Special Commentary: Beyond Surprise Attack  
Lawrence Freedman

Reevaluating Diplomatic & Military Power  
Hal Brands and Peter D. Feaver  
Michael R. Matheny

Innovations in Warfare & Strategy  
David J. Katz  
Emilio J. Iasiello  
Patricia M. Shields and Donald S. Travis  
Lionel M. Beehner, Benedetta Berti, and Michael T. Jackson

Army Expansibility  
Olen Chad Bridges and Andrée Navarro  
Ken S. Gilliam and Barrett K. Parker  
Robert C. Owen
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From the Editor

The Summer issue of Parameters opens with an essay by Sir Lawrence Freedman entitled “Beyond Surprise Attack.” Surprise, argues Freedman, can come in any number of forms, and sometimes those that come in the middle or end of a campaign prove the most decisive.

Our first forum, Reevaluating Diplomatic & Military Power, offers two articles. The first, “What Are America’s Alliances Good For?” by Hal Brands and Peter Feaver, contends the costs and risks associated with America’s military alliances are frequently overstated, while at the same time the benefits are downplayed. Brands and Feaver, thus, provide a more accurate net assessment of America’s alliances in hopes of better informing current policy debates. In the second article, “Employing Military Force in the 21st Century,” Michael Matheny petitions US policymakers look to past uses of force for ways of employing force while managing the global and national violence threshold.

The second forum, Innovations in Warfare & Strategy, contains four articles on new or emerging forms of warfare. David Katz’s “Waging Financial Warfare: Why and How” introduces financial warfare as a valuable and innovative tool for deterring the sponsors of the “little green” and “little blue men” of proxy warfare. Emilio Iasiello’s “Russia’s Improved Information Operations: From Georgia to Crimea” discusses Russia’s enhancements in information warfare since 2008, which he insists put it somewhat ahead of the United States. In “Achieving Organizational Flexibility through Ambidexterity,” Patricia Shields and Donald Travis, introduce the concept of organizational ambidexterity and explain its value to military planning and problem-solving. In the last article, “The Strategic Logic of Sieges in Counterinsurgencies,” Lionel Beehner, Benedetta Berti, and Michael Jackson question the perception that siege warfare is an effective and relatively low-cost form of counterinsurgency. Instead, they see it as ineffective without major outside military support or the willingness to use overwhelming force.

Our final forum, Army Expansibility, presents three articles touching on important aspects of the US Army’s ability to expand rapidly. In “Mobilizing for a Major War,” Olen Chad Bridges and Andrée Navarro expose some of the more glaring deficiencies the Army must correct to be prepared for a large-scale mobilization. In “Mobilization: The State of the Field,” Ken Gilliam and Barrett Parker describe research the Army is conducting to improve its ability to execute a large-scale mobilization. Last, Robert Owen’s “US Air Force Airlift and the Army’s Relevance” urges Army leaders to advocate for an expanded air mobility capability. ~AJE
ABSTRACT: This article explores the use and value of surprise attacks in modern warfare.

A surprise attack, conceived with cunning, prepared with duplicity, and executed with ruthlessness, provides international history with its most melodramatic moments. A state believes itself to be at peace then suddenly finds itself at war, in agony and embarrassed that it failed to pick up the enemy plot and will now suffer the consequences of blows from which recovery will be hard. Melodramas along these lines play out not only in the worst-case scenarios of military planners and alarmist commentators but also in movies and novels. They offer a compelling narrative: the most powerful states are humiliated and the course of history altered as one power sees possibilities for action that its victim misses completely. It is also a credible narrative as surprise attacks have been regular occurrences throughout history. They make military sense as defeating a strong opponent is always going to be difficult unless the first blows really count. Maximizing operational secrecy is essential to maximizing operational success.

Surprise makes the most sense when battles are decisive. Otherwise, the effect will be to start a war—with all the pain, risk, and uncertainty—without ensuring victory. A decisive victory forces the enemy hand. An important legacy of the Napoleonic Wars was the conviction that such a victory depended on the effective elimination of the enemy army. At some point surprise could make the critical difference when two essentially symmetrical armies, relying on superior tactics, organization and armaments, faced each other. Catching an unprepared enemy with an early blow from which it could never really recover, even if it tried to fight on, should allow the whole business of war to be concluded quickly.

The Franco-Prussian War underscored the importance of early battlefield success. The Prussians were astonished when the French, having declared war, were slow to mobilize. They did not make the same mistake. The efficiency of their mobilization, along with the innovative tactics of Helmuth von Moltke, caught France unaware, leading to its defeat at the Battle of Sedan at the start of September 1870. Germany executed the ideal campaign, quick and truly decisive, spoiled only by the refusal of the French population to accept the verdict of battle until their unexpected resistance was crushed. Moltke showed how to surprise the enemy, and his successors in the German general staff took note: To win a war, mobilize early and strike hard and fast.

The German victory also led to speculation about how other powers might be caught out by a ruthless and resourceful enemy, including books imagining how other great powers might also suffer
sudden and catastrophic defeats. An early example of this genre was *The Battle of Dorking*, written by a British Army officer. Appearing in 1871 just after von Moltke’s victory, *Dorking* described a German invasion from across the channel in which telegraph cables were cut to prevent advance warning. The Royal Navy, which had allowed itself to become overextended because of colonial commitments, lost its warships to “fatal engines which sent our ships, one after the other, to the bottom.” The drama concluded with a last stand on a ridge near Dorking in southern England, where a brave combination of regulars and reserves were let down by the army’s miserable organization. And so, the accumulated prosperity and strength of centuries was lost in days. A once-proud nation was stripped of its colonies, “its trade gone, its factories silent, its harbours empty, a prey to pauperism and decay.”

As with so much writing about the future of war, this example essentially made a point about the present, in this case the need for army reform, a statement about what might happen if sensible measures were not taken urgently. Other books followed with similar themes about the dangers of spies or readying young men for the demands and sacrifices of war, or sometimes in counternarratives to the gloom, demonstrating how a brave nation could cope with all challenges. By the start of the twentieth century, writers were exploring the military possibilities opening up with new technologies such as heavier-than-air flying machines. The imagination of the British novelist H. G. Wells even stretched to atom bombs. A regular theme in all this literature was the importance of surprise and the first blow. The key to victory was seizing the initiative.

There were those, such as the Polish banker Ivan Bloch, who understood that even the cleverest plans might fail, that defenses might cope better than expected with dashing attacks, and that a defiant population might resist foreign occupation. Still, the Germans opened the First World War with an ambitious offensive designed, once again, to defeat France quickly. But this time they failed. Instead of a decisive victory, they got caught up in a long attritional slog, in which they struggled to cope with the superior economic and demographic strengths of their enemies.

After 1918, alternative routes to a quick victory were sought. One possibility was to use tanks to wage a rapid offensive. But there was another alternative that dispensed with forcing an enemy land invasion. Instead of pressuring the enemy government to capitulate as a result of the annihilation of its army, it would have to surrender because of the demands of a desperate population unable to cope with a succession of massive air raids and being hit by high explosives, incendiaries, and poison gas. A new dystopian literature quickly developed, telling of the trials of ordinary people as they fled their burning cities or of the hopelessness of governments in the face of weapons they were unable

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to counter. The theme comes through in some of the titles: *The Poison War, The Black Death, Menace, Empty Victory, Invasion from the Air, War upon Women, Chaos, and Air Reprisal.*

Air raids did not provide the opening shots of the Second World War, but they soon came. becoming regular and progressively more destructive. Although their effects were certainly terrible, they were not decisive. The resilience of ordinary people and of modern societies had been underestimated. Only with the war’s finale and the atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the deadly promise of air power realized. Previous air raids had killed as many people, but this time the devastation required only single weapons and the impact was emphasized by the surrender of an already beleaguered Japan.

The prospect that the next war could soon “go nuclear” inevitably dominated strategic debates after 1945. But, the trauma of the two surprise attacks that brought the Soviet Union and then the United States into the Second World War shaped considerations of what that might mean. Pushing the logic of seizing the initiative to the extreme, Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa against Russia in June 1941 while the British were still fighting; the Japanese attacked the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, despite failing to pacify China. Both efforts were enormous gambles, bold in their execution and complete in their surprise. Both offensives were characterized by arrogance, for their leaders were convinced their nations were superior in spirit and in discipline, but also in recklessness, taking on much larger powers before defeating the existing enemies.

Both gambles failed. The Soviet Union was rocked; at one point it looked like it would succumb, but it held on. Gradually, the size of the country, its harsh climate, reserves of strength, and Nazi mistakes turned the tide of war. There was never much chance that Japan would conquer the United States—the objective was to get in the best position for what was assumed to be an inevitable war. The result was a terrible conflict with great suffering, ending with Japan under American occupation.

The most important lesson was that getting in the first blow, however well designed and executed, did not guarantee victory. Yet for the victims of 1941, the basic lesson was that great power did not provide immunity from surprise attack. The United States and the Soviet Union won in the end, but their fights were long and painful, and the results were not preordained. The shock effect was substantial, and it left a legacy in the way both thought about war thereafter. In 1958, when experts from both superpowers met briefly to discuss their fears of surprise attacks, the Soviets were fixated on yet another large offensive set in motion by Germany, this time backed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while the Americans were focused on another Pearl Harbor-type “bolt from the blue” this time with nuclear missiles.

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9 Jeremi Suri, “America’s Search for a Technological Solution to the Arms Race: The Surprise Attack Conference of 1958 and a Challenge for ‘Eisenhower Revisionists’,” *Diplomatic History* 21, no. 3 (Summer 1997).
The impact of these shocks could be seen during the Cold War, especially in regard to nuclear strategy. In Washington the dominant fear was that Soviet leadership might become convinced that a well-crafted first strike would put it in a position where it need not fear retaliation. Starting numbers were irrelevant if the United States could be disarmed by a surprise Soviet attack directed against its bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and missile-carrying submarines. In the 1960s, the Pentagon set a test for the US nuclear arsenal: could it “assure destruction” of the Soviet Union? In other words, could America maintain “at all times a clear and unmistakable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any aggressor, or combination of aggressors—even after absorbing a surprise first strike.” This damage was quantified at 33–20 percent of the Soviet population and 75–50 percent of the Soviet industrial capacity. These criteria assumed a pain threshold well above the losses experienced in World War II, which were hardly willingly accepted. Then, the highest possible intelligence assessments about future Soviet capabilities were considered to see whether any extra capabilities were required to ensure that the assured destruction criteria could be met. The answer was not a lot was needed beyond existing plans.

This effort was not a prediction of the course of a future war, or of the American government’s reaction to a complete failure of deterrence. The aim was to leave no doubt in the minds of Soviet leadership that aggression carried an unavoidable risk of nuclear devastation. An American response could not be guaranteed because the Soviet Union could also, even after absorbing a first strike, ensure similar levels of destruction of the United States. Hence “mutual assured destruction,” naturally known as MAD, came to describe the standoff between the nuclear powers during the Cold War. How much the capability contributed to preventing a hot war remains a matter for conjecture. There were many reasons why political leaders would have been desperate to avoid a Third World War, but the possibility of mutual destruction was hardly irrelevant. It was not necessary to gaze for long into a crystal ball to see the awful devastation with which a future war might end. Would the Germans and Japanese in 1941 have really been so ready to launch their wars if their crystal balls had shown them how bad things might turn out? The point of deterrence was to persuade a potential adversary not to bank on the first move being decisive, and to think through the consequences of an enemy still capable of fighting back.

Establishing there was no sure way to win a nuclear war did not end all fears. The Soviet Union kept building up its own arsenal, suggesting it had a different view of how deterrence might work, which might even include some plan for a nuclear victory. Even if MAD meant the nuclear arsenals neutralized each other, the Soviet strength in conventional capabilities provided them with other options for mischief. This capacity left plenty of scope for inventiveness when it came to imagining how Moscow might take an initiative that would catch Washington unaware and so allow stealing some geopolitical advantage. One scenario actively debated in the 1970s was the possibility of a sudden and vast Warsaw

Pact offensive into West Germany that required little prior mobilization, and so, no practical warning to NATO about the attack. This worst-case scenario assumed everything worked perfectly for the enemy while NATO was left flat-footed, overwhelmed before it could even consider escalation to nuclear force.

Yet, even when contemporary wars have opened with surprise attacks, the results have not been encouraging. Israel’s demolition of Egypt’s air force on the first day of the Six-Day War (1967) is one example where the enemy was left helpless by a well-executed attack. Although, this war also demonstrates how conquering and occupying another’s territory might also lead to persistent terrorism and insurgency. Two prime examples of surprise attacks that failed to deliver early victories are North Korea’s move against South Korea in 1950 and Iraq’s contest with Iran three decades later. The North might have succeeded if an international coalition had not managed to aid South Korea before it was completely overrun. Iraq found itself struggling to cope with Iran’s counterinvasion in 1980 and became caught in a war lasting until 1988. Its resultant indebtedness to those who helped it fund its defense, was one reason for its next surprise attack—Kuwait in August 1990. The occupation was easily accomplished, but it barely lasted six months. Kuwait was liberated under an American-led coalition in early 1991.

The most striking feature of modern wars is not how quickly they can be concluded but how long they last. The United States achieved quick victories in Iraq and Afghanistan against regular forces but then got bogged down dealing with insurgencies. Russian aggression against Ukraine has left it bogged down in an inconclusive struggle. Syria has become an arena in which a whole series of regional conflicts are played out without an identified route to anything resembling peace being identified. With civil wars, the typical conflict now lasts years, long after the economy, society, and political system have been broken, with the violence sustained by criminals as well as zealots, warlords, and neighboring states.

Major powers now often appear tentative and unsure. Even when, as with Russia, they seem to be taking bold steps, their objectives turn out to be limited. Grand victories are no longer in mind. Instead of audacious moves geared to a quick victory, a probing, patient alternative approach is even seen in China’s disputes in the South China Sea.

Yet, none of this has erased concerns about surprise attacks. One reason is the recollection of al-Qaeda’s attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, after which commentary soon turned again to Pearl Harbor. The lesson lay not in the revenge taken against al-Qaeda and its Taliban sponsors in Afghanistan but the shock of discovering the vulnerability of modern, open societies too malicious attack. The aim seemed simply to cause maximum pain, and that goal soon led to speculation about the many ways that pain might be inflicted.


Scenarios in which small terrorist cells or even “lone wolves” could cause harm using basic weapons such as guns, knives, highly explosive materials, aircraft or motor vehicles turned into lethal weapons were constructed. Attacks of this sort could not bring a modern western state to “its knees.” The surprise they achieved was essentially tactical in its effects. At most, strategically they were part of an ongoing and largely uncoordinated global insurgency. Despite the obvious differences in scale and impact, the outcome of a Taliban ambush in Kabul or of a shooting in Paris were part of a campaign that began before 9/11 and appears to be of indefinite duration.

All of this needs to be kept in mind when addressing claims that future surprise attacks will come out of cyberspace and have effects tantamount to defeat in war. As early as the 1990s, the growing dependence of vital services on digital networks led to warnings of an “electronic Pearl Harbor” directed against the critical infrastructure supporting energy, transport, banking, and so on. Instead of trying to get quick victories by taking out enemy forces, why not instead take out the enemy society? While the technical issues are quite different from more classical forms of military attack, and the practice would be far less violent, there are similarities to the post-1918 claims about strategic air bombardment providing a more satisfactory route to victory than attritional fights between armies. As with a nuclear first strike, the best case for the perpetrator requires confidence that preparations for an attack are not detected, that the appropriate networks are properly identified and could be attacked, and that the cyberattacks will work as planned. And then, as with Operation Barbarossa and Pearl Harbor, there is the question of what happens after the first blow. How would this turn into a lasting political gain? A cyberattack does not lead to territory being occupied. The victims would be expected to respond, even as they struggled to get the lights back on and systems working. An attack that produced drastic effects could be considered a casus belli, and classical military responses might be considered legitimate.

The issue is not whether critical infrastructure can be vulnerable and lead to major upset if taken down. Hostile activity in the cyberdomain, represented by a continuing offense-defense duel, is now constant and ubiquitous. It involves activists, terrorist and criminal organizations and poses constant trouble for those trying to preserve the integrity and the effectiveness of vital networks. The danger, however, is not so much of some one-off catastrophic surprise attack but a series of events in line with modern conflict, reflecting the blurring of the military and civilian spheres, efforts to weaken and subvert opponents without attacking them head on. These are wars with occasional military strikes and battles, often vicious but still short of being truly decisive. Cyberattacks

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represent another way to cause injury and irritation short of obvious acts of war, as well as serving as natural accompaniments to acts of war.

There is, therefore, a disconnect between the continuing search for a route to a decisive victory and the contemporary experience of warfare, which once started, is hard to stop. Even if enemy regulars are overwhelmed, the result is as likely to be insurgency, especially directed against foreign forces. This tends to be reflected in more recent future war fiction, such as *Ghost Fleet* by Peter Singer and August Cole. This story opens with a surprise attack of impressive complexity, cunning and duplicity, which almost succeeds but fails in the end.18

There will always be arguments for testing the resilience of systems against the worst case. If they can cope with the most severe threats then lesser cases should be manageable. The worst case may depend on the aggressor being foolish and futile, but stupidity is one of the hardest things for any intelligence agency to predict. At the same time, when planning an offensive, every effort must be made to make the first blows count. The key point, however, is that even with surprise and maximum effort, these first blows are unlikely to be decisive on their own, especially against an opponent with any reserves of strength. This depth is why states must look beyond surprise attacks to what follows, to the second and third blows, and also to those much further down the line, perhaps delivered by irregulars who have taken over the struggle after the defeat of the regulars. The surprises of war do not just come at the start.

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ABSTRACT: The costs and risks associated with America’s military alliances have always been more visible and easily understood than the benefits. In reality, however, those costs and risks are frequently overstated, whereas the benefits are more numerous and significant than often appreciated. This article offers a more accurate net assessment of America’s alliances in hopes of better informing current policy debates.

President Donald Trump has shaken up the foreign policy debate in the United States, and nowhere more so than in relations with America’s longstanding treaty allies. Since Trump emerged as a presidential candidate in mid-2015, he has often put US alliances squarely in his crosshairs. Trump labeled the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) “obsolete” and suggested leaving its easternmost members to defend themselves. He floated the idea of encouraging nuclear proliferation by Japan and South Korea to enable US geopolitical retrenchment. As president, Trump pointedly refused to explicitly affirm America’s Article 5 commitment at his first NATO summit, and he publicly dressed down the European allies for failing to spend more on defense.¹

In a subsequent trip to Europe, Trump offered a more robust statement of US commitment to NATO, but nonetheless vented his frustration with allies for not, in his view, shouldering sufficient burdens.² Underlying these critiques has been the idea that US alliances are fundamentally sucker bets—one-sided relationships in which a guileless America bears all the costs and parasitic allies derive all the benefits. “We’re taken advantage by every nation in the world virtually,” Trump commented in February 2017.³

Not surprisingly, the bipartisan US foreign policy elite has generally reacted with alarm at the administration’s rhetoric and policies. Leading commentators have warned that Trump is threatening to harm the alliances Washington spent decades building, institutions generally considered to be among America’s most precious geopolitical assets.⁴ Likewise, international observers have worried that the United States


⁴ See, for instance, Dov Zakheim, “Trump’s Position on Treaty Commitments Has Already Hurt America,” Foreign Policy, July 22, 2016.
seems to be turning away from its most important friends. Yet despite the reaction they have provoked, Trump’s critiques have nonetheless revealed a fundamental asymmetry in the cost-benefit assessment of US alliances.

The fact of the matter is that the costs and risks associated with America’s alliances have always been more visible and easily understood than the benefits. Moreover, because US foreign policy elites have long become accustomed to military alliances as facts of geopolitical life, even proalliance observers often struggle to specify, in concrete terms, why those institutions are so valuable. Supporters are thus at a rhetorical disadvantage in these arguments. They often defend alliances by pointing to vague and ill-defined benefits, or simply by invoking tradition, whereas critics can point to specific dangers and burdens, including those more easily reduced to a campaign trail slogan or a pithy tweet. And Trump is not alone in his attacks on US alliances—many leading “realist” academics have long offered similar critiques, which the president has now effectively appropriated as his own. “The U.S. net gain from its alliance relationships is... not commensurate with the cost,” Barry Posen writes: “the bargain has become unprofitable to the United States.”

In this essay, we offer a more accurate net assessment of America’s alliances by detailing the purported costs and considerable—if less widely understood—benefits. We first summarize the most common critiques of US alliances and explain why many of those critiques are less persuasive than they initially seem. We then provide a detailed typology of the myriad benefits—military and otherwise—of US alliances. As this analysis shows, the net assessment of US alliances is strongly positive, and the balance is not even particularly close. Today as always, there remain significant challenges associated with alliance management and reasonable debates to be had about addressing them. But those debates need to be informed by a better understanding of what US alliances are good for in the first place.

Costs, Real and Perceived

Trump is not the first prominent observer to critique US alliances. Ever since the country’s founding, permanent military alliances have been a source of controversy. The alliance structure built from the ashes of World War II, and gradually expanded in the decades thereafter, has itself been the subject of heated debate. Leading political figures such as Senator Robert Taft initially opposed an American commitment to NATO; Senator Michael Mansfield sought to force withdrawal of half the US troops deployed to Europe in the early 1970s. The post-Cold War expansion of NATO touched off perhaps the most intense foreign policy debate of the 1990s. And in recent decades, there has been a lively cottage industry among academics who deem US alliances expensive, unrewarding, and dangerous, and who argue for attenuating or simply abandoning those commitments. The standard academic critique—much

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5 Krishnadev Calamur, “Germany’s Merkel Urges ‘Europe to Take Our Fate into Our Own Hands,’” Atlantic, May 30, 2017.

of which Trump has adopted or adapted as his own—adduces several key costs and dangers associated with US alliances.

First, America’s military alliances require Washington to defend countries whose security is not vital to the United States. Second, US alliances compel military expenditures far higher than would be necessary simply to defend America itself. Third, maintaining the credibility of US alliances forces America to adopt aggressive, forward-leaning defense strategies. Fourth, having allies raises the risk of the United States being entrapped in unwanted conflicts. Fifth, America’s allies habitually free ride on America’s own exertions. Sixth, alliances limit America’s freedom of action and cause unending diplomatic headaches.7

So how accurate are these critiques? We consider each in its turn. In sum, America’s alliance system is hardly costless, and all of these critiques contain at least a kernel of truth. In many cases, however, the costs are significantly exaggerated—or critics simply ignore that the United States would have to pay similar costs even if it had no alliances.

**Alliances require defending countries whose security is not vital to the United States.** The United States has formal security commitments to over thirty treaty allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific and informal or ambiguous security commitments to over thirty additional countries.8 These commitments, particularly the formal treaty commitments, represent something approaching a solemn vow to shed blood to defend non-American lands. And some of the countries protected by US guarantees are not, in and of themselves, critical to the global balance of power or the physical security of the United States.9 The United States could be called upon to resist a Russian seizure of Estonia, and yet the American people could survive and thrive in a world in which Estonia was occupied by Russian forces.

Yet if this critique is not baseless, it is often overstated, because the United States does have a vital interest in defending many of its current allies. The basic geopolitical lesson of World Wars I and II—a lesson many critics of US alliances endorse—is that Washington should not allow any hostile power to dominate a crucial geopolitical region such as Europe, East Asia, or the Middle East.10 Accordingly, the United States could still find itself compelled to fight to defend those regions—and

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9 It is important to note that all of America’s defense commitments provide an “out” through clauses allowing Washington to act in accordance with its own constitutional processes. In essence, treaties—although they are ratified by the Senate and carry the force of law—represent more of a moral obligation than a tightly binding legal obligation to other states.

many key countries therein—even if formal alliance relationships did not exist. This was, after all, precisely what happened during both world wars and the Persian Gulf War, when American officials concluded that US security required defending or liberating key countries in these regions, even though Washington had not previously had military alliances there. Alliances do not cause US entanglements overseas; entanglements cause alliances.

US alliances compel military expenditures far higher than would be necessary to defend America itself. To defend allies in the western Pacific or Europe, the United States requires global power-projection capabilities and a military that can win not just in its own backyard but in the backyards of its great-power rivals. America thus needs a larger, more technologically advanced, more sophisticated force than would be necessary strictly for continental defense, along with an accompanying global-basing network.

For these reasons, the US military is indeed more expensive than it would be absent US alliances. Yet this critique is also overblown. After all, if the United States has an interest in preventing any hostile power from dominating a key region of Eurasia, then alliances or no alliances, Washington would still require a military capable of projecting decisive power into these regions in an emergency. Likewise, because America has geopolitical objectives beyond the protection of allies—such as counterterrorism and securing the global commons—the need for advanced power projection capabilities and overseas bases would remain even in a world without alliances.

Such a force might still be smaller than today’s military. If the United States pursued a strategy in which it rolled back or attenuated key alliances, one critic suggests, it could reduce defense spending to 2.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), as opposed to 3.5 or 4 percent. Yet America would still have the world’s largest defense budget by a considerable margin under this approach, and such a force—which would consist, for instance, of only four carrier strike groups instead of 10 to 11 today—might not actually be sufficient to command the global commons and fight its way back into key regions in a crisis.

In fact, if the United States pulled back from its alliance commitments and waited for a crisis to develop before surging back into key regions, it might find such a mission more difficult—and more expensive—than simply protecting its allies in the first place. It was precisely this fact—that the United States ended up deploying millions of troops to liberate Western Europe and East Asia during World War II, at financial and human costs that would be almost unimaginable today, that led American policymakers to adopt a different approach featuring formal alliances and forward deployments thereafter. Nor would eliminating parts of the US basing network associated with protecting American

12 Posen, Restraint.
allies save much money absent corresponding force reductions, because host-nation support arrangements often make it roughly as cheap, if not cheaper, to station American forces overseas than to station them in the United States. American defense expenditures could slightly decrease in a world without US military alliances, at least in the short-term, but the savings would be less dramatic—and perhaps more ephemeral—than one might expect.

Maintaining the credibility of American alliances requires adopting forward-leaning defense strategies. This critique comes closer to the mark. Prior to the Cold War, the US strategic posture was essentially one of allowing aggressors to conquer friendly states in Europe and East Asia, and then mobilizing to liberate those areas. Since the late 1940s, however, US policymakers have worried that American allies will be unlikely to risk aligning with Washington—and thereby antagonizing hostile neighbors such as the Soviet Union—if they believe the United States will simply allow them to be overrun in a conflict. If being liberated first requires being conquered, who wants to be liberated? 

Accordingly, since the early Cold War, the United States has focused on defending rather than liberating allies. This strategy required Washington to pledge to defend West Germany at the Rhine despite the enormous difficulty of doing so, to forward-station forces in Europe and East Asia, and even to pledge rapid nuclear escalation to defend vulnerable European allies. Since the end of the Cold War, the dilemmas associated with forward defense have been far less dangerous and agonizing because the United States has not confronted a rival superpower. But the return of great-power competition in recent years has begun to raise these issues anew, albeit in less dramatic fashion. Part of the rationale for the Pentagon’s much-hyped Air-Sea Battle concept appears to be to cripple China’s power-projection capabilities before it can subdue US allies in the Western Pacific. The recent stationing of US and NATO battalions in the Baltic states—in some cases, less than 200 miles from major Russian cities such as St. Petersburg—reflects similar imperatives.

Having alliances raises the risk of entrapment. Critics of US alliances point to the danger of “reckless driving” and “chain-ganging.” Reckless driving occurs when an ally, protected by a US security guarantee, behaves more provocatively than would otherwise be prudent. Reckless driving, in turn, can trigger chain-ganging. If an ally intentionally or unintentionally triggers conflict with an adversary, a formal security commitment may force the guarantor to enter the conflict whether it desires to or not. There is some irreducible danger of reckless driving and chain-ganging in any credible alliance, of course. Yet historical evidence suggests that this problem is actually less severe in US alliances than one might expect.

18 On AirSea Battle (now called the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons), see Andrew F. Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle? (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010).
As Michael Beckley and Victor Cha have shown, US policymakers have long been sensitive to this dilemma, and have thus inserted loopholes or escape hatches into security agreements with potentially problematic partners, such as Syngman Rhee’s South Korea or Chiang Kai-Shek’s Taiwan. Today, for instance, the US security commitment to Taiwan is ambiguous for this very purpose: to prevent Taipei from assuming Washington will automatically rescue Taiwan if its leaders provoke China. NÁTO forbids new members from having outstanding territorial disputes for the same reason.

In recent decades, moreover, the United States has repeatedly pressured allies and security partners to behave with restraint and warned those allies against provoking stronger neighbors. American officials underscored this point in dealings with Taiwan during the George W. Bush administration, and reportedly, with the Philippines and other allies in their more recent maritime disputes with China. As a result, scholars have found few, if any, unambiguous cases over the past 70 years in which the United States was dragged into shooting wars solely because of alliance commitments. Reckless driving and chain-ganging are risks, but US officials have so far proven fairly adept at managing them.

*Allies habitually free ride.* The opposite of reckless driving and chain ganging is free-riding. Logically, because America is committed to defend its allies, those states can spend less than they would otherwise on their own defense. In 2011, for instance, the United States spent around 4.5 percent of its GDP on defense, compared to 1.6 percent of GDP for European NATO allies and roughly 1 percent for Japan.

To be fair, these statistics exaggerate the free-riding problem because America’s defense budget includes higher-than-average personnel costs as a way of recruiting and retaining an all-volunteer force in contrast to many allies and partners whose labor markets enable them to recruit personnel at lower wages or who rely primarily on conscription. Moreover, this gap was subsequently narrowed as US military spending, which had been inflated by the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, fell after 2010. Yet free-riding is nonetheless real enough, as US officials have frankly recognized. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told NATO in 2011, “The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress—and in the American body politic writ large—to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense.” Indeed, this problem has troubling implications, for it renders


21 Beckley, “Myth of Entangling Alliances.”


23 Lindsay P. Cohn, “How Much is Enough?,” *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 9, no. 3 (Fall 2015): 47–61.

the allies less capable of contributing to either out-of-area interventions or collective defense operations.

If free-riding is indeed a dilemma, however, it is also an implicit goal of US alliances, and it probably costs less—when “cost” is defined holistically—than the likely alternatives. As extensive scholarship demonstrates, a primary reason Washington created its postwar military alliances was to break the cycle of unrestrained geopolitical competition in Europe and East Asia, for fear such competition would give rise to arms races and wars. Moreover, another prominent goal of US alliances has been to restrain nuclear proliferation, for fear the spread of nuclear weapons would make nuclear war more likely and dilute American influence.  

In other words, some degree of free-riding is a feature of America’s alliances, not a glitch. The United States has traditionally preferred for allies to spend less on defense than they otherwise might, because this restraint creates a world in which America itself is safer and more influential. To put it another way, does Washington really want a world in which Germany and Japan both spend 5 percent of GDP on defense and engage in nuclear arms-racing with adversaries? The answer is surely no, even if US officials might still urge these countries to spend moderately more than they do today.

Alliances limit America’s freedom of action and cause unending diplomatic headaches. This is true enough. In international politics, it can be harder to do things multilaterally than unilaterally. In many cases, relying on allies means relying on less capable military forces to perform functions the US military could better perform on its own, as Washington discovered during the intervention in Kosovo in the late 1990s. Allies bring their own idiosyncrasies into the relationship, often with messy and frustrating results. A vivid example of this dynamic was the set of caveats each NATO ally brought to the mission in Afghanistan—restrictions on when, where, and how its forces could fight—ensuring that, in terms of combat punch, the whole was somewhat less than the sum of the parts.

Making alliances work also requires continual “gardening,” in the phrase of George Shultz—continually massaging difficult relationships and suffering insufferable allies such as Charles de Gaulle. As Jimmy Carter once remarked, a meeting with allies represented “one of the worst days of my diplomatic life.” Yet there are obvious counterpoints here: frustrations are inherent in any diplomatic relationship, the United States undoubtedly finds it easier to address those frustrations within the context of deeply institutionalized alliances, and any constraints on US freedom of action have to be weighed against the myriad other ways in which alliances enhance US flexibility and power.


26 Seth Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (New York: W. W. Norton, 2009), 238–55.

Overall, the costs and frustrations of US alliances are not illusory, but many of those costs are actually less severe or salient than they appear. The benefits of US alliances, by contrast, are both more diverse and more significant than often appreciated.

**Benefits, Direct and Indirect**

Just as critics overstate the costs of alliances, so they dramatically understate the benefits. The most direct and obvious advantages involve the way allies allow the United States to punch above its own weight by augmenting US military strengths across a range of issues and contingencies. Yet alliances also offer additional geostrategic, political-diplomatic, and economic advantages that enhance American power and support a number of critical US national objectives. In other words, America’s alliances are less entangling than empowering. By binding itself to the defense of like-minded nations, the world’s sole superpower makes itself all the more effective and influential.

**Military Punching Power**

First and foremost, having allies significantly increases the military power the United States can bring to bear on a given battlefield. During the Cold War, European forces were vital to maintaining something approximating a balance of power vis-à-vis Warsaw Pact forces. NATO countries and other treaty allies also contributed to nearly every major US combat operation of the postwar era, even though nearly all of those operations occurred “out of area.” The United States may have waged the Korean War in part to prove its willingness to defend its treaty allies in Europe, but the NATO allies contributed over 20,000 troops—in addition to other capabilities—to the fight. Even during the Vietnam War, treaty allies South Korea and Australia contributed substantial fighting elements (and bore substantial casualties); South Korea sent over 300,000 soldiers to Vietnam over the course of the conflict and lost over 4,500 in combat. Virtually everywhere the United States fought during the Cold War, it did so in the company of allies.

In the post-Cold War era, this benefit has sometimes seemed less important, because of the vast margin of US dominance vis-à-vis its rivals, and because the gap between what Washington could do militarily and what even its most capable allies could do militarily widened markedly. Yet even so, the United States has relied heavily on allied participation in nearly all of its major interventions.

During the Persian Gulf War, key NATO allies such as France and the United Kingdom made large contributions to the coalition effort, with the British providing 43,000 troops along with significant air and naval contingents. The NATO allies provided roughly half of the 60,000 troops who policed Bosnia as part of the Implementation Force mission in that country from 1995 through 1996, and a majority of the 31,000 troops who made up the subsequent Stabilization Force. NATO

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29 The number may well have been higher; 20,000 seems like a rough and conservative estimate. For general information, see Paul M. Edwards, *United Nations Participants in the Korean War: The Contributions of 45 Member Countries* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2013).
contributions to the US-led war in Afghanistan peaked at around 40,000 troops; this contingent helped sustain the mission at a time of heavy US focus on Iraq and made it possible for Washington to surge 30,000 additional troops into Iraq when its forces were strained to the limit.  

Other US wars—in Iraq, Libya, and against the Islamic State—have also featured noteworthy contributions from treaty allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. Both critics and defenders of US alliances often speak of the frustrations of unequal burden sharing. But America’s military burdens would be much higher if it did not have allies willing to share them.

Having formal allies as opposed to relying on ad hoc partnerships also yields a second and related military benefit: it eases the process of mobilizing cobelligerents for action in a crisis. It is possible to assemble military coalitions on the fly, of course, and every coalition military venture in which the United States participated prior to 1945 was in some sense improvised. Moreover, even in the post-World War II era, the United States has solicited ad hoc contributions from nonallied partner states. It is even possible, as the United States has repeatedly demonstrated, to make a purely transactional alliance of convenience with a “devil”—a country that otherwise shares very few interests with America, such as the Soviet Union in World War II or Syria in the Persian Gulf War.

The possibility of improvising military cooperation when needed has led some critics to argue the United States can do away with formal, institutionalized alliances altogether. But turning every military operation into the equivalent of pickup basketball greatly increases the difficulty of building an effective combined force. Pushing the analogy further, pickup basketball is very hard to arrange in the absence of long-standing arrangements and customs that increase the predictability of the other actors. Economists refer to these difficulties as transaction costs; the routines and institutionalization of formal alliances make it much easier to bring military power to bear at much lower transaction costs.

In formal alliances, the partners practice together in peacetime, develop interoperability, and may even develop common equipment, thus easing logistics challenges. They also establish diplomatic forums and longstanding, fairly predictable relationships, thereby making it easier to coordinate interests and achieve the political consensus necessary to use force in the first place. To be sure, everything could be negotiated on the fly, but the price America would pay for this flexibility would be the


33 Both the advantages and limits of these practices are discussed in David P. Auerswald and Stephen C. Sedman, NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014). Seth Johnston argues that institutionalization also facilitates NATO’s adaptation and innovation, keeping NATO relevant and useful long after its original purpose had been eclipsed. Seth A. Johnston, How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance since 1950 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017).
significantly greater difficulty—and, most likely, the significantly longer timelines—of piecing together a coalition in a crisis.

A third major military contribution of allies is the specialized capability they can bring to the table. Sometimes this is material capability: British, French, and Australian special operations forces have all made vital contributions to the Global War on Terror. The Japanese have some of the finest antisubmarine warfare capabilities in the world, which would be essential in a US conflict with China.34 More often US allies contribute geographical capability in the form of proximity to the theater of interest. This proximity allows forward staging of the strike and intelligence assets, particularly air assets, on which the American way of war depends. It also allows for specialized technical intelligence collection that would be nearly impossible to conduct without local partners. The counter-ISIS campaign, for instance, would have been vastly more difficult had the United States not had access to key facilities controlled by either treaty allies (Turkey) or long-standing military partners (Qatar or Bahrain).35 Similarly, the United States would face a nearly impossible task in any North Korean contingency without the extensive US basing network in Japan.

And, of course, the United States has also traditionally relied on another allied contribution: intellectual capability. By virtue of their history, US allies have unique networks of relationships, along with the distinctive insights those relationships afford, in many regions of interest. This translates into intelligence—particularly human intelligence—that would be almost impossible for America to generate on its own; consider, for instance, the intelligence advantages possessed by the French in northwest Africa or the Italians in Libya.36

The existence of formal, deeply institutionalized alliances, in turn, facilitates the sharing of such intelligence. Three out of the four countries that make up the Five Eyes intelligence partnership with the United States are longstanding treaty allies; Washington also cooperates extensively with its NATO allies on intelligence matters.37 In this as in other respects, America’s alliances make it far stronger and more capable militarily than it would otherwise be.

**Geostrategic Influence and Global Stability**

If alliances are thus helpful in terms of the conflicts America wages, they are more helpful still in terms of the conflicts they prevent and the broader geostrategic influence they confer. Indeed, although the ultimate test of America’s alliances lies in their efficacy as warfighting

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35 American officials described access to Incirlik, Turkey, as a “game changer” in the counter-ISIS campaign. Ceylan Yeginsu and Helene Cooper “U.S. Jets to Use Turkish Bases in War on ISIS,” *New York Times*, July 23, 2015.

36 On local and regional advantages, see, for instance, Christopher S. Chivvis, *The French War on Al Qaeda in Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

coalitions, the most powerful benefits they provide come in the normal course of peacetime geostrategic management and competition.

First, US alliances bind many of the richest and most militarily capable countries in the world to Washington through enduring relationships of deep cooperation. Alliances reflect shared interests rather than creating them, of course, and the United States would presumably have close ties to countries such as the United Kingdom even without formal alliances. But alliances nonetheless serve as “hoops of steel.” They help create a sense of permanence and shared purpose in key relationships; they provide forums for regular interaction and cooperation; they conduce to deeply institutionalized exchanges (of intelligence, personnel, and other assets) that insulate and perpetuate friendly associations even when political leaders clash. And insofar as US alliances serve these purposes with respect to immensely influential countries in Europe and the Asia-Pacific, they help Washington preserve a significant overbalance of power vis-à-vis any competitor.

Second, alliances have a strong deterrent effect on would-be aggressors. American alliances lay down “redlines” regarding areas in which territorial aggression is impermissible; they complicate the calculus of any potential aggressor by raising the strong possibility that an attack on a US ally will mean a fight with the world’s most formidable military. The proposition that “defensive alliances deter the initiation of disputes” is, in fact, supported by empirical evidence, and the forward deployment of troops strengthens this deterrence further still.

NATO clearly had an important deterrent effect on Soviet calculations during the Cold War, for instance; more recently, Russia has behaved most aggressively toward countries lacking US alliance guarantees (Georgia and Ukraine), rather than toward those countries possessing them (the Baltic states or Poland). In other words, alliances make the geostrategic status quo—which is enormously favorable to the United States—far “stickier” than it might otherwise be.

Third, and related to this second benefit, alliances tamp down international instability more broadly. American security guarantees allow US allies to underbuild their own militaries; while always annoying and problematic when taken to extremes, this phenomenon also helps avert the arms races and febrile security competitions that plagued Europe and East Asia in earlier eras. In fact, US alliances are as useful in managing tensions among America’s allies as they are in constraining America’s adversaries.

NATO was always intended to keep the “Americans in” and the “Germans down” as well as the “Russians out”; US presence, along with the creation of a framework in which France and Germany were

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incentivized to cooperate rather than compete with one another, would help stifle any resurgence of tensions between these historical rivals.\textsuperscript{40} Similarly, US alliance guarantees in the Asia-Pacific were designed, in part, to create a climate of security in which Japan could be revived economically without threatening its neighbors, just as the expansion of NATO after the Cold War helped prevent incipient rivalries and territorial irredentism among former members of the Warsaw Pact.\textsuperscript{41} US alliances keep things quiet in regions Washington cannot ignore, thereby fostering a climate of peace in which America and its partners can flourish.

Fourth, US alliances impede dangerous geostrategic phenomena such as nuclear proliferation. As scholars such as Francis Gavin have emphasized, US security guarantees and forward deployments have played a critical role in convincing historically insecure, technologically advanced countries—Germany, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, among others—to forego possession of the world's absolute weapon. In several of these cases, moreover, the United States has used the security leverage provided by alliance guarantees to dissuade allies from pursuing the bomb after they had given indications of their intent to start down that path.\textsuperscript{42} If, as seems likely, a world with more nuclear powers is likely to be a more dangerous world in which crises more frequently take on a nuclear dimension and the risk of nuclear conflict is higher, then the value of American alliances looms large indeed.

In sum, as the framers of the post-World War II order understood, phenomena such as massive instability, arms racing, and violence in key regions would eventually imperil the United States itself.\textsuperscript{43} Whatever modest reduction in short-term costs might come from pursuing a “free hand” or isolationist strategy was thus more than lost by the expense of fighting and winning a major war to restore order. Accordingly, America’s peacetime alliance system represents a cheaper, more prudent alternative for maximizing US influence while also preventing instability by deterring aggression and managing rivalries among friends. The fact that so many observers seem to have forgotten why, precisely, America has alliances in the first place is an ironic testament to just how well the system has succeeded.

Political Legitimacy and Consultation

Beyond their military and geostrategic virtues, alliances provide important political benefits that facilitate the use of American power both internationally and with respect to the domestic audience. The chief political advantage of alliances is enhanced international legitimacy.

\textsuperscript{41} The role of NATO’s persistence and expansion in stifling competition in Europe is, ironically, acknowledged by one of the alliance’s foremost academic critics. See John J. Mearsheimer, “Why Is Europe Peaceful Today?,” \textit{European Consortium for Political Research Keynote Lecture}, \textit{European Political Science} 9, 3 (September 2010): 388, doi:10.1057/eps.2010.24.
\textsuperscript{43} Leffler, \textit{Preponderance of Power}. 
Formal alliances and the partnership of allies—particularly democratic allies—in cooperative ventures confer the perceived legitimacy of multilateral action. This perception is especially important when an administration is unable to secure the formal legitimacy of a UN Security Council Resolution authorizing the use of force. In the case of the Kosovo conflict, for example, being able to conduct the mission under NATO auspices somewhat mitigated charges of “American unilaterism.”44 Similarly, the ability of the United States to muster a coalition of the willing involving both NATO and Asia-Pacific allies in the Iraq War provided some rebuttal to critics who decried the invasion as a “unilateral” endeavor.

Allied support also enhances the perceived legitimacy of the actions for domestic audiences, thus strengthening the political foundations for military ventures.45 The willingness of other states to participate in a military intervention can signal that the resort to force is a wise and necessary move, has reasonable prospects for success, and will enjoy some minimal moral legitimacy. All of these factors can shore up public support and give the intervention greater political resilience should it prove more difficult than expected, and this international cooperation is easier to achieve in the framework of longstanding military alliances.

Finally, allies provide useful input on use of force decisions. Particularly when the deliberations involve long-standing treaty allies, US officials can have more honest discussions about difficult policy choices because the participants are “all in the family.” Put another way, every US president reserves the right to use force unilaterally when American interests demand. Yet as presidents have generally understood, the failure to persuade other partners to approve and to join America in the effort is itself a powerful cautionary warning.46 The need to make persuasive arguments to allies and partners is a useful disciplining device to prevent policy from running off the rails.

**Diplomatic Leverage and Cooperation**

Beyond their military, geostrategic, and political impact, having formal military alliances greatly increases the diplomatic leverage US leaders can bring to bear on thorny international challenges. Formal alliances and long-standing partnerships give US leaders myriad fora in which to raise concerns and advocate favored courses of action. Europeans are obliged to listen to the United States on European issues because Washington’s leading role in NATO makes it the central player in European defense; the same dynamic prevails vis-à-vis US allies in the Asia-Pacific. To give just one concrete example, the United States has repeatedly prevented the European Union from lifting its arms embargo on China because of the security leverage it has through NATO.47

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46 For instance, the Bush Administration was stymied on the Sudan by the reluctance of the rest of the international community to intervene. Condoleezza Rice, *No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2011), 582–85.

Having allies also increases US diplomatic options vis-à-vis adversaries. Here, the danger of entrapment (getting drawn into conflicts America might otherwise have avoided) must be weighed against the benefits of having more options in dealing with the adversaries Washington cannot ignore. One such benefit is the increased range of signaling options available to strategists during an unfolding crisis. Consider US efforts to constrain the North Korean nuclear program. Without military alliances with South Korea and Japan, the United States would have only two baskets of military options short of actual resort to force in order to signal resolve and to shape North Korean calculations: either taking relatively meaningless actions, such as changing the alert levels in the homeland or in other theaters, or taking relatively dramatic escalations, such as moving an aircraft carrier battle group within range of the Korean peninsula or flying sorties close to the North Korean border. With South Korea and Japan as allies, however, Washington has a wider variety of midrange actions—increasing missile defense capability or readiness in theater, raising local alert levels, and so on. These steps give leaders ways of responding, and thereby influencing diplomatic negotiations, while also better positioning America to respond if diplomacy fails.

Finally, alliances enhance US diplomatic efforts on security issues beyond those directly related to collective defense. The United States has used its alliances as vehicles for cooperation on counterterrorism (both prior to and since September 11, 2001), as well as for countering cybercrime, proliferation, and piracy; addressing climate change; and responding to other challenges. All of these efforts involve substantial intelligence sharing, information pooling, and coordination across law enforcement and other lines of action. And all of this coordination is greatly facilitated when conducted through deeply institutionalized alliances and long-standing cooperative relationships.

The United States has, of course, also been able to achieve tactical cooperation even from long-standing adversaries on issues such as counterterrorism, but such cooperation is frequently less significant, harder to obtain, and comes at a higher price in terms of the reciprocal American “gives” required in transactional relationships. It is thus with good reason that, when an international crisis breaks or a new global challenge emerges, the first phone calls made by US leaders are usually to America’s closest allies.

Economic Benefits

As noted, the economic costs of US alliance commitments are lower than conventionally assumed because the alliances allow Washington to project military power much more cheaply than otherwise would be the case. Alliances also generate numerous indirect economic benefits—so many that they may constitute a net profit center for the United States.

As a recent analysis of the deployment of US troops abroad and of US treaty obligations shows, both of these forms of security commitments...
are correlated with several key economic indicators, including US bilateral trade and global bilateral trade.\(^{50}\) The more US troops are deployed to a given country, the greater US bilateral trade is with the country in question. Furthermore, the effect extends to non-US global bilateral trade: “Countries with U.S. security commitments conduct more trade with one another than they would otherwise.” Adding all the economic costs and benefits of these treaty commitments together produces the estimate that the alliances offer more than three times as much gain as they cost.

American alliance commitments advance US economic interests in other ways, as well. For decades, US diplomats and trade negotiators have used the security leverage provided by alliance commitments to extract more favorable terms in bilateral financial and commercial arrangements. During the Cold War, West Germany made “offset” payments to the United States—transfers to shore up the sagging US balance of payments—as a means of preserving the American troop presence in Europe.\(^{51}\)

More recently, American negotiators obtained more favorable terms in the South Korea-United States trade agreement than the European Union did in a parallel agreement with Seoul. “Failure would look like a setback to the political and security relationship,” one US official noted; this dynamic gave Washington additional negotiating leverage.\(^{52}\) Additionally, as other scholars have shown, the US willingness to defend other states and police the global commons reinforces the willingness of other countries to accept a global order which includes favorable economic privileges for the United States, such as the dollar as the primary global reserve currency.\(^{53}\) And, of course, by sustaining a climate of overall geopolitical stability in which trade and free enterprise can flourish, alliances bolster American and global prosperity in broader ways, as well.

**Conclusion**

The balance sheet on America’s alliances, then, is really not much of a balance at all. There are costs and dangers associated with US alliances, and some of these are real enough. But many of those costs and dangers are exaggerated, blown out of proportion, or rest on a simple misunderstanding of what the United States would have to do in the world even if it terminated every one of its alliances. The benefits of US alliances, conversely, are far more diverse and substantial than critics tend to acknowledge. In sum, any grand strategy premised on putting America first should recognize that by creating and sustaining its global alliance network, America has indeed put itself first for generations.

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If this is the case, then why have alliances proven to be such lightning rods for both academic and presidential criticism of late? Part of the answer lies in the dynamic noted at the outset of this piece. The dangers and risks inherent in US alliances are mostly obvious and intuitive, whereas the benefits are often subtler, more indirect, or require digging deeper into the underlying logic of American internationalism to understand. Those benefits, moreover, often reside in things that do not happen—and are thus harder to observe, let alone measure. Yet part of the answer also undoubtedly lies in the fact that American alliances, like so much of American foreign policy today, appear to be in danger of becoming a victim of their own success. The fact that US alliances have been so effective, for so long, in maximizing US influence and creating an advantageous international environment has made it all too easy to take their benefits for granted. It would be a sad irony if the United States turned away from its alliances, only then to realize just how much it had squandered.

American alliances do not function perfectly, of course, and today as at virtually every point since the late 1940s, there are challenges on the horizon: the relative decline of many key US allies vis-à-vis US adversaries, the difficulties of prodding partners in Europe and Asia to do more on defense, the threat posed by coercion and intimidation meant to change the geopolitical status quo without triggering alliance redlines. Likewise, reasonable observers can debate what military strategy the United States should pursue for upholding its alliance commitments in the Baltic or the western Pacific. But the vexations of addressing these challenges within the framework of America’s existing alliances are undoubtedly less than the costs and perils to which the United States would be exposed without its alliances. Winston Churchill had it right when he said, “There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.” The US policy community would do well to heed this admonition today.

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ABSTRACT: As various states assert power more aggressively, US policymakers should apply lessons from past uses of force while developing strategic plans to manage the global and national tolerance for violence.

In the smoking wreckage of Hitler’s Berlin and in the burned out ruins of Tokyo, the old world order disappeared. The geostrategic context of international relations and power radically changed, bringing new challenges, trends, and patterns. Globalism, the survival and triumph of market capitalism, the end of colonialism, and the threat of communism, all under the haunting shadow of nuclear weapons, confronted the survivors of World War II and those who followed. In the emerging new world order, the United States stood as the most powerful nation on earth, if not in history. The end of World War II brought a strategic inflection point not only for the world but for the United States specifically—what would America do with its power? In retrospect, the United States managed the emerging challenges fairly well—the world survived.

Since 1945, the United States has found it necessary to exercise its power, to use force in the pursuit of its national interests and those of its allies, but has realized mixed results. After successfully defeating the Axis powers during World War II and winning the Cold War, why has the United States had trouble applying its overwhelming military advantage? In the ledger of US military force applied in Korea, Europe, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, is there something beyond the role of policymakers or the unique strategic context of each conflict that explains success or failure? The answers lie in understanding the actual utility of force—the amount and scale of force necessary to achieve desired political control—and in understanding the lingering problems of America’s use of force in an era dominated by limited war.

This era continued beyond the end of the Cold War, and many suggest, progressed to a period of limited wars characterized by nonstate actors, networked insurgencies, and new or resurgent state actors, all of which contribute to persistent conflict and challenge regional stability. The nature of this period may not necessarily alter the utility of force since force has been used successfully to assure, deter, coerce, and compel. Such reasoning, however, depends on a close assessment of our interests and objectives as well as those of our adversaries. Policymakers must understand what military force can accomplish, and once the

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1 See Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (NY: The Free Press, 1991), ix. This is a consensus view often reflected in professional military journals and publications in discussing the current security environment.
decision to apply military power is made, remain cognizant of its inherent constraints.

America’s application of military force in an age of limited war is invariably shaped by the asymmetry of interests between the United States and its potential adversaries, the fluctuation of political will during the conflict, and the challenges of building partner capacity. A better understanding of the nature of the utility of force and its relationship to several key limiting factors can help us develop and execute more appropriate strategies.²

The Utility of Force: Assure, Deter, Coerce, and Compel

For allies, force may be used to influence behavior by providing assurance—the visible result of security. Sir Michael Howard, a preeminent British historian, claimed the West’s use of force assured the global economy of safe passage to win the Cold War.³ Howard’s view of the Cold War as a largely economic struggle testing the viability of communism versus capitalism meant American force was deployed globally to secure trade—it takes force to assure the global commons. Assurance through forward presence and stationing has been the essence of regional stability in much of the world. Achieved through forward presence and global military capabilities, assurance also provides political leverage, giving substance to diplomacy, credibility, and international agreements. Generally positive, assurance descends on a scale of the potential use of force in which it becomes deterrence.

The advent of nuclear arms and the onset of the Cold War generated a great deal of literature on deterrence. Most evident among state actors, deterrence is predicated on controlling an adversaries’ political or military behavior by denying their ability to achieve their objectives or by threatening sure and prohibitive punishment via nuclear or conventional means. Deterrence depends on convincing an enemy of the futility of a potential action or the excessive cost of such action.⁴ Edward Luttwak argued deterrence is by far the most efficient use of force as it does not result in the actual expenditure of military resources. Additionally, the perception of power need not be restricted by time or space.⁵ Positioning the US Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait, for example, is not necessary to convince China that the United States will, in fact, oppose any attempt to conquer the island by force.

As efficient as deterrence may be, there are three problems with its use. For deterrence to work, the potential adversary must be convinced the deterring power has the capability to use force successfully. The adversary must be convinced one has the will to use force. And, the nation being deterred must have assets or interests that can be held at risk. In the first two cases, the burden of deterrence is the occasional

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⁴ There is a long and extensive literature on deterrence and coercion. Perhaps the best short summary can be found in Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 155.
⁵ Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 2. “In the imperial period at least, military force was clearly recognized for what it is, an essentially limited instrument of power, costly and brittle. Much better to conserve force and use military power indirectly, as an instrument of political coercion.”
demonstration of capability and will. In the latter case, not every adversary has fixed assets that can be easily threatened or attacked. Within a state’s borders are fixed assets that can be threatened; beyond those borders are sustaining international political, economic, and financial connections, which can also be threatened.

The Cold War is perhaps the most successful example of the utility of conventional and nuclear deterrence to international stability. The US nuclear arsenal threatened Soviet cities and industry while conventional Western forces defended and denied an easy conquest of Western Europe. In fact, mutually assured destruction was mutually assured deterrence.

Even so, does deterrence have utility at the lower range of conflict? Can nonstate actors—terrorists or insurgents, networked or distributed—be deterred? History suggests deterrence has little, if any, utility in dealing with such threats, which often require coercion instead.

Like deterrence, coercion is based on punishment or denial. Coercion by denial uses force to deny the enemy’s ability to achieve its objectives, demonstrating the futility of resorting to force. Coercion by punishment seeks to affect the enemy’s cost-benefit calculation such that the behavior is prohibitively expensive. Coercion results in the actual consumption of resources—blood and treasure. Coercion is about forcing your opponent to choose and often ends in negotiation.

In the Korean War, the United States coerced North Korea and China to abandon their designs for South Korea by physically denying its conquest. By the same token, the United States was coerced into abandoning South Vietnam due to the high military, economic, and political cost of continued support; however, since coercion involves the use of force—the employment of violence—it unleashes the dogs of war with all the attendant potential for escalation and unforeseen contingency. So far, the utility of force consisting of assurance, deterrence, and coercion are most frequently successful in statist warfare where the rational and objective calculation of interest and effort are more evident and the intensity of national interest varies. Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest coercion is any more effective than deterrence at the lower range of conflict with nonstate actors who have vital interests at stake.

In 1966, Thomas Schelling both coined the word for, and initially defined the concept of, the use of compellence. In the context of the Cold War, he sought to understand the utility and relationship of force in nuclear strategy. Schelling’s definition of compellence is very inclusive, embracing coercion, but it is fundamentally different from deterrence. He asserted deterrence is defensive, negative, and static while compellence is positive, offensive, overt, and dynamic. Since 1966, the expanded discussion of assurance, deterrence, and coercion suggests Schelling’s concept of compellence can be refined to arrive at a more complete understanding of the utility of force.

Whereas coercion uses force to manipulate the adversary’s cost-benefit calculations, leaving the decision to comply in his hands, true compellence offers the enemy no choice, no negotiation—the winner completely dictates terms of ending the war. Saddam Hussein was

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coerced to abandon his conquest of Kuwait through the denial created by Operation Desert Storm; twelve years later he was compelled by Operation Iraqi Freedom, which offered no opportunity for negotiation and removed him from power. Think regime change: Adolf Hitler, Saddam, Manuel Noriega, and Muammar Gadhafi were offered no choice in abandoning their ambitions and power.

The great theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, asserted resistance is the product of will multiplied by means. In this political formula, compellence reduces the capability to resist to zero by eliminating the means. Thus, wars exist in a vast variety of forms ranging from demonstration to total war in which compellence is the ultimate argument of arms. Of all the uses of force, compellence is the most expensive and the most decisive.

In the post-World War II period, the United States has rarely had the recourse to compel its adversaries. The reasons are pretty straight forward—the advent of nuclear weapons and the fear of nuclear escalation ushered in an era of limited war. For more than four decades following World War II, the specter of triggering nuclear escalation kept the use of force in the realms of assurance, deterrence, or carefully calculated coercion. Compellence only becomes an option in our backyard, as in Panama, or after the fall of the Soviet Union, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, or when seriously provoked in the pursuit of a vital national interest or in a cheap pursuit, as in removing Gadhafi in Libya.

There is an obvious symmetry between uses of force and levels of national interest, a range that may be broadly categorized from peripheral, to important, to vital. This careful calculation of national interests determines the level of force allowable to achieve them. The force must be scaled to the perceived interest. Herein lies the first problem in the United States's use of force since 1945—the asymmetric and dynamic nature of national interest.

The Asymmetry of Interest

Few nations or nonstate actors can actually threaten the vital interests of the United States. Virtually everyone, however, can at some level threaten lesser interests. American diplomatic and military power are used to pursue security and economic interests as well as support American values throughout the world. At what point those interests become sufficiently threatened to require the use of military power is at the heart of the cost-benefit calculation in the use of force.

When Clausewitz suggested two kinds of wars exist—limited and unlimited—he referred not to means, but to objectives. Unlimited wars usually involve vital national interests, existential threats, which summon the greatest will and effort. Invariably, compellence is often involved in unlimited wars. Limited wars, however, run the greater range of conflict, requiring the careful calculation of cost and benefit. These are wars of coercion, wars of choice. One of the chief problems in the exercise of US military power since 1945 is that most of these conflicts have been a limited war for the United States, but unlimited for its adversaries. Therefore, despite the vast power available to the

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8 Ibid., 585.
United States, the careful calculations of costs and benefits have been domestically controversial and rarely match the will and efforts of America’s adversaries.

One of Clausewitz’s more emphatic assertions is his insistence that “the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.” Policymakers must understand what kind of war they are embarking upon, limited or unlimited, and understand the nature of the war for the enemy as well. While US objectives in the Vietnam War were limited, they were clearly unlimited for the North Vietnamese.

This asymmetry of interest in a coercive use of force, meant the North Vietnamese were much stronger, not in means, but in will and willingness to sacrifice. This element suggests some obvious strategies for targeting US weaknesses. American efforts to coerce the North Vietnamese through force, by physically denying them conquest of South Vietnam, was likely to become expensive and to require constant vigilance. In contrast, the North Vietnamese could not be coerced, but only compelled, to abandon their ambition to unify Vietnam—an unlimited objective. Given the risks of escalation and self-imposed constraints, compellence was not a likely option for the United States.

This rationale remains the current and likely future case in the exercise of American power in attempting to maintain regional stability. Whether designing a policy over Crimea or Taiwan, nuclear-armed nation-states have the capability to threaten the United States existentially. All other threats are likely to be limited in both ends and means, resulting in controversial wars of choice. The exercise of US power will continue to be carefully calculated and largely circumscribed not only by the asymmetry of interest but also by domestic tolerance and partner capacity to assume or end these conflicts.

The Domestic Clock

In September 2007, General David Petraeus, commander of US forces in Iraq, traveled to Washington to face a skeptical Congress conducting a cost-benefit analysis on the Iraq War. Petraeus’s mission was simple but not easy: put more time on the domestic clock—convince Congress and the public that more time would permit the United States to apply power in Iraq successfully.

Due to the asymmetry of interests between the United States and its adversaries, America has chosen to limit carefully the amount of force applied to conflicts since 1945. As a result, in these limited wars of choice, the public as well as the Congress has been and will continue to be involved in any cost-benefit analysis involving blood and treasure in the pursuit of national interests. Consequently, time has become a problem for the employment of American power, working against the

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9 Ibid., 88.
consistent use of US force absent a consensus on the threat or the nature of the national interest.

Inevitably, two questions arise during cost-benefit analyses during a conflict: are we winning? And, is it worth it? The more limited the war’s objectives, the more the constraints and the restraints, the more political and the more partisan the war will become. Any perceived lack of success will be used as a political bludgeon by the opposing party. As the clock ticks, the military must provide incremental success to sustain public and political will. The rheostat for the amount of force used in limited wars must be adjusted to the objectives, the means, and most importantly, the clock.

To sustain public support for the use of force, we should use overwhelming force to eliminate quickly an opponent’s means to resist or to use protracted war over time with such a low level of violence that the public remains indifferent. This approach creates a long or short war scenario measured by the amount violence required. Short wars are intense, violent, and dominate the media, the national agenda, and public attention—but, they are short. To make the clock less relevant, violence can be dialed down such that it drops below the level of public interest.

Following the Persian Gulf War, Operation Southern Watch engaged significant proportions of US airpower to protect the Shia population. American airpower attacked any Iraqi air or ground forces from the thirty-second parallel to the Kuwaiti border. In the first six years alone 86,000 sorties were used to constrain Saddam’s use of military force.\footnote{Gregory Ball, “1991—Operation Southern Watch,” Air Force Historical Support Division, September 18, 2012, http://www.afhistory.af.mil/FAQs/Fact-Sheets/Article/458951/1991-operation-southern-watch/.}

Virtually every day, the United States delivered violence in southern Iraq in the pursuit of these objectives. Yet, the low level of violence kept these operations out of the public eye and allowed the application of force over a considerable period of time. Absent the ability to achieve political objectives with the application of minimal or carefully constrained force over time, we are left with a final option—let someone else do it.

The Partner Capacity

Even with the application of significant US power to any particular strategic problem, one question always remains: how ought this use of force end? The proverbial problem of strategic handoff is often the most vexing. While American military power can sustain weak regimes, our record of nation-building, or even building sufficient partner capacity that allows newly constructed allies to sustain or finish the fight, is decidedly mixed. American optimism in its ability to use force to reshape local political, economic, or military realities rooted in long-standing and foreign cultures has been at the core of its failure to succeed in limited wars since 1945. There are undoubtedly plenty of lessons available. But perhaps the greatest unlearned lesson evident from Vietnam is that despite its great military power, the United States constantly overestimates its ability to effect change in local or regional politics.\footnote{David L. Anderson, “Introduction: The Vietnam War and Its Enduring Historical Relevance” in The Columbia History of the Vietnam War, ed. David L. Anderson (NY: Columbia University Press, 2011), 83.}
America views the military as the primary instrument for building sufficient partner capacity to carry on or finish the fight even as the public wearies of the cost of such wars. The unfortunate but important truth is that all militaries are simply reflections of the society which creates them. If that society is rife with factionalism, corruption, predatory power structures, and inept leadership—those characteristics will inevitably be reflected in the military. The United States can give its partners equipment and teach them how to shoot, but it cannot always tell them whom to shoot. In short, America cannot change their culture.

In some cases, the only hope is that the enemy, the adversary, is more corrupt, inept, and predatory than one’s erstwhile ally or proxy. The relative long-term balance of power can rarely be altered if the enemy is not already predisposed to failure. The United States can weaken its adversary through attrition, decapitation, or sheer destruction, but a better-equipped proxy will soon revert to its own preferred cultural styles of management, leadership, and interests.

The final assumption in such proxy strategies is that one’s interests and those of one’s proxies or partners will align. America may be able to build partner capacity, but can it direct how the capacity will be used? America’s efforts to influence partners to do its bidding instead of pursuing their own interests will always be limited. After spending much blood and treasure in attempting to make Iraq and Afghanistan capable of defending themselves and ending the wars the United States started, America should not be surprised if the regimes in power are more interested in retaining and extending their domestic power than pursuing the US view of regional peace.

Of course, all alliances are based on mutual interests to some degree, and diplomacy clarifies and aligns those interests where possible. American leverage in regions and in countries is invariably overestimated; however, its perceptions of interest and cultural logic mirror the images of its partners’ responses. If asymmetrical interests, the clock, and the problems inherent in building partner capacity make the application of US power in limited wars problematic, what can be done?

The Potential Solutions

How might a better understanding of the utility of force and the inherent limitations in the application of American military power be addressed in formulating strategy? Possible approaches might be found in better organization and process, innovating a truly national strategic planning doctrine, or just education. Some years ago Andrew F. Krepinevich and Barry Watts noted a decline in American strategic competence. Harkening back to the practices of the Eisenhower administration, the authors recommended modifying the current organization of the National Security Council (NSC) to include a planning board and a coordination board supplemented by small study groups and invigorated by frequent senior policymaker participation. The current council consists of a Principles Committee, a Deputies Committee, and a set of Policy Coordination Committees. Perhaps a standing Strategic Planning Committee or strategic planning groups,

formed as necessary and armed with a strategic planning doctrine, could plan for the employment of American national power.

Currently, there is no true national staff systematically planning for the application of American power. The National Security Council staff advises the president by providing options to address immediate and long-term national security problems while under the pressure of political and public scrutiny. That staff also integrates efforts across and enables cooperation among departments and agencies. Since the National Security Council serves the president, each administration usually modifies and employs the staff as it sees fit. While these changes may aid in political responsiveness, they may not provide a consistent approach to planning the strategic use of force. More consistency may be found in the deeply embedded planning culture of the Department of Defense, which is likely why the National Security Council looks to it when the nation considers flexing its military muscle.

The Department of Defense has service and joint doctrine at the tactical and operational levels to consider and to execute a uniform planning process regarding the application of force even though there is no true national strategic planning doctrine. Detailed and deliberate contingency planning is done at the combatant command level in anticipation of potential conflict before it is reviewed by Defense Department. Directed theater, strategic, and even global plans are normally built from the bottom up with an incremental review and approval; however, these plans target very specific problems reflective of a strategic approach even though they are, in and of themselves, only operations.

The challenge is every conflict is essentially unique. Plans can only be made to address unique snapshots in time, reflecting the domestic, international, and regional conditions assumed to exist at the moment of crisis or decision. As conditions may be radically different from any anticipated scenario, there may be no preexisting deliberate plan, as was the case for the Afghanistan War. Perhaps it is time for a national strategic planning doctrine that formalizes the development of strategic net assessments and mandates strategic reassessments beyond the theater level, possibly even coordinating global war plans between theaters. In the absence of such a strategic planning staff or formalized process within the National Security Council, the Defense Department could ensure assessments are coordinated and considered across departments and agencies in the Joint Staff or within the office for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities, as appropriate.

As part of a strategic planning doctrine, a strategic net assessment would clarify friendly and enemy interests and objectives, not as a checklist but as part of a more deliberate process to avoid impulsive or inappropriate use force and ensure that force can, in fact, achieve our national objectives. Additionally, a national-level strategic net assessment might identify the strengths and the weaknesses of our partners and adversaries, allowing us to match strengths and weakness across all the elements of national power. Strategic reassessments would continue to calculate the costs and benefits as inevitable interactions with our adversaries change and influence the strategic situation. The reassessment should also reassess the clock on the pace and scale of the
national effort to manage public expectations and determine the need and timing of incremental success to sustain public will.

Enormous challenges—of time, effort, and other resources—will accompany attempts to improve the application of force through strategic planning and doctrine at the national level; however, the stakes are high even though no process, no doctrine, no implementation can ever guarantee strategic success. But, such forethought may help reduce the risk of oversight, cognitive bias, and political impulse.

Fundamentally, strategy is an art, a direct result of the talent and efforts of senior policymakers, commanders, and planners. The entire process, regardless of the organization and the doctrine, is driven by the personality of the decision-makers; certainly, the nature and inclinations of the president are foremost. In this respect, education and awareness leading to understanding the real utility of force and its limitations in an era characterized by limited warfare is perhaps the most realistic solution. Appealing again to Clausewitz, military theory is meant to guide, to educate, to “light [the commander’s] way, ease his progress, train his judgment, and help him to avoid pitfalls.”

With regard to the utility of force and its limitations, some general observations should be considered. First, the type of conflict should be identified: it may be limited for us but unlimited for the enemy. A careful, matched calculation of our own and our adversary’s interests, resources, and risk must be completed. In this way, a determination of the appropriate use force for the strategic problem set can be made.

When dealing with state adversaries, the utility of American force in foreign relations remains its ability to assure, deter, coerce, and compel; however, American power has demonstrated difficulty in deterring conflict and coercing nonstate actors and emergent enemies in limited wars. In such wars, the United States can choose to go fast, go slow, or not go at all. A strategic net assessment should carefully understand the international and domestic constraints and restraints in the possible use of force. The application of overwhelming force to compel an enemy can be used where appropriate to eliminate nonstate actors primarily with state support. This demonstration of willingness and capability may also serve to deter further state-sponsored extremism and assure allies. The problem of handing off in the smoking ruins of a regime change or in the sticky use of partners prosecuting proxy wars will remain; however, realistic expectations and pragmatic, rather than idealistic foreign policy, may help establish what passes for regional peace, aligned as close as possible to our national interests.

When international or domestic constraints will not allow compellence, violence should be applied at such a level of intensity to allow its application over time. Persistent scaled violence will exhaust the adversary, slowly destroying the adversary’s capability or at least contain the adversary until it can be eliminated. The use, scale, and type of violence over time has two possible objectives: to make the nonstate adversary strategically irrelevant or simply to drive the level of enemy violence into the criminal domain. Like crime, fanaticism that makes use of terrorism may never be eliminated, but it can eventually be exhausted or beaten
into the realm of political crime and treated as such. Marshalling the coordinated resources of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Interpol, and other allied-state agencies may be the best recourse for countering strategic-level violence driven into the criminal domain.

Finally, there is restraint. One piece of wisdom attributed to the Greek historian, Thucydides, suggests “of all the manifestations of power, restraint impresses men the most.” The decision to use force to assure, deter, coerce, or compel should be made carefully, deliberately, and always with the knowledge that violence is escalatory. Perhaps the great caution about the future use of force is that with rapid development and use of robotic technology, resorting to force will become altogether too easy. The promise of delivering violence precisely, with little collateral damage, and without unnecessary friendly—or even unfriendly—casualties will be hard to resist when political and public voices demand action. Unfortunately, the belief that one can shape or influence local or regional politics and conflict by the carefully measured use of force is the most persistent and dangerous illusion in the era of limited warfare following World War II.
ABSTRACT: This article introduces financial warfare as a valuable and innovative tool for deterring the sponsors of the “little green” and “little blue men” of proxy warfare. By analyzing the economic terrain, financial trace, nodes, and edges of a sponsor’s financial networks, US policymakers can develop, plan, and deliver financial deterrence necessary to support international stability as well as to persuade or coerce an adversary by increasing the costs of their wars.

In an era of proxy conflicts—such as Russia in Crimea and Ukraine, China in the South China Sea, and Iranian proxies in Iraq and the Levant—financial power may offer the United States the greatest capability to counter our adversaries’ “little green” and “little blue men.” Financial power is simply the means to make warfare—or anything for that matter—more or less costly. Extracting a cost from our adversaries by collapsing a single transaction, a single enterprise, or their entire defense industrial base provides the United States with a potentially unmatchable deterrent capability useful in conventional and unrestricted warfare.

Without innovating our strategic capabilities, America may have no option other than sending its fleets into the cauldron of the South China Sea in response to China seizing and militarizing islands hundreds of miles from its shores, intimidating the region using the little blue men of its maritime militia, restricting freedom of navigation, enforcing the self-declared air defense identification zone, and rejecting international law.

Without innovating our tactical capabilities, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) tanks and troops may have to respond conventionally to an expansionist Russian state emboldened by the success


2 For more on the importance of the supply chain that forms the defense industrial base, see M. Thomas Davis, “Blog: The Incredible Shrinking Defense Industrial Base,” Signal, June 16, 2105. For more on “unrestricted” reflecting the multifaceted approach to modern power projection, see Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts, 1999).

of its special forces and irregular troops seizing Crimea, segmenting the Ukraine, and exporting irregular war to Latvia, Estonia, or Lithuania.4

Even though America fought successfully against Iranian proxies, such as Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi militia in the battle of Najaf in 2004 and Qais al-Khazali’s Special Groups in Iraq thereafter, conventional constraints failed to limit Iran’s expansion in the Levant and its influence over Iraq.5 The South China Sea, Ukraine, Crimea, Iraq, and the Levant illustrate how state-sponsored unrestricted conflict has become the core of adversarial power projection. Adversaries’ asymmetric capabilities are outpacing US strategy, and America faces a conundrum—escalate to conventional war or give ground to new threats.

When the United States projects power, it operates through four principal avenues: military, diplomatic, information, and economic. Financial power, or the capacity to leverage capital or money, has typically been considered a subset of economics. Given the capabilities and effects of computer networks, particularly the internet, finance is separating from economics to become an affiliated but distinct channel suitable for power projection.

For the purposes of this paper, the delineation between finance and economics uses Yale Professor Paul Bracken’s definition: “The economic system deals with the hard and soft outputs of the economy—that is, goods and services. The financial system deals with money and credit.”6 Economics is simply the production and distribution of goods and services using three factors or inputs: capital, resources, and labor7 Finance, what Bracken colloquially refers to as money and credit, is also the “system that includes the circulation of money, the granting of credit, the making of investments, and the provision of banking facilities.”8

Financial power can be used to derive economic effects. Financial warfare can, at a minimum, disrupt the monetary foundations underlying production and distribution and, accordingly, disrupt an adversary’s ability to produce and distribute goods and services. Such an attack would not only preclude an adversary’s ability to transact (to price and exchange goods and services) but also to move, to aggregate, or to store capital necessary for production and distribution; in short, production and distribution would cease and the adversary’s economy would collapse.

From another perspective, economic warfare tools such as blockades and embargoes target the distribution of goods and services—outputs. Since financial warfare targets capital, it collapses an input. Thus, economic actions like sanctions, blockades, or embargoes sever connections between the United States and its target; while financial

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8 Merriam Webster, online, September 26, 2016, s.v. “finance.”
power projection bolsters capabilities by maximizing connectivity to targets. Economic actions are unit step functions—for example, a blockade is a definitive, declaratory step, and an incomplete or partial embargo is not an embargo. As such, blockades and embargoes are poor tools for a proportionate response. Conversely, the finely graduated tools of financial power projection, which can target a single transaction or an entire industrial base equally well, offer a number of compelling advantages in comparison to the imprecise consequences of economic power.

Financial power works in physical and electronic dimensions, and though existing financial markets (open market operations). An advantage of financial power projection is that its indirect or derivative approach to economic production and distribution presents less surface area for adversaries to exercise intelligence collection on, or to react against. Because it offers an indirect, misattributable or even unattributable approach, finance has significant potential for actively managing the risk of responding to any adversary.

Responding to Contemporary Conflicts

The wars confronting America today incorporate a range of different combat modes including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, and terrorist acts that include indiscriminate violence and coercion as well as criminal disorder. Such wars allow the sponsor to operate between the traditional means of state power projection by using nominally nonstate entities to conceal themselves from conventional retaliation. Since conventional military formations pursuing total war could easily destroy these irregular formations, the use of nontraditional means preserves the sponsor’s ability to project power in operations short of conventional war, fueling and supporting strategic deterrence.

Further explained, such “deterrence is the manipulation of an adversary’s estimation of the cost/benefit calculation of taking a given action”; thus, “by reducing prospective benefits or increasing prospective costs (or both), one can convince the adversary to avoid taking the action.” The strategic deterrence aspects of such tactics facilitate Russia’s maintenance of its enclaves in the Ukraine, China’s fortified islands in its near seas, and ongoing Iranian hegemony in the Levant.

Mechanics of Deterrence

Russian, Chinese, and Iranian deterrence strategies are conducted through military, diplomatic, and economic coercion of their neighbors, the United States, and other adversaries. This form of deterrence requires

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9 Electronic means include analog approaches that might disrupt the reliability of power generation, transmission, or usage. Cyber or digital means, a subset of electronic which includes analog, range from data manipulation in ledger systems to targeting core systems and interfaces as well as the reach and consistency of rule schemas inside liquidity markets (stocks, bonds, commodities, etc.). Cyber operates at microsecond speeds, which may exceed an adversary’s ability to measure and to assess its effects. This speed introduces uncertainty and indeterminacy that may suppress or delay counteraction. The speed also enables the creation of waves and wave-centric methodologies that use sequenced, discrete vectors at various frequencies. This capability can create powerful waves of price, supply, and duration volatility that travel across markets, geographies, and time. Such waves can exploit discrete vector strikes as well as adversarial and allied actions and reactions on an aggregate or cumulative basis.

10 Austin Long, Deterrence from Cold War to Long War: Lessons from Six Decades of RAND Research (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 7.
constructing a known status quo, a mutually understood level of conflict, or nonconflict, within which participants manage risks and expectations.

For example, because the Russians, Chinese, and Iranians cannot compete independently with the current militaries of the United States and its allies, they will pursue actions short of direct military engagement. Consequently, the Russian, Chinese, and Iranian perspectives and decision calculi rely on the absence of direct conventional military-to-military engagement. If the United States or any protagonist is unwilling to challenge the status quo ante by supplemental or innovative actions, then, by definition, they capitulate to the antagonists’ actions.

In order to manage multiple conflicts of this type while simultaneously invalidating their deterrent strategies, the United States must develop new ways to project power, and challenge, change or annul the adversaries’ decision calculus. Financial power disrupts calculability because it operates outside the Russian, Chinese, and Iranian formulations of deterrence, introducing new and unique variables. Socialist or sectarian political economies subordinate the independence of individual actions to centrally administrated ideology or oligarchy. The subordination of individual financial actions is enforced by constraining capital liquidity, storage or transport to the needs of the State. Ultimately, China, Russia and Iran are at a direct disadvantage to capitalist economies because they are, by definition, less capital efficient. Financial power exploits this disadvantage.

The Object of Financial Warfare

Analogous to military art, combat in financial warfare is conducted through the engagement. The object of the engagement in financial warfare is the adversary’s capital. The engagement is the only means of destroying the adversary’s capital, and it may come in the form of a direct attack on primary capital or an indirect attack on secondary and tertiary capital components. Primary capital is internal and inseparable from the enterprise; it is an input to, and a factor of, production. Capital includes cash, liquid investments and the value of raw materials, works-in-process, and finished goods inventories. If primary capital is removed, the enterprise collapses.

Secondary capital components are debt and equity, which are sold by the enterprise in exchange for cash, i.e. primary capital. Both debt and equity, secondary capital components, facilitate the formation of primary capital, provide a channel to it, and exercise a claim upon it. Secondary capital differs from primary capital in two respects: it does not organically possess capital functions, and it is external to the enterprise.

Tertiary capital components were created to provide the functions of capital to secondary capital components. Examples of tertiary capital components include depositories, markets: stock; bond; foreign currency; and commodity markets, and systems infrastructure: credit and debit cards; ATMs; point of sales; and real time gross settlement systems.

11 Carl von Clausewitz made an off-handed comparison between war and finance: “The decision by arms is for all major and minor operations in war what cash payment is in commerce.” While Clausewitz may have used the concept as a background metaphor, the similarities were apparent to him. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 97.
In financial war, engagements are fought in physical and electronic dimensions. Physical or digital capital can be attacked by engagements in those dimensions. In addition to physical and electronic engagements, tertiary capital components can be reduced through degrading their ability to provide capital liquidity—storage or transport.

Financial warfare can reach deep into the interior of a country, a hostile territory, or a denied area to project national power through supply and logistics chains. Industrial economies producing complex products, for example automobiles, use a sequence of specialized manufacturers, a supply chain, with each manufacturer purchasing raw materials (inputs) for their production, maintaining in-process inventory, and outputting finished goods. These outputs become inputs for downstream manufacturers in the supply chain. The transactions between or among specialized manufacturers in a supply chain are generally explicit and priced.

An adversary’s defense industrial base—entirely, by industry, by geography, or through an individual transaction of a single enterprise—can be attacked through capital-value transiting supply and logistics chains. Capital value of raw materials, work-in-process or finished goods inventories can be attacked by injecting or engineering volatility into their price, transit duration, or supply. Whipsawing price—creating sequential stock-outs and gluts that starve and then flood a market—at one component of the supply chain will cascade to other downstream companies. If any part of a supply chain is reachable, then all parts of the supply chain can be affected. In other words, risk to the entire supply chain is affected by variance in the risk to any single link.

The ability of finance to reach within and among enterprises in a supply chain is only one vector into a target economy. Engineering contagions or cascade failures based upon bank lending, credit expansion, direct investment, and currency exchange are obvious additional vectors.

Contemporary gray-zone warfare is designed to present a level of conflict that appears unreachable by conventional means. By using financial vectors exogenous to the conflict state, the United States can introduce an entirely new category of risk, financial risk, into the conflict causing a change in valuation between risk and reward. This condition can increase enterprise and supply-chain risk, raising expenses and eroding the commercial capabilities of the sponsor’s supporting infrastructure, defense industrial base, or a vital national interest. Financial risks can be increased to burden a conflict’s sponsor with greater expenses. Timing financial engagements to an adversary’s actions reinforces the immediacy of costs to the sponsor.

Financial strikes can manipulate spot and structural volatility to induce liquidity crises and bankruptcies for a locality, region, or province as well as a political leader, party, or regime. While the results of financial power can be used to coerce and change the decision calculus of policymakers, financial power can also persuade a sponsor’s commercial competitors to expand and to challenge them for market share. Sequential, multivector financial engagements can be used to engineer contagions, cascade failures, or Black Swans while remaining almost undetectable. Such financial campaigns can shape the adversary’s
Parameters

(2) Summer 2017

46  Parameters 47(2) Summer 2017

economy towards fragility by incentivizing over centralization and socialization of risk as well as promoting asymmetry, agency, and opacity.

Terrain Maps and Traces

The first step in financial power projection is targeting, which requires the national authority, department, agency, or combatant command to develop a detailed economic terrain map and financial trace of the target to construct accurate, precise, and specific financial vectors. An economic terrain map is a networked view of a targets' productive, distributive and systemic activities over a physical and virtual geography identifying integration points among the target, its vendors, its customers, and the relevant economies, which are all potential disintermediation targets.

A basic accounting of the factors of production—resources, capital, and labor—reveals how the target produces and distributes goods and services. Other characteristics—such as the costs, returns, and margins from component business processes; the mix of sales, income, and profit from consumer, industrial, reseller, and government markets; and the explicit and the reimbursed products or services delivered to the government—also help quantify potential leverage points by detailing the breadth of the target's business.

In addition to identifying productive activities, the economic terrain map should provide a comprehensive and detailed picture of the target's distributive activities including the logistics channels that move goods from production to consumers and critical factors of time, place, and possession that separate goods from consumers—for example, what factors might inhibit the delivery of seafood in Chinese maritime militia trawlers to purchasers?

Once the target's economic terrain is mapped, a financial trace of that economic space is made. This trace identifies and details the financial providers, networks, mechanisms, operations, and infrastructure that enable the target's capital liquidity, storage, and transport activities at the primary component level. Tracing the secondary and tertiary asset-liability network for both current assets such as working capital, credit lines, bank accounts, raw material, and work-in-progress inventories, as well as long-term assets such as owners' equity and infrastructure illuminates who is at risk.

From this financial trace, the appropriate network nodes—individuals, vendors, suppliers, commercial industries, and government entities, as well as the connecting edges that include transaction and payment networks can be identified. Namely, the nodes clarify where liability, risk, and reward reside, and the edges show how those elements flow across the network. The financial trace prioritizes vulnerable nodes and edges by their capacity to bear or transmit risk or loss.

In the case of a targeted enterprise and its customer conducting a sales transaction in physical cash, for example, the targeted enterprise will probably deposit its revenues into a depository (a bank) at some point. If the buyer uses another notional form of capital such as a credit or debit card instead of cash, then both parties to the transaction must have systems and depositories to provide liquidity, transport, and storage for their capital. The transaction, its supporting systems and
depositories are all available targets. Thus, traces are subject to multiple means and methods of attack whose results may range from isolating the target from its financial service providers; collapsing its ability to transact, move, or store capital; or bankrupting it.

**Targeting**

Financial power projection, in many ways like artillery or missiles, ranges from unguided to precision-guided vectors against an adversary efficiently and effectively delivering payloads adapted for point, area, or system targets. Point targets involve a specific transaction, a store or a transport of capital, or an individual enterprise. Area targets pinpoint grouped or associated transactions, stores or transports of capital, or associated enterprises such as a supply chain. System targets encompass liquidity markets (such as stock, bond, or commodity markets), industries, geographies, or an adversary’s entire economy. In summary, targeting financial power can be graduated from capital in specific productive or distributive activities inside a single company to sovereign systemic targets that include money supply and circulation velocity.

In overview, the financial targeting process begins with the desired outcome: specific outcomes require specific inputs while generalized outcomes may have arrays of complementary inputs. Each outcome sought must be described in terms of the effects or characteristics desired, which include:

- **Scale**—Is the outcome to encumber a single transaction of a single company or stop all financial activity within an adversary’s economy?
- **Speed**—When is the outcome required in relation to the theoretical or practical delivery speeds of the available tools?
- **Duration of effects**—Should the outcome’s duration be instantaneous or occur over decades or more?
- **Intensity of effects**—Within the scale and duration of an outcome, how intense are the desired effects—should the efficiency of an activity be reduced or be collapsed entirely?
- **Overtness of means**—How profound is the risk to the initiator, their sources, or methods—overt, covert, or clandestine?

Combining the desired outcome with the mapped terrain and trace, the determinations of critical requirements and vulnerabilities can be made. The means employed—physical, electronic, or open market—must be determined. Metrics, channels, and vectors must be detailed. Cost must be determined. If a networked target is involved, consideration must be given to constructive and destructive interference to preclude unintended consequences. If approaching the target through cyber methods, amplitude and frequency of volatility wave functions must be examined. Lastly, financial power projection can be formulated to occur independently, in coordination with, or in support of other activities.

To illustrate, the desired outcome might be to collapse the supply chain of a Chinese maritime militia company of “little blue men” to preclude its provocative actions against US naval forces conducting freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. Scale, speed,
duration, intensity, and overtess should factor in the timing, scope, and scale of the US exercises and the probable Chinese response.

A critical miscalculation of many contemporary deterrent strategies is the assumption that the sponsor’s receipt of economic benefits will remain unchanged even though they segment or destroy the commercial commons from which those benefits arise. China’s operative assumption in the South China Sea, for example, assumes it can deconstruct or segment the global maritime commons militarily through anti-access/area denial tactics while continuing to receive the commercial benefits, i.e. seaborne exports and maritime commerce, of a global commons.

Economic and financial systems are, by definition, networked. Removing the South China Sea from the global maritime commons renders the commons less than global in scale. Regardless of China’s locality advantage and the volume and range of its missile and aircraft coverage, commercial craft seeking to leave or to enter the South China Sea are eventually outside China’s physical power-projection capabilities and their transit is dependent upon US acquiescence.

Similarly, Russia’s seizure of Crimea and part of eastern Ukraine through proxy forces of “little green men” segments the network of sovereign and legitimate territorial control in Eastern Europe; however, Russia’s economic assumption appears to be one of uninterrupted trade. Likewise, Iran’s expectation is that the use of its proxy forces in the Levant and Yemen will have little impact on their hydrocarbons export and Persian Gulf maritime commerce.

The economic commons in these cases, the South China Sea, Eastern Europe, and the Persian Gulf are being segmented or removed from the global economic commons. This expulsion increases the risks and expenses as well as distance and duration for trade. Financial warfare is designed, at a minimum, to capture and deliver these increased costs to the conflict’s sponsors.

Conclusion

Financial power may enable the United States to develop and to present the contemporary sponsors of aggression with the costs of their actions at net present value, which will reduce prospective benefits and increase prospective costs both directly to the sponsor and inversely to their competitors. America should meet the Russian, Chinese, and Iranian challenges by developing and presenting financially enabled forward contracts, i.e. deterrent strategies, to its adversaries. Moreover, the United States should match an aggressor’s activities with concurrent deterrent responses of similar magnitude, and duration.

Financial warfare is an appropriate means: it has the breadth and depth to project power in a fashion suitable to achieve national policy goals. As an innovation, not just of means and methods but of efficacy and efficiency, financial warfare creates and uses a new channel for power projection to support national aims. Because finance can directly or indirectly touch every aspect of economic activity, financial warfare can accordingly range across the entire spectrum of economic responses to an adversary’s actions accurately, precisely, and proportionately.
Financial warfare can endow the United States with an unmatched deterrent capability useful in conventional as well as other wars. Creating a financial warfare capability initially requires the data and the analytics necessary to build economic terrain maps and financial traces. Then, the United States must create internal and external government competencies to exercise physical, electronic, and open-market means against primary, secondary, and tertiary capital components of selected targets, independently and within campaigns.

Financial warfare offers a number of compelling advantages. America’s use of financial warfare will gain strength over time by maximizing connectivity to, and penetration of, targets and by providing precise, proportionate responses. Lastly, financial warfare can help America counter, if not preempt, an adversary’s nontraditional warfare capabilities.
Russia has a long history of propaganda and disinformation operations—techniques it continues to adapt to the online environment. As the information space is broader than the technologies facilitating its use, Russia utilizes broad information-based efforts classified by effects: information-technical and information-psychological. A major milestone for these efforts surfaced in 2008 when pro-Russian cyberattacks occurred concurrently with Russian military operations in Georgia. During that brief conflict, a resilient Georgia overtook Russia in the larger information war, forcing Russia to rethink how it conducts information-based operations.

Russia adjusted its information confrontation strategy six years later against Ukraine, quickly and bloodlessly reclaiming Crimea and keeping potentially intervening countries at bay. Clearly, Russia finds value in manipulating the information space, particularly in an age where news can be easily accessed on demand through official and nonofficial outlets. Based on its successes in Crimea, Russia is outpacing its main adversary, the United States, by leveraging the information space to bolster its propaganda, messaging, and disinformation capabilities in support of geopolitical objectives.

Russian Information Confrontation

Russia has been long credited with having formidable information warfare capabilities.1 Russian information confrontation theory covers a wide range of these actions and the conceptual understanding of Russian information operations stemming from cultural, ideological, historical, scientific, and philosophical viewpoints.2 The broad nature of these activities views offensive information campaigns more as influencing agents than as destructive actions, though the two are not mutually exclusive. Simply put, the information space lends information resources, including “weapons” or other informational means, to affect both internal and external audiences through tailored messaging, disinformation, and propaganda campaigns.

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Igor Panarin, an influential scholar and a well-regarded Russian information warfare expert, outlined the basic instruments involved in the larger information struggle including propaganda (black, gray, and white); intelligence (specifically information collection); analysis (media monitoring and situation analysis); organization (coordinating and steering channels and influencing media to shape the opinion of politicians and mass media); and other combined channels.\(^3\) In terms of influence operations, Panarin identified information warfare vehicles such as social control; social maneuvering; information manipulation; disinformation; purposeful fabrication of information; and lobbying, blackmail, and extortion.\(^4\) Therefore, the essence of information confrontation focuses on this constant information struggle between adversaries.

Reviewing the application of these principles in two well-known instances of Russian geopolitical involvement helps illustrate if and how Russian understanding of information confrontation has evolved; it also provides insight into the outcomes of such practices in the context of on-demand media coverage.

### 2008 Georgia

Russia and Georgia competed to control the flow of information to the global community during their brief conflict in 2008. Both sides employed kinetic (conventional military strikes and troop movements) and nonkinetic (cyberattacks, propaganda, and denial and deception) offensives. As reported, Russia’s postanalysis and criticism of its efforts in the conflict led to some serious military reforms in its larger defense apparatus.\(^5\) Although experts observed alternating mission successes, Anatoliy Tsyganok, then deputy chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces believed Georgia won the information war at the preliminary stage of the conflict, but lost at the end of it.\(^6\)

#### Information-Technical

Russia’s perception of technical and psychological information confrontation working in concert with military attacks became evident during the conflict in Georgia. Despite the lack of a substantive connection between the orchestrators of the cyberattacks and the Russian government, this nonattributable action was the first time cyberattacks and conventional military operations had worked together.\(^7\) Such attacks included web page defacements, denial of service, and distributed denial of service attacks against Georgian government, media, and financial institutions, as well as other public and private targets.\(^8\) The attacks successfully denied citizen access to 54 websites related to communications, finance, and government, leaving some...

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4 Ibid.
to speculate at least some Russian complicity even though no hard connection was made.\textsuperscript{9}

\textit{Information-Psychological}

Russia also engaged in concurrent information-psychological operations—including propaganda, information control, and disinformation campaigns—with varying results, especially in contrast to Georgia’s efforts in the same areas. Russia focused on delivering key themes to the international community: Georgia and Mikheil Saakashvili, its president, were the aggressors; Russia was compelled to defend its citizens; and neither the United States nor its Western allies had any basis for criticizing Russia because of similar actions these nations had taken in other areas of the world, most notably in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{10}

By using television footage and daily interviews with a military spokesman, Russia controlled the flow of international information and sought to influence local populations by dictating news, sharing the progress of Russian troops protecting Russian citizens, and propagandizing Georgian atrocities.\textsuperscript{11} A review of Georgian, Russian, and Western media coverage during this period reveals Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was perceived as less aggressive than his Georgian counterpart and had little justification for Russian intervention in South Ossetia.\textsuperscript{12} Indeed, a CNN poll conducted at the time found 92 percent of respondents believed Russia was justified for intervening.\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{Why Did Georgia Win the Information War?}

Instead of acquiescing to Russia’s information confrontation over the course of the crisis, Georgians launched an aggressive counterinformation campaign by employing their own disinformation and media manipulation.\textsuperscript{14} Georgia requested assistance from professional public relations firms and private consultancies to help promote its message, limited the availability of Russian news coverage, and reported Russian air raids on civilian targets, thereby becoming the victim of a Russian military invasion.\textsuperscript{15}

Ultimately, Georgia gained the upper hand in the conflict—a fact corroborated by Russia’s review of its military’s performance, which noted deficiencies in both the information-technical and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{10} Ariel Cohen and Robert E. Hamilton, \textit{The Russian Military and the Georgia War: Lessons and Implications} (Carlisle, PA: SSI, 2011).
  \item \textsuperscript{12} Hans-Georg Heinrich and Kirill Tanaev, “Georgia & Russia: Contradictory Media Coverage of the August War,” \textit{Caucasian Review of International Affairs} 3, no. 3 (Summer 2009).
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
information-psychological domains. Germany won the hearts and minds of the global community even though Russia won the physical battlespace. The disinformation campaign was so successful that the European Union’s final report on the crisis focused on US support and military assistance to Georgia.

2014 Crimea

In 2014, Russia created a similar situation with the region of Crimea. Like South Ossetia, Crimea had a substantial Russian-speaking population (approximately 58 percent at the time) and was generally considered pro-Russian. Unlike South Ossetia, Crimea served as Russia’s only year-round warmwater port, hosting a large portion of the Russian military—the navy’s Black Sea Fleet.

Information-Technical

Six years after the Georgian conflict, Russia applied the lessons learned from the informational activities in Georgia to its efforts in Ukraine. Although there is no evidence of dedicated “information troops” in the Russian military who could directly engage in local and regional areas yet, the innuendo reveals Russia is intent on learning from its failures and fixing its problems. Russia also learned about timing cyberattacks, which have long been considered a first-strike option for maximum effectiveness, particularly against important targets such as critical infrastructures.

Unlike the concurrent digital attacks and military border crossing in Georgia, cyberattacks against Crimea shut down the telecommunications infrastructure, disabled major Ukrainian websites, and jammed the mobile phones of key Ukrainian officials before Russian forces entered the peninsula on March 2, 2014. Cyberespionage before, during, and after Crimea’s annexation also leveraged information that could support short-term and long-term objectives, a tactic that had not transpired, was not reported, or went unnoticed against Georgia.

According to one security company, cyberespionage operations employed simultaneously with other methods of information collection appeared to accelerate battlefield tactics. Unlike in Georgia, cyberespionage targeted the computers and networks of journalists.

16 Thomas, “Russian Information Warfare Theory.”
19 For more on Russia adding frigates to the fleet in early 2016, which further demonstrates the strategic importance of Crimea, see Alexander Mercouris, “Russia Strengthens Its Black Sea Fleet,” Duran (Cyprus), June 12, 2016.
in Ukraine as well as Ukrainian, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and European Union (EU) officials. Exploiting such targets could have provided Russia with insight into opposing journalistic narratives as well as advanced knowledge of important of key diplomatic initiatives. Operation Armageddon, for example, began targeting Ukrainian government, law enforcement, and military officials in mid-2013—just as active negotiations commenced for an EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, which Russia publicly deemed a national security threat.24

As in Georgia, nationalistic hackers, such as the Ukraine-based CyberBerkut, also engaged in a variety of cyberattacks against Ukraine. This group executed distributed denial of service attacks and defacements against Ukrainian and NATO webpages, intercepted US-Ukrainian military cooperation documents, and attempted to influence the Ukrainian parliamentary elections by disrupting Ukraine’s Central Election Commission network.25 While there is no evidence of collusion or direction on behalf of the Russian government, the attacks did lend to the overall confusion of the crisis, particularly for Ukraine, and might be reflective of the Russian military embracing Russian General Staff General Valery Gerasimov’s strategy on the future of warfare—conflicts will retain an information aspect part of larger “asymmetrical possibilities for reducing the fighting potential of the enemy.”26

Information-Psychological

Unlike Russia’s forceful invasion of Georgia, the contest over Crimean territory was more of an infiltration. In the absence of a direct threat, Russia relied on nonkinetic options such as propaganda, disinformation, and denial and deception to influence internal, regional, and global audiences. This reflexive control strategy—implementing initiatives to convey specially prepared information to an ally or an opponent to incline him to make a voluntarily decision predetermined by the initiator of the initiative—explains Russia’s reliance on the approach as an extension of information-psychological activities in Ukraine during and after the Crimean crisis as well as the method’s prominence in Russia’s information confrontation philosophy.27

More robust in Crimea than in Georgia, one scholar characterizes the Russian approach to information confrontation as evolving, developing, adapting, and just like other Russian operational approaches, identifying and reinforcing success while abandoning failed attempts and moving

A noticeable improvement from its efforts in Georgia, Russia used television broadcasts to generate support for actions in Crimea and to bolster the theme of Moscow’s necessary intervention to protect native Russian speakers. Additionally, pro-Russian online media mimicked anti-Russian news sources to influence opinion; for example, the website Ukrayinska Pravda was a pro-Russian version of the popular and generally pro-Ukrainian news site Ukrain'ska Pravda. The pro-Russian sources would communicate false narratives about actual events, such as denying the presence of the Russian military in Ukraine or blaming the West for conducting extensive informational warfare against Russia.

One significant lesson Russia learned from the Georgian conflict was how pervasively the Internet could disseminate news from legitimate and semiofficial organizations as well as personal blogs. Valdimir Putin, the Russian president, acknowledged the role of the Internet in influencing the outcome of regional conflicts and recognized Russia was behind other governments in this space saying, “We surrendered this terrain some time ago, but now we are entering the game again.” Russia now supports journalists, bloggers, and individuals within social media networks who broadcast pro-Russian narratives.

In one case, Russia paid a single person to hold different web identities, another to pose as three different bloggers with ten blogs, and a third to comment on news and social media 126 times every 12 hours. Such Russian trolls may be crude and unconvincing, but they do gain visibility by occupying a lot of space on the web. Arguably, “Russia’s new propaganda is not now about selling a particular worldview, it is about trying to distort information flows and fueling nervousness among European audiences.”

By adapting denial and deception strategies applied during the Georgian conflict, outside interlopers remained confused during the Crimean crisis. By denying involvement in the attacks until the later stages of the conflict, Russia continued messaging its desire to de-escalate the crisis while increasing chaos.

28 Keir Giles, The Next Phase of Russian Information Warfare (Latvia: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, 2016).
33 Bachmann and Gunneriusson, “Russia’s Hybrid Warfare.”
the European Union could not predict Russia’s objectives, Russia could leverage reflexive control to operate within Western decision-making loops, to reduce the costs of its actions against Ukraine, and to keep the United States and its allies out of the conflict. Once Putin admitted the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine, he had already annexed Crimea. Ultimately, the United States conceded Russian control of Crimea and sent Secretary of State John Kerry to mitigate the threat of further expansion into Ukraine.

Noticeably improved, Russia’s strategic communications proactively targeted pro-Russian rebels, the domestic population, and the international community to alienate Ukraine from its allies and sympathizers. Two key themes promoted the Ukrainian government being anti-Russian Fascist and declared the Russian administration would improve the population’s quality of life. Messages directed at the rebels kept them engaged in the fight whereas messages to the domestic population created moral justification for supporting the rebels and conveyed the extant intermittent prospect of widespread combat operations in eastern Ukraine.

Six years after the United States, NATO, and several European governments sided with Georgia despite the attack on South Ossetia, Moscow sought to mitigate Crimea’s external support via information activities aimed at influencing foreign government actions. Moscow used pro-Russian media sources to spread photos of Ukrainian tanks, flags, and soldiers altered to bear Nazi symbols in an effort to associate the Ukrainian government with resurgent Nazism, and thereby influence some European countries, such as Germany, to distance themselves from Kiev.

Another example involved disseminating images depicting columns of refugees fleeing Ukraine to Russia, when in reality the people commuted between Ukraine and Poland daily. Even cyberoperations effectively leaked stolen information such as the phone conversation between US Assistant Secretary of State Victoria J. Nuland and US Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey R. Pyatt, which may have embarrassed the United States.

Russia’s Victory

While the larger struggle with Ukraine continues, Russia’s successful and bloodless usurpation of Crimea testifies to the lessons learned in South Ossetia. Russia’s information confrontation strategy was more
centralized and controlled in Crimea. Perhaps the most telling aspect of success, Russia kept its biggest adversaries—the United States and NATO—from intervening thereby enabling a referendum in which the Crimean parliament voted to join Russia. While the West refuses to acknowledge Crimea’s secession, Russia attests full compliance with democratic procedures, a fact difficult to argue against on an international stage.

Despite marked improvements, Russia does not deserve all the credit. Ukraine did not learn from Russia’s missteps and was ill-prepared to handle Russia’s cyber, media, and kinetic onslaught. With a lack of funding and information outlets, there is also little evidence of an aggressive Ukrainian counterinformation campaign. Historically, Ukraine has maintained passive propaganda, public relations, and lobbying practices and does not seem interested in changing. Even since the Crimean independence referendum, Ukraine has not proficiently mitigated Russian information confrontation. According to one commentator, Ukraine “has no international voice or image” even though the entire course of events—from the takeover of parliament in Simferopol and dismantling of the Ukrainian military presence on the peninsula to the disputed referendum and the de facto annexation of the area to the Russian Federation—was accompanied by intense activity aimed to control the flow of information.

Ukraine Now

While one Ukrainian diplomat believes Ukraine is currently winning the information war, possibly due to the European Union maintaining sanctions against Russia, discontent with the sanctions is growing among European Union citizenry, particularly in Greece, Hungary, Italy, and perhaps most importantly, Germany. Furthermore, the sanctions are not the result of Ukrainian information warfare efforts as much as international perception of Russia as the aggressor state—a view influenced by Russia’s annexation of the region and suspected involvement in downing Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 (2014).

What’s more, the longer Russia engages eastern Ukraine, the more its objectives evolve. No longer entirely focused on inspiring separatists in the region to rejoin Russia in a manner similar to Crimea, Russia also seems to be combatting US influence in similar affairs.
while trying to keep Ukraine out of NATO.\textsuperscript{49} Moreover, Russia has demonstrated that obfuscating its true intent preserves its options while confusing its adversaries.\textsuperscript{50}

Hypothesizing over Russia’s true intent puts the advantage in its hands. Leveraging flexibility brings beneficial resolutions—for example, while assessing Syria in 2016, Russia’s aid to Assad’s forces successfully stopped US-backed opposition. The United States adopted a quid pro quo giving operational coordination against terrorist groups in exchange for a Russian commitment to stop Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from attacking Syrian civilians and the moderate opposition.\textsuperscript{51}

This involvement made Russia equal partners in the region, regardless of Assad’s return to power. Similarly, Russia may surrender its short-term goals for eastern Ukraine to have autonomous rights in favor of the strategic gain of Ukraine not joining NATO. Some believe the economic burdens of eastern Ukraine may be too much for Russia to take on.\textsuperscript{52} If true, using the region as a bargaining chip for the greater prize serves Russia’s long-term objectives.

\textbf{Information Confrontation—Evolutionary Thinking}

Information warfare has been referred to as an asymmetric weapon, and the incidents with Georgia and Crimea certainly support this categorization.\textsuperscript{53} Following the Color revolutions, which resulted in successful regime changes, both the Georgian and Crimean incidents reinforce the belief that constructing, controlling, and disseminating information effectively and substantially influences the outcome of geopolitical events.\textsuperscript{54}

Russia, generally perceived as one of the leading powers in information warfare, lost its information struggle against Georgia, the smaller country with less military capability and military history.\textsuperscript{55} Conversely, by applying an adaptive approach, Russia adjusted its information confrontation strategy, successfully enabling Crimea’s secession from Ukraine. Simply, Russia learned from its mistakes in Georgia, centralized generation and dissemination of its information and propaganda, and thereby subtly influenced Crimea’s final outcome. As one Russian expert remarked, “When you look at how Russia is attempting to copy Western style press briefings by the military . . . it

\textsuperscript{50} Maria Snegovaya, Putin’s Information Warfare in Ukraine: Soviet Origins of Russia’s Hybrid Warfare (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, September 2015).
\textsuperscript{52} “Does Russia Really Want Eastern Ukraine?,” World Policy (blog), http://www.worldpolicy.org/world-views/does-russia-really-want-eastern-ukraine.
\textsuperscript{53} James R. McGrath, “Twenty-First Century Information Warfare and the Third Offset Strategy,” Joint Forces Quarterly 82, no. 3 (July 2016).
\textsuperscript{54} For more on the Rose Revolution (Georgia, 2012), the Orange Revolution (Ukraine, 2004), and the Tulip Revolution (Kyrgyzstan, 2005), see Anthony H. Cordesman, Russia and the “Color Revolution”: A Russian Military View of a World Destabilized by the US and the West (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014).
speaks volumes to their understanding of how better to structure public opinion around a military operation.\textsuperscript{56}

Reviewing Russia’s information-related activities since the 2007 Estonia distributed denial of service incident, information confrontation has evolved from a tool used primarily for disruption to a tool of influence. The managing director for the Center of Security and Strategic Research at the National Defense Academy of Latvia echoes the sentiment by asserting influence operations are “at the very center of Russia’s operational planning.”\textsuperscript{57} Indeed, the more nonmilitary means are employed in areas of geopolitical tension, the more essential leveraging information confrontation becomes. As information is generally regarded as a soft power, it may be most effectively implemented in times other than force-on-force military conflict where, depending on its intent and objectives, information can be used to inform, persuade, threaten, or confuse audiences.

Unsurprisingly, Russian writing on information confrontation continues to evolve, a testament to the strategy being dynamic and fluid much like the domain in which it is applied. While Gerasimov may have helped redirect Russian military thinking about the role of nonmilitary methods in the resolution of conflicts, other thought leadership builds on the foundation. In 2013, two Russian authors acknowledged “a new-generation war will be dominated by information and psychological warfare that will seek to achieve superior control of troops and weapons and to depress opponents’ armed forces personnel and population morally and psychologically. In the ongoing revolution in information technologies, information and psychological warfare will largely lay the groundwork for victory.”\textsuperscript{58}

The use of “new-generation war” nods to the criticality of information dominance in a time where the content of information is as heavily relied upon for civilian-military matters as well as the technologies it traverses. Though new-generation war does not appear to have been used in military writings since 2013, a lack of official refutation by military officers suggests it may still be a relevant professional approach toward warfare.\textsuperscript{59}

Many Western scholars have categorized Russian tactics in Ukraine as hybrid warfare—the use of hard and soft tactics that rely on proxies and surrogates to prevent attribution, to conceal intent, and to maximize confusion and uncertainty.\textsuperscript{60} A 2015 article from \textit{Military Thought} suggests this interpretation of the events in Ukraine may be incorrect,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{57} Tony Balasevicius, “Russia’s ‘New Generation War’ and Its Implications for the Arctic,” Mackenzie Institute, November 10, 2015, http://mackenzieinstitute.com/russias-new-generation-war-implications-arctic/.
\item \textsuperscript{60} Andrew Monaghan, “The ‘War’ in Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare’,” \textit{Parameters} 45, no. 4 (Winter 2015–16): 65–74.
\end{itemize}
more accurately describing Western actions.\textsuperscript{61} In fact, by the end of 2015, Russian officers altogether refuted the use of “hybrid” to describe their activities.\textsuperscript{62} Nevertheless, the complementary and supportive role of information confrontation in Ukraine suggests it is best implemented in concert with other conventional and unconventional activities to achieve maximum effectiveness in larger campaigns and not as a stand-alone tactic.

In 2015, the director of the Russian General Staff’s Main Operation’s Directorate explained a “new-type warfare,” similar yet distinct from hybrid and new-generation warfare, that associates indirect actions with hybrid ones.\textsuperscript{63} Other authors of new-generation warfare accepted the new terminology, particularly for activities focused on military, nonmilitary, and special nonviolent measures to achieve information dominance, which logically includes actions in Ukraine. One author stressed “information warfare in the new conditions will be the starting point of every action now called the new-type of warfare (a hybrid war) in which broad use will be made of the mass media and, where feasible, the global computer networks (blogs, various social networks, and other resources).”\textsuperscript{64}

Unsuccessful attempts to place information confrontation under the rubric of any specific modern war strategy, such as new-generation war, hybrid warfare, or new-type warfare, may further testify to the reciprocally dynamic and malleable nature of the strategy and conflict activities. The one aspect consistently carried through official Russian documents concerning information security doctrine and military strategy and carried out in these regional conflicts is the belief that information superiority is instrumental to future victories.

As the world moves toward conflicts in which, as Gerasimov describes, “Wars are not declared but have already begun,” it is evident that—whether referred to as information warfare, information confrontation, information operations, or information struggle—no state is guaranteed victory based solely on the abundance of resources or capabilities. The art of information confrontation must be practiced continuously, refined over time, and tailored to specific audiences.

Russia actively refines its methods in real-time conflicts as it leverages and incorporates its information struggle into nonmilitary means to achieve political objectives. In this way, Russia is not learning from others as much as it is learning from itself and, in the process, leads states’ conduct of such operations in the future. And, therein may lie information confrontation’s greatest strength: there is no cookie-cutter playbook from which it originates or to which it applies.

Information campaigns can be tailored to suite each unique environment. The information campaign that worked in Crimea may produce different outcomes elsewhere, which reinforces Russia’s lessons-learned approach—do not fight the next battle in the same way as the

\textsuperscript{61} Thomas, \textit{Russia Military Strategy}.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{63} Thomas, “Russian Military Thought”; and Timothy L. Thomas, Thinking Like a Russian Officer: Basic Factors and Contemporary Thinking on The Nature of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, April 2016).

\textsuperscript{64} Thomas, “Russian Military Thought.”
last one. The greatest asset of this capability is the flexibility to assume
greater or lesser responsibilities given the nature of requirements, which
is paramount as the role of nonmilitary means to achieve political and
strategic goals in conflicts has significantly increased.

Recommendations

The United States needs to address hostile information activities
from its adversaries more effectively. As observed in the recent hacking
scandals surrounding the US presidential election in which Russia targeted
and, according to the US intelligence community, used information to
disrupt and ultimately help its candidate of choice to win, the soft power
most effective in confounding the United States is information itself,
and not necessarily any production or dissemination technology.\(^{65}\) Given
the fact that Russia spends approximately $400–$500 million per year
on foreign information efforts, while the US spends $20 million USD
on Russian language services, it is easy to see that the United States is far
behind.\(^ {66}\) Some recommendations to address this shortcoming include:

**National counterinformation strategy and center.** The United
States’ offensive cybercapability is generally considered among the most
sophisticated and powerful on the planet; however, as observed in efforts
against the Islamic State, America has been less adept in countering
online messaging despite substantial resources.\(^ {67}\)

In late December 2016, President Barack Obama authorized $611
billion for the military in 2017 and to establish a Global Engagement
Center to track foreign propaganda and disinformation efforts
undermining US national security interests.\(^ {68}\) Little information on the
development of this entity is available to date, although a similarly named
center focusing on Islamic State messaging is headquartered in the State
Department. Such a center should serve as a central, coordinating entity
as well as model the operations of the National Counterterrorism Center,
which maintains cross-government civilian and military representation
and directly advises the Director of National Intelligence. Furthermore,
this center needs to collaborate with national security stakeholders to
develop unique strategies for each state and nonstate actor.

**Protect against fake news.** The rampant proliferation of fake
news, such as observed during the US elections and annexation of
Crimea, undoubtedly plays a pivotal role in Russian information
operations.\(^ {69}\) One initiative to help reduce fake news involves leveraging

\(^{65}\) US National Intelligence Council (NIC), Background to “Assessing Russian Activities
and Intentions in Recent US Elections”: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution

\(^{66}\) Pavel Koshkin, “The Paradox of Kremlin Propaganda: How It Tries to Win Hearts and
Minds,” Russia Direct, April 2, 2015 http://www.russia-direct.org/analysis/paradox-kremlin
-propaganda-how-it-tries-win-hearts-and-minds; and Warren Strobel, “U.S. Losing ‘Information
War’ to Russia, Other Rivals: Study,” Reuters, March 25, 2015.

\(^{67}\) Danny Vinik, “America’s Secret Arsenal,” Politico, December 9, 2015; Emilio Iasiello,
“Rebooting the U.S. New Counter Messaging Efforts against ISIS,” Dead Drop, February 16, 2016,
Eric Geller, “Why ISIS Is Winning the Online Propaganda War,” Daily Dot (Austin, TX), March 29,
2016; and Arturo Muñoz and Erin Dick, Information Operations: The Imperative of Doctrine


\(^{69}\) Andrew E. Kramer, “To Battle Fake News, Ukrainian Show Features Nothing but Lies,” New
cutting-edge technology to help identify the fabrications as soon as they emerge. Artificial intelligence and data analytics can be used to detect words or word patterns that might indicate deceitful stories. In addition, the US government via the Department of Homeland Security should implement a strategy for educating the public as well as identifying and reporting fake news outlets in much the same way cyberscams are reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

**International engagement.** The global nature of the Internet provides many outlets for disseminating legitimate and illegitimate information. A myriad of social media platforms can also be used to promote slanted news stories and propaganda via Internet trolls. Increasing international collaboration among law enforcement and intelligence professionals who specifically focus on these outlets will help agencies identify and disable these sources.

**Conclusions**

Applying information warfare theories in today’s geopolitical climate remains a work in progress. An around-the-clock news cycle and the various ways of disseminating and consuming information worldwide make implementing information-based operations and tailoring messaging against competing narratives challenges. As observed in Georgia, smaller nations can competitively control information and influence target audiences to at least mitigate the efforts of, if not defeat, larger nations.

Even after learning from its missteps in Georgia, Russia, did not gain many Ukrainian regions. Russia lost opportunities in Luhansk and Donetsk when Russian troops were unable to penetrate the regions promptly. Russia, however, appears to be guided by Gerasimov’s principle of refining information confrontation strategies by continuing to engage in various forms of official and unofficial messaging as well as perfecting the art.

One scholar of Russian propaganda refers to it as less of an information war as much as a war on information. Given the value Russia places on manipulating information, perceptions of the information space as potentially dangerous and a successful agent for ousting governments and influencing public opinion and behavior are understandable. A former KGB general stated the overall goal of Soviet Union propaganda was not far from the “subversion” pursued by Russia’s modern Internet disinformation campaign: “active measures to weaken the West, to drive wedges in the Western community alliances of all sorts, particularly NATO, to sow discord among allies, to weaken the United States in the eyes of the people in Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America, and thus to prepare ground in case the war really occurs.”

While the media has focused on offensive cyberattacks and disruptive efforts to cripple critical infrastructures and to impede public access to financial institutions and emergency services, Russia understands the potential power associated with influencing via cyberspace. As such, Russia continues to refine its online information operations against regional and international targets, outpacing the United States in nonoffensive cybercapabilities and demonstrating not all threats in cyberspace are written in binary.
ABSTRACT: This article introduces the concept of organizational ambidexterity and explains its value to military planning and problem-solving from the tactical to strategic levels.

In 2005, as the US military waged numerous armed conflicts around the world, Army Chief of Staff General Peter J. Schoomaker was confronted with a serious troop shortage. In an interview with *Time*, he explained not only how he would overcome the shortage but also why there was no need to institute a draft: “We are developing a modular Army force that gives us much more rapidly deployable, much more capable organizations. . . . What you will have is a team of pentathletes. I want a whole team of Michael Jordans who can play any position. We must . . . have this pentathlete team better organized, better led, better trained, better equipped, and more strategically agile.”

It is not a stretch of imagination to anticipate future troop shortages, especially for an all-volunteer Army required to sustain numerous small wars across several regions of the world simultaneously. Thus, the concept of the pentathlete soldier—multifaceted and agile, proficient in a broad range of tasks, and capable of accomplishing a variety of missions—is key to sustaining Schoomaker’s vision of flexible, multifunctional Army units that effectively operate in complex environments.

While US Army strategists were devising more efficient and effective ways to train and employ soldiers to meet this vision, Joseph Soeters, then-dean of management studies at the Netherlands Defense Academy, was exploring organizational ambidexterity. Arguably, he identified and extended the philosophy of pragmatism practiced by Morris Janowitz, a pioneer of military sociology, to examine the changing nature of Cold War and post-Cold War civil-military relations. The passage below introduces Soeter’s perspective:

Peace operations are often mixed military and civilian and led by military forces, which bring a warrior ethos to the task. The warrior ethos includes rigid dichotomies such as friend/enemy, victory/defeat, strength/weakness, good/evil, and life/death. The seeming contradiction of
warriors administering peace poses challenges for the administration of a positive peace.⁴

Soeter's pragmatic approach to ambidexterity, which implies something exceptional such as a soccer player's skillful use of both feet, can impact warfighting and peacekeeping in many ways. This versatility can address seemingly contradictory goals imbedded in international peacekeeping operations that often employ military skill sets concurrently to carry out other operations. As a pragmatic approach, ambidexterity recognizes a problematic situation facing leaders of such missions and suggests a strategy to resolve the problem. The approach deals with the time-honored culture of the warrior and the need to adapt in the face of new or evolving missions. The concept also represents an adaptable and useful cross-disciplinary practice of excelling at seemingly contradictory skills that is applicable in medicine, business, and many organizations, including those involved in military affairs. This article addresses each of these applications and explains several implications of pragmatism and ambidexterity for the military environment.

Ambidexterity

In 1997 Michael L. Tushman, a leading organizational behavior theorist from the Harvard Business School, along with his associates Philip Anderson and Charles A. O'Reilly examined the problem of ensuring ongoing organizational innovation. They identified two types of innovation—incremental and discontinuous. Incremental innovations occur during routine business activities. Discontinuous innovations are needed to prepare for fundamental changes in technology or the market. Notably, the team determined “ambidextrous organizations have multiple organizational architectures to concurrently nurture these diverse innovation requirements.”⁵

O'Reilly and Tushman subsequently brought widespread recognition to the concept of ambidexterity after examining the challenges of attending to routine matters or exploiting the current business environment while also exploring opportunities to ensure future success. Considering how managers maintain stability and prepare for inevitable changes, they noted the difficulty of attending to exploitation and exploration simultaneously. Typically, a manager’s attention focuses on pressing daily activities, which leaves little time for contemplating future promises and pitfalls.⁶ This widespread management conundrum is endemic to the military.

The friction between current operations and the need to improve capabilities can result in organizations being ill-prepared for the future; ambidexterity is a way to resolve this competition. Successful organizations meet this challenge by placing these functions in

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separate divisions that report to a single supervisor—these firms are ambidextrous. Ambidexterity is a way for military leaders to cope with contradictory demands when carrying out missions that rely upon cooperation and collaboration with joint forces and nonmilitary organizations. This represents an example of a pragmatic organizational culture that can improve organizational effectiveness. The pragmatic approach will be discussed further.

Military Operations and Ambidexterity

The concept of ambidexterity is applied to contemporary military organizations by examining seemingly intractable dualisms. Take, for example, a pair of concepts known as bonding and bridging. By drawing on a common experiential reference, such as traveling, the relevance of these concepts can be explained for postmodern military operations. If a person is traveling in a group, interactions establish friendships and reinforce strong ties—bonding occurs within the community. On the other hand, if a person is traveling alone, efforts focus on bridging language and cultural differences to develop acquaintances that can help the traveler successfully navigate the journey. Thus, bonding and bridging are viewed as a mutually exclusive, fixed dichotomy.

As a feature of ambidexterity, bonding and bridging can occur simultaneously: unit cohesion is built while coordinating and collaborating with other units or organizations. Bonding “implies that servicemen do not want to have anything to do with people outside their own unit.” This is logical when enemies are clearly defined and understood, but can be problematic in the presence of ambiguity during complex operations. Further, traditional combat units take orders and respond in predictable ways; they are not supposed to demonstrate innovative ideas. Likewise, groups formed with strong ties generally have “limited cognitive flexibility” and are “less receptive to innovative ideas.” These fundamentals of ambidexterity explain why units must develop the ability to learn and adapt, especially during complex multinational operations.

Nevertheless, cohesion is not as essential during a crisis situation absent a clear friend-and-foe relationship. In these instances, the ability to bridge—collaborate with other civilian and military organizations—becomes a necessity. This need, however, does not reduce the importance of internal military cohesion: “Bonding and bridging are required during multinational non-Article 5 crisis-response operations. . . . Under those circumstances, the pattern of bonding without bridging clearly

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7 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
13 Ibid., 113.
14 Ibid., 115.
does not work as well.”15 So, there is an inherent contradiction: bonding and bridging appear to be more or less mutually exclusive, yet groups and people strongly gravitate toward one connection or the other. Military organizations dealing with diverse cultures in the uncertain postmodern environment need to be able to do both. Soeters interprets recent literature to suggest bonding and bridging can be compatible by applying the concept of ambidexterity.16

Similar to the soccer player who learns to develop a weak leg, organizations can learn to deal with the contradictory demands of bridging and bonding required for joint force operations.17 One technique to accomplish this proficiency involves structural ambidexterity, which would involve assigning units varied but distinct roles and missions such that one unit might orient more on bonding and focus on “war-fighting, terrorist hunting and other activities that imply the use of violence.”18 Tasks for another unit might involve bridging and focus on peacekeeping, civil-military cooperation, humanitarian relief, and nation-building.19 In this manner, military organizations develop the operational capacity to respond to a variety of contexts quickly and effectively.

An additional approach is contextual ambidexterity where commanders would develop both bonding and bridging skills to strengthen relationships with other policymakers and joint force leaders. As Soeters explains, leaders “need to have a broad view of their work, being culturally intelligent as well as being alert to opportunities and challenges beyond the confines of their jobs. They need to act like brokers, always looking to build internal and external linkages, and if needed they have to be comfortable wearing more than one ‘hat.’ Most of all they need to be able to immediately switch from communicating and negotiating to the actual repelling and use of violence.”20

Ambidexterity also applies to the challenge of defining and achieving peace—negative peace as the absence of violence and positive peace as the incorporation of social justice and equality.21 Functioning societies work to achieve a positive peace knowing it is perhaps an impermanent goal requiring diligence. To move a society from the sphere of negative peace to positive peace during turbulent transitions such as those accompanying peacekeeping operations, soldiers need to use ways of thinking and skills that are seemingly contradictory. In the pragmatic sense, ambidexterity helps a soldier to reconcile some of the contradictions, such as the need

15 Ibid.
16 O’Reilly and Tushman, “Ambidextrous Organization.”
17 Soeters, “Ambidextrous Military,” 120.
18 Ibid., 121.
19 Thomas P. M. Barnett recognized the dual role of military forces and called for organizing them into two functions or types of units: the Leviathan specializing in “high-tech big violence war” and the system administrator specializing in “low-tech security generation and routine crisis response.” Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004), 299–302.
to be a shooter and a talker that is associated with the uneven process of moving from negative to positive peace.22

It is not enough to simply recognize the dualisms fraught in warfare. Ambidexterity addresses dichotomies that appear to confound both theory and practice; it can clarify the fog and friction of bureaucratic inertia. When applied to military operations, pragmatism orients thinking to improve national security practitioners’ thinking. It can also affect approaches for achieving peace and stability while striving to maintain our humanity.

Pragmatism Underlying Ambidexterity

Pragmatism, a philosophy of common sense born in the United States soon after the Civil War, was a response to dogmatic thinking that propelled the bloody conflict.23 Using purposeful human inquiry as a focal point, pragmatism represents a continual process of discovery and doubt that acknowledges the qualitative nature of human experience as problematic situations emerge and are recognized.24 Pragmatism embraces doubt and uncertainty and focuses attention on practical effects.25 Janowitz employed it to challenge military problems.

The uncertainties of warfare are so great that the most elaborate peacetime planning and the most realistic exercises are at best weak indicators of emerging imponderables. Dogmatic doctrine is a typical organizational reflex reaction to future uncertainties . . . The constabularly concept provides a continuity with past military experiences and traditions, but also offers a basis for the radical adaptation of the profession. The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory . . . The constabulary outlook is ground in, and extends pragmatic doctrine.”26

Pragmatists such as Janowitz approach challenges with a spirit of inquiry, critical optimism, and cooperation by using an experimental logic—or purposeful human inquiry grounded in a problematic situation.27 Problems are situated in experience and culture; problematic situations often challenge existing belief systems and ways of doing things. Accounting for the qualitative nature of human experience, the uneasy, doubtful feeling preceding problem recognition and the problematic situation are recognized and reconciled through the transformations of inquiry, which involve “critical reasoning, empirical investigation and actions that are assessed in light of practical consequences.”28

22 Shields and Soeters, “Peaceweaving.”
26 Janowitz, Professional Soldier, 24, 418.
Inquiry reduces uncertainty, facilitates the next steps, and links the problematic situation to an end-in-view—a flexible, practical goal with meaning in the real world that cannot be separated from human experience. With a goal of continually adapting plans based upon practicality, a “social component” generally accompanies the curiosity of this approach, which helps the decision-maker expand information on a topic of interest through community input. Thus, pragmatism approaches all problematic situations with a spirit of critical optimism—“the belief that the specific conditions which exist at one moment, be they comparatively bad or comparatively good, in any event may be bettered.” Critical optimism recognizes evil yet never becomes stuck in the paralysis of pessimism.

As forerunners to Janowitz, John Dewey and Jane Addams pioneered a sophisticated theory of participatory democracy where a diverse community is involved in shaping or characterizing a problematic situation, developing approaches to resolve the problem, defining and refining the end-in-view, and potentially, being transformed in the process. Their pragmatic vision is embraced by Janowitz in his book *The Professional Soldier*, where the constabulary concept depends on cooperation, collaboration, and critical optimism. Whether any Army can build and sustain a cadre of pentathletes will impact military planning from the tactical to grand-strategic levels. Developing valid assumptions and feasible objectives, which is the primary building blocks of any plan, could benefit from practical inquiry, critical optimism, and cooperation.

**Resolving Dualisms**

Resolving two seemingly intractable dualisms central to many human problematic situations can help postmodern militaries develop ambidexterity. Psycho-philosophical dualisms deal with the separation of mind and body and incorporate dichotomies such as theory/practice and thought/action. Moral dualisms take into account notions of good and evil such as friend/enemy and oppressed/oppressor. Rigid moral dualisms mentioned in this section can also be an ongoing impetus to violent conflict.

**Psycho-Philosophical**

Dewey’s perspective on psycho-philosophical dichotomy arose from his organic and holistic model of experience. He criticized the reflex arc, a model that reduces behavior to discrete and separate stimulus and response observed in situations similar to a child quickly withdrawing (response) his or her hand from a flame (stimulus). Dewey disagreed with the model’s artificial detachment of sensory stimulus, central response, and action into discrete components. He also declared the reflex arc misrepresents how people interact with their environs, explaining how organisms do not “passively receive a stimulus and then become active

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29 Ibid.
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responders.”33 Concluding organisms interact continuously with their environment in a cumulative and mutually modifying manner, Dewey argued the arc too rigidly identifies a clear starting and ending point when “both stimulus and response are enmeshed in an ongoing matrix of sensory and motor activities. A stimulus comes from somewhere and a response leads elsewhere—to further coordination and integration of both sensory and motor responses.”34

Importantly, stimulus and response occur “in a wider dynamic context” (culture) that incorporates aims and interests as well as “an environment, which contains the problems and surprises that spur us on to grow.”35 Dewey suggested an alternative coordinated circuit illustrating dichotomies similar to stimulus and response that cloaks “ancient psychophysical dualisms” such as mind/body, thought/action, ends/means, and theory/practice.36

These common dualisms are rooted in an erroneous and radical separation of the perceiver from the world: “Dewey’s model rejects this inner/outer model from the start. His is an ecological model—mind, body and world are mutually created by their ongoing interaction.”37 Dewey’s model focuses on relationships: instead of viewing stimulus and response as discrete disconnected components, he shows their relationship within a larger environment. Soeters applies this concept to the relation of culture to human interaction and shows how bonding and bridging can be applied to complicated, multinational, postmodern military missions.38

Moral Dualisms

As mentioned earlier, pragmatism was partly a reaction to rigid moral positions that propelled the US Civil War—for example, Southern honor was tied to a devotion to the slave system. To threaten slavery threatened honor, which justified and compelled a violent response.39

Jane Addams, another pioneer of pragmatism and a philosopher of peace, clearly articulated problems with rigid moral perspectives. She reacted to the moral paternalism that bound women to the home and excluded them from the public sphere.40 Notably, such rigid moralisms contain implicit dualisms because for each right there is a contrasting wrong; each enemy has corresponding friends. Addams posits “life itself teaches us nothing more inevitable than that right and wrong are most confusedly mixed: That the blackest wrong is by our side and within our own motives; that right does not dazzle our eyes with its radiant shining, but has to be found by exerting patience, discrimination and

34 Hildebrand, Dewey, 15–16.
35 Ibid.
37 Hildebrand, Dewey, 21.
38 Soeters, „Ambidextrous Military.‟
39 Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).
impartiality.”

In this manner, rigid moral perspectives carry the weight of moral superiority with little room for human frailty or weakness. As a result, the concerns of the weak and dispossessed can be marginalized, offering the seeds of terrorism.

**Sympathy as Remedy**

As an alternative to inflexible moral certainty, Addams offered sympathetic knowledge explained as a willingness to suspend judgment, listen, “see the size of one another’s burden,” and “a determination to enter into lives that [are] not one’s own, without falling into the arrogant pretense that one [understand] the lives of others better than they [do].” Addams believed “when we sympathetically and affectively understand the plight of others, we are more likely to care and act in their behalf.” Armed with this perspective, leaders can incorporate emotions into their sense of knowledge to bring emotional kindness and imagination to interpersonal encounters. By applying this practice to the intractable, opposing moral narratives, such as friend/enemy, oppressed/oppressor, capitalism/communism, and Muslim/Christian, that are inevitably present in violent conflict, postmodern militaries can contribute to the puzzle of ending violence.

**Soeters’s Pragmatism**

Soeters recognized reciprocal stereotyping between groups who believe opposing poles of moral dualisms resulted in the groups assigning greater values to self-associated qualities and increasing requirements on those with opposing views, which is a “self-propelling process of ideological escalation” referred to as ethnic outbidding. This concept arose from Soeters’s search for a “coherent set of thematic concerns and common logic of inquiry” consistent with philosophical pragmatism that can be traced from Dewey to Janowitz. Samuel P. Huntington focused on this separation between civilian and military groups and the paradoxes that emerge from that detachment.

One notion, which acknowledged the separation but accentuated the societal interpenetration and societal context of the civil-military environment, veered away from absolutism. The pragmatic analysis

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47 Ibid., 84.


of military and society leading to this concept ended during the Cold War, but not before bearing the notion of constabulary force, which is visible in peacekeeping operations.51 Recent scholarship likewise emphasizes “inflexible or absolutist doctrine can no longer effectively address the needs of people in turmoil. A flexible or pragmatic approach to peacekeeping, on the other hand, offers a way to achieve this critically important end-in-view.”52

Dualisms

Recognizing the civilian/military dualism overlaying the study of military affairs, Soeters explored multinational peacekeeping operations, where the inherent contradictions and tensions are not only a ripe source for research but also predisposed to deeper implications. Such peacekeeping operations exist at all levels of war and during all phases of military operations, and Soeters discovered a way that pragmatism as a way of thinking could help achieve better results. He came to understand the methods armies use to defeat enemies and to set the conditions for peace is a reflection of the values inherent in the societies they serve, through research involving interpreters, strategic flexibility, demobilization and transition of soldiers, and operational planning in Afghanistan.

In a mechanical sense, interpreters, such as those who conducted peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Afghanistan, are tools to translate words across different languages. Familiar military slang—translations machines—captures this role and the active/passive dualism perfectly: the military officer actively communicates with host nationals, the interpreter passively relays the words.53 But Soeters’s research on translators challenges this metaphor. Harkening back to Dewey’s criticism of the reflex arc isolating stimulus-response events, a more organic model of experience developed in which interpreters and others engaged in negotiations by continuously interacting with their environment were integrated in a cumulative and mutually modifying way to prevent strategic faux pas.54

Because something as basic as interpretation could significantly impact peacekeeping operations, the resolution of the dualism of close/distant relationships between local interpreters and their military units must be achieved. Military leaders must facilitate effective communication in these situations by building cohesion within the team as well as supporting the ability of the unit’s interpreters to assimilate messages to cultural differences. The interpreters must likewise accommodate characteristics of other groups, such as the Dutch military’s direct

51 Travis, “Saving Samuel Huntington,” 2, 5, 7.
communication style and the Afghan military’s less explicit and more ambiguous style, to build trust among joint forces. Addressing this dualism simultaneously resolves the tension from the trust/distrust dualism interpreters experience when their interpretations are relied upon, but they are excluded from other activities.55

The dualism of large, mechanized forces/small, expeditionary units associated with Western militaries’ transition from defending a relatively ordered world to responding to regional instability crises also vexes military leaders. Given the nature of organizational flexibility and the ways military organizations could adapt, a problematic paradox of duality is identified: too much flexibility causes chaos and too much rigidity prohibits adaptation.56 Organizations often face a power struggle between stability and change, but organizational sensing enhances functional flexibility.

A case study involving the Netherlands’ armed forces found “within highly turbulent crisis response missions, organizational sensing becomes the predominant driver, stimulating ad hoc solutions that challenge existing structures, available technology and standard procedures.”57 This observation certainly resonates with insights from pragmatic inquiry much like the research on demobilizing and integrating Eritrean fighters into civil service rolls identified a dualism of fighter/nonfighter.58 The ambidexterity displayed during this transition can also be applied: “Military leaders should be ready for action, violent action if need be. At the same time they are requested to hold their fire when they operate in peacekeeping missions in which talking to people is more important than shooting.”59

Other research on an effects-based approach to operations identified seemingly contradictory intuition driven/assessment driven approaches to leadership as an implementation challenge to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.60 Although the researchers’ metaphor described the culture of the mind as software and the organization (or body) as hardware, Soeters provided a perfect rejection of the psychosophical dualism: “The implicit body versus mind analysis doesn’t work out because culture comprises body, soul and mind.”61

When contemplating the source of violent ethnic conflicts, Soeters notes “there is no simple emotional or rational understanding of the...
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62 He delves into dichotomies such as micro/macro factors, grid/group, us/Them, tough/soft, male/female cultures, economic growth/environment, collectivism/individualism, victim/perpetrator, and identification/disidentification. These dichotomies provide frameworks for useful analytical distinctions and illustrative examples. These and other dualisms depict cultural rigidities that contribute to violence.

63 The American Civil War sheds an example of the problems with moral dualisms associated with rigid belief systems where unwavering cultural conceptions of honor can contribute to violence. Offended by events that could be trifling or profound, people retaliate against perpetrators for revenge or as an effort to restore others’ perceptions of a valuable self-associated characteristic. A contrasting approach to influence others’ perceptions during dysfunctional conflicts applies sympathetic knowledge or empathy to “cement” relationships, which can also enhance cooperation and promote peacekeeping. Dutch Muslim servicemen are particularly effective working with host nationals because of their ability “to approach the local population in an empathetic and trustworthy manner.”

Conclusion

63 Ibid., 63.
64 René Moelker, Joseph L. Soeters, and Urlich vom Hagen, “Sympathy, the Cement of Interoperability,” Armed Forces & Society 33, no. 4 (July 2007): 496–517
creating pentathletes ad hoc.\textsuperscript{67} This type of force would add needed flexibility and resilience.

Thus, Soeters’ approach represents a fusion of European perspectives with American pragmatism that can be helpful for today’s American military thinkers who dichotomize military challenges. In the spirit of Janowitz, Soeter’s willingness to embrace uncertainty illustrates his understanding of the provisional nature of not only social science scholarship but also of the real world, where theory can be tested to optimize organizational effectiveness.\textsuperscript{68} The practical problems associated with managing and leading military organizations calls leaders to recognize and work with inherent contradictions and to develop ambidexterity within the force structure.\textsuperscript{69} Through inquiry, critical optimism, cooperation, and sympathetic knowledge, commanders, their staffs, and the soldiers they lead, as pentathletes, can more fully understand the operational environment, identify valid assumptions and appropriate objectives, and develop strategies and plans to optimize the effectiveness of military operations in complex environments.

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\textsuperscript{68} Shields and Soeters, “Pragmatism, Peacekeeping,” 105.

\textsuperscript{69} This requires militaries to broaden their approach to warfighting and peacekeeping. See Jason W. Warren, “The Centurion Mindset and the Army’s Strategic Leader Paradigm,” *Parameters* 45, no. 3, (Autumn 2015): 27–38.
ABSTRACT: This article examines the strategic logic of siege warfare in counterinsurgencies and questions the perception that siege warfare as an effective and relatively low-cost form of counterinsurgency. Sieges do allow the besieging side to conserve its military resources, avoid direct contact with the enemy, and minimize a rapid escalation of civilian casualties. Yet, on a strategic level, siege warfare is ineffective without major outside military support or the willingness to use overwhelming force.

Sieges, among the oldest and most recognized forms of warfare, are often poorly understood by military planners and policymakers alike. Siege warfare is almost completely absent from current US military doctrine. From the Joint perspective, the term “siege” does not appear in, and is not defined in, either the Joint capstone document discussing Joint operations, the Joint doctrinal publication providing the fundamental principles of Joint operations, or the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Similarly, siege is not included or defined in the US Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 1-02 Terms and Military Symbols. Nor does the term appear in the Army doctrinal publication discussing Army operations or the specific doctrine covering offensive and defensive operations. There is some discussion of siege warfare in the US Army Field Manual 3-06 Urban Operations; however, the majority of that discussion is in an appendix focusing on a single case study regarding the siege of Beirut in 1982.

Interestingly, that discussion indicates a list of factors deemed central to the success of siege warfare that include understanding the importance of information and psychological operations, preserving close combat capability, avoiding the attrition approach, minimizing collateral damage, controlling essential services and critical infrastructure, separating noncombatants from combatants, and transitioning control to civil authorities as quickly as possible. Even so, these lessons have
not been well integrated into the doctrinal frameworks of offensive or defensive urban operations. In fact, sieges are not included as a form of offensive maneuver or a type of urban offensive operations. Similarly, little academic research theorizes about the tactical and the strategic advantages of siege warfare as a tool of counterinsurgency. Moreover, most of the existing literature on siege warfare hails from strategic studies or military historiography and focuses primarily on the use of sieges in the context of conventional interstate wars.

This article fills that gap by addressing the logic, motivations, and some of the internal contradictions of siege warfare in modern counterinsurgencies. The authors predict siege warfare will become even more relevant in the future if urban migration patterns persist since counterinsurgencies will be carried out increasingly in dense urban environments or megacities, not in the jungles of Southeast Asia or the empty deserts of Mesopotamia. Still, few academic studies have looked at sieges in the context of modern counterinsurgencies, which are increasingly asymmetrical, urban, and fought with methods—including the use of chemical weapons or the deliberate targeting of civilians—that are blunt violations of international humanitarian law.

Siege Warfare and Counterinsurgencies

A siege is any attempt by an adversary to control access into and out of a town, neighborhood, or other terrain of strategic significance to achieve a military or political objective. The military objective of a siege during the Middle Ages was to drive out enemy forces by weakening their defenses and denying them access to reinforcements. In effect, sieges provided a way to subdue an enemy while limiting direct hostilities and reducing one's own casualties. Whereas strong fortifications during medieval times favored the defense, more infantry weapons from cheaper iron in modern warfare favored the offense. But in the contemporary era, given the greater density of urban terrain, siege warfare is arguably more challenging for the offense. Even with the assistance of Russian arms and aircraft, for example, the stronger Syrian military was unable to dislodge the modest Syrian rebel forces from entrenched positions in Aleppo for most of 2016.

The typical modus operandi of siege warfare dating back to Roman times has been one of conquest. In counterinsurgency, however, the military objective is often not conquest but control of territory. Counterinsurgency is largely seen as either enemy-centric—focused on defeating the foe militarily—or population-centric—focusing on separating the insurgents from the civilian population. In the latter case, the use of force does not typically revolve around a large concentration

5 Ibid., 7–12.
7 On these urbanization trends, see David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
of firepower per se, but rather lighter foot patrols and targeted attacks that deny the enemy their center of gravity: the population. This type of counterinsurgency has been framed as a fight between the state and the insurgency over the allegiance of the population.

Accordingly, counterinsurgency does not require killing as many of the enemy as possible or retaking all the contested territory, but rather winning the population over to the state’s or counterinsurgent’s side. Put otherwise, winning battles is less important than effective governance that pacifies the population and provides public goods. A core tenet of US counterinsurgency doctrine practiced over the past decade has indeed been to selectively target hostile parties and forcibly separate them from the local civilian population. Under this logic, insurgencies are seen as armed competitions for locals’ allegiance. Greater control over territory provides counterinsurgents with greater information about the enemy, which allows the counterinsurgent forces to avoid indiscriminate violence and deny the insurgents a base of popular support.

The origins of this strategy date back to the British counterinsurgency in Malaya (1948–60) as well as the Strategic Hamlet Program from the Vietnam War (1954–75). Then, as now, the philosophy was to isolate entire villages—to separate insurgents forcibly from civilians. Even for counterinsurgencies employing a more punishment-driven strategy heavy on firepower, the aim is not to eliminate the population per se but rather to control and to prevent it from supporting the insurgency.

The military objective of enemy-centric and population-centric counterinsurgencies overlaps with that of modern siege warfare, which is to isolate the population by force. Also like siege warfare, population-centric counterinsurgencies require patience. Data collected from 1900 show the average siege lasts longer than 12 months. In Aleppo, for example, the campaign of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime to besiege the eastern side of the city lasted for over three years, with little movement in the lines of control, before the Russian intervention in September 2015 facilitated the full encirclement of the rebel-held pockets there, speeding up the eventual capitulation.

A key difference between population-centric counterinsurgency and siege warfare, however, is the geography of force: in the former, security and the insurgency’s clearing and holding areas begin at the center of a city, before slowly moving outwardly, much like a spreading oil spot. By contrast, siege warfare generally takes an outside-in approach whereby

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12  Kalyvas, Logic of Violence. This logic provides the intellectual backbone of the “clear, hold, and build” model applied in Iraq after 2006, as US soldiers moved out of forward operating bases (FOBs) and engaged in smaller-scale military patrols to liberate and expand security in areas previously held by insurgents.
13  For more on the intellectual origins of US counterinsurgency, see Conrad C. Crane, Cassandra in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016).
14  Data varies but counterinsurgencies typically last over nine years. Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, RAND Counterinsurgency Study Volume 4 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008).
counterinsurgents seize territory along a city’s outskirts and slowly enclose the enemy.

Not unlike counterinsurgencies at large, siege warfare introduces a number of perverse incentives among combatants and noncombatants alike. First, siege warfare may be advantageous for the besieged side as it allows it time to regroup and rearm, to hold key terrain under stalemate conditions, and to signal strength to outside powerbrokers capable of pushing for a ceasefire. Paradoxically, a siege can lead to strengthening the level of dependency and control a rebel group has on the civilian population. Moreover, a siege can perversely generate economic benefits for the besieged group by creating self-sustaining “siege economies” created by actions such as aid manipulation and smuggling. Siege warfare thus holds some strategic logic for both besieged and besieger.

Siege warfare, while tactically attractive to counterinsurgents, is strategically ineffective unless two conditions are met: first, the counterinsurgency must be willing to use overwhelming force, which includes indiscriminate violence or scorched earth tactics. Second, there must be a forceful military intervention on behalf of the besieger by an outside power. Otherwise, the siege effectively becomes a protracted war of attrition that favors the side with sufficient will and resources to outlast the other. Considering the dense terrain of today’s cities and the unwillingness of democracies to sustain heavy losses, siege warfare to gain territory is only advantageous to the besieger who enjoys the support of outside backers or who is willing to use overwhelming force. Thus, siege warfare, whether to protect the population from harm or to prevent it from joining the fight, should only be used to isolate a territory similar to Sadr City, a Shiite slum in Baghdad (2004–2008).

The Strategic Logic of Siege Warfare

Western military strategists debate counterinsurgency tactics and strategies that focus on winning over the population’s loyalty. Primarily nondemocratic states have sought the opposite objective—to starve an enemy populace into capitulation—thus robbing the insurgency’s base of popular support. This approach is driven by a common set of assumptions. First, laying siege to an area appears a cost-effective way to be perceived as staying on the offensive, conserving resources for battles elsewhere, and avoiding a large-scale atrocity that might provoke an outside intervention on behalf of the besieged. Sieges allow armies to keep the enemy geographically contained in urban areas and to prevent their resupply while minimizing the besieged’s own casualties by avoiding direct combat. These benefits can be especially important when

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19 For a challenge to this logic based on the argument that democracies may be more willing to engage in indiscriminate violence because it is perceived as winning the war more quickly given the costs democratic leaders face if they do not win a war, see Downes, Targeting Civilians.


a great parity of military power exists between the opposing sides and the advancing army does not possess the human, financial, or military resources to seize and control the city outright.

Second, siege warfare seems an attractive option for both types of counterinsurgencies when civil wars drag on for years, becoming a stalemate; thus, the counterinsurgency becomes a war of attrition, redolent of World War I trench warfare. In Syria, for example, dozens of cities suffered prolonged and repeated sieges between 2012 and 2016. Infamous examples include the brutal siege of Madaya, a town in the rural Damascus governorate, where a Syrian and Hezbollah-backed siege culminated in the complete lock-down of the city in June 2015 and led to a severe humanitarian crisis. With military checkpoints and antipersonnel landmines preventing the delivery of goods into, and civilians’ departure from, the besieged area, Syrians in Madaya were literally starved to death. A similar account emerged in the Palestinian refugee camp of Yarmouk that former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon described as the “deepest circle of hell.”

Moreover, sieges can displace the populations of key embattled areas. This depopulation deprives the insurgency of human resources and demoralizes the rebellion, while it renews manpower and international assistance for the government. It can also strengthen a regime’s claim to legitimacy by allowing it to rule over the majority of the population. To be sure, technology has also changed the intensity, lethality, and length of siege warfare. Besieging forces now rely more on heavy and indiscriminate bombardment by air and artillery as a form of psychological warfare and as a method of increasing the risk and cost of rebel and civilian refusals to surrender. These mechanisms also blunt the tools counterinsurgents have at their disposal, especially when there is poor intelligence on the enemy.

But this can be counterproductive—for instance, indiscriminate targeting of civilians, despite international rules barring such uses of force, remains widespread but arguably, counterproductive, especially in non-expeditionary counterinsurgencies. In the siege of Grozny, “indiscriminate bombing and shelling turned the local population against the Russians” largely because the Russians were attacking their own people who were living in the center of the city.

Other exogenous conditions of modern warfare that should favor the defense exist. First, the increasing density of urban areas, subterranean infrastructure, and suburban sprawl, along with the role of networked populations, can increase connections between the insurgency and the population, allow undetected mobilization of insurgent forces, and provide a buffer zone advancing armies must penetrate to advance.

Second, the glacial pace of sieges can effectively freeze a conflict, since lines of control rarely budge much during the operational phase: a siege is mostly an all-or-nothing campaign of attrition, not one to gain ground or shift momentum. This dynamic can allow insurgents time to regroup, mobilize the population, and boost morale even though food and ammunition may be in short supply. Civilians in cities can weather severe hardships almost indefinitely.

Third, a siege can foster the development of dysfunctional, yet self-sustaining, siege economies. In Sarajevo, a small core of Bosnian soldiers relied heavily on ordinary citizens who took up arms to protect the city. These ad hoc groups of citizen-soldiers organized around existing social structures with little or no immediate access to military materials or resources. They relied heavily on supply routes the Bosnian Serbs purposefully left open.\textsuperscript{27} The most notable was a tunnel system connecting Sarajevo to Bosnian-controlled territory beyond the city’s limits. This underground network became the Bosnian army’s main way of transporting food, humanitarian supplies, and weapons into the city and prevented Sarajevo from deteriorating to the point of complete chaos and worsening the humanitarian crisis.\textsuperscript{28}

Finally, a siege can signal resolve, determination, and commitment to an insurgency’s goals at a fairly low cost to both outside parties and potential recruits. This advantage can also provide perverse incentives for the modern insurgent who may, even at the risk of great civilian suffering, favor hunkering down to fighting their enemy, retreating, or melting into the countryside to fight a Maoist-style guerrilla war.

In sum, despite its growing popularity as a counterinsurgency strategy, siege warfare rarely is effective to defeat an enemy, seize or control important terrain, or change the balance of power to end a war—barring a major outside intervention or a willingness on the part of the counterinsurgent to nearly level the area under siege. To better illustrate this point, two short case studies of the sieges of Aleppo and Grozny counterintuitively reveal some of the tactical and strategic limitations of siege warfare, short of relying on overwhelming indiscriminate force and external backing.

**Case Study: Aleppo (2013–2016)**

Beginning in 2013, the Syrian regime of President al-Assad attempted to lay siege to eastern Aleppo, a small enclave that gradually became choked from all sides by government-controlled forces. With about 25,000 troops initially, the regime lacked the material strength to occupy the area and struggled to take and to hold territory, especially in this dense urban terrain, without sustaining high casualties and carrying out an extensive house-to-house counterinsurgency campaign. So, instead of attempting a ground assault to retake eastern Aleppo, the regime began a series of offensive maneuvers aimed at encircling the rebel-held pockets of the city, cutting off their supply lines, and restricting their

\textsuperscript{27} Michael Jackson, Samuel Ruppert, and David Stanford, *Contemporary Battlefield Assessment— Bosnia and Herzegovina* (West Point, NY: Modern War Institute, 2015).

\textsuperscript{28} Andreas, *Blue Helmets*. 
access to basic services such as electricity and water. At the same time, through systematic airstrikes and artillery shelling, the regime focused on targeting civilians and combatants alike, traumatizing Aleppo’s civilians into a mass exodus. Meanwhile, through fortified positions and airpower, the regime strengthened its own positions in the city, creating a static frontline. By encircling eastern Aleppo, Assad’s forces gained control of the surrounding governorate with aerial bombardments, laying the foundation for the movement of ground forces composed of Syrian army and militias. While destroying civilian infrastructure, these operations also complicated the work of international and local humanitarian actors on the ground.

But, the push to encircle and besiege eastern Aleppo also revealed the Syrian military’s weaknesses. Siege operations alone were unable to force capitulation even though the enemy’s advance was halted and an incredibly high price tag was imposed on the rebels and the civilians living under their control. Despite the high reliance on foreign and domestic militias, the encirclement operations preceded slowly and suffered from repeated setbacks, revealing just how overextended the regime and its allies were. Yet, while not decisive, the encircling maneuvers contained the opposition and forced a painful stalemate, all while conserving force and avoiding the high cost of storming and holding the rebel neighborhoods. Moreover, the siege, combined with sustained aerial attacks, forcefully displaced the population, which effectively reduced the number of people under rebel control.

The Russian military intervention in Aleppo during September 2015 as well as its active and increased air support for the Syrian Army and its allies—especially after December 2015—was, in this context, highly valuable to the regime, allowing the balance of power in the battle to shift. Rebels accused the Russians of carrying out a “scorched earth” policy of counterinsurgency redolent of the siege of Grozny.

For the regime, Russia’s intervention was a game changer facilitating a key breakthrough. In February 2016, the regime and its allied forces cut off the rebels’ northern supply lines to the Turkish border, known as the Azaz corridor, further restricting goods and people to and from rebel-controlled pockets in Eastern Aleppo. The complete encirclement, in the summer of 2016, cut off the last rebel supply line, Castello Road, trapping roughly 300,000 civilians. Over the following months, Russia’s heavy bombing of eastern Aleppo, including its civilian infrastructure, combined with the tight siege and the withholding of humanitarian assistance eventually led to the regime’s advance into the embattled city, the rebels’ capitulation in December 2016, and the forced displacement of tens of thousands of people.

29 Caerus Associates, Mapping the Conflict in Aleppo, Syria (Fort Lauderdale, FL: Caerus / American Security Project, 2014).
31 HRC, Report.
34 HRC, Report.
Case Study: Grozny (1999–2000)

The five-month-long siege of Grozny by Russian forces during the early phase of the second Chechen war isolated the city, which was an indigenous separatist enclave in the North Caucasus region, as a way of compelling local Chechens to forego their struggle for separation. The Russians had suffered a humiliating defeat during the first Chechen war (1994–96), and the force they brought to bear in the final months of 1999 against 3,000 to 6,000 Chechen rebels reflected the challenges they faced during the previous ill-fated campaign. At the time, foreign witnesses described Grozny as the most leveled city they had ever seen.

The plan included an intensive and indiscriminate bombing campaign with airstrikes and heavy artillery barrages from a nearby ridge to wear down the Chechen defenses and isolate the city; then Russian ground troops would initiate a ground offensive with small units. In December 1999, the commanding officer on the ground, General Viktor Kazantsev, said the city was fully blockaded on all sides. The campaign sparked a great deal of controversy as there were still some 40,000 civilians holed up in central Grozny without supplies and subjected to the violence and chaos “despite pledges from senior military figures . . . that there would be no Russian assault on Grozny while ‘a single civilian’ remained.”

In the previous siege of Grozny, similar “indiscriminate bombing and shelling turned the local population against the Russians” largely because there were Russian civilians living in the center of the city and so the Russians were attacking their own people. Before the second attempt, the Russians dropped pamphlets over the city that warned civilians of the imminent force and even encouraging rebels to accept “safe conduct passes” allowing them to leave the city without punishment. Yet, there were widespread reports of Russian soldiers firing upon refugees who were leaving the city and invading while civilians were still present.

The Chechen forces were surprisingly strong and resilient, even in the face of heavy air strikes, forcing Russian ground forces to engage the rebels within the city itself. Much of this resilience stemmed from successful application of previous tactical experience from the first Chechen war. The rebels were also well armed and, having used the bombardment period to build up various bunkers within the city, well fortified. These preparations enabled the Chechen rebels to ambush the initial ground force invasion and destroy an entire Russian convoy.

The Russian forces quickly learned from their initial underestimation of the rebel capabilities, increased their bombardments, and leveled huge
swatches of the city. The Chechen fighters they encountered resisted, exploiting the terrain while luring the Russians into interconnected firing positions. Aslambek Ismailov led the Chechens to fortify the city with antitank ditches, trenches, and landmines along the perimeter. The rebels boarded up and booby-trapped buildings pockmarked from the previous war.

Allegations of Russian war crimes, including the use of chemical weapons, linger in the decades since the second Chechen war, and contribute to inconclusive estimates of civilian deaths during the siege. Ultimately, the combination of complete isolation, air strikes, and overwhelming and unrestrained force proved too much for the Chechen rebels, who fled into the mountains in early February 2000.44 Unfortunately for the Chechen forces, the Russians created a false sense of safety that allowed small groups to escape through a mined escape route. Some Chechens did survive the minefield, swearing to one day recapture the city they left to the Russians. While there were small-scale skirmishes with guerrillas in the years that followed, the Russians firmly controlled the city and actively began reconstruction in 2006.45 Though strategically counterproductive and blatantly disregarding international humanitarian law, especially regarding nonexpeditionary counterinsurgencies, the use of scorched-earth tactics during the siege derived a tactical “victory” for Russia.

Applications to US Military Doctrine

Neither Russia nor Syria possessed an operational doctrine for siege warfare in the context of carrying out nonexpeditionary counterinsurgency. Similarly, US military forces are unprepared to fight in dense urban environments against violent nonstate actors who have deep networks, possess superior knowledge of local terrain, use civilians as human shields, and fight indirectly. A recent case illustrates this point: US-backed Iraqi forces failed to cordon off a strategic corridor west of Mosul in 2015, which allowed Islamic State militants to escape and resupply. Although the importance of megacities in modern warfare has been emphasized, US Army doctrine should also address the critical aspects of siege tactics to urban warfare as a first step in correcting the lack of training, organization, and matériel for urban or siege warfare. Moreover, the current body of knowledge contains surprisingly few rigorous studies on the conduct of siege warfare in modern urban environments that are dense, networked, and reliant on informal economies. As a greater risk of civilian casualties arguably exists on these battlespaces, identification and mitigation of the specific challenges of siege warfare should also be undertaken.

The short cases outlined above highlight some of the challenges with siege warfare in the modern era that justify the Clausewitzian admonition that the worst policy is to attack a fortified city.46 In Aleppo, the siege may have lasted indefinitely or failed without the strong external intervention from Russian airpower as well as Hezbollah, Iranian, and

46 Bell, Besieged, 1.
Iranian-backed forces. The siege of Grozny achieved the Russians’ military objective, but only through overwhelming force that included immense bloodshed and leveling the city. Some might quibble that these two cases are not generalizable given the fact they were carried out by authoritarian regimes who were unconcerned with protecting civilian lives or using indiscriminate force. But these examples do highlight the challenges every military force faces when laying siege to a piece of complex or unfamiliar urban terrain.

The United States, rightly unwilling to conduct scorched-earth campaigns such as Russia’s and frequently unable to rely on allied support, faces unique challenges when conducting urban military operations in the context of counterinsurgencies. Since such types of warfare cannot always be avoided, the US military should not only include but prioritize siege warfare as part of its Joint doctrine. Notably, the doctrine should establish best practices to seal off terrain, provide humanitarian aid, avoid civilian casualties, and ultimately break a siege to prepare the military for future urban combat operations in complex terrain.

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ABSTRACT: Given recent developments in the strategic environment and the heightened emphasis on readiness by senior US Army leaders, the Army must assess its ability to mobilize the force rapidly in the event of a major conflict. This article identifies some critical elements of the mobilization process that are currently deficient and require greater attention for the Army to execute a short-notice, full-scale mobilization.

At present, it is unlikely the United States could mobilize its entire military as quickly as it might like to. More importantly, it is unlikely the United States could mobilize its entire military as rapidly as it might need to in the event of a major war. The US Army has only conducted total mobilization twice in the last one hundred years. Both instances, World War I and World War II, are almost beyond living memory. Historically, the US Army has been unprepared when called upon to mobilize and expand. Even recent small-scale conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan revealed gaps in the US Army’s mobilization capabilities and its readiness.¹

Moreover, the National Commission on the Future of the Army recently highlighted the Army’s lack of a total mobilization plan and recommended it develop one by September 30, 2017.² Given the increased emphasis the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army have placed on the mobilization process, this article discusses some key findings from research conducted by students of the US Army War College regarding the potential impact of nondeployable soldiers and the status of mobilization force generation installations (MFGIs).

Senior Army leaders have recently noted numerous deficiencies in the readiness to fight a major war. Some senior officials have gone so far as to say a “ready” Army cannot exist until at least 2020; others claim 2021–23 is a more reasonable time frame to “restore sufficient readiness.”³ The central problem is the Army’s present low level of readiness. For instance, Army Chief of Staff General Mark A. Milley testified:

about a third of our Regular Army Brigade Combat Teams [BCTs] are currently ready for high-end combat against a nation state. . . . Our goal is to have Regular Army Brigade Combat Teams achieve 60–66 percent full spectrum readiness, and I estimate that it will take the Army approximately four years to achieve that assuming no significant increase in demand and no sequestration levels of funding.4

Former Army Vice Chief of Staff General Daniel Allyn likewise assessed, “about two-thirds of the Army’s initial critical formations are at acceptable levels of readiness to conduct sustained ground combat in a full spectrum environment against a highly lethal hybrid threat or near-peer adversary.”5 Moreover, only one-third of the brigade combat teams, one-fourth of the combat aviation brigades, and one-half of the division headquarters were deemed ready for combat in early 2017.6

Since a crucial step toward readiness for more than half the Army is mobilization, the Army has begun to reexamine its mobilization plans. Clearly, every delay in aligning personnel requirements with updated matériel, such as “long-range precision fires, air and missile defense, Armored BCTs, and aviation,” would increase the risk of “losing overmatch in every domain” to our peer or near-peer competitors. This challenge has become even more acute because the Army’s senior leadership now believes “conflict between nation-states is ‘virtually guaranteed at some point.’ ”8

**Total Force Mobilization**

For the past 14 years, most mobilization requirements were handled by the president’s partial mobilization authority, which can activate up to 1,000,000 members of the Army Reserve for a period not to exceed 24 consecutive months. A congressional authorization for full mobilization, calling-up all of the existing active and reserve components for the duration of a declared war, has not been needed and, hence, has not been tested.

It now seems conceivable that a full mobilization is more probable than at any time since the Cold War. During a strategic-level wargame held in November 2016, participants gained “awareness of related challenges and innovative approaches to mitigate those challenges.”9 Scenarios concerning deliberate mobilization, contingency mobilization, and defeat-deny-defend mobilization revealed more than a few problem

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4 Hearing on Military Services Challenges Meeting Readiness, Modernization, and Manning under Current Budget Limits, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 114th Cong. 3–4 (September 15, 2016) (statement of General Mark A. Milley, Chief of Staff, United States Army).
5 Hearing on the Department of the Army 2017 Budget Request and Readiness, 114th Cong. 4 (February 26, 2016) (statement of General Daniel Allyn, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army).
areas regarding full and total response requirements. One of these is the status of nondeployable soldiers. Another is the state of mobilization force generation installations; most are inactive and might require substantial time and resources before they can assume operations.

The Army’s Deployability Challenge

During both World Wars, conscription enabled the US Army to expand greatly to play critical roles in defeating large-scale aggression. For both political and practical reasons, Congress abolished the military draft in 1973, and transitioned to a large-standing all-volunteer force (AVF). Despite early problems, the AVF became an effective fighting force expansible, when necessary, by no more than a partial mobilization. The all-volunteer force has not yet, however, had to confront a great power. That inexperience does not mean the force will not be successful; it simply means we are moving into uncharted territory, territory that will likely require full and possibly total mobilization.

As much as 40 percent of a mobilized total Army may not be ready for a specific contingency. Medical conditions may prevent as many as 10 percent of soldiers from responding to a conflict. Another 13 percent may be Trainees, Transients, Hoddees, and Students. And, 16 percent of soldiers, the minimum strength recommended by the National Commission on the Future of the Army, comprise the generating force “whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the operational Army’s capabilities.”

Of the deployable force, at least 182,000 soldiers (18 percent) cannot be expected to mobilize during a major war due to the Army’s global commitments to combatant commanders in at least 140 locations. In 2017, for example, 5,000 soldiers were deployed to the Middle East, 8,000 were in Afghanistan, 33,000 were in Europe, and nearly 80,000 were in the Pacific. Although some global commitments, such as theater security cooperation exercises, would be reduced during a major war, not all of these requirements could be eliminated. Even increasing the Army’s size to 2,000,000 soldiers would mean approximately 360,000 soldiers would become part of the generating force.

Furthermore, should regional actors attempt to take advantage of America’s involvement in one major conflict, the Army would be required to support combatant commanders in shaping their respective theaters, as well as providing enough presence to assure America’s allies and partners.
Mobilization Force Generation Installations

Mobilization force generation installations are responsible for providing power projection, combat preparation, postmobilization training, and other capabilities that support the Army’s readiness for war, contingencies, and national emergencies. Although mobilization and deployment are distinct activities, they intersect at the MFGIs, which are identified as essential power-projection platforms. These platforms “strategically deploy one or more high priority active component brigades or larger and/or mobilize and deploy high priority Army reserve component units.” Thus, MFGIs are doubly critical.

The United States had 25 designated MFGIs before the military drawdown in Afghanistan during 2014. Of these, 7 primary installations were federally-activated, state-operated, and designated for continuous support, which included combat training center events. The 5 secondary installations, which are inactive, maintained equipment sets and provided postmobilization support for reserve components. The remaining 13 were used to support postmobilization training for reserve component units. Indeed, of the 25 designated MFGIs, the Army now relies solely on only two active primary installations to train and validate active and reserve components. Hence, without due preparation, there will not be enough MFGIs to enable the Army to conduct a short-notice, large-scale mobilization, such as responding to a national emergency.

To be sure, efforts are underway to define, identify, and prioritize power-projection platforms, aerial ports of embarkation, and MFGIs in the conflicting organizational publications to support no-notice deployment operations that would be necessary during a major war. But, more needs to be done.

Low Likelihood, High Consequence

Admittedly, the likelihood of a major war is low. But, the risks are high and the potential consequences of delayed and inefficient mobilization are severe. The Army’s routine, predictable mobilization apparatus has worked well during more than a decade of rotational deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. In the event of a total mobilization, however, the Army may be expected to double or triple its size in quick order, and the defense industrial base may be asked to respond in-kind.

When America is called to execute a war plan to defend against a great power, or a bundle of war plans to respond to multiple threats, an updated and robust mobilization plan must be in place to direct the command and control element as well as the rapid expansion of the MFGIs. The structure must identify and incorporate all of the force enablers—including the reserve component capabilities such as support groups, medical units, and postal units—required to operate the MFGIs. These units must maintain high levels of readiness to ensure they can mobilize on short notice. Essentially, a standing mobilization task force

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structure must already be monitoring readiness and ready to assume command and control during total mobilization.

Failure to prepare MFGIs, or to plan for the time needed to return them to operational status, will put the Army on the path to repeating the mistakes of previous wars and potentially losing the first battles.\(^\text{17}\)

While the likelihood of a total mobilization may be low, the high risks and severe consequences of failing to plan for it are real. Mobilization must be a clear priority. The Army has not mobilized a large force that required standing up new MFGIs since 2003. The current reliance on predictable, rotational deployment procedures will not provide an effective short- or no-notice response in a major war. Deliberate planning efforts must be made to determine the proper training equipment sets and appropriate temporary or permanent MFGI facilities to support mobilizing units adequately. The current mind-set of the unlikelihood of short-notice, large-scale mobilization must change.

Assessments of the Army’s ability to support a full mobilization must be transitioned to mobilization planning efforts based upon war plans containing detailed time-phased force deployment data. Limited defense planning guidance scenarios that dictate assumptions-based forces during mobilization planning exercises should be replaced by realistic force-strength data from combatant commanders’ response-planning requirements. Comprehensive mobilization planning should include major war scenarios that involve competing requirements across multiple theaters of operation and warfighting domains to build a realistic, executable mobilization plan.

Recommendations

Forces Command currently has the implied task of working concurrently with mobilization enterprise partners that include Army Installation Management Command, Army Materiel Command, Army Medical Command, Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, Army Agencies, the National Guard Bureau, and the Army National Guard. Within this structure and as part of a new standing mobilization task force, the Army should designate several full-time mobilization planners who conduct full-scale, ongoing assessments to include examining the private sector’s ability to expand rapidly the capacity of each MFGI. These planners could develop and maintain mobilization plans, which include a short- or no-notice mobilization plan for a large force, as well as plan and oversee rehearsal of concept drills and mobilization exercises to test and refine installation mobilization plans. Mobilization planners would also be responsible for capturing lessons and insights throughout the process to help the lead command prioritize mobilization, training, and deployment of both active and reserve components based on their priority of need.

Additional and periodic wargames, exercises, and simulations across the Army’s mobilization enterprise—similar to command-post Warfighter Exercises that ensure corps, division, and brigade headquarters’ staff can perform their wartime missions—should be

used to identify gaps, seams, and challenges that can be mitigated. The
Army should not expect the mobilization enterprise to be as responsive
as needed if it does not routinely exercise or resource it.

Because total mobilization of the Army will not occur in isolation,
active data collection efforts should integrate other services. Exercise
Nifty Nugget-78, which estimated “400,000 troop ‘casualties,’ and
thousands of tons of supplies and 200,000 to 500,000 trained combat
troops would not have arrived at the identified conflict scene on time,”
serves an illustrative example because the lessons and insights resulted
in the Department of Defense Master Mobilization Guide (1989) and the Joint
Deployment Agency, a forerunner to Transportation Command.18

Conclusion

With gradual and persistent attention, these tools can not only
increase the information available to today’s leaders but also provide
data useful to future decision makers: information from such exercises
can help leaders identify, develop, and implement a systematic, parallel,
enterprise-level planning process for total mobilization throughout the
Army and update the Army’s doctrinal publications as well as support
Defense Department efforts to update the Department of Defense Master
Mobilization Guide used by the Joint staff, military departments, and other
defense agencies.

Greater understanding of US military capabilities and limitations
can reduce force-response times and lead to better support to combatant
commanders. The requirement should be to expand planning
perspectives, incorporating more scenarios in which there is active
competition for limited military resources. To reiterate, planning for
US military success should be based on information from realistic
enterprise-level exercises.

Historically, major wars have been the exception not the norm;
however, they are not extinct. The all-volunteer force has never fought
a conflict requiring a full mobilization on short- or no-notice. It is,
therefore, not safe to assume today’s Army can successfully prosecute
such a conflict. The actual deployable size of the one-million-soldier
Army makes it a high-risk force to meet Defense Planning Guidance
requirements.19 Therefore, Army leaders must continue to examine and
to update policies for improving the management and readiness of its
additional manpower pools. Realistic mobilization planning and exercises
to mitigate low readiness levels and to reduce delays in operational
planning timelines are imperative to success. Much more important,
however, is achieving the capability to integrate and synchronize the
total Army so it is ready for all conflicts, including a major war.

18 Danita L. Hunter, United States Transportation Command, 10 Years of Excellence, 1987–1997
(Scott Air Force Base, IL: USTRANSCOM). JP 4-05 references the Department of Defense Master
Mobilization Guide, as “the first level of mobilization planning.” See also, DoD, Master Mobilization
Plan, 1.

19 Hearing on 2017 Budget Request and Readiness.
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ABSTRACT: This article provides an overview of key definitions and themes related to mobilization, especially of reserve component forces, for large-scale contingency operations. The article also discusses the US Army’s ongoing and future research efforts on mobilization.

The current Army operating concept is to “Win in a complex world.” But to accomplish that objective, the Army will need to mobilize elements of the Army Reserve. In today’s Army, the reserve components bring not only required capacity but also key capabilities no longer resident in the active duty force. Understanding the timelines and challenges associated with large-scale mobilizations is critical to informing senior leaders’ decisions regarding the employment of the total Army force during deliberate and crisis situations. In accordance with the Army chief of staff’s designated priorities, the United States Army War College is conducting research to expand the body of knowledge for this core task and enduring first-order problem.

Over the past fifteen years, the Army has become well practiced at mobilizing and deploying the reserve components—both the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve—for limited contingency operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Despite this experience, many mobilization experts assert the current processes may prove insufficient to mobilize the total Army force rapidly for large, sustained contingency operations. While the term mobilization may seem to apply only to the reserve components, a large-scale mobilization will impact the entire Joint Force due to the anticipated competition for resources including personnel, training areas, equipment, transportation, and supporting organizations.

Mobilization: Definitions and Themes

In a broad sense the Department of Defense defines mobilization as “the process by which the military services or part of them are brought to a heightened state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the [Reserve Component] as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel.”

Title 10 of the US Code (10 U.S.C.) defines different statutory levels of mobilization ranging from voluntary call-up to total mobilization.
Each level of mobilization is characterized by emergency authority, level of military commitment, and length of mobilization. Current mobilizations, for example, are in accordance with 10 U.S. C. § 12304(b).

Partial mobilization occurs under a presidential declaration of emergency with limited activation of Reserve forces for a limited duration. Full mobilization requires a Congressional declaration of national emergency, provides access to all existing active and reserve forces, and allows those forces to remain on active duty for up to six months after the end of the crisis.

Large-scale mobilizations in the context of this article include presidential reserve call-up, partial mobilization, full mobilization, and total mobilization because these situations would require large-scale force quantities beyond the currently planned mobilization capacity.

Mobilization is an enduring first-order problem. The Army War College conducted a series of workshops and wargames to understand better the Army’s readiness to mobilize the total Army force under full mobilization authorities. Early research reveals a fragile assumption underpins Army and combatant command contingency planning: every unit will be fully ready for deployment on the date indicated in the deployment planning documents. There is, however, no reliable way to inform these planning dates because no model exists to quantify the time needed for the Army Reserve and Army National Guard to achieve various levels of mobilization readiness. Additionally, many of the mobilization process challenges identified and cataloged over a decade ago remain challenges today.

The United States last mobilized for war in 1942, when ultimate success was determined by industrial might developed over an extended period of time, was protected by a relatively isolated homeland, and was projected over great distances. Each of these three variables will be tested if the United States conducts a large-scale mobilization. America’s potential adversaries are not likely to provide the time necessary to prepare adequately, and the US political system may provide its own delays. Over reliance on space and cyber assets, once believed to be protected from attack, seem increasingly vulnerable. A lack of strategic lift capabilities also severely limits how quickly the United States can project landpower globally.

Training timelines will increase. Unlike the first presidential mobilization of the National Guard in 1916, when basic training was not a requirement, today’s reserve components are expected to deploy at the same levels of readiness as the active duty Army. Training and readiness timelines for all units will continue to trend longer because of increased requirements and emerging challenges. The Army’s goal to achieve sustainable

8 Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Enable, Resources, Build, Assets, and Sustain Training Readiness, Execution Order 002-16 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2016).
readiness should have a positive impact on the number of individuals and units ready to mobilize for large-scale contingency operations.\(^9\) Further analysis is, however, necessary to quantify and understand how sustainable readiness initiatives will affect mobilization processes, training timelines, and resource requirements.

*Mobilization is the first step for more than half the total force.* For Fiscal Year 2017, the reserve component is more than half of the total Army, with 343,000 Army National Guard and 199,000 Army Reserve soldiers.\(^{10}\) The current five year rotation model has approximately 2/5 of reserve component units conducting or preparing for a mission. Sustainable readiness initiatives will help, but the impact is unknown. The Army needs to improve comprehension on the impact of mobilization timelines when a large portion of the force is subject to statutory notifications and susceptible to potential delays in personnel arriving to their units.\(^{11}\)

**Capabilities and capacities in the reserve components are critical for major war.** While combatant command contingency plans are based on available resources and undergo a study of vigorous force flow, multiple conflicts in different regions will strain the total force and present competing signals for rapid delivery of all capabilities, not just low density, high demand units. Success for any protracted conflict will depend on Army Reserve capabilities and its capacity to sustain forces in theater as well as the Army National Guard’s capacity to provide ready combat forces.\(^{12}\)

**Diversity and dispersion drive complexity.** The reserve components depend on a diverse and geographically dispersed population—such as dual-status military technicians, civilian employment, and state militia—to fill formations, which can significantly exacerbate mobilization timelines. The commands and organizations that support and execute mobilization tasks are also diverse. Medical, logistical, theater, service commands, and active duty Army units all play their parts in mobilization, which further complicates resourcing and decision-making.

**The United States will be a contested homeland.** The ability of an adversary to disrupt mobilization processes in the homeland through cyber or physical means can no longer be ignored. The mobilization processes for reserve components contain vulnerabilities, such as reliance on cell-phone communication for initial alerts and reporting, isolated unit locations, and soldiers travelling long distances to report for duty, that are not present for the active duty Army. Thus, simplistic attacks on cellular infrastructure, isolated facilities, or transportation networks—especially, if focused on small units providing key, low-density reserve

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\(^9\) Hearing on the Posture of the United States Army, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 114th Cong. 18 (March 5, 2015) (statement of John M. McHugh, Secretary of the US Army and Raymond T. Odierno, Chief of Staff of the US Army).


\(^{11}\) Congress provided that soldiers in the reserve components who are called to active duty for more than 30 days be provided at least a 30 day notice before the mobilization date, with a goal of 90 days notification. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 99 § 515 (2008); and 10 U.S.C. § 12301. DoDI 1235.12 recognizes that some reserve component members may not report to active duty if “it is physically impossible or would clearly be a threat to the health, welfare, or safety of others” (21).

\(^{12}\) The US Army Reserve explains it “is structured to manage specialized capabilities, including those not present anywhere else in the Joint Forces, such as sustainment capabilities required for major operations, but too expensive to maintain on active duty, such as theater-level transportation, engineer, and logistics units” (January 12, 2017, www.usar.army.mil/About-Us).
capabilities, such as bridging, refueling, or biological agent detection—could effectively lengthen initial musters and reporting.

Ongoing Efforts

Many ongoing efforts across the Army are examining mobilization issues. United States Forces Command and the First United States Army continue to refine the steady-state mobilization processes while planning for relatively small-scale mobilizations to support combatant command contingency plans. The Army G-3/5/7 is coordinating analysis to support large-scale mobilizations related to Defense planning guidance. Most recently, the Army chief of staff designated mobilization as a strategic research priority for the US Army War College. Coordinating these efforts further and instituting the research as an Army warfighting challenge (AWFC) would solidify an enterprise-wide emphasis to ensure mobilization research and analysis endures beyond the current leadership.

Warfighting challenges, “enduring first order problems, the solutions to which will improve the combat effectiveness of the current and future force,” are the focus of the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC). A review of the current warfighting challenges, and their associated learning demands, reveals a limited treatment of mobilization along very narrow lines of inquiry. Not addressed are the personnel, installation, training, equipment, and transportation challenges associated with mobilizing a larger force, which will be needed for simultaneous or near-simultaneous contingency operations in a defeat-deny-defend scenario. The current disconnected nature of these mobilization elements within the warfighting challenges highlights the disjointed nature of mobilization within the Army enterprise.

A Way Ahead

Building on previous wargame insights and leveraging the Army chief of staff’s strategic research mandate, the US Army War College will undertake a deliberate study to deliver a digital mobilization proving ground. This simulated environment will allow senior leaders to make decisions about the mobilization enterprise and policies, to test them over the long-term and with various conditions, and to determine if the decision will produce acceptable results. The approach over the next two years will build on previous Army War College research, which advocates for a layered approach of addressing each of the levels of mobilization:

• Make the steady-state mobilization system more efficient in conducting deliberate mobilizations. Current small scale mobilizations provide the framework for decision-making during larger scale scenarios.

• Build a system that can rapidly accommodate a contingency mobilization. Refining the current systems and understanding which


14 In early 2017, only two challenges addressed mobilization related issues: “What CONUS/OCONUS infrastructure capabilities are necessary to ensure the rapid deployment of entry operation forces?” (12, learning demand 9), and “What organizational design changes can be enacted in the Near-, Mid-, and Far-Terms which improve speed of employment and/or close or mitigate capability gaps?” (20, learning demand 8), “Initiatives: Army Warfighting Challenges,” ARCIC, January 9, 2017, www.arcic.army.mil/.
processes will quickly scale and which will take more deliberate actions allows for more relevant and timely application of resources.

• Develop a plan to mobilize a force capable of executing a complex scenario. It is critical for the Army to define and understand clearly the initial mobilization actions and the limitations associated with multiple near-simultaneous contingencies. Developing a plan at the time of crisis will cause unnecessary delay.

• Understand the decisions senior leaders will encounter and the strategic trade-offs and risks associated with a full mobilization. In a complex scenario, leaders will be compelled to balance force readiness, time of delivery, and operational challenges with limited resources.

• Understand vulnerabilities and impacts in a contested homeland. Globalization and increased cyber and space capabilities reduce America’s physical isolation from potential adversaries. It is necessary to define how these elements will drive force generation and allocation.

• Think strategically about the challenges associated with a total mobilization, to include expanding the force. Adding manpower and matériel to the current structure will require time and extensive resources. The Army must understand the strategic implications of expansion and be prepared to influence the national level dialog.

The research team will consist of a diverse group of faculty from several external partners, including the United States Military Academy, Forces Command, Center for Army Analysis, and United States Transportation Command. The team will focus on the implications of full mobilization for the Army and the Joint Force during the first year; total mobilization during the second. Researchers will conduct analysis using senior leader engagements, workshops, and wargames throughout the study period.

The first year of research and analysis is already underway. The first event, a test of the prototype simulation against a single combatant command operations plan, will occur in September 2017. Further testing will incorporate progressively larger demand signals, starting with two operations plans in November 2017, then a full mobilization scenario in February 2018. Lastly, in keeping with the researcher role, the Army War College will ask resident and distance education students to examine strategic mobilization issues and use the simulation to test plausible futures. Preliminary results are expected to be released in May 2018.

The second year of research and analysis will focus on total mobilization and the implications associated with expanding the force and the industrial base. This effort will incorporate insights from faculty and student research from the previous year. Projected research questions include:

• What insights might previous mobilizations provide for the future? An examination and analysis of historical large-scale mobilizations

15 Department of Strategic Wargaming, Full Mobilization Wargame, 4.
can set the stage for planning and potentially prevent relearning lessons the hard way.

- How did the current concepts and practices of mobilization come to exist? Understanding the intent of statutory requirements and evolution of the current system can shape future recommendations.

- What are the strategic implications of large-scale mobilizations? Better understanding of mobilization limitations and requirements might alter the strategic scenarios which drive defense resourcing decisions.

- How quickly can the Army achieve the various levels of mobilization? It is critical to understand the capabilities and limitations of the current system in order to inform future decisions.

- What is the proper command and control structure for mobilization? Organizing the Army for large-scale mobilization sets the stage for effective, integrated decision-making.

- How much installation infrastructure is necessary to mobilize the total Army? Understanding the current capacities and shortfalls informs planning and rapid contingency decision-making.

- Which policies and procedures need to change in order to mobilize the total Army quickly? Understanding the trade-offs and risks associated with these changes enables decision-makers to identify alternative approaches and maximize available resources.

- What effect, if any, do different contingencies have on mobilization requirements and timelines? Awareness of the resources needed to respond to diverse threats in a variety of battlespaces, and possibly against multiple foes, builds the capability to mobilize the total Army effectively.

- How can we make mobilizations more robust and less vulnerable to interference? Recognizing mobilization vulnerabilities presents Army leadership with opportunities to develop contingencies that would facilitate total-force mobilization.

- How can the Army exercise the tasks associated with large-scale mobilizations? Wargaming mobilization under diverse scenarios will help the Army anticipate critical challenges.

The challenges associated with large-scale mobilization, which are too complex to begin addressing at the time of crisis, make it an enduring first-order problem. Mobilizing the total Army force requires a collaborative effort across the entire enterprise to assess requirements, identify capabilities, develop solutions, and implement decisions. This is exactly the environment provided by the Army warfighting challenges analytical framework. Through rigorous research and analysis, the US Army War College will provide senior leaders with findings and recommendations to improve the readiness of the current and future force.
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ABSTRACT: This article advises Army leaders to return to previously successful strategies of influence to articulate a collaborative vision for the future of air mobility. By underscoring the requirement for multiservice capabilities to deliver personnel and matériel wherever they are needed, US air mobility can once again become a strategic force multiplier.

The capability of transporting matériel and personnel remains essential to the US Army’s effectiveness. Likewise, maneuver momentum—mass x speed—remains a relevant element of national defense as Army operators and defense planners make the necessary provisions to get land forces where they need to go, when they need to go there, and with the necessary momentum. Accordingly, this article addresses two questions regarding American air-mobility forces. First, can the present and future US Air Force airlift force structure support existing and emerging US Army movement and maneuver requirements? Second, should the Army address its mobility concerns passively, by declaring its requirements and hoping the Air Force will come up with appropriate forces, or assertively, by involving itself more deeply in all details of airlift force structure planning? The importance of these two questions is obvious given the integral role of inter- and intratheater air mobility in most Army warfighting concepts. Ultimately, the Army’s vision of itself as a global response force, able to conduct rapid and agile “expeditionary maneuver” over strategic and theater distances, is compromised by shortfalls in our nation’s airlift program; but the Army can do something about that vulnerability.

The Army and Airlift Relevance

An airlift planning adage states “the Army does not have light units; it has heavy and incredibly heavy units.” This adage will remain painfully relevant to the current global environment of burgeoning strategic complexity, insufficient budgets, continuous (and probably expanding) overseas commitments, a predominantly homeland-based force structure, and “diverse enemies employing traditional, unconventional, and hybrid strategies.” Enemies such as international criminal gangs,

1 US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Movement and Maneuver, 2020–2040, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-6 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 2017), 34.


3 TRADOC, Operating Concept, 8–14.
transnational terrorists, and insurgents are growing stronger. Some are approaching the point of near-peer status in local areas and in certain realms of combat, gaining a capacity for coordinated or concurrent attacks on the United States and its interests. Nuclear proliferation and inexpensive communication networks also increase the possible danger, velocity, and complexity of future crises and conflicts.4

In response, Army leaders and planners are exploring numerous doctrine, training, force structure, and equipment innovations to preserve future readiness. The recently released Army movement and maneuver concept, for example, calls for task-organized forces moving in unpredictable ways and maneuvering throughout the depth of future battlefields to “defeat enemies by forcing them to fight against multiple types of attacks from multiple directions and domains.”5 To survive and fight decisively, these task-organized forces will need to be capable of semi-independent—but mutually supporting—cross-domain land, sea, air, space and cyber operations for at least one week before pausing to rest and refit.6 In many circumstances, these operations will enable sea and air forces to achieve their missions and support in-theater preparation activities by Joint commands. Agile strategic maneuver and logistical support by air and sea will be essential to achieving these effects.7

The success of these emerging lines of development will depend on the support of robust air mobility. Future combat scenarios often will require the Army to “maneuver over strategic distances along multiple axes of advance by air and sea,” without stopping at intermediate staging bases.8 If enemy anti-access/area denial operations block the arrival of sea and air forces in the early phases of future campaigns, Army forcible entry operations likely will involve airlifts of assault and then follow-on forces to seize terrain in unpredictable locations and to transition quickly to offensive operations. Throughout these activities, Army commanders will require high-capacity airlifts to build up and sustain maneuvers, achieve missions, evade enemy fires, reduce logistical footprints, and facilitate mutual support among widely dispersed units.9

The Army’s dependence on airlift gives it a practically bottomless quantitative appetite for airlift support. Moving a single Stryker brigade combat team, for example, involves around 4,200 personnel as well as 15,000 tons of matériel and sustainment, taking about 380 C-17

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5 TRADOC, Functional Concept, 15,
6 Ibid., 13–15, 25.
8 DoD, Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) (Washington, DC: DoD, 2012), 34
9 For the Army's vision of the relationship between maneuver and air and sea mobility, see US Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) and US Marine Corps Combat Development Command (CDC), Gaining and Maintaining Access: An Army-Marine Corps Concept (Fort Eustis, VA: ARCIC / CDC, 2012), 7–13. For the Air Force's tentative view of the aircraft needed to support Army maneuver, see Air Mobility Command (AMC), Joint Future Theater Lift: Technology Study Final Report (Scott Air Force Base [AFB], IL: AMC, 2013), 16–18.
Globemaster sorties.\textsuperscript{10} Assuming an out-and-back cycle time of 36 hours and a continual commitment of 40 C-17s, or approximately 20 percent of the US fleet, deploying the brigade from the middle of the continental United States to the Baltic Sea region would take about 14 days. Adding more C-17s and C-5 Galaxies might accelerate the move, but only if adequate airfields and parking spaces are available at the delivery points.\textsuperscript{11} Simple multiplication illustrates the timelines involved in air movements of multibrigade forces, their supporting elements, and sustainment supplies over longer distances can stretch into months. Even if equipment arrives by sea, onward movements to their points of need often will consume substantial theater airlift efforts to spare forces long, dangerous, and tactically undesirable road marches.

The Army also has articulated challenging qualitative requirements for airlift support under austere conditions. Indeed, in the face of strong enemy anti-access/area denial capabilities, Army air movements and maneuvers are far more likely to terminate at austere airfields and unpaved landing grounds than at developed airports and bases with long runways and extensive but easily identified and targeted parking areas. At the extreme of its maneuver vision, the Army’s mounted vertical maneuver concept calls for “the maneuver and vertical insertion of medium-weight armored forces into areas in close proximity to their battlefield objectives without the need for fixed airports, airfields or prepared airheads.”\textsuperscript{12} Similarly, the current US Army operating concept links the availability of Air Force airlift assets and improvements in Army rotary-wing transports to its “maneuver advantage . . . to overcome challenges of restrictive terrain and operations across long distances . . . to deter adversaries; respond rapidly to crises; and conduct expeditionary maneuver.”\textsuperscript{13} Succinctly, the Army wants airlift support capable not only of delivering all types of combat units and their matériel into the widest possible range of tactical destinations but also for maintaining delivery densities necessary to dominate any point in their battlespaces.

Delivery density, an uncommon term, is a useful consideration in evaluations of airlift aircraft and force structures. To maintain tactical dominance in circumstances characterized by fast-breaking events and waiting enemies, deployment times of these movements—measured from the first aircraft’s \textsuperscript{14}“wheels-up” to the arrival of the last aircraft—must be narrow enough to get ready-to-fight units on the ground and reinforced with light- to medium- mobile protected firepower elements before enemies can react. Consequently, the term has its most acute relevance to land forces transitioning across domain boundaries such as airland or airborne assaults. Under such circumstances, the interval between the arrival of the first and last aircraft to the battlespace must be short, or dense, enough to allow units to maintain tactical dominance even as they organize for offensive operations. For airlift planners,

\textsuperscript{10} Deployment Process Modernization Office, TRADOC, Fort Eustis, Virginia, e-mail message to author, February 27, 2013; and in Alan Vick, David Orletsky, Bruce Pirnie, and Seth Jones, \textit{The Stryker Brigade Combat Team: Rethinking Strategic Responsiveness and Assessing Deployment Options} (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002), 15–17.

\textsuperscript{11} Vick, Orletsky, Pirnie, and Jones, \textit{Stryker}, 13–29.


\textsuperscript{13} TRADOC, \textit{Operating Concept}, 15, 17, and 22.
then, achieving tactically viable delivery densities mandates acquiring and operating the airlift force necessary to get soldiers, equipment, and sustainment on the ground as quickly as possible and in increments configured for immediate and effective combat. Delivery density does not imply forces must arrive instantaneously—though helicopter assaults of infantry can approach that ideal—but forces must arrive fast enough to establish and preserve tactical dominance.

The ability of airlift forces and their aircraft to achieve dense airland deliveries of ground forces is directly related to their terminal agility—the variety of runways and terminal infrastructures into which they can operate. Airlift forces dependent upon the long and paved runways and parking areas of global and regional airports are far less likely to get Army forces to their points of need than airlift forces that can use short and unpaved airstrips, sections of multilane highways, open fields, or (best of all) helicopter landing zones. A study by the Army Capabilities Integration Center provides a useful example of these considerations. Examining the airfield availability to support force flows into a large African country, the study found the number of locations available to vertical takeoff and landing aircraft was virtually limitless. In comparison, only 24 percent of the territory lay within 50 kilometers of airfields capable of receiving a C-130 Hercules or a C-17 needed to deliver Stryker units. Moreover, the country possessed only 13 airfields able to accommodate C-5s. Only a few of those airports possessed the maximum-on-ground aircraft parking capacity to receive large airlift flows or to serve as global-theater intermediate staging bases. This issue is critical since airfield limitations or available transportation personnel will impose maximum on-ground limitations that will consequently limit throughput at forward airfields regardless of the number of aircraft available. Indeed, one recent Air Force review estimated only 16 airfields surveyed in sub-Saharan Africa had the runways and capacities needed to serve as C-17 hubs for onward C-130 operations.

Shortfalls in the Airlift Program of Record

A complex relationship exists between the Army’s airlift support requirements and the current airlift program of record’s ability to satisfy them. The American national air-mobility system is unparalleled in its capacity and personnel expertise. But, its ability to deliver combat forces to the places and with the delivery densities the Army wants is

14 For discussion on the operational and aerodynamic characteristics of these different airfield profiles, see Robert C. Owen, “Theater Airlift Modernization: Options for Closing the Gap,” Joint Force Quarterly 75 (4th Quarter 2014): 17.

15 Jim Young, “A Strategic Terrain Analysis Examining Deployment Considerations within the Arc of Instability” (briefing, US Army Capabilities Integration Center Deployment Modernization Office, February 4, 2009), slides 13 and 14.

16 Importantly, the Air Mobility Command’s 621st Contingency Response Wing only fields a handful of mobile transportation elements, which are able to support two aircraft on the ground at expeditionary airfields. Vick, Orletskey, Pirnie, and Jones, Stryker, 47; Christopher G. Pernin et al., Enabling the Global Response Force: Access Strategies for the 82nd Airborne Division (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), 22, 30–31, 40; and Robert C. Owen, “Humanitarian Relief in Haiti, 2010: Honing the Partnership between the US Air Force and the UN,” in Air Power in UN Operations: Wings for Peace, ed. A. Walter Dorn (Farnham, Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2014), 90.

17 Christopher M. Jones, e-mail message to author, December 29, 2015. At the time, Captain Jones was an operations research scientist at the combined headquarters of United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE)—Air Forces Africa, USAFE A9/A9A.

demonstrably inadequate. Moreover, the Department of Defense (DoD) has no comprehensive plan in place to address these shortfalls any time soon despite spending funds on piecemeal modernization programs that will not meet the full scope of the Army’s future needs much more than do the current requirements.

The American air-mobility system consists of several interconnected components. Its total force military arm consists of operationally integrated Air Force, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard components that possess a core airlift fleet of 54 C-5s, 222 C-17s, and over 300 C-130s. These components also operate just over a hundred specialized transports, ranging from presidential Boeing 747s to small business jets. Additionally, some 20 air carriers contribute around 450 airliners to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet. The rest of the airlift enterprise consists of a global system created by commands, headquarters, operating bases, logistics elements within each service, depots, and supply centers as well as training, education, and professional organizations. In a maximum effort, the Air Force expects this mobility system to produce around 50 million ton-miles per day (MTM/D) of lift. For perspective, this much cargo equates to transporting 4,600 tons per day over 11,000 nautical miles (nm)—a roundtrip between Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington and the Philippine island of Luzon—perhaps the equivalent of a brigade delivery every 4 days.

Of course, the ideal airlift would only exist if “someone shows up with enough fairy dust to wish away all of the things that hinder airlift efforts.” Historically, hindrances include competing demands on fleet capacity, changes in local operational circumstances and priorities, enemy and enemy-sympathizer military and diplomatic actions, limited availability of suitable enroute and destination airfields, breakdowns in movement coordination and cargo tracking, crew force limitations, shortages of cargo pallets and aircraft loading equipment, aircraft maintenance challenges, and more. During the Persian Gulf War, these impediments limited the airlift throughput to 13.6 MTM/D out of a notional airlift system capacity of about 49 MTM/D. The military services have done much to improve airlift management since then, but the complexities of and competition for airlift support have increased. In other words, the system will work better in the future but probably not enough to justify confident expectations that it will perform at capacity.

The mismatch in the cargo compartment sizes and the capacities of aircraft in the core airlift fleet also undermines the efficiency of many airlift operations. The airlift fleet has two categories of aircraft based

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19 Brendan McGarry, “USAF Almanac: Equipment,” *Air Force Magazine* 99, no. 5 (May 2016): 32–33. The number of C-130s in the fleet is variable at the moment, as the Air Force is slowly reducing the size of the fleet towards about 300 aircraft.


21 For a detailed discussion on the national air mobility system, see Air University, *Air Mobility Operations*, Annex 3-17 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Lemay Center for Doctrine, 2014).


on cargo compartment size. C-5s and C-17s comprise a category of big airplanes capable of carrying outsized loads such as battle tanks, self-propelled artillery, and up-armedored M1126 Stryker infantry carriers between developed airfields. The second category includes C-130s, much smaller aircraft capable of operating on unpaved airstrips while carrying medium-weight and oversized loads such as early variant, lightly armored Strykers, towed artillery, medium-weight engineering equipment, and tactical radars. The cargo compartment mismatch separating these two transport categories chokes force movements at intermediate staging bases when cargoes are transferred from the big planes to the C-130s capable of landing at less developed airfields closer to points of need. This disconnect can impose painful operational choices on commanders trying to preserve unit integrity while moving to austere forward bases.

The limited range and payload characteristics of the current theater transport fleet exacerbates the operational dilemmas inherent in force deployments since they can force commanders to conduct intermediate staging base operations within range of enemy weapons. A C-130J carrying a 38,000-pound basic Stryker vehicle, for example, has a range of about 1,600 nm. In comparison, the Airbus A400M can carry the same vehicle for 3,700 nm; the developmental Embraer KC-390 tanker-transport aircraft for 2,100 nm. Considering that unrefueled operational radius is around 40 percent of an aircraft’s range, an intermediate staging base receiving C-130J support for a Stryker brigade move would have to be within 640 nm of its point of need. That distance is well within the range of tactical aircraft armed with standoff weapons and by medium-range ballistic missiles, such as the Chinese DF-21. In such situations, Army movements affected by the previously mentioned chokepoints would be more vulnerable to enemy attacks.

The defense community has been fully aware of these long-standing mobility shortfalls as expressed in a US Transportation Command report in 2011:

Future operations described in joint concepts require the ability to transport forces over strategic and operational distances directly to points of need and to routinely operate on austere, short, and unimproved landing areas. The current mobility airlift fleet cannot. C-130s can carry cargo to semi-prepared runways, but not the medium-weight forces needed. C-17s and C-5s, on the other hand, can carry the medium-weight force, but not directly to a short or soft landing area that may be the point of need.

More recently, US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) Commander General Darren W. McDew reported to Congress: “The current pace of today’s operations requires the full effort of our . . . fleet. Should the need arise to respond elsewhere in the world, the mobility resources required could exceed our existing capacity.” McDew expressed the fleet’s capacity would be “sufficient with a manageable amount of risk.” Whatever “manageable” meant in this context, the term

27 Ibid., 37:57.
implicitly reinforces the perception that the simultaneous, multithreat, and multiregion crises visualized by current Army commanders—and the entire defense community—could quickly overwhelm American air-mobility capabilities, forcing difficult operational decisions within combatant commands.

Despite the obvious shortfalls and operational limitations of the existing airlift fleet, planning in this area by the Defense Department and the Air Force proceeds at a glacial pace. The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study—2016 (MCRS-16) and related strategic guidance documents remain the authoritative baselines for DoD discussions of airlift force structure issues. MCRS-16 found the existing airlift force sufficient to meet current DoD conflict planning scenarios but recommended the Department of Defense “continue to explore strategies to mitigate the adverse impacts of infrastructure constraints” to support major force deployments. 28 Oddly, the report also implied the availability of C-17s to support intratheater movements reduced the requirements for C-130s even though the bigger aircraft is more infrastructure-dependent than the smaller one. 29 The Government Accountability Office subsequently questioned the usefulness and even the relevance of MCRS-16 since the study provided no specific risk assessments of identified shortfalls and the basic DoD planning guidelines had changed since its publication. 30 Since then, various DoD and Air Force organizations have conducted limited studies of technology and fleet mix issues, but the Defense Department will not update MCRS until 2018, presumably after the Trump administration has issued new strategic guidance. So, apart from vague pronouncements about possibly recapitalizing the strategic airlift fleet in the 2030s and the theater fleet a decade or so thereafter, the defense community has no comprehensive plan to address the qualitative and quantitative shortfalls in the airlift fleet.

The Army’s Essential Role in Past Airlift Force Modernizations

If the past can be a prologue, it is important to understand no major modernization of American airlift forces has ever happened in the absence of strong, public, institutional, and detailed leadership from the Army. Certainly, Army leadership was pivotal to such policy milestones as the creation of the battlefield airlift component of Army aviation and global airlift forces as well as the acquisition of the C-17. Faced with Air Force reluctance in the mid-1950s to acquire fixed- and rotary-wing airlift forces adequate for their vision of maneuver on nuclear battlefields, Army leaders bootlegged their own technical and tactical development program, successfully pressing for funding to buy thousands of helicopters and a small fixed-wing fleet. 31 Concurrent Army

29 Ibid., 4–5.
advocacy for true global mobility and the “politicking” of sympathetic Air Force enthusiasts, two presidents, and many engaged legislators obliged the Air Force to fund the development of a turbofan-powered transport fleet truly capable of lifting all types of ground units over the oceans.\textsuperscript{32} As America’s strategic circumstances changed and the end-of-service life for the original turbofan fleet loomed, strong and persistent advocacy by Army leaders, overseas commanders in chief, and interested congressmen helped Air Force mobility leaders keep the replacement program focused on the uniquely capable C-17.\textsuperscript{33} Without that advocacy, the program’s focus might have drifted to cheaper options, such as upgraded C-5s and slightly modified commercial designs, less compatible with the Army’s emerging mobility needs. Conversely, the Army’s recent failure to package its proposed Joint Heavy Lift and Joint Cargo Aircraft programs to bridge interservice doctrines, roles, budgets, and professional languages led to the collapse of both programs.\textsuperscript{34}

The US Army’s advocacy for these programs had several consistent features. Most important, leaders did not cross the boundary between aggressive advocacy and insubordination.\textsuperscript{35} Rather, they worked within legal and constitutional structures to influence national policy and the Defense Department’s military requirements processes. They and their sympathizers surely stepped on institutional toes, but nothing suggests laws were broken or the good order and discipline of American defense services was undermined. Also, the Army galvanized every critical airlift debate with clear, confident, and credible vision documents. These documents ranged from the 1954 Project Vista study that coalesced Army thinking about air mobility in nuclear warfare to the Objective Force concept of the early 2000s that reaffirmed and quantified the Army’s need for long-range global mobility.\textsuperscript{36} Last, Army leaders approached advocacy as a team effort, assiduously informing and cooperating with other services, government leaders, and civil authorities on its airlift needs. Ultimately, this broad-based support carried visions of airlift modernization to the national level of endorsement and funding.

Current circumstances indicate requirements for successful advocacy of Army airlift interests will not change significantly. Conflicting perspectives dominate the complex and costly realm of military affairs. Army leaders view airlift as a vital underpinning of their mission and relevance; Air Force leaders consider Army movement aspirations as elements of a broader set of operational obligations and budgetary demands. Neither side clearly understands the tactical requirements of the other. Corporate leaders not only love their country but also market specific aircraft. Congressional members worry about national defense while protecting their Air National Guard units and preserving the

\textsuperscript{32} Robert C. Owen, \textit{Air Mobility}, 139–55.

\textsuperscript{33} Owen, \textit{Air Mobility}, 229–39. For a definitive discussion of this project and its advocacy, see Betty R. Kennedy, \textit{Globemaster III: Acquiring the C-17} (Scott AFB, IL: Air Mobility Command, Office of History, 2004).

\textsuperscript{34} Owen, \textit{Air Mobility}, 291–94.

\textsuperscript{35} For more than this summary of the content and tone of Army airlift advocacy based on numerous sources, see “Army Aviation in the 1950s” and “Vietnam—The Air Mobility War” in Owen, \textit{Air Mobility}. Also see Williams, \textit{History of Army Aviation}, 66–77, 97–104, 407–14. For a useful case study into the Army’s development and advocacy of the air mobility concept, see John J. Tolson in \textit{Air Mobility 1961–1971} (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1973), 1–22.

economic well-being of their constituents. The intellectually stagnating
effect of strategic uncertainty accompanying the increasing complexity
of the military’s future overshadows each of these interests.

So, if the Army intends to shape an air-mobility fleet capable of
supporting battle through the remainder of the century, it had better get
engaged. As General Mark Milley said on the eve of becoming the Army
chief of staff, it is time for him and the other service chiefs to “elbow” their
way into more assertive participation in Joint modernization decisions.37

Shaping the Future Airlift Program for Warfighting Relevance

Assiduous long-term airlift policy requires sustained knowledge
acquisition and context-setting campaigns by the appropriate Army
commands and leaders. The Army must clearly articulate its key airlift
goals and ardently hold the Air Force to its responsibilities to maintain
capability requirements. The first goal might address transporting
forces and outsize cargoes from intermediate staging bases located
outside enemy weapon-engagement zones to dispersed and austere
points of need. Some solutions Army leaders might champion include
equipping the Army with improved medium-weight protected firepower
vehicles and advancing vertical takeoff and landing technology. Should
advancing vertical technology prove unattainable or unaffordable, super-
short takeoff and landing systems capable of lifting medium-weight
forces might be a practical alternative. Due to the extreme MTM/D
requirements, profoundly increasing the throughputs and delivery
densities of long-range airlift forces into global class and regional
airfields cannot be overlooked.

Army leaders should broker an agreement between their service, the
Air Force, and other willing stakeholders, particularly the combatant
commands, to identify the appropriate technologies and to develop
acquisition strategies for modernizing air-mobility forces to meet specific
operational requirements rather than simple gross-lift calculations. This
step is essential to shaping the focus of the forthcoming MCRS and
to initiating modernization and development programs quickly—for
example, if all agree filling the existing gap in delivering medium-weight,
oversize loads to austere airfields is a pressing need, incrementing a fleet
of A400Ms for operations over the next 30 years can begin shortly after
the MCRS. Likewise, if emphasis is given to the strategic throughput
problem, development of a new strategic airlifter, probably larger than
the C-5 but with better airfield agility, can start. One compelling reason
for expediting these assessments is maximizing opportunities to offset
some costs by terminating acquisitions and service-life extensions of less
useful systems.

Finally, the Army should encourage stakeholders to create a new
multiservice airlift knowledge-management organization similar in
concept and tasking to the Airlift Concepts and Requirements Agency,
established in 1984 to “coordinate and integrate . . . the development and
promulgation of joint airlift concepts, doctrine, training, procedures,
and materiel which support current and future Air Force and Army

37 Marcus Weisgerber, “US Army’s New Chief Sets Three Goals,” Defense One, October 8,
2015.
doctrine and unified and specified command requirements.” Given changes in the Joint system since then, the structure of a new airlift knowledge management organization will likely differ in many respects from the Airlift Concepts and Requirements Agency, but the defense community will benefit from the centralization. Such an organization can facilitate the efforts of many groups to arrive at a common, detailed, and comprehensive understanding of airlift useful for wisely building the most capable fleet.

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**Review Essay**

**Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?**

James C. MacDougall  
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Professor Graham Allison gazes into the future of US-China relations in *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?* only to find the best guide to the future is the past. Specifically based on Thucydides’s well-known observation that “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this inspired in Sparta that made war inevitable,” Allison has popularized the phrase “Thucydides’s Trap” to describe the dangerous historical dynamic that develops when a rising power threatens to displace an established ruling power. This dynamic was summarized aptly in an earlier article: “The rise of a new power has been attended by uncertainty and anxieties. Often, though not always, violent conflict has followed. The rise in the economic and military power of China, the world’s most populous country, will be a central question for Asia and for American foreign policy at the beginning of a new century.”

In researching cases of rising powers challenging ruling powers over the last 500 years, Allison and the Thucydides Trap Project at Harvard University found 12 of 16 cases resulted in war. Avoiding Thucydides’s Trap thus equates to avoiding war. Based on this analysis, Allison concludes that “as far ahead as the eye can see, the defining question about global order is whether China and the United States can escape Thucydides’s Trap.”

The high percentage of cases that resulted in war provide persuasive support to the overall argument that war between the United States and China may be more likely than generally considered. Yet a few cautionary notes on the data set and methodology are warranted.

First, while the principal result of the study (12 of 16 cases led to war) seems objective, decisions on what cases to include necessarily involve some subjective analysis. As such, the overall data supporting the general argument have evolved since the initial Thucydides’s Trap argument was presented. In 2012–14 the argument cited 11 of 15 cases leading to war.

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In 2015 and subsequently, the data set was revised to include 12 of 16 cases that resulted in war. Later in 2015, a detailed argument presenting the Thucydides’s Trap metaphor appeared in the *Atlantic*. The 16 cases were identified in a table accompanying the article and included information on time period, ruling power, rising power, and result. 

In *Destined for War* the data also include 12 of 16 cases leading to war, but a comparison between the table in the book (42) and the table from the 2015 Atlantic article shows one case from the 2015 data was dropped and another was added. In the event, they both resulted in “no war” so the overall numbers remain the same; but, such changes highlight the difficulties inherent to determining which cases to include. While 12 of 16 may have a scientific ring, the result may be less rigorous than it appears; certainly, it is subject to further analysis.

Notwithstanding such questions about the aggregate data, the book’s use of the Thucydides’s Trap metaphor to alert the potential, indeed the seeming likelihood, that the current global shift in power could lead to war is its principal strength. The book’s conclusion, based on the available evidence, “when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power, the resulting structural stress makes a violent clash the rule, not the exception,” is a powerful warning that should help focus the attention of both policymakers and scholars to the perils inherent in the uneven growth of power.

Although a valuable lens through which to see the current shifting relationship between the United States and China, the text is somewhat less useful in prescribing policy or strategy responses that might be taken in pursuit of US objectives given the international context described. As an aid to statecraft, Allison says, “History shows that major ruling powers can manage relations with rivals, even those that threaten to overtake them, without triggering war. The record of those successes, as well as the failures, offers many lessons for statesmen today.”

The challenge for strategists and policymakers, however, is to distinguish the

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5 In Professor Allison’s 2015 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the data set was updated to include 12 of 16 cases which led to war. See *Hearing on China, the U.S., and the Asia-Pacific, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 114th Cong (April 14, 2015)* (statement, Dr. Graham T. Allison, Director of Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard’s Kennedy School).


7 For example, a list on the Thucydides’s Trap Project website of potential additional cases that may be included in a second phase of the analysis includes 14 cases of which 7 led to war and 7 did not. While none have yet been included in the overall data, the variance in the result highlights the importance of decisions of which cases to include and which not to include. See “Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?,” Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School, accessed July 18, 2017, http://www.belfercenter.org/thucydides-trap/methodology/thucydides-trap-potential-additional-cases.

8 Allison, *Destined for War*, xv.

9 Ibid., xvii.
historical lessons to avoid war, which vary widely and are in some cases mixed if not contradictory. Here former Presidential Historian Arthur Schlesinger’s lament “that the past is an enormous grab bag with a prize for everybody” would seem applicable.10

To illustrate how differing conclusions might be drawn, we might compare two cases from the Thucydides’s Trap analysis which had the same result of “no war.” In case number 11 regarding the British response to rising American power in the early twentieth century, Allison observes that Great Britain chose a strategy of ad hoc accommodation, deciding “to make a virtue of necessity and to yield to the Americans in every dispute with as much good grace as was permitted.”11 In case number 15, a rising Soviet Union challenged the United States for several decades, but the end result was “no war.”12 In what Allison describes as the “greatest leap of strategic imagination in the history of America diplomacy,” a “comprehensive strategy for a form of combat never previously seen” was developed to conduct a cold war “by every means short of bombs and bullets.”13 The result, though not war, was that “the US and Soviet Union made systemic, sustained assaults against each other along every azimuth except one: direct military attacks.”14

For the statesman or strategist intent to avoid Thucydides’s Trap the above two examples offer starkly different historically-derived approaches: accommodation or cold war. The advice to “apply history” found in chapter 10, “Where Do We Go from Here?,” while sensible, still begs questions on which history and how it is to be applied.

A fundamental challenge arises for efforts to apply the Thucydides’s Trap methodology and data to strategy and policymaking. The study designates war as the dependent variable. Could dependent variables other than war be understood in the context of Thucydides’s Trap? In other words, could strategic objectives beyond avoiding war be addressed by the information and evidence presented in the study? Allison cites Clausewitz’s famous line: “War is an extension of international politics by other means.”15

In case 9, the rise of Germany in the mid-nineteenth century, the “war” result suggests France and Germany fell into Thucydides’s Trap. Yet, the Franco-Prussian War assisted in the attainment of Bismarck’s main strategic objective of unifying the German states around a strong Prussia. Is it possible that war could be a rational choice in pursuit of national objectives? The answer, according to the analysis in Destined for War, is no. Of the “Twelve Clues for Peace” offered in chapter 9, several point out, given the unprecedented nature of nuclear weapons, war between modern great powers is “madness” and “no longer a

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12 Allison, Destined for War, 42.

13 Allison, Destined for War, 202–203.

14 Ibid., 203.

15 Ibid.
justifiable option.” Without doubt, this is an exceedingly sensible position. Yet, must we then discount historical analogies drawn from events in the prenuclear age?

To resolve the conundrums of the Thucydides’s Trap metaphor posed in the preceding two paragraphs, a couple of suggestions are offered. First, using a variety of different dependent variables to review the historical cases of a rising power challenging a ruling power could yield important knowledge. By identifying a nation’s strategic priority as the dependent variable, for example, insight could be collected into whether either power achieved its objectives. A possible observation would be that in x of y cases the rising power achieved its objectives, or alternatively, the ruling power achieved its objectives. How they did so would be the subject for further inquiry. Several variations on this approach might be useful.

A second approach might be to disaggregate the data and conduct detailed analyses of each case compared to the present using the structured methodology articulated by Richard Neustadt and Ernest May in their book, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers and cited favorably in Destined for War. By shifting the focus from the aggregate to the specific; identifying known, unknown, and presumed facts; and detailing both similarities and differences between the cases, the historical record would reveal a more comprehensive and nuanced picture that could provide important insights. Indeed, Allison previously used this approach to good effect, and it would complement the more general description of the cases included in Destined for War.

Yaacov Vertzberger reflected “history does not contain an inherent truth which necessarily reveals itself to the scholar or practitioner. It maintains many faces when studied with great care and through the application of scientific methodology.” Seen in that light, Destined for War presents not inherent truth, but one face, an important face, revealing a dangerous historical dynamic reflected more prominently in description rather than prescription.

16 Ibid., 206–209.
Scales on War: The Future of America’s Military at Risk
By Maj. Gen. Bob Scales, USA (Ret.)

Reviewed by COL Tarn Warren, Chair, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, US Army War College

This work is about the infantry, in close combat, the unique burden it has and will continue to bear for our nation, why we are neglecting it, and the cost of this neglect. A compelling narrative packed with piercing insights, Scales on War: The Future of America’s Military at Risk is a well-earned tribute to the military personnel who shoulder the weight of victory or defeat on the battlefield and a cogent and persistent argument that future conflict will demand more than ever before in our history from small combat units. Written principally for US policymakers but immensely useful for the wider defense community, Scales on War reminds readers those who do most of the dying overseas—the infantry—often also, and ironically, suffer at home from resource neglect and thin advocacy. With urgency, Major General (Ret.) Bob Scales implores national leaders not to be lured by high-tech, clean, quick, and bloodless thinking about victory that distorts the true character and nature of war. Although his book is thinly sourced, he effectively uses his lifetime of combat, senior military leader, and national security experience to make his case.

Galloping through the past 100 years of US military history, Scales adeptly describes the cyclical buildup and breaking of the Army before and after each major war or conflict. As a result of this cycle, the US Army, and especially the infantry, suffered from what he calls “amateurism” at least until the beginning of the all-volunteer force in the early 1970s. This amateurism has, in part, resulted in higher and needless casualties on the battlefield by those most likely to face close combat and has, again in part, accelerated the pursuit of quick and bloodless victory using high-tech standoff weaponry. To be sure, Scales does not eschew technology in warfare. On the contrary, he embraces the need to leverage technology to ensure dominant small-unit lethality and to better protect the soldier. He asserts, however, that current policymakers and the entrenched defense industrial base continue to steer warfare to a place it will not naturally go—to a clean, quick, strategic victory via technology.

Indeed, Scales spends a considerable amount of time describing current and future threats as those nearly immune from US technological advantages and willing to trade space and lives for time. Using the oft-cited “asymmetric” playbook, future threats do not have to win but merely not lose, run out the clock, and wait for the inevitable US domestic aversion to increased casualties, resulting in gradual withdrawal from the effort. His point here is to leverage resources and technology at the small-unit level to improve lethality, reduce friendly casualties, and achieve victory where the enemy lives and exerts its political power. Simultaneously, Scales sternly rebukes those that claim big-ticket warships and fifth generation jet fighters will claim the inheritance of future victory. To achieve future victory, he calls for an unprecedented investment in human capital, especially in the infantry. The United States
must carefully select, train, and educate these warriors to be more like special operations forces, including using social science as an amplifier. Deep and persistent cultural training and education will greatly improve small-unit effectiveness in complex environments with an enemy sometimes hidden in plain sight.

Lamenting the fact that soldiers and marines are still using nearly obsolete and unreliable small arms, among other paraphernalia, Scales also calls for a diversion of resource investment towards systems that improve small-unit lethality and survivability, such as new semiautomatic rifles, better ammunition of a caliber with more impact, lighter and more-effective body armor, soldier-view cameras, and handheld devices that replace secure radios and track not only the soldier’s location but also his vital signs. Along with the gear, the US Army must also raise its training and retention standards, accepting only personnel mature enough to handle warfare in complex environments.

Furthermore, leader judgment and small-unit resilience are critical. At more senior officer levels, the US Army must identify and groom future strategic thinkers early with rigorous professional military and civilian education. Admittedly, the author recognizes the cost and time required to achieve these standards. He does not offer any easy solutions. Despite his pleas, the author concludes with an ominous forecast: without these needed reforms at the small combat unit level, the US Army will break again within three years.

Overall, Scales on War reminds us victory in modern war may be tough and elusive, but it still resides where sovereignty and political power actually live: on the ground, up close. Although the narrative occasionally makes hard gear-shifts and is redundant in a few instances, the book delivers persuasive arguments for US policymakers and senior military leaders to consider. Interestingly, there is a hint of “fighting the last war” in this book. What if the next enemy is a high-end peer willing to fight symmetrically? In this case, while the book’s prescriptions may still be sound, its critique of our current defense investment may lose some punch. The author, nevertheless, makes a strong case for investing in the aspect of our military perhaps most likely to achieve lasting military and political outcomes—lethal, resilient, mature, and survivable small ground combat units.

Cyberspace in Peace and War
By Martin C. Libicki

Reviewed by Aaron F. Brantly, Assistant Professor, Cyber and International Relations, United States Military Academy

Cyberspace in Peace and War by Martin Libicki is arguably the most ambitious and thorough individual analysis of cyberspace challenges written to date. Libicki places his deliberate and robust analysis into a readable yet exhaustive work. He advances dozens of arguments from the basics of cyberconflict to deterrence, coercion, and strategic and asymmetric conflict—and nearly everything in between. The true value of this volume resides both within its immense breadth, which exposes
readers to the nuances of debates that have been forming within the cyberconflict studies community, and within its depth on each topic. The book should gain immediate prominence within the cyberconflict literature canon and should be included in required readings of serious graduate-level courses on cyberspace conflict.

What separates Libicki’s analysis from the field at large is his willingness to understand deeply the technical, tactical, operational, and strategic implications of a range of decisions. He is not a Pollyanna for cyberspace, making prognostications about the impending doom or the lack thereof in cyberspace, rather he charts a reasoned middle ground that will challenge both pessimists and optimists. His central argument resides in the realization that cyberspace is a complex domain that engages a variety of core attributes across civilian and military government as well as the public, social, and economic sectors. Any attempt to set policy or strategy in this domain requires coming to terms with the domain’s nuance and complexity.

In coming to terms with nuance and complexity, Libicki builds on his previous works on cyberdeterrence, cyberdefense, and cyberconflict in cyberspace which provided more detail on individual topics but did not encompass the full breadth necessary to understand the relationship between the different aspects of peace and conflict in cyberspace. *Cyberspace in Peace and War* remedies the lack of breadth by walking readers through nearly every debate in the field. The downside of this treatment is some of the latter chapters, in particular, lose the depth necessary to fully develop complex arguments. In the scope of a work connecting such a robust variety of concepts, this lack of depth is not a major weakness, but rather the starting point for academic and policy arguments.

Any chapter could constitute a stand-alone book, yet by consolidating arguments and linking chapters together Libicki provides a nearly linear path for readers to follow. The section on the foundations of cyberspace should be required reading for all senior leaders entering the field. The chapters in this section provide a concise, easily understood foundation for nontechnical individuals. Subsequent sections on policies, operations, strategies, and norms provide ample evidence for arguments on topics such as: how deterrence does or rather does not work, how coercion in cyberspace is lacking, and why a nuclear analogy to cyberspace is inaccurate. Senior leaders who read the entire book will understand very well how one of the most-respected scholars in the field rightly or wrongly interprets the challenges addressed—not come away from the arguments presented having a fixed position. Senior leaders who read the book as a debate rather than a fait accompli will be able to apply the arguments and robust sourcing to their work in the operational and policy worlds.

The greatest benefit of *Cyberspace in Peace and War* is that it removes the rose-colored glasses that cyberspace is the final domain of conflict, one which will solve or create problems independent of other domains. Rather conflict in cyberspace, just as conflict in any domain, is part of a larger whole, a whole that if approached studiously can yield a range of benefits. Libicki does not gloss over the challenges presented by conflict in cyberspace, instead he addresses each challenge in a reasoned manner that continues to place him—and his work—at the forefront of the field.
Rajan Menon, who has published extensively on many related topics, provides a realistic approach to the reasons nation-states become involved in humanitarian interventions with military campaigns focused on ending mass atrocities. Mass atrocities may be spurred by a variety of reasons to include ethnic conflict or cleansing, wars of succession or revolutions, and genocide or race hatred. Menon proposes that states primarily become involved in these warlike humanitarian interventions if it is in the state’s national interests. Others, using a more liberalist approach, have articulated that many campaigns were focused on ensuring universal human rights across the globe, which have expanded with the ending of the Cold War and the need for a “Responsibility to Protect (R2P).” There are real tensions between these two approaches with the author exploring these tensions in multiple ways by clearly examining the “why” behind many armed humanitarian interventions of the last four decades. The book’s smooth introduction, followed by eight succinct chapters with appropriate titles, and almost 50 pages of expansive source notes provide well-supported insights.

The book’s first chapter, “The Animating Ideal,” examines tensions between a realist and liberalist approach by exploring the intellectual foundation of humanitarian intervention. Menon discusses the boundaries of sympathy towards the oppressed and duty to help others, as well as how universal human rights and an enlightenment mind-set have gained traction. This mind-set has the potential to cloud the judgment of interventionists, who may not consider challenges or counterarguments to their approach. The second chapter, “Altruism’s Limits,” focuses on challenges and limits to this approach by a reticent public that does not want to spend their nation’s blood and treasure in warlike humanitarian intervention operations. Menon provides many examples of deaths related to a state’s inability to provide foreign aid to address poverty in certain areas and, most importantly, to not addressing or minimizing the response to mass atrocities in Rwanda, Darfur, and Syria.

From this impressive examination of the tensions between these two approaches, Menon grounds readers in a more academic perspective, providing historical examples of issues impacting humanitarian intervention in the third chapter, “Sovereignty, Legitimacy, and Intervention,” followed by “The Legal Debate,” which highlights states’ rights versus human rights, unilateral intervention by states or regional organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the challenges with aligning law and morality. He shows how states have used these concepts to justify to the global community their reasons for engaging in, or conversely, for blocking the involvement of other states in interventions. Examples from both chapters support the author’s insights and include Pakistan and Bengali, Vietnam and Cambodia, Tanzania and Uganda, NATO and Kosovo, and the United States in
Panama and Grenada. Menon concludes with the thought that “power and interest, not law, will prove decisive” when states decide to become involved in humanitarian interventions.

The approaches and tensions on when to intervene are covered in the fifth chapter, “Human Rights and Intervention,” which begins with historical examples from the 1800s. Menon seamlessly transitions to the complicated journey of the United Nation’s (UN’s) R2P debate and the 2005 World Summit to gain a global consensus on humanitarian intervention. Comments from the leaders of many of the nations at the summit illustrate the extent of global divisions as the original R2P proposal was diluted to provide more vague UN guidance for engaging in humanitarian interventions.

The sixth chapter, “The Primacy of Pragmatism,” clearly cements the author’s realistic approach to humanitarian intervention. He states: “When friendly states commit atrocities, the great powers are wont to look away, offer political cover, or even provide materiel assistance.” Examples he provides to support this pragmatic approach include: the West’s support for three decades of the brutal Indonesian dictator Suharto following his take over in a 1965 coup, the United States overlooking Turkey’s war against the Kurds in the 1980s and 1990s, the United States and European nations ignoring Bahrain’s oppression to quash a 2011 popular uprising with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council states’ assistance, and the way different states have approached the ongoing Syrian conflict. The lack of humanitarian considerations in these and other examples was compared with the UN Resolution and R2P-worthy actions in 2011 by NATO and Arab states; both parties wanted to oust Gadhafi due to his internal Libyan violence.

The book’s seventh chapter, “War and Post War,” smoothly provides a needed historical perspective to a leader’s overconfidence in quickly achieving their objectives when becoming involved with wars and humanitarian campaigns. Many humanitarian campaigns can create even more dire conditions within a region, especially when a dictator is removed. Examples include: the killing and turmoil associated with the former Yugoslavia region and NATO’s Kosovo and Bosnia campaigns, and NATO’s and the Arab nation’s risk aversion strategy in ousting Gadhafi and the anarchy and international rivalries that spilled over in neighboring states. The final chapter, “The International Community,” examines the influence, or better said the lack of effective influence, of global organizations. Starting with an international relations philosophy for how the global community has become more connective, Menon examines international organizations such as the UN High Commission for Refugees, the International Criminal Court, the World Food Program, and the International Court of Justice. He provides examples of how these organizations desire to address humanitarian challenges, but lack the power, resources, and needed support of key nations.

The author’s conclusion succinctly describes how his realistic perspective differs from humanitarian interventionists anchored by normative values, and why his approach is important. He provides final reasons “that I speak of the conceit of human intervention.” The Conceit of Humanitarian Intervention is well worth the read whether you agree or disagree with the author’s perspective, for it provides multiple perspectives from theory and practice on past and ongoing humanitarian
interventions. Perhaps, for future complex and uncertain humanitarian interventions, leaders may want to integrate relevant principles from both realist and liberalist approaches when making decisions if, when, and how to intervene.

**WAR & LEGALITY**

*Waging War: The Clash between Presidents and Congress, 1776 to ISIS*

By David J. Barron

Reviewed by John C. Binkley, Professor of History and Government, University of Maryland University College

On April 6, 2017, President Donald Trump authorized a cruise missile attack on a Syrian airfield in response to the use of poison gas by Bashar al-Assad’s regime. The administration based the legality of the missile attack upon the president’s power as commander-in-chief. While many in Congress welcomed the attack, there was considerable concern over the lack of congressional approval for the action. As any student of American civics understands, the Constitution contains numerous points of contention as institutional checks and balances come into play. While the Constitution clearly gives Congress the authority to declare war, its management of military operations sets the power of Congress against the authority of the president as the commander-in-chief. Two fundamental questions are raised regarding actions such as Trump’s: can Congress interfere in the military’s operational decisions once war has been declared, and to what extent can the president order the military into harm’s way absent a declaration of war? These are the questions David Barron attempts to answer in *Waging War*.

The answers to these questions tend to fall into two contradictory categories. For analysts who believe in the unitary executive, such as a John Yoo, a law professor at the University of California, Berkeley and author of *Crisis and Command: A History of Executive Power from George Washington to George W. Bush* (2009), the power of the executive as the commander-in-chief is effectively almost unlimited, checked only by the budgetary and impeachment authorities of Congress. Even in the absence of a congressional declaration of war, the commander-in-chief has unfettered authority to use military force to sustain America’s interests. Once Congress has declared war, it abdicates operational authority to the president.

Barron, a federal judge on the US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, rejects the unitary executive vision of almost unchecked presidential power. Instead, he argues presidents have been very cognizant of the constitutional prerogatives of Congress and have tried to gain congressional acquiescence to presidential actions. According to Barron, this deference to the legislative branch originated during the American Revolutionary War when George Washington followed the lead of the Continental Congress on a number of issues. This deference,
however, was based on the explicit grant of authority given Congress in the Articles of Confederation to direct military operations. Barron goes on to argue that even with the creation of the executive branch at the constitutional convention in 1787, the founders still believed implicitly that congressional power was to be dominant. While his analysis of the founders’ intentions is well written, interesting, and argued effectively, his conclusions are less sure-footed. For example, Barron does not discuss the important debate over whether to substitute the more operational term “make war” instead of the legislative authority to “declare war.”

The next 25 chapters are a series of historical studies on the use of presidential military power and how commanders-in-chief exercised this power in relation to Congress prior to the Global War on Terror. In most cases, the issue was how the president was going to achieve his desired goals in the face of congressional obstinacy, and in many cases, statutory obstacles. As Barron succinctly describes, the “commanders-in-chief have found themselves mired in statutory restrictions in every phase of American war-making, from the Revolutionary War, to the early wars with France and England, to the Civil War and its aftermath, to the specter of total war culminating in World War II, to the Cold War itself.” In each case, the president had to figure out how to circumvent Congress or co-opt its acquiescence either explicitly or implicitly. Since the last declaration of war in 1941, the solution for both branches of government has been a series of legislative grants of authority to conduct military operations short of a declaration of war. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (1964) is one of the more famous of these grants of authority.

The final three chapters address post-9/11 events. Barron delves into the conflict existing between the unitary executive supporters, primarily located in the Office of the Vice President and the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, and Congress, which believed it had certain power over post-9/11 military operations. The conflict between the George W. Bush administration and Congress over enhanced interrogation techniques was probably the most contentious.

In assessing the quality of *Waging War*, this reviewer noticed the writing style. While Barron, a former assistant attorney general of the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice, clearly knows his way around legal opinions and briefs, his writing is clear and uncluttered with legal jargon. In comparison, many books on this topic read as though they have been “cut-and-pasted” from a legal brief. Instead, Barron tells a series of well-written stories supporting his position regarding the presidents’ deference to Congress. While this style is readable for the nonattorney, some of the stories could have used more legal analysis. This is particularly apparent in the discussions of the writing of the Constitution and the crucial Supreme Court decisions relating to the executive/congressional war powers. Also, Barron selected stories supportive of his general proposition, while ignoring those that might have undermined it. For instance, he simply refers to President Thomas Jefferson’s use of the navy against the Barbary pirates in the First Barbary War (1801–5) as “a deft handling of the use of force” even though this decision is an early example of the use of unilateral executive power.

Notwithstanding these minor criticisms, Barron has written an extremely readable and effectively argued counterbalance to the viewpoint of unitary executive theorists. For anyone interested in
the constitutional relationship between the president and Congress regarding war powers, Waging War belongs on your bookshelf.

**Court-Martial: How Military Justice Has Shaped America from the Revolution to 9/11 and Beyond**

By Chris Bray

Reviewed by C. Anthony Pfaff, Research Professor for Military Profession and Ethic, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

In Court-Martial: How Military Justice Has Shaped America from the Revolution to 9/11 and Beyond, historian Chris Bray chronicles the evolution not just of the military justice system, but also of our sense of what counts as military justice. Thoroughly researched, Bray writes in an entertaining, narrative style that sheds a fascinating light on a process that shaped both the US military and the society it serves.

Civil-military relations in the early United States were very different than they are today. In those days, every “able-bodied white male citizen,” was a militiaman. This broad imposition, though popular at the time, embedded in the militia an irreconcilable character: it was simultaneously a government organization run by a strict hierarchy and a neighborhood association that relied on mutual consent and a sense of community. So while today our civil-military concerns are driven by fears that the military and society are too far apart, in those days the concern was they were too close together. Bray relates numerous stories where bar fights and business disputes between neighbors ended up in court-martials when one party happened to outrank the other in the militia. Similarly, many units simply evaporated because the commander did not treat subordinates as neighbors and gain their consent before giving orders.

This conflation of civil and military came to a head during the War of 1812, when Andrew Jackson declared martial law in New Orleans, bringing civilians and military alike under military rule. He conscripted soldiers from the local population and banished those who refused to serve. When several militiamen from Tennessee tried to go back home after their enlistments had expired, Jackson had eight of them executed. When a state senator objected to Jackson’s continued imposition of martial law months after his victory over the British, Jackson had the senator, and any who tried to support him, including his lawyer, thrown in jail. While Jackson’s own officers acquitted the senator, it was incidents like these, and Bray chronicles many, that drove the American public to prefer a large standing army rather than constant, if inconsistent, subjugation to military law.

Even after civil and military split, military courts continued to serve as an agent of change on the larger American society. While the role of the military in improving racial equality is well-known, what is less known is the important role of the court in that process. For example, during the Civil War, some African-Americans drafted by the Union army were tried for mutiny for objecting to serve for less than equal pay. A number were executed. But because they were tried in court, their
claims of injustice were aired, which prompted the same commanders who ordered the executions to lobby Washington to provide the necessary funds to right what they too saw as a wrong.

If the Civil War made the military more sensitive to racial inequality, it did not resolve it. While African-Americans struggled for equality under the law in civil society, military courts handed them a few victories. Jackie Robinson, the first African-American to play professional baseball, was also one of the few African-American officers commissioned during World War II. While stationed in Texas in 1944, he found himself on trial for disrespecting a superior officer and disobeying orders. The source of the disrespect and disobedience was Robinson’s refusal to sit in the back of an Army shuttle bus, which, in accordance with Army regulations at the time, had no segregated spaces. The prosecution, realizing Robinson’s cause was just, tried to make the trial about his justifiably angry response to an abusive interrogation by the camp’s provost. The plan backfired, and Robinson was acquitted.

While the military justice system moderated over time—only one person was executed for desertion in World War II—it still delivered wildly inconsistent outcomes, which Bray describes in great detail. These inconsistencies got a public airing in the aftermath of World War II and forced reform. While there had been attempts at reform during the interwar years, those efforts failed because the Army leadership, including its chief lawyer, saw them as undermining command authority. By 1948, however, in the wake of this public accounting, congress enacted the Elston Act, which established the Uniform Code of Military Justice. This legislation enacted many of the reforms sought previously. Notably, enlisted service members would serve on tribunals where the accused was an enlisted soldier. Lawyers, furthermore, would participate in all parts of the legal process, meaning soldiers would no longer be defended, prosecuted, or judged by the officers who commanded them. Perhaps most importantly, the Elston Act prohibited “unlawful command influence,” which meant commanders could no longer tell courts they expected a particular verdict.


Court-Martial: How Military Justice Has Shaped America from the Revolution to 9/11 and Beyond makes fascinating reading for military lawyers and historians—and anyone interested in American history. The book will be especially useful to military leaders at all levels who will benefit from this deep, nuanced description of how military justice has evolved in order to better understand where it—and American society—is likely to go.
Thomas Henriksen has written a relatively short, easy-to-read, quasi-historical account of the evolutionary relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Special Operations Forces (SOF). This book is targeted exclusively to the general public. To that audience, this book will seem tantalizing and sexy, providing a glimpse into a dark and mysterious topic.

The meaning of the title, *Eyes, Ears & Daggers*, is partially alluded to in the book. The “eyes and ears” refers, in general, to the intelligence community, while “eyes” seem to have been synonymous with the CIA. The metaphor of eyes for CIA is not meant to be a literal analogy to imagery intelligence, even though part of the CIA’s roots included ownership and control of such. The term “ears” is not explicitly referred to in the book although the plethora of mentions about the National Security Agency (NSA) and its signals intelligence capability are the obvious metaphor. As Henriksen points out, however, the CIA has a signal intelligence capability, but one dwarfed by NSA. Daggers refers to the military instrument of power, in this case, the author usually means the SOF.

Henriksen’s premise, which he reuses throughout the book, is that the individuals who are soldiers sometimes become spies, and vice versa. Using the analogy of the eighteenth-century American Revolutionary War army officer Nathan Hale who became a spy—and was caught by the British and executed—Henriksen attempts to trace the dynamic interplay between those who do soldiering activities and those who do spying activities. The CIA has done both, as has SOF, according to Henriksen.

I have some serious concerns about the scholarly value of this book. First, the book is a selected summary from secondary sources that are not scholarly. The secondary sources include: books or articles authored by individuals who were formerly employed by the various national security organizations who revealed unauthorized disclosures, information from leaked documents, and information supplied by anonymous sources; and newspaper articles by syndicated authors. If primary research was done, it was not clearly demonstrated.

Second, structured as a historical account from World War II through 2015, the narrative within each historical era goes back and forth in time, moving between different contexts, making it difficult to follow Henriksen’s argumentation. From a scholarly perspective, the
negative effect of this style of writing is the difficulty in identifying and validating arguments of causality within this complex topic.

Third, the book has many factual errors, which leads one to wonder how many additional errors exist beyond what I could glean. For example, the claim is made the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was created in 1961 to support tactical military operations, when any reading of its creation directive, Department of Defense Directive 5105.21, 01 August 1961, defines its responsibilities primarily at the theater and strategic levels of war. In another example, Henriksen mentions that Michael Flynn, a recent director of DIA, was a four-star general; he was a three-star general. Other errors were noticed as well.

Fourth, the book is highly editorialized emphasizing one view without acknowledging other views, and without evidence. For example, Henriksen mentions Clausewitz and refers to his famous dictum, “war is a continuation of policy,” when we know that this particular dictum was merely his antithesis, necessary to reach his synthesis, and that his real contribution was what Clausewitz called, the remarkable trinity; that was his famous dictum. Henriksen mentions recent personalities in the press and only represents them in the most positive light, yet fails to let readers know the vast extent of differing views also mentioned in the press. For example, Flynn is mentioned as being an outstanding colonel when in Afghanistan, yet Henriksen fails to mention the plethora of reporting that, at that time, he was known for his arrogance and toxic leadership style. In another example, terrorists were almost always referred to as “Islamic terrorists” or “violent Islamists,” without acknowledging or explaining the intentionality and logic of those in Washington, DC to not invoke the name of Islam to name them. One time, however, Henriksen did refer to such as “insurgent-based terrorism” (162).

Fifth, there were two areas Henriksen briefly raised but should have spent more effort to help the general public understand aspects of the relationship between the CIA and SOF. The first was the sense of identity; what does it mean to the individual who serves as a CIA or SOF officer, and then assume opposite roles? Henriksen briefly mentions the 2003 US Army War College Strategic Research Project (SRP) by an Army legal officer, Colonel Kathryn Stone. He used Stone’s SRP to reinforce the idea that CIA and SOF individuals can serve in both functions of intelligence collection and analysis and military operations. But, Stone’s SRP was fundamentally about the legal and identity issues that separate these two actors, focusing on what would happen, for example, if either were a prisoner, different expectations surrounding compliance with US law, and concerns with command and control. Henriksen could have pivoted the discussion to address these concrete issues. Second, the recent use of drones in nonwar zones, such as Yemen and Pakistan, was raised briefly to discuss the conflicts in authorities over drone use, but the logic behind who should be using drones, CIA or SOF, and why, were not sufficiently discussed.

Finally, the recommendations proposed lacked substantive discourse about how they might be implemented, and most have already been proposed by others.

For many reasons, which I have attempted to identify the most important, Eyes, Ears & Daggers is not a scholarly manuscript, nor does
it provide new information or analysis from what has already been published, and, consequently, it does not provide value to senior members within and scholars of the defense or intelligence communities.

**Chasing Ghosts: The Policing of Terrorism**

By John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart

Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, Adjunct Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart have created a first-class work in *Chasing Ghosts: The Policing of Terrorism* with a hard-to-beat pedigree of highly regarded authors, teams of research assistants supporting the authors, numerous talks and conferences used to sharpen the arguments contained within the book, various elements of the book appearing in leading publications, over 600 references cited within, and the Oxford University Press seal of approval stamped upon it. The book—per the publisher’s synopsis—“approaches terrorist-fighting national security measures and spending with a critical questioning from which they have largely been immune . . . analyzes the enormous cost of finding domestic terrorists relative to the threat posed . . . and . . . questions whether the current amount of resources allocated to find terrorists is necessary and appropriate.” Hence, the authors argue that Islamist extremist terrorists threatening the United States are like ghosts that, while existing, are far more uncommon (N=62, post-9/11 through 2015) than conventionally thought (refer to Appendix A, pages 267–74). As a result, their premise is that the post-9/11 national security apparatus established to catch terrorists is overkill and not worth the costs associated with maintaining the present size of the massive programs enacted to implement it.

The book begins with introductory insights into earlier ghost-hunting episodes in Western history—those focused on witch hunting (and burning) from 1480 through 1680 in Europe and communist hunting (and career destroying) during the 1950s through the 1970s in the United States—and how we have entered a radical Islamist terrorist-hunting era post-9/11. Two sections make up the next portion of the book. “The Ghosts” is composed of four chapters on official perceptions, public perceptions, terrorism and the United States, and the foreign adversary and mastermind myth, and “The Chase” is composed of five chapters on counterterrorism enterprise evaluation, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and local and airport police. The book ends with a conclusion detailing the consequences of the present ghost chase and three appendices, the latter two which cover the costs inflicted by terrorism (Appendix B) and marginal costs and benefits of FBI counterterrorism expenditures (Appendix C). Derived from the material laid out in the book and the robust cost-benefit analysis related to it, including tables related to risk-reduction calculations, the authors make a very convincing argument that some counterterrorism programs are more efficient than others and that, overall, the domestic security
apparatus put together post-9/11 is very much a “throwing money at the problem” debacle.

Still, the major theoretical and analytical strength of the book derived from its rationalistic methodology that utilizes a cost-benefit approach to public policy decision-making also, counterintuitively, represents its weakness. The methodology utilized is unable to account for noneconomic costs and benefits hence it is, in a sense, haunted by its own ghostly bête noire of the ethereal and unquantifiable quality of national security itself. This point is made abundantly clear related to the passages addressing 9/11 and Pearl Harbor in that “there was a clear lapse in rational decision making—that is, a failure to consider alternative policies—and that lapse was not necessarily predictable beforehand” (75). Such alternative policies, like “shor[ing] up the protection of US territory and to engage in a patient, far less costly Cold War-like harassment of the much under-resourced and over-extended Japanese empire” (75) in response to the Pearl Harbor attack, may make theoretical sense but contextually from a national security perspective, which follows a very different logic than simple cost-benefit analysis—one that includes concepts of grand strategy, deterrence, and the need for an immediate response to a crisis of governmental confidence in the national psyche—ignore the political and military realities of great power politics.

Sometimes a state, even a classical one such as Rome, will need to “go Masada” on an opponent and make a political statement no matter the high economic costs incurred by such a large-scale endeavor. While this may fail the logic metric of simple economic costs and benefits, it affords the state many international and domestic policy benefits. This is not to say *Chasing Ghosts* is categorically wrong about the overreaction to 9/11—it is not; it provides a valuable analytical assessment of US bureaucratic and policy failures in this regard. Indeed, US counterterrorism policy needs to find the reasonable middle ground between the present inflamed passions and bureaucratic momentums which have us “chasing ghosts” while at the same time recognizing that states and their citizens cannot, and should not, operate like soulless automatons that simply engage in probabilistic risk-based decision-making devoid of any emotive or ideological considerations. While Mueller and Stewart—to their credit—are cognizant of this dichotomy, they tend to downplay some of the real-world policymaking considerations states engage in for the sake of strengthening the rationalistic cost-benefit arguments presented in the book.
Taiwan’s China Dilemma: Contested Identities and Multiple Interests in Taiwan’s Cross-Strait Economic Policy
By Syaru Shirley Lin

Reviewed by Dr. Andrew Scobell, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation

The US national security community is accustomed to seeing the word “Taiwan” paired with the term “crisis.” Yet, in recent years, the Taiwan Strait has been remarkably calm and largely absent from the headlines. It has been replaced by media attention on other Asia-Pacific flash points, notably the Korean peninsula, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. Syaru Shirley Lin’s book contains significant insights enabling readers to understand why the Taiwan Strait has remained largely crisis free for almost a decade.

Continued calm is not assured. Taiwan remains the most likely location for a full-blown military conflict between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, even if the degree of tension and probability of a conflagration have both declined significantly. The main reason for this decline is not that China has given up on its pursuit of national unification with the island; on the contrary, Beijing remains staunchly committed to political union with Taipei. As *Taiwan’s China Dilemma* makes clear, political leaders in China have to date exercised considerable patience and exhibited a good measure of pragmatism and flexibility in pursuing this goal. This pragmatism and flexibility have been matched by political leaders in Taiwan. The result—a remarkable expansion of cross-strait economic relations, transportation links, and people-to-people interactions. The island’s China dilemma refers to the reality of Taiwan “relying economically on a partner it does not trust and that poses an existential threat” (206).

Understanding cross-strait dynamics and focusing on Taiwan requires an examination of multiple factors, and Lin’s book brings these together effectively, showing how economic realities and political aspirations interact. Merely focusing on the burgeoning economic ties increasingly binding Taiwan to China leads to a simplistic conclusion: eventual political union is inevitable. Meanwhile, simply focusing on political trends in Taiwan, such as evolving identities, suggests a more troubled and even turbulent future for the island’s relations with the mainland. Lin examines four case studies of Taiwan’s trade policy toward China and shows how “identity forms the basis for defining interests,” leading the island to alternate between restriction and liberalization (12).

*Taiwan’s China Dilemma* underscores that while people on the island increasingly identify as Taiwanese and less as Chinese, they also recognize their economic present and future are intertwined inescapably with China. Psychologically, the islanders are very proud of the democratic system they have created and the economic prosperity they have built through ingenuity and hard work. For Washington, Taipei’s persistent Beijing dilemma demands continued US vigilance.
Afshon Ostovar’s *Vanguard of the Imam* is a study of the political and military role of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) since it was established in early 1979 as a pillar of the country’s new revolutionary regime. Ostovar describes the development of the IRGC from its beginnings as a loose grouping of proregime militias until its emergence as a major force in Iranian politics and security over time. Ostovar notes IRGC units began as a collection of Islamic militias within a postrevolutionary patchwork of anti-monarchist groups that also included powerful armed leftist organizations. Aware of the leftist threat to its authority, the Islamic government quickly appointed an IRGC command headquarters that provided the militia units with official status and began the effort to centralize the force. The IRGC’s official standing also gave it the political cover it needed to engage in actions such as disarming rival militias and detaining suspected counterrevolutionaries before turning them over to the doubtful justice of revolutionary courts. Throughout this period of upheaval, Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the new government, stressed the danger of foreign powers attempting to undo the revolution through a campaign of subversion and other hostile acts. With Khomeini’s encouragement, the IRGC leaders correspondingly justified the campaign against potential rivals as a fight against US and Israeli “plots.”

A central turning point for the development of the IRGC was the Iran-Iraq War, which began with Saddam Hussein’s September 1980 invasion of Iran. At the beginning of this struggle, IRGC fighters were poorly armed, undisciplined, badly trained, poorly led, and had only a few units with combat experience (against Kurdish guerrillas). The organization, nevertheless, did everything it could to rise to the occasion. Early in the war, the IRGC leadership attempted to substitute the revolutionary enthusiasm of its members for military expertise. In this environment, IRGC military efforts yielded high Iranian casualties, but over time members’ combat skills improved, and sometimes the force inflicted serious setbacks on the usually less-motivated Iraqi ground troops, especially in urban fighting. As the war continued, the IRGC and its subordinate Basij militia (mostly made up of boys in their early and mid teens) became the chief proponents of mass infantry assaults as well as the primary participants in such operations (often described as “human waves”). These tactics produced horrendous Iranian casualties, but they also helped to break the Iraqi army’s defensive formations in Iran and push the Iraqis back into their home territory. This approach further leveraged Iran’s larger population as a way of countering Iraqi technological superiority and greater access to weapons suppliers.

Flushed with these grisly victories, the IRGC gradually replaced the regular army as Iran’s leading operational force in the conflict. Moreover, so long as the Iranians continued to rely on human-wave tactics, the IRGC/Basij forces could plausibly claim that they should
be the dominant forces for achieving an Iranian victory. Unfortunately for these organizations, they championed this tactic long after the Iraqis had learned to cope with it through dramatic improvements in their system of defenses. Iranian mass infantry attacks increasingly led to horrendous losses for negligible gains. By 1988, Iran had suffered a number of battlefield defeats and no longer had a viable path to winning the war. Consequently, the regime had no other option except to agree to a United Nations sponsored plan to end the war. The Iran-Iraq War correspondingly ended in August 1988 without any clear Iranian gains. The failure to defeat Iraq served as a significant blow to the prestige of the IRGC with its previous unrelenting calls for more sacrifice as the road to total victory.

Despite these setbacks, the IRGC sought new roles for itself in the post-war era and in an especially significant move established the Qods Force. This elite IRGC force took over the responsibility for exporting Islamic revolution and thereby creating a regional order more open to Iranian power and priorities. The IRGC correspondingly became the main instrument of Iranian meddling throughout the region, replacing the Office of Liberation Movements, and building on previous IRGC involvement in countries such as Lebanon. Ties to Shia overseas clients and militias were a priority, and these groups have often been especially receptive to Iranian influence, although the IRGC has also supported some Sunni groups that share its goals. In contemporary times, the Qods Force has played an important role in supporting the Assad regime in Syria and is a major supporter of the most prominent Shia militias fighting ISIS in Iraq. Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani has claimed the uprising against the Assad regime in Syria is part of a much larger Western plan to weaken “Iran’s place in the region” (207).

Also in contemporary times, the IRGC continues its intense devotion to Iran's supreme leader. The IRGC’s role and functions are safeguarded through the dominance of the leader within Iran’s theocratic system and his special relationship with the IRGC. The 2009 elections, which are widely assumed to have been rigged by the government, serve as an example of this relationship. As unrest expanded, angry mass demonstrations against the vote rigging became a serious problem for the regime, especially when demonstrators singled out Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, in chants of “death to the dictator” (185). The IRGC correspondingly unleashed Basij militia forces (which may number over four million) to crush the demonstrators and brutally restore order for the regime.

Despite this and other chilling episodes, Ostovar concludes on what seems like a bit of forced optimism suggesting that the IRGC may yet find itself weakened by the longing of the Iranian population for reform as evidenced by a number of elections where moderate candidates for office did well despite systematic governmental efforts obstruct their success. He also notes that a future supreme leader will almost certainly enter the office weaker than Ayatollah Khamenei, and may need to make concessions on reform to maintain some level of legitimacy for the system. Such developments are certainly possible, but it is also possible that the current system, which has become remarkably resilient, will maintain itself in the same basic form for some time to come.
The period 2003–9 remains a traumatic one for the British defense establishment. The United Kingdom had committed to a deeply unpopular and possibly illegal war in Iraq in 2003 and, then, already embroiled in a failing and underresourced struggle in Basra, the country launched itself into another major campaign in Helmand. Operating far in excess of defense planning assumptions, the results were predictable. The British forces, led by the army, suffered a humiliating defeat in Basra, while they proved, despite their best efforts, incapable of pacifying Helmand. The implications for the transatlantic relationship were profound.

In *High Command: British Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars*, Christopher Elliott, a former two-star general in the British Army, seeks to explain how the British armed forces and the defense community could have failed so badly. There has been much criticism of the senior commanders and politicians over the Iraq and Afghan campaigns culminating in the Chilcot Inquiry into the Iraq War. Elliott, however, notes an oversight: “what the witnesses at the Chilcot Inquiry have not revealed is why good, principled, capable public servants took the actions that they did” (1). He, therefore, determines to explain this conundrum.

Understandably, Elliott wants to avoid the polemical and ad hominem criticisms that have been levelled at senior commanders. Explaining the Iraq-Afghan debacle would be easy if senior officers were just stupid, weak, or malign. For him, the debacle over Basra and Helmand is interesting precisely because senior officers were overwhelmingly so honest, hard-working, and professional. In the last section of the book, he discusses each Chief of the Defence of Staff who served from 1998 to 2010, concluding “it is self-evident that officers of high ability achieved the top military post of UK Chief of the Defence Staff in his period.” Similarly, “all the military chiefs who worked with the Secretaries of State [for Defence] of the decade had nothing but admiration for them” (44). Overseen by competent professionals, the British crisis was an anomaly, then, which Elliott wants to unravel.

Elliott proposes two central explanations for the crisis. Firstly, while individual officers at every level were highly capable, the armed forces institutionalized a system of command that was unhelpful in this era. As an imperial power, British forces have long been accustomed to devolving authority to local commanders. The introduction of mission command into British military doctrine from the 1980s has only accentuated this tendency. Consequently, despite the existence of significant command nodes in the United Kingdom, such as the Permanent Joint Headquarters...
(PJHQ) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) Director of Operations, senior commanders in London consistently referred to commanders on the ground in Iraq and Helmand as “there emerged a culture where there was just too much deference to the commander on the ground” (177). Consequently, focused on the tactical issues of the local commander, normally on a six-month tour, no coherent national strategy was ever developed and “it was inevitable that each successive vision changed substantially on handover, not least because of deference from PJHQ and the MOD to the man on the ground.”

Excessive decentralization was partly a product of the second central reason for the crisis—the politics of the Ministry of Defence and Whitehall, more broadly. Elliott outlines how the different interests and priorities of politicians, civil servants, and military officers sometimes conflicted with each other to prevent coherent strategic decision-making. In addition, the administrative procedures of Whitehall, a monstrous bureaucracy, impeded coherent decision-making and responsibility.

In an opening vignette, Elliott describes the niceties of its “Byzantine processes” with sharp irony. On his first day as director of military operations in the MOD, Elliott was given a series of files on which to make a decision. Finding the staff-work flawless, he confidently signed off on each file without reference to his colleagues. The decisions seemed so obvious no consultation was required. Elliott, however, was soon confronted by his subordinate: “Brigadier, you signed off the files . . . without socializing them?” (4). No matter how obvious a decision, it was the norm in the Ministry of Defence to confer with the Head of Secretariat, Finance, and probably the Foreign Office, too.

Against this viscosity, strategic commanders in London found it easier to short-circuit decisions by simply passing them down to the local commanders and then presenting the Ministry of Defence, Whitehall, and, indeed, the government with a fait accompli. Yet, the consequences of this ad hocery became obvious in Iraq “when the British found themselves up to their necks in a problem very much greater than they had first anticipated, they lacked the political and institutional will to resolve it, either by reinforcing with sufficient combat forces to master the insurgency or by deploying sufficient cross-government capabilities to exploit military success where it appeared” (125). The episode was truly tragic.

Written by an insider, High Command provides a very useful and perceptive insight into the problems which vitiated British strategy in the crucial decade after the September 11 attacks. There is but one irony in the book. Elliott rightly highlights the problems of interservice rivalry in the Ministry of Defence. As an army officer, however, he cannot always resist a subtle dig at the Royal Marines. He notes the apparent anomaly of sending the marines to landlocked Afghanistan in 2002. While the fact that the Chief of the Defence Staff was an admiral was not irrelevant, the United States requested the Royal Marines for their expertise in mountainous terrain—not for their amphibious capabilities. More archly, Elliott records “several have commented in interview that the hugely talented and influential [Royal Marines] Lieutenant General Sir Rob Fry would have approached things differently as Director of Operations in the MOD if he had experienced high field command himself, which through no fault of his own, was denied to him” (179). While the British
Army has two divisions and a corps, the largest formation of the Royal Marines is, of course, a brigade. Tribalism lives on.

**MacArthur’s Korean War Generals**

By Stephen R. Taaffe


In this fascinating book, Stephen R. Taaffe examines the performance of and relationships among senior US ground force commanders during the first year of the Korean War when General Douglas MacArthur served as the unified, multinational commander-in-chief, Far East Command, and commander-in-chief, United Nations Command (UNC). During MacArthur’s tenure, his forces first conducted a delay against attacking North Korean forces, then began a counteroffensive with the amphibious landing at Inchon and subsequent push deep into North Korea. A massive Chinese intervention in the winter of 1950–51 forced the UNC back into South Korea. A renewed UNC counteroffensive and subsequent war of movement in 1951 culminated in a final drive back to a line generally north of the 38th Parallel. At that point, the two sides began negotiations that would, after another 18 months of bloody but static conflict, bring an armistice that remains in effect to this day. For each phase, Taaffe provides clear, tightly written descriptions of the strategic situation, the military operations, and the actions of the senior ground force leaders. He concludes each section with an analysis of the performance of the senior leaders.

Taaffe, an experienced and respected military historian who has published several excellent books on senior American military leaders during the Revolution, the Civil War, and World War II, is well placed to make these assessments. His evaluations are thoughtful, well informed, and persuasive. He deals with the two most controversial Korean War generals, MacArthur and X Corps Commander Edward M. Almond, objectively and unemotionally. He argues some of the qualities that had made MacArthur successful in the Pacific in World War II (giving his subordinates free play, remaining aloof from tactical decisions, and playing senior leaders against each other) were counterproductive in Korea. He also faults MacArthur for his decision to separate Almond’s X Corps from Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker’s Eighth Army, for withdrawing X Corps to conduct an amphibious turning movement into northeastern Korea, and for his hasty, ill-organized push north that left UNC forces vulnerable to the Chinese attack. Almond, he concludes “was certainly an overbearing, arbitrary, and insensitive man who made mistakes, but his innate aggressiveness and single-minded determination to win paid big dividends for the Eighth Army” (172).

Walker, MacArthur’s ground component commander, tried with his understrength and poorly equipped Eighth Army to stop stronger, better-prepared North Korean forces during the chaotic and desperate first two months of the war. While noting examples of inadequate
leadership by some of Walker’s subordinates, Taaffe praises Walker for his conduct of the delay and subsequent tenacious defense of the Pusan Perimeter. He also notes Walker did not have MacArthur’s full confidence, refused to challenge some of MacArthur’s questionable decisions, and failed to relieve weak subordinates from fear of being relieved himself. Taaffe blames the substandard performance of some of Walker’s subordinates in part on their selection, based not on previous performance, but rather to give them experience at a regimental or divisional command or as a reward prior to retirement.

Walker was killed in a traffic accident in December 1950. His replacement, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, had the full confidence of both MacArthur and Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins, which greatly strengthened Ridgway’s position, allowing him to replace most of the early-war division commanders and to take other actions that improved capabilities. Ridgway’s Eighth Army, now experienced in combat and under solid leadership at all levels, stopped the Chinese winter offensive.

Taaffe continues his analysis beyond April 1951, when President Truman relieved MacArthur of command and replaced him with Ridgway. Ridgway in turn was replaced as Eighth Army commander by Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, whom Taaffe rates highly. Under Van Fleet, Eighth Army stopped another Chinese offensive and drove north, well past the 38th Parallel. Taaffe argues, despite an uneven performance earlier in the war, Eighth Army fought well enough to win the war militarily. He insists Van Fleet most likely could have continued the offensive further north, and he notes it was a political decision, not the military situation, that stopped Eighth Army.

Readers may argue with some of Taaffe’s judgments, but he has exhaustively examined the documentary evidence and makes a compelling case. MacArthur’s Korean War Generals is particularly relevant to readers of Parameters. What could be more valuable to senior military professionals than a well-informed study of leadership and operational art during a major and challenging war? This is the heart and soul of the military profession, and Taaffe makes a substantial contribution to the grand conversation on the art of war.

The Myth and Reality of German Warfare: Operational Thinking from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger
By Gerhard P. Gross

Reviewed by Richard L. DiNardo, Professor of National Security Affairs, US Marine Corps Command and Staff College

Certainly no foreign military establishment has garnered more attention in the United States than the German army. Historically, the German army of World War II has taken the lion’s share of interest, but consideration of the army of the Kaiserreich has grown with the arrival of the centennial of the Great War. Some scholars, most notably Robert M. Citino, have posited the idea of a “German way of war.”
This volume by Gerhard Gross is a welcome addition to the corpus of literature on this subject.

Gross, is both a colonel and a career officer in the German Bundeswehr and a well-published author and researcher. Until recently, he had been the head of the Department of German Military History before 1945 at the Center for Military History and Social Sciences of the Bundeswehr (ZMSB) located in Potsdam, Germany. The center is the successor to the former Military History Research Office (MGFA), the organization that had produced the German “semiofficial” history of World War II, translated into English under the title Germany and the Second World War.

Gross’s work is very similar to Citino’s German Way of War, but with some important and interesting differences. Where they agree is on the basic parameters of the Prusso-German approach to war. Given the geographic circumstances of the Prussian kingdom, the Prussian army and its German successor sought to fight short wars, quickly decided by sharp offensively oriented campaigns culminating in decisive battles. Thus, while Napoleon is often credited with creating this style of warfare, for the great Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz, Napoleon was merely the continuator of a process really begun by Frederick William, Elector of Brandenburg.

While Citino began his work with Frederick, the Great Elector of the seventeenth century, Gross begins his book with Helmuth von Moltke, Moltke the Elder, and thus wades into a controversy that still resonates today, especially in the American military. Moltke is credited with creating the operational level of warfare—or at least identifying it. Defining it, however, was another matter. As Gross notes, Moltke contributed to the confusion with the looseness of his language in his writing on the subject.

The greatest danger to the German army’s preferred method of warfare was something over which the army had no control, namely increasing size. The span of Moltke’s career saw the rise of mass armies, first in the American Civil War and later in Europe after the creation of the German Empire in 1871. The growth in the size of armies made the prospect of waging a short, sharp conflict problematic. Although all the European war plans that were developed called for decisive campaigns, other factors almost ensured the plans would miscarry. Primary among these factors was logistics. Gross notes the failure to take logistics into account was one of the constant weaknesses of German military planning throughout the period of both world wars.

Another critical factor for the German way of war was the environment in which war was conducted. The German high command, both during and after the war, pointed to the Battle of Tannenberg as the ideal operation. Gross, however, identifies two important things that run counter to this fixation. First, Tannenberg was a defensive battle, as opposed to the German army’s preferred posture, which was offensive. In addition, the battle was fought on German territory, allowing German commanders Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff to make use of the excellent road and rail system.

The German method of waging war was thus best suited to areas of central and western Europe, where road and rail systems could facilitate the conduct of rapid operations. Where these systems were not present,
most notably in the expanses of Russia, the German way of warfare either yielded indecisive (if occasionally spectacular) results or broke down completely.

Where German military thinking really failed was in its focus, which was generally downward. Thus, the focus of thinking, education, and doctrine produced an army that was operationally nimble and tactically adept, but strategically as bereft of ideas as the country’s political leadership.

Gross goes beyond the scope of most works on German military history, including Citino’s, by extending his discussion into the early Cold War period. The thinking of both German armies owed much to its predecessor, although the Soviet army had also developed its operational theory during the war. For the newly created Bundeswehr, the key figure was Adolf Heusinger, a high-level staff officer who was arrested by the Gestapo in 1944 as a suspect in the attempt to kill Adolf Hitler. Ironically, the German approach to conventional warfare worked best when incorporated into a broader alliance system, where a bigger ally really determined the strategy.

In conclusion, Gross has made a major contribution to the literature in this field. The Myth and Reality of German Warfare: Operational Thinking from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger is indispensable reading for any student of the topic.
# Contributor’s Guidelines

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**Scope:** The manuscript addresses strategic issues regarding US defense policy or the theory and practice of land warfare. Visit our website (http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/submission.cfm) to gain a better understanding of our current editorial scope.

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**Concurrent Submissions:** The manuscript is not under consideration with other publishers and has not been published elsewhere, including on the Internet.

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**Visual Aids:** Only include charts, graphs, and photographs when they are essential to clarify or amplify the text. Images must be grayscale, a minimum of 640 x 480 pixels, and submitted in their original file format (.tiff or .jpg). It is not sufficient to submit images embedded in a .doc or .rtf file.

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