Special Commentary: Rebalancing Offshore Balancing
Michael G. Roskin

Adapting to Strategic Change
Brian McAllister Linn
J. P. Clark
Charles Hornick, Daniel Burkhart, and Dave Shunk

Myths about the Army Profession
Don M. Snider
C. Anthony Pfaff

On Strategic Communications Today
James P. Farwell and Darby J. Arakelian
Christopher Paul
Gideon Avidor and Russell W. Glenn
Parameters is an official US Army Periodical, published quarterly by the US Army War College. The Secretary of the Army has determined that publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department. Use of funds for printing this publication has been approved by the Secretary of the Army in accordance with Army regulations.

**Disclaimer:** Articles and reviews published in Parameters are unofficial expressions of opinion. The views and opinions expressed in Parameters are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.
From the Editor

Features

Special Commentary

7 Rebalancing Offshore Balancing
   Michael G. Roskin

Adapting to Strategic Change

13 The US Army's Postwar Recoveries
   Brian McAllister Linn

23 Organizational Change and Adaptation in the US Army
   J. P. Clark

41 Rightsizing the Army in Austere Times
   Charles Hornick, Daniel Burkhart, and Dave Shunk

Myths about the Army Profession

51 Five Myths about Our Future
   Don M. Snider

59 Five Myths about Military Ethics
   C. Anthony Pfaff

On Strategic Communications Today

71 Using Information in Contemporary War
   James P. Farwell and Darby J. Arakelian

99 Information and Warfare: The Israeli Case
   Gideon Avidor and Russell W. Glenn

Commentary and Reply

109 On "The ‘Practice’ Problem: Peacebuilding and Doctrine"
   Raymond D. “Boz” Bossert Jr.

110 The Author Replies
   Christopher H. Tuck
## Book Reviews

### Ethics and War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Reviewer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td><em>Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory</em></td>
<td>James M. Dubik</td>
<td>Charles D. Allen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td><em>Fighting Hurt: Rule and Exception in Torture and War</em></td>
<td>Henry Shue</td>
<td>David Perry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Technology and War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Reviewer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td><em>The Future of Violence: Robots and Germs, Hackers and Drones — Confronting a New Age of Threat</em></td>
<td>Benjamin Wittes and Gabriella Blum</td>
<td>John C. Becking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td><em>The Other Space Race: Eisenhower and the Quest for Aerospace Security</em></td>
<td>Nicholas Michael Sambaluk</td>
<td>Raymond A. Millen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Biographies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Reviewer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td><em>Alter Egos: Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, and the Twilight Struggle over American Power</em></td>
<td>Mark Landler</td>
<td>W. Andrew Terrill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td><em>The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA’s Clandestine Service</em></td>
<td>Henry A. Crumpton</td>
<td>Mark Grzegorzewski</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### New Theories in Security Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Reviewer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td><em>Ontopower: War, Powers, and the State of Perception</em></td>
<td>Brian Massumi</td>
<td>Philip W. Reynolds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td><em>Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse</em></td>
<td>Paul Staniland</td>
<td>Patrick Finnegan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Regional Studies: China and Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Reviewer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>129</td>
<td><em>Middle Kingdom &amp; Empire of the Rising Sun: Sino-Japanese Relations, Past and Present</em></td>
<td>June Teufel Dreyer</td>
<td>Michael A. Spangler</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Military History

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Reviewer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td><em>Margin of Victory: Five Battles that Changed the Face of Modern War</em></td>
<td>Douglas Macgregor</td>
<td>Tarn Warren</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135</td>
<td><em>Braddock’s Defeat: The Battle of the Monongahela and the Road to Revolution</em></td>
<td>David L. Preston</td>
<td>Jason W. Warren</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Our Autumn issue opens with a *Special Commentary* by Michael Roskin, “Rebalancing Offshore Balancing.” Roskin cautions against being too enthusiastic about embracing offshore balancing, as it can lead to incremental interventions and ambiguous outcomes, the likes of which we have seen before.

Our first forum offers three contributions on *Adapting to Strategic Change*. Brian Linn’s “The US Army’s Postwar Recoveries” analyzes how the Army has responded to postwar drawdowns and endeavored to meet new strategic demands with inevitably fewer resources. Adaptability remains the most important key to success in such situations. J. P. Clark’s “Organizational Change and Adaptation in the US Army” advances a typology to help senior leaders understand the factors that drive change, and how the Army has adapted to it. In “Rightsizing the Army in Austere Times,” Charles Hornick, Daniel Burkhart, and Dave Shunk provide critical information for countering some of the arguments for a smaller Army.

The second forum features two essays addressing *Myths about the Army Profession*. Don Snider’s “Five Myths about Our Future” expresses concern over the Army’s persistent bureaucratic mind-set. Snider seeks to remove some of the complacency about the Army’s future as a profession by demolishing five of the more powerful myths underpinning that complacency. In “Five Myths about Military Ethics,” Tony Pfaff applies similar tactics to redress the thinking of Army leaders about the role of military ethics in the twenty-first century; military ethics contribute more to victory than practitioners might realize.

Our final forum, *On Strategic Communications Today*, consists of three essays discussing the ever-expanding role of information in armed conflict. In “Using Information in Contemporary War,” James Farwell and Darby Arakelian remind us just how important the strategic narrative is in shaping expectations as well as outcomes. Christopher Paul’s “Enhancing US Efforts to Inform, Influence, and Persuade” warns not to cut strategic communications’ capabilities since the result may be a disproportionate decrease in the potency of hard power. In “Information and Warfare: The Israeli Case,” Gideon Avidor and Russell Glenn offer an array of lessons from the Israeli use of “targeted messaging” in recent conflicts; designing, promulgating, and sustaining a strategic narrative is now an inseparable aspect of the character of war.

~ AJE
Abstract: Long, indecisive wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have led some to propose a middle ground between intervening too much and too little. One prominent strategy for this is called offshore balancing. With ships on the water instead of boots on the ground, power and stability would be projected at seemingly little cost or risk. Offshore balancing, however, would be tantamount to an unstable selective isolationism leading to a delayed and perhaps more costly intervention.

Mearsheimer and Walt’s Offshore Balancing

Perhaps the greatest interest to defense practitioners is the recent proposal of the University of Chicago’s John Mearsheimer and Harvard’s Stephen Walt for an offshore strategy.1 As realists, they recognize not all regions reflect American national interests; many states can be left to sort out their difficulties without our help. In a swipe at neoconservatives, they decry the “misguided grand strategy of liberal hegemony” that includes spreading democracy.

Instead, Mearsheimer and Walt propose a realist grand strategy that would concentrate on “preserving U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere and countering potential hegemons in Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf.” They would have the United States contribute to a regional balance carried out chiefly by local powers while American Military Power would “remain offshore as long as possible.”2

These scholars call this a strategy with a limited agenda, but it could easily lose its limits—for example, they admit a fast-rising China “is likely to seek hegemony” in Asia, “which the United States should undertake a major effort to prevent.” European NATO members should take the lead in Europe and the Russians in Syria.3 But, what happens when these areas blow up? The devil is in the details, and the generic problem of offshore balancing is how to control events on land from the sea.

Which shores? Mearsheimer and Walt do not mean our own shores—something they might have considered, but would basically amount to isolationism.4 They have no interest in the southern and

2 Ibid., 71–74.
3 Ibid., 81–82.
4 See Nicholas John Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1943).
eastern Mediterranean basin, including Syria, where the Russians have a small naval base at Tartus. These are areas, however, where unrest sprouts and spreads. If the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is a menace in Iraq, it does not cease to be a menace when it crosses into Syria. Can local forces handle it with Iranian and Russian help? Surely, we do not wish to see stronger Iranian and Russian roles in the region.

A victory for Iran would solidify its Shi‘iah corridor through Iraq and Syria into Lebanon, an uncomfortable development not least for emboldening Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese outlet, to start a new war with Israel. Standing offshore in the Persian Gulf would not block the Shi‘iah corridor. The situation could resemble the Tonkin Gulf, where the events of August 1964 illustrated how offshore operations easily become stepping stones to onshore wars.

Moreover, US ships must come into port to refuel, which could resemble the Gulf of Aden in 2000 where an al-Qaeda boat crammed with explosives blew a big hole in the USS Cole, killing 17 American sailors. We can, of course, refuel from supply ships, but they in turn become the targets. The point is there is no such thing as sitting completely offshore, a land connection always requires onshore security.

Is offshore balancing inexpensive? American offshore power projection chiefly revolves around carrier strike groups, each consisting of a carrier surrounded by escort vessels to protect it. As Lawrence Korb, a former Navy officer who also served as assistant secretary of defense, told the US Army War College in the early 1990s, these “floating cities” are the most expensive way to project power, far more expensive than land-based forces. And offshore costs are born entirely by US taxpayers; whereas American land bases are usually subsidized by the host country, such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea, which contribute free rent, base construction, and maintenance. Put everything at sea, and we lose these subsidies.

Does offshore balancing keep us out of harm’s way? The Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) included the use of Iranian sea mines—some of them 1908 models purchased from tsarist Russia. One mine severely damaged a US frigate in 1988. In the Persian Gulf War (1990–91), Iraqi mines struck two American vessels because we lacked mine-sweeping capacity—too low-tech for us. Until European minesweepers arrived, we improvised using US Coast Guard whaleboats with US Marine Corps sharpshooters in the bow. At low cost, mines can block the shipping channels of the Persian Gulf, especially in the narrow Strait of Hormuz.

China, which insists the US Navy has no business in its seas, has shore-to-ship missiles that Beijing claims can reach hundreds of miles. The US Navy is conducting occasional freedom-of-navigation operations far to the south in the Spratly Islands to keep away from mainland shores. Years ago, China provided the design of Iran’s C-802 antiship missiles, which passed some on to Hezbollah.5

The Mearsheimer-Walt article echoes Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism, in which major powers construct territorial shields to keep threats distant, an accurate description of current Russian and

5 James Holmes, “Is the U.S. Navy a Sitting Duck?” Foreign Policy, October 25, 2016.
Chinese expansionism. But Mearsheimer now argues we must intrude precisely where China does not want us to go—namely, into the South China Sea. China may well be bluffing, but finding out is highly risky.

What about the Philippines? America’s pivot to East Asia suddenly developed a surprising hole: the Philippines. Manila’s newly elected President Rodrigo Duterte vows to throw America out and purchase Chinese and Russian arms. A mercurial personality, he publicly cursed President Obama. The Philippines depends on American support, and we need the Philippines for an anti-China coalition; hence many suppose Duterte’s temper tantrum will pass, but he reflects a long-simmering Filipino nationalism that seeks freedom of maneuver.

After the Philippine Islands gained independence in 1946, major American basing continued at Subic Bay and Clark Field until 1992, when Manila demanded too much to renew the leases. China noted the lapse and seized Mischief Reef in the Spratlys, claimed by the Philippines, and fortified it. China also claims Scarborough Shoal, just 123 miles west of Subic Bay, within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. China muscles closer, but Duterte thinks he can get a deal: Filipino fishing rights in exchange for friendship with China.

So, how can offshore balancing block Chinese expansionism if there is a gap in the first island chain running from Japan through the Philippines and Indonesia to Vietnam, which China aims to neutralize or dominate? An international tribunal just found in favor of the Philippines, rejecting China’s claims to the South China Sea; however, Beijing says it will ignore this ruling. Duterte, pursuing his other goals, has refrained from waving the ruling at Beijing, but the United States cannot defend someone who does not want to be defended.

Another part of our Asia pivot, the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, finalized in early 2016 after seven years of negotiations, faces much opposition in the Senate. This rare case of Obama-Republican cooperation collapsed as presidential contenders denounced it as harmful to American workers. An altered and renamed partnership could conceivably pass later; many business executives and economists say it will boost our economy. Some strategists worry that without an agreement China will effectively dominate the Western Pacific. How would offshore balancing redress that?

How clever are we at offshore operations? The overnight detention in early 2016 of two small US patrol craft and their crews near Iran’s Farsi Island does not inspire confidence. They missed their rendezvous with the refueling ship, US Coast Guard Cutter Monomoy. After covering 170 miles in four and a half hours at 38 miles per hour, the boats’ tanks must have been dry, which explains why they did not outrun the slower Iranian boats. Squadron Commander Eric Rasch was relieved of command, but the Navy has not told us the whole story or permitted the detainees to speak to the media. Getting close to a hostile shore invites


snafus that easily lead to gunfire and wet-boot operations. In other words, operations may start out offshore but are soon pulled ashore.

How do we handle China’s New Silk Roads? Little remarked, the great geo-economic development of our day is China’s New Silk Roads, which are stitching Asia—and even Eurasia—together for the first time. Railroads, pipelines, and highways in several directions are returning China to its classic status as the Middle Kingdom (中国), the hub of networked land corridors. Goods are already shipped by rail from Shanghai to Spain. A rapidly growing portion of China’s energy, both oil and natural gas, comes from central Asia and Siberia as well as through Myanmar. The more China trades along the new routes, the less traditional sea routes will matter and the safer China’s energy supplies will be.

If an Axis-dominated Eurasia was a real and frightening prospect in World War II, a Sino-Russian Eurasia, distant from and essentially unreachable by American naval counterbalancing, is no less threatening. The construction and fortification of reefs in the Spratlys yield dramatic satellite photos, but they may be a diversion from China’s inland constructions. Again, offshore balancing would not do much to influence this development.

**Selective Isolationism, Delayed Intervention**

Mearsheimer and Walt deserve praise for their critique of recent onshore interventions and their attempt to put limits on them. Such grand theories, however, always dissolve in the face of specific problem areas. If applied, offshore balancing would mean selective isolationism that easily turns into delayed intervention.

By designating just three areas for offshore balancing—Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf—our adversaries are alerted to the areas where we would not get involved, inviting expansionists’ opportunistic adventures. Would the two scholars include the Black Sea in Europe, the South China Sea in Northeast Asia, and the Red Sea with the Persian Gulf? If they do not, they offer quasi-isolationism to keep us out of explosive areas—respectively the Ukraine, the Spratlys, and Yemen—not a bad idea but one that requires the cooperation of our adversaries. Mearsheimer and Walt look at much of the globe and say: “So what?” While this perspective is a welcome corrective to overengagement, if we say it often enough, we become isolationists.

With a grand strategy that rejects land action in the Persian Gulf’s littoral states—or makes it rare and reluctant—what is the point of being in the Gulf at all? To be sure, Mearsheimer and Walt have not said “never” to land interventions but to remain offshore as long as possible. This might please Gulf clients who prefer an “over the horizon” US presence on ships since US bases attract resentment and bombings. American bases on the sacred soil of Saudi Arabia were targets of Osama bin Laden’s ire and were terminated in 2003. Riyadh and Ankara did not permit us to launch the Iraq War (2003–11) from Saudi Arabia and Turkey respectively; we had to launch from tiny Kuwait. Soon we may not have a land option in the Persian Gulf.

Standing offshore in the Persian Gulf puts us in the middle of what could soon become a regional Sunni-Shī‘ah war led by Saudi Arabia and
Iran. A US fleet cruising the Gulf could dissuade Iran, but do nothing about dangerous Saudi economic and demographic trends. Unrest builds over withdrawn subsidies, homegrown Sunni extremists, and an unhappy Shīʿah minority. A succession conflict looms between Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef and the king’s son, Prince Mohammad bin Salman, who is 31 years old and in charge of just about everything. Prince bin Salman’s ambitious reforms now rattle the kingdom. Mearsheimer and Walt are quite right in urging us to avoid local complexities, but Saudi instability has repercussions far beyond the peninsula.

America is already involved in an unsuccessful Saudi war in Yemen, which uses US intelligence, aircraft, bombs, and refueling assets. Something like a Tonkin Gulf incident is being replayed in the Red Sea. Land-based antiship cruise missiles—of Chinese design, probably manufactured by Iran—were deflected before they could hit the USS Mason off Yemen’s shore, which was probably supporting Saudi bombing of Shīʿah Houthi rebels. The USS Nitze retaliated with cruise missiles, destroying several onshore radar sites. Yemen illustrates again how offshore is intimately connected to onshore.

### The Excluded-Middle Problem

Many strategic thinkers want to curtail US activity overseas, but some seek to preserve a hegemonic role. These include ex-neoconservatives, few of whom admit to ever having been neo-cons. Two Dartmouth professors, Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, propose a grand strategy of “deep US engagement” abroad to counteract the “retrenchment” mood. If the United States retrenched, they argue, several areas would quickly destabilize and soon require more extensive US intervention. America is still the sole superpower, able to stabilize the world cheaply and with little risk. They warn against the neoconservative temptation of overdoing engagement and the risk of escalating to major war but do not explain how to prevent them. Like Mearsheimer and Walt, their grand strategies are long-term and theoretical, brushing over the devilish details, which tend to trip up theories. If you oppose retrenchment, where precisely do you propose to defend the country’s interests?

Mearsheimer and Walt occupy one pole of the emerging post-Iraq strategic debate, Brooks and Wohlforth the other. The former seek to limit engagement, the latter to maintain it. Both, however, face an excluded-middle problem, the difficulty of holding a middle ground between conducting massive interventions and avoiding complex entanglements. They reject extreme solutions but may find there is no golden mean. Events rudely shove us from cautious positions into major interventions. Few middle grounds work over the long-term; all may be quickly overthrown.

No strategy—offshore balancing or deep engagement—can prevent mistaken interventions any more than the 1973 War Powers Act could. Indeed, trying to “lock-in” any American grand strategy is a dubious undertaking. Things change too quickly.

---

8 Holmes, “Navy a Sitting Duck.”
Adapting to Strategic Change

The US Army's Postwar Recoveries

Brian McAllister Linn
© 2016 Brian McAllister Linn

Abstract: The US Army's typical postwar recovery process, which can last a decade, is characterized by increased strategic commitments, insufficient resources, and conflicting priorities. The most traumatic aspect of recovery, personnel turbulence, often manifests in the discharge of experienced leaders and technicians, generational discord, tension between policymakers and commanders in the field, insufficient maintenance, inadequate training, and social problems. As past examples illustrate, future success depends on how well soldiers today adapt to an austere postwar environment.

"What all Army operations will have in common is a need for innovative and adaptive leaders and cohesive teams that thrive in conditions of complexity and uncertainty." 1

As the US Army transitions from full engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan to the uncertain and complex operational environment predicted by Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) planners, it must again undertake the historic process of military recovery. If the previous two centuries of Army history are any guide, this process will probably take almost a decade. And in the service’s long institutional memory, the years after demobilization are always dark ages—long stretches of austerity, hollow forces, internal tensions, and public hostility. Despite their grim reputation, periods of recovery have often served to inform discussions about current military issues.

During the revolution in military affairs debate, analysts studied the two decades between the World Wars for insights on their own era’s policies, doctrines, and technologies.2 In the 1990s, the broken Army of the post-Vietnam era was romanticized as the incubator of the “prodigal soldiers” who had led it to victory in Desert Storm. A few years later that same Army was cited as a warning of the dangers of military overextension in Iraq and Afghanistan.3 Perhaps because soldiers have served as sources of inspiration, literature on the Army’s experiences after every war is extensive; however, there is very little analysis of postwar recovery as a distinct military phenomenon. This comparative study of the Army’s

recoveries from past wars illuminates some of the current and future problems likely to be faced even though it provides no easy solutions.

**The Complexity of Recovery**

For the last decade, the US Army’s vision statements have defined the impending environment as complex and uncertain with adaptation and innovation as crucial abilities for professional soldiers. Today’s planners, who are experts in current military affairs, have the daunting task of preserving the Army’s present capabilities while simultaneously anticipating future contingencies. Planners make both immediate and imminent decisions on everything from spare parts to schools and post exchanges to personnel. They not only need to identify, retain, and place the next war’s William T. Shermans and George C. Marshalls but also to purge today’s Beetle Baileys. They must concurrently fulfill existing missions and plan for the near and long-terms. And they must do so under conditions of austerity that include restricted budgets, personnel cuts, and a civil-military atmosphere too often characterized by miscommunication and mistrust—just as they have in the past. In this unstable environment, the past can be both a guide and a trap, a postwar invitation to seize a few examples of strategic success—the blitzkrieg, amphibious war, AirLand Battle—as the road map to a future D-Day or Operation Desert Storm. The benefits of such an approach, perhaps more inspirational than practical, must be balanced by studying the unified themes, the problems, and the shared experiences of the Army’s postwar recoveries as provided in this article.

The US Army is, was, and will always be a hierarchical, top-down organization overseen by a federal agency. The inevitable consequence is a focus on the study of postwar recovery based on Washington-mandated institutional and organizational changes. Although much insight can be gained by studying postwar legislation or the roles of key individuals and bureaucracies, this approach can frame the ensuing postwar era’s problems and solutions as largely a matter of institutional change. Thus, the Army’s recovery from the Spanish-American War is restricted to the Root reforms, World War II (WW II) to the national security legislation of 1947 and 1949, Korea by Eisenhower’s New Look, and Vietnam by Barry Goldwater and Bill Nichols’s legislation.

Aside from missing many other significant changes, this approach contains an inherently false assumption that recovery programs generated by the Pentagon army are matched by changing conditions in the field army. To illustrate, compare the soaring rhetoric from the Pentagon during Chief of Staff General Maxwell D. Taylor’s 1956 pentomic initiative with the reports from battalion-level field units that were tasked with its implementation. From Washington, the staff proclaimed an Army for the atomic era, but from the perspective of Fort Lewis’s harassed battalions, the effort produced a cascade of woes, from malassigned personnel, constantly changing tables of organization and equipment, 

---

administrative disorder, and missing or damaged equipment to a complete shutdown of training.\(^5\)

Based on the last century or so of the Army’s postwar recovery process, today’s planners can anticipate some familiar problems. First, after every conflict, the US Army not only recovers most of its prewar responsibilities but also inherits some new ones. The post–Civil War force not only assumed its predecessor’s frontier and harbor defense missions but also the onerous task of Reconstruction. After defeating Spain in 1898, the Army still had to protect the homeland by constructing and manning a complex harbor fortification system and shielding overseas territories from Great Power rivals. In 1907, defending the Philippines alone required almost a quarter of all Army personnel. The post-World War I (WW I) force maintained its predecessor’s overseas and continental defense commitments and also the 1920 National Defense Act’s mandate to administer, equip, and train a million-man mobilization force. The post-WW II Army continued the service’s historic continental defense obligation augmented by new responsibilities for civil and air defense and also expanded its international role from Berlin to Tokyo.

The rapid emergence of the Communist Soviet threat increased international deployments and led to the momentous and unprecedented decision to authorize peacetime conscription. In 1950, this recovering Army was thrown into combat in Korea. It emerged from that conflict with expanding military obligations—including the requirement to provide permanent combat-ready forces in Asia and Europe, a continental air defense program, overseas military assistance, a strategic rapid deployment force, and a general reserve. The post-Vietnam recovery may, in retrospect, appear an exception to the historic pattern of increasing commitments, but a closer examination of that hollow force and its extensive missions, most notably stopping a resurgent Warsaw Pact, reveals the persistent pattern of postwar overstretch. During the 10-year recovery period of the Gulf War, the US Army was deployed in a series of frantic and often ambiguous missions in the Balkans, Somalia, Haiti, and numerous other places as Defense Secretary Les Aspin Jr. boasted he could simultaneously restructure the nation’s armed forces and do more with less.

Past experience indicates today’s recovering Army will have little chance to revive before receiving new and burdensome missions—just as Supreme Allied Commander Europe General John R. Galvin warned his fellow officers of the tendency to “invent for ourselves a comfortable vision of war” and to prepare for “a combat environment that is consistent and predictable” against “an enemy who looks like us and acts like us.”\(^6\) Such comfortable visions are often assumed to be essentially conservative, leading to the cliché that peacetime armies are always preparing to fight the last war. At its worst, this mentality includes efforts to reestablish prewar certainties and customs with spit-and-polish routines that conjure images of the post-WW I Army’s fixation with polo.

---

5 On the problems caused by the ‘pentomicization’ of the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, see After Action Report (ROCID) File, 4th Infantry Division, Box 56, Entry NC3-38-81-4, Record Group 338, National Archives, College Park, MD.

The vision, however, can sometimes cut free from the past and thrust the Army into the future. As with reactions to traditional efforts, the verdict on these radical postwar transformations is mixed—for example, both the post-Spanish-American War and the post-Korean War forces underwent radical reorganization programs, but only the first initiative was successful.

Whether reactionary or revolutionary, the real danger of falling for a comfortable vision of war is that the Army will invest its meager resources in missions that prove irrelevant to the future requirements of the United States. To avoid obsolescence, planners must have a clear-eyed, realistic appraisal of future needs and defend it from all budget-chasing bids to resolve each crisis.

Personnel Turbulence and Recovery

Beyond the lack of foreknowledge about the military environment, the most consistent and traumatic problem in the US Army’s recovery experience has been prolonged personnel turbulence. In some cases the government has matched the services’ expanded postwar strategic commitments with increased manpower billets, at least on paper, but then failed to fund them. Following the Civil War, Congress tripled the regular Army’s prewar size; after the Spanish-American War of 1898 it quadrupled. In both cases legislators soon slashed military budgets, hollowing the organization. After WW I, Congress approved a standing army of 280,000 soldiers as well as a substantial increase in reserves. But in the next decade, the number of soldiers hovered between 130,000 and 138,000 troops. When war finally broke out in Europe in 1939, there were only 188,000 active duty soldiers; after WW II, 1.6 million. Yet, neither the president nor Congress provided sufficient funding. In June 1950, soldiers totaled some 600,000, most of whom were stationed in Europe or the United States not in Japan or Korea. In the six years after the Korean War armistice, President Eisenhower and Congress cut Army personnel from 1.54 million to 862,000; six years after withdrawing from Vietnam, from 1.12 million to 775,000.

The tendency of civilian leadership to impose reductions in force in a capricious, arbitrary, and spontaneous manner compounds this problem. The human effects have often been calamitous. What appears to outsiders as small cuts in surplus personnel actually entails firing or reducing the rank of hundreds of dedicated professionals who not only experience a potentially significant loss of retirement benefits but also general demoralization as younger officers and specialists exit their service.

Facing the inevitable discrepancy between changing missions and having sufficient personnel to accomplish them, the Army’s postwar leadership has made hard decisions and set clear priorities. Even though most of their predecessors’ choices were later vindicated by the test of war, today’s strategic planners should not be blind to the risks that were accepted. After the end of the Philippine war in 1902, Secretary of War Elihu Root chose to sacrifice the Continental Army’s readiness to his educational and organizational reforms and the buildup of Pacific defenses. As a result, many stateside combat arms regiments had only a third of their officers and enlisted personnel in 1907 when Chief of
Staff Major General James Franklin Bell contrasted the current force with the long-serving, well-trained, proud force that had gone to war in 1898. Noting the shortfalls in recruiting, the skeletonized units, the inexperienced officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and the widespread demoralization, Bell, not being overly pessimistic, concluded that most officers believed “conditions are growing steadily worse.” Four years later, the First Field Army in Texas revealed the service could mobilize barely half a division. Chief of Staff Leonard Wood bluntly informed Congress that the service was unprepared to fight any comparable opponent and published an article with the chilling title of “Why We Have No Army.”

The choices Bell and Wood faced may have reflected the Root era’s conflicting priorities, but they were not atypically complex. After the WW I demobilization, Chief of Staff John J. Pershing and his successors had to resolve other no less difficult questions stemming from the 1920 National Defense Act: Should the focus be on creating a small, but efficient rapid-reaction force? Should the Army commit its troops to defend the overseas territories and the nation’s coasts from attack? Should investments be made in promising technologies such as the airplane or tank? Should combat units be skeletonized so regular Army cadres could train a large citizen-soldier reserve and officers could be educated in the responsibilities of higher command? Ultimately, the Army focused on the last mission while trying to fulfill the others to the best of its ability. In making these choices, the Army’s leaders abandoned any realistic hope of defending the Philippines or modernizing their service’s equipment. They gambled that if correctly mobilized, American industry would provide the tools and its citizens the soldiers for war. In retrospect, they deserve much credit for laying the foundations for victory, but they perhaps condemned the Army to wage an unimaginative, resource-intensive, brute-force land war against the Axis powers. An even more problematic decision, Maxwell Taylor’s pentomic experiment may have inhibited both the conventional and counterinsurgency skills needed in South Vietnam a decade later.

**The Recovering Army’s Generation Gap**

Personnel turbulence has a devastating effect on the recovering Army’s officers that inevitably leaves the postwar officer corps unbalanced with too many captains and too few colonels for peacetime needs, an excess of infantry officers and insufficient aviators, or as happened after WW II, a surplus of conventional warfare experts and virtually no one qualified in atomic weapons. Besides grade or specialty imbalances, every recovering army had to deal with internal generational divisions between prewar, wartime, and postwar officers as deep as the current tensions between Baby Boomers, Xers, and Millennials. No doubt

---


Generation Z will bring its own attitudes, strengths, and weaknesses. Optimistic planners assume each new generation will bring desperately needed technical skills, but hardheaded logisticians respond that a teenager’s skills in repairing a jalopy or operating a computer do not mean he can fix a tank or maintain a battalion communication net. As one exasperated officer explained during the height of the atomic battlefield experiment in the 1950s, “The accuracy of our weapons is so far superior to the accuracy of the persons manning them as to be ridiculous.”

The postwar “military generation gap” can be quickly summarized. The survivors from the prewar Old Army endured a long and slow peacetime promotion process with command, staff, and school assignments that prepared them for their wartime responsibilities. They tend to believe their subordinates require indoctrination in their service’s historic traditions and standards. Meanwhile, those commissioned during the most recent war feel, with some justification, that their experience provides at least equal qualifications, particularly over those Old Army-types whose “good wars” were fought back in the rear. One Philippine war veteran recalled the struggle between his cohort and the prewar “old irreconcilables” as “holding fast to old ideas of organization and training, or better, the almost total lack of both.”

In 1930, a Command and General Staff College (CGSC) student remembered those commissioned during WW I as “of the opinion that they were about as good as a great number of their superiors. Consequently, instruction for them was very hard.”

The young officers who proved successful in WW II were also confident of their abilities and suspicious of those trying to restore prewar traditions. Michael S. Davison, who graduated from West Point in 1939 and was a lieutenant colonel by the war’s end, recalled his time at CGSC in 1946: “There wasn’t much those instructors could tell us. Or, at least we didn’t think they could.” Another war-tested lieutenant colonel, commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1941, recalled his outrage when a “pompous idiot of a colonel” with “one row of ribbons”—indicating both the colonel’s prewar longevity and stateside posting—told a room full of veterans they lacked the maturity to succeed in a peacetime army.

Newcomers who bring their own assumptions and values compound the recovering Army’s generational divisions. To quote one disenchanted captain in the post-Korea Army, junior officers often translate what seniors decree as a return to their fondly held Old Army’s standards as “post beautification, all manner of special duty, post details, [and] demonstrations, all of which seem to have a higher priority than...
training.” These generational fissures have been aggravated when senior officers’ wartime experiences have not immediately produced expertise in postwar missions. One lieutenant serving in a tank battalion in the mid-1950s remembered his superiors as mediocrities: “Many had entered WW II as teenagers. A lot of them had gone to OCS. . . . They didn’t receive adequate training, or understand what it meant to be a company commander . . . for the most part, the lieutenants carried the load.”

Today’s senior officers, who often boast of the Army’s current depth of proven combat leadership, would do well to remember the captains in the 1970s who complained of commanders who “couldn’t get out of the jungles of Vietnam” when the time came to wage mechanized warfare in Europe.

Exacerbating these differences in generational attitudes, every recovering army incorporates what earlier officers termed “the hump”—a large cohort of equivalent rank and age who block the peacetime promotion ladder. The bigger the war, the larger the “hump.” A cohort of Civil War veterans dominated the Army’s upper ranks into the twentieth century, and those who were junior officers in Cuba and the Philippines still numbered among the generals of WW II. The post-WW I hump was notorious for keeping Dwight D. Eisenhower a major for 16 years. For WW II and Korea veterans of the 1950s, the time-in-grade from captain to major more than doubled within a few years. And unlike Ike, most Army officers after WW II were, and continue to be, unwilling to remain stuck in grade for over a decade. The goal of the post-Korean War era was to keep half its Reserve Officers’ Training Corps graduates, but it retained only 10 percent in fiscal year 1956. Worse, almost a quarter of US Military Academy graduates resigned within five years of commissioning. A US Army War College study confirmed what many both inside and outside the service already knew: “The retention of junior officers is the key to the solution of the most vital long-range personnel problem now facing the Army.”

Rebuilding the Enlisted Ranks

Problems resulting from officer turbulence in a recovering army are compounded by the upheaval in enlisted ranks. At the end of every war from the Philippines to Korea, observers noted a rapid decline in both the quantity and the quality of soldiers. In 1904, for example, the 70,000-man Army lost most of the 30,000 veterans who had enlisted between 1898 and 1901 for the Spanish-American and Philippine wars. The chief of staff returned from an inspection convinced that too many recruits were underage “weaklings” and that “evidently the minimums of the standards for admission to the army had been closely observed, if not

trespassed on in the enlistment of these unsatisfactory men.” Moreover, poor pay and worse living conditions convinced many to leave, stripping the Army of experienced enlisted leaders and skilled technicians. The same problems appeared after WW I. Less than two years after the Armistice, an officer reported a popular sentiment among veterans was “I am through with the Army.” To persuade soldiers to reenlist, the 1920s army repackaged itself less as a combat force than as a way for young men to achieve “education, vocation and Americanization.”

Three years after the end of WW II, the Army estimated it would have to discharge two-thirds of its enlisted strength within 18 months and that less than a fifth of these would reenlist. To make matters worse, enlistees represented the bottom of the manpower barrel. In one group of replacements sent to the occupation forces in Japan, 98 percent were in the lowest acceptable mental category.

The perception that standards have declined for incoming personnel has often extended to career enlisted personnel. Historically, the postwar noncommissioned officer cadre contained not only a large number of proven squad leaders and technicians, but also soldiers whose rapid rise through the enlisted grades was due more to vacancies in their unit than to individuals’ technical skills or leadership. By the end of war, some soldiers achieved ranks and benefits far exceeding what their qualifications would fetch in the civilian world; however, they soon discovered that the postwar Army expected far more of them than the wartime force did. Likewise, requirements kept increasing, particularly for paperwork. In the post-WW I Army, lifetime privates were often illiterate, and sergeants were expected to read at the third-grade level. In the post-WW II Army, over a third of the sergeants lacked an eighth-grade education. In 1957—four years after the end of the Korean War—41,500 NCOs (40 percent) scored in mental Category 4, designating illiteracy or cognitive impairment. By expending enormous time and resources, the US Army steadily raised both standards and opportunities for its sergeants, but the qualitative recovery of the NCO corps extended into the 1960s. A similar extended effort was required in the post-Vietnam era to restore the NCO corps.

The personnel turbulence inherent in all recovering armies often suggests a postwar force traumatized by indiscipline, demoralization, substance abuse, and a variety of other social problems that reflect what Homer noted in the Iliad: some warriors simply cannot adjust to peace. The turbulence also reflects long-standing public concern that military service corrupts America’s young men and women. The US Army may be more successful than most in helping members adjust to peacetime, but it has suffered from highly publicized instances of misconduct by a few individuals—pacification operations in the Philippines, post-World War

20 HQ, 8th Army Annual Report 1949, Box 273, Entry 1A1, Record Group 550, National Archives, College Park, MD; and A Study of Desertion [1920], Ridgway Hall, AHEC.
21 Linn, Elvis’s Army, 159–62; and John T. English, “Military Personnel Management” (lecture, Army War College, Carlisle, PA, February 27, 1957), AHEC.
and Korean War Occupation black markets, the Aberdeen Scandal—that threatened the reputation of all who served.

**Social, Training, and Maintenance Problems**

One recovering-army problem that commands a disproportionate degree of public interest is substance abuse. In the Spanish-American War, reformers managed to ban the sale of beer at post canteens; by WW I, the Army was forced to accept prohibition. The result was a dramatic and destructive increase in alcohol-fueled crime and demoralization. Recent scholarship has invalidated the old shibboleth that opiate addiction was “the army disease” among Civil War veterans and also the myth of Vietnam’s “addicted army.” In many cases, references to historic drug use in the armed forces reflected changes to public, medical, and legal standards that reclassified substances once prescribed for medical treatment as illegal. The evidence itself is ambiguous. Court martial statistics suggest minimal drug use in the post-WW I Army while anecdotal evidence indicates in some places, such as Panama, usage was relatively common. In post-WW II Japan, narcotics became a significant problem. Reports of soldier-addicts in the Korean War prompted a host of sensational media exposés and a flurry of federal commissions, which soon revealed military drug use was lower than civilian usage. In the post-Korean War period, the number of soldiers arrested for narcotics offenses was relatively small, but soldiers such as Elvis Presley used amphetamines to boost energy or to lose weight. Although statistical evidence indicates the use of illicit drugs among today’s soldiers is far less than among civilians, in 2009 military doctors issued almost four million prescriptions for pain relievers, some of which have proven to be physically or psychologically addictive.

A recovering army’s personnel turbulence plays havoc with maintenance and training. Every postwar army inherits mountains of wartime equipment, often designed for specific tactical situations or terrain, and often equally damaged by climate, combat, overuse, or negligence. The technician-soldiers capable of repairing and maintaining this specialized arsenal are likely to leave the service for civilian occupations, compelling the postwar army to recruit, train, and retain a host of new technicians as repairmen.

Between Congressional parsimony and its own uncertainty about which equipment can be used for the next war, the recovering army is always a war-surplus army. During the Spanish-American War, soldiers fought with black-powder rifles three decades old and wore blue wool uniforms possibly dating from the Civil War. A decade after

---


the end of WW I, soldiers were still wearing wartime uniforms, living in wartime barracks, using wartime equipment, and sometimes eating wartime rations. Tank crews toved their antiquated, malfunctioning war-surplus vehicles into formation for inspections. Three decades later, their successors—also lacking working engines—added a flourish by hand-cranking their tank’s gun barrels to salute the passing brass. If today’s company-grade officer must spend most of his day scrounging parts and inventorying matériel, at least he can take pride in preserving this recovering army tradition that dates back two centuries.

**Adapting to Recovery**

With history as a guide, what can the US Army, and those who study it, anticipate during its next transition from a postwar military force to a peacetime force preparing to fight the next war? The recovery period between wartime and a fully recovered peacetime force will be long-lasting, perhaps a decade. The recovery will be interrupted by recurring prewar missions and by new and unforeseen military commitments. The recovery era requires carefully selecting soldiers for the future Army. And, recovery imposes its own restrictions.

For soldiers in the recovering army, the strategic environment is always in a state of flux: former enemies often become allies and vice versa, low-level regional threats may erupt as clear and present dangers and then subside to minor annoyances, and new technologies may resolve an immediate problem while creating greater ones for the future. In contrast, the recovering army can be sure of certain constants—resources will never match requirements, tension will be inherent between field forces and the Pentagon, and readiness will often come at the cost of future capabilities.

Selecting soldiers during the recovery era is not only a question of integrating and assimilating those with experience in the wartime force but also about acquiring new talent able to adapt to future threats and environments. Moreover, the immediate postwar period may appear an ideal time to restore prewar standards, focus on readiness, inaugurate long-delayed organizational reforms, impose prewar standards, revise doctrine for recent lessons, upgrade matériel, and otherwise undo the damage of war. The implementation of Washington’s mandated organizational, doctrinal, personnel, and other reforms; however, will be delayed by new missions, hamstrung by drastically reduced budgets, sabotaged by personnel turbulence, or beset by any combination of the problems the Army encountered in past recovery efforts.

Those serving in today’s armed forces can take some satisfaction in knowing their service has a history of triumphing over adversity and emerging stronger at the end; for good reason, these postwar recovery eras have been associated in the service’s memory with hardship, austerity, and sacrifice. For the future envisioned in the Army Operation Concept, creating leaders “able to adapt and innovate for the future” may be the greatest contribution of, and greatest challenge for, today’s recovering Army.
ABSTRACT: The military profession changes by both slow evolution and sudden revolution. This article offers a typology to understand the factors that influence such changes, and then suggests how each factor might help or hinder the US Army’s ability to adapt in the near future.

Between the early nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the US Army transformed how it prepared for war. This shift grew from an equally stark change in how the officer corps conceived military professionalism. The old professionalism was built upon the belief that military competence was a product of character, common sense, and natural aptitude. Those innate qualities might be refined through experience or study but were largely beyond the ability of the institution to manufacture. Consequently, there was little effort to train officers in anything but the technical skills of engineering and gunnery.

The new professionalism, by contrast, assumed command was a communal affair built upon a body of expert knowledge that could be codified, imparted, and regulated through umpired field training, professional education, and tactical doctrine. These activities implied the Army can, indeed must, shape the manner in which officers think and act.

In war times, the change in professionalism was manifest as a shift from informal direction grounded in the personality of the commander to more formal control using impersonal staff procedures. The former was embodied by the figure of a general sitting atop a hill, aides dashing off with orders dictated by the commander; the latter was characterized by a command post filled with staff officers producing detailed written plans in accordance with standardized procedures taught at a staff college. Although undeniably more functional, the elements of personality were sacrificed in the transition. Individuals lost autonomy as they were subsumed within standardized organizational structures.

Officers commissioned in the 1890s regarded this change as a natural evolution; one officer sneeringly called the era of his immediate predecessors the Army’s “Dark Age.” From the vantage of this younger generation, the path was one of progress. Previous generations would not have agreed. They found that the notion the institution could manufacture commanders misguided and offensive.

These irreconcilable views disprove the myth of a universal military profession. There is no normative standard against which all can be 1

LTC J. P. Clark is a US Army strategist. He holds a BS from the US Military Academy and an MA and PhD from Duke University. He has served in the Republic of Korea, Iraq, the Pentagon, and as an exchange officer with the British army. He is the author of Preparing for War: The Emergence of the Modern US Army, 1815–1917, Harvard University Press, forthcoming.

judged. Instead, military professionalism can take many forms, each reflecting the prevailing ideas and values of its society and time. Because these ideas and values are so fundamental to those who hold them, a major shift in professionalism creates a significant divide within an army. Soldiers from either side of the division might be as foreign to each other as if they came from different countries. Those accustomed to the old ways regard the change as one for the worse, a betrayal of what they hold dear. Those who come up in the new tradition cannot fathom how their predecessors could have been so backward.

The first part of this article provides a conceptual framework to explain why such changes happen. The second portion applies the framework to the US Army. Using lessons from the past and observations of the present, this article explores the possibility a significant professional shift is decades in the future or whether one might already be underway.

Why Military Organizations Change

The existing scholarship of military adaptation provides several models of organizational change. In *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel Huntington examines the case of the US Army as just described. He argues a separation from society that was born of civilian neglect and geographic isolation in the late nineteenth century allowed military professionalism to flourish. His argument rests upon a flawed understanding of the beliefs of the officer corps of the time and its relationship with society. In fact, the opposite was the case; Huntington saw professionalism more as a product of the civilian influences stirring in the 1870s which later flowered in the Progressive Era than any other factor. The Army’s ties to society—not an imagined isolation—gave rise to the new military professionalism.

Among the other theories of military adaptation, one of the most influential is that of Barry Posen. He argues that the inherent conservatism of military organizations makes it necessary to have some external force—albeit often in conjunction with a maverick internal reformer—to develop new, innovative means of warfare. As an international relations neorealist, Posen contends the primary impetus for reform is a shift in the strategic environment.

Stephen Peter Rosen offers a countering theory. Noting that external actors often lack the staying power and institutional reach to impose lasting change and that military organizations are far from monolithic, he argues only a senior military leader who imparts his conceptual vision to a rising cohort of junior followers can fundamentally reorient a larger organization. Rosen also notes adaptation is not purely a product of

---


external factors, but internal competition for resources or prestige might also serve as catalysts for change.

Subsequent scholarship has provided variations and additions to the basic external-internal debate. Summarizing some of this work, Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff demonstrate cultural, political, and technological factors can also play a role in shaping institutional change. They also note some form of external shock, such as defeat in war or the emergence of a new technology, can serve as an impetus for adaptation.\(^5\)

In summary, the scholarship of military adaptation offers three broad causes for change: external direction that overcomes military conservatism, internal direction emanating from a visionary leader, or an institutional reaction to an external shock. We can refer to these theories by the simplified shorthand of politicians, generals, and events. In combination, these causes and theories do well to explain discrete instances of evolutionary change, such as a revision of doctrine or an institutional reorganization.

In the instance of the US Army described earlier, elements of each were present. As demonstrated elsewhere, the professional transformation of the twentieth century cannot be fully explained by politicians, generals, or events. Ultimately, a series of generational shifts caused by forces beyond the control of politicians or generals and arising from trends far deeper than any single event caused the change in thinking that created the new military professionalism.\(^6\) Though generational difference is an intuitive notion, generation-based theories are often unsatisfying, either imposing artificial uniformity upon diverse populations or giving unnatural significance to the moment separating one page of the calendar from the next. Noting professional generations are not monolithic avoids the first fault; indeed, disagreements define a generation as much as points of consensus.

Exemplified by the competing views of John Nagl and Gian Gentile, the debate on the efficacy of counterinsurgency illuminates the great military-strategic problem of recent years and also reveals how today’s soldiers filter the problem through personal experience, organizational memory, bureaucratic politics, and institutional aspirations and fears.\(^7\) Such complex variables cannot possibly produce a single view on this complicated issue; a theory that contends otherwise should be rejected immediately. Just as generations do today, past generations had defining debates that reflected their problems and preoccupations; thus, one means of charting the course of the institution is to plot shifting points of debate. An idea that is unthinkable to one generation becomes an eccentric notion for the next and a self-evident truth for another. Meanwhile, other ideas progress in the opposite direction, falling from the status of unquestioned assumptions to relics of the past.

While generations do not share a single understanding of their world, they do share a context of military problems and a set of resources,\(^5\) Theo G. Farrell and Terry Terriff, *The Sources of Military Change: Culture Politics, Technology* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 3–20.  
tools, ideas, and values that shape how they approach those problems. Keeping our study of generations focused upon this context and not tidy dates avoids the other fault of generations-based theories—the tendency to rely on artificial calendar-based definitions. Rather than a decade or a century, shared context gives a generation its coherence. The encompassing milieu of changes presents practitioners with a different set of ideas and tools to apply to military problems, and so a new professional generation is born. The changes in environment that power these tectonic movements of professional norms take too many forms to be reduced to a simple theory, but can be grouped into three broad categories of influences: institutions, experiences, and culture.

Institutions refer to all the mechanisms by which a military deliberately tries to shape the profession: curricula of military schools, policies governing the selection of officers, systems of promotion, and methods of organizing and giving preference to certain functional specialties over others. Experiences encompass all the elements of military service that shape perceptions but are outside the control of the institution, such as informal norms or experiences in war. Everything else—all that is not strictly military—falls into culture: the values, concepts, and outlooks inherited from civilian society. Although nonmilitary in origin, civilian norms do have military implications. Class attitudes can define officer-enlisted interactions, racial attitudes can affect the conduct of overseas operations, and ideas about the national place in the world can dictate strategy.

By virtue of mass, experiences and culture tend to be more important than institutions. The several years officers spend in professional education are overshadowed by decades in units and a lifetime of interaction with society. Nonetheless, the relative importance of these categories varies with each generation, so no fixed relation or hierarchy among them can be established. The utility of the model is descriptive rather than prescriptive. The framework of influences allows us to describe the inputs into the profession better and to discern deliberate efforts to change from those that happened in response to external forces.

The institutions-experiences-culture model has three implications for military change.\(^8\) First, efforts to shape the profession will deviate from their intended course when reformers’ efforts are channeled through institutions and interact with the influences of experiences and culture. Even reforms rigorously grounded in the logic of military effectiveness will lose coherence, diverging as they are altered by factors such as ingrained habits of thought grounded in experience or cultural notions of fairness, propriety, or prestige.

The corollary is that institutional efforts to preserve the status quo will also fail. Freezing institutional inputs in place will not halt movement in the three-sided dynamic interplay. To illustrate this, imagine if all the professional education, doctrine, and systems of training used in 1980 remained unchanged through the 2020s, thereby ensuring the

---

\(^8\) In the nineteenth-century Army, the officer corps and the military profession were synonymous. That is no longer the case. Because the generational model of change relies upon common influences, the different constituent elements of the Army Profession—active and reserve components, commissioned and noncommissioned officers, and Army civilians—must each be analyzed in accord with its distinct influences. To make comparisons with the past, this article will focus upon the active duty officer corps.
chief of staff in 2040 would undergo precisely the same professional socialization as the current chief of staff. Even controlling for differences in personality, the outcomes would certainly be different.

General Mark Milley was commissioned into the Army of the Cold War era, served in an experimental motorized division in the 1980s, deployed to Haiti as a brigade operations officer, commanded brigades in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and returned to Afghanistan as a brigadier general and later as a lieutenant general. Contrast his background with the future chief of staff, who was commissioned around 2005 and most likely had multiple deployments as a company-grade officer to Iraq, Afghanistan, or both. While he or she might have served in the same campaigns, what Milley took from the early days of Iraq as a brigade commander after 20 years of commissioned service was quite different from what his successor might have learned as a platoon leader during the Iraq troop surge.

And the future chief of staff—just promoted to major—still has many formative experiences coming in the years ahead. Furthermore, the ideas, events, technologies, and influences that have surrounded Millennials are different than those that shaped the Baby Boomers. Even if the institution attempted to instill the exact same traits, habits of mind, and approaches to solving military problems, differences in experience and culture would cause a different outcome; change comes whether we want it or not.

The third implication—and the most important—is that while the institution can neither command nor halt change, it can channel the forces of experience and culture in a beneficial direction. This was the case with the Root reforms in the early-twentieth century, which introduced a general staff corps, realistic large-scale training, and a comprehensive system of professional education to include the US Army War College. Those reforms were not sufficient in themselves to create the professional attitude embodied by young officers like George C. Marshall. The reforms did, however, harness the spirit of the age by employing methods of education, training, and doctrine that earlier generations would have resisted as too intrusive.

Without Root, Marshall would have likely had much the same attitude toward professionalism derived from Progressive Era society, but he would not have received the specific skills and knowledge that made him such an adept planner in World War I. Because of these institutions, Marshall and his peers learned how to manage field armies much larger in size than that of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in World War I, which were able to manage field armies. This proficiency would have been impossible if the foundation of professionalism had remained based on character, talent, and experience.  

---

9 General Mark A. Milley Résumé.
10 Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General 1880–1939 (New York, NY: Viking Press, 1963), 167–79. The US Army in World War I was flawed in many aspects, but its ability to command large forces from the outset of the conflict was vastly superior than demonstrated at similar stages in previous wars; and Clark, Preparing for War, 256–68.
To the Present: Three Army Generations

Beyond these generically applicable observations, the analytical prism of institutions, experiences, and culture can yield insights into the intergenerational dynamics of a specific organization. An examination of how those influences shaped and continue to shape each cohort fosters mutual understanding and self-awareness, creates opportunities to question predilections and biases, and suggests the future course of the organization. Put differently, it seeks a sense of perspective by attempting to view the present in the same fashion that future historians will someday consider.

The Superpower Generation: The Perils of Misunderstanding

With these general observations in mind, we can apply the framework of institutions, experience, and culture to the present and the future. Currently, there are three generations serving within the US Army, the oldest of which is the Superpower Generation. Made up of those officers commissioned in the mid-1980s and earlier, this group includes some senior brigadier generals and most of the major generals and higher. They entered an Army configured for the Cold War and then gained operational experience in Grenada, Panama, Desert Storm, Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans. Culturally, they are drawn from the late Baby Boomers.

No longer subject to standardized assignments, education, or training, these officers are beyond the reach of formal shaping mechanisms; in fact, they are the ones who control the institutional levers shaping the two younger generations. The commendable willingness of the Superpower Generation to make sensible accommodations to generational differences was well expressed by a foreign senior leader, Air Chief Marshal Sir Andrew Pulford of the Royal Air Force, who when asked what he thought about accommodating younger sensibilities, replied, “It is absolutely imperative that I do not build an air force for a 56-year-old man. It is [the young airmen’s] air force, not mine.”

The application of general principles, however, sometimes flounders on the emotion of specific cases. In 2013, Sergeant Major of the Army Raymond Chandler defended a strict tattoo policy, asserting it was necessary to ensure soldiers conformed to the highest standards of military appearance. A valid institutional concern for functional, psychological, and reputational reasons, what constitutes military appearance is not fixed. Indeed, even values far more central to military practice—such as courage, honor, and duty—have varied over time. The cultural connotations of tattoos have changed significantly over the last several decades. To many younger soldiers, the unpopular policy seemed to reflect outdated cultural preferences rather than genuine military need.

11 Air Chief Marshal Sir Andrew Pulford, Royal United Services Institute, September 18, 2014.
An instance of misunderstanding emerged from different generational views in 2011. The year before, an Army study on suicide prevention included a chapter titled, “The Lost Art of Leadership in Garrison.” Members of a temporary organization that was investigating related issues through interviews with soldiers of all ranks at various posts, observed that this effort resonated with senior officers. The Superpower Generation wanted to regain some of the qualities of the Army of the 1990s. Most had commanded brigades and battalions in the period, pivotal assignments presumably integral to their professional self-conception. As such, many experienced leaders believed there was self-evident worth in formulations using the prefix “re”—“restoring lost habits,” “returning to fundamentals,” and “regaining the art of garrison leadership.” The notion repelled many junior officers who had entered service after September 11, 2001. In their imaginations, the 1990s were a barren era of small-minded attention to pointless tasks. The intended audience regarded the talk of returning to that time with horror.

We can take two lessons from these cases. First, our own beliefs of contextual and universal are easily confused. We should constantly seek objective confirmation by comparing other institutions and history in order to guard against this fault. Second, generational misunderstandings are more likely when one party’s point of reference is lived experience, and the other’s is abstract. In the not-so-distant future, the lessons Iraq and Afghanistan veterans regard as self-evident will be viewed differently by a younger generation with more dispassionate views drawn from a smaller and more eclectic set of sources—a mixture of youthful impressions, history books, war stories, and pop-culture films like The Hurt Locker.

The Long War Generation: The Limits of Experience

The Long War Generation occupies the broad middle swath of the officer corps from brigadier generals to captains who were commissioned from the late 1980s to the early 2010s. Whereas in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Superpower Generation commanded at nothing lower than the brigade level or were staff directors and division chiefs in higher headquarters; the Long War Generation served at the company- and battalion-levels or as more junior staff officers. Culturally, the Long War Generation consists of Generation Xers and older Millennials.

Combat experience is generally regarded as an unqualified good. Accordingly, this second cohort would seem to ensure an unmatched Army for years to come. But generations defined by war can fare poorly when faced with new conditions. Marshall’s generation, for instance, was misled by experiences in the Philippines. There, poorly armed guerrillas preferred ambushes from hidden trenches they could abandon when pressured causing the US troops to counterattack impetuously whenever fired upon, even across seemingly suicidal stretches of open terrain. Intellectually, American officers denied that the lessons of “savage warfare” were applicable to conventional warfare, but experience was

---


15 It is possible future events may alter the lower boundary. If, for instance, a world-war-like conflict were to occur in the next few years, then the Long War Generation would shrink as all of those who survived to serve after that war would presumably be primarily influenced by that event.
not so easy to compartmentalize. The belief that boldness and discipline could overcome firepower, that the infantry did not require artillery support, and that it was better to remain in the open than shelter in morale-sapping field fortifications took hold.

While similar notions in European armies were swept away by the Great War, even the examples of the battles of Verdun and the Somme did not prompt the United States to reassess its convictions. Thus, in 1917 when the United States entered the war, the principal infantry tactics manual still maintained machine guns were nothing more than “weapons of emergency” and artillery was less important than rifle fire. Veterans of the Philippines placed greater trust in their own past than in more relevant vicarious experiences.

Unfortunately, being made prisoner of our own experiences seems impossible to avoid. Psychologists note the tendency to attach particular significance to impressions developed during particularly challenging moments of our formative years; a combat deployment as a lieutenant or captain certainly fulfills that condition. Several years ago, an observer to a US Army Training and Doctrine Command seminar examining a Korean conflict was struck by majors’ and captains’ fixation with IEDs even though the enemy had far more dangerous weapons. The participants had recently returned from deployment, a detriment in this case. Having all likely seen, and perhaps personally suffered, the effect of IEDs, the officers found it difficult to put that danger into perspective with abstract threats. Deliberate effort not to fall into the same trap as the Philippine war veterans will be required as we collectively attempt to balance threats we have directly experienced with exotic new capabilities like cyberwarfare, electronic warfare, and enemy unmanned aerial surveillance as well as older but still unfamiliar dangers such as enemy air, armor, and massed artillery.

One method of overcoming individual bias towards personal experience is to have a broad range of perspectives within the institution. As secretary of war in the 1850s, Jefferson Davis attempted to broaden the education and training of officers to prepare them to lead large bodies of volunteers. Davis correctly anticipated the manner in which Civil War armies would be raised; however, that prescience was rooted in his own past. During the Mexican-American War, he had commanded a regiment of volunteers, an experience shared by just a few dozen other West Pointers. Consequently, Davis met stiff resistance from those who lacked his perspective and saw no need to alter a hitherto satisfactory system.

Although Cassandras—as the etymology of the term suggests—have faced similar problems for as long as human memory extends, they will be of no comfort to soldiers who suffer because accurate warnings were ignored. Of course, which predictions will come to pass is never clear in the moment. Moreover, with national security at stake chasing every fad would be unwise. Nonetheless, there is a fine line between prudent

---

18 Author’s conversation with RAND analyst, spring 2013.
19 Clark, Preparing for War, 58–63.
conservatism and reactionary obtuseness. The former is best achieved through openness to other views, a willingness to question assumptions, and rigorous study of the past to place the present into proper context. The example of Emory Upton, an outstanding regimental and brigade commander during the Civil War, illustrates the importance of the latter.

Unlike many veterans who assumed the Union victory validated the rudimentary system of training that had produced them, Upton was far more critical of the regulars’ performance during the war. His analysis led him to advocate many of the changes later instituted by Root. Yet, even Upton had conceptual biases and blind spots stemming from his past. In a war generation, even iconoclasts are likely to have a recent war as their starting point. Thus, war generations need to look outside their own time or the recent conflict will become an intellectual tether limiting how far they can stray in any direction.

So while the Long War Generation should certainly make use of hard-won knowledge, they should also remain humble and conscious of the limits of experience. In a February 2014 *Washington Post* opinion piece, former Army Captain Adrian Bonenberger proposed culling the senior ranks so outstanding captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels could be promoted directly to brigadier general. As a precedent for the idea in the early twentieth century, President Theodore Roosevelt and Secretary of War Elihu Root made similar promotions to circumvent the seniority system that governed promotions up to the rank of colonel. But, Roosevelt and Root selected officers for potential rather than actual combat performance; some of their selections had seen little or no combat. In contrast, Bonenberger emphasized the superiority of experience. Generals “trained to fight World War III against the Soviets,” he argued, are of less utility than junior officers who have “fought against al-Qaeda, Sunni militias, and the Taliban.”

So long as those and similar groups remain our only enemies Bonenberger might be correct, but the generals Upton thought so poorly prepared for command had also once been proven veterans. In the antebellum US Army, their experience was sufficient for frontier campaigns and small-scale conventional campaigns, such as Mexico, but when conditions changed, these officers were left rudderless. Upton’s disgust with their failures led to his advocacy of professional institutions that would allow the Army to operate competently even when faced with situations outside the personal experience of its leaders—an institutional trait that is even more important for a global power in a rapidly changing world. This desire to transcend experience animated the Root reforms and is reflected in our current professional institutions.

*The Nascent Generation: A Work in Progress*

The final generation will eventually produce the colonels and generals of the 2030s and 2040s. At present, they are lieutenants, cadets, or

---

20 Ibid., 93–128.
21 Ibid., 202, 242–43.
students. The ultimate character of this Nascent Generation is not yet defined, but we can look to the past for hints as to how institutions, experiences, and cultures might shape it.

If there is no large war in the next several decades, the course might be like the one of those commissioned between the Civil War and approximately 1890. This cohort was dispersed in small posts across the continent and engaged in many different missions: reconstructing the South, warring in the western frontier wars, intervening in the midwestern and eastern states, guarding the borders and coasts, and preparing for another great war. The Nascent Generation might be shaped by an equally diverse range of experiences—disaster relief, security force assistance, train-and-advise efforts, and combat in small contingency operations.

As illustrated by the case of Jefferson Davis, diverse experiences will only be useful if they are recognized, encouraged, and can be accessed when needed, which was generally not the case in the nineteenth-century Army. The unavoidable divisions caused by far-flung and diverse missions were made worse by branch and unit tribalism. Subcommunities came to regard their functions as superior to others with whom they only grudgingly cooperated.\textsuperscript{24} If the Nascent Generation is to avoid this fate, institutional influences must counter the tendency for individuals and organizations to define the Army in accordance with their own narrow preferences and experiences. Doctrine, education, training, and personnel policies should emphasize the multifaceted nature of the Army and its many roles. Of course, limited resources and institutional coherence demand some degree of prioritization and preference. But to the extent just one function, mission, type of assignment, or set of skills is emphasized, the Army will quickly become a caricature of the privileged element.

The influence of culture is even more difficult to predict. If the general trend is continuity, then in that respect the Nascent Generation might also resemble the post-Civil War cohort; cultural continuity favors professional continuity. Even the most committed reformers of the late nineteenth century did not desire a fundamental break with the past. They wanted to improve, rather than overthrow, the familiar individualistic professionalism.\textsuperscript{25} In the absence of a major cultural shift, the Nascent Generation would likely modify the profession to suit its tastes and ultimately remain content to operate within the same paradigm as the Superpower and Long War Generations.

If there were a cultural upheaval, the Nascent Generation might be more like the generation of Marshall, which was the product of the transition from the individualistic Gilded Age to the systems-oriented Progressive Era. The most zealous members of that group—like their reforming civilian contemporaries—desired a sharp break with what

\textsuperscript{24} For instance, see Clark, \textit{Preparing for War}, 140–52, 178–79, 201–6.

\textsuperscript{25} One such reformer was Arthur L. Wagner, a pioneer in the development of several tools of professional indoctrination: education, after-action reviews in field training, and tactics manuals. Yet, when given the opportunity to put his ideas into tactical doctrine, he demurred, arguing it was more important for commanders to be allowed to fight in whatever fashion they wished. Ibid., 217–18.
they saw as a benighted past. We might already be witnessing early indications of a reordering of society just as great as that of the Progressive Era: extraordinary turmoil within and among the political parties, dislocation of entire sectors of the economy, and dissatisfaction with social structures manifested in movements like Occupy and Black Lives Matter. These simultaneous pressures on political, economic, and social systems could be made even more potent by technology that allows groups to organize and act in ways previously impossible.

Decades from now, the Millennials—or whatever future historians choose to call them—might be regarded as a revolutionary generation. If so, the ideas they will bring into the military would inevitably have a revolutionary impact upon the profession. Unfortunately, the nature of cultural paradigms—tied up in deeply held beliefs—makes it exceptionally difficult for those on the wrong side of history to imagine what the new way of thinking might be. Just a few decades ago, the prospect of African-Americans or women commanding white men would have been dismissed as unthinkable.

While the 1960s cultural upheaval radically altered who served, the how still reflects the Progressive Era notion that a profession is a body of expertise to be codified, imparted, and regulated by a central institution. Trends may soon alter that view of expertise and, by extension, professionalism. Google has already eroded the value of simply knowing facts. Professions are distinguished by the application of judgment, which has long seemed safe from automation; however, recent experiments in using machine learning and artificial intelligence for legal research and medical care have brought the prospect of disruptive change to even the two quintessential professions. In medicine, just a partial automation of diagnosis, surgery, and patient monitoring could render obsolete the present distinctions between doctors, nurses, and technicians. That shift, in turn, would have enormous implications for the professional apparatus of associations, journals, accrediting boards, and schools grounded in the current boundaries of expertise. A revolution of that sort in just one field might not have much effect on other trades, but how might public perceptions of institutional authority change if multiple fields undergo similar transitions? In that case, an entire generation might develop a common expectation of the need for change and reform in all fields.

Such a generalized distrust of the status quo among those entering military service would have obvious implications for trust within the organization. Yet in our system, the opinions of those who oversee the military are also important, as demonstrated by recent efforts to reduce commanders’ authority over military justice due to perceptions of incompetence in the handling of sexual assault. Such interventions would increase if we enter an age of reform similar to the


early twentieth century. The appearance of incompetence or inefficiency could lead to efforts to reduce military authority in other areas, such as human resources, procurement and contract management, installation management, media operations, and information technology that are outside of the core business of applying violence on behalf of the state.

A 2013 study, *Building Better Generals*, coauthored by Lieutenant General (Ret.) Dave Barno, implicitly acknowledged there are already weaknesses in the management of such functions. To correct these faults, the study recommended senior leaders slated for institutional positions receive relevant education, such as a civilian master of business administration and be given one or two preparatory assignments within that field. These suggestions were, in part, inspired by Barno’s own experience of being placed in charge of the Installation Management Command after a career in operational command and staff appointments. “I was a complete neophyte,” Barno admitted.

The professional preference is to retain as much control as possible on the premise that military requirements are so unique only someone with a career of uniformed experience can make proper judgments about how to integrate generalist functions into military institutions. Future political appointees and legislators might not be convinced by this argument and opt for the simpler solution of employing civilian experts to manage these functions. Indeed, the Department of Defense (DoD) recently announced it would seek legislation to allow lateral entry, a variation granting civilian specialists commissions in the middle ranks. The proposal seeks to create a realistic path into military service for those with advanced technological skills. For instance, someone from Google or Facebook might become a colonel overseeing cyberwarfare or information operations.

At present, even the most ambitious plans for lateral entry are confined to functional or technical specialties. All credible plans for personnel reform observe the divide between those specialties and the defining military function of command and operations. Yet in a world of complex whole-of-government problems that distinction might be difficult to maintain. For instance, if the success of a stabilization operation is predominantly a matter of re-establishing governmental and economic activity while security operations are only a supporting effort, then future policymakers might decide to make a development specialist the overall commander of an interagency task force. Ironically, this alignment of the most relevant expertise with the staff resources to support decision-making would be consistent with the military principle of unity of command. Similarly, in a gray-zone conflict—in which the main forms of maneuver allowed to Western forces are political, informational, and digital—policymakers might place greater trust in

---

28 David Barno, Nora Bensahel, Katherine Kidder, and Kelly Sayler, *Building Better Generals* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security [CNAS], 2013). It is worth noting the CNAS report made note of corporate best practices in executive management, an example of the way in which the outlooks and methods of contemporary civilian society influence the manner that military professionals approach their specific problems.


the skills of diplomats, politicians, or technology gurus like Jared Cohen, the head of Google Ideas, whose strategic analysis of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant has drawn much attention.  

There are sound reasons to restrict command over lethal operations to long-serving military professionals; however, the decision to depart from this principle will be made by civilians rather than military personnel. And, if outsiders like Cohen seem better equipped to solve problems—an outcome that is more likely if the Long War Generation succumbs to hubris—then presidents and legislators can issue the necessary directives and legislation. Such was the case in the nineteenth century when presidents often appointed political generals to shore up political support for unpopular wars in some cases. The reason such appointments were possible at all was due to the common belief that career officers were no more fit for high command than talented civilians, a perception somewhat justified by the Army’s rudimentary system of training and education.  

The military should not be lulled into complacency by the current high levels of public trust. Civilian disdain for professional soldiers has been the historical American norm and could reappear if the institutions providing professional credibility remain stagnant. Such a turn is even more likely in a society with quite different views of expertise than those of the twentieth century and in which the archetypical hero is the 20-something Silicon Valley entrepreneur.

**Living with Generations**

These musings are not meant as hard predictions, but as illustrative examples of how societal developments might reverberate within the military. These changes are not likely to pass, but we can be certain that there will be a major cultural change at some point. When this change occurs, the Army will have to manage tension within its ranks and between the institution and society.

Such tensions were evident during World War I, when the rise of Marshall and his contemporaries caused what historian Edward Coffman has termed a “generation gap” within the American Expeditionary Forces. Commanding generals from an older generation that venerated the individual skill of the commander clashed with their chiefs of staff, who had been studying the German staff-centric system in the professional schools that the older officers had largely ignored. When the generational clash came in the midst of a larger conflict, the junior officers fared surprisingly well due to the support of the overall commander, John J. Pershing.

Decades earlier, Pershing had the benefit of what today would be termed a “broadening experience” when he was sent to observe the Japanese army during its war against Russia. Pershing admired the Japanese general staff system, which was similar to the one desired by the Army.

---

the younger officers of the AEF. Pershing also had personal reason to believe the preferences of senior officers should sometimes be ignored. In 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt, who was convinced that many of the Civil War veterans who still held prominent senior positions had little to offer, promoted Pershing from captain to brigadier general. That decision led to unrest within an officer corps that was steadfastly committed to promotion by seniority. Roosevelt, however, cared little for the opinions of traditionalist officers whom he dismissed as “mutton heads”.

Neither was that a singular instance of disrupting the preferred military order. During the overlapping tenures of Root and Roosevelt, three other future chiefs of staff, in addition to Pershing, were promoted from junior ranks to brigadier general. One of these, Frederick Funston—who but for his premature death in 1917 might have commanded the American Expeditionary Forces instead of Pershing—had only three years of experience as a volunteer officer in the Philippines before he was commissioned a brigadier general in the regular Army in 1901. Thus, civilian preferences born of societal change overcame military resistance and radically altered the trajectory of the Army. Inevitably this will happen again at some point. The only question is when and in what form.

Observations and Recommendations

Acknowledging the nature and intractability of generational differences. When faced with the possibility of generational strife, the natural inclination is to attempt to integrate or synthesize the different viewpoints. The nature of the problem, however, suggests that this is unlikely to succeed. Generational conflict occurs when an organization contains groups that have undergone significantly dissimilar formative experiences and so consequently operate in accord with different sets of core beliefs. Compromise might be reached upon ancillary matters but not on the kind of fundamental issues that define generations.

With the national predisposition to regard history as the inevitable progression toward a better condition, the intractability of generational difference might lead one to conclude that the best course would be to bring on the new and get rid of the old as soon as possible as suggested by Bonenberger. Yet new is not necessarily better. Generational characteristics are derived from their context; there is no iron law of history dictating that cultural change must enhance military effectiveness. Even experiences formed in war might be counterproductive, as was the case when lessons from the Philippines were carried into World

---

34 Donald Smythe, *Guerilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing* (New York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1973), 125–30; and Clark, *Preparing for War*, 244–45. For one example of resentment over Pershing’s promotion from an officer with impeccable credentials as a committed professional, see Matthew F. Steele to William Richardson, April 20, 1912, Box 2, Steele Papers, US Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.


36 The three chiefs of staff were J. Franklin Bell (promoted from captain), Leonard Wood (promoted from captain within the Medical Department), and Tasker H. Bliss (promoted from major within the Commissary Department). William G. Bell, *Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staff, 1775–1991: Portraits & Biographical Sketches of the United States Army’s Senior Officer* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1992), 102, 104, 110; and Francis B. Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army: Volume 1* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1903), 441.
Adapting to Strategic Change

Assuming that either the older or the younger generation has an inherently superior vantage would be a mistake: both groups are simply products of their environment.

**Use training and education to complement experience.** Training and education are the most direct means of shaping the profession, but they are not all powerful. Combat training centers and schools exist alongside and interact with personal experience, a reality that the Army must take into account. Just as the officer corps of 1910 demonstrated their smug imperviousness to the reality of World War I, so too future generations might also acquire a shell of misplaced certainty derived from a narrow set of experiences. If training and education are to impart a broader perspective, schools and training centers must first crack that shell of certainty by challenging individuals to reassess strongly held beliefs. The necessary precursor to this practice is an organizational effort to do the same. Tactics, techniques, and procedures should be reexamined with the aim of understanding underlying objectives in order to determine under what circumstances they would no longer be desirable.

**Guard against identical backgrounds.** If there is no significant campaign in the coming years, then the Army will return to the condition in which most pivotal professional experiences occur within the environment of daily routine and training. If so, the structure of training and personnel systems might cause a situation in which professional diversity comes more through operational deployments than training. For instance, one might imagine that the experience of planning and executing a deliberate attack as an S-3 at the National Training Center (NTC) would become a professional touchstone since the insights gained there influence an officer’s thinking throughout the remainder of his or her career. Indeed, creating such moments is precisely the function of the training center, and there is much merit in that purpose.

But what if a significant majority of brigade commanders all share that same touchstone moment, or more accurately, a similar set of 10, 20, or 30 pivotal moments accumulated over the course of a career? At the individual level, all of those moments are valid and useful. Yet at the institutional level, it is dangerous for a large number of key leaders to draw upon a pool of similar challenges framed in similar ways. Key and developmental assignments should be reviewed with the aim of determining what are truly vital shared experiences and where there might be opportunities for diversification. A fine balance is to be struck; undoubt-edly, those entrusted with the lives of soldiers must possess a core of essential knowledge, but the Army should not too narrowly define that core. The Army that stakes its future upon a narrow set of skills and attributes risks disaster when the character of warfare renders that core less relevant, or even obsolete.

**Encourage diverse experiences.** Personnel policies, another important tool of institutional control, foster adaptation by making use of the broad base of experience already resident within the institution. With the benefit of hindsight, a combination of personality and formative experience clearly led Jefferson Davis to anticipate the mixing of professionals and citizen-soldiers in the Civil War and likewise influenced Emory Upton to apply professional education to command before others saw the possibility. In an organization as large as the US military,
there are undoubtedly individuals who by similar quirks of background possess an equally good sense of future trends. Ideally, in addition to tolerating such individuals during the Cassandra stage, the personnel system should encourage professional soldiers to pursue developmental opportunities that foster alternative thinking.

Of course, the Army already encourages broadening assignments. Yet this is an excellent illustration of the early observation that institutional efforts to shape the force are often diverted from their intended course by other influences. In this instance, even the institutional inputs work at cross-purposes. An evaluation system that often punishes those who step outside of the large rating pools of typical Army assignments to venture into the joint, interagency, and multinational arena with unwavering mathematical severity, discourages the broadening encouraged by other elements of the personnel system. This observation is not meant to advocate for overturning the present evaluation system as the personnel system must meet many different aims and optimizing it solely to encourage broadening experiences would be naive and unwise. Nonetheless, it should be acknowledged that the Army is sending mixed messages with its institutional influences.

In order to achieve the desired effect, institutional efforts must also account for the influence of experience. Just as field grade officers who experienced the reduction in force during the early 1990s frequently counseled younger officers to pursue conservative career paths, members of the Long War Generation who have experienced the perhaps even more traumatic separation boards and unusually low promotion rates of recent years will almost certainly urge caution when mentoring the Nascent Generation. Thus, both institutions and experience are likely to cause less rather than more professional diversity in the years ahead.

Communicate assumptions. Whatever the issue at stake in any generational conflict, senior leaders should articulate the assumptions that frame their views while seeking to understand the foundation of the younger generation’s perspective. Identifying the competing core principles would, at the very least, allow the discussion to move beyond the superficial cause and get to the fundamental issues at the heart of any conflict. For instance, intergenerational conflict in the American Expeditionary Forces was only secondarily over the proper role of the chief of staff—the underlying cause concerned the nature of military expertise. There is little likelihood that the two generations would have ever agreed on the subject; both were entirely committed to their respective views of professionalism, which were each rooted in decades of personal experience. Yet, the inevitable strife might have been lessened with mutual understanding of the core issue.

As mentioned in the discussion of the Nascent Generation, similar questions about the nature of professional expertise and command might reawaken after lying dormant for a century. Likewise, several other conceivable sources of differences, such as delineating roles between humans and machines in warfare, deriving lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan, or compensating soldiers for military service, might separate generations in the years and decades ahead. Moreover, issues current professionals cannot even imagine as points of dissension will become disputes.
Practice prudence and humility. Prudence and humility are ultimately the greatest keys to adaptation. These virtues suggest a moderate, cautious approach that counsels against trusting too much in individual experience, assuming that personal values and understanding are universal, overestimating the Army’s ability to command change according to its wishes, or resisting all change until it is imposed. The Army should be a slow adapter. Chasing transitory fads in the civilian sphere is not necessary as being too eager to change creates needless turbulence and undervalues the considerable store of wisdom built into the present military organization and practice. Lagging a step behind allows military leaders to carefully assess civilian interventions, but once an expectation or way of thinking has become pervasive across society, the course is clear. The choice is between deliberate acquiescence and uncompromising, ultimately futile, resistance that cedes influence over the future force.
Abstract: Force reductions resulting from the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review significantly compromise the US Army’s ability to maintain the global commitments and positioning necessary for managing strategic risks arising from multiple, unforeseen sources. In this article, the authors discuss how active duty Army capacity affects America’s strategic risk.

During the upcoming decade, the United States will be challenged by a new strategic threat or worse, multiple strategic threats. How will the US Army respond if sequestration cuts continue? The near-future Army—for better or worse—will originate in this decade. The size and readiness of the near-future Army will offer one of two options, either reducing America’s strategic risk or increasing it. So what would be the right size of the Army if we want to reduce America’s strategic risk?

The results of 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) led to reducing the size of the Army to levels unseen since before World War II. Unfortunately, the current force reduction can only produce one result, the weakening of the joint force’s ability to deter conflict, which accordingly increases America’s strategic risk.

Since the publication of the 2014 QDR, numerous new threats have emerged to challenge the Army’s reductions. Daesh captured large parts of Iraq and Syria. The Syrian Civil War escalated, causing a Middle East and European refugee crisis. Russia annexed Crimea, invaded Ukraine, and intervened alongside the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps to maintain the Assad regime in Syria. North Korea remained bellicose, testing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. China continued its territorial expansion in the South China Sea, and the Taliban continued to intensify offensive operations in Afghanistan. All of these events occurred in just the last several years; what might the next few years bring?

While acknowledging the indispensable roles of both the Army Reserve and Army National Guard as strategic reserves, their roles, missions, and sizing are beyond the scope and length of this article, which focuses on the size of the active duty Army. This discussion considers what the Army “brings to the fight” in relation to forward presence and deployable capabilities, the current and future demand on land forces, and examines two options for rightsizing the Army to reduce strategic risk. To set the stage for Army force sizing, we discuss the definition of strategic risk and five troubling assumptions about future war.
Strategic Risk

How does strategic risk relate to the size of the current and future US Army? Strategic risk is the probability of failure to achieve a strategic objective at an acceptable cost. The smaller the army, the higher the risk of failure to obtain a strategic objective at an acceptable cost. Senior US Army leaders view today’s Army at “high risk” in regards to the emerging threats and potential for future great-power conflict. High risk is the rating in which the Army would not be able to accomplish all its assigned tasks in the allotted time and level of casualties.

Five Faulty Assumptions

While assessments of strategic risk, acceptable cost, and the size of the Army are complex, several false assumptions about future war and landpower have gained currency in defense circles. These assumptions increase national strategic risk by failing to appreciate Army capacity—capability with sufficient scale and endurance—as an essential element of national security. The risk is troubling because it threatens to consign the US military to a repetition of the mistakes of recent wars and the development of joint forces ill-prepared for future threats.

Forward-positioned land forces do not prevent conflict.

Deterrence depends on the demonstrated ability to prevent the enemy from accomplishing its objectives, and deterrence theory states deterring aggression is most likely to succeed when the potential aggressor believes the threats will be enacted. Joint forces must operate with sufficient numbers and logistics to win, otherwise adversaries may become bolder and the effectiveness of forward deployed US Army forces to deter conflict, even with limited objectives, fails. The forward positioning of Army forces elevates the cost to an unacceptable level for the aggressor.

In 1990, some 213,000 soldiers assigned to US Army Europe contributed greatly to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) deterrence efforts and lowering strategic risk. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, Army forces were reduced in Europe. In 2002, US Army Europe still offered a large, potent deterrent force that consisted of a corps headquarters, two heavy divisions, six combat brigades, and their supporting forces totaling about 70,000 troops. Since 2008, US Army Europe has been cut to one Stryker brigade combat team and one light infantry brigade totaling 28,000 troops.

4 At the time, US Army Europe divisions included the 1st Armored Division, 3rd Brigade 2nd Armored Division, and the 3rd Armored Division, as well as the 1st, 3rd, and 8th Infantry Divisions (Mech), and the 2nd and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiments. See Vincent H. Demma, “Force Structure,” chap. 7 in Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1989 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 1988), 64.
5 Timothy M. Bonds, Michael Johnson, and Paul S. Steinberg, Limiting Regret, Building the Army We Will Need (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 9.
substantial reduction in US Army posture in Europe has resulted in increased strategic risk with regard to the ability of the United States and its allies to deter and to help US allies resist Russian aggression.

If deterring threats from offshore or across extended distance fails, retaliation or reaction can be insufficient because adversaries achieve rapid, low-cost objectives prior to US or allied response. Deterrence in Europe during the Cold War depended, in large measure, on the effects of a globally responsive and forward positioned joint force that included land forces capable of operating in sufficient size. Today the Army grapples with how to return to Europe to counter the latest Russian efforts in the Ukraine and to protect the Baltic nations.

The Army can rapidly generate required ground forces.

Generating ground forces for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) from 2001 to 2010 proved to be an extraordinarily difficult, long, and costly endeavor. Different from the Army of the 1940s to 1960s, the all-volunteer Army of today and tomorrow requires personnel operating sophisticated modern weapons and communications equipment in complex missions, which in turn requires substantial and extended training, focused education, and established unit cohesion that takes years to build and to refine. One such example of this lesson drawn from OEF and OIF is that building an armor brigade combat team required a minimum of 32 months.

Force structure decisions made in fiscally constrained environments today may be impossible to augment in a timely manner if they are based on flawed strategic assumptions. Decision-makers must maintain enough military power to handle all contingencies, even those involving major ground forces.

Future conflicts will not require significant landpower.

Many defense professionals significantly underestimated the ground force requirement for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq after September 11, 2001. Historically, landpower has been required to resolve a wide range of crises. Nothing indicates the pattern will change in this decade or the next. All major US operations—World War I, World War II, the Korean War, Vietnam, and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in Iraq—demonstrated significant ground forces are required not only to conduct major combat operations but also to consolidate gains and to sustain favorable outcomes. A total Army force of 297,000 personnel was deployed to Southwest Asia during Desert Storm. The main attacking force, VII Corps, included the 1st Armored Division, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, 3rd Armored Division, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), 2nd Armored Division (Forward), 1st Cavalry Division (Detached), 2nd Cavalry Regiment, 11th Aviation Brigade, and four brigades of the VII Corps Artillery. If the drawdown continues, the loss of capability to produce another contingency response on this
level will increase strategic risk. Significant land forces will be required to win or engage in great power conflicts.

*Enemy forces can be defeated through precision strikes or raids.*

Human will and political aspects of war require landpower to achieve victory and sustainable outcomes. The enemy’s will to fight is ultimately broken on the ground. Many thought that the March–August 2011 air campaign against Libya, for example, would yield far better political results than the chaotic situation in that country today. The campaign applied airpower to support indigenous forces, as in Afghanistan, while accepting continued turmoil in the country and the proliferation of weapons in the region as acceptable risks or outcomes too difficult or expensive to prevent with our own ground commitment.

*Allies and partners can provide capable land forces.*

Although advising and assisting other armies will continue to be an important mission, partners often lack the will or the capability to fight consistently for US interests; for example, in Afghanistan from 2004 to 2009, our allies planned troop reductions even as the Taliban gained control of territory and populations. Another significant factor is the landpower reductions of our longtime European allies. The French army has been reduced to less than 135,000 soldiers and the British army is even smaller; therefore, reliance on traditional allies to augment US landpower or advance American interests appears to be rapidly disappearing.

In future conflicts, strategic objectives may be of lesser value to coalition partners and indigenous allies than they are to the United States. Consequently, other nations may be less willing to contribute the land forces that future missions require; ergo US leadership may have to demonstrate commitment through the deployment of land forces to move others to action, which was clearly the case in Desert Storm and Desert Shield. Our ability to help others in a region solve their own problems will often be contingent on our ability and willingness to deploy landpower. Though ground commitments are often costly, an early deployment of sizeable, professional, American land forces can control a situation before it spirals out of control as well as preserve our interests and allow others to take over long-term constabulary roles. The key question for American decision-makers is how much chaos are they willing to accept in the world, and where. If stability in a tumultuous region is deemed vital to our national interest, it will not be achieved with long-range strikes.

**The 490,000 Army**

An Army of 490,000 troops is a powerful force that is partly committed, partly deployable, and partly a generating force. The following section discusses what this force can and cannot do for current and future missions based on capacity, capabilities, and strategic risk.

*Forward Deployed—186,000 Soldiers*

The Army currently has 186,000 soldiers (38 percent of the total force) meeting global commitments and reducing strategic risk in more
than 140 countries. In the European Theater of Operations, a rotational force of over 2,800 soldiers will augment approximately 30,000 soldiers in the mission of reducing strategic risk through forward presence and deterrence by 2017. These forces assure allies of our continued NATO commitment and counter Russian operations that include the use of conventional and unconventional military capabilities to assert power and accomplish objectives below the normal threshold of war. In Asia, 80,000 soldiers support US Pacific Command, including 16,412 soldiers on the Korean peninsula who are critical to deterring North Korea—a dangerous and unpredictable nation that is expanding its nuclear arsenal and improving its ballistic missile force to complement a large conventional force.

In addition to deterrence, soldiers deployed throughout the world lower strategic risk with other missions such as building relationships based on common interests, ensuring interoperability, and developing an enhanced understanding of the environment. These activities not only reduce threats of transnational terrorism and organized crime but also instill and reinforce leadership and civil-military relations norms with our partners.

Since armies are the dominant service in most allied and partner nations, combatant commanders—field commanders responsible to the president and secretary of defense for achieving national security objectives—look to the US Army to execute security force assistance and theater security cooperation activities. In fiscal year 2013 alone, the Army conducted nearly 6,000 security cooperation events. US presence conveys a guarantee to support our allies if they are threatened and significantly diminishes concerns about regional security competition and armed conflict.

Forward-positioned and rotational Army forces not only demonstrate US resolve, they also provide unique land force capabilities to the joint force. As the executive agent for 42 other Department of Defense components, the Army supplies critical communications, intelligence, rotary wing aviation, theater missile defense, logistics, and engineering capabilities and support equal to all the other assigned component agents combined. The secretary of defense and combatant commanders rely on these irreplaceable Army capabilities; for example, highly deployable Patriot missile units that assure allies, deter adversaries, and represent a key component of regional defense plans. In 2016, over 50 percent of the Army’s air and missile defense force was either forward assigned or

---

11 Ibid.
deployed. This high percentage demonstrates the growing demand for these and other Army capabilities.

The 186,000 forces that are committed are proving the difficulty of disengaging forces once soldiers are committed to a national security mission. At the height of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, Army forces remained committed in Europe, Korea, the Balkans, the Sinai Peninsula, Japan, and the Philippines, as well as Central, North, and South America. The size of the Army, therefore, must not only allow our nation to sustain committed forces but also expand for unexpected operations.

**Deployable—148,000 Soldiers**

Combatant commanders require land forces prepared to respond globally; the Army currently has a deployable force of 148,000 soldiers (30 percent of the total force) that plays this pivotal role in joint force operations. Although long-range strike and offshore capabilities will remain important to joint force deterrence, deployable land forces will be critical to joint force planning and operations if deterrence fails. The demands on rotational forces affect the active Army because, in essence, three rotational land forces must be maintained in sufficient scale and capability to meet current and future commitments, to operate for the duration of war plans, to respond to unfolding contingency missions, and to allow units to refit at a home station.

**Generating Force—156,000 Soldiers**

Trainers, educators, and students primarily compose the generating force of 156,000 soldiers (32 percent of the total force) whose capacity ensures the readiness of Army forces to sustain commitments overseas as well as expand forces to win in combat, respond to crises, and fulfill combatant command commitments. One of the most important roles for the 93,000 person training force, training and leader development, provides the foundation for today’s all-volunteer professional Army and maintains the Army’s competitive advantage over future enemies. Members of other services, our allies, and international military partners are trained and educated with the remaining 63,000 soldiers in the generating force; for example, all US Marine Corps tankers and field artillerymen complete Army training.

Because the size of the generating force, as well as the entire active duty Army, has a critical effect on the Army’s ability to mobilize and expand in wartime, reductions in the generating force directly impact intervention and expansion capacity risks. These factors in turn impact

---

15 The US Army currently rotates soldiers on a 1:2 deployment ratio, which equates to a nine-month deployment followed by 18 months at a home station. This ratio requires a rotational force of 120,000 troops to keep 40,000 troops deployed in the field—40,000 conducting operations, 40,000 returning from operations, and 40,000 preparing to conduct operations. Decisions on Army capacity, therefore, must consider what it takes to sustain these commitments and readiness over time.
16 Evans, “Getting It Right,” 16.
the joint force’s ability to deter conflict, lower strategic risk, and fight and win against increasingly capable enemies when required.

**Increasing Demand, Historical and Future**

In predicting the Army’s future size, planners have never correctly forecast the character or scale of anticipated conflicts nor the demands of other missions. Across the last three decades, US leaders committed land forces to at least 50 named operations, many with little or no notice, which included a wide range of missions:

- Response to natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina (2005), the Haiti earthquake (2010), and Superstorm Sandy (2012)
- Restoration of the territorial integrity of an occupied nation (Operation Desert Storm 1991)

Additionally, between September 2001 and December 2012, the Army provided 1.65 million cumulative troop-years to overseas operations in support of OEF and OIF, more than the other services combined. Those conflicts, which were not large by historical standards, stressed the Army’s ability to meet commitments and demonstrated that landpower requires forces for both quick response and long-lasting operations. With this requirement in mind and the plan to cut personnel to 450,000 soldiers, the joint force will be unable to surge forces to fight another Operation Desert Shield or conduct operations on the scale of Operation Desert Storm without accepting significant risk in other theaters.

Since World War II, history reveals the need to retain not only the ability to intervene with land forces at the outset of a conflict but to also expand forces to sustain efforts. Both capabilities are critical to retaining the initiative over determined enemies and during the consolidation period that follows. Post-World War II reductions saw the Army go from eight million soldiers and 89 divisions in 1945 to 591,000 soldiers and 10 divisions by 1950—a 93 percent reduction in manpower over five years. This drastic reduction was based on the pre-Korean War theory that the offset capability of atomic weapons would prevent a large-scale land conflict. Yet, after North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in June 1950, the 8th Army in Korea grew by over 300,000 personnel. Many US units were unprepared for the demands of combat and casualties were high. The situation grew so grim at one point that it was not clear if South Korea could keep its toehold on the peninsula.

Despite this record, the United States continued to undervalue the need for ready land forces in interwar years. Since the Korean War, the
complexity of weapon systems and combined arms operations have hindered the rapid generation of forces and increased the risk to soldiers who were required to fight without proper training or skilled leaders. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 demonstrates how quickly a major problem cannot be solved by anything other than a significant ground force. Moreover, an overview of the VII Corps Desert Storm battle plan illustrates the complexity of weapons, combined arms, and leadership used during the conflict.

The ground campaign plan envisioned a main attack against the Iraqi Army’s right flank by armor-heavy forces to attack one of Saddam Hussein’s centers of gravity—the Republican Guard armored and mechanized divisions. Crucial factors in the success of the ground campaign were overwhelming combat power, rapid maneuver, deception, a sound combined arms approach, a well-trained, highly motivated body of troops, and a skilled team of combat leaders. This action would not have been possible if the Army needed 32 months to create an armor brigade combat team or additional units for a long-term response.

Our most recent military experience highlights the need for the US government to maintain ready joint forces capable of operating in sufficient scale and duration to accomplish its missions. Prior to September 2001, the Department of Defense planned significant reductions in the Army, erroneously believing that the next war would be fought mainly with long-range precision weapons. This error had consequences.

During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the active Army grew from 476,289 to 570,000 soldiers. The US Army’s requirement to sustain other NATO commitments overseas in areas such as Europe, Japan, and Korea; remain prepared for unforeseen contingencies; and sustain an Army capable of manning, training, and equipping the force compounded the challenge of this extraordinarily difficult expansion.

Demands on the Army’s capabilities are increasing. Strategic risk is not declining. With the rise of multiple near-peer adversaries and regional hegemons, a smaller Army may only encourage adventurism. Recent world events have invalidated the force reduction plans of only three years ago, resulting in the demand for land forces to increase, not decrease as postulated. Since the 2013 Department of Defense Strategic Choices and Management Review and the National Defense Panel review calling for Army force reductions the world chose another path. Instead of a peaceful Europe, a diminishing commitment in Afghanistan, and no US forces returning to Iraq, the world went into unforeseen conflict. Russia invaded Crimea and Ukraine, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant established a protostate in Syria and Iraq, Yemen collapsed, and the security environment in Africa and the Middle East worsened.

Instead of drawing down the 7,200 Army forces in Afghanistan in 2017 as originally planned, they will be maintained. Over 5,000 soldiers are now in Kuwait and Iraq to sustain the campaign against the Islamic State. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter announced on July

---

21 Final Report to Congress, 123.

11, 2016 that an additional 560 troops will deploy to Iraq.\textsuperscript{23} Discussions to increase Army forces in Europe by the addition of another rotational or permanent brigade are ongoing, and the Army is seeking to expand the Pacific Pathways mission for the Guard and Reserve.\textsuperscript{24}

These increasing commitments overseas and reductions in the size of the Army have significantly decreased the pool of land forces available to decision-makers, in turn limiting options and increasing strategic risk. Because the location, scale, and duration of future conflicts are impossible to predict, calculating intervention and expansion capacity requires intellectual rigor, outstanding judgment, and humility about how much we know.

The one undeniable pattern for the future is that crises will materialize quickly, blindside the best defense forecasters, and demand a land-force response. Analysis informed by studies of emerging threats, joint force mission possibilities, historical insights, and the technological impacts on the character of future war all lead to the conclusion that mounting strategic risk is associated with reduced Army capacity. Accordingly, what options are available for limiting our strategic risk?

**Rightsizing the Army**

Like the defense planners, Army leadership is working toward informed decisions about rightsizing the Army. Recently, senior Army leaders found that operating under current National Security Strategy and defense planning guidance, an approximately 1.2 million person Army would be necessary to reduce significant risk.

As a short-term option, policymakers could stop the drawdown at the current force level, 490,000 soldiers, until existing strategic threats are fully analyzed and addressed. In the short term, the overseas contingency operations funding could be used until a permanent funding option is obtained.\textsuperscript{25} While the Army’s analysis to determine the optimum increase for the future is ongoing, at 490,000 troops the Army is potentially headed toward dangerously low levels of capabilities and will have difficulty meeting foreseeable challenges. Experience suggests the most obvious threats are not always the most likely. Precisely because planning occurs for foreseeable threats, we have an even smaller margin available to meet unforeseeable challenges; these may be more demanding and become much more problematic with a one campaign Army.\textsuperscript{26}

**Conclusion**

Even the deep force cuts that reduced Army forces from 572,000 to 479,000 by the end of the Clinton administration as a result of the Bottom-Up Review in 1993 were less than current proposals.\textsuperscript{27} The Soviet Union had collapsed, terrorist threats to the homeland were not


\textsuperscript{25} Bonds, Johnson, and Steinberg, “Limiting Regret,” 19.

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.

apparent, and North Korea did not have nuclear weapons; therefore, the cuts seemed reasonable. In our increasingly interconnected world, however, Army forces must be prepared to respond to both overseas contingencies and threats to the homeland. Accordingly, the Army must develop and sustain ready forces capable of defeating our enemies and accomplishing missions under all conditions of combat. To accomplish assigned missions while confronting increasingly dangerous threats in complex operational environments, some military experts argue that the Army must possess both capability and capacity, which would require a force increase by well over 100,000 soldiers. Although further internal assessment is essential, wide-ranging external analysis supports this position.\textsuperscript{28}

As leaders consider the appropriate size of America’s land forces, they should understand the challenges of today’s increasingly dangerous and rapidly changing security environment require greater landpower capacity. This point is underscored by the Army’s current commitments and foundational role within the Joint Force, the value of surge capacity, and the investment required to generate, mobilize, and expand Army forces. Likewise, widely held, yet flawed, assumptions that mask risks associated with a smaller Army should be discarded. A capable Army of sufficient capacity is a prudent investment to protect our nation’s interests, to defend our homeland, and to mitigate risk.

Charles Hornick

LTC Charles Hornick is an Army strategist (FA-59) serving as the special assistant to the UK Army’s chief of the general staff in Andover, England. He holds a master of arts in international affairs from the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University.

Daniel Burkhart

MAJ Daniel Burkhart, is an Army strategist (FA-59). His operational experience includes deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition to graduating from the Basic Strategic Art Program at the US Army War College, Burkhart holds a bachelor’s degree from the United States Military Academy and a master’s degree from Hawaii Pacific University.

Dave Shunk

COL Dave Shunk (USAF Ret.) is a Department of the Army civilian. He is a former B-52G pilot and Desert Storm combat veteran whose last military assignment was as the B-2 vice wing commander of the 509th Bomb Wing, Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri. Shunk has a master of arts in military art and science from the Army Command & General Staff College and a master of science in national security strategy from the National War College.

Myths about the Army Profession

Five Myths about Our Future

Don M. Snider

Abstract: The Army, and many of its professionals, still behave far too much like they are leading, and serving, in little more than a government bureaucracy. To advance the implementation of the new doctrines, old myths must be destroyed. That is the purpose of this article and the next by Dr. Pfaff, to expose the myths as the falsehoods they are and replace them with correct, motivational understandings.

In a recent and quite prescient US Army War College publication, “Changing Minds in the Army: Why It Is So Difficult and What to Do about It,” two faculty members explain a core issue of Army leaders—the ability to re-evaluate personal frames of reference when confronting new information: “Unfortunately, shattering or unlearning frames of reference is an action that is easy to espouse, yet incredibly difficult to execute.” The authors note one convention senior leaders can use to assess their frames successfully is a red team charged with a direct, yet tactful, challenge. When presented within a culture of trust created by the leader, the team’s ability to speak truth effectively to those in power is greatly enhanced.1

Similarly, Dr. Tony Pfaff, the War College’s new professor of the Army Profession and Ethic, and I have collaborated to confront commonly held myths that can rightly be understood as specific frames of reference senior Army leaders, indeed all Army professionals, need to change. This article focuses on incorrect frames of reference still held three years after The Army Profession doctrine was implemented.2 In each case these frames, these myths, are almost incompatible with the institution’s doctrine, thus hindering not only the timely implementation but also the desirable influence on the effectiveness of the Army and its professionals.

The Army is and will always be a military profession—not true.

The Continental Congress created the US Army in 1775 from the colonial militias and then placed it within a new Department of War before the end of our Revolution against the British crown.3 It is thus fair to say that since its establishment the US Army has always been a government bureaucracy. Accordingly, since the end of the War of Independence

and the ratification of the Constitution in 1789, both the Congress and the executive have continued to exercise their Constitutional powers to treat the Army just like every other federal bureaucracy. The institutional character and behavior of government bureaucracy, therefore, has been and will be the US Army’s default setting.

Turning now to the Army’s professional status, which was attained by cohort during various periods of the institution’s history, the creation of branch schools, consistent terms of service, and promotions by merit rather than patronage slowly professionalized the officer corps during the mid to late-nineteenth century; the noncommissioned officer corps by World War II. But professionalizing the Army did not cause its character of origin—government bureaucracy—to go away. Bureaucracy remains in the background and constantly creates tension within the profession. So the Army is uniquely an institution of dual cultures in which only one culture can be dominant at a given time and Army leaders determine through their daily leadership at each location whether the dominant culture is that of the profession or of the default bureaucracy.

Since becoming a profession, the US Army’s degree of professionalization has ebbed and flowed. The most recent decline of culture and ethos of profession occurred during the late-Vietnam War period and the morph into bureaucratic behavior caused immense loss of trust by the American people. But trust, with both internal Army ranks and external citizens, is the currency that legitimizes professions and it is ever perishable. In Western democracies, the client—in this case the American people—gets to determine if an institution is treated as a venerated profession meriting the autonomy necessary to do its expert work. Thus, by the end of the Vietnam War, the Army had lost not only public confidence but also its status as a military profession and the associated autonomy. Likewise, it is wrong to infer “once a profession, always a profession” from Professor Huntington’s influential work when modern competitive professions, such as post-Cold War European land armies, do in fact die as they morph into military bureaucracies.

Unfortunately, because it believes it will always be a military profession, the Army has only studied itself as a military profession episodically. More often than not the institution simply declared itself a profession and continued to operate much like a bureaucracy. Although civilian historians have conducted most research on the military as a profession, the Army chief of staff did direct the US Army War College to conduct internally a “Study on Military Professionalism” after the failures in Vietnam.

---


5 In earlier publications the sharp differences between these two cultures have been more specifically contrasted. See Don M. Snider, “Will Army 2025 be a Military Profession?,” *Parameters* 45, no. 4 (Winter 2015–16): 40.


Notwithstanding the quality of the War College study that highlighted the unprofessional nature of the Army officer corps in the early 1970s; the Army did not perform another self-study on the profession for the next 30 years. In 2000 a group of faculty at West Point, aided by civilian colleagues from several academic institutions and disciplines, renewed the study of the US Army as a military profession, publishing four books from 2000 to 2010 that laid the intellectual groundwork for more recent doctrinal publications.\(^8\)

In summary, the Army is an institution of dual character—bureaucracy and profession. With constant tension between their cultures, how the Army conducts itself each day in each location is determined by the effectiveness of Army leaders acting as the stewards of the Army Profession. The stewards’ role is to resolve deep cultural tensions and behaviors by leading the institution to manifest the five characteristics essential to the Army’s status as profession: military expertise ready for any contingency, a culture that fosters honorable service by all professionals, an esprit de corps that overcomes the adversity of combat, stewardship of the Army Profession, and military effectiveness that generates respect and trust from the American people.\(^9\) Only under those conditions can the US Army continue to be a military profession.

The Army Profession is just about the historic profession of arms—not true.

It is true the Army community of practice that approached the initial tasker to research and study the meaning of the Army as a profession did start producing doctrine based upon the historic profession of arms.\(^10\) Soon, however, the doctrine writing process fostered deeper reflection within the community as to whether in the current era the Army Profession should, or even could, be composed only of those who bear arms. After another year of deliberating and drafting the document that would eventually become official doctrine, a new consensus clearly formed. Consequently, Army leadership made a conscious decision during 2011 and 2012 that led to the profession of arms and the Army civilian corps jointly comprising the Army Profession. Specifically, the first decade of conflict in the Middle East caused the community to rationalize the inclusion of the Army civilian corps, which enables professionals to fight effectively as an expeditionary force. Thus the belief that the whole Army—uniformed and civilian—must be a coherent and cohesive military profession informed the doctrinal definition of the expertise and role of Army professionals:

Military expertise is the ethical design, generation, support, and application of landpower, primarily in unified land operations, and all supporting capabilities essential to accomplish the mission in defense of the American

---


\(^9\) ADRP 1, 1-4.

people. Soldiers and Army Civilians will find within this definition the role their units and organizations play in ultimately applying landpower and how their own contribution fits into the larger mission.11

Army civilians have for some time provided expertise, stability, and continuity in most major army organizations. The recent decision to include the Army civilian corps within the profession created recognition that the Army needed to more deeply professionalize the civilian corps with individual and institutional developmental programs as it did in earlier periods for the other cohorts. In fact, the rate and effectiveness with which the civilian corps professionalizes will likely be a major determinant of how well the US Army can meet the challenge to “win in a complex world.”12

The practice of Army professionals is about applying large amounts of technology—not true.

Apache pilots and Abrams tank drivers might think this statement to be true; however, the professional art, the practice, of any Army professional is best understood as “repetitive exercise of discretionary judgments” executed by actions that apply the expert knowledge and skills of individual professionals and the units they compose.13 In fact, this definition is now Army doctrine and true regardless of which cohort—uniformed or civilian—a professional serves within. These actions are then analyzed for their effectiveness by after-action reviews and potential adaptations to knowledge and practices in the form of doctrine as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Discretionary judgments are informed by many years of studying and training within the fields of expert knowledge—military-technical (how the Army actually fights); moral-ethical (how we enter, fight, and end wars rightly by the values of the American people); political-cultural (how we operate outside the boundaries of the Army to create joint, interagency, and allied effectiveness in both peace and war); and knowledge of human and leader development (how Army professionals of all cohorts are assessed, developed, and employed over a lifetime of service).14 Whether made during peacetime or during war, these judgments are inevitably moral judgments because they directly influence the well-being of other humans—Army professionals, their families, the enemy, and innocents on the battlefield.

Army doctrine uses the term “discretionary judgments” as discussed above rather than simply “decisions” to establish Army professionals must be developed and then trusted to act with significant autonomy of action, the true mark of a professional. Granting such discretion through limited autonomy and underwriting prudent risk-taking by junior leaders is the behavior of a profession, not a government bureaucracy. These

11 ADRP 1, 5-1.
13 ADRP 1, 1-2.
14 ADRP 1, 5-1.
positive behaviors are now being better facilitated through the Army’s Mission Command doctrine.\textsuperscript{15}

Quintessentially, Army professionals practice their art with their minds, voices, and hands, even though they may also use massive amounts of technology to implement their discretionary judgments. But such technology is not a precondition to professional practice as professions are human institutions, something the US Army has long recognized and cherished when manifested in unit cohesion, esprit de corps, and the personal camaraderie of a band of brothers and sisters bound together in common moral purpose to defend our republic.

Competency is the most important aspect of being an Army professional—absolutely not true.

Perhaps the most pernicious myth reflects the belief that the Army is an amoral institution, that all we need to do is be proficient at our specific tasks with little to no regard to whether those tasks are applied to moral ends. No other myth could be further from the truth nor more dangerous to the Army’s future. The development of Army professionals has long focused, rightly, on the development of the individual’s competence and moral character. Current doctrine intentionally modifies phrasing to make the commitment aspect of one’s professional character explicit. Thus, the US Army now develops individual professionals, regardless of cohort or rank, across the 3Cs—character, competence, and commitment.

Such professional development draws deeply from the Army’s Ethic, a slowly evolving set of foundational assumptions and beliefs embedded within the Army’s culture. This ethic is the means of social control within professions, reflecting “how we do things around here to be effective at our profession’s work.”\textsuperscript{16} The Army’s history most often shows competent professionals of well-developed moral character and personal commitment are the leaders best able to make correct moral judgments in the stress of combat.\textsuperscript{17} Vitally, the character, competence, and commitment of an Army professional must be integrated into their normative-ethical advice and actions involving the lethality of our military practices. This integration is particularly important at the strategic level, the upper level of the profession’s civil-military relationships, where the moral imperative that lives must not be wasted is so heavy when advising on military options and outcomes to effect political objectives.\textsuperscript{18}

General Dempsey, the Army’s former chief of staff and then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, summed up this issue quite succinctly: “You can have someone of incredible character who can’t

\textsuperscript{15} HQDA, Mission Command, Army Doctrinal Publication 6-0 with Change 2 (Washington, DC: HQDA, May 2014).
\textsuperscript{17} Patrick J. Sweeney and Sean T. Hannah, “High Impact Military Leadership: The Positive Effects of Authentic Moral Leadership on Followers,” in Forging the Warrior’s Character, 91–116. The critical finding of this research is that “trusted leaders will not only have the ability to lead followers effectively in combat, they will also have the ability to change who they are as people” (95).
lead their way out of a forward operating base because they don’t have the competence to understand the application of military power, and that doesn’t do me any good. . . . Conversely, you can have someone who is intensely competent, who is steeped in the skills of the profession, but doesn’t live a life of character. And that doesn’t do me any good.”

So, yes, the competence of an Army professional counts, but not a bit more than the professional’s moral character and personal commitment. This fact is true in both conflict and peace. The US Army has recently had too many instances like Abu Ghraib and Mahmudiyah as well as the many public moral failures by senior Army leaders and major matériel acquisition failures of all types to believe otherwise!

**Whether the Army is a profession does not matter; we will always get the job done—not necessarily true.**

The Army’s effectiveness has depended on and will continue to depend on professional behavior from the institution, individual professionals, and their units. Remember, as discussed under the first myth, the Army is an institution of dual character that will always be part large, lumbering government bureaucracy. But can that bureaucracy win battles and ultimately wars in manners acceptable to the American people? Why is the alternative character, military profession, different with ebbs and flows over recent decades such as the Vietnam War’s low point and the Persian Gulf War’s (1990–91) high point?

The difference can be explained by the things professions routinely do and government bureaucracies seldom, if ever, do. The most important are the creation of expert knowledge and the human art and practices to apply that knowledge, which are natural functions of all professions, including military ones. For just one example, the doctrines of fighting and sustaining combined arms battles in joint and allied coalitions have taken years to develop and adapt and so have the battalion and brigade commanders who have the professional knowledge to apply those doctrines. That persistent development is the unique work of a military profession—expert knowledge applied by leaders who are experts in its application. But government bureaucracies generally do not deal in such expert knowledge nor professional practices. Their role in Western societies is to complete the routine, nonexpert, tasks (e.g., testing for and issuing drivers’ licenses) necessary for an ordered and structured society.

Moreover, history shows that when stewards of the Army Profession fail to conform the institution’s behavior to that of a profession, specifically keeping expert knowledge attuned to future needs, very bad things can happen. In March 2003, after a successful conventional campaign to take down the forces of Saddam Hussain, Baghdad fell. The US Army then found itself with no expert knowledge or practice to deal with the follow-on insurgency against our occupation. Note how General Ray

---

Odierno, a division commander who later became the chief of staff of the Army, described the situation:

When we first went there, we thought we would have a conventional fight... We had a conventional fight, which turned quickly into an insurgency that was compounded by terrorism... We were surprised by the changing tactics we saw. We had no idea about the irregular aspect we were about to face. We didn't recognize this was a possibility. And when we did recognize this, it took us too long to adjust.20

Notice the words he used, “we were surprised,” “we had no idea,” “we didn’t recognize this.” An egregious failure had occurred by senior stewards of the 1980s and 1990s who failed to keep the profession’s knowledge and practices current to future needs. After Vietnam, the Army simply dropped the essential knowledge of counterinsurgency and instead focused narrowly on fighting Soviet forces in central Europe.21 That horrible failure was paid for with the lives of far too many American soldiers and civilians, not to mention the prolonged nature of the conflict thereafter. So the point here is straightforward—as recent history demonstrates, whether the US Army is a bureaucracy or a profession makes all of the difference in combat effectiveness.

Conclusion

Army doctrine can often be turgid and too matter-of-fact. Doctrine regarding the Army Profession and Ethic is no exception even though significant efforts were expended to avoid that outcome. While doctrine may be quite declaratory, explanations are sometimes not sufficient. Thus, myths persist because the new information that Gerras and Wong note must directly confront old frames of reference if they are to change—the reasons why—are insufficient to be persuasive. So the five explanations above as to “why” are offered specifically to assist the stewards of the profession, and indeed all Army professionals, to change their minds on these issues. Gerras and Wong conclude their study with: “These questions are difficult to answer, but what we suggest in the preceding paragraphs is that for an Army operating in an environment of intense uncertainty and profound ambiguity, changing one’s mind may not only be a distinct possibility, but also a pressing necessity.”22 I could not agree with them more, and especially if the US Army is to be a military profession.

21 See Conrad C. Crane, Cassandra in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016), ch. 1.
22 Gerras and Wong, Changing Minds, 29.
ABSTRACT: After a decade and a half of struggling across various dimensions, the Army’s ethic risks losing traction with its practitioners. With that loss of traction comes a commensurate loss of trust, which will have a negative impact on the relationship the military has with the society it serves, undermining its status as a profession. Addressing these challenges requires getting past the myths that obscure the solutions.

As Dr. Snider notes, winning in a complex world requires a professional military capable of generating new expert knowledge that addresses the demands of evolving characters of war as well as the changing society the military serves. Ethical application of this knowledge is critical since it demonstrates our moral commitment and provides the cornerstone of our trust with the American people. This trust will be essential if the military profession is to navigate the uncertain and ambiguous environment associated with twenty-first-century security challenges. To this end, the following article addresses current challenges to the military profession and its ethic.

While professional and ethical challenges have multiple sources, such as “endless” wars, eroding resilience, bad leader behaviors at multiple levels, and the impact of technology, they cannot be resolved without dispelling the myths that often obscure the solutions. The first challenge is acceptance. After a decade and a half of fighting “among the peoples” and struggling with restrictive rules of engagement, the military ethic risks losing traction with practitioners, who often see restrictions on the use of force as misguided, or worse, cynical efforts of higher authorities to avoid bad publicity, often at the soldier’s expense.

The second related myth is the psychological impact this ethical confusion imposes on soldiers. Ambiguous moral commitments and weak understanding impact their experiences of the harms they commit and the sacrifices they and their comrades make. The resulting moral injuries undermine soldier well-being and thus readiness of the force, suggesting it is in the interest of the services to address these injuries with the same concern as physical ones. Similarly, the prevention—or at least mitigation—of moral injury raises the third challenge which requires not just identifying the traits of good character but also ensuring conditions are met for the successful development of those traits.

The fourth and fifth myths address the evolution of warfare, specifically the future challenges technology will pose to the ethic. In this regard, cyberwarfare has opened up an entirely new domain of warfare with different morally relevant features not present in the other physical domains. In doing so, it poses moral challenges largely unfamiliar...
to many professionals who will have to lead troops in this domain in the very near future. Likewise, the advent of autonomous weapon systems has the potential to erode moral decision-making and accountability while perhaps simultaneously making warfare more humane. As we acquire new technologies, therefore, we must also develop the norms associated with employing them.

Acting ethically in war ties my hands and makes winning more difficult—false.

Certainly soldiers who have fought in Iraq and Afghanistan have experienced rules of engagement that severely limited their ability to close with and destroy the enemy. More important, applying these rules has placed soldiers at considerable risk, often without any commensurate contribution to victory. In some cases, these rules of engagement have even appeared to limit the enemy’s risk while endangering friendly soldiers and the populations they are supposed to protect. These situations arise out of misunderstanding the role military ethics plays. Understanding how the ethics of war aligns with ways of war and how ways of war align with war’s ends can resolve this tension.

Ethical military decision-making requires balancing moral obligations associated with achieving a just cause, minimizing harm to civilians, and protecting soldiers.1 The balance, however, depends on the character of the war being fought. For the most part, Americans characterize war, drawing heavily on Clausewitz, as the imposition of one’s will on the enemy. In such a view, one has successfully imposed one’s will when the enemy no longer has the capacity to resist. The resulting way of war, therefore, typically requires a strategy of annihilation that seeks open, head-to-head battle with the enemy’s combat forces.2

In this conventional way of war, winning is not so much about what the enemy or enemy population wants as much as it is about the destruction of its military forces. In this view, imposing one’s will does not mean the other party must adopt new goals. Rather, it simply means eliminating the other’s ability to realize its goals. Germany, for example, was able to occupy France in 1940 because it destroyed the French and British military forces defending it. There was no requirement for a referendum among the French population to justify the German invasion, as there appeared to be when Russia seized Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. In such a way of war, achieving the military objective necessarily attains the political objective that motivates the fighting: when the enemy’s military is destroyed, he can no longer resist, and the war is won.

One can easily see how this way of war shapes its ethics. When victory is almost entirely dependent on the destruction of military forces, civilians have little direct impact on the military’s combat capability. Therefore, imposing restrictions on directly targeting civilians, even though they belong to the enemy, and requiring soldiers to take some extra risks to prevent otherwise unnecessary destruction, makes

---

1 Tony Pfaff, Resolving Ethical Challenges in an Era of Persistent Conflict, Professional Military Ethics Monograph Series 3 (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute [SSI], 2011), 10–12.
2 Victor Davis Hanson, Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power (New York: Doubleday, 2001), 22, 10–12.
sense. In this way, soldiers can maintain a commitment to humanitarian concerns but still effectively prosecute the war.

Not all wars, however, entail equivalent military and political objectives—for example, insurgencies, such as the ones the United States has fought in Iraq and Afghanistan, depend on civilian populations for concealment, protection, intelligence, and logistics. In this way, civilians contribute more directly to enemy combat power than they have for more conventional wars. Thus under the current rubric, a gap arises between the political objective of war and the military objectives intended to attain it. This gap is filled by shifting the support of the population away from the insurgent cause.

The requirements associated with winning such wars confound the American military ethic. When the gap between enemy and civilian closes, almost all risk associated with warfighting is born by the counterinsurgent force. Since directly targeting civilians is prohibited, targeting the enemy becomes extremely difficult. As a result, the enemy moves and fights almost freely while counterinsurgent forces must undertake the slow, deliberate, and risky effort to separate adversaries from a supportive population. Of course, counterinsurgent forces are free to use nonlethal means to achieve this separation, even though such measures often create other kinds of suffering. Moreover, when they fail, counterinsurgent actions frequently drift toward barbarism as soldiers are compelled to take increasingly stronger measures to break the will of insurgents and their supporters.

Resolving this conundrum requires rebalancing the application of norms associated with warfighting to align with the character of irregular wars. Doing so will likely mean a slower, more deliberate way of war that may encourage foregoing short-term gains and perhaps lead to experiencing short-term losses to attain longer-term strategic goals. Such a balance will permit soldiers to forego missions and require less risky and less lethal means to accomplish objectives. This balance would also mean soldiers will have to develop an ethic for dealing with civilian populations beyond current prohibitions against direct, lethal targeting. The resulting ethic will likely emphasize practices normally associated with law enforcement and an understanding of discrimination that prohibits even incidental civilian harm while accentuating a wider range of means and measures to control populations, to deter civilian cooperation with insurgents, and to gain reliable intelligence on insurgent activities.

Commanders have multiple ways to align these moral obligations, but by understanding ethical decision-making as the balance of competing obligations, a framework emerges to address the various demands of the evolving battlespaces in which the Army finds itself. Being sensitive to this ethical dynamic enables paths to victory while preserving the moral integrity necessary to fight just wars well.

---

Acting ethically prevents depression or post-traumatic stress syndrome—not always.

A great deal of research correctly observes that soldiers who believe they act ethically, even when those actions entail killing, experience war-related mental illnesses such as depression or post-traumatic stress disorder less frequently or severely; however, some events are so traumatic that moral injury occurs even when one has not committed any particular wrong. Thus only considering moral injury as arising out of some failure makes no more sense than always attributing physical injury to a mistake on the individual’s part. This point suggests leaders need to address moral injury with the same interest and support given to physical injuries.

The military’s traditional stoic ethos prepares soldiers for the demands of warfighting but sometimes at the expense of living well in peace. Stoicism detaches a person from his or her personal desire and emphasizes responsibilities, breeding combatants who willfully accept extreme hardships and are prepared to hold themselves accountable for events that are largely out of their control. While apt for warfighting, these traits interfere with caring for moral wounds. In fact, this ethos fails to prevent and likely contributes to 10–20 percent of the mental health difficulties for the two million service members who served in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Generally speaking, moral injury occurs in the presence of grievous moral transgressions committed by oneself or others that “overwhelm one’s sense of goodness and humanity.” Many soldiers have experienced a great deal of mental anguish over harms they caused, failed to prevent, or suffered. Moreover, the source of suffering can also be a sense of betrayal by higher authorities who are perceived as having a cavalier attitude toward the soldiers’ safety and well-being. Such injuries can be exacerbated by a soldier’s sense of cause’s justice as loss is psychologically easier to bear when some tangible good results. In this regard, society’s attitudes toward a specific war matter: to the extent society feels a war is unjust, soldiers will have difficulty accepting the harms they have committed and the sacrifices they and others have made.

Counterintuitively, the public’s expressions of appreciation, though well-intentioned, work to undermine the kind of civil-military relationship necessary to address this concern. Resentment arises because civilians, of whom less than 1 percent have experienced military service, are largely distanced from the costs of war; thus soldiers perceive the ubiquitous “thanks for your service” as a sentiment too cheap to count as sharing any part of the burden. This distance further contributes to confusion among soldiers and civilians alike about what exactly we are warring over. If civilians are not invested, there is only the leader’s word.

that the cause is both just and worthwhile. In today’s cynical society, that word is often not good enough.\textsuperscript{12}

Thus, those charged with the decision to go to war—including advisers—need to ensure the justice of the cause, the necessity to fight for it, and the commitment of the civilian population to its successful outcome. In so doing, these leaders need to emphasize that soldiers are never mere forces, never only an asset to be used or preserved instrumentally. This point suggests the public should be invested enough in the war effort to make its voices heard, to elect leaders who fight the right wars in the right ways, and to hold leaders accountable when they do not.

Trust in the civilian-military relationship, while important, is not sufficient to provide soldiers and their leaders with effective resources to deal with moral injuries. Trust in the chain of command plays an important role as well. In her book \textit{After War}, Nancy Sherman relates stories of women in combat zones who raised concerns regarding sexual harassment to their commanding officers. In one case, the concern regarded theft of undergarments, which even the victim felt might be too trivial to waste her supervisor’s time. But the violation of her privacy in an environment where she did not feel entirely safe was enough for her to come forward, trusting her supervisor would take her concerns seriously. The commanding officer did not, and she spent the rest of her tour hypervigilant, resentful, and distrustful of her command. Sherman’s point is not that leaders have an unrestrained responsibility to take every subordinate concern seriously; however, especially where issues closely associated with identity—like sexuality—are involved, leaders should be especially sensitive.\textsuperscript{13} Another important lesson from this story is that moral injury in the military does not arise only from warfighting.

Most importantly, transitioning soldiers back to society should begin before the war starts. Leaders at all levels need to pay attention to what they teach soldiers about responsibility to ensure they have a balanced response to their experiences. Furthermore, citizens need to make their voices heard regarding decisions to go to war to ensure such wars are both just and necessary. Finally, military leaders need to build and act on the kind of trust that enables subordinates to be resilient in the face of adversity. While moral injury may be as unavoidable in war as physical injury, there is much to do before the military, as a profession, has fully met its responsibility to address it.

\textbf{Good character entails good behavior—not necessarily.}

No matter how strong someone’s character is, there is a set of circumstances where it will fail. As suggested above, military history is filled with stories of good people in difficult situations doing bad things. Military history is also filled with flawed human beings who go on to be great warriors and military leaders. While truly good character should always yield morally appropriate decisions, the limitations of individual human psychology, especially under pressure, suggests human beings are sometimes inefficient at finding the right thing to do at the right time. As Leonard Wong and Stephen J. Gerras noted in \textit{Lying to Ourselves}:

\textsuperscript{12} Sherman, \textit{Afterwar}, 23–55.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 105–30.
Dishonesty in the Army Profession, excessive demands to meet individual and organizational competency requirements forced many leaders to choose between meeting these requirements and placing unfair demands on subordinates. Many leaders, according to the study, chose not to impose the excessive demands and often falsely reported compliance. So while it was good these leaders cared for their soldiers, it was not good that doing so came at the expense of conscientiousness towards their duties.

The real test of character in such circumstances is how one responds to that failure. Repetitive bad acts are certainly an indicator, if not a determinant, of bad character. Even without repetition, however, attempts to hide or cover up failure, especially those that entail additional wrongdoing, also discredit a person’s character. The extent one is transparent, on the other hand, about the bad act and voluntarily subjects oneself to judgment by the appropriate authorities for having committed it, preserves the individual’s virtue and should mitigate the institution’s response to the wrongdoing. Further, as Wong and Gerras’s observations suggest, commanders also need to take into account the conditions in which bad acts arise and try to understand how the conditions influenced the subordinate’s available choices.

Of course, there are numerous competing viewpoints on what counts as a bad act or a good character trait. In general, good character is determined by what is required for humans to live well, which can be understood as realizing potential. That potential depends on what one believes the purpose of a human being is, for which there are numerous, competing conceptions. This point suggests commanders would be hard-pressed to establish one comprehensive view that could be implemented for a diverse force of close to one million soldiers and civilians. In fact, the Army has recently identified its inability to determine the attributes of good character as a significant capabilities gap and has launched a major effort to address it.

A good place to start that effort lies in analyzing the Army’s role, which identifies the kinds of potential it seeks to realize. In the same way we know the traits of a good racehorse—strong, sure-footed, and fast—by understanding what purpose it serves—winning races—we can align our concept of good character to the Army’s purpose to establish the character traits necessary for individuals to serve the role of soldier well. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 1 (ADRP 1), The Army Profession, provides a good beginning by stating the purpose of the Army is to defend the nation and win its wars, which requires the traits

15 Alasdair MacIntyre observes: “Homer, Sophocles, Aristotle, the New Testament and medieval thinkers differ from each other in too many ways. They offer us different and incompatible lists of the virtues; they give us a different rank order of importance to different virtues; and they have different and incompatible theories of the virtues.” MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 181.
16 US Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Developing the Character of Trusted Army Professionals: Forging the Way Ahead, white paper (New York: Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, 2016), 3. The white paper notes “the Army Character Development Project specifically addresses Army Capability Needs Analysis Gap #501028: ‘The Army lacks the capability to identify attributes of character and to assess the success of efforts to develop character so that Army professionals consistently demonstrate their commitment and resilience to live and uphold the Army Ethic.”
of honor, competence, and commitment.\footnote{17} Such a view entails acting with integrity not just in relation to one’s actions but also in regard to one’s relationships, conscientiousness towards not just doing one’s duty but also demonstrating a commensurate commitment to excellence, and accountability for not only the material resources society allocates but more importantly for the people who place their trust in the profession by joining it. Setting these conditions is the responsibility of all Army leaders and necessary for the successful development of professionals of good character.

**Cyberwarfare poses no new challenge to military ethics—false.**

Actions in cyberspace, the fifth and newest domain of war, can differ greatly from the four physical domains: air, sea, land, and space. Unlike in the physical realm where an action constituting an act of war is violent, instrumental, and political, cyberattacks—which are directed at information—do not have to be. In fact, no cyberattack to date has met all three of these criteria.\footnote{18} Rather, the vast majority of cyberattacks are better characterized as subversion, espionage, or sabotage, all of which are well-accounted for in international law.\footnote{19}

Although there has not yet been a “cyber Pearl Harbor,” there is a great deal of research regarding possible moral and legal responses to such an event. Probably the most comprehensive articulation of these responses is found in the *Tallinn Manual* written by a group of experts hosted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence. Written in the aftermath of widespread directed denial of service operations against Estonia in 2007, the manual essentially argues unless a cyberattack entails some physical harm, it cannot constitute an act of war.\footnote{20} This conclusion ignores the potentially devastating disruption cyberoperations could cause even without physically harming anyone or anything.

Of course, assessing the detrimental effects on Estonia is a somewhat subjective endeavor. While the attacks went on for three weeks, most government and financial services were only off-line for a few hours at a time. So these cyberoperations probably did not rise to the level of an act of war; however, imagining cyberattacks causing much more widespread disruption to government and financial services thus severely damaging the economy and individuals’ livelihoods would not be difficult. Given such a possibility, it is worth asking what a purely cyberconflict would look like and what its rules would be? When no violence is associated with the cyberattack, the appropriate response is not always clear. Preferably, the attacked state would be able to defend itself, eliminating or reducing the harm. Given the just cause, however, determining whether a responding cyberattack would be warranted, especially if attribution were not certain, is also not clear. Further, if a

responding cyberattack were not possible or effective, questions remain regarding the permissibility of a kinetic response.\footnote{Randall R. Dipert, “The Ethics of Cyberwarfare,” \textit{Journal of Military Ethics} 9, no. 4 (2010): 384–410, doi:10.1080/15027570.2010.536404.} Notably, the use of military force that is violent, instrumental, and political is always attributable in the other four domains, at least eventually; when they are not, they are not proper acts of war.\footnote{Rid, \textit{Cyber War}, 2–3.} If war is a contest of wills, then in the physical world it matters whose wills are in conflict—a point complicated when an attack cannot be attributed to any particular state. There is, in fact, a great deal of evidence the attacks on Estonia were not directed by the Russian government as some claim, but rather the attacks were conducted by angry Russian hackers who used the Internet to coordinate a largely automated response to the Estonian government’s removal of a World War II monument from a public square. Whether the Russian government would not or could not intervene may be in question in this case. Given such uncertainty, however, these kinds of cyberoperations raise questions regarding how states can hold one another responsible for malicious cyberactivity when none has the capability of exercising sovereignty over cyberactors operating in the state’s territory. The situation is further complicated when malicious cyberactivities seem to originate in territories of states that are not a party to a particular conflict and who may be on friendly terms with the affected state. Such a dynamic could challenge how the international community views and respects state sovereignty in the future.

Cyber-resources also raise questions that military means in the physical realm typically do not. Namely, because cyber-resources can avoid physical harm while attaining a great deal of disruption, some argue they are morally preferable.\footnote{Ryan Jenkins, “Cyberwarfare as Ideal Warfare,” in \textit{Binary Bullets: The Ethics of Cyberwarfare}, ed. Fritz Allhoff, Adam Henschke, Bradley Jay Strawser (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 89–114.} This point further suggests their relatively nonlethal nature should permit rethinking preventive war doctrine as well as preemptive operations against an adversary even in the absence of imminent physical attack. If the Israeli attack on a presumed Syrian nuclear facility in 2013 that used cyberattacks to preemptively shut down Syria’s air defense systems avoided a larger and more destructive military operation, perhaps the criteria for permissible preventive and preemptive actions should be revised.\footnote{David E. Sanger and Mark Mazetti, “Israel Struck Syrian Nuclear Project, Analysts Say,” \textit{New York Times}, October 14, 2007.}

Cyberweapons also complicate the application of the traditional just war principles of discrimination and proportionality because military and civilian networks are often indistinguishable and targeting one could have similar effects on the other. As one speaker pointed out at a recent conference on cybersecurity, for example, where states see adversaries in cyberconflict, technology companies see customers. This point suggests that otherwise legitimate government responses to adversaries’ cyberoperations could represent violations of their terms of services with those clients.\footnote{Speaker, “Protecting the Future: International Conference on Cyber Conflict” (conference, Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, Washington, DC, October 21–23, 2016).} Adding “respect terms of service agreements” to
cyberwar rules of engagement adds a layer of complexity not seen in the physical domain.

Applying the principle of proportionality is also more complicated in the cyber domain. In the physical domains of war, proportionality only takes into account physical harms. Without an established way of accounting for cyberwarfare’s nonphysical harms, calculating the value of a bank’s off-line hours or code destroyed in human lives becomes difficult. While it is easy to answer “zero,” given the potential for widespread disruption, it is reasonable to ask if the answer will remain constant even if outages last days and affect entire banking systems. In 2014, for example, NATO ministers agreed a cyberattack could trigger the mutual defense provisions of Article 5; however, they have been relatively quiet about what scale, scope, and intensity of attack would warrant a defensive response or what such a response might be.26

Although cyberattacks that warrant just cause for war are still very much in our imaginations, there is no reason to believe they will remain there. The strategic ambiguity associated with declarations such as NATO’s have made the rules governing cyberwarriors difficult to determine. The Tallinn Manual’s claim that cyberattacks resulting in physical destruction should be treated as a use of force under international law is likely definitive; however, as noted above, its conclusions are not nearly as applicable in governing the kinds of covert political cyberactions constituting many of the cyberoperations states experience.27 Further, the relatively low cost and anonymity of such measures suggests states will increasingly rely on them to pressure adversaries to conform to the state’s interests. Given the likelihood of such increases, it may be time to establish an international convention, much like those of Géneva and Hague, to govern the technical innovations of the time and bring order to the current chaos.

Technology changes, but our ethics do not—false!

A discrete concern from the previous discussion of warfare in the cyber domain, the application of technologies such as lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWs) requires reviewing and perhaps revising the principles and practices associated with military ethics across the four physical domains. These autonomous weapons challenge the military ethic because of the central role autonomy plays in assigning moral praise or blame.

To understand the ethical implications of such technology, imagine a soldier who wants to kill noncombatants out of some misguided notion that the noncombatants are responsible for the war, but is not allowed to participate in any operations. The soldier’s actions conform to the rules, but one would not praise the behavior because no choice was made. Later permitted to participate on a patrol, the soldier still chooses not to kill noncombatants when given the opportunity because of the threat of punishment. Again, following the rule was a good choice, but praise


27 Seumas Miller, “Cyberattacks and ‘Dirty Hands’: Cyberwar, Cybercrime, or Covert Political Action?,” in Binary Bullets.
would not make sense. Exercising moral autonomy does not simply mean following the rules, it means deciding which rules to follow. For decisions about rules to be morally praiseworthy, they have to be made for the right reasons and be free from coercion. In this case, the soldier followed the rule, but absent the threat of sanction, this was not a rule the soldier would choose to follow. We would, however, praise someone who, despite having some motivation to kill noncombatants, chooses not to because of consciously acknowledging and accepting the rule as well as believing the action would be wrong.

Moral autonomy as described above is not exactly the same kind of autonomy employed by lethal autonomous weapon systems. As stated in Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems, a LAW is “a weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.” This removal of the human from aspects of the targeting process transfers decision-making capabilities without conveying commensurate moral autonomy. This transfer is not, of course, all or nothing. The directive does recognize degrees of autonomy that can be characterized as “human in the loop” where the human decides what to shoot and when, “human on the loop” where the human can intervene if the machine makes a mistake, and “humans out of the loop” where the machine’s autonomous process operates without additional input. What is important to note, however, is at even the highest level of autonomy, the machine does not choose which rule to follow as much as it follows the rule humans programmed into it.

Thus, increasing levels of machine autonomy can represent an erosion of humans’ ability to act morally. In addition to taking some decisions away, from a psychological perspective, these machines distance soldiers from actual fighting, which can desensitize them to the harm their machines commit. As one US Air Force lieutenant reportedly said about conducting unmanned air strikes in Iraq, “It’s like a video game. The ability to kill. It’s like . . . freaking cool.” One thing LAWs are teaching the twenty-first-century warfighter: racial denigration is not the only way soldiers can dehumanize an enemy.

Given this desensitization, it is perhaps counterintuitive to observe that LAWs can also have a positive moral effect on warfighting. The precision afforded by even semiautonomous weapons gives humans the ability to target more specifically and thus more humanely. Because such weapons limit the risk experienced by soldiers, the soldiers may act more deliberately, spending more time accounting for factors morally relevant to targeting that might not be possible in the heat of battle when human senses, and thus autonomy, are often compromised. Likewise, machines are immune to motivations such as revenge, dehumanization,

frustration, and psychological dispositions that make people prone to cruelty and give rise to war crimes.\textsuperscript{32}

These points suggest the advent of LAWs will profoundly affect how soldiers experience war and what they consider when making decisions about ethically employing these systems. These points also suggest calls to eliminate or strictly reduce the employment of such weapons are unfounded. If employed appropriately, the development of such weapons can deter war or reduce the harms caused by war. If employed inappropriately, these same weapons can encourage violence when nonviolent alternatives are available, set conditions for atrocities for which no one can be found accountable, and thus create soldiers desensitized to killing.

\textbf{Strengthening the Army Profession in a Complex World}

Clearly, these challenges are of immense practical as well as moral importance. Failure to reconcile the competing imperatives of defeating the enemy, protecting the force, and avoiding harm to noncombatants imposes excessive risks to soldiers and the mission, often leading to feelings of betrayal or impotence. These feelings can exacerbate moral injuries thus making the force less resilient and thus less prepared.

In such a context, trust between soldiers, leaders, and institutions will remain elusive and undermine the Army’s efforts to develop good character among its professionals. Without moral character enabling soldiers to “exercise discretionary judgments” repeatedly the lack of trust within the Army will further erode its trust with the American people and its status and legitimacy as a profession. Finally, the culture of the Army Profession, rather than the culture of military bureaucracy, creates the best position to respond to the security and technology challenges the Army must confront in the years to come.

\textsuperscript{32} Caton, \textit{Autonomous Weapon Systems}, 52; and Singer, \textit{Wired for War}, 396–98.
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has sophisticated propaganda capabilities and expertise that can be turned against it. The United States should draw upon its expertise in political communication and psychological operations as well as adapt Russian precepts of operational shock and reflexive control to complement traditional military approaches.

The requirements for defeating the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have many facets: a coherent policy, a confluent political strategy, traditional military and kinetic operations, and effective information warfare (IW) strategies. Despite their dominant role in ISIL’s playbook, IW strategies are too often ignored. The group has used information warfare to expand its battlespace beyond the borders of Syria and Iraq to every television set on the planet—reaching anyone with Internet access. American IW response must be as aggressive and strategic as kinetic military operations.

Congress recognized the need to broaden military authority to counter ISIL messaging after US Special Operations Command commander General Joseph L. Votel argued the Department of Defense required more authority to counter recruitment and reduce the flow of foreign fighters. This article, therefore, focuses on communication strategies and tactics the US military might employ in close coordination with kinetic operations as well as political and diplomatic efforts. We first examine the broader precepts governing information warfare, then apply them to define potential options for defeating ISIL.

Fundamental Assumptions about Winning the War

What steps will achieve battlefield dominance against ISIL in information warfare? One key lies in aligning a counter-ISIL narrative with our military objectives and the political goals of regional allies, which

---

1 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Vintage Press, 2008). Smith argues the future threat environment is defined by engagements (no kinetics) and conflicts (kinetics) that take place in areas in which combatants and noncombatants are intermixed, not on conventional battlefields where opposing armies confront one another.

requires defining assumptions about US intentions. First, battlefield victories—including victory in the information environment—are vital. Second, taking sides in the long-standing tensions between Sunnis and Shi’ites or making US policy the issue in the conflict should be voided. Third, the prominent public role Muslims should take in articulating a counter-narrative that discredits and delegitimizes the religious and political dogma of ISIL should be recognized. Public demonstrations denouncing ISIL require words and deeds to contribute significantly to success: Western countries should provide behind-the-scenes leadership and support, but Muslims must lead.

The United States must clearly define the stakes, narratives, themes, and messengers, requiring careful target audience analysis (TAA) for language and content. No single narrative or messenger fits every strategy. Components must be consistent, coordinated, and tailored to each target audience. Communication strategies must respect current political and military realities. Iraqi Sunnis comprehend ISIL brutality; however, they will not risk their lives to destroy ISIL to restore the status quo ante of Shi’ite repression.

A winning IW strategy requires fresh approaches. Western commercial advertising methods do not work for politics or for changing behavior in military conflict zones. Consumers represent groups who have already decided to purchase. Brand advertising seeks to increase the hit rate of customers in a target group. A successful commercial ad campaign may change the minds of 10 percent of customers. But as Steve Tatham points out, a “10-percent change in the behavior of an insurgent group or hostile community is highly unlikely to be game changing in the context of the wider conflict.” The United States should not confuse political communication with commercial advertising. Branding and commercial advertising are the kiss of death for information warfare.

Strategic Considerations for Information Warfare

We define communication as words, deeds, images, or symbols that shape public opinion and attitudes to change behavior in order to achieve specific effects or end-states. Information warfare must discredit and delegitimize ISIL, destroy the ideological pillars upon which its appeal rests, reveal its leaders are hypocrites, and drive the message that ISIL faces inevitable defeat and does not represent the winning side.

Information warfare can help undercut ISIL’s center of gravity, whatever enables a party to keep on fighting, in this case the will and decision-making of ISIL. We must subvert and destroy that will, which means attacking the core claims of ISIL:

4 This article suggests some messages or narratives. Each needs to be phrased in proper Arab language or dialects so testing yields dependable answers. Research for story, narrative, theme, and message must be keyed to a clear comprehension of religious, cultural, psychological, linguistic, and psychological factors that shape behavior, not merely attitudes, among target audiences. For a good discussion of these, see Dr. Steve Tatham and Keir Giles, *Training Humans for the Human Domain* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, November 2015).
6 Farwell, *Persuasion and Power*. 
1. Controlling territory governed through a new Caliphate
2. Contrasting corrupt, apostate governments with those of “religious” integrity
3. Rejecting the artificial Middle Eastern borders drawn by the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916), which fuel the revolutionary appeal for a new Arab nationalism
4. Protecting Sunnis against Shi’ite repression
5. Proclaiming inevitable victory ordained by God

ISIL spreads its narratives, themes, and messages through social media and battlefield results. Information warfare conducted by coalition allies must discredit the claim ISIL advances its notions of theology or justice are true to Islam. Muslim religious leaders must lead the effort. While noting that a grand counter-messaging campaign lies beyond the scope of this comment, this article focuses on IW support for US military strategies, operations, and tactics.

The Maxwell Message Grid, a four-dimensional analysis tool, frames perceptions ISIL has about itself and its enemies as well as what enemies of ISIL say about themselves and their messages beyond the subjective views communicated through narratives, themes, and messages. Applied rigorously, the grid can help achieve persuasive information dominance. Moreover information superiority, “the imbalance in one’s favor (relative advantage) in the information domain that is achieved by being able to get the right information to the right people at the right time in the right form while denying the adversary the ability to do the same,” informs operators while minimizing risks of information compromise and helps throw adversaries off balance.

Advanced information technology provides a competitive edge by fostering collaboration and enhancing awareness of relevant, accurate information. Sharing knowledge provides a real-time, accurate picture of ground realities. Key channels for achieving information dominance include social media, cyberspace, grass-roots activities and broadcasts, as well as political actions and statements by key communicators. Even though defeating ISIL requires a whole-of-government approach, US government allocation of task as well as the debate between advocates of

---

7 History.com This Day in History, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/britain-and-france-conclude-sykes-picot-agreement. This claim of arguably erasing the border between Syria and Iraq was among his most popular actions among its supporters.
9 Led by Majid Nawaz, the Quilliam Foundation has articulated some of the most actionable ideas for achieving this goal on their website at Quilliamfoundation.org.
10 Named after the distinguished political consultant John Maxwell who devised it.
12 The Anbar Awakening that proved vital to success during the Iraq 2003 War illustrates this notion.
information warfare—such as ourselves—and patriotic, but misguided traditionalists in military public affairs who oppose the idea of using the military for influence operations are beyond the scope of this article.\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{Forging a Strategy}

A successful communication strategy requires effective target audience analysis that frames the story and narratives using credible voices and channels which also create and drive themes and messages to discredit the enemy. Information warfare campaign planning should start with target audience analysis.

\textit{Target Audience Analysis}

Target audience analysis highlights stories, narratives, themes, and messages that strike a responsive chord with the intended audience. Each aspect of the analysis is articulated in language that resonates with the audience and respects religious, cultural, psychological, linguistic, and psychological factors that affect the audience and shape not only their behavior but also their attitudes.\textsuperscript{14} While reason persuades, emotion motivates. Messages designed to shape behavior, therefore, should appeal to emotions and be rooted in values, which are critical to human decision-making and behavior. Effective messages “resonate with information already stored within an individual and thereby induce the desired learning or behavioral effect. Resonance takes place when the stimuli put into our communication evoke meaning in a listener or viewer.”\textsuperscript{15}

Communication strategy communicates information in ways that shape and influence desired behavior. A message is not the starting point for communicating but “the final product arrived at after considering the effect we hope to achieve and the communication environment where people will experience our stimuli.”\textsuperscript{16}

How does one reach an audience? The maxim “frequency = penetration = impact” helps to answer the question.

Correct target audience analysis provides insight into the emotional impact of communication. Microsegmenting audiences helps distinguish

\textsuperscript{13} Farwell, \textit{Persuasion and Power}. Actually, as Mark Kimmert’s political strategy in handling the Abu Ghraib debacle and the public affairs fiasco that surrounded the “rescue” of Jessica Lynch in Iraq illustrate, military public affairs does not flinch from the kind of influence operations many public affairs officers deny sanctioning. In our view, their approach constrains the ability to defeat enemies in the new information age and inadvertently constitutes a prime asset enemies can exploit for their advantage. Political and corporate communication explicitly aim to influence and change behavior. The media understands and expects that and discounts the view expressed by many public affairs officers that they avoid influence or manipulation.

\textsuperscript{14} Tatham and Giles, \textit{Training Humans for the Human Domain}.

\textsuperscript{15} Tony Schwartz, \textit{The Responsive Chord} (New York, NY: Anchor Books, 1973), 24–25. The classic example was the “Daisy” television spot aired just once in 1964 for President Lyndon Johnson, in which a little girl picks leaves off a daisy. The frame freezes, the camera zooms into her eye, a narrator counts down, and there is a nuclear explosion. The spot worked because it brilliantly crystallized deeply held fears and doubts about Senator Barry Goldwater. While that involved American politics, the principles that governed the success of Schwartz’s famous strategy apply to Iraq-Syria and other conflicts. By analogy, Muslims who criticize a leader as a pharaoh need not explain further. People understand the critics mean a tyrant and is “arguably the most prominent narrative archetype in the Qur’an.” See J. R. Halverson, H. L. Goodall Jr., and S. R. Corman, \textit{Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism} (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 28.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 26.
how communication—the process by which communicators transmit stimuli (usually verbal)—can modify the behavior of target audiences. This analysis is about who says what to whom and with what effect.

Several tools are available for analyzing target audiences. The military favors polling and focus groups to help examine the impact of messages and strategies among base audiences whose opinions are hard and fast and swing audiences whose opinions can be moved. Polling provides statistical data across demographic and regional groups to help ascertain what must be said or not said. Polling can yield a picture in time of the dynamics of a strategic situation, but as a snapshot in time, the data can become quickly obsolete. Polls are clumsy for ascertaining what communication motivates behavior or evokes an emotional response. Poorly framed questions can produce misleading results. Focus groups explore participants’ concerns in their own words, determine their intensity of interest, and discover the sources of their ideas and opinions; however, the results cannot be projected onto a larger universe. Focus groups are useful in a limited context of understanding what language to use in driving a message.

Volumetrics monitor media and support social media analysis, but they do not measure the emotional impact of statements. We stress reason persuades, but emotion motivates. No correlation exists between sentiment analysis and identifying emotional response to statements, actions, or images.

The best target audience analysis tools measure emotion and motivation and combine those results with quantitative analysis, innovative technology that employs information theory in real time to identify key communicators and assess the impact statements have on their emotions and motivation. In fact, emotional metrics correlate strongly with the likelihood of violent action with such certainty that specific emotional affinity scores correlate strongly with recruitment into violent extremist organizations. Metrics cross the emotional vectors of grief to ecstasy and loathing to admiration as well as the motivational vectors of apathy to attention and calm to panic. The intersection of emotional and motivational responses generates inclination toward behavior and changes in that behavior.

17 Steve Tatham argues polls “are just not accurate predictors of real behavior.” Steve Tatham, Using Target Audience Analysis to Aid Strategic Level Decisionmaking (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, August, 2015), 8. Tatham is acutely insightful about target audience analysis, but that statement over-generalizes. Properly used, polling can be very relevant in predicting behavior, depending on the context in which it is employed.

18 Interview with Celinda Lake of Lake Research, November 20, 2015.


20 Richard LaPiere, “Attitudes vs. Actions,” Social Forces 13, no. 2 (December 1934); and Martin Fishbein and I. Ajzen, Belief Attitude, Intention, and Behavior: An Introduction to Theory and Research (Boston: Addison-Wesley, June 1975). Attitudes can measure favorability but this factor does not ascertain emotional response or predict behavior; and Ibid., chapter 8.

21 For more on the subject of emotions, violence, and the psychotherapy process, including information theory and Plutchik’s Wheel, see the research of Dr. Robert Plutchik. For more on identifying key communicators and the emotional and motivational impact their messages have on micro-segmented audiences and an advocate’s view on the use of “multisource, scientifically verified, diagnostic methodology undertaken in-country and in the local language used to identify specific motivations for behavior,” see Tatham, Using Target Audience Analysis to Aid Strategic Level Decision Making, 26.
The values-laddering approach, pioneered by the late Richard Wirthlin, is difficult to employ in a conflict zone, but applies when surveying a proxy audience, such as refugees or exiles, and in nonconflict zones. Wirthlin assessed decision-making by identifying the attributes of issues, the consequences associated with them, and the beliefs—personal and societal motivations—that bestow specific importance and meaning, which are essential to forging narratives, themes, and messages that strike a responsive chord.

Opinion researcher and former Wirthlin associate, Mike Dabadie, suggests effective target audience analysis helps:
1. Reinforce the network of positive attributes, consequences, and values embodied in narratives, themes, and messages
2. Refocus the links between attributes and consequences or introducing new attributes or consequences that strengthen our posture and weaken that of hostile parties
3. Redefine potential weaknesses to be perceived as strengths
4. Reframe adversary’s strength to be perceived as a weakness
5. Redirect attention from an adversary’s strength to its weakness
6. Remove an adversary’s strength by showing strength does not exist

Decisions have rational and emotional aspects. Perceptions have positive and negative dimensions. Effective strategy leverages the positives and neutralizes the negatives. Context affects choices so strategy must match context. People do not make decisions in a linear, ordered manner; therefore, strategy must consider ways to engage target audiences in adjustable ways.

No matter how sound a message, it will fail unless communicated by credible sources through credible channels. Persuading someone to change their beliefs, especially those rooted in cultural practices and established through respected voices, is difficult. Audience attention, comprehension, receptivity, and retention of a message varies. Whether audience members believe they have the power to decide their own actions or other parties, such as ISIL, control their actions matters. Existing beliefs, life experiences, family, culture, social context, class, cognitive biases, and, above all, values guide the decision process.

Values—the emotional criteria people use to determine the importance of, give purpose to, and motivate individual action—are culturally contingent. Increasingly, people ask how decisions affect them personally, how choices benefit them, and how choices affect society. In Western cultures, the decision context tends to be more about “me” (individualism). In other cultures—including the Middle East—decisions are more

---

22 Interview with Mike Dabadie, November 21, 2015.
23 Ibid.
about “us” (collectivism)—tribe, family, and clan. Pluralism is rising around the world. To drive (or avert) motivation, we must understand whether decisions are made based on how actions affect the individuals or the group—or both.

**Framing Narratives**

Narratives explain who you are, what you are doing, your cause, how you pursue it, and what it means for target audiences. Narratives bind together players, actions, and objectives in related stories so audiences can make sense of events. Often widely shared and repeated, events woven together may be deeply embedded in culture and serve as common knowledge for the society. The narrative expresses ideas about what people should or should not do and what rewards or penalties a particular action may produce, forming a basis for arguments. Circulating in social and political environments, narratives create a landscape that embrace a complex array. Different narratives may resonate differently with each target audience, thus, the development of ISIL and coalition narratives requires testing.

**Themes and Messages**

Themes and messages flow from story and narrative. Certain messages, which can be formulated in many ways, are worth testing to redefine, refocus, reframe, and redirect ISIL narratives, themes, and messages. Testing can also reinforce our themes and messages and determine if we are achieving our goals to undermine, discredit, and delegitimize ISIL.

Several messages are worth testing. One is that ISIL is doomed. Its recruits apparently believe in inevitable victory, but what is the impact on recruiting if followers and fence-sitters decide the group faces inevitable defeat?

Another is women are leading the fight against ISIL. Some reports claim the group believes being killed by a man opens the path to heaven.

---

26 Halverson, Goodall Jr., and Corman, *Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism*, 182.
28 One coalition narrative worth testing might be: “ISIL leaders are mercenaries, terrorists, sub-humans that use terrorism and accuse everyone of blasphemy.” Another might be: “ISIL leaders are cowards. They hide while sending followers to die. While Arabs are sent to the front, Western thrill-seekers get special privileges—cars, good housing, food, and are kept safe. ISIL promises a good life. But look around. In the streets, garbage piles up uncollected, the poor scavenge for scraps, women and children have no food, water is undrinkable, disease is on the rise. They do not respect good Islamic principles to help others. Its Caliphate is a fraud and doomed. We need new leaders we can trust to provide real opportunities and a better life.” An ISIL narrative might be: “Today once again your sons and clerics and the faithful people in these circumstances are fighting for a Caliphate against non-Muslims, apostates, and infidels who have demolished Arab homes and kicked Arabs out. ISIL is serving Islam. If you do not do anything else, at least support your Sunni families and sons, and do not be tricked by the false propaganda of non-Muslim enemies.” Each needs to be tested for content, language, and resonance with each target audience. These are two of many possible narratives, from which flow themes and messages. Both narratives reflect Tony Schwartz’s insight that the most effective narratives and messages avoid providing new information or attempting to change minds. Instead they tap into beliefs, attitudes, and opinions already held and make those relevant to an argument or message.
29 This presumes ISIL loses more battles. If they do not, none of this matters.
Parameter 46(3) Autumn 2016

while being killed in combat by a woman is a ticket to hell. The exploitation of that fear is worth assessing. Could messages highlight the role of females as battlefield leaders, aircraft pilots, and drone pilots and accord women maximum credit for killing terrorist fighters motivate ISIL fighters—not renowned for their respect or support for gender equality—to stiffen their resolve? Possibly, which is the point of testing.

We should examine ISIL’s perverse exploitation of women. The Quilliam Foundation discounts the “jihadi bridge” concept as lacking nuance. It notes the organization offers women empowerment, in noncombatant roles; deliverance, using religious justification to oppose gender equality; participation in building a state—especially for teachers, doctors, and nurses; and piety by addressing claims to divine credibility and thus a theological imperative for women to make hijrah to join ISIL. Accounts of abuse of women by ISIL may offer potential.

Also worth testing is the message that ISIL leaders are hypocrites. Not incidentally, the Prophet Muhammad constantly labeled his opponents hypocrites. As Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger point out, ISIL engages in sexual abuse, sexual slavery, rape of women and men, and execution of gay men by rape while promoting puritanical virtue. What impact might painting these leaders as cowards who hide from fighting, who lie to followers, and who cannot be trusted have?

A message is needed to show the solidarity of the many Muslims and non-Muslims across the world who agree ISIL is not Islamic. They need a message to show solidarity. Observers like Graeme Wood have cogently argued the group holds carefully considered beliefs well rooted in Islam. He contends their ideology is drawn from tangible issues, like currency and education, as well as intangible issues, like twahid (oneness of God) and al-wal’ w’al bara (loyalty and disavowal). Still, many Muslim scholars have denounced ISIL as not Islamic. These ideas should be tested for resonance and application. Does the concept of a solid international coalition comprised of nations and individuals from different


32 Hypocrisy in Arabic is niffaaq and a hypocrite is munaafiq. Applying the terms to ISIL will resonate if done properly. Telephone interview with Foreign Service Officer Greg Hicks, May 26, 2015.


religious backgrounds fighting against ISIL resonate differently than one comprised only of Muslims? Do certain nations—notably Saudi Arabia—carry different weight with certain audiences? What is the impact of the new Saudi-Iranian tensions? How do regional allies view the role of Kurds, Turkey, and Kurd-Turkey tensions? The answers to these questions may prove useful in mounting operations.

We should test how effectively the testimony of those who joined ISIL and then defected can be leveraged. Exploiting the realities of these defectors and highlighting changed beliefs and behaviors may deter future recruits and sow doubt among supporters. Propaganda fosters the belief that joining ISIL is an adventure for a noble cause. The reality, as media accounts widely report, is quite different. What impact can communicating the realities have on our efforts?  

Any counter-ISIL narrative needs to highlight injustice. The question is how, where, and when to use this message. The group believes its cause is righteous, invoking Islam to justify violence and intimidation, arguing its violence discriminately punishes only those who oppose it. Anecdotal evidence suggests this argument does not resonate, even among its own followers. Abu Hajer, an ISIL cameraman, expressed discontent with the mass execution of captured Assad soldiers. What bothered him was not their execution, but the manner of it. “I thought they deserved to get shot,” he declared, noting they were soldiers. “What I did not like was that they were stripped to their underwear,” an indignity under Islamic law. These ideas merit thorough testing.

Finally, we should test the impact of generally positive Arab reaction to Kurdish action in traditionally Arab territories that ISIL controls or occupies. President Barack Obama clearly believes Kurdish forces are key to defeating ISIL militarily. Kurds have doubtlessly proven effective in defending their turf. They helped regain Sinjar and have declared it part of Kurdish territory.

**Information Warfare Tactics**

**Information Dominance**

The first goal of any information warfare strategy, operation, or tactic is to gain information dominance. No formula guides what constitutes success in this area (e.g., volume of tweets or social media communication). The overall goal is to forge a cohesive communication

---


39 Benotman and Winter, *Islamic State—One Year On*.


43 A complete discussion of IW components would take into account Department of Defense operations security, physical destruction, electronic warfare, etc. to help describe the entire IW tool kit available to create potential synergies necessary for achieving operational and strategic effects. Space limitations mandate leaving that analysis to a future commentary.
strategy that achieves superior credibility, reach, and frequency to microaudiences; that strikes a responsive chord; and that shapes or changes behavior.

Achieving dominance has defensive and offensive aspects. Knocking ISIL and hostiles off the Internet may make sense. Yet, identifying and mapping its voices and exploiting that vulnerability may be wiser. Zeroing in on digital commanders by identifying and suspending specific accounts that set strategy, and through which they give orders to the online army, makes sense and should be done case-by-case as an operational decision. Other considerations may mandate keeping ISIL actors online specifically for tracking and exploitation.

Monitoring hostile voices may yield important information and intelligence. We should preserve our ability to monitor enemy social media while disrupting or manipulating it. Different tactics offer that opportunity. Distributed denial of service attacks can generate a flood of precisely timed counter-ISIL. messages delivered to target audiences. Volume and content can overwhelm the group’s messaging and exploit channels of communication to confuse, mislead, demoralize, misguide, or disrupt. We should employ every channel of communication, including television, radio, social media, print, and grass-roots communications to achieve information dominance.

**Humor**

Humor can help achieve information dominance as the Middle East enjoys a strong tradition of satire. Humor is powerful. As a symbol of ruthless authority, ISIL offers an ideal target. Iraq's *State of Myths* television show featuring a gun-toting dwarf and an Abu al-Baghdad who arm-curls human skulls illustrates the popularity of satire. Humor draws audiences; it helps shape the information environment. A well-targeted campaign using print, social media, and broadcast media (radio and television) to mock the terrorists may bolster morale among its opponents while goading the other side into mistakes.

**Footnotes**

44 Jared Cohen argues for marginalizing, not defeating ISIL, urging we separate human from automated Internet accounts, suspend social media accounts, publicize arrests, and use algorithmic analysis to identify, map, and deactivate accounts of terrorist supporters. Each of these has merit, but should be subject to specific strategies for operations and tactics. Except for publicizing arrests, one must be cautious about over-generalizing. See Cohen, “Digital Counterinsurgency: How to Marginalize the Islamic State Online,” *Foreign Affairs* 94, no. 6 (November/December 2015).


47 Arab militants are not famous for having a sense of humor. In Lebanon, the TV band *A Nation Smiles* poked fun at Hezbollah. Instead of laughing, an angry Hezbollah took to the streets in demonstrations. Bassem Mroue, “Officials: TV Satire Riots Taint Lebanon,” *Washington Post*, June 2, 2006. Any tactic that goads an opponent into mistakes is worth considering. Do not confuse such tactics with controversies such as the Danish cartoons which Muslims felt insulted their religion.
Operational Shock

Achieving operational shock on ISIL command and control mechanisms could prove useful. Shimon Naveh, a retired Israeli Defense Forces Brigadier General, draws upon Russian theories of deep operations that inflict shock and un hinge an adversary’s equilibrium. Simultaneous operations attack the enemy’s center of gravity by identifying exact points of enemy strength and weakness, creating operational vulnerabilities, and exploiting those opportunities through maneuvering strikes to destroy operational cohesion.

The theory combines a mechanical element (kinetic strike) with cognitive elements (surprise and deception) and momentum to affect the adversary’s consciousness. This notion was developed for kinetic operations, but adapts well to information strategy in asymmetric conflicts that lack a continuous front. Operational shock may dampen enemy morale, create doubt, sow confusion, diminish confidence, disrupt command and control, deter recruitment, discourage potential donors, rattle leadership, destroy cohesion, and force mistakes.

Experiences in Iraq in 2003 and Syria in 2015 illustrate this point. In Iraq, journalist Mark Urban reported Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) operations killed around 3,000 insurgents and captured 8,000 to 9,000. British Special Forces captured or killed 3,500, which impaired al-Qaeda. In May 2015, US Special Operations forces staged a surprise attack that killed ISIL commander Abu Sayyaf. The ISIL response betrayed surprise and dismay. Mounted continuously and simultaneously against key targets, such tactics can induce operational shock, wear down hostiles, and throw them on the defensive.

Military strategy we leave to the military. An integrated strategy that combines a kinetic element with information warfare can jointly achieve an operational shock that paralyzes, disrupts, confuses, misleads, or otherwise disrupts the military capacity and effectiveness of ISIL.

Reflexive Control

The discussion of traditional American notions of psychological operations important to any information warfare strategy lies beyond the scope of this article, but it should be considered in tandem with

49 Ibid., 18–19 and 218–20.
50 Russian Deep Operation theories were developed for conventional wars characterized by armies opposing one another on a defined battlefield.
52 Barbara Starr, Laura Smith-Spark, and Ray Sanchez, “Abu Sayyaf, Key ISIS Figure in Syria, Killed in US Raid,” CNN, May 17, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/16/middleeast/syria-isis-us-raid/. Obviously such raids require solid intelligence and a commitment of resources. No one suggests beating ISIL is easy or simple.
53 For a good illustration of the cumulative impact of forces inflicting operational shock, see the 2010 CNN news broadcast documentary by Paul Refsdal that took viewers behind Taliban lines in Afghanistan. The confidence and cohesiveness of Taliban fighters disintegrated into sheer panic when the noise of approaching helicopters signaled the apparent arrival of US Special Operations forces. See Paul Refsdal, CNN, “Inside the Everyday Life of the Taliban,” December 11, 2010, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1VDNArL0uTQ.
54 One recognizes success for these raids requires a lot of elements, including solid intelligence.
Russia’s theory of reflexive control. The Russian notion represents another tactic to use that requires understanding the motivation and decision-making of ISIL fighters and then manipulating them into doing the wrong thing.

Stephen Padgett, a former British commander in Afghanistan, relates a good example of how the mujahideen employed this tactic against the Soviets:

The Soviets advanced in conventional formation with mechanized forces against a dismounted mujahideen enemy that used tactics unlike anything the Soviets had trained for. The mujahideen knew and understood the Soviet tactical approach. They countered the Soviets with low-visibility small units that operated through dispersed command and control. They employed rapid fire and movement. They avoided presenting themselves as the types of targets the Soviets had trained to defeat—other conventional forces. The mujahideen got inside the decision-action cycle of the Soviets and used it against them to inflict casualties and defeat on the Russians.

The goal here is to manipulate information to compel an enemy to take desired actions. The conditions for using reflexive control require strong target audience analysis, which enables anticipating enemy action and using harsh forms of pressure that take social elements as well as intellectual, psychological, theological, and ideological factors into account. The theory holds using armed force requires a psychological campaign. Like Carl von Clausewitz, reflexive control frames war as politics by other means.

National security expert Timothy Thomas notes reflexive control emphasizes the criticality of disorganizing the enemy as much as achieving information superiority in a successful information warfare campaign, and the former produces the latter. Applying strong psychological pressure and driving messages that provoke emotional responses and disadvantage the enemy require influence operations that go beyond traditional military deception or military information support operations. Some American military public affairs officers may frown upon these tactics, but information warfare is about influence operations. Concerns these operations will undercut credibility through deceptive tactics are misguided. Mislead ISIL? Certainly. Operations should disrupt and demoralize the enemy at every level. Political and corporate communication campaigns achieve this goal all the time. Our military must do so as well.

55 Diane Chotikul defines reflexive control as “conveying to a partner or an opponent specially prepared information to incline him to voluntarily make the predetermined decision.” See Chotikul, The Soviet Theory of Reflexive Control in History and Psychological Perspective: A Preliminary Study (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, July 1986).
57 Interview with retired Colonel Stephen Padgett, May 17, 2016.
59 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Translated by Col. J. J. Graham), Kindle Location 416/4382.
60 Timothy L. Thomas, Comparing U.S., Russian, and Chinese Information Operations Concepts (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, February 2004), 3–4; and also cited by Tatham, Information Operations and Strategic Communications, 51. Thomas notes the Chinese consider “control” to be nearly as important as information superiority and that control produces superiority.
Reflexive control entails several elements. Distraction creates a real or imaginary threat to a location the enemy considers vital, forcing the enemy to reconsider the wisdom of their decisions. This tactic may often combine kinetic and information tactics. The Soviet takeover of Afghanistan offers a good example of the impact of this tactic when the combination of kinetic and information tactics are properly executed. Using feints or disinformation to mislead, confuse, or distract may exploit vulnerabilities in the dispersal of ISIL forces. The effect may force them to become more visible to kinetic operations or to make a tactical mistake. At this writing, despite recent setbacks in Fallujah and other places, ISIL seems confident it can win most battles, therefore, information strategy should aim to make it overconfident.

Information overload through distributed denial of service can overwhelm the enemy by sending a large amount of conflicting information. The goal is to confuse and paralyze by denying access to a website by flooding the site with enormous numbers of visit requests. The Russians notoriously employed this tactic in Estonia and Georgia; Israelis and Palestinians used it against each other. China’s “Twitter War” of 2012 over Tibet used bots that flooded discussions with the hashtags #Tibet and #Freetibet to intimidate Tibetan activists. This tactic illustrates how focused use of the Internet employs nonconventional military means to promote objectives. The Islamic State prides itself on posting 90,000 messages a day. Tactics that degrade this capacity while promoting our messages can create confusion, distraction, paralysis, and other problems.

Reflexive control and operational shock can induce ISIL to carry out useless operations and tax its finite resources. Setting a trap, strategic messaging that uses social media outlets to provide false or misleading information may prompt them to perceive a vulnerability incorrectly. Strategic messaging communication about the size of a force, type of force, available support, or morale closes the trap and sets the stage for trumpeting ISIL weaknesses and allied triumphs.

Division and deterrence are additional elements of reflexive control. Division may convince ISIL to divide its forces to cope with a pressing problem and provoke reactions that make their combat forces vulnerable or disclose vital intelligence. Deterrence can create the perception of insurmountable superiority, which may impair small-unit attacks or delay a larger assault, giving coalition forces time to counter them.

Provoking ISIL by using attacks, coordinated messaging, or other means of initiating irrational emotional responses may induce ISIL to take actions that make it more vulnerable. The force that is demoralized, hesitant, or paralyzed by command and control makes mistakes.

62 Soviet advisers convinced Afghan President Hafizullah Amin to move his court to a secure place at Darulaman, outside of Kabul. The move made him vulnerable to Spetsnaz forces who secretly moved into the Kabul airport and Bagram Air Base. Much of Amin’s government was captured at a lavish Soviet social function in Kabul. In the meantime, Russian forces attacked and killed Amin and his family at Darulaman. This operation was an excellent example of deception, manipulation, and surprise. See Mark Lloyd, The Art of Military Deception (Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword, June 1999), 128–29. Iraq and Syria may not offer an exact parallel, but the principle of finding ways to execute such tactics stands. Deception and surprise work for both kinetic and information warfare, although one needs to be very careful to limit deception to achieving military operational goals.
63 Adam Segal, “China’s Twitter War,” Asia Unbound (blog), March 22, 2012, http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2012/03/22/chinas-twitter-war/. Segal notes the government took no credit for the war, but no other explanation makes sense.
Reflexive control tools help achieve cognitive dissonance, tension between the expectations of a target audience and the impact of information that contradicts those expectations—with similar results. In Iraq, al-Baghdadi and other leaders exhort members to fight and die for a winning cause. Their leaders’ refusal to bear the same risks and battlefield losses creates opportunities for achieving this dissonance. Mocking ISIL about the better treatment accorded foreign fighters over Arabs opens up a second potential vulnerability for information warfare. A third may lie in undercutting expectations of victory—assuming Iraqis develop a will to fight. In Ramadi they have done so, although at a fearful cost. At this writing, Iraqi Security Forces, supported by US airpower, seem to have dislodged ISIL from Ramadi. Unfortunately the city lies in ruins. A similar situation occurred in Fallujah.

The United States did the same thing in its two battles for Fallujah in 2004. Losing the first battle thanks to superior information warfare by insurgents, Coalition forces prevailed in the second battle, but at the cost of destroying the city. Residents hated the insurgents, but they also did not like having their city destroyed. Fortunately by the war’s end, Coalition forces avoided destroying the city and ousted the enemy—an outstanding achievement.

**Weaponized Social Media**

Weaponized social media opens up opportunities for kinetic action, but should be used in tandem with other tactics. Members of ISIL use Twitter, Facebook, Skype, Viper, and YouTube as well as radio, television, print, and the rumor mill—a force multiplier that is ideal for capturing popular imaginations while speaking intimately to cultural, religious, and political sensitivities. Our information warfare arsenal should include tactics that employ technical approaches to exploit the enemy’s use of online venues.

We must access and utilize content that lies beyond mainstream Internet sites. Search engines like Google tap only 5 percent of the web. The remaining Deep Web consists of sites accessible generally through

---

64 For an excellent analysis of how social media can be used as a weapon, see Thomas Elkjer Nissen, *The Weaponization Of Social Media: Characteristics of Contemporary Conflicts* (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College, 2015).

65 In the Iraq War, the rumor mill was effective in spreading false information that consumed time and resources. See Bernardi, Cheong, Lundry, and Ruston, *Narrative Landmines*. Grounded in fears and frustrations of target audiences, rumor is a shorthand term for specula-
tion, half-truths, and misinformation in the form of stories, that to some groups, offer rational cause-and-effect explanations of effects. They flow freely and plausibly fill gaps in knowledge in ways that can be totally fraudulent. Rumors operate as part of narrative systems and circulate within narrative landscapes. They explain conditions in the absence of information, express social anxieties, and are non-narrative. Example: In the Iraq War, insurgents spread the rumor US forces administering medicine to cattle were poisoning them. Cattle were observed to die. But why? No one knew; al-Qaeda tied the rumor into the broader narrative during the Crusades that Westerners came, attacked, pillaged, and destroyed. Now the United States is back, doing the same thing. The story fits into a familiar pattern that makes sense to local residents. As the story was repeated, it gained legitimacy. In the current conflict, rumors have spread—and believed by Iraqi troops—that American forces are secretly supplying ISIL, making them vulnerable to reprisal attacks. See Seán D. Naylor, “Top US General: Many Iraqis Believe Washington Aiding Islamic State,” *Foreign Policy*, May 20, 2015. In the meantime, Iranian leader Ali Khamenei has blamed the rise of the Islamic State on “America, Zionism, and especially the veteran expert of spreading divisions—the wicked government of Britain.” See Jacob Siegel, “Who Thinks ISIS Is a Zionist Plot?” *The Daily Beast*, March 20, 2015, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/03/20/who-thinks-isis-is-a-zionist-plot.html. Such rumors undercut efforts to forge a cohesive political, military, or information warfare strategy against ISIL.
encrypted technologies and comprises more than 90 percent of the web. New approaches of collecting, archiving, and analyzing that content, including DARPA’s Plan X, are being developed.\(^{66}\) Potentially useful, Plan X will provide a common operating picture of the entire realm of cyberspace that will enable commanders to select targets; to develop strategies, operations, and tactics; and to understand the enemy order of battle.\(^{67}\) Such technology should be employed as soon as it becomes feasible given ISIL employs the Dark Web to recruit, raise money, and plan operations.\(^{68}\) Information warfare tactics should incorporate strategic analytical insights gleaned from hidden service directories, social site monitoring, hidden service monitoring, and marketplace profiling.\(^{69}\)

**Additional Information Warfare Operations**

We should identify key communicators important to the target audiences and shape not sentiment, but behavior. These voices connect directly to the target audience; what they communicate—and how we deal with them—is pivotal. Core messages must astutely blend nuance, emotion, and appropriate language—for example, incorporating highly emotional words or phrases that key into predicted psychological reactions improves the chances of motivating behavior.\(^{70}\)

Accurately measuring the results of the information warfare campaign is imperative. One tool that uses volumetrics is behavioral analysis, which tracks user website visits, browsing, and interactions.\(^{71}\) Behavior analysis requires gaining secure access to targeted networks, systems, or nodes to facilitate data mining (cyberexploitation) of terrorist networks and communications channels. Stanley McChrystal, a retired general and former commander of US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces in Afghanistan, emphasized the value of this approach in the Iraq War.\(^{72}\) So did the Mumbai attack on November 29, 2008, which gave Pakistani terrorists an edge over Indian law enforcement. Gaining access will facilitate the collection and exploitation of ISIL data and provide better situational awareness of the cyber domain.

In another tactic, information warfare attacks against these networks deny, confuse, degrade, disrupt, deceive, divert, destroy, and ultimately prevent freedom of online operations. Preventing online

---

\(^{66}\) Kim Zetter, “DARPA is Developing a Search Engine for the Dark Web,” *Wired*, February 10, 2015. The term Dark Web is a catch-all term for various Internet networks most people do not use, such as Tor, Freent, and I2P; and Thomas Fox-Brewster, “Watch out Google, DARPA Just Open Sourced All This Swish ‘Dark Web’ Search Tech,” *Forbes*, April 17, 2015.


\(^{69}\) Ibid. Customer data monitoring refers to watching the visible web to see how user behavior relates to, or telegraphs, attempted connections to nonstandard domains. Social site monitoring applies to sites like Pastebin, which is often used to exchange contact information and addresses for new hidden services. Hidden service monitoring means staking out Dark Web sites. Marketplace profiling means developing construction models of how deals on the Dark Web go down.

\(^{70}\) Nissen, #TheWeaponizationOfSocialMedia.

\(^{71}\) Ibid.

access could have devastating effects on ISIL who has become reliant on cybertechnology to coordinate its fighters, support its networks and attacks, and conduct online messaging, recruiting, and fundraising.\textsuperscript{73}

Conclusion

Information warfare alone will not defeat ISIL. Information warfare is about advocacy and giving visibility to something by promoting ideas or perceptions that advance our interests while discrediting those of the enemy. Hammering ISIL on every lie, large or small, and fostering negative rumors rooted in truth can be effective.\textsuperscript{74} Information strategies are crucial to neutralizing supporters of ISIL or other adversaries and converting them to be supportive opponents.

Information warfare is about changing behaviors—the way people act. Combined with the right political strategies and battlefield victories, information warfare can prove divisive. The United States has never forged a smart, savvy, cohesive strategic plan for it, but needs to for victory.

James P. Farwell


Darby J. Arakelian

Darby Arakelian is a national security expert and former CIA officer. Farwell and Arakelian have co-authored the textbook, Communication Strategy: How to Forge One That Wins on Communication Warfare for the Joint Special Operations University and their new book on information warfare, Punch Counter Punch, will appear in 2016.

\textsuperscript{73} In Iraq, then-General Stanley McChrystal used cybertechnology and fusion capabilities from diverse parties to track enemies. Should DARPA’s Plan X become operational, it will provide a common operating picture commanders can use to select targets; develop strategies, operations, and tactics for attack; understand the enemy order of battle; and advise special operations forces on forging and executing effective measures. The goal is to obtain a rapid, high-order picture of what cyberspace looks like at any given point, including network connections and the capacity a particular route has for carrying computer malware (e.g., a cyberweapon) and to suggest alternative routes according to traffic flows. Mapping may also enable commanders and tactical operators to avoid damaging systems not targeted, including homes or hospitals.

\textsuperscript{74} False rumors can be discredited, undercutting broader messaging against ISIL. Spreading rumors, such as ISIL showing it was no match for Kurdish women and was afraid at Kobani, is different from fabricating stories about false victories.
ABSTRACT: Capabilities to inform, influence, and persuade are necessary both for national security success and as a cost-effective toolset relative to physical military power. This article discusses shortfalls and deficiencies in this area, and concludes with recommendations to increase resources for manning and tools for informing, influencing, and persuading, as well as efforts to inculcate “communication mindedness” in commanders and senior leaders.

Asking for a second helping when everyone else is tightening their belts is awkward. Unfortunately, proponents for US government capabilities to inform, influence, and persuade are in just that position, as such capabilities have not yet fully matured nor are demands for their use fully satisfied. While a time of “belt-tightening” is undeniably upon us, we must find a way to support continued growth, development, and improvement in this area.

Informing, Influencing, and Persuading

How US government representatives present and describe themselves to and engage and communicate with foreign audiences matters. The success of many policies is contingent on the support received from various populations whose perceptions are influenced by both what we do and what we say, which is particularly relevant for national security policy—for example, one of the greatest national security threats of our time is transnational terrorism and other forms of violent extremism. Efforts to combat violent extremism must consider the beliefs, motives, perceptions, and grievances that predicate extremism as well as those that lead to support for violence. National security objectives are not necessarily well served when US forces kill or capture the members of a terrorist network if the perceptions and beliefs that motivated the terrorists and their supporters remain to generate a similar network in its place.

Similarly, US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have starkly exposed the truth that some military objectives depend in large part on the behavior and attitudes of relevant civilian populations and cannot be achieved solely through the application of force. As the


3 For a contemporary example, see the observation that “the application of military force alone is not likely to defeat ISIS.” in David S. Sorenson, “Priming Strategic Communications: Countering the Appeal of ISIS,” Parameters 44, no. 3 (Autumn 2014): 25–36.
Department of Defense Strategic Communication Science and Technology Plan noted: “a compelling argument can be made today that the public perceptions and implications of military operations might increasingly outweigh the tangible benefits actually achieved from real combat on the battlefield.”

Informing, influencing, and persuading go beyond traditional messaging to include a much wider range of capabilities that need to be coordinated because actions communicate. Whether you think of it as minimizing the “say-do gap,” or wish to discuss the “diplomacy of deeds,” what we do matters at least as much if not more than what we say, which is especially important for deployed military forces. Every action, utterance, message, image, and movement of a nation’s military forces influences the perceptions and opinions of the populations who witness them—both first hand in the area of operations and second or third hand elsewhere in the world. The White House National Framework for Strategic Communication got it exactly right: “Every action that the United States Government takes sends a message.”

If informing, influencing, and persuading are important, the United States needs not only the capabilities dedicated to communication and messaging, but also the means to coordinate policies, actions, and other sources of messages and signals to achieve desired objectives.

Informing, Influencing, and Persuading Are Cost Effective

Compared with other elements of national power, efforts to inform, influence, and persuade are relatively inexpensive and generally low-cost synergistic multipliers for applying other forms of power. There are two arguments to be made here: the preventative argument where informing, influencing, and persuading efforts help avoid the need for deploying more expensive capabilities because an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure and the enabling argument where the combined arms application of information power along with other forms of power makes it easier, and thus less expensive, to accomplish missions.

Considering the first argument, imagine the savings that accrue when American efforts to inform, influence, and persuade are so successful preceding a prospective military operation (during phase 0, shape, in the six-phase joint operation construct) that the planned operation becomes unnecessary. The costs of successful efforts to diminish support for violent extremism are reduced when the costs involved in hunting and
eliminating terrorists, including the human cost exacted by the terrorists and possibly lost to collateral damage, are not expended. Following the same logic, even if prevention is not possible, efforts to inform, influence, and persuade can modestly decrease the costs of, or threats to, other efforts by making an operating environment more permissive and conducive to desired end states before operations begin.

In addition to shaping the battlespace or preventing the need for full-fledged operations, a second argument insists the synergies from informing, influencing, and persuading alongside other military capabilities can reduce costs. Some operations require the support of indigenous constituencies in order to succeed and winning that support strictly through physical force and without employing influence capabilities is impossible or at least extremely costly. Occurring more often than we would like to think, this situation is one of the main drivers behind winning all the battles but losing the war.\textsuperscript{11}

While easily imagined, making concrete cost-benefit calculations in support of either of these arguments and generating evidence for them is much harder.\textsuperscript{12} Measuring the impact of efforts to inform, influence, and persuade remains a notable challenge, and counterfactuals (where something did not happen) are even harder to document rigorously.\textsuperscript{13} Other research has used notional data to illustrate the possible cost savings from influence operations during military activities under a number of different scenarios and assumptions. The conclusion was the increased use of information operations in phase 0, phase 1, and phase 2 “should be worth the investment to avoid or delay the significantly higher costs of the remaining phases,” where the application of conventional forces costs orders of magnitude more than information operations.\textsuperscript{14}

Firmly quantified or not, successful prophylactic action will be undeniably cheaper than resolving a contingency through deploying significant forces. Likewise, military operations or other forms of expense that are made easier or shorter when preceded or accompanied by effective influence will always yield savings, as inform, influence, and persuade activities are inexpensive relative to the costs associated with longer (or bloodier) operations.

**Improving US Capabilities to Inform, Influence, and Persuade**

The past decade has seen a host of white papers, reports, articles, and commentaries suggesting reforms and improvements for US strategic communication and public diplomacy, two prominent categories of US efforts to inform, influence, and persuade. The ideas, conclusions, and recommendations of 36 of these reports were surveyed and compared in a 2009 RAND study, which found the documents often recommend

\textsuperscript{11} Gina Cairns-McFeeters, John Shapiro, Steve Nettleton, Sonya Finley, and Daryk Zirkle, “Winning the Ground Battles but Losing the Information War,” *Small Wars Journal* (January 21, 2010).

\textsuperscript{12} On the difficulty of assessment and measurement in this area, see Amy Zalman, “Getting the Information Albatross off Our Back: Notes toward an Information-Savvy National Security Community,” *Perspectives* 6, no. 2 (April 2014).


\textsuperscript{14} Mark A. Ochoa, “Conventional Operations Must Be Less Expensive than Information Operations,” *IO Sphere* (June 2011), 43.
very different things with no universal consensus and at least four commonly repeated themes:

Demand for Increased Resources. The strategic communication reports showed strong consensus that capabilities to inform, influence, and persuade are under resourced. The call for more resources was the single most frequent recommendation, appearing in more than half of the 36 reports reviewed. Agencies and departments broadly agreed on the need for both increased personnel and for more programmatic resources. This call for resources must be echoed and should emphasize both force structure and tools.

Leadership. Roughly one quarter of the 36 strategic communication and public diplomacy documents reviewed make an explicit call for leadership, which referred to at least four different things: 1) presidential attention (a desire of proponents in any issue area), 2) authority, 3) good choices (bad policies cannot be well communicated), and 4) clear direction. Distilling and synthesizing from these previous recommendations, leaders across the government should pay more attention to communication, to influence, and to the effects that actions and policies have or require in or through the information environment.

A Clear Definition of Overall Strategy. Often related to calls for leadership, almost one-third of the strategic communication reports reviewed make a call for clear strategic direction. According to one commentator, without a clear strategy, “the leaders of each department, agency and office are left to decide what is important.” Most of the sources recommending clear strategy call for highest-level strategy, a clear foreign policy strategy that efforts to inform, influence, and persuade can support, as well as strategy that goes beyond a communication strategy. Unfortunately, critics have pointed out that the United States is often poor at strategy.

While strategy may be hard, goals, at least, need to be clear, which is supported by research on assessment. That one cannot evaluate progress toward a goal that has not been clearly stated is self-evident. The gold standard for objectives in evaluation research is that they be SMART—specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound. Many of the calls for clear strategy would be more than satisfied by SMART strategic or operational objectives as well. Coupling the calls for leadership and strategy, leaders who are more attuned to thinking about the information environment might also be more willing to specify goals in a way that more clearly describes what they want to accomplish and how informing, influencing, and persuading can contribute.

---

16 Lindsey J. Borg, “Communicating with Intent: DoD and Strategic Communication” (graduate studies report, Air University, April 2007), 23.
Better Coordination

Second in prevalence to increased resources is an admonition to coordinate better, also recommended in more than half of the reviewed strategic communication and public diplomacy documents. Many sources lament the lack of coordination of US government efforts to inform, influence, and persuade, both within and between agencies.  

Reports of “information fratricide,” where one element of the government, including the military, makes a statement that contradicts or undermines messages from elsewhere in the government, abound. Stepping beyond these calls for better coordination and integration between agencies and departments in this area, efforts to integrate and coordinate capabilities to inform, influence, and persuade with other military capabilities as part of the combined arms construct should continue. Information power should be viewed and treated as one of the combat arms.

Taken together, the reports on strategic communication and public diplomacy make clear that if informing, influencing, and persuading are important, we need to continue to improve our abilities in these areas. These top four recommendations and the challenges they imply are particularly interesting; while the first clearly indicates a need for increased resources the other three require commitment and change—improvements that could be made with little or no additional expenditure, a benefit in the increasingly austere fiscal climate.

Getting Better at Informing, Influencing, and Persuading

Informing, influencing, and persuading are critical to support and achieve foreign policy goals. Such efforts are relatively cost effective, but this capability area is underfunded and otherwise in need of improvement. Suggestions for getting better at informing, influencing, and persuading in the current era of deepening budget cuts include:

Continuing to Expand Resource Allocations. Continue growing public diplomacy, information operations, military information support operations (MISO), and other information-related capabilities, as well as our ability to prepare, coordinate, and integrate such efforts with other forms of power. This action will require more resources in this area for additional force structure, including personnel and formations and staff billets in the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of State (DoS), as well as investment in specialized tools. As noted at the beginning of this article, asking for more when everyone else is tightening their belts is awkward, but the relatively low costs of such efforts, their critical importance, and the possible savings make this the right thing to do.

---


21 Military information support operations were formerly known as psychological operations.

22 Specific tool requirements evolve with changing technology, but some examples of their usage include robust automated translation, monitoring social media, and visualizing the information environment.
Changing Culture to Create Communication Mindedness.

Changes to address perceived gaps in leadership, clarity of objectives, and coordination must be made. Leaders and commanders need to behave as if foreign publics and other populations’ perceptions affect the US government’s ability to reach policy goals or operational objectives. Further, leaders and commanders need to understand the things they and their subordinates do and say shape and impact those perceptions and have further echoes in and through the information environment. Finally, individuals need to be thoughtful about and plan for the messages and signals their actions and utterances send.

Summarized, this package of awareness and consideration is “communication mindedness.” Significant progress toward leadership, goals, and integration of information efforts with other policies and operations could be made if all leaders and commanders possessed a certain communication mindedness and were predisposed to ask or think “what message does my planned course of action send” and “what message do I want it to send?” If leaders begin to ask questions about effects in and through the information environment, subordinates will have to try to answer them. This accountability will lead to at least three further positive developments: first, subordinates will ask these questions earlier in the planning process to be able to answer their leadership’s queries. Second, subordinates will begin to seek out and consult with those who have relevant expertise in information operations and information-related capabilities rather than such specialists having to fight to try to somehow insert themselves into the planning process (which happens far too often at the moment). Third, the answers to these questions will inevitably align with broader goals and lead to changes in operations or execution.

A bit of a culture change throughout the government and the DoD is required to support leaders and commanders in developing communication mindedness—thinking and asking critical predating questions. The shift will take time, and it will take effort; fortunately, it will not take much money.

Two suggestions for inculcating this culture change include training and education programs and commanders modeling their expectations by communicating an information end state. Costs might exist with training and education or tradeoffs with existing curriculums may be necessitated; however, the importance of, and information on, the means to inform, influence, and persuade intentionally or otherwise should be prominent in the training and education of junior, midtier, and senior leaders. With sufficient exposure and acculturation, communication mindedness and even more sophisticated awareness of and thinking about these capabilities and processes can become fully integrated into planning and decision-making.

This awareness is particularly critical in the DoD where information combat power should become just another arm of the traditional combined arms approach as opposed to information operations and information-related capabilities being considered a

24 See Helmus, Paul, and Glenn, Enlisting Madison Avenue, chap. 2.
second-class citizen as a source of nonlethal effects, an afterthought bolt-on to fires, or worse. Professional military education for even junior officers should include introductory material on the possible contributions of informing, influencing, and persuading. Training on planning should explicitly include information operations as an important consideration for every operation. Training and education relevant to the informational element of national power should become more sophisticated throughout officers’ careers.

A process of culture change driven by training and education can take years, perhaps even a generation. Thus, the second suggestion will initiate the needed near-term culture change process as commanders ask critical questions even when it is not natural to do so. Dennis Murphy, a former US Army War College professor, has suggested all statements of commander’s intent should also include a commander’s desired information end state, and I have echoed this suggestion repeatedly. The inclusion of an information end state will force the commander and planning staff to think about and be specific about desired informational outcomes that will guide subordinate plans to comply with the commander’s stated intent as well as provide more guidance and context for subordinates’ autonomous decision-making in support of the mission.

Here is an extended example of the benefits of operating under such guidance. The traditional commander’s intent might include the end state: “remove the insurgent threat from village X.” Subordinates executing this guidance, depending on the existence of other standing orders or rules of engagement, might conceivably have the whole military toolbox open to them: they could level the village, cordon and search, or apply a variety of softer approaches. Now imagine the implications of additionally specifying the following information end state: “If possible, leave the population of village X neutral to US force presence.” That intent significantly changes the approaches subordinates are likely to take while also allowing the commander to assign explicit priorities to physical versus informational or short-term versus long-term outcomes. The commander’s intent can also note rare occasions in which informational end state does not matter. If commanders and their planning staffs think about and explicitly communicate cognitive and informational end states, their subordinates will have no choice but to do so as well. Under this construction, the commander accepts responsibility for conceiving the information end state while his subordinates naturally accept more responsibility for achieving it than they could have if it were left unstated.

This recommendation is obviously aimed explicitly at the Department of Defense, but also has applicability for senior leaders and decision-makers throughout the government.

25 An example document conveying similar problems and proposing similar solutions is Deployable Training Division, Integration of Lethal and Nonlethal Actions, 3rd ed., Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper (Suffolk, VA: Joint Staff J7, 2016).

Improving Department of State Capabilities. Accepting that capabilities to inform, influence, and persuade are good and necessary, where should they be housed? The current distribution of such capabilities is not necessarily ideal.27 Right now, “American public diplomacy wears combat boots.”28 The Defense Department employs the majority of the resources—funding, manpower, tools, and programs—the US government uses to inform, influence, and persuade foreign audiences. Most observers and participants in government communications agree that this is not the ideal state of affairs. Both the White House and the Department of Defense concur; the Department of State or another civilian agency should have a greater share of the steady state US capabilities in this area.29 This shift would, of course, require substantial changes at the State Department in terms of orientation, priorities, funding, and capabilities available for public diplomacy and strategic communication. This change also begs two questions: what is the right balance between civilian and military capabilities, and how do we get there?

Distributing informing, influencing, and persuading capabilities exclusively to the Department of State or to the Department of Defense is not an appropriate solution. Imagine that, in some foreseeable future, State Department capabilities become sufficiently robust to meet a baseline of steady-state needs on a global level. The Defense Department will still need to retain significant capability in this area for several reasons. One is that actions communicate. Defense personnel will continue to act and need the capabilities to support planning and coordinating the communication content of those actions. Defense agencies and military formations will also need at least the minimum communication capabilities to explain those actions and encourage favorable perceptions of those actions.

Also, Defense responsibilities for contingency response necessitate retaining capabilities to inform, influence, and persuade. Even the most robust State Department imaginable will lack the kind of surge capacity and expeditionary capability needed to respond to the crises and contingencies for which our military prepares. When the US military presence in a foreign country expands from negligible to massive, who will be alongside the operating forces, explaining and making their presence palatable? The answer is military communicators. If all the military communicators went away, no one would conduct critical inform, influence, and persuade missions at the outset of an emergent crisis, which is why the DoD needs to remain capable. In fact, Defense personnel, as argued above, should continue to become more capable, given the possible savings for other defense capabilities.

Further, military leaders should be encouraged to use informational combat power as part of their combined arms approach to prevail over our nation’s foes, rather than outsourcing the capability to other parts of the government.

The existing structure and organization at DoS limits its absorptive capacity for quickly building new or assuming existing responsibilities for informing, influencing, and persuading. Considerably smaller than DoD, State personnel allocations are also less flexible. Culturally, the State Department views its primary mission as traditional state-to-state diplomacy, not public diplomacy, and the public diplomacy apparatus is currently quite small. To become the home for government capabilities in this area, DoS will need to pursue organizational and cultural changes and increase or transfer resource allocations in moderate, absorbable amounts.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Even though the government needs to increase resources and expand capabilities for informing, influencing, and persuading, the following three suggestions support using existing resources and capabilities more wisely and efficiently.

Emphasizing Assessment and Evaluation

Too often, efforts to inform, influence, or persuade go unmeasured. The failure to establish clear evaluation criteria limits planners from determining the extent to which their efforts have been successful. Likewise, analysts may observe an effort’s effectiveness, but have no way to explain the outcome. Quality assessments can improve planning, shape midcourse corrections, and improve accountability and oversight. While costs are associated with assessments, the benefits make them worthwhile. Good assessments can improve the prospects for a nascent effort, save a failing effort, and demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of successful efforts.

MISO for Everyone

Currently, all active duty Army Military Information Support Operations (MISO) personnel are tasked with supporting US Special Operations Command, leaving general purpose forces supported by reserve formations. This broad tasking, along with high clearance levels and operational environments, leaves MISO forces detached from line units, which results in tasks to produce influence products independently or provide close tactical support to special operators. Efforts organized in this way have produced valuable effects, especially at the tactical level; however, the need for effective informing, influencing, and persuading is bigger than that.

Actions speak louder than words. Maneuver and line forces far outnumber MISO forces and are the preponderant face of US forces to the populations in areas of operations worldwide. The words and deeds of these forces do contribute to influence, which is best if the

---

30 One of the smallest State Department career tracks, or “cones” in State parlance, public diplomacy officers are only about 1,000 of approximately 11,000 foreign service officers. See Laurence Wohlers, Getting The People Part Right: A Report on the Human Resources Dimension of U.S. Public Diplomacy, with Katherine Brown and Chris Hensman (Washington, DC: Meridian International Center / US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2008), 8.

31 For industry, academia, and government best practices that are applicable to DoD assessments, see Christopher Paul, Jessica Yeats, Colin P. Clarke, Miriam Matthews, and Lauren Skrabala, Assessing and Evaluating Department of Defense Efforts to Inform, Influence, and Persuade: Handbook for Practitioners (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015).
contribution is thoughtful and positive. How can the actions of our line forces contribute better and more consistently in this area? Greater command emphasis on influence and communication mindedness will help, but even when trying to make a positive contribution in this arena, most military personnel simply lack the expertise. One solution is more military information support operations force structure, but if these forces reduced the amount of time spent making influence products and increased the time spent training, preparing, and supporting the inform and influence activities of the rest of the force, thoughts about and employment of their capabilities would change. Instead of being exclusive, information operations could become inclusive.

Perhaps a model worth considering is the relationship between civil affairs (CA) forces and civil-military operations. Like MISO, civil affairs is a discrete military organization within the service with its own personnel and force structure. As all other force elements at the commander’s discretion, civil affairs units integrate with and support civil-military operations efforts, however, much more frequently than do their line unit colleagues. Civil affairs units engage in independent activities, but they also help plan and enable the efforts of other forces. MISO forces are the only personnel in the US government who are trained to conduct influence. What if we make the relationship of MISO to the (intentional or otherwise) influence efforts of maneuver units similar to the relationship between civil affairs and civil-military operations? Using military information support operation forces to directly support and enable the influence efforts of maneuver forces would reduce the number of products they would have time to produce, but the trade-offs are worth considering.

Cyberspace and Informing, Influencing, and Persuading

Capabilities to defend and operate in cyberspace are of critical importance now and in the foreseeable future. The American need to improve in that area is broadly accepted; however, nascent and existing cyber-related organizations and capabilities are extremely well-resourced. In fact, cybereabilities are currently suspected to be over-resourced in relation to the absorptive capacity of organizations and commands responsible for this area. Although cyberthreats are growing, may require serious investment, and are rightly supported with vigorous funding, at the moment authorities unfortunately lag proper capabilities and lexical agreements. Additionally, command and control disputes delay implementation and maturation of cybereabilities. Some cyber-resources could and should be slowed or diverted to related information capabilities.

Particularly relevant, a possible relationship between cyber-operations and information operations could give rise to cybereabled

32 Civil-military operations are defined as “activities of a commander performed by designated civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions, by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation.” See US Joint Chiefs of Staff, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC: DoD, February 15, 2016).

MISO, which would fill an important operational seam. As an example, cyberforces can potentially access and exploit adversary networks and systems, to include electronic communications—e-mail, for example—however, just because offensive cyberoperations or computer network exploitation experts might be able to send messages to adversaries or potential adversaries, cyberexperts are not necessarily expert in the composition of effective personal influence messages. That expertise lies elsewhere—namely in military information support operations.

When tasked with a mission that includes an exploitation like this, a lash-up might occur if cyberforces contact and leverage MISO expertise, preferably at some point prior to the exact moment the adversary network has been penetrated and operators are poised, ready to type an influential message. Importantly, it is possible that cyberpersonnel would execute the mission without leveraging external expertise, mistaking their own expertise at creating the opportunity to send the message as sufficient for designing the content of the message, too.

Standing relationships between cyber formations or commands and military information support operation formations for efforts like or related to the one discussed above would not be unreasonable for executing cyberenabled MISO. The details of the variety of ways this relationship could be structured are not important here. That such relationships be considered and that the necessary capabilities be developed or constructed from existing ones is important. Even more important in this context, funds dedicated to the cybermission area can and should be used to support these improvements to both cyber and inform, influence, and persuade capabilities.
On Strategic Communications Today

Information and Warfare: The Israeli Case

Gideon Avidor and Russell W. Glenn
© 2016 Gideon Avidor and Russell W. Glenn

Abstract: Much as Israel’s 1967 Six-Day and 1973 Yom Kippur Wars served as lenses on the evolution of warfare in the latter half of the twentieth century, so too do its more recent experiences cast light on war’s early twenty-first-century character. This article uses the Israeli experience to discuss the challenges inherent in designing, promulgating, and sustaining a strategic narrative today and, ideally, a comprehensive approach to operations.

War’s inherent complexity requires political and military decision-makers to manage its challenges holistically, orchestrating resources in the service of sought-after objectives. Difficult even during short contingencies, those challenges are magnified by extended conflicts such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet, the duration of these undertakings pales in comparison with Israel’s decades of continuous regional tensions. This article draws from the Israeli case to illuminate the nature of twenty-first-century conflict and its lessons for US security policymakers.

After considering several of the components that assumed increased importance to Israel’s security interests, we look more closely at one element in particular: the increasingly recognized but little understood influence of the virtual domain on modern conflict, specifically in terms of the strategic narrative and targeted messaging. Social media, partly responsible for the restrained character of wars fought today, has also expanded theaters of conflict both geographically and temporally. Restraint has made decisive victory a relic of the past while rendering definition of ultimate end states an exercise in futility. Moreover, new ways of targeted messaging also provide opportunities.

Israel’s security environment encompasses three primary spaces:

- The close-combat realm in which fire and maneuver are the primary means of engagement
- Broader, traditional warfighting environs encompassing the close-combat space while incorporating physical elements farther afield that influence competitors’ effectiveness on the battlefield—manmade infrastructure, underlying terrain, and populations that potentially impact reinforcing or sustaining the forces
- The virtual space critical to command, control, and information exchange among those associated with military and extra-government activities, which are impacted by the laws of war, ethical constraints, ideology, religion, and the strategic narrative.

Persistent conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq suggests new doctrine—or more effective application of existing doctrine—is called for. This
guidance must look beyond the physical battlefield to prepare commanders for effective orchestration of activities both within and across the three primary spaces. Populations continue to expect decisive victories despite compelling evidence most conflicts end differently. Israel is among the countries finding themselves in conflicts characterized by an evolving blend of activities across the three conflict spaces, any or all of which are susceptible to Clausewitz’s play of chance and friction. Newer conceptualizations of conflict may reveal as-of-yet little understood opportunities.¹

**Brief Observations on Israeli Conflict**

Israel has been a petri dish for cultivating thinking on future conflict much as was the case after its 1967 and 1973 wars. Three evolutions in approaches recently employed by Israel’s nonstate opponents are notable. Subterranean excavations in the form of adversary firing positions for missiles, rockets, and mortars; hideouts for headquarters, munitions, or other facilities; and cross-border means of smuggling or attack have increasingly challenged the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Secondly, urban areas are more evident as primary—even preferred—physical spaces for waging combat when the threat finds itself at a technological disadvantage.

The last of our three environmental spaces—the virtual—has seen the most expanded influence on the conduct of warfare, particularly on the strategic narrative via the increased ability for parties to target specific audiences through social media. It is a realm in which even impoverished nonstate actors have access to capabilities on par with those of their otherwise more advantaged opponents. Targeted messaging via social media and other platforms is responsible for a dramatic expansion in what constitutes Israel’s theaters of conflict. It has also emerged as a key element in a comprehensive approach to modern conflict that melds elements of national power with those of other countries, nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations’ capabilities, and commercial resources that might also be used in the service of these entities’ overlapping objectives.

**Competition in the Virtual Space**

Common to the increasing impact of targeted messaging on the strategic narrative is the role of noncombatants as willing, unwilling, or unwitting participants. The willing are especially influential when students and other information technology-savvy individuals man the social media barricades. Israel is one of the world’s most technologically proficient countries. Yet, such talent is not limited to its citizenry. Gaza, too, has a plethora of knowledgeable youths who are willing to support Hamas or other opponents of Israel. These freelancers—we might label them “cybermilitias”—bolster social media efforts via text messaging.

¹ Some might question the security significance of social media and other forms of targeted messaging, seeing little difference between it and the CNN effect attributable to more traditional mass communication. The differences are ones of magnitude and form, a reasonable analogy being that of dumb and smart bombs. It often took 10, 20, or more dumb bombs to destroy a target during World War II and the Korean War. Bombs missed their target despite their numbers. Today, a single smart munition can accomplish its task. Traditional media blankets large segments of a population in hopes of influencing key social nodes. It may miss those nodes altogether. Targeted messaging can instead directly engage select individuals or groups to achieve desired effects.
image posting, and other methods in support of those combatting Israel.\textsuperscript{2} They have Israeli volunteer counterparts who complement a 24/7 formal IDF capability that includes Facebooking, Tweeting, Instagramming, and communicating in six languages across an equal number of social media platforms.\textsuperscript{3}

The impact of official and informal domestic social media capabilities now competes with physical force for primacy in the service of political objectives. The influence exercised by geographically distant social media participants on combat operations and political leaders helps explain the disappearance of decisive victory in but the rarest of cases.

This competition in the virtual environment primarily involves struggles over legitimacy.\textsuperscript{4} One might imagine an audience being pulled in opposite directions by two competitors for its attention, each having an arm in grasp. The reality is far more complicated. There are often more than two parties competing for a population’s attentions. The most influential of these parties may be thousands of miles from where armed forces compete in combat. A theater of conflict without physical boundaries results.

**Consequences of Social Media Influence**

Social media competition muddies several traditional conceptualizations inherent in conflict, the character of *victory* among them. Decisive victory is inherently objective: an opponent need not admit defeat.

Israel is not alone in finding its wartime achievements measured in degrees rather than absolutes. Its adversaries can, with some legitimacy, declare themselves victors in light of stated objectives—objectives that admittedly, but largely irrelevantly, may have been loosely defined originally or undergone dramatic revision during or after cessation of hostilities. Proclamations of victory by Israel’s opponents after fighting in southern Lebanon (2006) or in Gaza (2009, 2012, and 2014) were not without merit. Hezbollah’s and Hamas’s claims were accepted as more legitimate than those of Israel by some international audiences despite the IDF’s perseverance in the close combat and broader traditional warfighting spaces.

The gulf between this subjective form of victory and the objective (decisive) victory Israel’s citizenry expects is a considerable one. How is it, Israelis ask, that the country’s enemies return to kidnappings, cross-border raids, and the firing of rockets given the punishment meted out during their last handling by the IDF? The answer lies in what Israel’s citizens fail to grasp.

\textsuperscript{2} Use of the term “militia” reflects the less-regimented nature of social media user relationships while also recognizing both the need for and difficulty of maintaining control over these individuals and groups. The authors thank Andrew T. Glenn for suggesting this metaphor.

\textsuperscript{3} For further discussion of social media challenges during recent IDF operations, see Russell W. Glenn, *Short War in a Perpetual Conflict: Implications of Israel’s 2014 Operation Protective Edge for the Australian Army*, Army Research Paper 9 (Australia: Australian Army, 2016).

\textsuperscript{4} There have been instances of cyberattacks against physical targets, influencing centrifuges in Iranian nuclear weapons development facilities being the best known as described by Kim Zetter in her *Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2014). The broader impact of such capabilities on warfare, however, has to date been limited.
Battlefield dominance with lasting consequences was achievable when the opposition chose to fight conventionally. Unfortunately for Israel, its advantages in the arts of conventional war do not have an equal in those less traditional. Conflict has proven to be lengthier as a consequence. We have already noted that knockouts—decisive tactically and operationally, if not strategically—such as those of 1940 France, 1967 and 1973 Israel, or 1991 Iraq have become the rare exception. Spikes in Israel’s extended conflicts with Hezbollah, Hamas, and other regional foes—spikes labeled “wars” by media and political officials—are more accurately described as operations or campaigns within the context of these long competitions. The Second Lebanon War and Operations Cast Lead (2004), Pillar of Defense (2012), and Protective Edge (2014) in Gaza exemplify this development. One can argue the same is true for Russia’s simmering, yet ongoing, dispute with Chechnya and the previously cited US-led coalition undertakings in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Dramatic as these evolutions are, their consequences leave the character of war unchanged. It remains, in the familiar words of Clausewitz, “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” Yet the above makes it only too clear that the inconclusiveness of recent wars limits the ability to impose one’s will. Hezbollah and Hamas remained intact and effectively uncowed in the aftermath of violent conflict. Taliban resurgence and the emergence of ISIL demonstrate a similar indecisiveness in Afghanistan and Iraq. Foes sustain support from essential population segments at home and abroad, a vital precondition for the all-but-inevitable next uptick in hostilities. Acceptance of Hezbollah’s proclamations of victory after Israel’s albeit limited military—but not political, social, or economic—success at the end of the 2006 Second Lebanon War and Hamas’s obstinate declarations in the aftermath of recent peaks in aggression demonstrate the point. Targeted messaging via social media did much to support acceptance of both.

This near disappearance of decisive victory undermines the effectiveness of state militaries relying on traditional destruction-oriented war-fighting methods. Superiority in close combat and broader traditional warfighting spaces almost ensures Israel, the United States, and other nations with similarly advanced armed forces maintain a general advantage in tactical combat. That same imbalance does not exist in the virtual realm.

Announcing overly ambitious or unrealistic political objectives compromises the ability of political leaders to declare victory convincingly. Detailed intentions such as those stated by Israeli political leaders at the outset of fighting in Lebanon in 2006—“the return of the hostages, Ehud (Udi) Goldwasser and Eldad Regev,” “deployment

5 Contrarily, Charles D. Freilich argues “even in ostensibly decisive wars, Israel only succeeded in destroying a comparatively small percentage of enemy capabilities . . . but not enough to deliver a knockout blow, or to turn the military achievements into concrete diplomatic ones.” See Charles D. Freilich, “Why Can’t Israel Win Wars Any More,” *Survival* 57 (2015): 81. Freilich asks too much of 1967 and 1973: the country had neither the intent nor capability to decisively defeat the combined forces of Egypt, Iraq, and their allies. Remaining with the metaphor of boxing, the IDF won those meetings by a knockout with subsequent meetings constituting a rematch. The Second Lebanon War and Operations Cast Lead and Protective Edge, among others, are instead rounds in a single, very lengthy boxing match.

6 Israel denoted the 2012 spike in violence as Operation Pillar of Defense.

of the Lebanese army in all of Southern Lebanon,” and “expulsion of Hizbullah from the area”—proved unwise in retrospect. Little wonder those leaders justified later operations in Gaza with more amorphous ends, seeking objectives that included “weakening Hamas,” “reducing smuggling and rocket attacks,” and “reinforcing deterrence.” Specificity precludes deniability. Vagueness, the habitual tool of the campaigning politician, is no less valuable when decisive victory lies outside the province of the possible.

**Strategic Narratives and Targeted Messaging: Beyond Social Media**

Convincingly, denying an enemy’s triumphal declarations takes on a significance unnecessary in the aftermath of decisive victory. Success requires accurately assessing the expectations of a foe’s key audiences and undermining these anticipations. Achieving this type of success imposes a form of defeat even in the absence of battlefield domination, although less so in the face of significant combat reverses. Competition comes to incorporate dimensions both inclusive of and well beyond confrontations between forces in the field.

It is evident that shaping outcomes during these wars, and over the course of the extended conflicts of which they are a part, demands approaches traditionally outside those found in an armed force’s quiver. This was amply demonstrated during Operation Protective Edge in 2014. Deliberately limiting the depth of its ground incursions into Gaza to avoid becoming enmeshed in urban fighting and unable to completely interdict indirect fires into Israel, Jerusalem sought a way to halt two months of fighting. Resolution would lie less in the contest of arms than the destruction of a few apartment buildings housing the residences of middle- and upper-class Gazan civilians. Bombing of the structures after Israeli evacuation warnings triggered protests from the buildings’ influential former residents. Hamas officials found these impossible to ignore, a significant factor in ending the war. The implication is clear: a military and its government must incorporate the full range of an enemy’s objectives, capabilities, and bases of support into its strategic narrative campaign. They must treat components as a whole rather than parts as does Israel when it overly focuses on its enemy’s armed forces.

**The Virtual Domain and a New Indirect Approach**

The previous discussions make it clear today’s wars may be less amenable to traditional military conceptualizations of battle. That need not preclude application of proven approaches in innovative ways. J. F. C.

---


10 Israel should also seek to enhance the effectiveness of their employment of the ever-increasing means available for communicating their strategic narrative. As is apparent from the example of the bombing of Gazan apartment buildings, direct messaging in support of that narrative should meld capabilities from all three security environment spaces, not just the virtual.
Fuller, Basil Liddell-Hart, and Giulio Douhet developed their concepts of the indirect approach in the first decades of the twentieth century. Their construct was meant to aid in breaking stalemates confronted on World War I European battlefields by finding alternatives to frontal attack such as deep and broad maneuver against strategically vital objectives in an enemy’s rear or flying over resistance to undermine the morale of populations remote from the battlefield. The concept originated in the junction of need (cracking the stalemate) and capability (mechanization, radio communications, and powered aircraft).

The indirect approach seeks to overcome defenses through the application of familiar concepts using new capabilities. An expanded conceptualization of the indirect approach provides routes into an adversary’s rear—its popular support base—via WhatsApp, Twitter, and other social media platforms that complement traditional means of mass communication. Ways of addressing centers of gravity or decisive points (e.g., people living in those targeted apartment complexes in Gaza) increase in number. In the wake of recent campaigns, Israel increasingly recognizes activities on the three-dimensional battlefield may be relegated to a supporting role when an enemy’s vulnerabilities are better addressed via the virtual sphere. No longer does knowledge of a foe’s battlefield capabilities and intentions suffice. The implications for information collection and management—like those for intelligence—are clear. Other implications regarding international law and international public reaction may be less so.

A Broader Approach to Conflict Resolution

Expanded targeted messaging is but one of the additional capabilities Israel should bring to bear for conflicts in the twenty-first century. Only with steps toward a more comprehensive approach, too rarely taken as of yet, can the country’s involvement with continuous conflict give way to the possibility of lasting resolution. The solution will have to come from outside the military. Service parochialism remains too strong to hope otherwise.

The Israeli Air Force has long boasted of sophisticated air-strike capability. As a result: Israel’s warfighting has at times too greatly relied on air power to achieve political objectives. This reliance has repeatedly disappointed as was the case with efforts to subdue Hezbollah with air power alone in the opening phase of the Second Lebanon War and early dependence on air strikes to put the Hamas genie back in its Gazan bottle in 2014. History supports the application of multifaceted capabilities rather than overreliance on one arm, service, or armed force alone. Today, a single-service focus is doubly flawed, first in its inherent presumption that armed force should be the primary means to apply the service of Israel’s national security; second in its emphasis on the resources available only to one arm.

11 US joint doctrine defines center of gravity as “the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act,” while a decisive point is “a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success.” US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC: JCS, June 2015), 29, 61.
Israel has not yet taken the systems approach essential to prevail in the type of conflicts confronting the country today. The result is “mowing the grass”—periodically calling on military might—sufficient to return the security situation to an acceptable status with the assumption similar applications of force will be necessary when threats again exceed an unacceptable threshold of violence. The ability to influence during operations can be envisioned as a four-tiered pyramid: From initiative, influence continues to escalate into superiority and supremacy, ultimately peaking with control.12

Israel’s military has repeatedly demonstrated it can seize and hold the initiative virtually anyplace on a battlefield thanks to advantages in training and technology. The armed forces can achieve superiority at least locally, and—given sufficient commitment of resources—attain local supremacy during periods it is effectively unchallenged. The armed forces cannot establish more than fleeting control—the capacity to dictate behaviors and decisions. Achieving any of these states is beyond Israel’s capacity in the strategic narrative sphere other than when it addresses its citizenry, a population with a predisposition to favorably respond to its government’s messages.

Systems of Campaigns: Integrating the Strategic Narrative

Regardless of the moniker chosen, Israel’s recent “wars,” “operations,” or “campaigns” have introduced a new spin on operational art (and strategy). Given the employment of targeted messaging as a means of communicating state and nonstate strategic narratives, the application of this art—the sequencing of operations or campaigns in the service of strategic ends—further increases complexity when the circumstances of continuous conflicts involve a series of interim end states.13 Sequencing has no well-defined, long-term route to follow given the transient nature of the ends sought. Any such end is nothing more than another fork in the road, one with an unpredictable number of tines, the character of each revealing itself only vaguely as preceding operations advance.

Yet despite Israel’s shortfalls in applying a comprehensive approach, Operation Protective Edge validated what had become apparent during Operation Cast Lead: other-than-military organizations external to the government are essential to effective operations. United Nations’ intergovernmental bodies and nongovernmental organizations have a legitimate call to coordinate with the IDF. All parties benefit from orchestrating activities. Without that cooperation, Israel’s effectiveness

12 These four levels are defined as follows in US doctrine: initiative—setting or changing the terms of battle by action ... forcing the enemy to conform to our operational purpose and tempo while retaining our own freedom of action; superiority—that degree of dominance in battle by one force that permits the conduct of its operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference from threats; supremacy—that degree of superiority wherein the opposing force is incapable of effective interference within the operational area; and control—physical or psychological pressures exerted with the intent to assure that an agent or group will respond as directed. For the definitions of initiative as well as superiority and supremacy (adapted from air superiority and air supremacy), see JCS, DoD Dictionary, 49, 10, and 10 respectively. The definition for control is from the Headquarters, US Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: HQDA, 1986), 15.

13 The authors favor this more straightforward definition of operational art in lieu of the more complex one that currently appears in US joint doctrine: “The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means.” JCS, DoD Dictionary, 174.
at any of the four influence levels will remain limited to the security arena alone. The country’s recent experiences reinforce the need to focus on a systems approach, one incorporating resources beyond a government. It is an approach, perhaps the only approach, with the potential to move the country away from interminable conflict.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The foregoing discussion makes it clear today’s conflicts demand cooperative efforts broader in function, character, and societal reach. IDF leaders organized operations in Gaza during 2014 much as their predecessors did during the Six-Day War a half-century before. Conditions have changed. Those fighting before 2016 were less challenged by social media concerns. Nor did they confront substantial requirements to synchronize their actions with inter- and nongovernmental organizations already on the battlefield to the extent found in Gaza or Afghanistan.

This need to orchestrate resources permeates virtual spaces no less than close combat and broader traditional warfighting ones. Operation Protective Edge drew the attention of thousands of traditional network reporters; firsthand observers employing social media; and followers, bloggers, and additional retransmitters that left few actions unmonitored. Social media was a camera perched on every IDF soldier’s, adversary’s, and noncombatant’s shoulder. Factual feeds had plentiful, fabricated, and deliberately biased accompaniment. Anyone resending transmissions magnified messages’ impacts regardless of validity. The United States and other nation-states currently find themselves similarly competing with misleading yet effective ISIL messaging. Ariel Sharon’s and George Patton’s media confrontations pale in comparison—likely fortunate given what smartphone messages would have contained.

Israel’s ongoing conflicts illuminate alternative approaches to future US challenges in this regard, revealing obstacles that thus far prove too bureaucratically encumbered to surmount. The United States knows far more of social media’s challenges than ways to employ it effectively.

A comprehensive approach is an obvious first step toward addressing future US security challenges. Efforts to construct and conduct effective whole-of-government operations—much less incorporate comprehensive approaches—have proven elusive. Regardless, the Department of Defense should be more proactive in incorporating less-traditional participants to plan, rehearse, and conduct operations in-theater. Working through organizations that coordinate diverse activities of nongovernmental organizations could reduce the burden of cooperation in the field and in orchestrating deployment activities.14

Some form of coordinating targeted messaging activities—at least those from users sympathetic to US and coalition partner efforts—

---

14 For examples of coordinating organizations and their needs and implications, see Russell W. Glenn, Band of Brothers or Dysfunctional Family? A Military Perspective on Coalition and Alliance Challenges During Stability Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011). United Nations organizations have at times provided coordination of multiple NGO and IGO representatives. There are NGOs that habitually choose not to cooperate with government representatives; others will have objectives but fractionally overlap with those of military organizations and correspondingly limit willingness to orchestrate their activities. It behooves all involved, however, to ensure at least a minimum level of coordination takes place in the service of avoiding inadvertent NGO, IGO, or other groups’ casualties due to combatants’ ignorance of their locations on a battlefield.
would similarly benefit from operational objectives. *Coordination* rather than *control* is the realistic objective. As the IDF found when well-intended noncombatants sought to assist in promoting Israel’s efforts during Operation Cast Lead, dictating rules of behavior is a social media nonstarter. Unfortunate mistakes such as platform users prematurely and inaccurately reporting casualties, to include releasing the names of wounded as killed in action, can at best be minimized. Often, the most effective way of limiting such events is for other social media participants to police their own, perhaps at the behest of an overarching, and loosely coordinating, body. No such entity yet exists. Logic dictates it would be better to support the efforts of an external organization willing to take on the responsibility rather than creating one within government given the taint official communications can assume in the minds of many.

Development of technological solutions for dealing with urban and subterranean challenges is already underway. US efforts would benefit from continued study of recent and ongoing Israeli experiences in these areas. Solutions for dealing with growing demands on intelligence implied by targeted messaging capabilities receive less attention. Pinpointing key, and perhaps decisive, individuals and groups able to influence notably influential segments of domestic and international populations could be vital to operational success and coalition cohesion.

Lessons taken from Israel’s 1967 and 1973 wars informed US practitioners of war who defended Europe, offering lessons, that, when melded with economic, diplomatic, and other initiatives, helped to bring an end to 40 years of Cold War. Is it not conceivable insights from the ongoing struggles at the far eastern end of the Mediterranean might once again inform both US and partner nation leaders regarding solutions to the Gordian knot of continuing conflict?

**Gideon Avidor**

Gideon Avidor is a brigadier general in the IDF (Res.) and a veteran of Israel’s 1967 and 1973 wars and the 1980s conflict in southern Lebanon. His academic degrees include a Master of Arts in Social Studies from Haifa University. General Avidor’s publications appear frequently in Israel’s security community journals. He currently heads the nonprofit Institute for Advanced Military Thinking.

**Russell W. Glenn**

Russell Glenn is an associate professor with the Australian National University’s Strategic and Defense Studies Center. He is author of the recently published *Rethinking Western Approaches to Counterinsurgency* and editor of the forthcoming *Trust and Leadership: The Australian Army Approach to Mission Command* due out in 2017 as part of the Association of the United States Army book program.
Dr. Tuck’s article highlights several challenges inherent in defense support of stabilizing weak and failed states. Unfortunately, the article fails to offer solutions to improve these efforts or future planning. Not only is Tuck reluctant to identify and address planning dilemmas, but his definition of stability operations encompasses three seemingly interchangeable meanings: nation-building, state-building, and peacebuilding. This usage creates a problem. The terms used in his article are not interchangeable and mean different things, at least they should. Nation-building refers to constructing a national identity using the power of the state. State-building influences the security, political, and economic dimensions. Peacebuilding denotes actions that identify and support structures that strengthen and solidify peace to prevent relapse into conflict. Thus, the three terms are not synonymous.

Over the past two decades, state-building, the focus of this argument, has become a specific stabilization approach of the international community. Internationally-led state-building has three dimensions: security, politics, and economics. Of these, security—creating a safe and secure environment to make comprehensive political and economic development possible—is almost always considered the first priority. The security aspect is inherently a military and police function requiring some form of doctrine or handbook contrary to the assertions previously presented.

Tuck’s “planning school” discussion assumes the stabilization approach is inherently defective. Having been personally involved in updating our current Joint and Army doctrine on stability operations, I can guarantee that we do not create cut-and-paste approaches to how the United States should conduct stabilization tasks and I welcome Tuck’s thoughts on improving the process. Stability operations are the current that flows throughout our engagement in another state; they are neither upstream nor downstream of other actions or decisions, but constant.

Tuck notes President Obama’s position: “American isolationism is not an option. . . . But a strategy that involves invading every country
that harbors terrorist networks is naive and unsustainable.”

Thus, America should focus on building the capacity of local partners. In fact, building partner capacity is already a key, albeit challenging, part of stability operations, which seek to build effective and accountable public institutions, including those in the security sector.

In regards to Tuck’s thoughts on building democratic states, I agree with his analysis and examples; however, he fails to provide historical examples of success or offer solutions. Would he grant that planning can entail a dynamic, flexible, and open-minded approach to how we engage in stabilization rather than a closed, ethnocentric, and otherwise biased one? Good planning should drive stabilization practitioners to be more sensitive and aware of the myriad issues that confront a fragile state, and thus understand those issues even if they contradict the values of the countries contributing to security efforts.

While Tuck’s article highlights many key dilemmas and issues worthy of expanded treatment, ultimate success is a result of learned experiences, for better or worse, that help us innovate our practices. Many of our military and interagency partners have been struggling with stabilization missions for decades, but progress has been made. Dynamic senior leadership—characterized by accepting risk, respecting local customs and cultures, emphasizing change over time, and engaging in stability early, often, and always, as well as preventing one-size-fits-all or Western approaches to every situation—will strengthen future missions. The willingness of the intervening nation’s government and populace, host-nation “buy-in,” and an understanding that the mission will take time to be successful are also required.

The Author Replies
Christopher H. Tuck

I would like to thank COL Bossert for his thoughtful comments on my article “The ‘Practice’ Problem: Peacebuilding and Doctrine.” In the context of such crises as those in Syria, the topic of peacebuilding is one that merits continued reflection and debate.

Bossert’s critique revolves around three related themes: that I have implied that planning for peacebuilding operations is pointless; that I am, in effect, advocating isolationism; and that my article does not provide planning solutions to the problems it identifies. Let me take these points in order.

On the first issue, it is important to understand I am not criticizing the military for preparing as best it can for peacebuilding operations. Indeed, while peacebuilding may be out of fashion, there is no guarantee the military will not again be tasked by governments to conduct such operations. Military organizations have no choice but to prepare for

---

these activities. Nor, do I say in my article the military only “cuts and pastes” its approaches.

But I ask whether success in peacebuilding activities is “simply a matter of getting the right principles and honing tactical and operational methods.” My answer is we cannot assume the processes of producing a better doctrine actually will improve outcomes for peacebuilding operations because there is no wider consensus on whether or how these operations should be conducted. This position is an expression of the wider distinction between tactical and operational excellence on the one hand and strategic performance on the other. We simply do not know objectively if successful peacebuilding is possible, or whether top-down liberal approaches are the right means to achieve it. It may be that no amount of tactical military acumen will bring success.

So, to answer Bossert’s question, yes; I would “grant that planning can entail a dynamic, flexible, and open-minded approach to how we engage in stabilization rather than a closed, ethnocentric, biased one.” I would hope the former would be the preferred choice, but the point of my article is that even it may ultimately make no difference to the overall outcome. If peacebuilding cannot be done, good doctrine may simply mask failure longer. On that basis, I would probably disagree with Bossert that “ultimate success is a result of learned experiences—for better or for worse—that help us innovate our practices.” Leaving aside the practical and conceptual problems surrounding the notion of learning lessons, if Bossert’s statement were true, our prior accumulation of experience would have led us to much more success in peacebuilding than we have recently experienced.

On the second theme, given my skepticism, Bossert notes my argument implies an isolationist stance. Actually, my article does not argue for isolation; rather it says we should expect less from peacebuilding operations, and future performance in such operations is unlikely to improve radically. To argue peacebuilding is likely to remain highly problematic is not to argue that it cannot be used.

The final critique is I do not provide a set of recommendations for military practitioners. This is entirely true and for an organization focused on producing doctrine for stability operations, would indeed be a frustrating and possibly alienating outcome. But this criticism misinterprets the purpose of my article. Explicitly, my article says “there is no consensus on the practice of complex nation-building” and “the difficulties derive from fundamental uncertainties about whether such operations can be done at all.” To put it another way, my article does not provide answers because it sets out to show that we cannot even agree on the questions.
Lieutenant General (Ret.) James Dubik has written a little book with big ideas. After an extraordinary military career, he served as the Omar N. Bradley Chair of Strategic Leadership at the US Army War College, completed a PhD in philosophy, and is now Professor of Practice in the Strategic Studies Program at Georgetown University.

*Just War Reconsidered* is an ambitious and provocative book. Dubik conducts a critical analysis of two contemporary models of civil-military relations—Peter D. Feaver’s “Principal-Agent” model presented in *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (2003) and Eliot A. Cohen’s “Unequal Dialogue” illustrated in *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (2002)—against the moral framework proposed by Michael Walzer’s *Just and Unjust Wars* (1977). Military professionals are well acquainted with the Just War terms of *jus ad bellum* (just cause for war) and *jus in bello* (just conduct in war). The latter is more salient for them vis-à-vis the use of military force against combatants and noncombatants with the prevalence of rules of engagement for military operations during the ongoing war on terror. Arguably, such rules for fighting wars are clearer and simpler under the model of state-on-state conflict, and they get fuzzier with civil wars and insurgencies. This is especially so against nonstate actors as with the twenty-first-century’s global experience with violent extremist organizations.

Early in the book, Dubik introduces the expression “citizens-who-become-soldiers” to reinforce the link between a government that has a moral obligation to protect and defend its citizens, who in turn become agents of the state in the protection of national security interests. Given that soldiers have moral value and are simultaneously citizens, their activity, effort, and lives, when sacrificed, should be used well.

Dubik identifies an important gap in Walzer’s Just War theory in that it fails to address the moral obligations of political and military leaders in waging war. Ostensibly, senior national leaders guide and direct war-waging strategy, resourcing, and decisions for how war is conducted. Perhaps, most important is the leader’s responsibility to sustain the will of the people—here Dubik completes his allusion to the Clausewitzian trinity. War-waging decisions by political leaders are necessarily in collaboration and coordination with leaders of the military profession. Civil-military relations are thus an integral component of the decision-making processes for Just War deliberations and actions.

Dubik sets the stage appropriately with Samuel Huntington’s *Soldier and the State* (1957) and the precept of objective civilian control for the military profession. Noticeably absent is the mention of Morris Janowitz, the author of military sociology. This reviewer finds it difficult to discuss
civil-military relations and the military profession without addressing the precepts of The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (1960). Janowitz would support military leaders having the agency to influence and shape policy—as Dubik contends is necessary—because the stakes of getting it wrong are so high. Dubik asserts, convincingly, that moral responsibility does not give anyone “the right to be wrong” in waging war. Accordingly, insistence on that authority and failure to establish the conditions (leader climate or organizational/institutional culture) that increase the chances for success are morally bankrupt actions of civilian and military leaders, who have “an obligation to be as right as possible before they make a decision” (93).

Dubik uses three primary cases to test Walzer’s framework for jus in bello: the American Civil War, the Second World War, and the combined case of Afghanistan and Iraq. For the ideal war waged rightly, he notes civilian and military leaders had “several months of active analysis, intense and sometimes acrimonious debate, aboveboard and behind-the-scenes maneuvering, contentious analysis, and final argument” (16).

In completing his analysis of less-than-ideal war, Dubik cites cases of broken dialogue “when participants, whether civilian or military are dismissive of the perspectives of others, the dialogue breaks down and is quickly replaced with a facsimile or worse—no dialogue at all” (119). He concludes: “There is no arbitrary line dividing civilian and military war-waging responsibilities” (123) and derives the following five principles for ethical war-waging for national security professionals:

1. Continuous dialogue with senior civilian and military leaders (devise strategy and plans; understand, acknowledge, and address risk)
2. Final Decision Authority with the political-strategic leader in accordance with governing documents (for the United States, the Constitution)
3. Managerial competence in performing enterprise-level functions (US Title 10) that enable the operational force in the conduct of mission across the spectrum of conflict
4. Legitimacy established and maintained with the governed populace
5. Resignation as a form of dissent (moral agency for senior military leaders)

While Dubik provides a framework and set of principles for national leaders, his epilogue presents two sections with important questions by which to judge the conduct of war as ethical and moral. It really comes down to who is to blame and who is responsible for wars waged badly. To judge, Dubik asks simply “is the war being dragged out unnecessarily owing to a refusal to allocate sufficient resources—forces, funds, or strategic attention” (175). The reader is left to conclude that while senior military leaders may be complicit, it is the civilian leaders who are ultimately responsible for waging wars justly.

Just War Reconsidered offers a compelling challenge to the existing civil-military debate. When does a military leader’s provision of “best military advice” to inform the development of policy objectives and thereby shape strategy cross the line from influence to insistence? At what point does the option of military resignation threaten civilian
leaders and have an adverse impact on civil-military relations? These questions remain unanswered, but the military profession must have this conversation.

**Fighting Hurt: Rule and Exception in Torture and War**  
*By Henry Shue*

Reviewed by David Perry, Professor of Applied Ethics, Davidson College, and author of *Partly Cloudy: Ethics in War, Espionage, Covert Action, and Interrogation*

Philosophers are often accused of living in “ivory towers,” preferring to ruminate about arid abstractions rather than the stuff of everyday human existence. Thankfully, Henry Shue is not that kind of philosopher. Even though he has studied and taught at several top-notch universities, including Princeton, Cornell, and Oxford, his whole scholarly career has been devoted to examining practical ethical and political issues. *Fighting Hurt* gathers 22 essays published over a 40-year period on topics such as preemptive and preventive war, humanitarian military intervention, *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* proportionality, torture, and whether a country facing a “supreme emergency” may justifiably target enemy civilians.

Shue is steeped in the laws of armed conflict and international humanitarian law. Many of the arguments in the book reflect his efforts to interpret treaty law in connection with US strategy and military doctrine, as well as to urge reforms of international legal norms where he finds them wanting. Most chapters will be of interest to Department of Defense lawyers and doctrine writers. A few chapters will be accessible primarily to Just War theorists who have followed recent lines of dense philosophical debate, for example, on whether soldiers fighting for an unjust cause forfeit some rights that opposing combatants retain. While most readers will not study the complete anthology, all strategic leaders will benefit from reading Shue’s careful analyses.

Given that a current presidential candidate has endorsed waterboarding and “worse” interrogation tactics, and threatened to order US government personnel to employ them even if they are illegal, it would be prudent for military and intelligence leaders to reflect on one or more of Shue’s chapters on torture. For decades, Shue has argued against government-sanctioned torture, criticizing the standard “ticking bomb” hypothetical scenario as artificial and unrealistic and condemning attempts by judges and government lawyers to dilute the clear meaning of US-ratified treaties that ban torture under all circumstances. Although I have taken issue with a couple of Shue’s stances in my book *Partly Cloudy: Ethics in War, Espionage, Covert Action, and Interrogation* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, 2016), his arguments against legalizing torture, even against suspected terrorists, are powerful and well worth considering.

Some of Shue’s most interesting work (exhibited in several chapters) has focused on issues surrounding the targeting of “dual-use” infrastructure in war, for example, in some of the bombing tactics employed against Iraq in 1991 and Serbia in 1999. “If radar and missiles designed to bring down attacking aircraft cannot function without electricity, electricity-generating plants then serve a vital military role. But operating
rooms in hospitals and water-purification plants also do not function without electricity, and they are both central for civilian life” (280). Shue is critical both of relevant laws of war and US-NATO bombing tactics he believes have been too permissive in such cases. He argues instead that a more restrictive rule would be more ethical, both in light of the *jus in bello* principle of noncombatant immunity and in the interest of minimizing gratuitous harms to civilians. “A facility that is . . . dual-purpose, but makes an irreplaceable contribution to vital civilian needs, should be treated as if it were entirely civilian,” hence, not a legitimate target of military attack (282).

Shue deserves credit for the care he has taken to specify what we ought to mean by *ad bellum* and *in bello* principles of proportionality, and how we should weigh force protection against avoiding harm to non-combatants in military deliberations about war strategies, tactics, and weapon reining. Finally, Shue constructs compelling arguments for morally justifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for humanitarian military intervention and preventive war.
The Future of Violence: Robots and Germs, Hackers and Drones—Confronting a New Age of Threat
By Benjamin Wittes and Gabriella Blum
Reviewed by John C. Becking, US Army

The Future of Violence is an excellent exploration of technology’s impact on modern security concepts. The authors show how technology has altered the world, such that governments are no longer the sole guarantors of security. Benjamin Wittes and Gabriella Blum describe technologies seemingly plucked from Hollywood science-fiction movies: insect-sized drones controlled by smartphones from half a world away that are used to deliver DNA-matched lethal doses of poison; home chemists using publicly available information to create a virus resistant to vaccination which could be dispensed by air to a packed stadium of people; and cyberattacks assuming control of a user’s computer to execute nefarious activities around the world. Published in 2015, the authors concede these technologies will soon show their age or become irrelevant (citing Moore’s Law that computing “power” doubles every two years). Such technological advances, however, showcase the arc of technological capabilities.

Wittes and Blum argue technological advancements have created an environment of distributed offensive capabilities where new technologies allow groups or individuals to conduct offensive actions previously reserved for states. Offensive action, for example, no longer requires an aircraft carrier or the latest stealth fighter. Instead, action could be conducted by an individual via a cyberattack, and achieve the same levels of destruction. They further describe how technological advances have simultaneously created distributed vulnerabilities where increased use and reliance upon technology mean all states, groups, and individuals are vulnerable to attack, corruption, or theft. The authors call this new reality many-to-many threats and spend considerable time describing the political, legal, and moral implications of facing many-to-many threats as opposed to the traditional peer-to-peer threat that characterized the Cold War.

Another intriguing discussion regards the balance of liberty and security. Challenging the common conception that decreasing liberty and privacy is a natural cost to increasing security, Wittes and Blum suggest the most-free societies (Australia, Scandinavian countries, and the United States) are not necessarily the least safe, while the least-free countries (North Korea, Somalia, and Uzbekistan) are not likely to make a visitor feel safe. Rather, they argue the liberty and security balance is more nuanced in a technologically advanced age and is most reflected in terms of privacy.

Modern technology makes total privacy unobtainable as states and corporations gather megadata about individuals and organizations alike. Wittes and Blum suggest the modern perception of privacy is based on the intent for data collection and the nature of the data collected.
A corporation using individual data (to target marketing, for instance) would be considered acceptable while a government using the identical data would be considered unacceptable and a grave infringement upon privacy. They believe this privacy nuance parallels the liberty and security balance.

Throughout the book, the authors describe technologies and threats in relation to central governments, which they term “Leviathans.” These Leviathans still have a significant place in world security, but are seen as exercising shared rather than sole responsibility for societal security. Wittes and Blum highlight the careful balance between the responsibility of the state to secure society with the responsibility of private organizations/citizens to contribute to security. They cite, for example, the hacker group Anonymous’ attacks against ISIL: Anonymous did not act in concert with the international community, but the intended effects were complementary. The authors strongly suggest international governance (treaty organizations like NATO as well as bilateral agreements) will be important to the ability of Leviathans to provide security in the face of technological advances. Overall, a combination of individual, private, and government measures will be required to ensure societal security.

Wittes and Blum spend little time discussing specific policies governments and societies should adopt to deal with the new security realities. With the majority of the book so well developed, this reviewer wishes they had devoted more attention to plotting the way forward for ensuring security.

The Future of Violence is an excellent resource for anyone in the security or national policy fields desiring to understand how technology is changing our conception of security. This book will force us to reconsider how technology alters concepts of security.

The Other Space Race: Eisenhower and the Quest for Aerospace Security
By Nicholas Michael Sambaluk

Reviewed by Raymond A. Millen, Professor of Security Sector, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, US Army War College

In his book, The Other Space Race: Eisenhower and the Quest for Aerospace Security, Nicholas Sambaluk precisely recounts the Cold War dilemmas confronting presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy. While the Cold War was largely an era of US economic prosperity and peace, political and military tensions and competition drove policy decisions in regards to strategic deterrence, ballistic missile research, and the space race. Accordingly, both presidents were compelled to adjust these policies, mainly due to unsubstantiated fears among Americans, interservice rivalries, and astute Soviet propaganda.

As Sambaluk accurately relates, Eisenhower used the National Security Council (NSC) mechanism to formulate long-term policy and strategy. In accordance with his Basic National Security Policy, The New Look, Eisenhower devoted several NSC meetings, as well as
commissioning several committees, to study the inclusion of ballistic missiles in the US nuclear deterrence. This effort paid substantial dividends, resulting in the establishment of the US nuclear triad by the end of the decade. Of significance, the central role of nuclear deterrence resulted in a strong US national security posture without injury to the economy and societal moral fortitude.

While Eisenhower’s leadership and managerial style steadfastly guided the nation through a dangerous period in the Cold War, it did so at the cost of his presidential power. Eisenhower, the war hero and political outsider, fostered an image of quiet optimism, confidence, and nonpartisanship in the executive office. Few dared to challenge his mastery of national security issues during his first term; however, whereas Eisenhower was an incredibly active and engaged president in the development of policy and strategy, his “hidden hand” management style gave the general impression of inactivity, detachment, and complacency regarding Soviet ambitions.

Even though critics continually assailed the administration with perceived gaps—bomber, nuclear, and economic among others—Eisenhower was able to stave off these assertions, primarily due to public confidence in his leadership. With the Soviet launch of Sputnik in October 1957, however, this trust began to unravel. Critics now spoke of a missile gap and a space gap, creating near hysteria among the American people of an imminent nuclear holocaust. In reality, all the purported gaps favored the United States, but partisan politics and interservice rivalries stoked fears to fever pitch.

Aside from the Democratic Party using the missile gap for the midterm and presidential elections, the US Air Force sought to monopolize aerospace (both the air and space mediums), ultimately with nuclear armed bombers orbiting the planet (i.e., the Dyna-Soar program). Eisenhower persistently fought Air Force efforts to weaponize space, wishing to reserve this realm for peaceful purposes and to keep the space program under civilian control (i.e., NASA). Though the president was primarily interested in reconnaissance satellites to monitor Soviet intercontinental missile and bomber bases, he did see the scientific benefits of space initiatives—as long as the programs were financially prudent and served a practical purpose.

For his part in the space race, Kennedy used the myth of the missile gap to ascend to the presidency. Shortly after the inauguration, however, he backed off when Defense Secretary Robert McNamara inadvertently exposed the myth of the missile gap. Still, senior Air Force officers regarded Kennedy as an aerospace ally in view of his campaign promises and his invocation of the New Frontier. The quintessence of youth, energy, intelligence, and charm, Kennedy showed promise as an Air Force advocate.

Nevertheless, Kennedy, like Eisenhower, wanted to reserve space for peaceful means, though he did relish the competitive aspects of the space race. Furthermore, he ensured NASA remained in control of the space program. As a reflection of his ambiguous space policy though, he chose to support both the space program and the Dyna-Soar program. Where Kennedy differed from Eisenhower was in the realm of national prestige. Whereas Eisenhower saw no practical purpose in a lunar
landing, Kennedy viewed it as a demonstration of US technological and scientific superiority over the Soviets. Ironically, other than for prestige, Kennedy had no real interest in space. Hence, Kennedy provided no vision for the future of space exploration—that would be left to subsequent administrations. Moreover, despite the hype and propaganda, the Air Force Dyna-Soar program could never overcome the technological (and political) hurdles to fulfill program objectives. This program, too, would become moribund before the end of the decade, ending Air Force aspirations for space.

Sambaluk’s well-researched and well-written book captures the zeitgeist of the Cold War. Accordingly, Sambaluk addresses obscure issues surrounding the missile age. Hence, students of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations will find The Other Space Race not only revealing, but also a fine addition to their library.
Mark Landler’s *Alter Egos* examines the political and working relationship between President Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, when she was Obama’s Secretary of State. Landler states Obama and Clinton share a similar foreign policy outlook, but have very different views—based on their upbringings, experiences, and political worldviews—on the use of the military as an instrument of power.

According to Landler, Obama’s childhood in Indonesia and Hawaii, exposed him to a variety of opinions on the nature of US foreign policy, including the belief US leaders could bungle into conflicts they did not understand, thereby doing more harm than good. Obama came to believe many Americans habitually overestimated their country’s ability to shape events in distant countries, and as a rising young politician he easily applied this critique to the George W. Bush administration. Later, as president, Obama came to believe the most important foreign policy decisions were about the careful calculation of risk and avoiding costly interventions in places where US core interests were not at stake.

Clinton, by contrast, sees the military as a useful tool to be deployed sometimes as a “force for good” when resolving tough foreign policy dilemmas. Landler fully accepts that Hillary Clinton is a liberal interventionist, and her hawkish approach to foreign policy is not simply the result of political expediency, though this factor can also play a role. While her husband was president, Clinton believed “the only way to stop genocide in Bosnia was through selective air strikes against Serbian targets” (43). She also pressed her husband’s aides to help support President Bill Clinton on the decision to go forward with punishment air raids against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Operation Desert Fox (1998). Many of her closest aides over the years have shared this outlook, reinforcing and even prodding her to consider more interventionist ideas. Clinton’s hard-edged views on the use of force have been noted by critics throughout her career, including Senator Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump.

As Secretary of State, Clinton was a forceful advocate for the US intervention in Libya, although she was strongly opposed in this effort by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Many of her critics defined this position as a major blunder; however, at the time, Libya had a lot to recommend it, including a manageable population of 6.6 million, important oil resources, and no virulent religious or ethnic divisions. Obama, by contrast, was skeptical of the West’s power to shape events in Libya, but was eventually persuaded by Clinton and others that the intervention would be easy and low cost. Later, as the post-Gaddafi Libyan order descended into chaos, Gates came to believe, “They made exactly the same mistake in Libya that they accused Bush of in Iraq, failure to plan...
for what comes after the bad guy is gone” (169). Clinton and especially Obama were both haunted by the unravelling of Libya, however, Obama also blamed himself for being talked into an intervention he had strongly doubted from the beginning.

Looking elsewhere in the Middle East, Obama was skeptical about deeper US involvement in the Syrian civil war and remained satisfied with sending a trickle of weapons to Syrian rebels. Obama's reluctance to get more involved was also reinforced by the CIA's “hard look” at the record of providing weapons to insurgent fighters in previous conflicts, which were mostly “miserable failures” (220). The notable short-term exception to this disastrous record was the supply of weapons to Afghan fighters during the Soviet–Afghan war. Under these circumstances, Syria seemed like a bad bet to Obama.

Landler notes both Obama and Clinton maintained a strong interest in Asia and sought to revive the US role there after long years where the central focus of US foreign policy was the Middle East. Clinton spearheaded the effort to focus greater interest on supporting Asian allies, dubbing it the “pivot” (289). Her tough diplomacy with China and heavy focus on Asia is described by Landler as “perhaps her greatest contribution to Obama's foreign policy, the one in which she indisputably made a mark” (289). Such policies included the sale of weapons to Taiwan and a 35 percent tariff on China for dumping tires into America.

Clinton also told her subordinates to work more closely with Asian states concerned about China and took offense at the Chinese belief the United States was in a downward spiral and its representatives (including President Obama) could be treated accordingly. Clinton further normalized relations with Myanmar, allowing its leaders to reduce reliance on China which had turned their country into a vassal state. This initiative was handled almost entirely through Clinton and her subordinates with very little input from the White House.

Landler maintains that, as the Obama administration comes to a close, the President views his two most significant foreign policy accomplishments as the agreement on the Iranian nuclear program and the diplomatic breakthrough with Cuba. He also contends Hillary Clinton, as president, would not have sought a diplomatic solution to the problems with Iran and would have been more open to a military attack on Iran's nuclear infrastructure. Nevertheless, Clinton was of real use to Obama in putting together the program of multilateral sanctions designed to pressure Tehran into negotiations on surrendering its nuclear weapons option. Landler suggests Clinton “set the table” for the diplomatic agreement which was negotiated under the leadership of Secretary of State John Kerry. In dealing with Tehran, she was the “bad cop” while Obama was the “good cop” and both benefited from this belief. The author also believes Obama and Clinton are now in a “delicate succession dance” where they are seeking to help each other for their own reasons (345). Obama realizes his legacy could be undone by Trump's presidency, and he considers the Iran deal and the climate-change pact to be vulnerable in such circumstances.

Additionally, the book includes a number of interesting points on how the Washington foreign policy machine works. In selecting Clinton as his first secretary of state, Obama recognized the danger of having
an ambitious politician in this key cabinet role. Nonetheless, he also saw significant advantages. In particular, he hoped Clinton’s stature as an important public figure could help repair the US image and diplomatic setbacks he saw as a result of the eight years of George W. Bush’s presidency. Clinton also saw advantages in working with Obama, although her defeat in the 2008 presidential campaign left her with some bitterness to overcome. In one memorable passage in the book, the Brazilian president admitted to Clinton he had never expected Barack Obama to become president. Her more than candid response was, “Well, neither did I” (9).

In summary, *Alter Egos* is an important look inside the Obama and Clinton formulation and implementation of foreign policy. This study had special resonance during the election campaign between Clinton and Trump, but is also important because the contrasting Obama and Clinton views of foreign policy will continue to be reflected in upcoming strategy debates.

The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA’s Clandestine Service

By Henry A. Crumpton

Reviewed by Mark Grzegorzewski, Professor of Graduate Studies, Joint Special Operations University

To the uninitiated, the intelligence world is full of skullduggery, deceit, and loathsome behavior. Henry A. Crumpton, in *The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA’s Clandestine Service*, puts a human face on this world while acknowledging the need for clandestine operatives in defense of the nation. Crumpton, a career CIA officer and head of operations at the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center during the 1990s, achieved legendary status for his work in thwarting the Millennium Plot and for his actions in Afghanistan against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Accordingly, he is the ideal contributor to a book on covert action.

*The Art of Intelligence* is a very readable book. Full of anecdotal accounts of a CIA officer’s fulfilling career, it is more a memoir than an academic analysis of the intelligence world and its applicability to policymakers. With multiple references to Sun Tzu and a chapter on Crumpton’s time with the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, it never transitions to a theoretical lens, and readers are left searching for lessons learned by the US government in countering terrorism.

Among other things, the book describes Crumpton’s interagency and counterterrorism career, including his liaison role with the FBI and the institutional distrust between the FBI and the CIA, his involvement in developing armed drones and the resulting pushback from the Department of Defense, and his time at the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center. An important insight provided by Crumpton is much counterterrorism work goes unacknowledged because of the nature of the business. Alternatively, the public only sees acts of terrorism that have not been thwarted by the US intelligence community, rather than the “presumably” many-more instances when terrorism has been foiled.
Crumpton also vividly describes the US fight against terrorism in Afghanistan. His accounts of working directly with Ahmad Shah Massoud and Hamid Karzai are truly wonderful. Readers are left musing what happened to Afghanistan? Crumpton’s answer is how the US government’s failure to plan for Afghan state-building and its premature focus on Iraq contributed to disappointment in Afghanistan. This is a persistent theme throughout the book—the failure of US policymakers, not the failure of US intelligence operatives.

In addition, Crumpton discusses his role as the coordinator for terrorism at the Department of State and attaining the rank of ambassador-at-large, which gave him a brief outsider’s view of the CIA before his retirement from government service in 2007. He also highlights his work at Johns Hopkins, following his government service, which put his CIA career in a theoretical context—something the book is missing.

While Crumpton’s aim to show the nature of intelligence will continue to grow as the nature of war continues to shift, especially in the post-9/11 world, readers are left underwhelmed by his plethora of anecdotal accounts which lack analysis. The book, a reflection of his distinguished service coupled with a treatise on how the CIA is underused, misused, or misunderstood, never details how to restructure the organization to inform policymakers better.

Although Crumpton did not meet his stated goals, I would recommend The Art of Intelligence to veterans and newcomers for its interesting firsthand accounts and its display of how actions taken by others, including policymakers and intelligence operatives, impact US national security. The value of this book lies in the insight it provides into the interlinked worlds of intelligence, policymaking, and warfare.
New Theories in Security Studies

Ontopower: War, Powers, and the State of Perception
By Brian Massumi

Reviewed by Philip W. Reynolds, University of Hawaii-Manoa

Brian Massumi’s latest addition to our understanding of power may be the most important addition to strategy since On War. To Massumi, an *ontopower* is power that is able to alter perception about a chain of effects, altering the future of the original (41). It is, as its Greek prefix would indicate, a living power. Massumi’s protagonist is the idea of preemption as strategy, and he describes in his book the underlying assumptions on which preemption becomes the only response available to threats. Preemption, because it occurs before the threat emerges, must have as its ontological premise the ability to define a threat after its destruction has occurred. Preemption, in its truest sense, requires perceptions bent to fit the action. In other words, what could be a threat should be attacked because it could attack you. Preemption changes premise from fact to potential.

What Massumi does very well is translate a philosophy of action into epistemological methods. He uses the word “operationalization,” familiar to military planners, to describe this process. This word means “to make into an action.” True to its assumptions, *ontopower* requires descriptions of the environmental system as full of threats. What may be surprising to some, the two dominant descriptive paradigms of modern life, neoconservatism and neoliberalism (43), synthesize a need for this power, one that benefits from an ability to reorganize the complexity of the environment. One militarizes the environment and the other benefits from the creative destruction of the capitalist order. It is in this way preemption, an ontology, becomes epistemology.

To Massumi, the juxtaposition of deterrence and preemption creates a new era in security studies. Deterrence is policy; it is the rationalization of competition between peers who are against unitary actors. Preemption supposes there is no benefit for rationalizing. The Cold War was deterrence, but we have entered a new era where threats require responses faster than policy can provide. Massumi makes the point, if our actions create the enemy, then preemption only requires a threat because the threat could become an enemy. But, preemption disturbs equilibriums. It creates reactions that cannot be predicted, and uncertainty is a vague, uneasy threat, and so on. One does not preempt something you can deter, and you do not deter something that can be preempted. Preemption is the logical conclusion of the liberal state’s inability to provide security, what Massumi calls the “perception attack.”

Massumi’s explanation of the militarization of *ontopower* and the machinations of history are his strengths. In joining the concepts that drove the revolution in military affairs to the execution of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, he reveals the transformation of mundane military strategy into a power to the edge (93). Massumi’s connection here of the unknowable threat and the preemptive actions reveal a frightening world in which there are unanticipatory effects that create
father actions, and so on. Capabilities-based operations provide a nexus in which the terminus of action meets the push of past skill and reflex. The role of command is one of modulating emergence in order that the action provides the information required to perceive the threat. Information becomes secondary even as the military relies ever more on information technology (123).

This operationalization and militarization of preemption and Massumi’s description of the role of threat is deeply concerning. Are these assumptions conditioning the security-state to long for the “end of action” that preemption seems to afford? A nation could convince itself of the need to preempt a threat that is not really there, and trigger a war. Massumi approaches the metaphysical with his “confounding aspect” when he invokes Whitehead’s lament about the “unfortunate effect” of “back cast critical thought” (155). There is no pure history from which to learn, no exogenous right. What we know now affects what we knew before. Something happens, and we immediately reconfigure the past to fit the new information. Not doing this could create an unbearable cognitive dissonance, but it is not a one-way street. The past has a force all its own that affects the present and the future. Through his writing, both here and previously, Massumi is issuing a clarion call on the changing nature of power, with preemption becoming a strange attractor bending past and present into a network of constantly changing assumptions (209).

*Ontopower* is less a guidebook than a warning against assuming we will be right. Without making a moral argument, Massumi effectively describes the moral limitations of the power to preempt, the rewriting of history through the actions of the present, and the confirmation of what could have been into what was. This book should be studied by practitioners of power—professionals who owe it to the country to have discussions now, so as to have answers when policy demands action.

**Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse**

By Paul Staniland

Reviewed by Patrick Finnegan, Strategy and Security Institute, University of Exeter, with Anthony C. King, Chair in War Studies, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick

Paul Staniland’s *Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse* is an important contribution to the analysis of terror networks and their motivations. The book compares the organizational structure and strength of militant groups engaged in violent conflict and examines the question of cohesion in terrorist groups. This is necessary as, in Staniland’s words, “the ability of rebels to build strong organizations has been crucial to their military effectiveness and political influence.”

Staniland’s central argument is that the social solidarity and internal hierarchy of terrorist organizations—their social cohesion—will determine their political goals and tactics: “pre-war networks in which insurgent leaders are embedded determine the nature of the organization
they can build when a war begins.” By focusing on the social links surrounding the initial leadership of these groups, Staniland highlights how social networks determine the development of the organization. He also shows how this development, and later performance, at an organizational level is dependent on the initial social structures of the founders. While this does not explain performance at a ground level, it does show how it may be possible to predict organizational development based upon preexisting knowledge of the founders. This aspect of the book is well suited for readers wishing to understand nonstate actor organizational development, strengths, and weaknesses.

After an initial contextual discussion, readers are presented with a series of case studies, exploring how each of the selected terror groups originated and adapted to the changing situation. Conflicts reviewed occurred in theaters in Kashmir, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka. A fourth case study is based in Southeast Asia. By utilizing ideas of path dependency, Staniland illustrates how these groups were, in many cases, restricted in the potential forms they could take; shows the difficulty of transition between one form and another; and highlights the impact of destabilization tactics on particular groups.

*Networks of Rebellion* is an accessible work. It deals with a variety of conflicts, many of which Staniland acknowledges as being underresearched, and presents clear, understandable explanations of each organization under review. In the fifth chapter, for example, Staniland presents organizations which may initially appear to share many similarities, but which can and will act differently based on subtle preconflict differences. He uses the different paths followed by traditional clerics and urban Islamists in pre-Taliban Afghanistan as an example.

Through detailed case studies, Staniland highlights the subtle differences between the groups, which in other studies might be discussed collectively under particular titles such as “religious extremist”—or may not be discussed at all if they are smaller or do not pose the largest threat—and illustrates how subtle differences can have significant implications. For instance, the difference between the links found in revolutionary Islamists and traditional clerics, both religiously minded, resulted in the clerics becoming “obsolete and unequipped to do political battle” compared to the Islamist group with its better connections between leaders.

A negative issue with the book is its difficult position within current cohesion literature. The title suggests the book explains how insurgent groups operate and conduct their missions. This is not entirely true. This is a work of organizational cohesion taken in its literal sense—bonding links. Current cohesion literature focuses more on cohesion defined as actual military practice—task cohesion. For readers seeking an understanding of the latter, they will need to look elsewhere.

That being said, one of the most redeeming features of the book is how it is written. Staniland is honest about the strengths and limitations of his research, and he does not claim to answer all of the questions related to the chosen conflicts. He attempts to answer specific questions by examining specific case studies. When the results differ from the prediction, he is direct and clear about the limitations of this way of
thinking. He is also aware of what the book contributes to the field, in many ways substantially, and what it does not.

The closing chapter is the book’s most important. Staniland lays out what his theory can and cannot explain. He presents recommendations for future research and policy and opens the door for a wide range of research activities that can build directly upon his work and focus on the questions he omitted. One of the most important elements to take away from *Networks of Rebellion* is that “conflict does not play out on a blank slate that actors can make and remake as they wish. Instead, the past shapes leaders’ options in the present.”
June Teufel Dreyer, a political science professor at the University of Miami, offers readers a broad historical introduction to China-Japan relations, but breaks no new ground to explain their power rivalry or to assay their likely future directions. Dreyer begins with the first documented contact between the Chinese and Japanese in the late Han dynasty and touches on their clashes on the Korean peninsula during the Tang and Ming dynasties that bookended the failed Yuan dynasty invasions of Japan in the thirteenth century. She then devotes most of her book to the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries when Japan occupied Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, and China’s eastern seaboard.

Dreyer’s chief strength lies in her detailed discussion, often drawing on primary sources, of political groups in both countries that held conflicting opinions about trade, military strategy, and the growing role of the United States in the region. She spotlights little-known facts that flesh out readers’ understanding of Sino-Japanese relations—for example, Dreyer cites often-insulting terms both sides applied to each other during their turbulent history. She notes China’s declaration of war against Japan in 1894 referred to its adversaries as “dwarf pirates,” while in 2004 a Japanese Diet member called China “a Yamata-no-Orochi,” that is, “a mythical eight-headed, eight-tailed dragon reputed to attack a village each year to eat one of its female children.”

Dreyer argues Sino-Japanese clashes are “merely symptoms” of an underlying problem, namely the unwillingness of either state to accept the other as an equal or to accept a position of inferiority vis-à-vis the other. She notes the Chinese have long regarded themselves as civilized and all others (including Japan) as barbarians or inferiors. Japanese nativists ridiculed this claim because barbarians had conquered China and been recognized as its leaders several times. To these Japanese nativists, Japan was the true Middle Kingdom, especially after it adopted Western-inspired industrial and military reforms that placed it on an upward trajectory of national power. Dreyer argues the Japanese were “psychologically prepared” to undergo these reforms because they had borrowed “so heavily from China in the past.” What a back-handed compliment to China and a put-down of Japan’s own cultural gifts for self-criticism and improvement!

Arguably the most horrific episode in Sino-Japanese history was Japan’s Nanjing Massacre in December 1937. Nanjing, then the capital of the Republic of China, was devastated by the Imperial Japanese Army reportedly killing 300,000 people, according to Chinese accounts. To this day, Dreyer concludes, this campaign “remains . . . a massive impediment to efforts at Sino-Japanese reconciliation.” In 1985 when Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone made his government’s first post-World War II visit
to Tokyo’s Yasukuni Shrine honoring Japan’s war dead, anti-Japanese protests by students broke out in several Chinese cities. Prime Minister Shinzō Abe’s visits to Yasukuni draw strong rebukes from China today.

In 1951, Japan and its World War II adversaries concluded treaties that affirmed Japan’s sovereignty and ended Allied occupation. The US-Japan treaty called for a continued US military presence in Japan to strengthen regional security in East Asia where the Korean War had broken out a year earlier. In China, however, Communist Party officials viewed the US forces as a potential threat. Dreyer observes that the Chinese began to see the US-Japan alliance as designed to “wage war against China and the rest of Asia.” Dreyer could have added that many Chinese opinion makers today frame the US policy of rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific in similar terms. They fuel China’s encirclement anxieties by claiming, inter alia, Japan and other neighbors are challenging China’s maritime claims due to US support, Japan’s prime minister is moving to reinterpret his country’s pacifist constitution with US acquiescence, and the United States is shepherding a trans-Pacific trade deal that includes Japan while excluding China.

China’s weakness throughout most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries constitutes a historical outlier, not the norm of its history. By reverting to its mean, China today may be enjoying a relatively stable period during which it increasingly reasserts its influence as a major world power. If this is true, it is not surprising Dreyer contends “the intervals between Sino-Japanese confrontations have become shorter, positions more intransigent, and the probability of reaching compromises progressively reduced.” The best we can hope for, Dreyer suggests, is a carefully managed “uncomfortable peace.” No wonder she ends Middle Kingdom & Empire of the Rising Sun with a Chinese proverb she translates as “stones that cannot escape each other rub each other smooth.” Clearly, she believes the grating Chinese and Japanese stones will become smoother either through greater cooperation or violent conflict. Readers are left to decide.
Using the lens of history and five twentieth-century campaigns and battles, Douglas Macgregor’s *Margin of Victory: Five Battles that Changed the Face of Modern War* delivers an incisive account of the salient reasons for success and failure in war and what the United States needs to do to ensure its future margin of victory. Macgregor asserts that a nation’s ability to adapt its military organization, technology, and human capital to dominate enemies and threats will ensure its victory in the critical first battles of future high-intensity conflict. He also warns that the last 15 years of counterinsurgency and occupation duty has atrophied the US military’s ability to succeed in this environment, particularly so for the US Army.

Thematically linked, each chapter offers a unique historical vignette—the battle of Mons in 1914, the battle of Shanghai in 1937, the destruction of German army group center in the western Soviet Union in 1944, the counterattack across the Suez Canal in 1973, and the Battle of 73 Easting in Iraq and Kuwait in 1991. Although some of the chapters support the author’s arguments better than others, their overall message is clear: wars are often decided in the decades before they begin, not by just-in-time technology, rushed task organization, or the surprising impact of key leaders on the spot. The book concludes with specific, well-considered reform recommendations for the US Department of Defense.

An iron fist of a read, *Margin of Victory* is generally coherent and supported by ample and relevant evidence; however, Macgregor does not always choose the best historical examples to support his main points, and he sometimes strays into unsupported commentary on previous national policy and unnecessary declaratives. Add to this Macgregor’s affinity for high-intensity conventional warfare, and the balance of the book suffers.

The book opens with a less-than-expected first example: the battle of Mons. While Sir Richard Haldane’s reforms of the British army were underway, they had little strategic impact on the Western front in the fall of 1914. The narrative gains strength as it unfolds further in the battle of Shanghai, where Japanese resistance to needed reforms and the exorbitant price they paid in blood and material for courting hubris exposed their failure to adapt their military organization, their poor use of nascent armored forces, and their refusal to take advantage of the synergy of jointness.

Patient readers are rewarded in the middle of the book. The 1944 collapse of German army group center and the 1973 Suez campaign are towering examples of victory achieved through needed reforms and
superb human capital. Macgregor adeptly lauds the seriousness and impressive utility of Soviet interwar reforms, not only in technology, but also in organization and doctrine. The Soviet use of mobile armored and related forces with integrated air support conducting shock and deep operations inside a unified general staff structure was nothing short of revolutionary for a state that just two years before nearly faced extinction. Equally impressive was the 1973 Israeli counterattack across the Sinai Peninsula and Nile River, leveraging speed, surprise, and a culture of mission command that rewarded small-unit initiative. Front and center in these two examples, Macgregor makes his point clear: fast and well-protected armored forces were vital to ensure a solid margin of victory.

In the final example, Macgregor highlights the Battle of 73 Easting during Operation Desert Storm. While this battle was wholly tactical and not particularly decisive to the outcome of the campaign, Macgregor shows why excessive caution and a lack of true jointness are threats to victory and why aggressive leaders imbued with a culture of mission command are needed at all levels.

But what about the types of modern, “wicked” problems that do not lend themselves to solution by highly mobile armored forces with joint fire support, yet remain vital to our national interests and need a military response? The author gives foreign policy prescriptions that dismiss many of these, and they weaken his arguments. The range of military operations is well-established in US joint doctrine for a reason, and we would be wise to remember that soldiers did not invent the range; national policy did.

Macgregor concludes with innovative and powerful recommendations. First, the Department of Defense should create a national chief of defense and staff with full operational and administrative authority. Second, the geographic combatant commands and services should cash in bloated and unnecessary layers of command, such as the service components, and replace them with robust and agile regional joint task forces. At a minimum, this would reduce decision cycles and improve joint integration. Third, all services, but particularly the Army, need organizations far less suitable for occupation and more capable for decisive, mobile, and high-end joint combat. To be sure, Macgregor’s repeated warnings about the need for decisive victory on short notice against high-end symmetric threats are well founded and supported by recent scholarship. But, this fact does not mean the United States should neglect security cooperation, presence for assurance and deterrence, and permanent alliances to achieve it. Our national interests demand a more balanced approach.

Whether you agree with the author or not, Margin of Victory is a worthy read with several well-considered recommendations that will prompt critical thinking and debate among senior military leaders and others in the defense community about how we fight—and what it might take to win the next war.
This book is a major contribution to understanding one of the lesser-known and under-studied campaigns of the First World War still dominated by the Western Front. It is part of the publisher’s “War, Technology, and History Series” whose editor highlights the challenge to analyze “the precise role of technology.” This work is a case study from the principal Central Powers’ perspective. The author has made extensive use of German and Austrian sources.

The introduction articulates the book’s scope and context clearly and succinctly. It juxtaposes this final invasion of Serbia with the Central Powers’ previous, combined operation against Russia earlier in the year, the stunning victory at Gorlice-Tarnów, which the author covered in an earlier book in the same series. The latter was a high-water mark of German and Austro-Hungarian cooperation, liberating Austrian Galicia and conquering Russian Poland in May–July 1915. The invasion of Serbia in September–November 1915 was the last for the “military marriage” of August von Mackensen as commander and Hans von Seeckt as his Chief of Staff.

The first chapter is a whirlwind review of nineteenth-century European history, national developments, diplomacy, and conflicts. The start of the twentieth century saw increasing German diplomatic isolation, but particularly Austrian fear of an expansionist Serbia as a mortal threat. The chapter reviews the embarrassing Austro-Hungarian failures to subdue Serbia in the latter half of 1914, emphatically stating Austrian Chief of Staff Conrad von Hötzendorf should have comprehended Austria-Hungary could only fight on one front at a time. The main effort should have been Galicia against the Russians, not both simultaneously.

Chapter 2 considers strategic priorities and decisions in March–September 1915. Turkish membership in the Central Powers from October 1914 had raised the requirement to develop a landline of communications. Any future missions also had to account for the devastating Austro-Hungarian defeat in the winter Carpathian Campaign against Russia. Significantly, German Chief of Staff Erich von Falkenhayn established alliance strategic prioritization of a Serbian operation—without consideration of civilian policymakers.

Chapter 3 covers plans and preparations, including assigned forces, which composed a joint and combined campaign. Under command were German, Austro-Hungarian, and Bulgarian troops; aviation elements; and the Austrian-Hungarian Navy’s Danube Flotilla. The text includes a superb review of commanders, German and Austrian, down to division. This cast of characters brought quality and experience to the conduct of the operation.

Chapter 4 discusses the opening moves between September 25 and October 12. Chapter 5 focuses on the decisive 10 days from October 12 to 22. Chapter 6 highlights the subsequent fall of key cities from...
October 22 to November 5. Chapter 7 summarizes the pursuit on November 6 to 30. These chapters convey the continual challenge to comprehend ground truth and to demonstrate flexibility to adapt and retain initiative. Indeed, campaign success did not deliver the intent to destroy the Serbian Army around Kosovo. Nonetheless, Mackensen’s operation had achieved the defeat of Serbia and the establishment of a line of communications for about 67,000 casualties.

Chapter 8 analyzes post-campaign considerations from December 1915 to January 1916, and Chapter 9 provides overall assessments. Serbian remnants escaped to Adriatic ports, where Allied shipping evacuated them. Reconstituted on Corfu, a new Serbian army would fight out of Salonika. Worse, the defeat of Serbia marked the end of the closest German and Austrian cooperation. As with the Gorlice-Tarnów operation, the perennial spats between Falkenhayn and Conrad had magnified difficulties. The final conquest of Serbia also exacerbated the less-than-harmonious relations between the German High Command and the German operational headquarters on the Eastern Front. German and Austrian strategic priorities increasingly diverged as Austrian dependence on German military assistance increased.

The role of technology is integrated throughout the text. The Central Powers leveraged several technical enablers. Specialists extracted the maximum benefit from available rail lines. Army and aviation services had well-integrated aerial reconnaissance. Commanders fielded a preponderant advantage in artillery overall—and heavy artillery in particular. The Germans capitalized on signals and communications to facilitate offensive operations, including frequent movement of higher headquarters forward as necessary. Nonetheless, technology was not a panacea; warfare still required careful planning, logistics, and sustainment. Skilled commanders and staff wielded them with seasoned expertise; they did not own a monopoly. Admittedly, they fought an outnumbered and war-weary foe.

Unfortunately, there are numerous errors in the text. The significant quantity of editing oversights is difficult to comprehend. These do little justice to the author’s efforts. One factual error is to categorize both the German SMS Goeben and SMS Breslau as light cruisers; the former was a battle cruiser.

Invasion: The Conquest of Serbia, 1915 provides a thoroughly researched, well-written case study in a mere 138 pages, not including endnotes, on a joint and combined operation from a century ago. The analysis underlines the clashing perspectives of different headquarters’ echelons. One of the more intriguing aspects of the book concerns the ready German concession to Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria of responsibility for post-conflict occupation. That period is another story entirely.
Braddock’s Defeat: The Battle of the Monongahela and the Road to Revolution
By David L. Preston

Reviewed by LTC Jason W. Warren, Concepts and Doctrine Director, Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College

Reading terrain in relation to the adversary is often the key to tactical victory. It also makes for the beginnings of a first-rate military history, as David L. Preston demonstrates in his profound Braddock’s Defeat: The Battle of the Monongahela and the Road to Revolution. Preston paddled, hiked, and drove his way to an excellent analysis of the maneuver and decision-making of the French, Indians, British, and colonists during this epic campaign in the 1755 American wilderness. His on-the-ground treatment of events renders this study the definitive work of the first conventional British ground operation of the French and Indian War, and as Preston shows, with wide-ranging implications for Europe in the Seven Years’ War, and eventually, the American Revolutionary War.

Hesitant at first to purchase what I considered yet another treatment of this infamous engagement, Preston’s excellent lecture at the Ohio Country Conference convinced me to rethink my impression. I was more than rewarded. Braddock’s Defeat is one of the most thorough military history accounts of any topic, combining detailed strategic, operational, and tactical examinations with the best of modern military history’s cultural considerations. In so doing, Preston revives Braddock’s reputation as a sensible military man, sensitive to the need to cultivate indigenous allies, while placating the infighting colonists. The Indians themselves become the main agent of victory for the battle, acting in conjunction with French officers and cadets in crushing the British flankers and pouring deadly enfilading volleys into Braddock’s beleaguered column.

Preston’s uncovering of rare Indian voices in the record adds brilliantly to this analysis. Braddock’s defeat was a matter of initial Indian success in an ambush, in a fashion similar to what I have discovered occurred repeatedly in the Great Narragansett War (traditionally King Philip’s War). An initial accurate volley into a European column negotiating difficult terrain by a large number of concealed Indians usually led to a rapid and decisive Indian victory. Although it may have been more useful in the section about the battle itself, the counterfactual allusion to how Braddock might have reacted tactically is a critical piece of Preston’s analysis (315–316). Subsequent Indian fighters, like Henry Bouquet, Robert Rogers, and “Mad” Anthony Wayne, employed such tactics against Native Americans, perhaps making good Braddock’s supposed final words, “We shall better know how to deal with them another time” (273). As with many commands unprepared for the enemy, there was no next time for Braddock and many of his troops who were killed in action and mutilated in accord with Indian cultural affinities in war.

Preston does not conclude with new consideration of Indian material, but uncovers original French sources in Caen’s archives and elsewhere which produced, among valuable maps, a hitherto unknown account of the French battle plan. I once attended the lecture of a well-known and popular Second World War historian, who, when asked...
about the German sources he had examined for his massive volumes, replied he had not considered them. Wrong answer. Preston avoids this one-sided pitfall of writing military history by examining both Native and French sources. He also reveals American historians have usually filtered the extant English primary sources on Braddock through an American-Whiggish lens, distorting the British commander’s ability as a field commander and effective purveyor of colonial-Indian policy.

Preston’s championing of irregular warfare in the “Consequences” and “Epilogue” sections, however, establishes a sense of false dichotomy between European “conventional” and American “irregular” warfare. (He also sometimes conflates ranging and light infantry tactics, which were not always identical.) The Western-Near Eastern tradition of light infantry musketeers developed in earnest during the endemic warfare between the Ottoman Turks, particularly the Janissaries, and the Spanish Habsburg’s light infantry in the sixteenth-century Mediterranean theater. Gustavus Adolphus later employed light infantry effectively during the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648). In the New World, John Mason of Connecticut utilized light infantry and ranging tactics (some of which he had experienced in the Thirty Years’ War) in the Pequot War (1636–1637), as did later Connecticut leaders and Massachusetts’ Benjamin Church in the Great Narragansett War (1675–1676). Wayne Lee in Barbarians and Brothers also details the circulation of irregular military methods within the Anglosphere.

Preston should have given his audience the “Paul Harvey” by detailing the other side of the story concerning conventional forces’ initial losses. For every Braddock’s defeat, there was a Quebec, for every St. Clair’s debacle (Battle of Wabash), a Fallen Timbers, for every Isandlwana (Anglo-Zulu War), a Battle of Ulundi. This treatment of irregulars extends in the American case to George Washington (whose excellent treatment in the book is noteworthy), who sought not to build a perfect hybrid of conventional and irregular units, but rather to utilize light infantry and irregular tactics in complementary fashion for decisive conventional combat. This relationship does not apply in the inverse, as the operations in Quebec (1759) and Yorktown (1781) were both war-ending conventional campaigns. While David Hackett Fischer (who wrote an editor’s note for Braddock’s Defeat) demonstrates in Washington’s Crossing the utility of American light forces to set the stage for conventional battle—the reverse remains untrue—conventional forces do not usually set the stage for war-ending victories of irregular or militia forces.

This book must be read by those interested in early American, ancien régime European, or military history. Preston has crafted a truly special and remarkable account.
Contributor's Guidelines

Article Submissions
The editor welcomes unsolicited works that adhere to the following criteria:

Content Requirements

Scope: The manuscript addresses strategic issues regarding US defense policy or the theory and practice of land warfare. Visit our website (www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/) to gain a better understanding of our current editorial scope.

Audience: US Army War College graduates and other senior military officers as well as members of government and academia concerned with national security affairs.

Clearance: If you are a member of the US military or a civilian employee of the Department of Defense or one of its service departments, your manuscript may require official clearance (see AR 360-1, ch. 6). Contact your local Public Affairs Office for assistance.

Concurrent Submissions: The manuscript is not under consideration with other publishers and has not been published elsewhere, including on the Internet.

Formatting Requirements

Length: 5,000 words or less.

File Type and Layout: MS Word Document (.doc) or Rich Text Format (.rtf) file; Times New Roman, 12-point font; double-spaced; 1-inch margins.

Visual Aids: Only include charts, graphs, and photographs when they are essential to clarify or amplify the text. Images must be grayscale, a minimum of 640 x 480 pixels, and submitted in their original file format (.tiff or .jpg). It is not sufficient to submit images embedded in a .doc or .rtf file.

Citations: Document sources as footnotes. Indicate all quoted material by quotation marks or indentation. Reduce the number of footnotes to the minimum consistent with honest acknowledgement of indebtedness, consolidating notes where possible. Lengthy explanatory footnotes are discouraged and will be edited. The Quarterly generally uses the conventions prescribed in the Chicago Manual of Style.

Submission Requirements

Submit to: usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@mail.mil

Include:
• Each author’s full name, mailing address, phone number, e-mail address, and curriculum vitae or biographical sketch. When there are multiple authors, please identify the primary point of contact.
• All original files (.doc or .rtf, and any .tiff or .jpg files, if applicable) as attachments.
• An abstract.

Lead Times: If you would like your manuscript considered for a specific issue, submit it by the following dates:
• 1 December – Spring
• 1 March – Summer
• 1 June – Autumn
• 1 September – Winter

Note: Lead times only ensure the editor will consider a manuscript for publication in a specific issue; however, the editor reserves the right to recommend a manuscript for publication in any upcoming issue to meet space or topic requirements.

Review Process: Upon receipt, we will send you a confirmation e-mail. The review process can take four to six weeks from date of receipt.
Book Review Submissions

Parameters publishes reviews of books on history, political science, military strategy, grand strategy, and defense studies. The editor welcomes inquiries for potential book reviews.

Send inquiries about a book or to request a review copy for a specific title to usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@mail.mil. In the e-mail, please provide:

- The book's title and the name of the author(s) or editor(s).
- Your qualifications, full name, e-mail address, phone number, and mailing address.

Statement of Ownership, Management, and Circulation

(Required by 39 U.S.C. 3685.)

1. Publication Title: Parameters
2. Publication Number: 413530
3. Filing Date: 31 August 2016
4. Issue Frequency: Quarterly
5. Number of Issues Published Annually: 4
6. Annual Subscription Price: $26.00 (through GPO)
7. Complete Mailing Address of Known Office of Publication: US Army War College, ATTN: Parameters, 47 Ashburn Drive, Carlisle, Cumberland County, PA 17013-5010
8. Complete Mailing Address of Headquarters or General Business Office of Publisher: US Army War College, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, Cumberland County, PA 17013-5238
9. Publisher: US Army War College, same address; Editor: Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria III, same address; Managing Editor: Nora Ellis, same address
10. Owner: US Army War College, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA 17013-5238
11. Known Bondholders, Mortgages, and Other Security Holders Owning or Holding 1 Percent or More of Total Amount of Bonds, Mortgages, or Other Securities: None
12. The purpose, function, and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for federal income tax purposes have not changed during the preceding 12 months.
13. Issue Date for Circulation Below: Summer 2016
14. Extent and nature of circulation:
a. Total Number of Copies: Average No. Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months (hereinafter “Average”), 11,926. No. Copies of Single Issue Published Nearest to Filing Date (hereinafter “Most Recent”), 11,975.
b. Legitimate Paid and/or Requested Distribution: (1) Outside County Paid/Requested Mail Subscriptions stated on PS Form 3541: Average, 10,312. Most Recent, 9,935. (2) In-County Paid/Requested Mail Subscriptions stated on PSF Form 3541: Average, 0. Most Recent, 0. (3) Sales Through Dealers and Carriers, Street Vendors, Counter Sales, and Other Paid or Requested Distribution Outside USPS: Average, 1,010. Most Recent, 1,291. (4) Requested Copies Distributed by Other Mail Classes Through the USPS: Average, 127. Most Recent, 132.
c. Total Paid and/or Requested: Average, 11,449. Most Recent, 11,358.
d. Nonrequested Distribution: (1) Outside County Nonrequested Copies Stated on PS Form 3541: Average, 0. Most Recent, 0. (2) In-County Nonrequested Copies Stated on PS Form 3541: Average, 0. Most Recent, 0. (3) Nonrequested Copies Distributed Through the USPS by Other Classes of Mail: Average, 0. Most Recent, 0. (4) Nonrequested Copies Distributed Outside the Mail: Average, 444. Most Recent, 419.
e. Total Nonrequested Distribution: Average, 444. Most Recent, 419.
f. Total Distribution: Average, 11,893. Most Recent, 11,777.
g. Copies not Distributed: Average, 33. Most Recent, 198.
h. Total: Average, 11,926. Most Recent, 11,975.
i. Percent Paid and/or Requested Circulation: Average, 96%. Most Recent, 96%.

I certify that the information furnished is true and complete.
Antulio J. Echevarria III, Editor
The US Army War College Quarterly, *Parameters*, is a refereed forum for contemporary strategy and landpower issues. It furthers the education and professional development of senior military officers, and members of government and academia concerned with national security affairs. *Parameters* is indexed in, inter alia, *Air University Library Index to Military Periodicals*, *US Government Periodicals Index*, *LexisNexis Government Periodicals Index*, *Worldwide Political Science Abstracts*, *Lancaster Index to Defense & International Security Literature* (UK), and *PAIS Bulletin*. Book reviews are indexed in *Gale Group's Book Review Index*. *Parameters* is also available through ProQuest and UMI.

Periodicals postage is paid at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and additional entry offices. ISSN 0031-1723 | USPS 413530 | Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 70-612062.

Subscriptions: US Army War College graduates who are actively employed by the government as well as select organizations may receive a gratis subscription. For eligibility requirements, visit the website listed above.

Non-graduates, retired graduates, and the general public may subscribe through the Government Printing Office.

Address Changes: Submit address changes for unpaid subscriptions to the *Parameters* office by e-mail or phone.

For paid subscriptions, submit address changes to the GPO (bookstore.gpo.gov).

Reprint Requests: For permission to reprint articles, contact the *Parameters* editorial office by phone or e-mail. Be prepared to provide the article’s title, author’s name, publication date, intended use, quantity, and means of distribution.

Commentaries and Replies: We invite reader commentaries on articles appearing in *Parameters*. Not all commentaries can be published. For those that are, the author of the article will be invited to provide a reply. For additional information, visit the website listed above.

The US Army War College

The US Army War College educates and develops leaders for service at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application of landpower.

The purpose of the US Army War College at this time in our nation's history is to produce graduates who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers in the global application of landpower. Concurrently, it is our duty to the Army to also act as a "think factory" for commanders and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage in discourse and debate on ground forces' role in achieving national security objectives.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national security and strategic research and analysis to influence policy debate and bridge the gap between military and academia.

The Center for Strategic Leadership develops senior leaders and supports the strategic needs of the Army by educating senior military and civilian leaders on landpower at the operational and strategic levels, developing expert knowledge and solutions for the operating and generating force, and conducting research activities, strategic exercises, and strategic communication.

The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute provides subject matter expertise, technical review, and writing expertise to agencies that develop stability operations concepts and doctrines.

The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in the analysis, evaluation, and refinement of professional expertise in war, strategy, operations, national security, resource management, and responsible command.

The US Army Heritage and Education Center acquires, conserves, and exhibits historical materials for use to support the US Army, educate an international audience, and honor soldiers—past and present.