations. Similar

46 The papers are available on request. Contact benjamin.m.jensen@usmc.mil. For a discussion on possible ways to field smaller MAGTFs for distributed maritime operations, see Jeffrey Tlapa, “The Micro-MAGTF: Optimizing Distributed Amphibious Operations,” Marine Corps Gazette 99, no. 1 (January 2015).
48 Ibid.
joint exercises between the Indian Army and Air Force since 2004 have tested the ability to deploy integrated battle groups. During exercise Sudarshan Shakti in 2012, Indian forces leveraged UAVs and satellite precision targeting in support of a traditional integrated battle groups, consisting of a division minus with attached armor, artillery and aviation formations conducting short notice attacks against an adversary. In December 2013 exercise Shahbaz Ajay sought to validate new, scalable joint formations including integrating Indian Air Force operations with airborne and helicopter insertion.

Based on the conduct of the 2008 war with Georgia, Russia began an aggressive military modernization effort focusing on ready brigades as opposed to larger divisions that required time to mobilize. The concept focused on smaller ground forces as part of a larger Joint force (i.e., tri-service interconnectedness). To assess the progress of the reforms as early as 2009, the Russian military used the Zapad exercises to test new concepts and force readiness. Of interest, the overall direction of the reforms, similar to the Indians, is to use small, joint formations that can move on short notice and engage targets from multi-domains. In the Zapad 2013 exercise, Russian forces experimented with a wide array of UAVs for target acquisition and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) in support of air and ground forces. In separate exercises held in Kemerovo Oblast in 2013, the Russians successfully used UAVs to coordinate ground fires including rockets and self-propelled howitzers. Based on events in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014, the Russians are also exploring new approaches to irregular warfare backed by the threat of conventional and strategic escalation.

Israeli Defense Force (IDF) doctrine calls for rapid counter-attacks leverage multi-arm coordination for quick attainment of war objectives. After 2003, the IDF began exploring a “small and smart” Army to shock opponents. According to IDF Chief of Staff Benjamin Gantz, “The time factor is critical, and the campaign must be shortened because the home front is paying a heavy price. The new operational outlook presents a swift transition to a state of war and the implementation of the “shock and awe” doctrine to achieve the campaign’s goal within a few days.” The concept envisions helping the IDF survive budget cuts while building on the assumption technological innovation will continue
to favor increased lethality and precision.\textsuperscript{62} As seen in the 2008 and 2014 during operations in Gaza, the IDF worked to integrate air and ground fires in new ways, including how unmanned systems and intelligence fed targeting.\textsuperscript{63} The IDF is at the forefront of developing mini-precision munitions that will enable dispersed ground and air elements to engage in multi-domain targeting in urban campaigns.\textsuperscript{64}

Large militaries are not the only ones developing these capabilities. Singapore is investing in what they refer to as a “3rd Generation Army” that integrates multi-domain platforms in an “integrated battlefield” construct capable of overmatching larger formations.\textsuperscript{65} The idea is a “knowledge-based” force that observes and orients faster than future adversaries can react, a vision similar to former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Admiral William Owens in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{66} Since 2007, the European Union has fielded two multinational battlegroups. The Nordic Battlegroup includes a Swedish infantry battalion designed to be “reinforced with support resources such as engineering, logistics, anti-aircraft, intelligence, transport helicopter, medical or mine clearance units [and] should the need arise, combat aircraft with an airbase unit or special forces.”\textsuperscript{67}

There appears to be an emerging character of modern conventional conflict. Military professionals the world over are imagining future war where diffusing precision strike-capabilities change the tempo of operations. Exercises, concept development, and procurement all point to a mode of warfare in which increasingly lethal, cheap technology as well as economic and diplomatic constraints on sustained, major theater war put a premium on fielding smaller, multi-domain capable forces. There appears to be an assumption that speed is more important than mass and forces can achieve short-term overmatch through multi-domain maneuver.

**Implications for Crisis Management**

The diffusion of precision-strike systems combined with an assumption that conventional conflicts will be fought beneath the high-end threshold is altering the character of war. Multiple nations are planning to use smaller, modernized combat formations or hybrid proxies to signal their capabilities and gain advantages in a crisis, and if necessary, fight and win short wars. Given this trend, the question becomes what are likely consequences?

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{65} Speech by Senior Minister of State for Defence Mr Chan Chun Sing at the 3rd Generation Army Wide Area Communications System Commissioning Parade, May 10, 2013.


There are two potential risks apparent in the emerging character of war that will require military and civilian decision makers alike to relearn the art of crisis management. First, as multiple countries optimize their forces and doctrine, they could produce a world prone to rapid escalation and miscalculation. One can imagine a scenario in which rapid deployments of multi-domain, first-strike systems accompany crisis bargaining as a form of coercive diplomacy. Actors threaten to strike first, crippling the adversary’s C4ISR as seen in AirSea Battle. Yet, because precision forces have an inherent “first-mover” or “first-strike” advantage, it could put premium on being the first party to strike a blow. Such a situation could risk what Barry Posen calls “inadvertent escalation.” A world of small, optimized forces seeking advantage before tensions escalate could fuel a 21st century “short war illusion.” Military planners could inadvertently box in political leaders to high-risk courses of action predicated on lightning fast assaults that force an adversary to capitulate.

Operational plans need to factor a broader range of instruments of power and move beyond flexible deterrent options to flexible coercive options. Current joint doctrine moves from Phase 0 Shaping to Phase I Deter. Yet, coercion, as latent force, is more than deterrence. It includes compellence and coercive diplomacy, the art of finding levers to employ minimal threats across multiple instruments of power to induce a change in behavior. In crisis management, one does not wait until Phase II to seize the initiative; one finds a way to force an adversary to back down short of pulling the trigger. The goal, to use Sun Tzu’s phrase, is to win without fighting. Using a wider array of coercive threats reduces the incentives to rely on any single option, from military force to economic sanctions.

Second, if what can be seen can be hit, and military actors are primed for the offense, crisis response predicated on “showing the flag” is insufficient. The art of crisis management is in managing threat asymmetries and developing future options. Every action in the transition from Phase 0 to Phase I should produce potential costs for adversaries and increase the range of response options open to national decision makers. Large forces are large risks and, hence, potentially introduce more costs than benefits in an escalating crisis. They also potentially limit response

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72 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning (Washington, DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011) discusses Flexible Response Options (FROs), but focuses the majority of the appendices on Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs).
options as, with carriers, they change the focus from crisis response to protecting the proverbial capital ship. Future joint plans will need to look beyond traditional force demonstrations and uses of large formations like carriers and brigade combat teams to “pressurize” a crisis.

These risks highlight the need for the defense community at large to become more imaginative in approaching coercive diplomacy. Small, joint expeditionary forces imposing potential costs on an adversary act to signal intentions, but they are only one signal amongst a larger array of instruments of power. The effects of coercion tend to be cumulative. Therefore, new approaches to leveraging force demonstrations and other military signals alongside diplomatic and economic pressures become a strategic priority to advance national interests short of triggering increasingly dangerous “limited” wars. If a new theory of victory is emerging, then its core idea depends on credible signaling of the cascading risks and costs of any potential conflict.
Of Note

Reconsidering Why We Lost

Daniel Glickstein

Adding to the Special Commentary in the Winter 2014-15 issue of Parameters (vol. 44, no. 4), Daniel Glickstein gives Daniel Bolger's Why We Lost an “Incomplete” grade.

Why We Lost offers an inside account of the Afghan and Iraqi conflicts by retired Lieutenant General Daniel Bolger. It cites hyper-realistic descriptions of tactical firefights and conducts a broad, strategic discourse on the major policy goals of those wars. Chapters of the book characterize many of the prominent military and civilian personalities involved, but I hew here to General Bolger’s strategic commentary and would like to single out three key points for further scrutiny:

• the lack of a cohesive enemy in both Iraq and Afghanistan;
• how deeply the oscillation of American support and the broadcasted deadline for an American presence impacted the readiness of the Afghan Security Forces (ANSF), and the strategic calculus of our enemies; and, lastly,
• the importance of “buy-in” from local civilians and the cooperation of local security forces in forging an enduring stability.

Know Thyself, Know Thy Enemy

The most vexing problem for tactical forces in Iraq and Afghanistan was identifying the enemy. As General Bolger noted, our technology and training “sent every American platoon of soldiers into action confident that they could slay their antagonists with impunity today, tonight, and as long as it took...as long as the Americans could find the enemy. As usual, therein lay the rub.” (426) With the exception of periodic Special Operations Forces raids and larger conventional operations (valley sweeps with blocking positions, etc.), the average day consisted of clearing routes of improvised explosive devices and meeting with local national leaders, including periodic interruptions of indirect-fire attacks and ineffective hit-and-run ambushes. Usually, coalition forces could expect to escape unscathed, and in some instances even “pick off” a few of the slower antagonists. But “a gaggle of one-sided firefights...do not victory make, especially against guerilla enemies.” (428)

Additionally, there was a failure to acknowledge the diversity of antagonists in each theater. Al Qaeda and the Taliban took center stage and presented the strongest threat to American soldiers. But organized groups such as the Haqqani Network and Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin,
Muqtada Al-Sadr’s Jaish al-Mahdi militia, and non-affiliated local nationals interspersed into the Afghan and Iraqi mix as well. General Bolger states “we were drawn into nasty local feuds, we took on too many diverse foes, sometimes confusing supporters with opponents and vice versa.” (429-430) The counterinsurgency canon that came to the forefront by 2006 posited that providing services to the population and protecting them against the insurgents would win greater popular support and weaken the enemy. But troops already stretched too thinly could not guarantee 24/7 protection for civilians across each theater, and all the afore-mentioned foes had ample opportunity to threaten, coerce, or cajole varying levels of support. And appeals and strategies that might work to counter the Taliban proved completely ineffective against the violence of a farmer angry at events such as Robert Bales’ murder of Afghan civilians in 2012.

Short-term Commitment

Another major point raised by General Bolger is the irreparable damage stemming from the media-shaped erosion of long-term US commitment. By the late 2000’s, the American public’s tolerance for extended, bloody campaigns abroad as fading fast, and many politicians were echoing this sentiment. The antagonists in Iraq and Afghanistan, no strangers to using the internet and social media to study the enemy, were well aware of this shift in domestic US politics. Predictably, the insurgents were willing to bide their time, avoid risky and decisive engagements, and wait for the international coalition and American forces to withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan. The Coalition, and not the insurgents, fell into a sustainability trap.

Unfortunately, the fleeting commitment to Iraq and Afghanistan negatively impacted US service-members, too. While General Bolger’s suggestion of a correlation between drug abuse and disciplinary issues amongst soldiers and the eroding US commitment may be exaggerated, his overall claim the “president thoughtfully and deliberately condemned Americans in uniform to years of deadly, pointless counterinsurgency patrols sure to end in a wholesale pullout” rings true. (374) Faced with deficient local security forces, the likely prospect of ambushes and improvised explosive device strikes with no real enemy in sight, and the inevitable conclusion the war would be over in another year or two, the strain from 2011 onwards was quite substantial for US service-members.

All Security is Local

The last critical point, and most vexing problem, is the matter of local support and security. Consider the notable successes of the past decade: Colonel McMaster’s stabilization of Tal Afar, Captain Travis Patriquin’s unconventional methods leading to the origins of the “Sunni Awakening” in Iraq, and the fruitful albeit short-lived deployment of Afghan Local Police. Although each case is unique and characterized by different methods, local buy-in and support were critical to each. A foreign military force can only affect so much change in a given country, and each decision casts second- and third-order effects of unknown magnitude. (David Kilcullen once offered the interesting analogy of considering what would happen if an Iraqi security force tried to come in and establish order in New York City.) Local national forces appear
to constitute the only option with the ability to attain legitimacy, used along with the background knowledge needed to root out antagonists at the tactical level.

Regrettably, the lingering question is how to find, train, and empower these local forces to reach a suitable level of performance. Finding young men and women with tactical prowess is difficult, and made worse by trying to determine whether or not they are sympathetic to enemy combatants. In addition, the sectarian divisions in Iraq and the influence of criminals and war lords in Afghanistan also block this effort. There is a fine line between developing local security and training and abetting local militias (Shia death squads in 2006-2007 Iraq, for example), and this nuanced problem deserves further attention.

Conclusion

General Bolger’s blunt talk in certain chapters must be taken in stride, and should not detract from his depiction of the past decade of conflict. His statement that the American military is more suited to decisive, conventional strikes such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq is absolutely correct. But this fact should not be pushed to an extreme where we abandon counterinsurgency yet again, and pray for better, more conventional future conflicts. Instead, General Bolger’s work should spark further debate on the factors contributing to the effectiveness of counterinsurgency but still require study.

For me, the most critical issue was the process of choosing and training a local military and police force. Other soft skills such as interacting with local politicians and religious figures and partnering with contractors and civil-military teams to establish public works and facilities are indeed difficult, but the military made significant progress in these areas over time. However, the security-force training process was too often plagued by “stop-go” changes, insider attacks, corruption, desertion, and sectarian divisions. This is the area needing further illumination. Train-and-equip programs remain preeminently a domain of the US Department of Defense and US Armed Forces. Given General Bolger’s critical positions as an advisor to the Iraqi Army and later as the commanding general of NATO’s training mission in Afghanistan, I had hoped to hear more about these problems, which arguably may determine more than any other whether the US can meet minimal and sustainable strategic objectives in any conflict-affected countries determined to be in the US national interest. Despite this shortcoming, Why We Lost lays the groundwork for analysts, civilian and military, to reexamine strategic tasks, derive lessons, and exhibit the moral courage to tell policy-makers their ends require far more time (and other resources) than their terms of office can provide.
Recent articles concerning the defeat of ISIS by BG(R) Huba Wass de Czege and Paul Rexton Kan in the Army’s flagship journal Parameters seek to overturn Clausewitz’s assertion that “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” (On War, 75) The United States and its allies will not defeat ISIS through legitimacy-seeking-nation-building projects—for which the West does not currently have the political will to execute over the long term—nor by reducing ISIS’s financial networks and waging a law-enforcement campaign against it. Host-peoples may perceive the West as arrogant in assuming it can force the “legitimacy” of an Iraqi or Syrian government on them. It would also be disingenuous to claim population-centric counterinsurgency operations, such as the “government in a box” proposed by BG(R) Wass de Czege, is not nation building, as these operations seek to clear the enemy, hold key terrain (and population centers), and build national forces and government (including public infrastructure). This is literally a description of nation building.

The most efficient way to combat ISIS is through the employment of US conventional military power supported by the strongest allies available in the region, such as the Kurdish peshmerga. The obvious “solution” is to fight fewer ill-advised conflicts in failed nation-states that have little strategic value to the United States or its allies. However, when that is not a possibility, the default option should not be population-centric counterinsurgency. There are a number of successful pre-1945 examples of counterinsurgency operations that have little to do with fostering host-nation legitimacy or conducting financial “warfare.”

A social-science approach to warfare has overly influenced US military doctrine. This approach, which trumpets “engagement” as a warfighting function, seeks to redefine the nature of war. “Engaging” other cultures with joint military exercises and training, officer exchanges, and infrastructure projects, builds on a notion of counterinsurgency that has negatively influenced more conventional doctrine, hinging strategic success to the solidification of legitimacy for a host-nation government.

Building legitimacy, as espoused in FM 3-24, is beyond the scope of US military operations. As conflicts in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan have demonstrated, infrastructure projects and the imposition of “Western” rule of law on foreign peoples are fools’ errands. A former Army company commander in Iraq recently challenged my claim population-centric COIN had failed—until I asked him what happened to the Iraqi government’s legitimacy as soon as US troops left the area.
A casual survey of the news in America reveals problems with corruption, and it is folly to think predominantly military forces with a sprinkling of interagency personnel can solve the intractable, centuries-long squabbles and injustices of other nations and peoples. History offers many examples of failed operations in this vein from Alexander the Great to the present.

Decision-makers tend to lack historical insight, however, and have little knowledge of past events since 1945, let alone antiquity. Training a military force in local culture and history, as community police, and for civil engineering, is beyond the capabilities of all but elite US units. It should thus come as little surprise that legitimacy-building efforts have failed since 1960, and in fact proponents of population-centric COIN cannot point to a single modern success, which begs the obvious question of why the United States continues to employ such methods. For example, John Nagl's assertion in *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, that the British succeeded in employing population-centric COIN in Malaysia has been debunked as a “one-off” based less on counterinsurgency and more on the de facto segregation of the Chinese insurgents (who were thus already separated from the Malaysian population at large), as well as the geographic situation of Malaysia.

Financial warfare and the use of law enforcement to confront adversaries like ISIS, are also only sideshows for the main event of armed confrontation. ISIS fighters cannot be arrested in the conventional sense, and the use of law enforcement to incarcerate Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters has met with only mixed success on previous battlefields—many returned to the battlefield after incarceration.

Victory is achievable through the employment of conventional forces accompanied by competent local allies, such as the Kurds. The main emphasis must be the finding and fixing of ISIS, and their ultimate destruction. Non-lethal counterinsurgency methods play a tangential role in this endeavor. As Peter Mansoor establishes in his book *Surge*, conventional forces employed during that phase of the Iraq campaign, used more lethality than in previous operations there. In fact, the restive Iraqi provinces imploded into sectarianism, and ISIS conquests soon followed once US forces departed, indicating non-lethal legitimacy and engagement had failed.

Special Operating Forces (SOF) and airpower (including drone strikes) play a tangential role in targeting ISIS leaders. Although SOF-Airpower will not win the war, it supports conventional ground operations. As recent events in Yemen reveal, without conventional forces’ protection and intelligence gathering, SOF cannot operate effectively.

Examples of US conventional military power employed in the Philippines, numerous incursions into Latin America from the 19th-20th centuries, and Connecticut’s success in the Great Narragansett War (King Philip’s War), all demonstrate how conventional power with competent local allies can defeat insurgents such as ISIS. Competent military power, less concerned with legitimacy, nation building, law enforcement, and financial warfare, did succeed in these cases, and would again, if the United States were to unleash it in the Levant today.
I am not sure the diligent people at the US Department of Treasury would take kindly in having their efforts to combat ISIS labeled as “sideshow.” Be they Clausewitzian or not, their efforts to damage ISIS’s ability to operate and form a functioning state are in the best keeping of the American tradition of using all of our instruments of national power to defeat an enemy.

There is little in my article suggesting a conventional military campaign would be ineffectual against ISIS; nor is there any suggestion that COIN is the only option. In fact, winning hearts and minds may be more distracting than going after bank accounts and bottom lines. To imply my article recommends the United States and its partners “arrest” and “incarcerate” members of ISIS in Syria and Iraq is a facile interpretation. As the recent Special Forces raid in Syria that killed Abu Sayyaf attests—there was little need to Mirandize the purportedly central figure in ISIS’s economic organization in order to hurt ISIS. Does Major Warren suggest the information gained from the raid on the inner workings of ISIS and its finances be discarded, or the raid itself should have been shelved in favor of some sort of conventional campaign? Is he recommending the US forego its current efforts to cripple the illicit financial networks that underpin ISIS’s power?

Major Warren implies the strategic choices when employing an integrated financial and military strategy are binary rather than complementary. Using financial tools against a foe does not immediately lead to COIN (or to nation-building) or preclude a conventional military approach. The choice is not a binary one—it’s not “tanks or banks.” A conventional military approach can also include a component of economic warfare waged against a proto-state like ISIS. The history of conventional wars is also the history of embargoes and sanctions that were part and parcel of a broader strategy to bring down an adversary.

The notion that conventional fighting alone can be credited for the small set of examples Major Warren lists at the end of his commentary is a narrow approach for what is clearly a broader problem. Although history is not my discipline, I am fairly certain the enemies in those wars did not use illicit financing to pay for online propaganda and internet recruitment efforts to draw more foreigners into the fray, or to pay for expanding their franchise to countries in other continents.

If, as Major Warren argues, “Victory is achievable through the employment of conventional forces accompanied by competent local allies, such as the Kurds,” then I am confused. I believe the US Air Force is a conventional force that has already been employed along with the Kurds against ISIS targets in the current campaign. The Iraqi military and moderate Syrian rebels may not be “competent local allies” in the eyes of Major Warren; but, it is unfortunate that he should discard “training and officer exchanges” because he believes they represent how social science has “overly influenced military doctrine.” Perhaps
his commentary is merely an argument for a larger role for conventional US ground forces in an expanded war across both Syria and Iraq. Should policy makers decide to accept such an escalation, the ensuing campaign could also be augmented by a financial strategy to weaken ISIS. The successful ground operations against Hussein’s Iraq followed years of sanctions and the tracing of his regime’s illicit finances. These economic efforts hobbled Iraq’s ability to replace military equipment and train its forces, contributing to coalition military operations against the increasingly economically fragile nation.

To be sure, an integrated military and financial strategy is not a tonic for ill-conceived policy choices. However, the inclusion of financial efforts in whatever types of wars the United States wages—COIN or conventional or some mixture—against a foe like ISIS should not be removed from serious strategic discussions.
This commentary is in response to David L. Perry's article "Battlefield Euthanasia: Should Mercy-Killings Be Allowed?" published in the Winter 2014-15 issue of Parameters (vol. 44, no. 4).

Dr. David L. Perry's provocative article on the ethical viability of battlefield euthanasia brings an ancient practice into the present day with startling clarity. One of the real strengths of Perry's analysis is the selection of exemplary case studies that are not detached and abstract, but concrete and, most of all, recent. It would be very easy to dismiss this topic as obtuse moral musings, but Perry has not given us that option. Instead, he directly demonstrates this is an issue for our times.

Perry concludes decisions on battlefield euthanasia remain, for the moment, a function for the adjudication of the military justice system. However, legality and ethicality are two different, if related, issues. The imposition of “lenient sentences on well-intentioned soldiers convicted of battlefield euthanasia” may be the best we can hope for in the context of current social mores, but that is still, sadly, a pretty weak solution. Perry himself appears to realize that, but he may have a point, in this case: It may well be the best conclusion ends up also being a pretty weak solution. Real life is like that, sadly.

Most ethicists would agree dealing out death is wrongful when it terminates an individual's potential to exercise agency. Clearly we can waive that standard when the individual's agency means the denial of agency to another person. Hence, we can argue in favor of self-defense—it is presumably okay to kill an individual who is trying to kill you. Euthanasia, however, might require a parallel rationale, that is, the individual killed has no agency left to exercise. That is the problem I think we face. Is an individual in pain truly competent to surrender his agency and beg for death? It may be he has a serious head injury. It may also be that he still has enough brain left to function. Is one soldier qualified to make that kind of determination on behalf of another, who is writhing in pain, and whose judgment may be unreliable? If pain is at the heart of the issue, which is the better course of action: the application of moral judgments, or the application of morphine injections?

Perry mentions the inestimable James Rachels in his article. It was Rachels who also pointed out, “The first thing is to get one's facts straight.” (Elements of Moral Philosophy, 3rd ed., 17) Unfortunately, in such battlefield situations, truly straight facts are nigh impossible to find. Thus, Perry addresses a difficult issue, one made up of “harrowing dilemmas” made even more difficult by advances in medical technology that make it possible to remediate horrific wounds, damage once fatal a few decades ago, but now routinely fixed. Both the human body and the
human spirit seem astonishingly resilient. It may seem justifiable to end unbearable suffering, but we need to be sure the unbearableness of the suffering is a verifiable fact, not merely a well-intentioned assumption.

The Author Replies

David L. Perry

I am very grateful to my friend, former colleague, and distinguished Marine officer G. K. Cunningham for his thoughtful comments on my article. I have no quarrel with most of the claims he makes, but a few points of clarification seem appropriate in response.

In the third paragraph Dr. Cunningham states, “Most ethicists would agree dealing out death is wrongful when it terminates an individual’s potential to exercise agency.” He rightly notes an exceptional case of killing in self-defense, and perhaps would also affirm capital punishment as fitting retribution for certain heinous crimes.

But even if we then focus on innocent persons, meaning not guilty of a capital crime and not posing a lethal threat to others (characteristics that also undergird the just-war principle of noncombatant immunity), some civilian requests for euthanasia (in the Netherlands, e.g.) are made by competent individuals who (reasonably) no longer value their continued life, or (reasonably) believe it portends little more than unbearable pain, suffering, dementia, indignity etc. I can not speak for most ethicists, but certainly many prominent ones (including several noted on p. 121 of my article) believe honoring such requests—designated as voluntary active euthanasia—can be morally justified, even when doing so clearly means killing an innocent, rational person—“when it terminates an individual’s potential to exercise agency.” (A similar argument can support physician-assisted suicide, when patients are still able to take lethal doses of medicine themselves.)

So perhaps Dr. Cunningham would agree the really troubling cases of euthanasia that end someone’s ability to be agents/subjects of their own lives are ones where competent individuals are killed without the informed consent owed to them and against their stated wishes—i.e., involuntary euthanasia.

Dr. Cunningham goes on to note a different moral situation, when “the individual killed has no agency left to exercise.” In domestic settings we might imagine individuals who used to be competent but now can no longer reason due to advanced dementia, or others whose mental disabilities never permitted them to be competent. If such individuals were also clearly suffering terribly, and nothing short of death or complete unconsciousness would alleviate their misery, then unless they had previously (while competent) stated preferences to the contrary, perhaps nonvoluntary euthanasia might be regarded as merciful and right. I still
believe such an argument can justify morally some cases of battlefield euthanasia.

But I also agree with Dr. Cunningham that the prognosis for a soldier who has just received a serious brain injury can be too ambiguous to warrant active euthanasia on the spot. As I noted on p. 133, “The most our troops would typically expect on the battlefield is for medics to treat wounds and save lives as best they can, and use as much morphine as needed to alleviate suffering, even if the dose required might also suppress the victim’s breathing.” I would now go further and say our troops ought to be able to expect those things, especially since I have concluded it would not be prudent for our military to legalize battlefield euthanasia.
Few authors have been more prolific, or as penetrating, as Dr. Colin S. Gray. Currently wrapping up a career in academia at the University of Reading as the professor in the Department of International Politics and Strategic Studies and the Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies, he also served as a defense advisor for both American and British governments, at one point serving on the Reagan Administration’s General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. These experiences, together with decades of research, led to over two-dozen books, multiple edited volumes, and innumerable journal articles.

Among this vast body of work, the trilogy of The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice, Perspectives on Strategy, and Strategy and Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty will most shape this discipline – and the education of practicing defense and strategic planners – well into the future.

While all three are complementary, The Bridge and Perspectives are the most similar. Much as his predecessor in strategic theory, Carl von Clausewitz, whose magnum opus On War was written to explain a general theory of war that could be used in educating practitioners, Gray uses these two tomes to delve into a general theory of strategy. The Bridge is the more comprehensive of the two, taking Clausewitz’s theory and building upon it to describe the dicta and parameters necessary for practitioners to bridge tactics and policy – to be “good enough” in the translation of force into political effect. Perspectives, on the other hand, expounds upon some of the specific dimensions of strategy Gray was unable to address sufficiently in The Bridge. The most important additions these two books provide to the theory and practice of strategy are to its inherently relative nature and the dialogue and negotiation that make up the development of any strategy (as well as the particular strategies that lead to actions on the ground).

Strategy and Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty, the last book in the trilogy, builds upon Gray’s general theory of strategy – including the incorporation of the relative and iterative nature of strategy. In this book, however, Gray focuses on the necessity and difficulty in planning for future security. As might be deduced from the expanded title, Defence Planning is in large part a discussion of uncertainty – in this case, the uncertainty that plagues attempts to plan for the future defense of a polity.
Three core elements of Gray’s discussion on defense planning are: the impossibility of overcoming all uncertainty about the future when shaping the people, processes, and technologies for defense of a nation; as in war and strategy, it is a human endeavor and is therefore influenced by the political and bureaucratic preferences of those involved; and, also like war and strategy, it is an exercise in relativity – one need only be “good enough” (better than the adversary) to be successful. Of particular interest to current efforts at shaping the Department of Defense in our current environment is Gray’s dichotomy stemming from the political nature of defense planning. This dichotomy details the fact that defense planning can only be tested when employed to achieve political effect and must have both an internal and an external consistency; all measures at planning for the future must meet today’s domestic politics and bureaucratic preferences (internal) and be successful when employed against an adversary (external).

Finally, Gray spends significant space covering the importance of historical understanding to defense planning – because this is the only source available to ascertain patterns of behavior accurately that could drive human choices in the future:

“The choice of historical experience as the essential fuel for a tolerably prudent theory of defence planning is not exactly a heroic one. The reason is that there is literally no alternative to education in history for the preparation of contemporary defence planners.” (Strategy and Defence Planning, 38)

Such a focused treatment of the place of history in a defense planner or strategist’s intellectual tool kit makes one wonder whether it should play a larger role in the education of military and civilian leaders, whether before service or during their career progression. The ability to pick up a book on history belongs to any literate individual – the capability to read history holistically, ascertain trends, and determine patterns useful in planning for future defense scenarios is something requiring focused education over time.

Overall, Defence Planning is an admirable addition to the theory of strategy Gray developed in his previous two books. I recommend military and civilian leaders interested in – or likely to be involved in – the development of strategy or the preparations for the future defense of a polity read this remarkable trilogy, as well as study it over the course of their careers. Each book will provide different insights and cognitive tools necessary to hold together the bridge spanning the policy and tactics that make up strategy development and defense planning. These books should join works like On War, the Art of War, and the History of the Peloponnesian War as mandatory canon internalized by the military leaders and practitioners likely to participate in the development of strategy.
Restraint: A New Foundation for US Grand Strategy
By Barry R. Posen

Reviewed by LTC Joseph Becker, Department Chair for Military Strategy at the National Intelligence University.

The opinions expressed by this review are personal to the author and do not imply Department of Defense endorsement.

Grand strategy is an often controversial term in the vocabulary of United States foreign policy. Competing visions of the US role in global affairs lead to watered-down policy pronouncements which must be evaluated in hindsight by their manner of implementation for a clear interpretation. In his latest book, Restraint: A New Foundation for US Grand Strategy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Barry Posen makes such an assessment. He identifies a relatively consistent pattern of activist behavior which he dubs a grand strategy of “Liberal Hegemony.” This strategy, he argues, has been wasteful and counterproductive in securing US national security interests, and he offers a competing vision for US national security strategy. While most readers will find his arguments against Liberal Hegemony compelling, his grand strategy of “Restraint” will be divisive on a number of levels.

Posen is clear and systematic throughout the book in defining his terms and developing his arguments. He scopes his use of the term grand strategy along national security lines related to the generation of military power, avoiding potential pitfalls of debate over issues such as public health or domestic policy. He defines liberal hegemony as a strategy of securing the superpower position of the United States largely through the active promotion of democracy, free markets, and Western values worldwide. Variations of this strategy have been championed on both sides of the political aisle by liberals and neoconservatives. His counterproposal, Restraint, is a realist-based grand strategy which focuses US military power on a narrow set of objectives, relies on “command of the commons” to ensure global access, avoids entanglement in foreign conflicts, and actively encourages allies to look to their own security. Posen advances a largely maritime-focused strategy to command the world’s commons.

Liberal hegemony is a strategy based upon a worldview that sees accountable governments as safe and secure partners for perpetuating the American way of life and non-accountable or non-existent governance as a threat that must be managed or ultimately rectified. It encourages a leading role for the United States in establishing and defending this order. It is this role which Posen believes to be ill-conceived and poorly defined, leading needlessly to wars of choice and the open-ended commitment of US forces worldwide. Posen views the current network of US alliances and security guarantees as largely a Cold War relic, allowing countries such as Germany, Japan, France, the Republic of Korea and even some of the Middle Eastern oil suppliers a free ride on the US taxpayer. He also believes that some of these commitments have encouraged reckless behavior, with Iraq and Israel as particular examples. Posen states that, since the end of the Cold War, policymakers have consistently exaggerated the threats to US interests in various regions of the world,
overstated the benefits of military engagement, and embroiled the US in a morass of identity-based conflicts with little hope for a solution. He argues that most US allies could (and would) manage their own security if forced to do so and they would naturally balance against threats to regional stability and the emergence of aspiring hegemons. Also, importantly, Posen bases his arguments on the assumption that great powers (current and emerging) will maintain a nuclear deterrence capability and this will largely reduce the likelihood of great power wars.

The grand strategy of liberal hegemony, in the form described by Posen, would likely have fewer supporters today than any time since the early 1990s. There is no doubt the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, combined with the larger Global War on Terror, have been tremendously costly in terms of blood and treasure, and their long-term benefits are dubious. As of this writing, the Iraqi government faces mortal danger from extremist groups. Democracy in Afghanistan is a tenuous prospect at best. Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, the recently departed director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, was quoted in recent statements as saying that even after more than 13 years of war the US is not safer and extremist ideology is “exponentially growing.” There is little argument that business as usual is no longer an option in US national defense.

While the status quo would seem to require a change, the level of disengagement recommended by Posen could be problematic in ways his book fails to explore. The network of alliances and security guarantees maintained by the United States does more than simply abet stability in far-flung areas of the world. The United States, as a nation, tends to be rather opinionated as to the conduct of world affairs. While rarely stated explicitly, security assistance in its various forms is one of the levers used by Washington to gain influence over the decision-making processes of other nations. A prominent example is Congress’ linking of security assistance for Pakistan in 2011 to a concrete set of performance objectives. It is also true that countries hosting US bases or deployments usually reap considerable economic benefits from those arrangements as well.

Unfortunately, balancing power is a dangerous game which does not always lead to stability. Posen argues, for instance, the US should remove ground forces from Japan and the Republic of Korea, believing the South Koreans are more than a match for the North Koreans and both Japan and the ROK will balance against China once they have to. But what if the Japanese and the Koreans assess the threat differently than the United States? What if one nation attempts to “buck pass” its security preparations to another and holds out too long? Stalin did this before World War II, expecting France to bear the cost of balancing against Germany. When France fell, the stage was set for Hitler’s invasion of Russia.

Balancing can also have unintended consequences. Posen states, “Restraint aims to energize other advanced industrial states into improving their own capabilities to defend themselves…” (162) But the capability to defend generally implies a capability to attack as well. Japan’s balancing against China would almost certainly arouse insecurities on the Korean peninsula, among other places. Nationalist tendencies in either location might also encourage a state to flex its newfound muscle. Perhaps the US can no longer afford to be the guarantor, but abandoning this role
will relinquish a measure of control the United States maintains over its international environment. The United States will always maintain some responsibility to assist its allies and could be drawn into regional conflicts whether or not it prefers.

Posen’s vision for “command of the commons” means the United States would dominate the air, sea, and space. His treatment of space is brief and largely sound, but he underestimates the contested nature of this arena. Air forces are treated as essential but could be right-sized to coincide with a reduction of ground forces. The thrust of Posen’s argument is the United States should support its grand strategy of Restraint through a maritime-focused force, significantly reducing the size and priority of ground forces. In his view, the balance of power and nuclear deterrence will reduce the likelihood of great power war, and a reluctance to engage in smaller-scale regional conflicts will eliminate the need for massive counterinsurgency operations and render the current force structure irrelevant. Oddly, Posen argues for a reduction in naval forces as well, going so far as to assess the number of aircraft carriers in the fleet. The United States, he believes, has the economic might to reconstitute the reduced forces if necessary, but should save its money in the meantime.

Regardless of the reader’s views on the grand strategy of Restraint, this book has value. Posen outlines the benefits of having a clearly articulated grand strategy and demonstrates the pitfalls the United States has faced in navigating national security policy without this level of clarity. His case against becoming embroiled in conflicts requiring counterinsurgency operations is strong. The grand strategy he proposes is problematic for a variety of reasons, largely for the optimism of its assumptions and its required alignment of forces. However, this work provides a starting point for debate and a structure from which various alternatives might be built and assessed. Posen is right that something needs to be done differently.
Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice
By John Nagl

Reviewed by Paul J. Springer, PhD, Professor of Comparative Military Studies, Air Command and Staff College

What is it about colonels named John with revolutionary ideas about how to conduct warfare and an inability to function effectively within the existing military system? For the US Air Force, it was John Warden and, to a lesser extent, John Boyd, who invented entirely new concepts for aerial warfare, but who could never get out of their own way enough to maximize the effect of their ideas. For the US Army, Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl played the same role, and it is evident in his recent memoir, Knife Fights, that he has only partially internalized the old cliché about capturing more flies with honey than vinegar. A West Point graduate, Rhodes Scholar, and recipient of a PhD from Oxford University, Nagl quickly developed a reputation as a brilliant defense intellectual and he is accustomed to being the smartest person in the room. Unfortunately, he at times conflates raw intelligence with subject matter expertise, and his ego gets the better of him throughout this work.

Nagl was integral to the development of the US Army’s 21st-century understanding of how to conduct counterinsurgency warfare, and his first book, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, has justifiably been required reading for military leaders deployed to the long conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. His memoir offers a tremendous opportunity for insight into the development of FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency, the key doctrine manual guiding much US military decision-making in both conflicts. However, far too much of his memoir is dedicated to settling old scores and taking unnecessary cheap shots at people who helped him at every stage in his career. While some degree of criticism for senior leaders’ decisions is certainly warranted, this reviewer found Nagl’s decision to deliberately insult the members of his first platoon completely beyond the pale. It comes across as arrogant, demeaning, and peevish, completely unbecoming of an officer of his stature. Nagl would do well to consult Eugene B. Sledge’s With the Old Breed for an object lesson in how to criticize fellow service members—the insiders who served with Sledge could certainly identify the cowards and the villains in his work, but outsiders could not do so with any certainty.

After detailing his service in the Persian Gulf War, Nagl explains his intellectual development at West Point, Oxford, and the Command and General Staff College. None of those august institutions, nor their faculty, met Nagl’s high standards, suggesting his theme for the work will soon devolve into “If only they had listened to me.” After finishing his dissertation at Oxford, Nagl was appalled to have it rejected at presses he considered worthy of his efforts, and he makes no friends in the publishing community with his vicious attacks upon Praeger, the press that eventually published his work. Even a chapter break does not halt the assault on Praeger, who Nagl blamed for poor book sales, even though there is little evidence he lifted a finger to help those sales.
Chapter 3 is by far the best in the work—it is a thoughtful memoir of his deployment in 2003-2004 to Al Anbar province, just as the region descended into complete anarchy. There, Nagl discovered the fundamental differences between theory and practice. The chapter is exceptionally well-written, balanced, and offers a solid critique of his experiences, both positive and negative, in the Iraqi desert. Sadly, it is somewhat marred by his heavy focus upon his fellow officers—even though NCOs and enlisted personnel bore the brunt of the casualties under his command, there is little evidence Nagl knew much about them, and he has little to offer about their contributions and sacrifices, leaving the distinct impression they had little influence upon the war.

In Chapter 4, Nagl turns his attention to the genesis of FM 3-24, but once again, his petty attacks significantly influence the value of his discussion. He goes to great lengths to inform the reader that Conrad Crane was the second choice to lead the writing effort, although to Nagl's credit, he eventually admits that Crane, a self-effacing academic if ever there was one, was the better choice for the role. Additional insults are lobbed at senior civilian and military leaders, including some who significantly aided Nagl's career. In pursuit of said career, Nagl relates a tale of essentially selling out his co-author, Paul Yingling, for the sake of his own promotion opportunities, a move that paid no dividends. Perhaps that is why he passionately attacks the promotion system's failure to elevate his choice of leaders, while at the same time demonstrating how often the process was circumvented by aspirants with powerful benefactors.

By Chapter 6, Nagl's story has worn thin—he presents himself as one of the central architects of the strategy applied in Iraq in 2006, and yet, David Petraeus elected to leave Nagl commanding a training battalion in Kansas rather than bring him into the inner circle as he did with so many other promising officers. Nagl offers an outsider's summary of events in Iraq and Afghanistan, but probably should have focused instead upon his own role and how his unit performed in its “train the trainers” mission. It is clear Nagl offered a verbal summary of his dissertation to the officers who regularly rotated through his training course, it is not so obvious what else was accomplished by his unit.

Chapter 8 stands out as Nagl's chance to offer advice on how the military should conduct its affairs in the future, and is another shining example of what happens when he turns his formidable intellect upon a challenging problem. He comes to many of the same conclusions as have other prominent defense analysts, namely, US conventional dominance and nuclear deterrence make irregular warfare the only viable option for any opponent seeking to fight the United States or its allies. This chapter would benefit from offering a bit more guidance regarding the key works an interested reader should consult for more information, as the extremely truncated bibliography hits a few of the obvious highlights, but barely scratches the surface of good works currently available.

Overall, this memoir has some unique insights, particularly regarding the need for, creation of, and resistance to a new counterinsurgency doctrine. Unfortunately, the author's often-cutting style, relentless self-promotion, and continual name-dropping severely undercuts the final work. Nagl's perspective is reminiscent of Cassandra of Greek mythology—an oracle with unfailing accuracy, but doomed to be disbelieved.
by all who heard her prophecies. Perhaps Cassandra, and John Nagl, would have won over more believers had they been able to present their predictions in a less caustic fashion. This book is a worthy addition to the shelf for any consumer of war memoirs, any student of military doctrine, or a scholar interested in the development of modern counter-insurgency theories. Its flashes of greatness outweigh its negatives, but much like the war in Iraq, it could have been so much more successful with a better execution of a well thought-out plan.

The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft and the Call of National Security
By Bartholomew Sparrow

Reviewed by Steven Metz, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute

Few people have influenced US national security policy as much as Brent Scowcroft. Some luminaries burned more brightly – Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski come to mind – but their time in the spotlight was shorter. Scowcroft was a senior policy maker in both the Ford and George H.W. Bush administrations, and an influential figure in Washington policy circles between and after his stints in the White House. And he was there for some of the most seminal events in American history including the final collapse of South Vietnam and the end of the Cold War. As Bartholomew Sparrow puts in The Strategist, his massive new authorized biography of Scowcroft, “…no other official or analyst has consistently had such a profound impact on the national security policy of the United States. For many in Washington, Brent Scowcroft is a pillar of the foreign policy community and a global strategist par excellence.” (xii)

Capturing a career of this magnitude is an ambitious undertaking so Sparrow’s book includes well over 500 pages of primary text. It draws deeply from both secondary and primary material – including Scowcroft’s personal files – as well as extensive interviews with Scowcroft himself and dozens of his colleagues and associates, many of them central architects of American security policy.

Sparrow’s admiration for Scowcroft is evident on every page. At times it tips so far toward imbalance that it detracts from the power of the book: the author consistently gave Scowcroft credit for everything that worked out well and absolves him of responsibility for what might seem to be missteps. For instance, when recounting components of the Bush policy that were less than successful or outright failures such as Afghanistan and Yugoslavia, Scowcroft recedes into the background. On successful endeavors such as the Bush administration’s response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, he moves to the fore as when Sparrow argues that Scowcroft “Almost single handedly…determined what the United States’ response to the invasion of Kuwait was going to be” (385).

Still, there is much to be drawn from this impressive book. Two questions are particularly important. Sparrow places great stress on the idea that Scowcroft is the model of a national security adviser, combining a detailed grasp of complex issues with realism, pragmatism and a willingness to work behind the scenes rather than hogging the limelight.
Sparrow notes George H.W. Bush described Scowcroft as “the perfect national security advisor. He’s an honest broker, yet has strong opinions of his own.” (488) “He believes in working with other influential people out of public view,” Sparrow wrote, “Somewhat wary of Congress, skeptical of the media, and uncertain about the wisdom of the public, he believes in a security policy made by mandarins – a hierarchical approach…” (559)

If this is accurate, the question is how the United States can routinely find such people. It is not a coincidence that Scowcroft and Colin Powell, who had some of the same attributes, came out of the military. Is the answer that the National Security Adviser should routinely come from the senior ranks of the military? That has some appeal but also profound implications for civil military relations. As illustrated by the tenure of retired Marine General James L. Jones as Barack Obama’s national security adviser shows, success in uniform does not always translate into success at the National Security Council.

A second important question – and one Sparrow addresses more directly – is whether Scowcroft’s brand of pragmatic realism is still as relevant today as it was during the Cold War. During Scowcroft’s time in office, the global security system was very much state centric. The conflict with the Soviet Union had matured to the point that it was possible to craft a working consensus among Americans and their elected leaders that allowed things to get done. Today’s security system is very different. Violent transnational networks, both ideological and criminal, may not have fully surpassed other nations as security threats, but they are at least co-equal.

Domestically, the Cold War idea that partisanship should at least be muted in national security policy has collapsed. Instead, there is hyperpartisanship driven by a new form of populism created by the Internet, 24 hour news, and talk radio. This new populism has now spilled over into relations between the Executive Branch and Congress, making national security policy simply one more battleground for partisan political conflict. It is not clear whether a national security adviser like Scowcroft, who deliberately kept a distance from partisan squabbles, could be effective in this complex, dangerous new political climate. It may be that he was the perfect national security adviser for the final years of the Cold War but not a model for the future.

In any case, Sparrow’s magisterial book provides an invaluable picture of an important era in US national security policy and lays a foundation for talking about America’s future even if it does not attempt to provide a roadmap for it.
Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific

By Robert Kaplan

Reviewed by Andrew Scobell, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation

The South China Sea has rocketed into the headlines in recent years spawning a cottage industry of instant experts proffering alarmist commentary and provocatively titled volumes. Tensions in maritime Southeast Asia have been on a slow boil since at least 2010, but whether the South China Sea merits the label of “Asia’s cauldron” is debatable. Kaplan is prone to hyperbole, but he has done his homework and is no neophyte when it comes to the Asian littoral (he is also the author of Monsoon — a geostrategic examination of the Indian Ocean published in 2010).

Kaplan is right on target when he underscores the importance of the South China Sea to the wider region describing it “as central to Asia as the Mediterranean is to Europe.” (49) Using colorful anatomical terminology he describes this body of water as the “throat” connecting two oceans — the Pacific and Indian. (9) The South China Sea is certainly a major maritime thoroughfare crisscrossed by a spider’s web of sea lanes. But is it accurate for Kaplan to identify this semi-enclosed sea as “a principal node of global power politics”? (49) If “global power politics” is used as a synonym for geostrategic competition between the United States and China, then the answer is “yes.”

However, many in the United States and elsewhere insist the tensions in the South China Sea are not about “power politics,” rather (for many in Washington and other capitals), what is under threat is the sacrosanct principle of freedom of navigation. Arguably, the real issue is which great power or set of powers will guarantee this principle now and for the foreseeable future, and whose interpretation of freedom of navigation will be observed in this body of water.

But for many in China the issue is Beijing’s territorial claims over many islands, reefs, atolls and associated waters in the South China Sea. These claims tend to be made on the basis of a purported historical record of Chinese presence and activity in the area as well as China’s interpretations of international law. And many Chinese view high-minded US rhetoric about the sanctity of freedom of navigation as a ruse to justify continued geostrategic meddling and invasive military activity in Beijing’s maritime backyard. The author suggests China’s approach to the South China Sea is “akin” to America’s Monroe Doctrine in the Caribbean Basin. (13) However, as Kaplan observes, this parallel has its limits. An important difference is Washington never made territorial claims to all the islands and waters of the Caribbean; rather, the United States asserted a sphere of influence. This is not to say Washington hasn’t musculously asserted itself in this region over the years, but rather the United States never asserted sovereignty on the basis of historical claims.
The heart of the book is contained in the first two chapters which address the South China Sea’s significance to China and the rest of the world. While Asia’s Cauldron book does not add much beyond what has already been written about the South China Sea itself, Kaplan’s astute broader geostrategic analysis is well worth the price of admission. Discussion of this body of water becomes a launching pad to raise larger, uncomfortable questions about the future trajectory of US-China interactions in East Asia and the Western Pacific.

The strategy of other claimants to the land formations and associated waters to counter Chinese pressure tactics is to push the United States to remain engaged in Southeast Asia while avoiding an escalation of tensions to actual military conflict or to the point of forcing the capitals of the region to choose Beijing or Washington. Understanding how these other claimants and interested parties play is important and Kaplan does make efforts in this regard. Unfortunately, too much of the book — six of its eight chapters — is crammed with perceptive but peripheral geopolitical travelogue of the states surrounding the South China Sea. Much of this discussion — successive chapters on Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Taiwan, and China — does little to illuminate the roles each of these actors play in the South China Sea slow boil drama.

These shortcomings aside, Asia’s Cauldron is recommended reading for national security communities all along the Pacific Rim and around the world.

The Indian Ocean and US Grand Strategy: Ensuring Access and Promoting Security
By Peter Dombrowski and Andrew C. Winner, editors

Reviewed by Larry A. Grant, CDR USN (ret.), Research Associate at The Citadel Oral History Program and Adjunct Professor, Charleston, SC

The history of America’s relationship to the world’s oceans and seas began with the crossing of the Atlantic Ocean. American interest spread following independence to the Mediterranean Sea when North African pirates tested the young republic. The growth of the China trade and the movement of the nation westward to the Pacific expanded American horizons yet again, but the Indian Ocean did not assume a similar level of importance to the United States as these others until long after World War II. It caught strategists’ attention only belatedly and almost entirely as a consequence of the need to protect the flow of Middle Eastern oil and in reaction to Soviet advances in those waters. According to Peter Dombrowski and Andrew C. Winner in The Indian Ocean and US Grand Strategy it is time that negligent attitude toward this important body of water and its surrounding nations changed.

This book explores the same general territory mapped out by Robert D. Kaplan’s Monsoon in 2010. Kaplan wrote; “It is my contention that the Greater Indian Ocean, stretching eastward from the Horn of Africa past the Arabian Peninsula, the Iranian plateau, and the Indian Subcontinent, all the way to the Indonesian archipelago and beyond, may comprise a map as iconic to the new century as Europe was to the last one.” (xi)
The formerly slighted Indian Ocean is, in Kaplan’s view, on the verge of becoming a new international strategic locus for the United States.

This prediction and the concomitant requirement to make prudent national strategic preparations for the consequences that would follow from its realization provide the thematic framework for the collection of essays that make up *The Indian Ocean and US Grand Strategy*. Editors Dombrowski and Winner argue in their introduction that the rise of the Indian Ocean as a trade route and potential battleground elicits “questions about whether, and how, American policymakers should adjust their previously limited approach to the region.” (2) The required information for this reassessment according to the editors includes: 1) a determination of US interests in the region; 2) a grasp of the geopolitical characteristics of the region and their dynamics; and 3) the development of mechanisms by which the interests of the US can be furthered.

The editors argue there are significant risks even in maintaining the status quo. In light of recent events, perhaps the most compelling of those discussed is that “allies and partners in the region may perceive the status quo or a slight decline in US defense activities...due to the Afghanistan and Iraq drawdown as Washington pulling back more broadly. This may result in more aggressive behavior on the part of adversaries…” (11) (If the chaos there is evidence, this last prediction seems to have been realized in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq and may suggest that the decline in US influence is already underway). The editors accept the Obama administration’s proposed “Asian pivot” as a potential step in the right direction, but they also point out that it does not include a specific strategy for the Indian Ocean. They return to this deficiency in their concluding chapter, offering the “beginnings of an analytic framework for evaluating the contending strategic approaches offered” by the authors of the other essays. Their unsurprising conclusion is the United States would benefit from a coherent Indian Ocean strategy.

The editors’ introductory and concluding chapters bookend essays by eight other scholars offering varying assessments of the need for American engagement and the methods through which America’s geopolitical future in the region ought to be pursued. The second through seventh of the essays examine various strategic options, and essays eight and nine track the possible paths of evolution of recent policies into the future. All of the authors are either scholars or foreign service professionals with backgrounds in strategy, political science, or Asian or Pacific affairs.

Strategic speculation like that contained in *The Indian Ocean and US Grand Strategy* often makes for interesting reading assuming one can decipher the sometimes dense prose. However, the likelihood of any of the suggested Indian Ocean strategies receiving a serious trial in the near future seems small as long as other concerns continue to take center stage. For example, future China policy will undoubtedly include an Indian Ocean component, but of more immediate interest is China’s advancing “Great Wall of Sand” as some are calling China’s island hopping and building program in disputed South China Sea waters, and her growing influence in an area that is home to important American allies. Chinese encroachments there will not wane soon and will capture much of America’s limited resources before they can reach the Indian Ocean.
If some of those resources do pass through into the Indian Ocean, it will almost certainly be en route to the Middle East. There they will continue to go so long as the Middle East – where it could be argued the United States has long had and is now watching the decline of the sort of regional policy these authors advocate for the Indian Ocean – continues in its currently chaotic state. Perhaps that crumbling structure, which might be thought of as a policy under real-world review, ought to be repaired before moving on to other regions.

Prudent contingency scholarship and planning – like scientific exploration – always has value, even though it may not be realized until long afterward. At present, however budget pressures may keep the realization of an Indian Ocean regional strategy consigned to the academic seminar for room.

**The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower**

By Michael Pillsbury

Reviewed by Timothy L. Thomas, senior analyst at TRADOC’s Foreign Military Studies Office. He has written extensively on Chinese cyber issues and strategy.

Author Michael Pillsbury’s book *The Hundred-Year Marathon*, which is about China’s quest to become the world’s primary superpower by 2049 (the 100th anniversary of the Communist Party of China), contains three key elements. First, this book is unique in that, with regard to China’s geopolitical strategy, it attempts to weave two important elements of Chinese historical and cultural thought, namely the use of stratagems and the concept of *shi* (how to attain a strategic advantage over an opponent), throughout the entire narrative. Pillsbury relies extensively on writings and strategic lessons learned from the Warring States period, stating, “I learned that the Warring States mind-set has long been dominant among China’s leaders.” Pillsbury stresses that hawks have “persuaded the Chinese leadership to view America as a dangerous hegemon that it must replace.” Other works on Chinese strategy typically move away from this emphasis, making the analysis feel less “Chinese” and more “Western.”

Second, Pillsbury offers readers several insights regarding his personal history that indicate the extensive depth of his knowledge and why his book has to be taken seriously. His information comes from his access to classified sources (where the *shi* concept was mentioned often, he writes), personal interviews among a host of primary sources in China (to include former leader Deng Xiaoping), and access to Chinese defectors. His ability to read and speak Mandarin, access to such sources, and his work with the Central Intelligence Agency, and his role as a policy advisor were also important.

Third, Pillsbury’s book, perhaps unintentionally, may long serve as a primer for aspiring Chinese analysts. He offers educators several areas where they should direct their attention. For example, he lists the nine principal elements of Chinese strategy that form the basis of the *Hundred-Year Marathon*, and in the conclusion of the book he lists concepts the United States can adopt from China’s Warring States era to
offset or counter China’s strategic aims. Further, to insure analysts are not taken in by Chinese claims the United States is nothing more than a global hegemon or a great Satan, he explains in some detail how much assistance America has provided China over the years, in economic, diplomatic, and military terms.

In spite of these extensive friendly gestures on the part of the United States, China looks at US assistance (through its prism of skepticism and suspicion) as part of an overall stratagem against China. It continues to harbor concerns the United States is out to humiliate China. Perhaps this is merely a case of how China has learned to view the world through the Warring States template, where power politics, intrigue, deception, and open warfare existed side by side. Or perhaps this is simply the case with autocratic regimes, as we often hear the same claims of humiliation from Russia’s current leadership, even though they have been offered extensive assistance through the years. The assistance was clearly not intended to exert “dominance” over Russia, rather, it helped Russia get back on its feet. The United States simply does not have the desire, budget, forces, or strategy to dominate strategic giants such as Russia and China.

The book has a few shortcomings. For example, it would have been informative for Pillsbury to access and report on the context of some of the People’s Liberation Army’s more recent strategic works beyond the *Science of Military Strategy* (2001). It is important to know if Pillsbury’s continued references to the Warring States period are still in vogue. Or are we seeing more creative input in concert with President Xi Jinping’s “China Dream?” When Pillsbury asks whether we are continuing to “unwittingly assist in the challenger’s ascendance,” important responses are required from the perspective of strategy. Analysts, independent of their level of experience, should carefully weigh the lessons Pillsbury has learned. The responses of a new generation of strategists to such questions as “whether we are assisting the Chinese” will shape our future meaningful engagement with China. Books like Pillsbury’s will be important to their assessment processes.

**Asian Maritime Strategies: Navigating Troubled Waters**

By Bernard D. Cole

Reviewed by Richard Halloran, formerly with *The New York Times* as a foreign correspondent in Asia and military correspondent in Washington, DC

This book is a primer on the strategically vital, internationally complicated, and potentially explosive region running from the Yellow Sea through the Straits of Malacca to the western Indian Ocean. The study moves on known headings, with few discoveries, as it seeks to help those unfamiliar with these turbulent waters.

The author, Bernard D. Cole, is a retired Navy captain who was skipper of a frigate and commodore of a destroyer squadron. As an academic, he earned a PhD in history from Auburn University, has specialized in Asian naval issues, and teaches at the National War College in Washington DC.
Early on, the author points to the “essentially maritime character” of the region, then bit by bit acknowledges the basically continental orientation of Asian nations throughout history. Today, he writes: “Few Asian nations have coherent maritime strategies or ocean policies that reflect both truly vital national interests and defense-budget realities.”

Cole says Western nations have been influenced by the famed US naval officer, Alfred Thayer Mahan, British strategist Sir Julian S. Corbett, and French naval officer Theophile Aube. But he does not name an Asian counterpart, and neither Sun Tzu nor other classical Chinese strategists have much to say about seapower.

Indeed, from 1498 when the Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama landed in India, Asian nations were notable for their lack of naval power to fend off European, Russian, and American seaborne incursions. By the mid-twentieth century, foreign flags flew over all but three Asian nations: Japan, Thailand, and Nepal.

Two exceptions to this absence of seapower: A Chinese admiral, Zheng He (sometimes written Cheng Ho), led several exploratory voyages through the South China Sea and across the Indian Ocean in the fifteenth century. But China’s imperial rulers, as Cole points out, lost interest after that.

Japan responded to the arrival of American and Russian warships in the 1850’s by building a navy strong enough to defeat Russia at sea in 1905 and to attack the US fleet in Pearl Harbor in 1941. But during World War II, Japan lost 3,032 warships and commercial ships and was left with little afloat.

Thus, Asian seapower is largely a product of the postwar period in which Asians have built navies from the keel up. China’s plans have been the most ambitious, but Beijing had to resort to getting a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) general, Liu Huaqing, to change into a naval uniform to begin assembling a fleet. (The PLA comprises all of China’s armed forces.)

Liu, Cole writes, “made his mark as the country’s most influential modern flag officer” in the 1980s. His plans were based on three phases that reflected his thinking as a soldier whose armies operate along lines of defense, advance, and logistics.

By 2000, Liu’s navy would be able to defend waters from the coastline to what he saw as “the first island chain” running from northern Japan south through the Philippines to Indonesia. By 2020, the Chinese navy should be able to defend farther east, to “the second island” chain running from Japan through the Mariannas to Indonesia. “Finally,” Cole concludes, “by 2050, the PLAN (PLA Navy) would possess aircraft carriers and have the capacity to operate globally.”

For the moment, Cole asserts, Japan has a better navy: “It is the most capable maritime force in East Asia. It is not as large as China’s navy but it is more technology-intensive, more experienced, and more highly trained.” He argues Japan’s naval strategy has gradually shifted “from a narrowly focused defense of the home islands to a global focus.”

However, Cole contends: “National policy makers in Tokyo during the past decade or more have failed to acknowledge this maritime
dependence; they have not adequately funded the armed service most crucial to Japan’s national security.”

India reflects the experience of many Asian nations in shedding colonial rule, in this case from Britain in 1947, soon to begin assembling an armed force, including a navy. As Cole notes: “It is no exaggeration to say that Indian maritime strategists take the name ‘Indian Ocean’ literally.”

Cole reports that India’s 55,000 sailors, a relatively small number, man “an impressive fleet” that includes two aircraft carriers. The author reports that India’s naval leaders appear to realize that their force is not capable of going “one on one” against the Chinese. Hence, India has sought to forge “strong relations with other navies, particularly those of the United States, Japan, Singapore, and Vietnam.”

Asian Maritime Strategies, while valuable, is marred by several questionable contentions. A sampling:

The author asserts that John Lehman, who served in the Reagan Administration “was almost unquestionably the most strategically minded Secretary of the Navy in US history.” Yet Mr. Lehman was distinctly controversial and was reined in by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger for overstepping his authority.

Some 44,000 American sailors are deployed at sea on half the fleet’s 288 ships on any given day, Cole says. A few pages later, an admiral is quoted as saying 50,000 sailors are underway on 145 of the fleet’s 285 ships. Not a big difference but a good editor should have insisted that those numbers be reconciled.

In Japan, Cole says, the Japanese government “pays most of the costs” of US warships based there. That is overstated as the Japanese cover the yen costs—shipyard workers, guards, rent—while the US pays considerably more for the ships, their operations and maintenance, and the pay and allowances of the crew.

In Australia, the author says, US Marines are establishing a base. In fact, the Marines are rotating through Australian army training areas. Similarly, he writes that US ships will be homeported in Singapore when they are being rotated there for a six months at a time. Politically, rotating troops through someone else’s training grounds or ships through a host nation’s piers and setting up a base or port are quite different.
After more than a decade of continuous conflict, Anthony King, a Cambridge graduate and professor of sociology at Exeter University, authored a superb and in-depth look at today’s soldiers. King’s research passion, the examination of the sociological phenomenon “collective action”—how and why groups form and sustain themselves—ranges from sports teams to the military. In *The Combat Soldier*, King meticulously “explores how cohesion and combat performance, often assumed unchanging and universal across wars, may have changed in the course of the last century, as armies have moved away from the citizen towards the all-volunteer professional model.” (39)

King examines how armies in Western-like, democratic societies behave and maintain cohesion in the face of the hellish experience of combat. He does so by deftly analyzing how the “multiplicity of factors including comradeship, political motivation, doctrine, tactics, and training (39)” affected combat performance in battle from World War I to the present. Rather than a macro perspective, he studies the phenomenon from the grassroots level using the infantry platoon as his unit of analysis to identify what motivates these soldiers to act in unison in a combat environment. His method includes comparing citizen army platoons from World War I to Vietnam against the modern, professional army platoons which have fought from the Falklands to the most recent operations in Afghanistan. By design, his emphasis focuses on six armies: Australia; Canada; France; Germany; the United Kingdom; and the United States, and applicable infantry platoons from their marine ground units. Precise definitions and disciplined social science methodologies aid King’s objectivity in analyzing the conditions affecting combat performance. Consequently, he challenges commonly held notions of citizen armies, both positive and negative, in comparing their performance across countries and wars to make his findings more comparable and generalizable.

S.L.A. Marshall’s research based on 30 years of study on combat soldiers serves as King’s starting point. Marshall, widely regarded as the expert on soldiers in combat, came under attack over the past 25 years. Criticisms cast doubt on his methodology and objectivity, discrediting the findings in his seminal work, *Men against Fire*. While addressing criticisms of Marshall’s research, King examines and defends the essence of Marshall’s surprising and controversial findings—one in four combat soldiers actually fired weapons in battle. In the chapter, “The Marshall Effect,” King reestablishes the efficacy of Marshall’s work and uses it to serve as his foundation for exploring the differences in combat performance between citizen armies of the twentieth century and professional armies of the current century. King explains how armies
formerly appealed to “masculine honour, nationalism, ethnicity and patriotic duty” (97) to inspire soldiers to fight in the citizen armies of the 20th century. However, he argues new factors have emerged, as a result of the shift from mass to modern tactics due largely to advances in technology and the changing nature of modern warfare. Such factors account for significant increases in the effectiveness of today’s combat soldier—a direct result of the shift to all-volunteer, professionalized armies. King contends the technical and tactical expertise of matured all-volunteer professional armies (inclusive of both commissioned and non-commissioned officers, and probably veteran soldiers) was developed and sustained through rigorous training. Expertise in individual skills contributing to synchronous collective action has become the dominant factor in determining platoon combat effectiveness. King defines effectiveness as how well these “groups [platoons] generate accurate and effective fire on the battlefield with their personal weapons” (38) or, in today’s counterinsurgency environment, “the privilege of not firing because it [the platoon] has positioned itself in a way where it overmatches its opponent so thoroughly that resistance is plainly futile.” (38) King’s comprehensive and detailed explanation of how today’s armies conduct training through drills and rehearsals is persuasive.

In his final chapter, King examines a significant issue confronting the US military today—the integration of women into the infantry. He provides a balanced and comprehensive treatment of this issue. Although he does not offer specific answers, recommendations, or methods by which the decision should or could be implemented, he does provide a different frame of reference through which to consider the issue and evaluate possible ways to achieve the desired end.

In reading King’s book, I reflected on whom would most benefit from reading it. Historians and sociologists would find his book a fascinating in-depth exploration to inform their views and put today’s combat experience into an historical perspective. For military professionals, the book is most relevant for today’s infantry officer. Though written by an accomplished academic, King’s thorough analysis and research, complemented by expert testimonials, makes the book readable while advancing a meticulous and compelling argument. In particular, King’s descriptions of current infantry platoon training in various armies provide an informative and cross-sectional view. He implicitly communicates the vital role commanders and trainers from company to division level play indirectly in combat infantry platoon development.

Other military officers may find value in King’s work in drawing parallels with either their own branches of service (air and naval) or branch within the ground forces (armor, artillery, etc.) identifying the factors driving their own “collective action” and informing their own professional expertise. They would also gain a broader appreciation for what makes combat soldiers effective on today’s battlefield. From the service chief or combatant commander perspective, especially in these times of fiscal austerity and unpredictability, the important role they play in advocating for funding to resource training and readiness emerges. Although an outcome less tangible than those compared to monies spent on modernization (platforms) and personnel (end strength), King provides compelling justification as to why readiness should be fiscally resourced on par with, if not more than, the other two—if a credible
combat land force is to be preserved. Having the best equipment in the hands of individuals alone is insufficient to make an army effective. King reaffirms, above all, readiness is what makes combat soldiers effective in battle.

**Every Citizen a Soldier: The Campaign for Universal Military Training after World War II**

By William A. Taylor

Reviewed by COL (Ret) Charles D. Allen, Professor of Leadership and Cultural Studies, US Army War College

As the American profession of arms seeks to reclaim its identity, it is encouraging to see the emergence of warrior-scholars. William Taylor is one, as an Annapolis graduate and former US Marine Corps officer who transitioned back into civilian society to pursue a career in academia. In *Every Citizen a Soldier*, Taylor appropriately examines familiar terrain – the US policy formulation process to address postwar national security through the preparedness of its military force to protect American interests. Ostensibly, his thesis is the US military’s drive to reduce the time to prepare individuals and units for war through a program of universal military training was subverted by political and social agendas.

For this reviewer, such an examination is particularly timely as the United States marks more than forty years since the end of conscription and the inception of the All-Volunteer Force with the termination of the Vietnam War. Since that conflict the US has been engaged in numerous military operations across the globe—from the heightened Cold War and a series of contingency of operations (Panama, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo) to the hybrid conflicts of the global war on terror spanning the range of military operations. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey recasts the National Military Strategy with his focus on readiness, force structure, and modernization. Arguably, the latter two enable readiness of the joint force to fulfill missions directed by civilian officials in the White House and on Capitol Hill.

Taylor provides the context of experiences of the Second War World, which weighed heavily in the American psyche, especially as the nation imagined global threats could emerge after the Allied victory in 1945. During the war, it was apparent, as Taylor clearly presents, American society reconnected with its values and the national leadership held its citizenry responsible in supporting the war. He describes the three-fold challenges faced after the war: balancing national interests with individual liberty; determining the role of universal military training (UMT) and its impact on groups within American society; and defining the relationship of citizenry to its military.

Taylor provides a well-explicated precursor to the UMT efforts. Military historians will be familiar with the post-First World War Plattsburg Movement where American students and businessmen volunteered for basic military training under the command of then-former Army Chief of Staff General Leonard Wood. The movement’s success greatly influenced Wood and future generals whom he mentored—George C. Marshall and John Palmer—both who became the
foremost uniformed advocates for UMT. This legacy of the First World War became the National Defense Act of 1920, which reorganized the General Reserve (including the National Guard). However, a critical provision for compulsory military training of males between the ages of 18 and 21 was dropped from the bill. In hopes the world would not brook another conflict of a scale as the Great War, the United States followed George Washington’s imperative for a “respectably defensive posture” (22) with a small standing army and reliance on mobilizing its citizenry for military operations.

Embroided in the Second World War in 1944, Army Chief of Staff General Marshall signed War Department Circular No. 347 to make UMT “the primary goal of the army’s postwar establishment.” (29) To Marshall, UMT was essential in developing military leaders, informing public opinion on military matters, minimizing the expense of a large standing army, and aligning democratic traditions with civilian participation in defense and a small standing force. Above all, Marshall and other uniformed advocates saw UMT as the way to improve military effectiveness.

It is easy to use contemporary professional vocabulary to frame the Army effort as a military campaign in its design, planning, and demonstration of a UMT program. The Army chief of staff provided the vision and strategic direction. The general staff performed estimates of friendly and opposing forces. Together, they developed concept of operations, and “scheme of maneuver” with lines of operation. It was clear to military leaders of the time that readiness of the force was absolutely essential for national security. In an Army that grew from 400,000 to 5.4 million between 1938 to 1942, it was important to shorten the time to train individuals and units for future wars. The Army identified early on supportive stakeholders, called “Friendlies”—as well as opposition groups to UMT. For this reviewer, the chapter “Pig in a Poke” was especially intriguing and illuminating in presenting the concerns of leaders from, labor, religious, pacifist, and minority groups. These groups clearly identified that military necessity had direct and, from their perspectives, undesirable consequences for American society.

In today’s vernacular, the lines of operation included communication synchronization and strategic messaging across the War Department where senior officers were “on message” and set about to inform, shape, and build support for UMT in the public sector. Clearly, the goal was to build a constituency capable of influencing policy development. Not surprisingly, members of Congress levied charges of impropriety in civil-military relations against the War Department.

Taylor’s analysis reveals, while senior military leaders had a very specific conception of UMT, President Truman had a broader vision for UMT as an instrument to shape American society. Shades of Clausewitz—in other words, the military instrument was adapted and subordinated to policy. In response, the military fiercely resisted changes to the core design of its program. The UMT’s essential elements were to select men meeting entrance requirements, and train them to achieve individual and collective skills thereby effectively contributing to unit readiness. As Taylor contends, perhaps the fatal flaw inherent in the UMT structure was the maintenance of racial segregation for the sake of military effectiveness.
Elements of the UMT discourse foreshadow contemporary discussions of the US military and the Army. One can easily envision similar internal debates on Department of Defense force structure and capabilities needed to protect national security interests in an environment of global threats and domestic fiscal challenges. I expect the drive to develop the narrative for Strategic Landpower had similar elements of campaign design with its intent, lines of operations, and messaging. Despite the advocacy of iconic strategic leaders like President Truman and General Marshall, UMT was not enacted (defeated in 1948) and selective service was reauthorized by Congress in the summer of 1951. Subsequently, “large segments of American society remained untouched by military service.” (167) Again, the military necessity so clear to Army leaders did not resonate with civilians in the Executive and Legislative Branches. Other priorities subordinated the military instrument to civilian-derived policy.

Taylor has produced an immensely informative and insightful book for senior military professionals. His concluding chapter captures the critical responsibility of strategic leadership: “Senior army leaders grappled with the daunting challenge of crafting a postwar policy in the face of great uncertainty. Even as battles…still raged, they attempted to create a viable army that would stand the test of the unknown and be well suited to a democracy.” (168) Such challenges endure for our military leaders of today and Taylor’s work serves as important contribution to understanding the nature of policy formulation for the security of the Republic.
IRREGULAR FIGHTERS

The Islamist Phoenix: The Islamic State and the Redrawing of the Middle East
By Loretta Napoleoni

Reviewed by José de Arimatéia da Cruz, Professor of International Relations and Comparative Politics at Armstrong State University and Visiting Research Professor at the US Army War College

Since its inception in June 2014 when ISIS released a statement announcing the establishment of the Caliphate, not a single day has passed without the media reporting some activity by this notorious extremist organization. For example, the British weekly magazine *The Economist* reported that ISIS is spreading fear, but is losing ground. (March 21-27, 2015) The *Christian Science Monitor Weekly* reported ISIS is sophisticated, lethal and growing in numbers, but will not become a global force. (March 30, 2015) Some reporters treat ISIS as just another annoyance, while others question the ability of the West to deal with this new brand of terrorist organization effectively. No matter how the media treat ISIS, one important thing must be kept in mind: in the post-World War II period, no armed group has ever carved out such a large territory. It is an armed organization “redesigning the map of the Middle East drawn by the French and the British” with the Sykes-Picot Accord of 1946. In her book, *The Islamist Phoenix*, Loretta Napoleoni argues that, while the Western media treats ISIS as little more than a gang of thugs on a winning streak, the organization is proposing a new model of nation-building that relies on globalization and modern technology. (xiv) According to Napoleoni, ISIS and its leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi are viewed by many Sunnis in Iraq as an Islamist phoenix risen from the ashes of Abu Musab al Zarqawi’s jihad. (14)

ISIS’s spiritual leader, al Baghdadi, presents himself to members of the Caliphate as a man with honorable qualities, and traces his lineage to the Prophet Mohammad. In one of his official appearance after being elected Caliph, al Baghdadi spoke inside the Grand Mosque of Mosul dressed in the traditional attire of an imam. (16) In his speech to his followers, al Baghdadi shows himself as “a wise and pragmatic” religious leader telling them, “I am the wali [leader] who presides over you, though I am not the best of you, so if you see that I am right, assist me. If you see that I am wrong, advise me and put me on the right track, and obey me as long as I obey God in you.” (17) Al Baghdadi also portrays ISIS to its followers (and the world) not as the monstrous organization represented by the Western media. Instead, al Baghdadi presents ISIS as a legitimate organization fighting the alliance between corrupted Muslim elites in the Middle East and Western powers. (78) Therefore, al Baghdadi has said “those who can immigrate to the Islamic State should immigrate, as immigration to the house of Islam is a duty.” (76) He also called upon all Muslims to join the Caliphate to reconnect with their roots. This call also served as a means of creating Arab identity. An integral part of al Baghdadi’s mission is the purification of Islam, which is to be accomplished via Salafism. Salafism doctrine calls for all Muslims to go back...
Another important element of al Baghdadi as the Islamist phoenix is his appeal to geography. (81) As Robert D. Kaplan has written in *The Revenge of Geography*, “geography informs, rather than determines. Geography, therefore, is not synonymous with fatalism. But it is, like the distribution of economic and military power themselves, a major constraint on – and instigator of – the actions of states.” (29) In the case of the Islamic State, al Baghdadi and ISIS attempt to rebuild the Caliphate in Syria and Iraq is linked to their belief that this is an area where God’s judgment will come to pass. Also, geography has always been essential to Islam – both religiously and politically. (81) The Islamic State and al Baghdadi are also actively involved in the globalization of world politics. Rather than rejection modernity, its leadership shows an unparalleled grasp of the limitations facing contemporary powers in globalized and multipolar world. (xiv) ISIS has been able to use technology to spread its messages and promote its cause, linking them to the world news. For example, one of ISIS’s more successful ventures “is an Arabic-language Twitter app called The Dawn of Glad Tidings, or just Dawn. The app, an official ISIS product promoted by its top users, is advertised as a way to keep up on the latest news about the jihadi group.” (63) Unlike the Taliban or al Qaeda which rejected music, technology, dancing, etc., ISIS has not only embraced them, but also put them to use to advance its cause very successfully.

In conclusion, the Islamic State’s use of terrorism to promote changes in the Middle East differs from previous organizations, such as the Taliban or al Qaeda. These groups were fighting to promote their view of Islam in different parts of the world; al Baghdadi and ISIS are trying to establish the Caliphate in the Muslim world and, where God’s judgment will come to pass. ISIS is also different from previous terrorist organizations due to its embrace of geography, pragmatism, and a sense of nation-building. I highly recommend this short but timely book addressing an organization that has had much written about it yet about which much remains a mystery. Students of the US Army War College would benefit from reading Napoleani’s work. ISIS and al Baghdadi have learned that conquering territory is easy; the difficult part is managing and providing what people need and want from their leaders.

**Laws, Outlaws, and Terrorists: Lessons from the War on Terrorism**

Gabriella Blum and Philip B. Heymann, editors

Reviewed by Sibylle Scheipers, PhD, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of St Andrews

In *Laws, Outlaws, and Terrorists*, Gabriella Blum and Philip B. Heymann reach out far beyond legal debates and into the field of counter-terrorism policies. The message of the book is the United States needs to move away from a perspective that views the law as a cumbersome liability in its fight against global terrorism and it ought to base its approach to this task mainly on non-coercive means.
On the whole, this book is worth reading. At first glance, parts of the book seem to be stating obvious lessons from the “war on terror,” such as the idea that adopting a war paradigm as a response to terrorist attacks can lead to inadequate and counterproductive policies. This point has been made over and over again after 9/11. However, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls’ announcement that “France is at war with terrorism” after the 7/8 January 2015 attacks in Paris demonstrates it is a point well worth repeating. Lessons from the “war on terror” are easily forgotten in the panic ensuing a terrorist attack. The book provides a store house of memory, patiently discussing arguments leading down the wrong road and policy options which are likely to backfire.

However, the chapter on targeted killing is one of the weakest. There is little in Blum and Heymann’s recommendations with which US officials would disagree; targeted killing should be a measure of last resort, targeted persons must pose a real threat, targeted killing has to be lead by sound intelligence, and caution must be taken to avoid collateral damage. In this case, the devil is in the definitional detail, but Blum and Heymann do not dig deep enough to tease this out.

The book’s discussion of detention unfortunately focuses solely “outside the combat zone” and implies detentions in Afghanistan and Iraq were less problematic because detainees were apprehended on the “battlefield” and therefore ought to be treated as prisoners of war. However, a number of individuals who ended up in Guantanamo were captured in Afghanistan and Iraq, though not necessarily on the “battlefield,” and it was by no means clear whether or not they were combatants.

The chapter on interrogation is the best in the book as it really pushes the debate towards uncomfortable questions such as US cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies possibly using torture. It also goes a long way to deconstructing the “ticking bomb scenario” and shows it is merely hypothetical scenario that should not guide our thinking on interrogation.

The third part of the book moves into the field of non-coercive policies. It makes the case for abandoning the outright refusal to negotiate in favor of a case-by-case assessment, a point recent research has supported. The second, more original suggestion the authors make is akin to a global “hearts and minds” initiative towards the Muslim world on the part of Western governments. This rests on the assumption that the chief enabling factor of terrorist attacks is the popular support terrorists enjoy as far as their views of the Western world are concerned, even if this support does not extend to the tactics they choose. This is an interesting idea, even if it is not fully convincing. It does not address the problem of homegrown terrorism specifically. Neither does it apply to all sorts of “terrorisms,” as the authors seem to imply: historically, the extreme left terrorist networks of the 1970s and 1980s relied much less on popular support than current Jihadist terror networks do.

Yet these weaknesses should not distract from the fact that this is a good book. It ought to be a must-read for policy-makers in the field of counterterrorism. Terrorism scholars will find much in the book they already know, but will be rewarded with carefully presented arguments and discussions and will be able to use the book’s weaknesses as solid indicators of issues needing further debate.
The history of Canada’s civil-military relationship after the end of the Second World War is a complex story, parts of which remain largely untold. Having started the war as a significant yet still subordinate ally to the British Empire, Canada emerged from the war with a new voice of independence shaped in part by its wartime relationship with the United States. Still, for much of the Cold War era, Canada’s military forces found themselves split between its British traditions and an emerging American way of warfare resulting from latter’s dominant role in the cooperative defence of North America, the Korean War, and NATO’s defence of Western Europe.

In his most recent work, *A National Force: The Evolution of Canada’s Army, 1950-2000*, independent scholar Peter Kasurak offers a broad and sweeping narrative of the Canadian Army’s history from the Korean War to the beginning of the War on Terror. While general histories of the Canadian Army are nothing new, Kasurak’s study is very different from previous offerings in its analysis of the chosen subject. Departing from what he describes as “the standard narrative of the army’s history,” Kasurak sets out to reframe a story often viewed through the lens of Samuel Huntington’s *Soldier and the State* with the perspective of Peter Feaver’s *Armed Servants*. The exercise is novel and intriguing, if not at times outright controversial, with the results often at odds with the established scholarship on the subject.

The history of the postwar Canadian Army is typically divided into two eras. The period from 1945 to the unification of the Canadian military in 1968 has at times been referred to as the “command era,” followed afterwards by what many critics have referred to as a “management era.” The former is often perceived as a golden age of the Canadian Army – British roots, influential, worldly, combat experienced, and professional. The latter, during which the army was integrated with the other two armed services into a single unified service, ushered in what one military historian later described as a “generation of professional decline.” In the post-unification era, Canadian Army values had been replaced with civilian business management concepts. British traditions and ethos were discarded. It is this established narrative that Kasurak takes aim at, and using Feaver’s agency theory sets out to demonstrate it was in fact not the civilian leadership but rather the army that was “the author of its own decline,” beginning not after unification but instead right after the Second World War.

Any attempt to recast a military organization’s historical characteristics and attributes so significantly in a single study is bound to run into difficulty, and Kasurak’s book is no exception. The history of Canada’s postwar army has yet to receive detailed academic attention and there remain some gaping holes in the basic narrative, never mind
the analysis or revision of the existing historiography. For example, the
defence department’s historical directorate has published almost no offi-
cial history of the Cold War era Canadian Army above the regimental
level. Moreover, army biography, especially of the senior Cold War era
leadership, is almost non-existent. There is no official history of the
postwar army headquarters or the Mobile Command organization that
replaced it after unification of the Canadian Forces. Many of the army’s
NATO operations and UN peacekeeping missions have yet to receive
proper official or academic histories.

Kasurak’s book had an opportunity to fill some of these critical
gaps in the historiography of the subject, so it was disappointing that
the author did not do so. Though it is framed as a critical study of the
army’s institutional evolution, unfortunately National Force is just another
history of civil-military relations that in this instance sides with the
civilians over the soldiers. There is in fact very little explanation in the
book of how the army actually functioned as an institution during the
Cold War, how headquarters functioned, how the army was commanded
or structured, or how the army’s combat development processes con-
ceived, designed, built, and managed its various field forces. Similarly,
the defence operational research and development establishments that
influenced so many army procurement decisions during the Cold War
receives barely a nod in this study. Instead, readers are given limited
context of what shaped army decision-making leaving one to wonder
how the author was able to determine exactly that senior Canadian army
officers were engaged in a deliberate, decades-long campaign of “shirk-
ing” their duty to serve the state’s civilian leadership. Though Kasurak
admits “it should not be imagined that civilians are above criticism,”
too often he gives them a free pass, and this book is clearly aimed at
reducing the complex institutional processes of shaping armies through
war and peace into a singular struggle between the noble politician and
the nefarious general officer.

While the notion of challenging the army’s established narrative is
both original and welcome, missing scholarship has forced Kasurak to
gloss over critical elements of the army’s history and draw conclusions
without any proper foundational context. The result, unfortunately, is a
fractured and biased history that at times appears contrived rather than
deduced. In the absence of other scholarship on the period, this book is
recommended as an acceptable addition due to what new material it
does bring to the narrative. However, readers are cautioned to examine
its evidence and conclusions with a very critical eye.

Stopping the Panzers: The Untold Story of D-Day
By Marc Milner

Reviewed by Colonel Gert-Jan Kooij (Royal Netherlands Army)

Ever since the fighting for the beaches of Normandy and the struggle
for the first objectives of Operation Overlord came to an end, the
role of the Canadian Army has been underestimated and undervalued.
In seven decades of historical publications, it has been accused of being
an ineffective force that benefited from good fortune. Although the
Canadians fought hard, they were referred to as “hockey players led by donkeys.” *Stopping the Panzers: The Untold Story of D-Day* proves these allegations to be false. The story of the Canadians during Operation Overlord, is one of well-trained and well-organized units fulfilling their mission to stop the panzers.

Marc Milner is a well-respected professor and director of the Brigadier Milton F. Gregg, VC, Centre for the Study of War and Society at the University of New Brunswick. Additionally, he is an expert on World War II with many books and publications on military history. In 2011, the Society of Military History awarded Milner the Moncado Prize for his article in *The Journal of Military History*, based on his research for *Stopping the Panzers*. He spent many years researching Operation Overlord. In contrast to other historians he focused on the Canadian forces and the German units opposing them. He and his team conducted research in many archives such as those of the Canadian regiments, the Royal Canadian History Institute in Toronto, the Howard Gottlieb Archives in Boston, the Liddel-Hart Centre in London, the US Army Heritage Center in Carlisle, and many other Canadian, British, American and German archives. Milner also visited Normandy to understand better the terrain and the environment in which the Canadians had to fight.

*Stopping the Panzers* is not a repetition of earlier books or journals about Operation Overlord. It is a rich collection of new facts of the Canadian role and the German opposition to the 7th and 9th Canadian Brigades. Thorough research by the author and other scholars lead to new facts. Operation Overlord was mainly about speed and operational tempo and – in contrast to the other larger allied partners – this is not what the Canadians displayed. The mission of the Canadians was never to conduct a fast offensive operation. The mission for the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division was not to advance with speed and seize Caen, instead the mission was to stop the impending German counterattack. The Germans anticipated an allied landing on the beaches of Normandy. One of their options was to thrust this landing back into the North Sea with an armored attack on the allied bridgehead west of Caen, which is precisely what they tried to do. Allied planners expected the Germans to counterattack, which could have hampered the entire allied operation. If the Germans had driven a wedge between the British and US armies, the landing would have failed. The mission of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division was not to seize Caen, but to control key terrain along the road from Bayeux to Caen, consolidate, and stop the counterattack. They paid a high price with the highest numbers of casualties of all allied units during this operation.

*Stopping the Panzers* is a paradigm shift in Canadian history on Operation Overlord. It is a well-written book that is, despite the vast amount of new facts, easy to read. Because it is based on rigorous research from allied and German archives and because the author’s familiarity with the terrain *Stopping the Panzers* is not just another book about Operation Overlord, but a truly unique view on the Canadian mission and role in the operation. Because it is so groundbreaking and well-written it is a “must-have” for every individual interested the Second World War. This is a job well done by Milner, his team, and above all, the men of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division who paid a very high price for doing what they had to do.
 Nobody was better trained as a mid-nineteenth-century commander in chief than Jefferson Davis. There were more important American military leaders and more successful Washington hands prior to the Civil War, but Davis was almost unique in the way he navigated both worlds. A graduate of West Point, combat veteran and war hero (from his role as a regimental officer in the Mexican War), Davis was also a long-serving US senator from Mississippi, who had chaired the Committee on Military Affairs and held the post of Secretary of War during the Pierce Administration. If anybody was prepared for the challenges of an American civil war, it was Davis. Yet both contemporaries and historians have always appeared underwhelmed by the man whom James McPherson now sympathetically labels, “The Embattled Rebel.”

Part of the problem was too much expertise. Davis knew better than his generals how to fight the war, and with a few exceptions (such as in his relationship with Robert E. Lee), he meddled and micromanaged incessantly. McPherson goes so far as to claim, “No other chief executive in American history exercised such hands-on influence in the shaping of military strategy.” (11) That’s a bold statement in light of Abraham Lincoln’s equally assertive leadership style, but the noted Civil War historian demonstrates time and again how obsessive Davis was about exercising his duties as commander in chief. The signs were apparent from the beginning, when on Sunday morning, July 21, 1861, the Confederate president “could stand it no longer” and “commandeered a special train” to take him out to the first great battlefield of the war near Manassas Junction. (41) There, Davis even acted briefly as a field commander, “rallying” straggling troops by proclaiming, on horseback, “I am Jefferson Davis…Follow me back to the field.” (41) Lincoln, too, saw a little bit of combat in 1864 at Fort Stevens near Washington, but the former Illinois militia captain never ventured anything quite as bold as this. Nor was Lincoln as aggressive as Davis in demanding face-to-face conferences with his generals in the field, though both civilian leaders were surprisingly eager throughout the conflict to travel out to the frontlines to see for themselves what was happening.

Of course, Lincoln usually gets praised for being attentive to such details while Davis often gets vilified for nitpicking. McPherson warns against allowing these sorts of comparisons to cloud a more objective evaluation of the losing side of this equation. Instead, the author tries to understand Davis on his own terms and that’s exactly what makes this particular Rebel leader seem so embattled. Even the most devoted Civil War buff will be surprised by how early and often Davis found himself criticized and undermined by his own contemporaries. At his First Inaugural address as an elected president, delivered on February 22, 1862, Davis felt compelled to acknowledge, “we have recently met with
serious disasters,” (66) even though the war was not yet a year old. And soon after those sobering remarks, Davis’s favorite field commander, Albert Sidney Johnston, was dead (mortally wounded at Shiloh) and the Confederate’s most popular general at the time, Pierre G.T. Beauregard, essentially went absent without leave, forcing Davis to relieve him. The western theatre was proving disastrous for the Confederacy, an especially painful reality for the Mississippian in charge. And by late spring 1862, the Union forces, which had successfully sailed out from the defenses of Washington to the Virginia peninsula, were only miles away from capturing Richmond.

Fortunately for Davis and the Confederacy, out of this grim period General Lee emerged as kind of military savior, accepting field command in early June 1862 and then earning an extraordinary run of victories over the next year with the Army of Northern Virginia, until their terrible defeat at Gettysburg in July 1863. But even so, the underlying trouble for Davis during that selective series of triumphs was how much Lee’s success as a military strategist often collided what McPherson terms here the “policy” interests of the Confederacy. (9) Southern military offensives in the fall of 1862, for example, actually alienated Border States such as Maryland and Kentucky, and did little to affect diplomatic affairs. Lee’s audacious tactics also came at a high human cost — one the lesser-populated Confederacy could ill-afford.

Even if Davis could forget some of these problems — and McPherson makes clear he never did — whatever hopefulness the Confederate president may have derived from Lee’s short-term gains was soon lost in a cascade of recriminations over setbacks in the west and elsewhere. Davis spent weeks traveling across the South trying to quell problems among his feuding generals, especially regarding his deeply unpopular western departmental commander, Braxton Bragg. Nothing worked. There were also desperate problems with commissary and supply, made worse by poor administrative decisions. The tetchy cabinet was a revolving door — four different secretaries of state, five secretaries of war, and one miserably unhappy vice-president. Moreover, Davis faced deepening resistance from a balky Confederate Congress, anxious state officials, and a growing southern peace faction. Then, on April 30, 1864, the beleaguered president’s five-year-old son died tragically, after falling from a balcony at the Confederate White House.

Yet despite all of it, Davis endured. He was in poor health throughout the conflict and repeatedly beset by critics, but what emerges from McPherson’s compact study is the portrait of a leader undaunted. Davis may have been irritable, but he was never defeatist. While he has always been a difficult man to admire, McPherson, who openly acknowledges his sympathies for the Union, nevertheless has created provocative grounds for greater empathy and deeper analysis than most readers have ever tried to devote to the forlorn figure of Jefferson Davis.
Doughboys on the Great War: How American Soldiers Viewed Their Military Experience
By Edward A. Gutiérrez

Reviewed by COL Douglas V. Mastriano, PhD, Department of Military Strategy Plans & Operations, US Army War College

*Doughboys on the Great War: How American Soldiers Viewed Their Military Experience*, by Edward A. Gutiérrez, was written with the goal of capturing how American soldiers thought about their experience in the First World War. In particular, Gutiérrez sought to reveal the motivation of the men “to answer their country’s call.” The book opens with a discussion of how views and memories change over time. The challenge for Gutiérrez was to find reliable sources capturing the thoughts and feelings of American soldiers in the First World War during, or close to, the end of their military service. The obvious starting point for such data were biographies and personal letters. Yet, Gutiérrez also sought sources posing similar questions to “establish broader patterns of understanding and ascertain why men fought.” (3) The solution for the author was found in post-war questionnaires distributed by the states of Virginia, Connecticut, Utah and Minnesota. Gutiérrez spent fourteen years studying these surveys and found that data collected shortly after the soldiers returned from military service portrayed their feelings and motivations more accurately. By using this information, *Doughboys on the Great War* endeavored to explain “why individuals volunteer to go to war, and, if reality fails to match expectations … to ascertain the cause of these erroneous presumptions.” (12)

Using data collected largely from these questionnaires, Gutiérrez traced the impressions and motivations of the “Doughboys” from their entry into the Army, to basic training, the journey to France, combat, and home again. Just as was the case in Europe 1914, patriotic enthusiasm proved to be one of the chief motivations in joining the military in 1917 and 1918. Yet, there was something grander than this. Gutiérrez uncovered, in his extensive research, a sense of duty was indeed a greater motivation than enthusiasm. To highlight this view, a Virginian is quoted as saying “I believe now that it is the duty of every man to serve his country in time of need.” (23)

Yet, the sense of duty could not make up for the lack of preparedness in the United States. Upon arriving at basic training, the men of the fledgling American armed forces found a lack of equipment, tanks, planes, clothes and even rifles. The Wilson Administration naively believed preparation for war would provoke war. When war finally came in April 1917, the United States lacked what it needed to train and equip a modern army. Instead, soldiers often trained with wooden rifles, under the instruction of an officer, who equally lacked the skills needed to train a force for war. Indeed, many men would needlessly die in combat due to inadequate training and preparation. As one soldier wryly commented, “It is however, a matter of grave discussion, why, when at Camp Gordon, we were taught to sing, while after the armistice we were taught to fight” (Frank Holden, *War Memories*. Athens, GA: Athens Book Company, 1922 [77]).
Gutiérrez discovered insufficient physical preparation was compounded by a lack of psychological understanding. Once the soldiers experienced the reality of modern war, they found neither a sense of duty nor enthusiasm could help them overcome fear and devastation. Instead, the moral character they had developed in life before entering the army proved vital. Quoting one veteran in this regard, “Men get out of war what they brought to it.” Gutiérrez rightly added, “The prewar life experience and personality of a soldier dictate how that soldier will react in battle. Individual predispositions share a soldier’s experience.” (44) This proved especially true in the US military of the First World War, which lacked the skills to train an army for modern warfare.

Although outside of the scope of the book, a more extensive description of the campaigns and engagements in which the Doughboys fought would have provided better context for the reader. This would have enhanced its value by putting into perspective the views of the soldiers who experienced battle. Yet, despite this, Gutiérrez provides a well-researched and thoughtful book.

_Doughboys on the Great War_ is a gripping and engaging view into the feelings and perspectives of the average soldier before, during, and immediately after World War I. It does a terrific job painting a picture of the soldier’s experience, to include an engaging description of the motivations driving Italian-Americans and African-Americans in proving their worth in battle to reflect their value as citizens. Overall, Gutiérrez’s book is a valuable contribution to the historiography on the First World War, and a welcome addition to the Centennial commemoration of the tragic epoch.

_A Mad Catastrophe: The Outbreak of World War I and the Collapse of the Habsburg Empire_

By Geoffrey Wawro

Reviewed by James D. Scudieri, PhD, (Col., USA [Ret]), Independent Consultant & Research Analyst, US Army Heritage and Education Center, Historical Services Division

The present work is a long-overdue look at a neglected topic on the First World War. Author Geoffrey Wawro is a well established author with earlier monographs on the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars of 1866 and 1870 respectively. His current work blazes a new trail. _A Mad Catastrophe_ examines the pre-war Austro-Hungarian Empire, policy makers’ monumental decisions, and the disastrous operations in 1914. The acknowledgments section is a fascinating read unto itself on his ancestors and their links to the current story. He intends to demolish the myth of the quaint Austro-Hungarian Empire under grandfatherly Emperor Franz Joseph. His introduction sets the stage in no uncertain terms.

Chapters 1 through 5 describe the peacetime Dual Monarchy, including war plans and the pre-military response to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie. He sees an unworkable state, the more so due to Magyar duplicity; Austrian inadequacy; and unsolvable, ethnic tensions, which demanded national,
self-determination. Franz Joseph, the venerable Emperor from 1848, is out of his depth in the unraveling domestic situation and the more-challenged diplomacy of the early twentieth century during its latest crisis. Domestically, his shortcomings were glaring in a structure that empowered him over a bureaucracy of ostensibly representative institutions.

Wawro explains why the Hapsburg state did not posture itself for success. The long-expected showdown with Serbia, showcased by the assassinations, provided more challenges than opportunities. Diplomacy notwithstanding, nearly six weeks passed before troops invaded Serbia. Swift action by Austria would have capitalized upon international sympathy. More critically, Chief of General Staff Conrad von Hőtzendorf should have understood Austria’s limitations in fighting both Serbia and Russia simultaneously. A Serbian campaign had to be immediate or not at all.

The text paints a similarly dismal picture of Austro-Hungarian conflict of military operations. Chapters 6 through 13 cover 1914. Austrian General Oskar Potiorek commanded no less than three disastrous invasions of Serbia in four months, between August and December. Conrad sabotaged proper weighting of effort and deployment in either theater. The fighting in Galicia ebbed and flowed, but Wawro’s thrust is poor Austro-Hungarian performance against a better-prepared Russian Army, despite its own challenges. Chapter 14 outlines the devastating cost to the Empire of just five months of war with staggering casualties. He is not the first historian to state Austria-Hungary retained a sort of “militia army” due to losses in experienced officers and noncommissioned officers, besides untrained conscripts. The Epilogue reviews the rest of the war, marked by faster decline, and the unsuccessful, post-war successor states to Austria-Hungary.

In essence, the political, social, and economic situation of the Habsburg state meant significantly underfunded budgets for manning and equipping with tremendous ramifications for preparedness. Scripted exercise scenarios substituted for free-thinking maneuvers. Numerous aspects of national power lacked adequate capability and capacity. Austro-Hungarian land forces did not have the strategic basis, operational finesse, and tactical articulation for the characteristics of warfare and the proposed doctrinal solutions to the dilemma of defensive firepower. The army had not seen action in nearly half a century; whereas the Serbians were battle-hardened after two Balkan wars. The Russians had learned important lessons from the war with Japan in 1905. Some Austro-Hungarian leaders understood modern warfare, but learning was far too uneven across the force.

The author made skillful use of well-documented, primary sources. He has masterfully woven official documents, senior leaders’ evaluations, subordinates’ comments, and foreign observations into smoothly flowing prose. He astutely blends the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Moreover, the book’s maps integrate the analysis between armies and corps on the ground, while the text showcases the exceptional degree to which infantry divisions with thousand-man battalions were the “coin of the realm” of land power. Note these divisions were large formations, the more so as Austria-Hungary and Russia fielded divisions of eighteen and sixteen battalions respectively, compared to the more common twelve.
The book shows the deadly combination of rabid ethnic nationalism unleashed in total, industrialized warfare. Atrocity begets atrocity on both sides. Austro-Hungarian treatment of Serbs in particular in 1914 aroused some senior officers’ outrage at such excesses.

The particular use of primary sources leads to the book’s greatest challenge, which is balance. Wawro leaves no doubt repeatedly and explicitly that Austrian leaders, the Emperor and Conrad in particular, were blundering incompetents. The Dual Monarchy was ineradicably flawed, hopelessly unprepared, executed its plans ineptly. The reader is left wondering how such an entity could have waged four years of protracted war unprecedented in totality. It was not alone in woefully under-forecasted requirements for a prolonged war with a much-expanded force structure. Insufficient tactical articulation to counter the power of the defense, and shortcomings in battlefield intelligence to set the stage for a successful attack too frequently turned potential flanking attacks and synchronized assaults into catastrophic failures.

The book often reads more as an indictment, rather than an assessment. The text tends to present the demise of the Hapsburgs as a predestined, linear decline from peacetime unpreparedness to wartime bungling. Wawro faced unique challenges with these primary sources. Still, more helpful would have been an integrated, comprehensive analysis of politics, economics, manpower, and equipment production, etc.

This issue of balance perhaps symbolizes the conflicted twenty-first-century mind in comprehending the inconceivable wastage of the Great War on most unforgiving battlefields with punishing learning curves for both attacker and defender. Arguably, a revolution in military affairs (RMA) took place between 1914 and 1918. There were shortcomings aplenty in 1914. Yet, what army of the major powers realistically could develop a defensive doctrine that could win a war quickly? The politicians would not end the war, the diplomats could not, and the generals groped for war-winning solutions.

Austria-Hungary’s most senior leaders too often decided poorly. Arguably, they made more mistakes than their foes; but these errors were unaffordable given their army’s inherent weaknesses, compounded under wartime conditions. Also, a German “rescue” seems an inadequate explanation of individual and collective political, social, and military resiliency to 1918.

Wawro’s book is nonetheless an important work, a case study of senior leaders facing increasingly acute challenges without clear solutions. Indeed, he convincingly explains how Austria-Hungary was conceivably the major power least prepared to wage war in 1914, even compared to Russia and Turkey. There are numerous insights for the twenty-first century. Peacetime plans and wartime execution must account for shifting diplomatic, political, social, and economic factors; plus they must balance national perspectives and interests with alliance/coalition goals. Indeed, the wider and more complete research on the Great War to date highlights the depth and breadth of mistrust among the powers. Their interests evolved before and during the war, often in unforeseen ways. Wawro shows how diverging Austrian and German strategic and operational aims can make ostensible allies into competitors or adversaries. Finally, perhaps Wawro’s greatest illumination is how Austrian leaders
failed to comprehend the Clausewitizian notion of war as serious means to serious end, replete with chance.

The Devils’ Alliance: Hitler’s Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941
By Roger Moorhouse

Reviewed by Joseph A Maiolo, Professor of International History, King’s College London

The Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939 is one of the most notorious diplomatic arrangements of all time. With this deal on economic cooperation and spheres of influence between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union, Hitler and Stalin crushed Poland, divided up central and Eastern Europe between them and heralded the coming of the Second World War. During the Cold War, historians could only consult the German records of the negotiations leading to the non-aggression pact and the brief period of Nazi-Soviet collaboration, but since the collapse of the Soviet Union our knowledge of the Soviet side of the episode has benefited enormously from the opening up of Russian archives.

In The Devils’ Alliance, Roger Moorhouse draws on the latest research and sources to offer readers a vivid retelling of the making and breaking of the deal. He carefully reconstructs the game of political hardball played by the German foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, and his Soviet counterpart, Vyacheslav Molotov. The absorbing story of the diplomatic bargaining over frontiers and trade is set against the wider context of the implementation of the pact. The twenty-two months of Nazi-Soviet collaboration enabled the two regimes to experiment in the brutal imposition of their ideological visions on the peoples of Eastern Europe. Behind the German armies, advancing into Poland came special police units to murder Jews and others deemed enemies of the Third Reich; the advance of the Red Army permitted Moscow step by step to Sovietize its share of eastern Poland and the Baltic states and to murder or exile its political foes. With great skill, Moorhouse conveys the human tragedy of these events with telling details from individual experiences. Through these individual tragedies multiplied thousands of times over, Moorhouse reminds us why the collective memories of the period of Nazi-Soviet collaboration overshadow the politics of Eastern Europe to this day.

Moorhouse underscores the basis of the deal was strategic, not ideological. Although the two regimes are often lumped together under the “totalitarian” rubric, there was no red-brown political affinity drawing them together. Ribbentrop may have dreamed about a grand alliance between the Axis states and the Soviet Union to confront Anglo-American powers, but he was alone in this respect. Hitler needed the pact to isolate Poland. Stalin opted for it because he could archive Soviet territorial ambitions in Eastern Europe and remain out of the impending European war, at least temporarily. In this respect, it is worth recalling the Nazi-Soviet Pact failed to achieve Hitler’s primary purpose: he had hoped the stunning announcement of the pact would persuade London and Paris to abandon Poland to its fate and to seek a peaceful way out of the European crisis of 1939.
As we know, Britain and France did not seek peace because they were determined to defend their status as great powers, and the balance of economic-military power was ultimately in their favor. Germany avoided a slow defeat through attrition and economic strangulation by the swift victory over France in May-June 1940. No one was more surprised than Stalin, who had predicted his deal with Hitler gave the Soviet Union a few years of peace to arm and prepare for the expected war against Germany and its allies. Although Moorhouse correctly dates the formal German decision to attack the Soviet Union to December 1940, Hitler began to air the idea with his top military advisors just after the French sued for peace. He was never at ease with a grand political bargain that allowed Moscow to acquire German machine tools and blueprints of advance weapons in exchange for industrial raw materials. Mistakenly convinced they could defeat the Red Army in a few weeks, the German high command enthusiastically prepared for Operation Barbarossa. In 1941, Soviet intelligence reported these preparations with growing alarm, but Stalin dismissed them as provocations to lure him into a war he did not want. He saw the German arms buildup in Eastern Europe as part of the hard bargaining process over territory and trade the Nazi-Soviet pact had initiated. In a report of 5 June 1941, the Joint Intelligence Committee in London came to the same conclusion. Stalin simply did not expect Hitler would attack until the war against Britain and its informal ally the United States had ended. As Moorhouse shows in his book, Stalin’s failure to anticipate the German attack cost the Red Army and the people of the Soviet Union dearly.

Four Decades On: Vietnam, the United States, and the Legacies of the Second Indochina War
Scott Laderman, Edwin A. Martini, eds.

Reviewed by William Thomas Allison, PhD, Georgia Southern University

The American War in Vietnam continues to engage creative scholars from across diverse academic disciplines to rethink both the legacies of the war and the war itself. The editors of Four Decades On have assembled an impressive collection of scholarship in this vein, drawing from the transnational study of identity, memory, film, culture, tourism, and economy. The contributors explore boundaries, official histories and counter-narratives, and remembrance and reconciliation to assess the enduring legacies of a ten-year war, now literally Four Decades On, and they go beyond traditional, though still useful, American or Vietnamese-centric approaches. The resulting collection compels reflection on how assumptions and myths influence memory, and emphasizes the illuminating conclusions of new, cross-disciplinary approaches applied to understand better the deep and lingering legacy of this war. In this, the editors succeed.

Christina Schwenkel, for example, an anthropologist at the University of California, Riverside, argues transnationalism influences the evolving narrative of the war exhibited at museums, memorials, and other war-related sites in Vietnam. As Vietnam’s economy becomes more global and war tourism gains popularity among American visitors, narratives at these sites (which Schwenkel calls “memory-scapes”)
have shifted from the older hurray-for-we-defeated-the-Americans to a softer, more American friendly tone, often focusing on mutual victimhood of combatants and non-combatants, regardless of nationality. For Schwenkel, reconciliation, ironically, may be the most important if not unintended consequence of Vietnam’s desire to open markets with the United States and court American tourists.

Analyzing cultural legacies looms large in this collection. Historian Walter Hixson, of the University of Akron, examines how Americans have emphasized healing and overcoming the Vietnam Syndrome through a variety of means, but most interestingly through film, which tends to focus on the American soldier as victim and the Vietnamese as nearly invisible. These cultural influences allow revisionist history to take root, which can deflect attention from real questions of American intent in Vietnam and American militarism in general.

Fitting well into this rubric of memory, narrative, and reconciliation are the divisive issues of “Agent Orange” and accounting for POWs/MIAs. The legacies of both have been strewn with myth, politics, and manipulation. Diane Niblack Fox, an anthropologist who also teaches Vietnamese Studies at the College of the Holy Cross, offers one the better article-length studies of this controversial issue. Fox looks at the impact of the use of chemical defoliants from multiple perspectives – science, medicine, public policy and law, the work of non-profits, history, and most interestingly the actual experience of those directly affected. She ably dissects the various meanings and contexts of “Agent Orange” among diverse constituencies that transcend class, borders, and even time. Fox argues that closing the gap between state policy and international relations with individual experiences and needs is key to approaching reconciliation for Americans and Vietnamese over the “Agent Orange” controversy. H. Bruce Franklin, professor of English and American Studies at Rutgers University, likewise tackles the POW/MIA myth, providing again one of the better article-length examinations of the evolution of this extremely sensitive issue. From the political manipulations of the Nixon administration to Chuck Norris’ numerous Missing in Action films, Franklin pulls no punches in explaining how the POW/MIA myth maintained momentum from its apparent usefulness in all but silencing the anti-war movement in the early 1970s to perpetuating the myth through flying the black POW/MIA flags as a way to focus on American victims of the war rather than on why the United States engaged in such a disastrous war in the first place. Similar to Hixon, for Franklin, the POW/MIA myth conveniently enables Americans to ignore the difficult national questions of memory and legacy from Vietnam.

This collection will find eager readership among specialists and graduate students, but those with a more passing interest in what is the most innovative scholarship on the Vietnam War will find some of the essays difficult. Because some among the academic community insist on using pretentious terminology and, further, assume all are familiar with their particular discipline’s theoretical frameworks, they make their otherwise valuable work inaccessible to a willing cross-disciplinary audience. This frustrating problem crops up across the collection and can be distracting. Another minor and related issue is a hint of rejection toward more traditional historical approaches. Scholars utilizing these
new, important approaches should be mindful of the debt they owe to the useful work that preceded theirs which provides a firm foundation for historical understanding, without these newer methods they would have no context and little upon which to build.

Do not let these concerns, however, discourage reading these valuable essays. *Four Decades On* challenges assumptions, dispels myths, and offers insightful arguments on causation, memory, narrative, and reconciliation among nations and, more interestingly, among peoples. As we enter fiftieth anniversaries of key events of the American War in Vietnam, we will be reminded how much that experience continues to affect us, and how we are still unwilling to engage in an honest discussion on “Vietnam.” Laderman and Martini have compiled a provocative collection of the best new scholarship on the “Second Indochina War.” Specialists should read it and engage in the conversation.
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