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VOL. 50 NO. 3 AUTUMN 2020

THE US ARMY WAR COLLEGE QUARTERLY PARAMETERS

Contemporary Strategy & Landpower

Special Commentary: Disintegrating the Enemy

Jacqueline N. Deal

COVID-19

*Nina Jankowicz and Henry Collis
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and Patricia M. Shields*

Race and Inclusivity in the US Military

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Jason Healey*

Regional Challenges

*Michael J. Eisenstadt and Kenneth M. Pollack
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From the Editor in Chief

This issue of *Parameters* opens with a *Special Commentary* by Jacqueline Deal entitled “Disintegrating the Enemy: The PLA’s Info-Messaging.” Deal shows how the People’s Liberation Army’s involvement in political warfare, via info-messaging, opens a competitive space that does not favor Beijing. The United States needs to take advantage of this opportunity.

Our first forum, *COVID-19*, offers two perspectives concerning the shortcomings in how governments have dealt with pandemics. Nina Jankowicz and Henry Collis argue “Enduring Information Vigilance: Government after COVID-19” will help US and partner governments deny advantages to adversaries engaged in information operations against Western interests. In “The COVID-19 Enemy is Still Advancing,” Ryan Scott, Odelle Means, and Patricia Shields maintain US policy and military practitioners can draw lessons from the Spanish Flu pandemic to assist them in balancing the threat of COVID-19 vis-à-vis other strategic objectives.

The issue’s second forum, *Race and Inclusivity in the US Military*, consists of two contributions concerning the state of race relations in America’s armed forces. The first, “Two Worlds: African American Servicemembers, WWII and Today” by Douglas Bristol Jr., suggests viewing African American servicemembers as different stigmatizes them in ways that are discriminatory; solving this problem will require a collective response by African Americans. The second, “Toward a Racially Inclusive Military,” by Danelle Gamble, argues America’s armed forces may not have gone as far as they believe they have in terms of racial integration; she contends they must promote equitable relationships that acknowledge and challenge power imbalances and reevaluate the impact of cultural imperialism on standards and evaluations.

Our third forum, *Technological Innovation*, contains two articles discussing how we might leverage technological change. In “Technology and Strategic Surprise: Adapting to an Era of Open Innovation,” Audrey Kurth Cronin discusses the differences between open and closed innovation, and she urges the US Defense Department to leverage the advantages of the former. In “A Bizarre Pair: Counterinsurgency Lessons for Cyber Conflict,” Jason Healey claims counterinsurgencies hold many lessons for cyberwarfare, such as the principle of “winning hearts and minds,” and he proposes the Defense establishment consider them more closely.

Our final forum, *Regional Challenges*, deals with developments in the Middle East and the Pacific regions. In “Training Better Arab Armies,” Michael Eisenstadt and Kenneth Pollack offer ways for US security force assistance missions to avoid repeating the mistake of casting Arab armies in an American mold. In “The US Army and the Pacific: Legacies and Challenges,” David Finkelstein maintains the US Army would do well to draw from its rich institutional and operational legacies to support America’s strategic efforts in the Indo-Pacific Region. ~AJE

Disintegrating the Enemy: The PLA's Info-Messaging

Jacqueline N. Deal

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ABSTRACT: The DoD can exploit weaknesses in Chinese military attempts at political warfare, or “enemy disintegration,” most recently observed in PLA media on the subject of the pandemic. Targeted information efforts will signal the United States’ refusal to be intimidated, expose untruths in Chinese government messaging to its citizens, and reassure relevant third parties of US military resolve.

By dividing the United States internally and from allies and partners, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) political warfare aims to deter hostile action against the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and ensure victory in the US-China competition. To be sure, the PLA is just one of several Chinese party-state institutions charged with waging political warfare and disintegrating enemies—from so-called “Wolf Warrior” diplomats to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) United Front agents of co-option and subversion.¹ But the PLA’s mission set in this area is one for which the US Department of Defense may lack an analogue. This special commentary argues as competition with the PRC intensifies, expanding the DoD mandate to engage in political warfare against its Chinese counterpart constitutes an opportunity. The PLA’s involvement in political warfare opens up a competition space that does not favor Beijing.

From late June through early July 2020, two series of articles criticizing the US response to COVID-19 appeared on a special COVID-19-themed page of China Military Online, the official website of the PLA. The website is advertised as being approved by the Central Military Commission of the CCP Central Committee, chaired by CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping himself. Links to the articles with their titles were accompanied by cartoon graphics depicting, among other images, the president of the United States flinging mud at a sign representing China from a house being attacked by the coronavirus, pumping blood out of Uncle Sam lying in a hospital bed, holding a wad

1. See Anne-Marie Brady, “China’s Political Influence Activities Under Xi Jinping,” Wilson Center, September 18, 2017, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/magic-weapons-chinas-political-influence-activities-under-xi-jinping>; Alexander Bowe, “China’s Overseas United Front Work: Background and Implications for the United States,” US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, August 24, 2018, <https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinas-overseas-united-front-work-background-and-implications-united-states>; Martin Hala and Jichang Lulu, “The CCP’s Model of Social Control Goes Global,” Synopsis, December 20, 2018; Alex Joske, “Reorganizing the United Front Work Department: New Structures for a New Era of Diaspora and Religious Affairs Work,” China Brief 19, no. 9 (May 9, 2019), <https://jamestown.org/program/reorganizing-the-united-front-work-department-new-structures-for-a-new-era-of-diaspora-and-religious-affairs-work/>; and Joske, “The Party Speaks for You,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, June 9, 2020, <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/party-speaks-you>.

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of cash while being stalked by the grim reaper, and sitting astride the crown of a sinking Statue of Liberty (see figure 1).²

Figure 1. COVID cartoons (Reprinted from China Military Online website sponsored by the PLA newspaper)

Few in the United States seem to have noticed the articles or their nasty illustrations. The episode nonetheless offers an illuminating case study of PLA political warfare. Both series attacked the United States and were thus intended to boost the PLA's spirit and Chinese pride domestically. But beyond this agenda, the series aimed at different audiences in order to advance a common project—what the PLA calls “enemy disintegration work,” conducted in peacetime and in war alike.³ Disintegration consists of degrading the enemy's resolve and impeding its mobilization capacity by sowing divisions within the enemy camp and wooing critical elements over to one's own side.⁴ The first series was designed to exacerbate tension over China policy and to promote dovish voices in the United States; the second series was intended to discredit the United States in the eyes of relevant third parties.

It is possible to reverse engineer the respective political warfare goals of the two series because while both ended up on the dedicated China

2. Images from <http://www.81.cn/2020zt/attachement/jpg/site351/20200615/309c236f8d3c205189d006.jpg>, <http://www.81.cn/2020zt/attachement/jpg/site351/20200615/309c236f8d3c20518ae109.jpg>, http://www.81.cn/2020zt/2020-06/22/content_9840587.htm, and http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2020-06/25/content_9841138.htm. The first graphic accompanied Jun Sheng, “Sinister Intentions Behind Mud-Flinging at China,” *PLA Daily*, May 20, 2020; the second, Jun, “Beware the Blame Game Will Backfire,” *PLA Daily*, May 23, 2020 (both from the first series). The third graphic accompanied Li Peng, “Behind the US Epidemic Part 1: Save the People vs. Save the City,” (in Mandarin) *PLA Daily*, June 22, 2020, and the fourth, Niu Chenfei, “Behind the US Epidemic Part 4: Anti-Epidemic vs. Protest,” (in Mandarin) *PLA Daily*, June 25, 2020 (both from the second series).

3. Wu Ming, “Deeply Understand the Essence of Political Work is the Lifeline of Our Army,” (in Mandarin) *PLA Daily*, 19 April 2016.

4. “Disintegrate the Enemy,” (in Mandarin) Baidu Baike, <https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E7%93%A6%E8%A7%A3%E6%95%8C%E5%86%9B/12605412>.

Military Online COVID-19 page, they appeared at different times, in different languages, and offered distinctive messages. Before China Military Online's special COVID-19 page was created, the first series was originally published under an authoritative byline in both English and Mandarin, without illustration, in late May. It ran in Mandarin in the *PLA Daily*, the official newspaper of the PLA, and on China Military Online, the PLA's official English-language portal, where some *PLA Daily* content appears in translated form.

Not all *PLA Daily* content is posted in English on China Military Online, so it is safe to assume translated pieces are intended for foreign consumption. This first, late-May series combined targeted attacks on "some" or "certain" Americans—those "politicians" who accused the PRC of being the source of the novel coronavirus—with threats against the United States.⁵ The message was that if only we expelled our hawks and dispensed with the hard line toward Beijing, then we could avoid painful consequences.

The second, late-June series appeared only in Mandarin. As it was being rolled out in *PLA Daily* without illustration, it was also posted in real time to the special COVID-19-themed China Military Online page where the first, late-May series had also just been posted in Mandarin and in English. Both series were accompanied by offensive graphics (figure 1) on China Military Online's COVID-19 page. The idea behind the second series, and the special page on which the two series appeared adorned with the images, was to humiliate the United States in the eyes of domestic PRC viewers and relevant third parties such as US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region. The latter are supposed to question the credibility of American defense guarantees in light of such vicious attacks against the United States in official PLA media. If these partners have doubts, they may in turn deny access to US forces, complicating or raising the costs of any US action in the region.

The first series was clearly triggered by high-level American criticism of Beijing's handling of COVID-19, especially calls to hold the PRC responsible for damages. Top officials at the White House, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense all made statements to the effect that the virus originated in Wuhan, and that Beijing was not being transparent or forthcoming. The *PLA Daily*'s response indicates these statements struck a nerve, which from a competitive standpoint is a good thing for the United States.

The fact that China Military Online's retorts fell on deaf ears suggests a deficit of PLA retaliatory options. Deconstructing the PLA's unsuccessful messaging reveals approaches that if applied by the Department of Defense to the PLA, promise to pay strategic dividends. This case study suggests an opportunity for the Department to expand

5. Jun Sheng, "Sinister Intentions"; Jun, "Burning House Looters Will Get Burned," *PLA Daily*, May 21, 2020; Jun, "What Are the Sources of the Political Virus?" *PLA Daily*, May 22, 2020; Jun, "Blame Game"; Jun, "The Hideous Morbidity in the House of Cards," *PLA Daily*, May 24, 2020; Jun, "Stop Lying Through Your Teeth," *PLA Daily*, May 25, 2020; and Jun, "It's Much Easier to Move Mountains than Shake the PLA" *PLA Daily*, May 27, 2020.

its involvement in whole-of-government efforts to use political warfare or information operations to sow division within China and to humiliate the PLA in the eyes of third parties.

Central Military Commission's Voice

The first, late-May series, which ran from the 20th through the 27th of that month, should be considered particularly authoritative. It was attributed to “Jun Sheng,” a pen-name byline that first started appearing in *PLA Daily* on January 1, 2017 with a promise to analyze global “hot spots,” focus on “world military reforms,” and “transmit a frank and sincere voice” to compete in the “international discourse system.”⁶ The *PLA Daily* is overseen by the Central Military Commission, chaired by Xi Jinping, and pen-name authors are believed to be associated with the Central Military Commission's Political Work Department.⁷ Jun Sheng's charter article concludes:

Here, what needs to be told to the world is that the Chinese army has always been the guardian of world peace and development, the defender of national sovereignty, security and development interests, and will not allow anyone to damage the core interests of the Chinese nation. In order to allow the people to “live in a peaceful environment without destruction,” the Chinese soldiers will be loyal to their ideals, face the storm and be brave, and they will definitely attack when necessary.⁸

In hindsight, this column served notice of the byline's intent to justify and rationalize the PLA's growing international footprint, as 2017 is the year the PLA officially opened its first overseas base, a naval support facility in Djibouti.

Jun Sheng was thus advertised from the start as a megaphone for China's geostrategic goals, transmitting both reassurances and threats. Of the more than 30 articles published under the byline in its first three years of existence, several offered cheerleading for the Belt and Road Initiative, while others warned India about territorial incursions; warned Japan not to cross the PRC over disputed maritime territory or in relations with Taiwan, the United States, Australia, and India; and warned the United States about arm sales to Taiwan.⁹ Unlike other *PLA Daily* pen names associated with coverage of internal matters such as modernization or the anticorruption fight, Jun Sheng has focused on external developments. Though one of Jun Sheng's columns was previously translated and published in English as well as Chinese, it was not until the late-May series that it became clear Jun Sheng aims not only to cover foreign affairs but also to shape foreign views.¹⁰

6. Jun Sheng, “Peace, the Most Beautiful Scenery in the Eyes of Chinese Soldiers,” (in Mandarin) *PLA Daily*, January 1, 2017.

7. See David Gitter and Leah Fang, “The Chinese Communist Party's Use of Homophonous Pen Names: An Open-Source Open Secret,” *Asia Policy* 13, no. 1 (January 2018): 69–112, 92–97.

8. Jun, “Peace, the Most Beautiful.”

9. Jun Sheng, “Resolutely Oppose US Arms Sales to Taiwan,” (in Mandarin), *PLA Daily*, July 12, 2019.

10. See Gitter and Fang, “Open-Source Open Secret”; and Jun Sheng, “Be Wary of Japanese Militarism,” (in Mandarin) *PLA Daily*, March 29, 2017.

Enemy Disintegration Work

Why would this kind of material, essentially diplomatic or political in nature, appear in the *PLA Daily* rather than, say, the *People's Daily*, the PRC's largest newspaper and the official outlet of the CCP's Central Committee? Some of Jun Sheng's stories have been reprinted in the *People's Daily*, but as Mark Stokes has emphasized, "enemy disintegration work" (wajie dijun gongzuo [瓦解敌军工作]—literally, "disintegrate the enemy work") has always been a key PLA mission and continues to be codified in the PLA's "Political Work Regulations."¹¹ The latest political work regulations stipulate enemy disintegration is to be accomplished in peacetime by attending to "the situation of foreign forces, enemy forces, and national separatist forces at home and abroad," and in wartime through "public opinion, psychological, and legal warfare."¹² In addition to providing the muscle behind threats, then, the PLA is a source and executor of the Chinese Communist Party political-warfare strategy.

From the perspective of the Marxist-Leninist way of war, enemy disintegration work is an essential precursor to the use of force. This point would have resonated with Mao Zedong and other early communist readers of the ancient Chinese military classics, which stress the importance of balance between belligerents in cohesion—which side is more resolute and internally unified—as well as the need to prepare the battlefield before fighting.¹³ The first chapter of Sun Zi's *Art of War* opens with a recommendation to assess which side is more in harmony with, or loyal to, its leadership. If you can weaken the adversary's resolve and cohesion in advance, your strikes will have outsized effects. War may even be obviated by successful efforts to shape the enemy's perceptions and behavior in peacetime. While this may sound odd to readers who have to be reminded to consider Phase Zero, from Beijing's perspective, the PRC's historical experiences validate the approach.¹⁴

The lesson the CCP learned while working with the Soviet Union in its founding decades was the party could not expect to win in combat unless it first subverted the opponent. The PLA's August 1 (8/1) birthday, the inspiration for the URL of its China Military Online website (81.cn), commemorates the Nanchang Uprising in 1927, in which the party tried and failed to take the city of Nanchang from the Kuomintang (KMT), the Chinese Nationalist Party. This was itself an act of enemy disintegration, as the CCP commanders who led the operation were formally KMT officers—in 1924 the party had bowed to Soviet pressure to join the KMT in a United Front, which was ostensibly aimed at expelling foreign powers from China but which the Soviets intended to use to pressure

11. Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, "The People's Liberation Army General Political Department: Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics," Project 2049 Institute (October 14, 2013), https://project2049.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/P2049_Stokes_Hsiao_PLA_General_Political_Department_Liaison_101413.pdf; and "Regulations on Political Work of the Chinese PLA," (in Mandarin) March 15, 2012, <https://wenku.baidu.com/view/3743d9d0360cba1aa811da3d.html>.

12. "Regulations."

13. See Sun Zi, *Art of War*.

14. Scott D. McDonald, Brock Jones, and Jason M. Frazee, "Phase Zero: How China Exploits It, Why the US Does Not," *Naval War College Review* 65, no. 3 (2012), 122–35.

the national government in Beijing into ceding disputed territory in Manchuria and Mongolia.

The merger never worked smoothly. Chinese Communist Party members resented having to defer to the KMT and constantly worked to recruit nationalists to their own ranks, while Moscow sought to undermine the KMT's ambition of unifying China and encouraged party members to oppose that course as well. Six months before the Nanchang Uprising, fed up with communist machinations, the leader of the KMT, Chiang Kai-shek, acted to purge the CCP from the KMT's ranks, killing or forcing into hiding hundreds if not thousands of party members in Shanghai and other cities. The degree to which the party then acted on Moscow's orders or of its own accord to seize Nanchang remains contested, but the episode highlights how fundamental enemy disintegration is to the PLA. It is, in fact, the PLA's origin story.

After seceding from the Kuomintang, the PLA would have to wait decades before its intelligence and subversion arms were mature enough to facilitate defeating former nationalist comrades in battle on a regular basis. The PLA's military liaison efforts and underground outreach to the opposition—aimed at wooing potential sources of intelligence and defectors—eventually played a decisive role in the party's triumph in the Chinese civil war. To this day, the PLA boasts its enemy disintegration work led to recruitment of over one-fifth of the KMT army, including more than 1,400 senior officers.¹⁵ The CCP's initial victories in northeast China after World War II were accomplished in large measure by using superior intelligence to surround and suborn KMT commanders.

From the United States and the Kuomintang in the civil war period to the United States and Taiwan today, the CCP's enemy has often been a coalition rather than a single party or state. This means disintegration work must be applied not only within rival states but also across their alliances. Jun Sheng's late-May campaign to blame "some Americans" while warning of the consequences of their behavior in order to promote doves within the US system fits into this playbook, as does the subsequent attempt to make the United States look weak in the eyes of relevant third parties and thus inject doubt into the American alliance structure.

Singling Out American Hawks

Jun Sheng's first appearance in 2020 was in late May, and the series was the first attributed to the byline. To ensure it reached American readers, as mentioned, all eight articles were published simultaneously in Mandarin in the *PLA Daily* and in English at China Military Online. All eight articles also mention "some [or certain] American [or Western] politicians" in their opening lines. The point of "some American politicians" is to imply that if it were not for these troublemakers, US-PRC relations would be on a better footing. By singling out a particular group

15. Wang Zhaoyue, "Uphold Justice to Shake the Enemy Camp: The Red Army's Long March," (in Mandarin) China Military Online, September 19, 2016, http://www.mod.gov.cn/education/2016-09/19/content_4733311.htm.

of officials and excluding others—not to mention financiers, business people, academics, etc.—Beijing tries to encourage finger-pointing in the United States, discredit its opponents and, by default, promote its friends in the United States.

The denunciation of “some American politicians” is the common thread across the diversity of titles in the series—“Sinister Intentions Behind Mud-Flinging at China” (Part 1), “Burning House Looters” (Part 2), “What Are the Sources of the Political Virus?” (Part 3), “Beware the Blame Game Will Backfire” (Part 4), “The Hideous Morbidity in the House of Cards” (Part 5), “Stop Lying Through Your Teeth” (Part 6), “Why Cannot China [Be Allowed to] Provide Better Solutions?” (Part 7), and “It’s Much Easier to Move Mountains than to Shake the PLA” (Part 8).¹⁶ Examples of “some American politicians” in the opening lines include:

- Part 1: “In the face of the poor pandemic response, economic slowdown, bipartisan hostility, and divided public opinion, *some US politicians* are head over heels busy, not battling the outbreak and saving lives, but shifting the blame and putting on one disgusting farce after another [emphasis added].”¹⁷
- Part 2: “As the COVID-19 outbreak continues to rage across the United States, the American people are complaining about the White House’s ‘lack of action’ in the critical period of pandemic prevention and control, to which, however, *Pompeo and his fellow politicians* have kept finding excuses for themselves. . . . [C]*ertain American politicians* have the nerve to reap geopolitical gains where they set fire in the first place [emphasis added].”¹⁸
- Part 3: “While the biological virus is a common enemy of humankind, the political virus born out of *certain American politicians* is equally detestable, for it has damaged the global antiepidemic cooperation and impeded the long-term development and progress of human society [emphasis added].”¹⁹
- Part 4: “The blames [sic] that *certain American politicians* have been trying to shift to China have all backfired on themselves . . . [emphasis added].”²⁰

16. Jun Sheng, “Sinister Intentions”; Jun, “Burning House”; Jun, “What Are the Sources”; Jun, “Blame Game”; Jun, “The Hideous Morbidity”; Jun, “Stop Lying”; Jun, “Why Cannot China Provide Better Solutions?” *PLA Daily*, May 26, 2020; and Jun, “It’s Much Easier.”

17. Jun, “Sinister Intentions.”

18. Jun, “Burning House.”

19. Jun, “What Are the Sources.”

20. Jun, “Beware.”

- Part 5: “Lately, *some American politicians* have been taking advantage of the Covid-19 pandemic out of pure selfish interests in the 2020 presidential election . . . [emphasis added].”²¹
- Part 6: “We’ve long known that lying through their teeth is the ‘survival skill’ for *some Western politicians*, but we never expected it to become their ‘only skill left’ . . . [emphasis added].”²²
- Part 7: “Whoever speaks well of China would be attacked—this has become a hysterical new normal for *some American politicians* [emphasis added].”²³
- Part 8: “For quite some time, *certain American politicians* have rampantly slandered China through politicization and stigmatization to deflect domestic problems and shirk responsibilities for the poor pandemic response at home . . . [emphasis added].”²⁴

Considering the source is a propaganda writing team of the CCP’s Central Military Commission, those being inveighed against should be honored. Who does Jun Sheng include in the aforementioned “some [or, certain] politicians?” Part 3 offers the most thorough description of the members of this group. Following the initial line about the “political virus” quoted above, readers learn “some American politicians” refers to those who “are so crazily intent on fabricating all kinds of fallacies about ‘holding China accountable’” and who “attack the WHO for being too ‘China-centric,’” as well as those who insist on calling COVID-19 “the Chinese virus.” Most of all, it includes those who exhibit a “Cold War mentality” and:

have the wishful thinking that accusing China of the so-called “mask diplomacy” would offset its influence; vilifying China’s aid to help build the African Center for Disease Prevention and Control as an attempt to “steal genome data” would drive a wedge between China and Africa; and egging other countries to claim reparations from China would pin the “original sin” of the virus on the country.²⁵

The article echoes Part 2 in naming Secretary of State Mike Pompeo a particular offender and seems at pains to imply only a small subset of the American political class cares about Beijing’s initial obfuscation around the virus and subsequent attempts to use it to boost China’s international standing. This is the prelude to threatening the United States about what will happen if that cadre is not sidelined. Of course, one audience is the PLA itself. Chinese military personnel must comprise the majority of domestic *PLA Daily* readers, and their spines would have been stiffened by these broadsides. But again, the pieces also appeared in English, which explains the repeated singling out of “some” or “certain” politicians rather than the issuance of blanket indictments. As discussed below, the second series published only in Mandarin features more

21. Jun, “The Hideous Morbidity.”

22. Jun, “Stop Lying.”

23. Jun, “Why Cannot China.”

24. Jun, “It’s Much Easier.”

25. Jun, “What Are the Sources.”

sweeping language, but Jun Sheng's targeting of a few rotten eggs was clearly meant to influence high-level dynamics in the United States.

Implying Punishment

All but one of Jun Sheng's articles ends with a threat (part 7 ends with a paean to the PRC's rise—"We firmly believe that China will only do well when the world is well, and the world will do better when China is doing well!"—that is only threatening indirectly, in its implication that the world will do worse if the PRC suffers). These threats suggest an incentive for Americans to ditch the troublemakers while leaving the "or else" vague.

The conclusion of the first article is particularly vivid, warning, "*those sinister American politicians* will one day pay a high price for what they did—they will bring miseries to the American people, pave the way for their decline, and ruin their political credibility [emphasis added]." A citation from Hemingway's *For Whom the Bell Tolls* follows, "[Ask not] for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee."²⁶ Aside from displaying impressive fluency in the American canon (Lincoln is quoted in a previous passage), Jun Sheng here goes beyond hinting "the American people" will benefit if only certain leaders are jettisoned.

The Hemingway quotation may be designed especially to be resonant, as the pen name Jun Sheng is a homophone for "Voice of the Military," paralleling the pen name "Zhong Sheng," "Voice of China," which appears in the *People's Daily* newspaper.²⁷ In addition to Voice of China, Zhong Sheng is a homophone abbreviation of "Sounding the Alarm Bell,"²⁸ so by association Jun Sheng may conjure a warning of imminent danger as well, in which case borrowing Hemingway's claxon reinforces the message.

Other threats from the final lines of six of the remaining seven articles in the series include:

- Part 2: "The burning house looters will eventually get burned themselves."²⁹
- Part 3: "Stop the misdeeds and change course before it's too late."³⁰
- Part 4: "Stop making anti-China noises and face up to justice, reason, and public opinion."³¹
- Part 5: "All righteous people of the whole world will firmly oppose them, and the Chinese government and people will hit back hard."³²

26. Jun, "Sinister Intentions."

27. Gitter and Fang, "Open-Source Open Secret"; and "What Do the Zhong Sheng and Jun Sheng Published by the *People's Daily* on 3 August Mean?" (in Mandarin), Zhihu (website), August 5, 2017, <https://www.zhihu.com/question/63397602>.

28. Gitter and Fang, "Open-Source Open Secret."

29. Jun, "Burning House."

30. Jun, "What Are the Sources."

31. Jun, "Beware."

32. Jun, "The Hideous Morbidity."

- Part 6: “An ancient fable says that a rabbit used to have a long tail, which becomes short because it is bitten off for telling lies. . . . Stop lying through your teeth; otherwise your personal credibility, political career, and the ‘America great again’ you promise the American people will, like the rabbit’s tail, be cut short for sure.”³³
- Part 8: “Focus more on controlling the pandemic at home, and stop flexing muscles at other countries’ doorstep. It’s much easier to move mountains than [to] shake the PLA. . . . No force will ever stop China’s steps forward.”³⁴

For PLA watchers accustomed to turgid accounts of soldiers or units resolutely “holding high the banner of [fill-in-the-blank CCP jargon],” this is unusually stark language. Such direct threats issued by authoritative mouthpieces are relatively rare.

Shaping the Views of Third Parties

Nonetheless the series met with resounding silence in the United States. As far as this author could determine, no one wrote publicly about what was being said or reprinted the material. Jun Sheng was unlikely to succeed in persuading the United States to stand down or to demote politicians inclined to confront Beijing. In the face of this missed salvo, the writing team behind the pen name elected to repurpose the material for a different political warfare purpose. Jun Sheng’s kick save was to post the columns in mid-June on a special, dedicated page advertised with a banner at the top of the China Military Online home page (see figure 2).³⁵ The banner depicts a sickly, sinister-looking man wearing a US flag armband. He has a coronavirus in one hand behind his back and is reaching out with his other hand toward a man dressed like a doctor in white scrubs with a PRC flag armband. The latter is offering a stack of presumably scientific documents to the American, who is spewing coronavirus germs as he accepts the papers.

Figure 2. China Military Online homepage (Reprinted from China Military Online website sponsored by the PLA newspaper)

33. Jun, “Stop Lying.”

34. Jun, “It’s Much Easier.”

35. The banner image appeared atop the China Military Online homepage from June 16, 2020, through the end of the month, and the image including the Chinese language headings at the bottom remained available at <http://www.81.cn/2020zt/110107.htm> through at least July 7, 2020.

Again, for the analyst accustomed to China Military Online's usual depictions of shiny new PLA hardware or of soldiers earnestly striving to live up to Xi Jinping's injunctions, this is striking stuff—probably aimed less at an American audience than at domestic viewers and US allies and partners. Nationalists at home would be buoyed by the combined visual and verbal assault on the US position, and the issuance of such brazen attacks by an official PRC media outlet could cause some foreign readers to question Washington's credibility as a security provider.

Clicking on the banner in mid-June yielded a page including the late-May articles, newly illustrated with the aforementioned offensive cartoons. By the 20th, these articles were accompanied by a new, second series of articles called “Behind the US Epidemic.”³⁶ This second series was also offensively illustrated but not attributed to Jun Sheng, and (as mentioned) not translated into English. In the new, less authoritative series of six articles, the phrase “some American politicians” appeared a few times but was eclipsed by more sweeping indictments of American “cruel capitalism,” “global hegemony,” “systemic racial discrimination,” “political polarization,” and “hypocritical democracy.”

Also unlike the first series, the second did not feature threats, so the intent seems to have been just to accuse the United States of hypocrisy and in so doing, highlight that the *PLA Daily* was authorized to engage in such attacks. Again this suggests the content of the China Military Online special page was aimed at impressing domestic or non-US foreign audiences. While the first series was designed to moderate US behavior toward the PRC by encouraging a shift toward more dovish policy makers, the second was designed to constrain US options for confronting Beijing by peeling away international partners.

Conclusion

Ironically, the CCP, like all autocratic regimes, is convinced US military and intelligence organizations are plotting to take it apart from within. But scratching beneath the surface, one recognizes that the party assigns credit to the United States for emissions that are organic rather than official. No state hand guides the operation of American popular culture or of US business leaders who sympathize with the plight of Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet or whose firms' websites depict Taiwan as a separate state on maps. American or Western human rights activists who decry the CCP's infringements on the basic civil liberties of Chinese citizens do not work with or receive support from the Defense Department. DoD-sponsored freedom-of-navigation operations in the South China Sea do broadcast opposition to excessive maritime claims

36. Li, “Save the City”; Ren Xu, “Behind the US Epidemic Part 2: Cooperation vs. Nonsense,” (in Mandarin), *PLA Daily*, June 23, 2020; Zhang Xiaojun, “Behind the US Epidemic Part 3: Human Rights vs. Hegemony” (in Mandarin), *PLA Daily*, June 24, 2020; Niu, “Anti-Epidemic vs. Protest”; Liu Xing, “Behind the US Epidemic Part 5: Epidemic vs. Election” (in Mandarin), *PLA Daily*, June 26, 2020; and Li Xian, “Behind the US Epidemic Part 6: Work vs. Show” (in Mandarin), *PLA Daily*, June 27, 2020.

there, a useful message, but until very recently, there was an effort not to single out China but rather to proclaim US neutrality across the various local claimants.

As long as the CCP believes the United States is working to undermine it, and as long as the PLA is involved in political warfare, the Department of Defense might as well make use of its resources to join the fray. The PLA's history and example suggest pathways for enhanced DoD political warfare to send direct messages to Beijing and to send tailored messages about Beijing to relevant third parties. In other words, PRC political warfare efforts that fall short of their mark in the United States may nonetheless be used to inspire US options.

There is no reason for American efforts to mirror exactly the PLA's efforts. Where the Central Military Commission seems to believe it can weaken the United States by amplifying disagreements over China policy, DoD messaging might highlight our understanding of PLA weaknesses or problems. For instance, the Defense Department could call attention to the numerous veterans' protests that have reportedly broken out across the PRC in recent years, or the scrapping in 2017 of the PLA's National Defense Students program, which was launched in 1998 to train reserve officers at civilian universities. Could there be issues with PLA recruiting and morale?

Disclosure of PLA issues would signal to Xi Jinping and other CCP elites that for all their bluster, the United States is not intimidated. With economic inequality in the PRC at an all-time high, the CCP justifies its privileges on the grounds that it has advanced the Chinese nation and is uniquely positioned to protect it. The Chinese people have a right to know their sacrifices have been in vain—the party-state's requisitions and repression are not strengthening the country. Finally, the disclosures would signal to relevant third parties that the US military retains its edge and, just as important, its resolve.

Enduring Information Vigilance: Government after COVID-19

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ABSTRACT: The framework of Enduring Information Vigilance will help ally and partner governments deny advantages adversaries gain through their use of information operations in our new global perpetual information environment. This approach recognizes the persistent threat, unifies responses within and between governments, and resolves societal fissures toward a more global democratic information environment.

A clear pattern of opportunism has emerged across Russian and Chinese information operations. Exacerbated by the pandemic, this adversarial activity will continue to characterize the information space in the future. In an era of perpetual information competition, and given the persistent nature of the information threat, current paradigms and structures for countering hostile-state disinformation in Western governments are inadequate. Western democracies should instead organize their responses around what we have deemed “Enduring Information Vigilance,” which recognizes the perpetual nature of the threat, addresses societal fissures bad actors exploit, overcomes bureaucratic hurdles to cross-government and cross-sector collaboration, and fosters international cooperation toward a more democratic information environment.

Hostile-state information operations, which Herbert Lin defines as “the deliberate use of information (whether true or false) by one party on an adversary to confuse, mislead and ultimately to influence the choices and decisions that the adversary makes,” continue to confound democracies.¹ The use and manipulation of information as a tool of influence began long before the 2016 US presidential election. But information operations have become more potent in an increasingly networked world, aided by the ubiquity of online targeting tools and the anonymity and credibility the Internet provides.

Since 2016, the American public and private sectors have struggled to address this challenge, stymied by domestic politicization of the topic and legitimate concerns about balancing social media regulation

1. Herbert Lin, “On the Organization of the U.S. Government for Responding to Adversarial Information Warfare and Influence Operations,” *I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society* 15, no. 1–2 (Spring 2019): 2, <https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/lin.pdf>.

with First Amendment rights.² As a result, disinformation has thrived during the COVID-19 pandemic and left the country vulnerable to manipulation through hostile-state information operations.

Perpetual Information Competition

Since the end of the Cold War and the resurgence of great-power competition, Western democracies have conceptualized hostile-state information operations as one-off occurrences—explained away by societal peculiarities, tensions, and events such as elections—that provide inflection points hostile states can attempt to manipulate. Rather than organizing crosscutting, proactive, whole-of-government responses, most Western governments stand-up extra capabilities only when necessary, such as election *war rooms* before events like the 2018 US midterms or the UK government’s response to the Russian poisonings of Sergei and Yulia Skripal on British soil.³

In the United States, countering information operations has been largely securitized, primarily involving elements of the Defense, Homeland Security, and State Departments, in addition to the Intelligence Community, but rarely, if ever, focused on domestic audiences or involving the softer side of government, such as the Department of Education. As the development of Russian and Chinese information operations over the past decade-plus into the COVID-19 era demonstrates, this lack of whole-of-government approach misses the bigger picture and inhibits an effective response.

Russia, China, and other authoritarian states have recognized the utility of engaging in perpetual information competition, utilizing a strategic-level integrated approach to information operations and “are already contesting this domain and exploiting democracies’ inaction.”⁴ Hostile states understand information competition is the new normal, and they are constantly probing for and exploiting societal fissures such as ethnic or racial tension, pandemic uncertainty, and political polarization to drive their ongoing campaigns. They use all channels available—government and nongovernment, online and offline—when engaging in perpetual information competition. Finally, hostile-state perpetual information competition does not adhere neatly to international borders, but rather exploits them, attempting to undermine the unity of alliances and international organizations.

2. Karen Kornbluh and Ellen P. Goodman, *Safeguarding Democracy against Disinformation*, DIDI Roadmap no. 4 (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2020), 9, https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/Safeguarding%20Democracy%20against%20Disinformation_v7.pdf.

3. Jonathan Owen, “Kremlin’s Web of Lies on Novichok Exposed by Government’s Security Comms Team,” *PR Week*, July 25, 2018, <https://www.prweek.com/article/1488558/kremlins-web-lies-novichok-exposed-governments-security-comms-team>.

4. Laura Rosenberger and Lindsay Gorman, “How Democracies Can Win the Information Contest,” *Washington Quarterly* 43, no. 2 (Summer 2020): 77, https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.edu/dist/1/2181/files/2020/06/RosenbergerGorman_TWQ_43-2.pdf.

Russian Information Operations

Building on the long history of Soviet active measures in the pre-Internet era, Russia has used the online information environment and levers of offline information manipulation to drive division and distrust abroad and undermine democratic processes for at least 13 years. The first example of these modern information operations occurred in Estonia in 2007 when the Kremlin exploited the ethnic Russian population's latent grievances toward the Western-oriented Estonian government. "Putin's regime started to consciously restore and rehabilitate the Soviet symbols and Soviet version of history" through the primarily state-backed Russian-language media in Estonia, creating a flash point at a statue to Soviet World War II dead.⁵ The statue became the site of violent demonstrations, and Tallinn became a target of cyberattacks. According to Estonia's internal security service, Russia carried out these information campaigns "towards the Baltic States in order to prevent anti-Russian moods and secure [an] increase in Russia's influence in foreign policy in the world."⁶

Russia's information operations continued. The next year, during the five-day conflict between Russia and Georgia, cyberattacks—seemingly emanating from Kremlin-encouraged *patriotic* hackers—crippled parts of the Georgian government.⁷ Moscow also launched an all-out information campaign that sought to call into question Russia's role in provoking the conflict and inspire fear and capitulation among Georgians, to varying degrees of success.

Russia's information operations in Estonia and Georgia occurred before social media platforms developed the worldwide ubiquity they enjoy today. If Estonia and Georgia were the beta versions of the Kremlin's online information operations, Ukraine felt their full effect beginning in 2013–14 with the Euromaidan protests and the Revolution of Dignity, illegal annexation of Crimea, incursions of Russian-backed forces into eastern Ukraine, and the downing of the passenger airliner Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 on July 17, 2014 with a Russian BUK missile.⁸ Russia's infamous *troll factory*, the St. Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency, had an entire unit focused on undermining Ukrainian sovereignty, the legitimacy of the post-Maidan government, and international support for Ukraine.⁹

5. Kadri Liik, "The 'Bronze Year' of Estonia-Russia Relations," in Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Yearbook 2007* (Tallinn: Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007), https://vm.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/web-static/053/Kadri_Liik.pdf.

6. Estonian Internal Security Service, *Annual of the Security Police Board 2007* (Tallinn: Estonian Internal Security Service, 2007), 4, <https://www.kapo.ee/en/content/annual-reviews.html>.

7. John Markoff, "Georgia Takes a Beating in the Cyberwar with Russia," *Bits* (blog), *New York Times*, August 11, 2008, <https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/08/11/georgia-takes-a-beating-in-the-cyberwar-with-russia/>.

8. NATO StratCom Center of Excellence (CoE), *Analysis of Russia's Information Campaign against Ukraine* (Riga, Latvia: NATO StratCom CoE, September 2014), <https://www.stratcomcoe.org/analysis-russias-information-campaign-against-ukraine>.

9. David Patrikarakos, "The Troll: The Empire Strikes Back," in *War in 140 Characters* (New York: Basic Books, 2017).

Like the Kremlin-sponsored information operations in Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine that preceded it, Russian online interference surrounding the 2016 US presidential election had the goal of “provok[ing] and amplify[ing] political and social discord in the United States.”¹⁰ Through fake accounts and pages, illegally purchased online advertisements, monetary support of authentic American activists and protests, the hack-and-leak of the emails of Democratic political operatives, and billions of organic online engagements, Russian operatives were able to influence America’s democratic discourse ahead of the 2016 vote.¹¹ They built community and trust through positive messaging and later used this influence to launch more ambitious and divisive campaigns, including in-person protests.¹²

Due to the insufficient and tardy response of the social media platforms and the US government in the wake of the 2016 election interference campaign, Russia’s information operations targeting the United States continue as the 2020 presidential election approaches.¹³ The Kremlin and its channels of influence have adapted their information operations’ tools and tactics to the responses that have been implemented, finding innovative ways around regulations in the United States and beyond. In 2019 and 2020, Ukraine’s security service uncovered evidence Russian operatives *rented* Facebook accounts from Ukrainian users and organized a bot network utilizing 40,000 Ukrainian and European SIM cards to field 10,000 accounts across the country.¹⁴

Chinese Information Operations

Understanding the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) approach to the role of information in great-power competition starts with the regime’s ideological basis, which shaped the instruments of power and led to the development of capabilities designed specifically for political warfare. The regime relies on propaganda in all its forms to legitimize itself, maintain support, and undermine its adversaries’ will.¹⁵ The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) invested in studying the impact

10. Robert S. Mueller III, *Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election* (Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, 2019), 1:22, <https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf>.

11. Philip N. Howard et al., “The IRA, Social Media and Political Polarization in the United States, 2012–2018” (working paper, Project on Computational Propaganda, University of Oxford, UK, 2018), <https://comprop.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2018/12/The-IRA-Social-Media-and-Political-Polarization.pdf>.

12. Nina Jankowicz, “The Top Three Trends We Miss When Discussing Russian Ads,” Alliance for Securing Democracy, May 15, 2018, <https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/the-top-three-trends-we-miss-when-discussing-russian-ads/>.

13. *Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community: Hearings before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate*, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence), 7, <https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-dcoats-012919.pdf>.

14. SBU, “СБУ блокувала роботу розгалуженої мережі ботоферм, якою керували з РФ,” June 16, 2020, <https://ssu.gov.ua/novyny/7698>.

15. See the Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2019), iv–v, [https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019%20CHINA%20MILITARY%20POWER%20REPORT%20\(1\).PDF](https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019%20CHINA%20MILITARY%20POWER%20REPORT%20(1).PDF).

of information technology on the nature of conflict and learned from US and allied experiences, incorporating doctrinal developments into its approach.

Operation Desert Storm provided an ideal case study for the US approach to a modern conflict against Russian and Chinese equipment; it underlined the importance of using better technology to integrate battlefield systems in order to create strategic advantage. But Chinese strategists were also impressed by how the United States shaped the narrative around the conflict, using Iraqi aggression as the justification for military operations and employing psychological operations to break the will of the Iraqi army.¹⁶ China implemented these lessons, combining integrated network electronic warfare in close coordination with influence components, such as propaganda and psychological operations, in a single doctrine to achieve information dominance.

But it was in 2003 that the approach most associated with CCP influence activities, the “three warfares,” was formally adopted by the former General Political Department of the PLA.¹⁷ “Three warfares” emphasizes three areas of impact for influence activity referred to in political manuals dating back to Mao Zedong: public opinion or media warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare.¹⁸

Public opinion or media warfare uses the full breadth of traditional and social media to influence overseas audiences. From state-linked television and print outlets to paid advertising and senior figures’ op-eds in major newspapers, media activity is supported by public outreach organizations and efforts including Confucius Institutes, PLA-run or civilian government-run visits, and exchange initiatives.¹⁹

The psychological warfare component aims to undermine the will of adversaries to fight as well as promote division among and between leadership, populations, and allies. Techniques might include media activities, diplomatic levers, military deployments or tests, and the use of front organizations such as government-linked think tanks.

The legal warfare component aims to establish the basis for competition or the illegality of an adversary’s position. Examples see Chinese government-linked delegates engaging in academic conferences and legal debates about issues of strategic interest to China, including nuclear issues, the sovereignty of space, or the application of international norms in cyberspace.

16. James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, *The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999), https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF145.html.

17. Larry M. Wortzel, *The Chinese People’s Liberation Army* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press, 2014), 29, <https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2263.pdf>.

18. Peter Mattis, “China’s Three Warfares in Perspective,” War on the Rocks, January 30, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/chinas-three-warfares-perspective/>.

19. Ethan Epstein, “How China Infiltrated U.S. Classrooms,” *Politico*, updated January 17, 2018, <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/16/how-china-infiltrated-us-classrooms-216327>.

The three warfares, however, are not the sole preserve of the PLA. Other state bodies contribute to China's efforts to influence the world and discreetly assert political power over competitors. The Ministry of Education leads efforts to instrumentalize the large number of Chinese students studying overseas, the Ministry of State Security runs fake think tanks and uses academic bodies to influence discourse, the United Front Work Department leverages the Chinese diaspora for political purposes, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, among others, uses targeted advertising and media to promote the CCP position abroad.²⁰

Despite some similarities in tactics, Chinese and Russian information operations diverge in their intent; China does not opportunistically sow division and inflame internal conflict in an ideologically agnostic way as the Kremlin does, nor has the CCP been linked to attempts to interfere in democratic processes as Russia has.²¹ China's objectives focus on the nation's image and ensuring their point of view is heard, even through subversive means. When Beijing has engaged in more aggressive operations such as using fake content or instances of inauthentic online behavior, these efforts have related to the CCP's top foreign policy priorities such as Hong Kong and Taiwan.²²

Exploiting the COVID-19 Infodemic

In a state of perpetual information competition, the uncertainty, fear, and distrust that characterize the coronavirus pandemic present an opportunity Moscow, Beijing, and other hostile-state actors have exploited. For China, as the origin of the virus, this opportunity was a foreign policy imperative requiring a response at scale and pace. For Russia, however, the pandemic provided multiple new vulnerabilities to exploit for sowing discord, spreading doubt, and subverting discourse. Although news from mainstream outlets achieved greater distribution overall than information from state-backed outlets, Oxford Internet Institute researchers found Russian and Chinese state-backed content among the most engaging content shared in late June 2020.²³ This trend underlines a key strategy of perpetual information competition: relentless and opportunistic exploitation of security vulnerabilities, societal fissures, and highly emotive content intended to drive engagement, decrease trust in institutions, and further amplify division.

20. Mattis, "China's Three Warfares"; and Amy Searight, "Countering China's Influence Operations: Lessons from Australia," Center for Strategic and International Studies (website), May 8, 2020, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/countering-chinas-influence-operations-lessons-australia>.

21. Larry Diamond and Orville Schell, eds., *China's Influence and American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2018), <https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-promoting-constructive-vigilance>.

22. Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer and Paul Charon, "Russia as a Hurricane, China as Climate Change: Different Ways of Information Warfare," War on the Rocks, January 21, 2020, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/russia-as-a-hurricane-china-as-climate-change-different-ways-of-information-warfare/>.

23. "Coronavirus Misinformation Weekly Briefing," The Computational Propaganda Project (website), June 29, 2020, <https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2020/06/ComProp-Coronavirus-Misinformation-Weekly-Briefing-29-06-2020.pdf>.

Russian Exploitation of COVID-19

Using practiced tactics, Russian officials and state-run media were quick to seize on the pandemic to drive further division in Western democracies. The COVID-19 opportunity was particularly appealing in the United States, where another divisive presidential election campaign had just begun, and US government missteps could be amplified and exploited to influence political discourse. According to the Alliance for Securing Democracy, the pandemic was the most discussed topic throughout the “Russian media ecosystem” for 14 weeks, from mid-January to late April 2020.²⁴ Narratives featured on Russian state-run propaganda outlets have mimicked and amplified those in the US domestic information space. Claims COVID-19 might be a US-created bioweapon, or a future vaccine against the virus would be used to microchip and track Americans were among the most popular coronavirus stories on the Sputnik news website in January to March 2020.²⁵

As yet, there are no confirmed instances of coordinated inauthentic Russian campaigns around coronavirus, that is, campaigns utilizing false personae or organizations, placing false ads, or employing bots for inauthentic amplification of content. But narratives in Russian state-run media have broadly tracked with those pushed by covert Russian online properties in the past, suggesting such inauthentic campaigns may yet be uncovered.

Russia has also utilized the coronavirus crisis for more traditional influence campaigns as well as cybercrime. Like China, the Kremlin sent aid, including personal protective equipment and ventilators, to hard-hit nations. Moscow’s April aid shipment to the United States provided President Vladimir Putin a domestic propaganda coup at home.²⁶ An earlier shipment to Italy—emblazoned with the words “From Russia with Love” was part of a wider influence operation to undermine NATO and EU unity, according to reporting by Italian newspaper *La Stampa*.²⁷ Russian operatives have also used the panic and disruption of routine cybersecurity amid the pandemic to launch widespread cyberattacks against at least 31 companies, “including major American brands and Fortune 500 firms.”²⁸

24. Amber Frankland, Bret Schafer, and Matt Schrader, “Hamilton Weekly Report: April 18–24, 2020,” Alliance for Securing Democracy (website), April 27, 2020, <https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/hamilton-weekly-report-april-18-24-2020/>.

25. Andrew Rettman, “Russia’s Top Coronavirus ‘Fake News’ Stories,” EU Observer, March 27, 2020, <https://euobserver.com/coronavirus/147905>.

26. Anton Troianovski, “Turning the Tables, Russia Sends Virus Aid to U.S.,” *New York Times*, April 2, 2020.

27. Natalia Antelava and Jacopo Iacoboni, “The Influence Operation behind Russia’s Coronavirus Aid to Italy,” Coda Story, April 2, 2020, <https://www.codastory.com/disinformation/soft-power/russia-coronavirus-aid-italy/>.

28. David E. Sanger and Nicole Perlroth, “Russian Criminal Group Finds New Target: Americans Working at Home,” *New York Times*, June 25, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/25/us/politics/russia-ransomware-coronavirus-work-home.html>.

As the pandemic persists, so have Russian hacking efforts; according to a joint US-UK-Canadian intelligence advisory released in July 2020, the same Russian group responsible for some of the 2016 breaches at the Democratic National Committee attempted to steal coronavirus vaccine intellectual property and supply-chain information.²⁹ The full effect of Russian COVID-19 information operations is difficult to ascertain, as their narratives converge with authentic grievances in American society surrounding the virus and the US response to the virus. Regardless of their source, over time, these narratives weaken confidence in authority and trust in the government.

Chinese Exploitation of COVID-19

Since news about COVID-19 first emerged from the city of Wuhan, the Chinese government has been actively trying to manage the narrative and protect the legitimacy and interests of the Chinese Communist Party, both domestically and abroad. In the early stages of the pandemic, this strategy focused on suppressing narratives inside China. The government-imposed nationwide quarantine was used as a messaging opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Chinese system and President Xi Jinping's leadership.³⁰

The suppression of virus information, however, ran afoul of the Chinese public. Outrage developed in February and March about the degree to which information was suppressed, including the crucial understanding of human-to-human transmission. Normally strong adherence to the party line by the Chinese people wavered with the widespread coverage of the death of Li Wenliang, a doctor who had been accused of rumormongering when trying to warn fellow medical professionals about the virus on social media in December. The story made the front pages, even of official outlets, provoking widespread criticism of the Wuhan authorities and a political backlash from Beijing as the CCP sought to reassert control over the narrative.³¹

While suppression and censorship sought to maintain the domestic legitimacy of the CCP, this type of activity did not represent a departure from the party's usual practice at home. These actions did, however, set the stage for a fundamental change in the use of information internationally in attempts to demonstrate the strength of China's response and the superiority of the Chinese system and to cast doubt on the origins of the virus.³² This change in approach to international

29. "UK and Allies Expose Russian Attacks on Coronavirus Vaccine Development," National Cyber Security Centre (website), July 16, 2020, <https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/uk-and-allies-expose-russian-attacks-on-coronavirus-vaccine-development>.

30. Joshua Kurlantzick, "China and Coronavirus: From Home-Made Disaster to Global Mega-Opportunity," *Globalist*, March 16, 2020, <https://www.theglobalist.com/china-soft-power-coronavirus-covid19-pandemic-global-health/>.

31. Minxin Pei, "Will the Coronavirus Topple China's One-Party Regime?," *Strategist* (blog), Australian Strategic Policy Institute, March 5, 2020, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/will-the-coronavirus-topple-chinas-one-party-regime/>.

32. Laura Rosenberger, "China's Coronavirus Information Offensive," *Foreign Affairs*, April 22, 2020, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-22/chinas-coronavirus-information-offensive>.

messaging was combined with a significant and high-profile effort to provide aid and advice to countries affected, initially to Europe and later to a vast majority of countries in Africa and in Latin America. As domestic fatalities from the disease fell, China positioned itself as a global leader on public health, engaging multichannel messaging activity to promote its humanitarian stance.

Throughout the pandemic, China has used a variety of means and tactics to engage audiences, including targeted ads by Chinese state media to build a long-term audience through content focused on positive cultural stories. In early 2020, these ads changed, reflecting significantly enhanced efforts aimed at promoting articles related to COVID-19. The content of the ads promoted China's transparency and leadership in the global response including so-called mask diplomacy, while also promoting the personal role played by Xi. This positive messaging then evolved into "misleadingly reframed events, and amplification of conspiracy theories."³³

The shift apparently sought to cast doubt on the origins of the disease by sowing multiple explanations in a manner similar to Russian obfuscation efforts after the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 and the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal. These efforts promoted US culpability for the coronavirus, claiming specifically that US military personnel taking "part in the Military World Games in Wuhan in November 2019" brought the virus to China, thereby trying to deflect blame and responsibility for the pandemic.³⁴

In addition to the use of state-linked outlets to amplify false narratives and conspiracy theories, other elements of the CCP's international communications during COVID-19 indicate a new appetite for sustained engagement.³⁵ Chinese diplomats rapidly increased their use of Western social media platforms throughout 2019 but accelerated these efforts in early 2020, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs launching an official Twitter account in late 2019.³⁶ US government analysis of the followers of these accounts found a large number of them were identical and had been created in the same six-week period, indicating the coordinated inauthentic use of fake accounts.³⁷ The analysis also pointed to Chinese

33. Vanessa Molter and Renee DiResta, "Pandemics and Propaganda: How Chinese State Media Creates and Propagates CCP Coronavirus Narratives," in "Covid-19 and Misinformation," special issue, *Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review* (June 2020), https://misinformreview.hks.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Ipeditis_FORMATTED_PandemicsandPropaganda_HKSReview.pdf.

34. Molter and DiResta, "Pandemics and Propaganda," 12.

35. Jessica Brandt and Bret Schafer, "Five Things to Know about Beijing's Disinformation Approach," Alliance for Securing Democracy (website), March 30, 2020, <https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/five-things-to-know-about-beijings-disinformation-approach/>.

36. Abhishek G. Bhaya, "China Gives a Nod to Twiplomacy: MOFA Launches Twitter Account," CGTN, January 14, 2020, <https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-01-14/China-gives-a-nod-to-Twiplomacy-MOFA-launches-Twitter-account-NfiQHr2slW/index.html>.

37. Laura Kelly, "U.S. Says China, Russia Cooperating to Spread Coronavirus Disinformation," *Hill*, May 8, 2020, <https://thehill.com/policy/international/496880-us-says-china-russia-cooperating-to-spread-coronavirus-disinformation>.

messaging piggybacking off Iranian and Russian disinformation online to amplify divisive or conspiratorial false narratives.

Inauthentic activity in support of Chinese messaging has not been limited to fabricating followers of newly created official social media accounts. Independent researchers have also found significant evidence of covert activity promoting China's interests and conducting messaging in support of CCP objectives; investigations by ProPublica since August 2019 have revealed a number of different social media manipulation techniques.³⁸ These techniques include Chinese-based marketing companies using Twitter to boost the following of government-run news services; creating inauthentic user networks to boost the following of state-linked media outlets; hijacking Twitter accounts to tweet Chinese-language content critical of the Hong Kong protests and COVID-19 conspiracy theories; and offering bribes to prominent Chinese language Twitter users to post pro-CCP misinformation.

Using a platform such as Twitter that is largely inaccessible from China to engage Chinese-speaking audiences indicates this sudden flurry of online activity was apparently intended to engage diaspora audiences. Other investigations detected inauthentic accounts amplifying Chinese government talking points across multiple platforms including YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter.³⁹ As a result of this activity, Twitter took down a network of accounts and attributed them as an information operation run by the Chinese government.⁴⁰

While the CCP's appetite for using disinformation and online deception to build strategic influence and interfere in other nations may have changed, its inauthentic activity has so far been easily detected and exposed. If, however, PRC activity were to influence its target audiences successfully, three messages could damage international perceptions of the United States as they relate to the pandemic: criticism of the US domestic response versus Chinese response to claim the superiority of their system; the use of mask diplomacy to promote CCP leadership and benevolence while US and allied roles in supporting other nations is ignored; and a belief of conspiracy theories that the United States is responsible for the pandemic.

As the fallout from COVID-19 becomes clearer, the relationship between China and the West could change rapidly, exacerbating competition and potentially triggering an economic decoupling between

38. Jeff Kao and Mia Shuang Li, "How China Built a Twitter Propaganda Machine Then Let It Loose on Coronavirus," ProPublica, March 26, 2020, <https://www.propublica.org/article/how-china-built-a-twitter-propaganda-machine-then-let-it-loose-on-coronavirus>.

39. Benjamin Strick, "Uncovering a Pro-Chinese Government Information Operation on Twitter and Facebook: Analysis of the #MilesGuo Bot Network," Bellingcat, May 5, 2020, <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2020/05/05/uncovering-a-pro-chinese-government-information-operation-on-twitter-and-facebook-analysis-of-the-milesguo-bot-network/>.

40. "Transparency Report: Information Operations," Twitter, accessed July 31, 2020, <https://transparency.twitter.com/en/information-operations.html>.

the United States and China.⁴¹ And in such a scenario, China's vastly increased pace and scale of information operations are likely to persist.

Enduring Information Vigilance

To respond effectively to this *new normal* of perpetual information competition, governments must recognize and understand its characteristics in terms of the doctrine and institutions at its source and the fact that information competition has developed with the specific goal of projecting influence and waging political warfare. Governments should configure institutions, develop capability, and drive activity in the framework of what we have dubbed "Enduring Information Vigilance." The framework explains how governments, through capability building, coordinating via holistic and inclusive government structures, and international cooperation, can work more effectively to detect the vulnerabilities adversaries exploit, manage those attempts, and ultimately deny adversaries any benefit. If effective, the denial of benefit is a powerful tool, alongside the imposition of cost, in supporting an approach based on modern threat deterrence.⁴²

Capability: Beyond Discrete Campaigns

As the exploitation of the uncertainty surrounding the coronavirus pandemic has shown, there is a rising baseline of activity to which Western governments must be attuned. Developing situational awareness requires ongoing monitoring, detection, and analysis of the information environment to paint a threat picture of hostile influence activity and warrants investing in the capability building necessary to keep that picture current. Given the vast changes in the scale of both misinformation and disinformation from ideological, commercial, and other nonstate actors during COVID-19, governments will find it harder than ever to identify hostile-state activity; indeed, legitimate grievances across the whole political spectrum in democratic nations are a particular target for Russian online activity. Ensuring hostile states do not exploit divisive, but legitimate discourse requires building government capability and understanding.

Tools for detecting online campaigns and inauthentic activity have developed rapidly in recent years, and parts of the national security infrastructure have adopted them. But none of these tools is a panacea, and the military adage about the importance of having skilled personnel is particularly relevant: "Don't operate the equipment, equip the operator." Enduring Information Vigilance relies on skilled people with a nuanced understanding of the threat, who are capable of applying

41. Patrick M. Cronin, Michael Doran, and Peter Rough, "Geopolitical Implications of the Coronavirus," Hudson Institute (website), March 13 2020, <https://www.hudson.org/research/15816-geopolitical-implications-of-the-coronavirus>.

42. Vytautas Keršanskas, *Deterrence—Proposing a More Strategic Approach to Countering Hybrid Threats*, Hybrid CoE Paper 2 (Helsinki, Finland: European Center for Countering Hybrid Threats, 2020), <https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-paper-2-deterrence-proposing-a-more-strategic-approach-to-countering-hybrid-threats/>.

the full range of tools and techniques for monitoring, detecting, and responding to information operations.

Several governments have already started raising awareness and enhancing the relevant skills of their personnel: the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency produced a handbook for countering information influence activities, and the UK government published currently train public sector communications personnel on the “RESIST” toolkit, which emphasizes the importance of understanding the objectives of information activities when formulating appropriate and effective responses.⁴³

Moreover, building capability for Enduring Information Vigilance should not be limited to traditional national security-focused departments; hostile states have configured their institutions to deliver across multiple channels, and the US response must be equally coordinated. Training on detecting and responding to hostile-state information operations should be required of all civil servants as a part of their regular professional development, with more specific and tailored development programs required for communications professionals and those focusing on hostile states.

Coordination: All Sectors, At All Times

The breadth of activity under Russian information operations or China’s “three warfares” approach spans the remit of multiple government agencies; Western governments must break out of siloed national security thinking, coordinate more effectively, and provide space for cross-sector cooperation. From hard security and defense to cultural activity and media, as well as many other realms of society not typically situated at the forefront of foreign interference, hostile states have the potential to exploit the inability of Western governments to work effectively across traditional departmental boundaries. This “bureaucratic vulnerability” can lead to poor information flow, competition for resources and influence, or the exclusion of key stakeholders.⁴⁴

Information operations comprising the use of multiple tools, vectors, and activities in coordination (with malign intent), challenge bureaucratic coherence and cohesion, exploiting blind spots and targeting vulnerabilities. Bureaucratic vulnerability lies in the range of ministries in which different states choose to place counter-information operations efforts. Some nations focus on security institutions considering adversary information operations a counterintelligence challenge; some nations respond through ministries of interior—an

43. Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, *Countering Information Influence Activities: A Handbook for Communicators* (Karlstad, Sweden: Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, 2019), <https://rib.msb.se/filer/pdf/28698.pdf>; and UK Government Communications Service, *RESIST Counter Disinformation Toolkit* (London: Government Communications Service, 2020), <https://gcs.civilservice.gov.uk/publications/resist-counter-disinformation-toolkit/>.

44. European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, *Tackling the Bureaucratic Vulnerability: An A to Z for Practitioners*, Hybrid CoE Paper 3 (Helsinki, Finland: European Center for Countering Hybrid Threats, 2020), <https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-paper-3-tackling-the-bureaucratic-vulnerability-an-a-to-z-for-practitioners/>.

approach centered on protection and resilience; and some nations place their efforts within the offices of prime ministers to reflect the crucial need for coordination. And some nations have created entirely new structures that face branding, communications, and legitimacy challenges.⁴⁵

These shortcomings emphasize the need to work more effectively across government. Newly built capabilities required for monitoring, detecting, and understanding the multiple elements of hostile information activities—and associated intelligence and analysis—must be integrated to advance a shared view of what adversaries are doing, whom they are targeting, and whether these activities are effective. Further, this information must be shared with nontraditional security departments via leads with the necessary security clearances.

Building this situational awareness across the government will enable the prioritized coordination of effective responses in the short term and beyond, including the exploitation of vulnerabilities. Policy and operational levers for ameliorating vulnerabilities and building resilience against information threats in the long term lie with ministries of education, health, and local government; they require policies that ensure a thriving and pluralistic media, societal awareness of the threat, robust media and digital literacy, and an understanding of civics.⁴⁶

In addition to a truly whole-of-government approach, Enduring Information Vigilance requires governments to initiate and create space for a whole-of-society response to the problem. Governments should convene regular meetings and establish communication and collaboration channels across the public, private, nonprofit, media, and academic sectors. Ideally, governments would facilitate cross-sector cooperation and trust through grant programs requiring collaboration and cost-sharing among grantees, eliminating duplication and competition that exists between many organizations in the counterinformation operations space. Particularly in the social media space, these programs would place special emphasis on information sharing to detect and combat cross-platform information campaigns. Such partnerships would build societal resilience to information operations, investing in awareness building and media and digital literacy programming, and identify trusted third parties to deliver these messages to the general public. Ultimately, healing societal fissures takes an ethos of understanding and service across systems, which a persistent, wide-reaching strategy like Enduring Information Vigilance can build over time.

45. Nina Jankowicz, *Avoiding the Band-Aid Effect in Institutional Responses to Disinformation and Hybrid Threats*, Policy Paper no. 21 (Washington, DC: Alliance for Securing Democracy, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, August 2019), <https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Jankowicz-Bandaid-Effect-paper.pdf>.

46. Nina Jankowicz, "The Disinformation Vaccination," *Wilson Quarterly* (Winter 2018), <https://www.wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/the-disinformation-age/the-disinformation-vaccination/>.

Cooperation: International Partnership

Hostile influence activities have never occurred at such a scale before. Any deterrent effect of Enhanced Information Vigilance is augmented by demonstrating resolve and denying benefit to adversaries through a collective stance against their activities, including better sharing of information and knowledge to identify threats, tactics, tools, and procedures and the formulation of effective responses. In the wake of the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in the United Kingdom in 2018, the coordinated expulsion of over 140 Russian diplomatic personnel from allied nations demonstrates how a well-coordinated response can impose costs on a threat actor.⁴⁷ Building cross-border resilience and reducing vulnerability to deny benefit, however, requires enduring cooperation and demonstrations of shared capability and resolve.

Allies and partners can support Enduring Information Vigilance in multiple ways: sharing analysis and assessments to understand and counter threats; developing ongoing joint strategic communications to engage hostile states' target audiences; joint exercising of contingencies; and creating issue-specific plurilateral groups allowing partners to respond or put pressure on adversaries in specific regions or on specific topics, such as a wildlife commission into wet markets.

Finally, adversaries use information operations to exploit open societies and undermine shared democratic values; therefore, they must remain the center of gravity for any approach to countering hostile interference. Preserving these values and the transparency, openness, and commitments to freedom of expression and human rights through a community of democracies will ensure our societies continue to provide an alternative to the authoritarian regimes of hostile states.

Conclusion

The coronavirus pandemic has underscored the West's patchwork response to hostile-state information operations and the need for change. Western democracies must reorganize and reorient themselves to address this threat through Enduring Information Vigilance by investing in nuanced capability building, casting aside turf and funding wars to coordinate more effectively across government, and actively driving cooperation with allies and partners worldwide. These structures cannot be built overnight; they require a long-term commitment that will likely outlast the political class initiating them. But the result will be a more resilient society that reassures its populations and denies adversaries benefit, deterring malign attempts to exploit the openness of democracy.

47. UK Government, "PM Commons Statement on National Security and Russia," March 26, 2018, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-commons-statement-on-national-security-and-russia-26-march-2018/>.

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COVID-19

The COVID-19 Enemy is Still Advancing

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ABSTRACT: The US military has a historical precedence for dealing with a pandemic while simultaneously conducting large-scale combat operations. Two twentieth-century examples assess the extent to which the military adapted operations following an influenza outbreak, and make clear military and civilian leaders must balance strategic objectives when facing threat multipliers such as COVID-19.

The strategic environment remains uncertain, complex, and continues to change rapidly.¹ The novel coronavirus has validated this point, inducing a pivot in history and altering the landscape: on March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization declared Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) a global pandemic.² “Now the trumpet summons us again—not as a call to bear arms . . . but a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle . . . a struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease, and war itself.”³ Although the virus seemingly has eclipsed what military leaders have trained to defeat—a visible adversary with agency—the virus bears a striking resemblance to a thinking enemy; it utilizes stealth, speed, and surprise.

Before COVID-19 gained momentum, the United States was responding to multiple dilemmas around the globe. In early 2020, tensions between the United States and Iran spiked following mutual retaliatory military actions in the aftermath of the US airstrike that killed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Commander, Major General Qassem Soleimani, triggering a standoff.

In Afghanistan, the United States was continuing to struggle with asymmetric warfare despite the doctrinal shift toward near-peer and large-scale combat operations.⁴ Terrorist and insurgent groups continued to present challenges to US, Afghan, and Coalition forces.⁵ Although US-Taliban negotiations were on the horizon, conditions were far from ideal. In January, the Department of Defense released a semiannual

1. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), *Joint Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington DC: CJCS, 2017), 1-1.

2. US Department of Health and Human Services, *Guidance for Certifying Deaths Due to Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)*, (Washington, DC: Centers for Disease Control, 2020), 1.

3. John F. Kennedy, presidential inaugural address (transcript), Washington, DC, January 20, 1961, <https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=91&page=transcript>.

4. Hew Strachan, “Learning lessons from Afghanistan: Two Imperatives,” *Parameters* 49, no. 3 (2019): 7.

5. DoD, *Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: Amazon Digital Services LLC, 2019), 25.

report on Afghanistan, which stated Taliban violence, coupled with al-Qaeda and ISIS-Khorasan operations in Afghanistan, continued.

In early 2020, escalating tensions in the Pacific were equally challenging. By the end of 2019, North Korea had fired at least 25 ballistic missiles in 13 launches, including tests of new short-range and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.⁶ The United States, with over 28,500 soldiers stationed in South Korea, had successfully avoided conflict while preventing North Korea's nuclear ambitions. But North Korea continued to reject peaceful negotiations with the United States and amplified its aggressive rhetoric against its southern neighbor and some in the region were questioning American commitment to and influence in northeast Asia.⁷

In Africa in early 2020, the US military continued to rotate forces. Al-Shabaab was the dominant insurgent terrorist organization operating from Somalia in the Horn of Africa. In 2012, al-Shabaab merged with al-Qaeda, and the enhanced group continued to maintain its tenacity.⁸ Similarly the influence of China and Russia had deepened in the region. Africa generally views China, its biggest trading partner, positively, and in October 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin hosted the first Russia-Africa summit.⁹ In February, the Department of Defense deployed the Army's 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade in place of elements of the 101st Airborne Division to the continent to conduct train, advise, and assist missions.¹⁰ As of January 2020, over 5,000 US military personnel were deployed in Africa in support of US Africa Command.¹¹ In total, at the time of the declaration of the pandemic, the US military had over 171,000 active duty personnel deployed around the globe.¹²

The addition of COVID-19 to existing complex and nonlinear threats worldwide, including extreme weather, rising sea levels, and arctic warming, creates a new challenge and forces military leaders to

6. Colum Lynch, "North Korea Continues to Flout Trump, Advance Nuclear Ambitions," *Foreign Policy*, April 20, 2020, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/20/north-korea-trump-advance-nuclear-ambitions/>.

7. "American Steadfastness Is in Doubt in South Korea Thanks to Trump's Policies" *Washington Post*, November 23, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/american-steadfastness-is-in-doubt-in-south-korea-thanks-to-trumps-policies/2019/11/23/efdaf63c-0bc4-11ea-97ac-a7ccc8dd1ebc_story.html.

8. Rajen Harshé, "Al Shabaab's Insurgency and the Somali Imbroglio in the Horn of Africa," Observer Research Foundation, July 7, 2020, <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/al-shabaabs-insurgency-and-the-somali-imbroglio-in-the-horn-of-africa-69289/>.

9. Danielle Paquette, "Trump Administration Unveils Its New Africa Strategy—with Wins and Snags," *Washington Post*, June 19, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/trump-administration-unveils-its-new-africa-strategy--with-wins-and-snags/2019/06/19/c751be4c-91f5-11e9-956a-88c291ab5c38_story.html.

10. Alyssa Farah, "Statement on the Deployment of Army's 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade to Africa," DoD (website), February 12, 2020, <https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2082314/statement-on-the-deployment-of-armys-1st-security-force-assistance-brigade-to-a/>.

11. Luis Martinez, "Pentagon to Decide Soon on Possible Troop Cut in West Africa" ABC News, January 16, 2020, <https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/pentagon-decide-troop-cut-west-africa/story?id=68342094>.

12. "Department of Defense Personnel," Defense Manpower Data Center.

rethink how to maintain global strategic initiatives. More importantly, the conventional threats in each region mentioned above persist. Put simply, the virus is a threat multiplier; it is unconventional with real impacts on national security.¹³ Threat multipliers intensify conditions that tip the scale for societies already vulnerable to social, political, and economic instability, compelling the United States and its allies and partners to respond.

While COVID-19 has made an effective assault against the United States and its allies, partners, and adversaries alike, Iran, North Korea, China, Russia, and terrorist groups continue to pose a threat to national security and would surely exploit opportunities to gain dominance. In other words, the enemy is still advancing. The military's challenge is to strike a balance between pursuing global opportunities while also protecting servicemembers, families, and civilian employees. While COVID-19 feels like an unfamiliar problem, the military has overcome this type of complexity before.

Historical Precedence

“One should not be surprised that diseases occur in a loosely constituted polity such as a multitude of states of various sizes: after all, they also occur in the marvelously structured organic whole of all living nature.”¹⁴ The United States entered World War I in April 1917, one year before the outbreak of the influenza. The years of conflict saw the central powers of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire fighting the Allies—Great Britain, the United States, France, Russia, Italy, and Japan.¹⁵ Even though Russia's decision to end the war via a separate peace treaty with Germany in March 1917 risked a death blow to the Allied cause, Britain, France, and other partners were able to absorb the shock thanks to the Americans.¹⁶ The United States shifted away from neutrality aimed at continental defense and found itself in the throes of a new strategic environment featuring aerial combat, chemical weapons, the unyielding gridlock of trench warfare, and a new invisible enemy.

Known as the Three Day Fever, Grippe, Grip, knock-me-down fever, Flanders Grippe, Spanish Grippe, and most commonly Spanish flu, this new strain of influenza struck all combatants without prejudice.¹⁷ The German Army reportedly lost 14,000 soldiers to influenza.¹⁸ The influenza pandemic of 1918–19 circled the globe in three waves:

13. Michael T. Klare, *All Hell Breaking Loose: The Pentagon's Perspective on Climate Change* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2019), 21.

14. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 374, Kindle.

15. Cynthia A. Roby, *Strategic Inventions of World War I* (New York: Cavendish Square Publishing, LLC, 2016), 5.

16. Kevin Hillstrom, *World War I and the Age of Modern Warfare* (Detroit, MI: Omnigraphics, Inc., 2013), 73.

17. Grant T. Harward, “Get the Boys Home—Toot Sweet,” *Army History* 115 (Spring 2020): 29.

18. Peter C. Wever and Leo Van Bergen, “Death from 1918 Pandemic Influenza during the First World War: A Perspective from Personal and Anecdotal Evidence,” *Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses* 8, no. 5 (2014): 540.

spring 1918, fall 1918, and winter 1918–19.¹⁹ While there are several theories explaining the origins of the influenza pandemic, in recent years researchers such as Mark O. Humphries, Christopher Langford, Dorothy A. Pettit, and Janice Bailie have adopted the hypothesis that the influenza pandemic diffused as a result of the Chinese Labor Corps following the sinews of war, moving from China, to North America, to Europe, to Africa, and then back again.²⁰ Despite its origin, scholars widely agree the pandemic's explosion in the summer and autumn of 1918 can be explained by the massive movements of demobilized armies.²¹

By the summer of 1918, First Army was busily engaged in preparations for the Saint-Mihiel offensive.²² The Saint-Mihiel offensive was the first major operation of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) and served as a proving ground for American soldiers and for General John J. Pershing, vindicating his insistence the American soldier fight as an independent entity with unique objectives and responsibilities.²³ The Saint-Mihiel offensive was the first time Pershing fielded an entire army with 550,000 troops.²⁴ The operation took place in trench warfare, a new tactical method requiring great detail and synchronization.

As a result of the rapid increase of American troops in Europe and subsequent Allied and American victories during the summer of 1918, in September the Allies successfully conducted a large convergent offensive movement against the German forces on the Western Front—the Meuse-Argonne offensive.²⁵ For the Allies, the Meuse-Argonne offensive coincided with the highly fatal second wave of influenza.²⁶ The high watermark for deaths in the United States came the week of October 4, 1918, with 6,160 officially recorded deaths and in the AEF, the week of October 11, 1918, there were 1,451 deaths from flu during the height of the American Meuse-Argonne campaign.²⁷ For the month of October the AEF evacuated some 110,000 patients, over a division per week, due to influenza.²⁸ Strategic success depended upon crippling the Germans. The American Army was to advance northward between the Meuse River and the Argonne Forest, supported on its left by the French Fourth Army west of the Argonne.²⁹ The First US Army, which reached a strength in early October of about 900,000 Americans and was

19. Mark Osborne Humphries, "Paths of Infection: The First World War and the Origins of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic," *War in History* 21, no. 1 (2013): 56.

20. Humphries, "Paths of Infection," 58.

21. Humphries, "Paths of Infection," 60.

22. American Battle Monuments Commission (ABMC), *American Armies and Battlefields in Europe: A History, Guide, and Reference Book* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office (GPO), 1938), 171.

23. Allan Kent Powell, ed., *Nels Anderson's World War I Diary* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2013), 100.

24. Carol R. Byerly, *Fever of War: The Influenza Epidemic in the US Army during World War I* (New York: New York University Press, 2005), 99.

25. ABMC, *American Armies*, 167.

26. Wever and Van Bergen, "Death from 1918 Pandemic," 538.

27. Carol R. Byerly, *Fever of War*, 80.

28. Edward G. Lengel, ed., *A Companion to the Meuse-Argonne Campaign* (West Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 2014), 383.

29. ABMC, *American Armies*, 167.

reinforced by more than 100,000 French, was responsible for leading the offensive.³⁰

By the end of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, hundreds of thousands of soldiers had crossed the Atlantic, many traveling with and spreading the virus. Pandemic influenza struck all the armies, but the highest morbidity rate was found among the Americans as the disease sickened 26 percent of the US Army, over one million men.³¹ The pandemic struck at the climax of US military operations and created a new complexity for military leaders. The influenza clogged transportation lines along the battlefield, overwhelmed hospitals, killed thousands of soldiers, and rendered many more noneffective.³² Despite the pandemic's devastating effects, the military had no choice but to continue its assault into France until the November 11, 1918 Armistice.

Lessons from History

To paraphrase Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, no plan survives contact with the enemy. During World War I, the enemy was not only the German Army but the influenza pandemic. World War I produced 8.5 million casualties, remarkable by any measure.³³ But advanced planning against a known threat is not always enough. The influenza pandemic of 1918–19 killed approximately 40 million people worldwide.³⁴ With its common ally, pneumonia, influenza was the deadliest enemy to strike during that war, ignoring the Armistice to wage its third and final campaign during the first half of 1919.³⁵ Military leaders could not have predicted a pandemic would occur at the height of the war. Though we tend to think of World War I dangers in terms of artillery, gunfire, poisonous gas, and barbed wire, the influenza pandemic had a much greater impact on the US military than occasional references would suggest.³⁶

Military leaders struggled to combat the spread of the virus. Researcher Kathleen Fargey details Army experiences in five locations—Camp McClellan, Alabama; Camp Merritt, New Jersey; Camp Meade, Maryland; Camp Greenleaf, Georgia; and Camp Gièvres, France—between 1918 and 1919. Camp McClellan first experienced the influenza on September 20, 1918. Medical officers learned that by keeping buildings clean, airing out tents and bedding daily, exposing troops to fresh air, and keeping recovering patients isolated for an additional 10 days, they could mitigate the impacts of the flu. Despite officials quarantining the

30. ABMC, *American Armies*, 192.

31. Wever and Van Bergen, "Death from 1918 Pandemic," 539.

32. Carol R. Byerly, "The U.S. Military and the Influenza Pandemic of 1918–1919," *Public Health Reports* 125, supplemental 3 (2010): 89.

33. John Graham Royde-Smith and Dennis E. Showalter, "World War I," *Encyclopædia Britannica* (website), July 21, 2020, <https://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-I/Killed-wounded-and-missing>.

34. US Homeland Security Council, *National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza: Implementation Plan* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2006), 1.

35. Kathleen M. Fargey, "The Deadliest Enemy: The US Army and Influenza," *Army History* 111 (Spring 2019): 25.

36. Fargey, "The Deadliest Enemy," 25.

camp from October 2 to October 14, over 4,900 cases of influenza and pneumonia and about 228 reported deaths from these causes occurred there in October 1918.

Pandemic influenza arrived at Camp Merritt on September 16, 1918, and after a few days doctors realized the new flu cases were “of far greater severity” than earlier cases of the flu.³⁷ This camp was a critical hub for mobilization. Between December 1917 and November 1919, over 500,000 soldiers representing dozens of Army divisions deployed overseas. Camp (now Fort) Meade, Maryland, was another large cantonment established in 1917 to handle draftees. Camp Meade’s doctors were aware of influenza outbreaks at other Army camps and had cleared beds—moving patients, convalescents, and staff to tents—in anticipation of the flu’s arrival.

On September 23, 1918, the second and deadlier wave of the epidemic arrived at Camp Greenleaf. By October 26, there were roughly 5,160 flu cases and 999 cases of pneumonia resulting in 325 deaths.³⁸ In June 1918, the flu broke out in Camp Gièvres, in central France, among Chinese laborers. Many historians believe US troops carried the flu to France following outbreaks at fourteen large Army camps in the United States in the spring of 1918.³⁹ Desperation to build up troops in France led Army Chief of Staff Peyton March to reject recommendations from the medical experts to execute a one-week quarantine prior to embarkation and to reduce the capacity of troop ships. March would later agree to a 10 percent reduction in crowding on troopships, but that was all.⁴⁰

Despite the added complexity of the influenza, leaders adapted and never lost sight of their strategic objective to defeat the Germans. At Camp Humphreys, a US Army training camp in Virginia, leaders discovered crowding increased the spread of influenza as its incidence grew proportionally with the number of soldiers in the barracks.⁴¹ Similarly, Surgeon General Charles Richard recommended a one-week quarantine of all troops before embarkation and a reduction in the capacity of troopships by one-half.⁴² In October 1918, the US Army Medical Department recognized leaders could minimize influenza on troopships by transporting soldiers who had recovered from or been exposed to the flu. By mid-October, the practice of taking men who had already weathered the epidemic also reduced the influenza rates on troopships and in the AEF.⁴³ In similar efforts to contain the outbreak, the commander of Camp Upton, New York, Brigadier General John Skinner Mallory, placed the camp’s 30,000 inhabitants under quarantine, barring travel except on urgent business.⁴⁴

37. Fargey, “The Deadliest Enemy,” 27.

38. Fargey, “The Deadliest Enemy,” 29.

39. Fargey, “The Deadliest Enemy,” 30.

40. Byerly, “Pandemic of 1918–1919,” 90.

41. Wever and Van Bergen, “Death from 1918 Pandemic,” 543.

42. Byerly, “Pandemic of 1918–1919,” 89.

43. Byerly, “Pandemic of 1918–1919,” 90.

44. Byerly, “Pandemic of 1918–1919,” 87.

Pershing is another example of adaptable leadership. During then-Colonel George C. Marshall's assignment as the chief of operations for the First Army, he recounts life became "a succession of dangers, discomforts, and hungers, with a continuous pressure being exerted on the individual to do more than he felt himself or his organization capable of accomplishing."⁴⁵ By October 1918, First Army faced the enemy along 90 miles of the front between the Aire River and the Meuse River, one third of which was subject to continued assault.⁴⁶ Marshall adds, under these conditions "real leaders of the Army stood forth in bold contrast to those of ordinary clay."⁴⁷ First Army also faced the most deadly form of influenza that fall, which was soon accompanied by pneumonia; both peaked in October.⁴⁸ The pandemic and the Meuse-Argonne offensive stressed the entire medical system.⁴⁹

According to firsthand accounts by Marshall, October marked the crisis of battle both due to the enemy and to the rampant pessimism among high-ranking officers.⁵⁰ Organizations with weak and pessimistic leadership quickly grew ineffective unless a suitable commander was given charge. But Marshall recounts that throughout the crisis, Pershing carried himself with an air of relentless determination to push the operation to a decisive victory.⁵¹ Marshall adds Pershing's presence inspired confidence and his bearing convinced others the "weak-hearted would be eliminated and half measures would not be tolerated."⁵² During the northward advance, Marshall saw the spirit of competition was awakened in the American soldiers where "the men threw aside all thoughts of danger and fatigue in their efforts to exceed their neighbors."⁵³

The military was just beginning to understand the impacts of disease during battle.⁵⁴ Alexander Fleming was a Scottish physician-scientist recognized for discovering penicillin. When World War I broke out, Fleming served in the Army Medical Corps as a captain. During this time, he observed the death of many of his fellow soldiers, not always from wounds inflicted in battle, but from the ensuing uncontrolled infection. The primary means to combat infection was antiseptics, which frequently did more harm than good. In 1928, Fleming began experimenting with the common staphylococcal bacteria and was able to isolate a mold fluid he identified as a member of the genus *Penicillium*.⁵⁵

45. George C. Marshall, *Memoirs of My Services in the World War, 1917–1918*, ed. James Lawton Collins (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), 175.

46. Marshall, *Memoirs of My Services*, 176.

47. Marshall, *Memoirs of My Services*, 175.

48. Fargey, "The Deadliest Enemy," 33.

49. Wever and Van Bergen, "Death from 1918 Pandemic," 540.

50. Marshall, *Memoirs of My Services*, 175.

51. Marshall, *Memoirs of My Services*, 176.

52. Marshall, *Memoirs of My Services*, 176.

53. Marshall, *Memoirs of My Services*, 192.

54. Leonard Porter Ayres, *The War with Germany: A Statistical Summary* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1919), 123.

55. Siang Yong Tan and Yvonne Tatsumura, "Alexander Fleming (1881–1955): Discoverer of Penicillin," *Singapore Medical Journal* 56, no. 7 (July 2015): 366.

He discovered the fluid killed the bacteria not the mold. Fleming published the discovery of penicillin in the *British Journal of Experimental Pathology* in 1929.

History has pointed out during times of war and peace, militaries will never execute strategies as the planners initially conceived.⁵⁶ Unfortunately, the experiences of the US Army in combating influenza during World War I are often overlooked, in part because the virus came, killed, and moved on with little impact on the course of the war.⁵⁷ Additionally, some would argue the number of influenza fatalities at the time relative to the size of First Army—seven divisions and more than 500,000 soldiers—makes such an example insignificant.⁵⁸

But while the US military helped to subdue the Germans, the medical profession failed to conquer an even more deadly, unseen enemy.⁵⁹ Furthermore, the war fostered disease by creating conditions in the trenches of France some epidemiologists believe enabled the influenza virus to evolve into a killer of global proportions.⁶⁰ The 1918 pandemic influenza had a profound impact on both the military apparatus and the individual soldier.⁶¹ The War Department estimated 51 percent of Army deaths during the war had been caused by disease. The examples above illustrate how Army leadership had to deal with two seemingly overwhelming challenges—large expeditionary forces fighting an unprecedented war and an unrelenting killer virus.⁶² If they are not careful, military leaders today will overlook the lessons of the past.

Recommendations

In the case of COVID-19, the government and science predicted a pandemic was on the horizon. In 2005, the Homeland Security Council published the *National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza: Implementation Plan*. The document warned of a crisis that could overwhelm our health and medical capabilities while leaving hundreds of thousands of deaths in its wake.⁶³ The strategy further advised, “while a pandemic will not damage power lines, banks or computer networks, it will ultimately threaten all critical infrastructure by removing essential personnel from the workplace for weeks or months.”⁶⁴

56. Richard Hart Sinnreich, “Patterns of Grand Strategy,” in *The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy, and War*, ed. Williamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich, and James Lacey (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 254.

57. Wever and Van Bergen, “Death from 1918 Pandemic,” 544.

58. “The American Expeditionary Forces,” Library of Congress (website), accessed August 7, 2020, <https://www.loc.gov/collections/stars-and-stripes/articles-and-essays/a-world-at-war/american-expeditionary-forces/#:~:text=LC%2DUSZ62%2D113824,of%20127%2C500%20officers%20and%20soldiers>.

59. Byerly, “Pandemic of 1918–1919,” 91.

60. Byerly, “Pandemic of 1918–1919,” 125.

61. Wever and Van Bergen, “Death from 1918 Pandemic,” 544.

62. Patricia Shields and Donald Travis, “Achieving Organizational Flexibility through Ambidexterity,” *Parameters* 47, no. 2 (2017): 74.

63. US Homeland Security Council, *National Strategy*, 1.

64. US Homeland Security Council, *National Strategy*, 2.

While COVID-19 seems unfamiliar, it is not a new problem for the Army. The nation has a strategy for dealing with pandemics and complex scenarios. Since the DoD pandemic plan was developed in 2006, the US military has held pandemic exercises in locations such as Germany, Hawaii, Indiana, and South Carolina, involving rapid vaccination of local communities, enactment of quarantines, and communication and coordination with multiple agencies and officials.⁶⁵ The challenge for the Department of Defense is training its leaders to manage complexity while in contact with an adversary. How can this be done? It is impossible to plan for every contingency, so leaders must remain adaptable. The following recommendations are intended for present and future leaders who will face these complex scenarios.

First, detailed planning against a known enemy is not always enough. First Army operations officer Marshall proved the AEF could outthink, outmaneuver, and out-resource the Germans. As First Army penetrated the German defense in the Saint-Mihiel offensive, planners simultaneously prepared for the Meuse-Argonne offensive. Both operations took place in unyielding and intensive trench warfare, which some epidemiologists believe enabled the influenza virus to evolve into a more lethal killer. But the plan did not consider the highly fatal second wave of influenza occurring during the decisive Meuse-Argonne offensive or the toll of disease and exhaustion on the AEF during the height of combat operations at all ranks. By October 11, 1918, the pneumonia mortality for the AEF was 43 percent.⁶⁶ For the American Army, the influenza overlapped almost completely with its wartime operations. The AEF was faced with the challenge of defeating both germs and Germans.⁶⁷

Marshall describes the combination of tired muscles, physical discomfort, and heavy casualties as causing officers of high ranks to lose their will and take on an exceedingly gloomy view of the situation.⁶⁸ Surely plans must be feasible and well thought out. But they also require leaders with *relentless determination* to face planning branches and sequels head on, inspiring confidence along the way. Pershing exemplified the leadership First Army needed to overcome complexity by pushing forward with the operational task at hand, despite the combination of influenza and widespread pessimism.

COVID-19 has already changed the lives of Americans and the world. A second or third wave may occur during our next decisive operation. Military leaders, therefore, must have the confidence and determination to face the unknown. Again, no plan survives first contact with the enemy, and in some cases the enemy will be invisible.

Second, military leaders must trust the experts while adapting quickly to the unknown. First Army staff, and all armies that fought in

65. Fargey, "The Deadliest Enemy," 36.

66. Byerly "Fever of War," 98.

67. Byerly "Fever of War," 97.

68. Marshall, *Memoirs of My Services*, 175.

World War I, developed the wholly new and three-dimensional forms of combined arms tactics, adapting to the new operational environment.⁶⁹ Back home, medical officers and camp commanders also adapted, doing their best to learn and adjust to an invisible enemy. Leaders risked success by not trusting the experts. Army Chief of Staff Peyton March was reluctant to listen to the medical experts and had no intention of inhibiting US participation in the war.⁷⁰

Luckily by mid-October 1918, the practice of taking men from camps that had already weathered the epidemic gained traction and finally reduced the influenza rates on troopships and in the AEF.⁷¹ But failure to adapt could have significantly hindered mobilization across the Army camps. The war itself was a revolutionary change further complicated by the influenza pandemic of 1918–19. No military planner would have predicted a war of this scale or that an even more lethal global pandemic would ensue during their watch. Both occurred. And for those currently deployed in combat zones, the same scenario is happening again. In the case of COVID-19, as with the 1918–19 pandemic, military leaders must develop adaptable plans, listen to the experts, and be good improvisers.

Third, leaders must train physically and mentally for complexity. During World War I, Marshall recounts leaders who were in excellent physical condition maintained the will and optimism to conquer the enemy in the face of adversity.⁷² Similarly, leaders must remain mentally ready to conduct large-scale combat or asymmetric operations while simultaneously confronting a coordinated chemical and cyberattack following a natural disaster. There are no such things as far-fetched scenarios. The leader who says, “that would never happen” should be challenged. The impacts of the ill-timed influenza pandemic of 1918–19 and COVID-19 today are proof of the perils of this kind of thinking. At the same time, planners must direct their efforts. First Army planners focused efforts on developing plans to penetrate the German defense in trench warfare, trusting commanders would do their part in overcoming the additional challenges of exhaustion, pessimism, and influenza. In other words, planners must develop creative, tailorable solutions and count on mentally and physically fit operational and tactical leaders to do the rest.

On the surface, COVID-19 represents uncharted territory for the military. But the military has responded to similar complexity and adversity in the past. To see the current national emergency as creating a new normal for the military overlooks the lessons of history. The Army has and will continue to face multiple dilemmas often while in contact with an adversary. Complexity will only continue to grow. Despite the current pandemic, the enemy is still advancing.

69. MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, *The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 145, Kindle.

70. Byerly, “Pandemic of 1918–1919,” 90.

71. Byerly, “Pandemic of 1918–1919,” 90.

72. Marshall, *Memoirs of My Services*, 175.

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Two Worlds: African American Servicemembers, WWII and Today

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ABSTRACT: The theory of social stigma provides a context for the subjective experience of African American servicemembers in World War II. Those experiences reveal the paradox the military faces when addressing racial discrimination. An examination of these experiences suggests only a collective response by African American servicemembers will solve this problem.

The death of George Floyd in police custody on May 25, 2020 galvanized Americans from every background to protest in the streets, where they demanded to know why racial inequities persist in the twenty-first century. Many Americans did more than protest, as unparalleled numbers sought to educate themselves about racism, driving the sales of books on mass incarceration, White privilege, and White supremacy to the top of the best-seller list.¹ Yet one perspective has been omitted from the public's reading list: the experience of African Americans in the US armed forces since World War II. This fact is surprising because, arguably, no other institution has done more to end racial discrimination and provide opportunities to African Americans.² As the last war America fought with a segregated military and the first war in which the US government promised to treat African Americans equally, World War II reveals the paradox the military faces when addressing racial discrimination. This article contends as long as the military views race as a meaningful difference between servicemembers, the armed forces cannot avoid making African American servicemembers feel inferior to their White counterparts.

Since historians have generally failed to analyze what it means to be judged inferior on account of one's race, this paper employs Erving Goffman's theory of social stigma, which sociologists have lately reevaluated to understand better the power dynamics of race relations. The article examines two incidents from World War II that reveal the impact of stigmatization on African American servicemembers and compares them to General Charles "CQ" Brown's description of

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1. Mary Cadden, "Books about Race Flying off Shelves, Climbing Best-Seller Lists Following the Death of George Floyd, Protests," *USA Today*, June 4, 2020, <https://www.usatoday.com/story/entertainment/books/2020/06/04/books-race-flying-off-shelves-following-george-floyds-death/3143169001/>.

2. Douglas Walter Bristol, Jr. and Heather Marie Stur, eds., *Integrating the U.S. Military: Race, Gender, and Sexual Orientation since World War II* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017), 219.

“living in two worlds.”³ This brief comparison suggests only a collective response by servicemembers will eradicate racial stigma in the military.

The US armed forces had a great deal of racism to overcome. As recently as World War II, the military rigidly enforced segregation. Black veteran Lamar Lenoir recalled the impact of segregation on his military service in Africa and Italy during World War II when he said: “You know, your area, your situation that you would really run into, they were segregated. It was just black and white.” Nonetheless, Lenoir said his time in the army “was a great experience.” He said he enjoyed seeing the world and meeting Europeans. Lenoir also said he got respect for being a well-trained medic in the army, something he would never have received back home in Mississippi. He said, “I had something that somebody wanted, you know.”⁴ The contributions of African American men and women like Lenoir during World War II paved the way for President Harry Truman in 1948 to order the desegregation of the armed forces, which began a long process of reform that reached a new milestone this spring with the appointment of Brown as the first Black Air Force Chief of Staff.

While Brown awaited Senate confirmation, Minneapolis police killed George Floyd, and the general responded by posting a video on Twitter that quickly went viral. In his video, Brown described his military experience as “living in two worlds,” one Black and one White, eerily reminiscent of the way Lamar Lenoir described his experience in the military 75 years before.⁵ The fact that Brown, on the eve of his historic appointment, still felt like an outsider in the military because of his skin color draws attention to the subjective experience of African American servicemembers.

Literature Review

The experience of African American servicemembers “living in two worlds” has been largely overlooked by scholars. As Christine Knauer observes, historians tend to look at the integration of the armed forces “mostly ‘from the top down’” and pay little attention to the daily lives of African American servicemembers.⁶ For example, one prominent scholar in the field, Bernard Nalty, said it was pressure “from elected officials, from the demands of war, or from Black Americans themselves” that led to successive waves of military reform during the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and in the all-volunteer force.⁷ Although they note the protests of African Americans served as a catalyst for reform, the primary

3. General Charles “CQ” Brown, “What I Am Thinking About,” Pacific Air Force Services, YouTube, accessed June 25, 2020, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mx0HnOTUkVI>.

4. Lamar Lenoir, “An Oral History with Mr. Lamar Lenoir,” in *Mississippi Oral History Program of the University of Southern Mississippi*, vol. 496 (Hattiesburg, MS: Special Collections, McCain Library, University of Southern Mississippi, 1993), 6, 21, 26.

5. Brown, “What I Am Thinking About.”

6. Christine Knauer, *Let Us Fight as Free Men: Black Soldiers and Civil Rights* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 6.

7. Bernard C. Nalty, *Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military* (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 354.

concern of these historians is the problem of racial discrimination, so they focus on institutions and White people.⁸

A more recent trend has been to study African Americans in the military as agents in the Black freedom struggle. The pioneering work of Robert Jefferson, Leisa Meyer, and James Westheider gave voice to the Black men and women who fought for equal rights in the military during World War II and Vietnam.⁹ The latest studies employing this approach have broadened in scope to examine multiple wars and consider how the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements affected the views of African American servicemembers.¹⁰ Knauer herself joins a group of scholars who examine Black activism through the lens of gender, and their books focus on African American soldiers demanding recognition of their manhood.¹¹ The use of the Black freedom struggle as a model for studying the fight for equal rights in the military, however, still neglects the experience of typical African American servicemembers because this approach fails to consider why they served.

Simply put, most African Americans have tended to view their military service as a patriotic duty and as a means to realize their career ambitions rather than as an opportunity for activism. Historian Neil McMillen interviewed almost fifty Black World War II veterans in Mississippi before he reached this conclusion. He had expected the veterans to associate their military service with a claim to full citizenship, in line with the ideology of the Double V campaign urging African Americans to fight against the Axis overseas and against racial discrimination at home. To his surprise, he discovered none of them had even heard of the Double V campaign during the war. McMillen said, “most of these men and women insisted that, however resentful of social injustice, they served in uniform because this was their country too.”¹²

Charles Moskos looked at the early all-volunteer force and found the percentage of African Americans in the Army almost doubled from the 17 percent they comprised when the draft had ended, attracted by bonuses

8. Sherie Mershon and Steven Schlossman, *Foxholes & Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed Forces* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); and William A. Taylor, *Military Service and American Democracy: From World War II to the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2016).

9. Robert F. Jefferson, *Fighting For Hope: African American Troops of the 93rd Infantry Division in World War II and Postwar America* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2008); Leisa D. Meyer, *Creating GI Jane: Sexuality and Power in the Women's Army Corps during World War II* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); and James E. Westheider, *Fighting on Two Fronts: African Americans and the Vietnam War* (New York: New York University Press, 1997).

10. Kimberly L. Phillips, *War! What Is It Good For? Black Freedom Struggles and the U.S. Military from World War II to Iraq* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012); and Jeremy P. Maxwell, *Brotherhood in Combat: How African Americans Found Equality in Korea and Vietnam* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2018).

11. Knauer, *Let Us Fight*; Herman Graham, *The Brother's Vietnam War: Black Power, Manhood, and the Military Experience* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003); Steve Estes, *I Am a Man! Race, Manhood, and the Civil Rights Movement* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005); and Adriane Lentz-Smith, *Freedom Struggles: African Americans and World War I* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).

12. Neil R. McMillen, “Fighting for What We Didn't Have: How Mississippi's Black Veterans Remembered World War II,” in *Remaking Dixie: The Impact of World War II on the American South*, ed. Neil R. McMillen (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1997), 104–5.

and good pay.¹³ Beth Bailey confirmed this interpretation of African American motives for enlisting in the early all-volunteer force when she uncovered market research showing young Black men interested in joining the military “were more concerned about salary than were young white men.”¹⁴ So, what do African American servicemembers have in common over time? They share the experience of dealing with White servicemembers who view them as inferior on account of their skin color. To shed light on these interactions, this article employs the theory of social stigma, which, to the author’s knowledge, is the first application of this theory to military history.

Social stigma theory posits that face-to-face interactions can be analyzed, a sphere of activity best studied through microanalysis. According to sociologist Imogen Tyler, “what is most novel and influential” about Erving Goffman’s definition of stigma is it: “describes a relation between normal and stigmatized persons. What he means by this is that people acquire stigma in their exchanges with other people.”¹⁵ Goffman says stigma arises from “normals” devaluing an individual because he or she has an undesirable characteristic, whether it be a physical handicap, a questionable character, or they belong to the wrong ethnicity, race, or religion.¹⁶ Hence the reaction of others, as Goffman puts it, spoils one’s identity as a normal person. A stigma, according to the theory, makes “normal” people believe stigmatized individuals are “not quite human” and discriminate against them.¹⁷ There is also a tendency, Goffman said, to attribute many flaws to an individual based on the original stigma that, in turn, form the basis for ideologies rationalizing discrimination.¹⁸

As a result, a large gulf exists between how a stigmatized individual views him or herself and how other people view the stigmatized individual. These are the two worlds in which Brown lives. Black sociologist W. E. B. DuBois memorably described this double consciousness as, “always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others . . . measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity.”¹⁹ DuBois’ remarks clearly indicate social relationships between different groups are structured by power. Tyler and other contemporary sociologists accept DuBois’ premise and criticize Goffman for analyzing stigma from the perspective of “normals,” which validates that perspective without considering how society uses stigma

13. Charles C. Moskos and John Sibley Butler, *All That We Can Be: Black Leadership and Racial Integration the Army Way* (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 33–34.

14. Beth Bailey, *America’s Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 79.

15. Imogen Tyler, “Resituating Erving Goffman: From Stigma Power to Black Power,” *The Sociological Review* 66, no. 4 (2018): 747, 750.

16. Erving Goffman, *Stigma: Notes on the Management of a Spoiled Identity* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963; New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 5. Citations refer to 1986 edition.

17. Goffman, *Stigma*, 6.

18. Goffman, *Stigma*, 2–7.

19. W. E. B. DuBois, *The Souls of Black Folk* by W.E.B. DuBois, eds. David W. Blight and Robert Gooding-Williams (1903; repr. New York: Bedford Books, 1997), 38.

to keep social groups lower in rank and position.²⁰ Bruce Link and Jo Phelan add that “stigma power” gives individuals an effective means to control or exclude others precisely because this power operates in ways that are hidden within every day interactions “that are difficult to recognize in the absence of conceptual tools that bring them to light.”²¹

Sociologists have been thinking critically about how “stigma power” applies to racial discrimination. Caroline Howarth argues conceptualizing race as a stigma clarifies the operation of racism, drawing attention to how “race is seen in or on the body.”²² This phenomenon relates to the origins of the term stigma, which came from the ancient Greek custom of marking the skin of people viewed as a threat to the community so they could be easily identified. Howarth also thinks because stigma is imposed on others in ways that clash with the identity of the stigmatized, the resulting tension can prompt challenges to the ideology of racism.

In her research on Black students in England, she found families, community groups, and schools could work together to counter racial stigma by making students aware of Black accomplishments and fostering pride in themselves. The key finding of her research is, “an individual cannot develop the confidence and the emotional strength to challenge stigma alone.”²³ Instead, her evidence shows, “resisting stigma can only be a collective enterprise.”²⁴

Imogene Tyler extends this insight about the possibilities of battling racial stigma collectively to reexamine the Civil Rights Movement. She claims, “Black freedom struggles remind us that racial stigmatization is a historical practice centuries in the making.”²⁵ In this context, Tyler reconceptualizes stigma as a political economy of devaluation that marked African Americans as inferior in order to limit their freedom, first in slavery and later in segregation. Tyler says the sit-in protests, where Black teenagers refused to give up their seats at Whites-only lunch counters after being denied service, dramatized the humiliations segregation inflicted on African Americans to mark them as inferior.²⁶

Tyler also notes the violent retaliation of angry Whites against the Black protestors galvanized many African Americans to challenge segregation. She quotes Stokely Carmichael’s explanation for why he joined the sit-ins in 1960: “when I saw those kids on TV, getting back up on their stools after being knocked off of them, sugar in their eyes, catsup in their hair—well, something happened to me. Suddenly, I was burning.”²⁷ Public demonstrations against segregation, therefore, both publicized and undermined the power of racial stigma in the

20. Tyler, “Resituating Erving Goffman,” 756.

21. Bruce G. Link and Jo Phelan, “Stigma Power,” *Social Science and Medicine* 103 (2013): 24.

22. Howarth, “Race as Stigma: Positioning the Stigmatized as Agents, Not Objects,” *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology* 16, no. 6 (2006): 442.

23. Howarth, “Race as Stigma,” 449.

24. Howarth, “Race as Stigma,” 449.

25. Tyler, “Resituating Erving Goffman.”

26. Tyler, “Resituating Erving Goffman.”

27. Tyler, “Resituating Erving Goffman,” 759.

Jim Crow South. She not only demonstrates that the theory of social stigma can be used to interpret African American history, but she also notes an overlooked dimension of the Civil Rights Movement, namely, its participants sought to end racial stigmatization as well as to repeal discriminatory laws.

These sociological analyses of the role stigma plays in racial discrimination inform the following case studies from World War II in three ways. First, segregation, by marking African Americans as having a spoiled identity that dictated their separation from White people, inevitably harmed the self-esteem of African American servicemembers. Second, “stigma power” operated covertly, subordinating African American servicemembers without requiring blatant person-to-person discrimination. Third, although individuals might try to cope with racial stigmatization along the lines suggested by Goffman, only a collective response will overturn it.

Individual Responses to Stigma in World War II

During World War II, African American servicemembers had reason to be dissatisfied—they had been guaranteed equal treatment by the US government and did not receive it. The Selective Service Act of 1940, which established conscription during the war, stated there would be no racial discrimination “in the selection and training of men.”²⁸ The Selective Service system was required to conscript Black men in proportion to their share of the general population, and the armed forces had to train Black servicemen for whatever tasks they were qualified to perform.²⁹ Moreover, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, fearful of losing the Black vote in the 1940 presidential election, agreed to demands from Black leaders to give Black soldiers equal opportunities in all departments of the Army, including the Army Air Force (AAF).³⁰

Yet, as soon as the draft began, the government’s actions fell short of its promises. The Army had not established new units for Black troops, and as a result, only had six Black units consisting of 4,450 Black soldiers, which prevented the Selective Service system from calling up more than a token number of Black troops.³¹ By the end of 1943, the Army planned to reach the goal of African Americans composing 10 percent of its troops, equal to the proportion of African Americans in the general population, but 8 out of 10 Black soldiers were assigned to service units with a large proportion engaged in menial labor, a situation that fell short of the expectations these soldiers had been given.³² These

28. US Congress, *Selective Training and Service Act of 1940*, 50a U.S.C. §§ 302-315 (Suppl. 1 1940), <https://www.loc.gov/item/uscode1940-005050a003>.

29. Ulysses Lee, *The Employment of Negro Troops* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966), 73–74.

30. Harvard Sitkoff, *A New Deal for Blacks: The Emergence of Civil Rights as a National Issue* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 304–5.

31. George Q. Flynn, *The Draft, 1940–1973* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 42–44.

32. Lee, *Employment*, 405–8.

assignments and the indignities of segregation wounded the self-esteem of African American servicemembers.

According to Goffman, Black servicemen could respond to the situation in two ways. Stigmatized individuals could choose to reject the standards of society and turn the views of “normals” on their head, asserting they are full-fledged human beings and those who discriminate are not quite human. Stigmatized individuals could also choose to play along with the “normals.” Goffman calls this reaction managing one’s spoiled identity, and he says to succeed at this task, one must accept the viewpoint of the wider society. Those who adhere to the official line are said to be mature and well adjusted; those who do not are “said to be an impaired person.”³³ An inherent contradiction resides in the attitude of “normals” toward stigmatized individuals. Stigmatized individuals are encouraged to work hard at meeting the standards of society as fully as he or she can. But if efforts at self-improvement are too successful and make the individual appear to be normal, she or he will be regarded with heightened suspicion.³⁴

Goffman says society also expects stigmatized individuals to suppress feelings of anger or depression caused by their spoiled identity. Instead, these individuals are told they should be cheerful because, after all, the “normals” are tolerating their stigma and have their own problems. Navigating life with a spoiled identity requires an extreme courtesy toward “normals” that overlooks slights and always tries to reduce tensions caused by the stigma.³⁵ The notion of managing a spoiled identity captures the experience of Colonel Benjamin Davis Jr., the commander of the first all-Black air unit, the 99th Pursuit Squadron, when he returned to America after his first combat engagements.

A reminder of his racial stigma marred Davis’ triumphant return. Davis came back from Italy in September 1943 to take command of the 332nd Fighter Group, a larger all-Black unit preparing for deployment overseas, only to learn top generals in the AAF sought to discredit the 99th and reassign Black pilots to coastal patrol duty. A Colonel Momyer had written a report stating the 99th lacked discipline and teamwork. In addition, Davis recalled in his memoir the report said “that its formations had disintegrated under fire,” raising questions about the courage and the composure of Black pilots.³⁶

Notes added to the report by AAF officers while they read it show at least some of them viewed Davis and his pilots through the lens of racial stereotypes that associated a range of defects with Black skin. In this line of thinking, the stigma of race discredited Black pilots automatically. One officer, for example, wrote, “the Negro type has not the proper reflexes to make a first-class fighter pilot.”³⁷ In fact, as Davis would argue

33. Goffman, *Stigma*, 115.

34. Goffman, *Stigma*, 115–6.

35. Goffman, *Stigma*, 115–6.

36. Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., *American: An Autobiography* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), 103.

37. Davis, *American*, 103.

before the McCloy Committee that oversaw policies for Black troops, the 99th had performed just as well as White squadrons. A subsequent investigation ordered by Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall confirmed what Davis had said. The debate over the quality of Black pilots ended finally in January 1944 when the 99th, in just two days, shot down 12 enemy fighters over Anzio.³⁸

Yet, before Davis could respond to the false charges against the 99th, he had to suppress his anger. He said, "I was furious." He later remembered his presentation to the McCloy Committee "did not come near to expressing the depths of the rage I felt." The root of Davis' anger was his understanding that he and his pilots were being stigmatized for their race. The report, he said, "was only a reflection of the prevailing AAF attitude toward Blacks." He understood it was up to him to help White officers accept the fact that African Americans can make good pilots. The controversy has to be, Davis said: "handled with the utmost discretion. It would have been hopeless for me to stress the hostility and racism of Whites as the motive behind the [report], although that was clearly the case. Instead, I had to adopt a quiet, reasoned approach, presenting the facts about the 99th in a way that would appeal to fairness and win out over ignorance and racism."³⁹

The debate over the performance of the 99th Pursuit Squadron illustrated the limits of individual efforts to cope with racial stigma. In his recollections of those events, Davis admitted he was unable to challenge racism directly. Instead, he had no choice other than to rely on the goodwill and political calculations of White officers. He suffered greatly in the process. He had to restrain his anger at the injustice of the charges against his unit and play the role of the respectful subordinate, which must have been humiliating. After the war, he received a general's star, evidence he was adept at managing an identity spoiled by his race. But he also must have been painfully aware some of his fellow officers viewed him with contempt for no other reason than his skin color, a stigma he would never overcome, regardless of how many promotions he earned.

Collective Responses to Stigma in World War II

Sociologists today argue the only acceptable way to deal with racial stigma is through a collective effort. A 1942 incident in Houston provides an example of Black soldiers choosing to take a stand against racial stigmatization as a group. Three off-duty Black soldiers were having drinks at a bar in one of Houston's Black neighborhoods when a White police officer barged inside. One of the policeman yelled a racial epithet at the soldiers, "You [...] soldiers," and began to lecture them on the inadequacies of African Americans. One of the soldiers, a Black sergeant, refused to tolerate being degraded and said, "I am not a [...] soldier, we are American soldiers." The policeman shot back, "You are

38. Davis, *American*, 105–7.

39. Davis, *American*, 106.

a [...] soldier if I say so, and if you don't like it I will kill you," and then called for help.⁴⁰

Several policemen came to assist, as did a White military police officer. The White military police officer told the Black soldiers, "they were in the South and were [...] and that they would be treated as such as long as they were there." A standoff ensued, and the White policemen threatened the Black soldiers with death. Yet, because the three Black soldiers stood their ground, the confrontation ended without violence, even though White military police officers patrolling Houston's Black neighborhoods regularly clubbed Black soldiers with their nightsticks. The three soldiers were arrested instead.⁴¹ Their decision to confront racial stigma together had unnerved the White policemen and effectively took away the officers' "stigma power."

Increasingly, Black soldiers chose to fight racial stigmatization in groups, and their resistance began to pose a major threat to the war effort. In 1943, Black soldiers rioted at Camp Van Dorn, Mississippi; Camp Stewart, Georgia; March Field, California; Camp Breckinridge, Kentucky; Camp San Luis Obispo, California; and Fort Bliss, Texas, to name just a few.⁴² Marshall called the racial clashes "an immediately serious problem" and sent a memo in July 1943 threatening to remove commanders who did not "personally and vigorously" address problems with race relations.⁴³ The modest policy reforms that followed provided the legal basis for Black soldiers to adopt the tactic of nonviolent protest. A detailed analysis of military records found, "the share of racial confrontations caused by organized protest by Black soldiers rose from 3.4 percent in 1942 to 19.4 percent in 1944," while the share caused by fighting declined.⁴⁴ Black soldiers had not ended segregation, but their collective resistance had imposed limits on racial stigmatization.

Responding to Stigma Today: Living in Two Worlds

When Brown talked about "living in two worlds, each with their own perspective and views" in his video, he confirmed racial stigma is still a problem.⁴⁵ His memories of situations where he always shouldered the burden of meeting the standards of White people bring to mind DuBois' words about "measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity." As a child, Brown and his sister were the only African Americans in their elementary school, and he remembered "trying to fit in." In high school, although half the students were African Americans, he said he was still "trying to fit in." In the Air Force, Brown said he "was often the only African American

40. Truman K. Gibson Jr., *Knocking Down Barriers: My Fight for Black America* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2005), 96.

41. Gibson, 96.

42. Gibson, *Knocking Down Barriers*, 121; Lee, *The Employment*, 366–74; and Daniel Kryder, *Divided Arsenal: Race and the American States during World War II* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 146.

43. Kryder, *Divided Arsenal*, 147.

44. Kryder, *Divided Arsenal*, 157–8.

45. Brown, "What I Am Thinking About."

in my squadron, or as a senior officer, the only African American in the room.” Most of his mentors, people who gave him “sound advice that has led to my success . . . could not relate to my experience as an African American” because these individuals lived in a different world than he did. His sense of disconnection from the White people who surrounded him was intensified when they chose to use their “stigma power.”⁴⁶

Brown said those experiences of racial stigmatization were unpleasant. In his understated way, he recalled overhearing “insensitive comments made without awareness by others.” One particular incident, however, stood out in his memory—“I was wearing the same flight suit with the same wings on my chest as my peers, and then being questioned by another military member, ‘Are you a pilot?’”⁴⁷ The man obviously did not know him, and given Brown’s uniform was identical to those worn by White airmen, the only characteristic that made him different was the color of his skin. By asking a simple question, this servicemember was able to make Brown feel excluded from his own squadron. The interaction follows the logic of racial stigma by equating difference with inferiority.

In general, Brown thought White airmen, who “don’t have to navigate between two worlds,” had a mixed commitment to addressing racial discrimination. Some, he said, are empathetic, while others do not see racism as a problem “since it didn’t happen to them.”⁴⁸ The results of a 2019 survey of 1,630 active duty *Military Times* subscribers showed Brown is not the only servicemember who observes racism within the ranks. More than one-third of all active duty troops and more than half of minority servicemembers said they had personally witnessed examples of White nationalism or racist ideology in the military. The situation appears to be getting worse, with the number of active duty servicemembers who said they personally witnessed racism increasing by 14 percent from the 2018 *Military Times* survey.⁴⁹

Brown also discussed how he has coped with racial stigma throughout his Air Force career, and his strategy fits Goffman’s description of an individual managing a spoiled identity. He clearly sought to be perceived as mature and well adjusted, so he worked hard to meet the expectations of White supervisors, even when he thought they were prejudiced. He talked about “the pressure I felt to perform error-free, especially for supervisors I perceived had expected less for me as an African American.” Brown said he responded “by working twice as hard to prove their expectations and perceptions of African Americans were invalid.”⁵⁰

46. Brown, “What I Am Thinking About.”

47. Brown, “What I Am Thinking About.”

48. Brown, “What I Am Thinking About.”

49. Leo Shane III, “Signs of White Supremacy, Extremism up Again in Poll of Active-Duty Troops,” *Military Times*, February 6, 2020, <https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2020/02/06/signs-of-white-supremacy-extremism-up-again-in-poll-of-active-duty-troops/>.

50. Brown, “What I Am Thinking About.”

Conclusion

Brown discussed separate Black and White worlds in order to raise awareness that race continues to stigmatize African Americans. In turn, the persistence of racial stigma raises questions for scholars about continuities with the past. On the face of it, major changes such as the end of segregation and affirmative action programs have made today's armed forces into a completely different institution than it was during World War II. Yet the awareness of having an identity spoiled by the stigma of race is a direct parallel between the experience of Brown and his World War II predecessor Davis.

Both men cracked the glass ceiling in the armed forces, attaining general officer rank, by navigating between two worlds and trying to fit in. They succeeded by working harder than their peers and not showing the anger they felt when White superiors questioned their competence. The consequences of racial stigma for Davis, who faced the possibility Black pilots would be removed from combat, were admittedly more serious than for Brown, who faced the possibility of being passed over for promotion. Nevertheless, the feeling of living in two worlds—an existential dilemma forcing African Americans to redefine constantly who they are depending on the situation—remains strong in the twenty-first century. Incidents from the experiences of Davis and Brown in the military illustrate both the hardships caused by racial stigmatization and the limits of trying to cope with them as individuals.

The collective resistance of Black soldiers during World War II to racial stigmatization, however, appears to have been more effective. Black soldiers increasingly responded as a band of brothers, heedless of the consequences, to oppose “stigma power.” In Houston, the determination of three Black soldiers to stand their ground in the face of threats to their lives resulted in arrests—the way White soldiers would have been treated—rather than beatings. And by 1943, the scale of protests by Black soldiers grew to the point that Marshall could no longer ignore the everyday humiliation these soldiers experienced living under White supremacy. Although reforms following Marshall's order were modest in scope, the very existence of these reforms put White servicemembers on notice there were limits to their “stigma power.”

By making his video, Brown appears to have adopted a new strategy for coping with racial stigmatization. His public response to the killing of George Floyd breaks with the tradition of active duty US military officers not commenting on political issues, but to be fair to the general, his remarks strike one as more sociological than political. His decision to speak publicly about his experience of racial stigma make it seem that, like Stokely Carmichael, what he witnessed on television gave him a new frame of reference for understanding how racial discrimination operates. According to recent polls, the protests surrounding George Floyd's death and the #BlackLivesMatter movement were larger than the civil rights protests of the 1960s. Somewhere between 15 to 26 million Americans, in the middle of the worst public health crisis in 100

years, participated in demonstrations, which makes it the largest mass movement in the nation's history.⁵¹

Brown ends his video by talking about the expectations that come with his historic appointment as the first African American to serve as the Air Force Chief of Staff. He appears to realize he can no longer deal with the problems of racial stigma as an individual because he says, "I can't fix centuries of racism in our country, nor can I fix decades of discrimination that may have impacted members of our Air Force." What is his solution? He says he wants: "to lead, participate in, and listen to necessary conversations on racism, diversity, and inclusion . . . I want to hear what you're thinking about, and how together we can make a difference."⁵² In other words, General Brown seeks a collective solution to the problem of racial stigma, which is hopeful because it is the approach sociologists think is most likely to succeed.

51. Larry Buchanan, Quoc Trung Bui, and Jugal K. Patel, "Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History," *New York Times*, July 3, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html>.

52. Brown, "What I Am Thinking About."

Toward a Racially Inclusive Military

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ABSTRACT: Racialized structural inequalities and related social biases in US society and replicated in the military hinder diversity and inclusion efforts necessary to maintain a ready force. Examining the history of Blacks in the military through a social science lens helps explain this challenge and reveals the military must both promote relationships that challenge power imbalances and assess the impact of cultural imperialism on standards and evaluations.

The Secretary of Defense recently committed to identify ways to “increase racial diversity and ensure equal opportunity across all ranks . . . ensuring the Armed Forces look more like the broader society we serve.”¹ Such a commitment is necessary, but while representative diversity can be an indicator of organizational diversity, it does not measure inclusivity. An inclusive military must consider the experiences of minority servicemembers and respond appropriately to the biased systems and culture with which these individuals contend.

Although integration in the military did not equate to representative diversity, and a diverse force has not equated to an inclusive one, leadership committed to addressing biases and inequalities provides an opportunity to effect systemic change. The US military can begin the deliberate process of creating a more representative and inclusive environment for all servicemembers by (1) utilizing a social scientifically grounded approach recognizing social inequalities are the result of historicized structural inequalities and processes and (2) highlighting meaningful social interaction as an essential mechanism for change.

Historical analysis reveals systemic bias characterizes the social order of the United States of America. These social biases are replicated in the United States military and are manifested as differences in life chances—including distribution of resources and risks, and differences in lived experiences—including interactions with institutions that regulate access to these resources and exposure to risks. As this research demonstrates, social inequalities and the resulting disparities are not just the fault of individual bad actors; more accurately, they are the result of systemic shortcomings born of structural inequality and institutional social biases.

Normative belief systems and values that advance and privilege the perspectives of social majorities and simultaneously constrain and

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1. Mark T. Esper, “Message to the Force on DOD Diversity and Inclusiveness,” June 18, 2020, Pentagon, Arlington, VA, transcript, <https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2224438/secretary-mark-t-esper-message-to-the-force-on-dod-diversity-and-inclusiveness>.

discriminate against the perspectives of social minorities undergird and drive social inequality.²

While Asian, Native, and Latino Americans have all faced racial discrimination in the United States, Black American socialization in a society with historical roots in the race-based chattel slavery of Africans is unique. While each branch in the military has a history of social systemic inequalities, the Army provides the most robust baseline from which to apply social theory to department-wide integration and diversity efforts. As such, this work utilizes a social scientific lens to analyze the history of Blacks in the Army to provide insight as to how systemic social inequalities are replicated in the military.

Social Inequalities in a Racialized Society

Systemic social inequalities entail arrangements existing across multiple dimensions of society and at multiple levels of influence within society that are simultaneously advantageous to majority populations and disadvantageous to minority populations.³ Furthermore, systemic social inequalities are the result of the combined processes of structural inequalities—beliefs and values forming normative frameworks.⁴ Eduardo Bonilla-Silva argues a “racialized social system” like the United States allocates “differential economic, political, social, and even psychological rewards to groups occurring along racial lines.”⁵

These racialization processes lead to a racial structure of society with “a set of social relations and practices based on racial distinctions.”⁶ The process of categorizing society into social groups with a set of corresponding “social relations and practices” based on an ideology determined by the social majority, finds its way into every aspect of society.⁷ The pervasiveness of the ideology and process, combined with its persistence over time, makes it systemic.

Race in America has roots in the eighteenth century when settlers used what people looked like to identify various population groups in colonial America and “established a rigid hierarchy of socially exclusive categories” with “unequal rank and status.”⁸ As the power-wielding social majority, White elites had the privilege of defining and assigning membership to racial categories. By rationalizing inherent inequality, the White majority justified the race-based chattel slavery of Africans and the oppression of Native Americans. Established during this time, the Army adopted policies of exclusion, segregation, and quotas to address

2. Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, *Critical Race Theory: An Introduction* (New York: New York University Press, 2001); and Emile Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method*, ed. George E. G. Catlin, trans. Sarah A. Solovay and John H. Mueller, 8th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938).

3. Jay A. Pearson, *Lecture on Structural Inequality* (Durham, NC: Duke University, 2019).

4. Pearson, *Structural Inequality*.

5. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, “Rethinking Racism: Toward a Structural Interpretation,” *American Sociological Review* 62, no. 3 (1997): 465–80.

6. Bonilla-Silva, “Rethinking Racism,” 474.

7. Bonilla-Silva, “Rethinking Racism,” 474.

8. American Anthropological Association (AAA), “AAA Statement on Race,” May 17, 1998, <https://www.americananthro.org/ConnectWithAAA/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=2583>.

racial minority service. The reputation of Black service was shaped by a belief Blacks were biologically inferior to Whites, a social order that imposed this belief, and subsequent beliefs that Blacks were a detriment to morale and incapable of performing combat duties.⁹

Race, however, does not exist as a biological differentiator within humanity; rather race exists as a social construct. Ninety-four percent of physical variation “lies *within* so-called racial groups” and “conventional geographic ‘racial’ groupings differ from one another only in about 6% of their genes.”¹⁰ But as the social majority developed systems, structures, and institutions around the concept of race, they succeeded in the social assignment of “some groups to perpetual low status, while others were permitted access to privilege, power, and wealth.”¹¹

Social majorities—in the United States, disproportionately wealthy White men—define group distinctions, assign group identity to the masses, and utilize the group distinctions as a means to maintain superior position.¹² The long-term impacts of these historical phenomena are not trivial as race remains a relevant social distinction across virtually all institutions in the United States. Many servicemembers’ experiences have been overshadowed by White fears of Black uprising and denials of the capability of Blacks to serve effectively.

Consider the following examples: Blacks were eliminated from the force through policy on account of the fear of Black servicemen mounting a revolt against race-based chattel slavery after the Revolutionary War; Blacks were denied service at the beginning of the Civil War; Blacks were denied commissioned officer leadership positions and relegated to auxiliary and service specialties after the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863; Blacks were relegated to all-Black units after the Civil War; and Blacks were forced into the “menial occupations” of support positions in World War I.¹³

The relationship between the social majority and the minority is a result of the nature of social hierarchies in which the social majority holds hierarchy-enhancing roles and “allocates social resources to the advantage of dominant groups and to the disadvantage of subordinate groups.”¹⁴ Research shows the likelihood of hierarchy-enhancing ideology and discriminatory practices increases when individuals serve in hierarchy-enhancing roles within a hierarchy-enhancing institution.¹⁵ When Blacks were assigned to combat roles in World War I, the White

9. Sherie Mershon and Steven Schlossman, *Foxholes & Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed Forces* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

10. AAA, “Statement on Race.”

11. AAA, “Statement on Race.”

12. Bonilla-Silva, “Rethinking Racism”; and Gerda Lerner, *The Creation of Patriarchy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

13. US Army Center of Military History (ACMH), “The Army and Diversity,” ACMH, n.d., <https://history.army.mil/html/faq/diversity.html>; and Martin Binkin and Mark J. Eitelberg, *Blacks and the Military* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1982).

14. Jim Sidanius and Felicia Pratto, “Social Dominance Theory,” in *Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology*, vol. 2 (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2012), 419.

15. Sidanius and Pratto, “Social Dominance Theory,” 426.

officers over them were “so prejudiced against the troops that the unit lacked organizational cohesion.”¹⁶

Whites worked actively from their hierarchy-enhancing positions to maintain control over the narrative surrounding Black service. White officers denied successful Black units the appropriate honors for their successes in multiple conflicts.¹⁷ Army leadership carelessly assigned Black units to unaccepting communities in the south, leading to a deterioration of the reputation of and secret hangings of Black soldiers.¹⁸

By the eve of World War II, the small number of active duty Black soldiers—six percent—had primarily been consigned to hierarchy-attenuating positions.¹⁹ Despite the 1940 Selective Training and Service Act against race-based policies on drafting or accepting volunteers for service, Whites secured their position by keeping the ranks segregated, limiting the number of Black officers in officer candidate schools and ensuring the number of Blacks permitted into the Army did not exceed their national representation.²⁰

Prejudicial and biased policy shaped where, when, and how Blacks could serve to the benefit of the White majority. Personnel shortages in December 1944 required the Army to open its infantry ranks to Black units during the Battle of the Bulge, but as the need for more troops faded with the end of World War II, Blacks—three percent—were all but weeded out of combat arms units.²¹ The Civil Rights Movement began to shift the national narrative, but the nature of oppression resulted in a lack of accountability and urgency in President Truman’s 1948 declaration of equality in the armed services, and the Army remained heavily segregated well into the Korean War.

Prior to the official desegregation order in 1951, two studies led by White general officers concluded for the sake of unit morale—the comfort of those in hierarchy-enhancing positions—the Army must maintain a cap on Black soldiers at 10 percent of the total force and continue limits on occupational specialties open to Black soldiers.²² The military teams came to these conclusions despite the success of integrated units in the Korean War. Conversely, two civilian-led studies with no stake in the military’s hierarchical structure—The Fahy Committee and Project Clear—recommended full integration to improve overall

16. ACMH, “The Army and Diversity.”

17. ACMH, “The Army and Diversity.”

18. ACMH, “The Army and Diversity”; and Binkin and Eitelberg, *Blacks and the Military*.

19. Binkin and Eitelberg, *Blacks and the Military*.

20. Binkin and Eitelberg, *Blacks and the Military*.

21. Binkin and Eitelberg, *Blacks and the Military*; and Leo Bogart, ed., *Social Research and the Desegregation of the U.S. Army: Two Original 1951 Field Reports* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1969).

22. Historical Division, Headquarters US Army Europe (USAREUR), *Integration of Negro and White Troops in the US Army, Europe, 1952–1954* (Stuttgart, Germany: Headquarters, USAREUR, 1956), now declassified and on file with US Army Center of Military History, Historical Manuscripts Collection, no. 8-3.1 CK 2, <https://history.army.mil/documents/cold-war/EI-Ch1.htm>.

effectiveness as Black soldiers performed on par with Whites and found the Army proved more effective with integrated units.²³

The Systemic Nature of Oppression

The continued acceptability of segregation in the military despite the ostensible unacceptability of racism exemplifies how oppression, a fundamental cause of persistent racialized disparate outcomes, extends beyond individual action and into ideologies, norms, and values that form biased systems and institutions. Political philosopher Iris Young argues minorities contend with five dimensions of oppression: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence.²⁴

This more comprehensive conceptualization of oppression addresses its influence absent explicit expression. Because oppression is normative and systemic, it may not be overt and easily recognizable, especially to the majority. Such subtlety often leads to a denial that oppression exists because policies do not support explicitly oppressive acts and majority population members are unlikely to experience or witness oppression.

Having integrated in the midst of *Brown v. Board of Education*, the military was several steps ahead of the nation, but the Vietnam War and the Civil Rights Movement brought awareness to persistent oppression of racial minorities. Whites, no longer concerned with the fighting capabilities of Blacks, found Blacks suitable for service in lieu of Whites suffering their fate. Between 1960 and 1966, statistics show Blacks were more likely to be drafted, sent to Vietnam, placed in combat units, and killed or wounded in battle, suffering almost a quarter of enlisted casualties.²⁵ It took an outcry from social movements at home to decrease the disproportionate deaths of Black servicemembers before the end of the war.²⁶

In 1968 the Department of Defense displayed a lack of understanding regarding the social manifestations of oppression when it declared it had “officially eliminated discrimination in the Military Services.”²⁷ In its assessment, military leadership only considered actions committed at the level of the discursive conscious. To limit the analysis of oppression to the discursive conscious (an individual can verbalize “what” and “why”) is to assume individuals acknowledge and verbally express everything they do, all the time.²⁸ But as Giddens outlines in his three-level theory of subjectivity, the unconscious governs most actions and interactions at the levels of practical conscious and the basic security system.²⁹

23. Bogart, *Desegregation of the U.S. Army*.

24. Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 49–63.

25. Binkin and Eitelberg, *Blacks and the Military*.

26. James E. Westheider, “African Americans, Civil Rights, and the Armed Forces during the Vietnam War,” in *Integrating the Military: Race, Gender, and Sexual Orientation since World War II*, ed. Douglas Walter Bristol Jr. and Heather Marie Stur (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017).

27. Westheider, “African Americans,” 107.

28. Young, *Justice*.

29. Young, *Justice*.

Although reluctant military leaders changed course in the early 1970s and acknowledged individual and institutional racism still existed within the force, the Army Diversity Office today has publications revealing a lack of understanding about the historical impact of systemic social bias and inequality—these materials indicate affirmative action efforts eliminated the negative effects of the past.³⁰

Evidence of systemic social inequalities in the absence of intentionally harmful acts indicates oppressive acts generate at “the basic level of identity security and sense of autonomy required for any coherent action in social contexts.”³¹ Because overt interpersonal racial discrimination is no longer socially acceptable or desired, most people do not knowingly oppress others, which could possibly explain why racial minorities in the military report witnessing racism at a greater rate than Whites.³²

Socialization in a society with discriminatory roots—racism—unconsciously engages the basic security system for self-preservation when individuals fear compromised social position or socioeconomic displacement. As a result, social majorities exhibit hostile behaviors toward minorities all the while “rarely conscious of their actions or how they make the others feel.”³³ The engagement of the basic security system explains why the military has historically considered the overrepresentation of serving racial minorities within the armed services compared with their national representation a “success” and failed to consider it necessary to address disparate distributions of minorities across the force by categories such as rank and occupational specialty.

Contentious and violent race relations throughout the military following the death of Martin Luther King Jr. prompted congressional action to address race relations in the military, and led then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to establish the Inter-Service Task Force on Education and Race Relations.³⁴ Subsequently, in 1971 the Department of Defense established the Race Relations Education Board to “set guidelines and establish policy for education in race relations for the armed forces” and tasked the Defense Race Relations Institute—now the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute—with implementation.³⁵ The Board saw the need to address and educate servicemembers on the root causes of bias, racism, and inequalities, but having personally experienced over a decade of military training

30. US Army Diversity Office, “Army Diversity: Diversity & Leadership” (PowerPoint slides, Army Diversity Office, November 14, 2011), https://www.armydiversity.army.mil/document/Army_Diversity_Slides.pdf; and Westheider, “African Americans.”

31. Young, *Justice*, 131.

32. Leo Shane, “Signs of White Supremacy, Extremism up Again in Poll of Active-Duty Troops,” *Military Times*, February 6, 2020, <https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2020/02/06/signs-of-white-supremacy-extremism-up-again-in-poll-of-active-duty-troops/>.

33. Young, *Justice*, 133–4.

34. Isaac Hampton II, “Reform in Ranks: The History of the Defense Race Relations Institute, 1971–2014,” in *Integrating the Military: Race, Gender, and Sexual Orientation since World War II*, ed. Douglas Walter Bristol Jr. and Heather Marie Stur (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017).

35. Hampton II, “Reform in Ranks.”

on equal opportunity, I can attest this training falls woefully short of expectations.³⁶

Social Inequalities and Biases Today

The lack of education and acknowledgment by the social majority of the continued existence of White privilege, systemic racism, and systemic social inequalities reflects a lack of understanding of the negative impact of a racialized society on social minorities. Lawrence Bobo terms the evolution of explicit racist ideologies into the now “covert, sophisticated, culture-centered, and subtle racist ideology” that denies the government’s responsibility to undo racial inequality as “laissez-faire racism.”³⁷ Laissez-faire racism “protects White privilege, rationalizes Black disadvantage, and expands racial inequality” based on a demand for “color-blindness.”³⁸

This “laissez-faire racism,” along with other mechanisms, has permitted the systemic social inequalities experienced by Black Americans to continue and in some cases widen. The idea that socially unaccepted ideologies of the past mar the modern, socially esteemed value of holding every human being equal is often dismissed by those who view America as a post-racial society. But the evidence presented here demands a response recognizing systemic social inequalities are a result of historicized social biases to which the military is not immune.

Career and wealth. Racial minorities experience a lower return on skills that training programs and education cannot overcome. After controlling for variables that might influence employer decision making, researchers in 2004 found despite having the same qualifications, résumés with “White sounding names” received 50 percent more callbacks for interviews and more than three times the return on skills than résumés with “African American sounding names.”³⁹ Similar rates of bias were found in a 2017 study.⁴⁰

Black officers in the military experience similar lower returns on skills at senior officer ranks. Military promotion rates differ by race and gender throughout the course of a career. A 2012 study found that up to the rank of O4, promotion rates were similar across gender and race, but from the O4 to O6 ranks, rates declined for non-Whites.⁴¹

36. Hampton II, “Reform in Ranks.”

37. Lawrence Bobo, “Somewhere between Jim Crow & Post-Racialism: Reflections on the Racial Divide in America Today,” *Daedalus* 140, no. 2 (2011): 11–36; and Bobo, “Laissez-Faire Racism,” (part of lecture series on structural racism and the root causes of prejudice, University of Maryland, October 2014), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i3-FBsMziLQ>.

38. Bobo, “Laissez-Faire Racism.”

39. Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan, “Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination,” *American Economic Review* 94, no. 4 (2004): 991–1013.

40. Lincoln Quillian et al., “Meta-Analysis of Field Experiments Shows No Change in Racial Discrimination in Hiring over Time,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 114, no. 41 (October 10, 2017).

41. Beth J. Asch, Trey Miller, and Alessandro Malchiodi, *A New Look at Gender and Minority Differences in Officer Career Progression in the Military* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012), https://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR1159.html.

Another study determined White military officers were 29 percent more likely to be promoted than Black officers.⁴² Additionally, Navy officer evaluation reports for White officers indicate they were more likely to be recommended for early promotion, whereas Black officers were recommended for on-time or no promotion.⁴³

Racial disparities in wealth over time provide evidence of the persistent nature of systemic social inequalities. When examining net worth, a measure of wealth, only 6 of the 615 American billionaires are Black.⁴⁴ Often transferred intergenerationally, wealth—a measure of socioeconomic status—has remained elusive to the majority of racial minorities due to adverse and discriminatory government policies including redlining and the denial of housing benefits.⁴⁵ Non-White households are less likely to benefit from the recovery of financial markets due to a reduced likelihood of owning stocks through retirement accounts.⁴⁶

During the economic recovery following the 2008 recession, household wealth for non-Hispanic Whites increased by 2.4 percent but decreased for non-Hispanic Blacks by 33 percent, and middle-income household wealth decreased for Blacks by 47 percent and Hispanics by 55 percent, but only declined for middle-income Whites by 31 percent.⁴⁷ In 2016, the median wealth for White households was ten times that of Black households and eight times that of Hispanic households.⁴⁸ The inability of racial minorities to hedge off threats to wealth has widened the inequality gap.

Information on the wealth of servicemembers is not readily available, but racialized disparities exist in other socioeconomic status indicators in the military—rank and occupational specialty. In 2006, 80 percent of Army generals were from the majority White male combat arms branches.⁴⁹ The Military Leadership Diversity Commission's final report identified a significant reduction in representation of racial minorities at the flag/general officer level and found non-Hispanic White males were the only officer corps demographic overrepresented

42. James Burk and Evelyn Espinoza, "Race Relations within the US Military," *Annual Review of Sociology* 38 (2012).

43. Burk and Espinoza, "Race Relations."

44. Taylor Nicole Rogers, "There Are Only 5 Black Billionaires in the United States," *Business Insider*, June 12, 2020, <https://www.businessinsider.com/black-billionaires-in-the-united-states-2020-2>.

45. William A. Darity, *From Here to Equality: Reparations for Black Americans in the Twenty-First Century* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2020).

46. Rakesh Kochhar and Richard Fry, "Wealth Inequality Has Widened along Racial, Ethnic Lines since End of Great Recession," *Pew Research Center* (blog), December 12, 2014, <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-great-recession/>.

47. Kochhar and Fry, "Wealth Inequality"; and Kochhar and Anthony Cilluffo, "How US Wealth Inequality Has Changed since the Great Recession, by Race, Ethnicity, and Income," *Pew Research Center* (blog), November 1, 2017, <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/01/how-wealth-inequality-has-changed-in-the-u-s-since-the-great-recession-by-race-ethnicity-and-income/>.

48. Kochhar and Cilluffo, "How US Wealth."

49. Nelson Lim et al., *Officer Classification and the Future of Diversity among Senior Military Leaders* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA507944.pdf>.

in the military.⁵⁰ The White-male-dominated combat arms branches are the military elite, and as such, they “set the policies and procedures and determine criteria for promotion.”⁵¹

Health care. Overwhelming evidence shows racialized health differences in the United States persist over time. Studies reveal health-care providers with positive implicit bias for Whites prescribed reduced pain treatment for Blacks.⁵² Similarly, pediatricians with positive White implicit bias prescribed narcotic pain medication for Black child patients at decreased rates.⁵³ Black women are at increased risk of stillbirth—63 percent higher—as compared to White women, and those living in high socioeconomic status White neighborhoods had the highest prevalence of low birth weights.⁵⁴

Only one of the aforementioned studies considered the impact of social bias on female servicemembers, finding similar, albeit attenuated, racial differences in birth outcomes were present in the military.⁵⁵ A single study cannot lead to a determination of systemic social bias and racism on the health outcomes of minorities serving in the military, but the systemic nature of inequalities should propel the military to investigate further.

Criminal justice. Inequalities also exist elsewhere in the military. Historically, Blacks were routinely denied due process and more likely than Whites to be executed.⁵⁶ Although the military has made significant strides to improve and disparities across race are not readily apparent in military justice sentencing, differences are evident “at the gateway into the military justice system where commanding officers have discretion to determine what charges and punishments (if any) might be levied before a formal process of courts-martial is convened.”⁵⁷ Biases at early stages

50. “From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military” (Military Leadership Diversity Commission, March 15, 2011), https://diversity.defense.gov/Portals/51/Documents/Special%20Feature/MLDC_Final_Report.pdf.

51. Lim et al., *Officer Classification*, 3.

52. Kelly M. Hoffman et al., “Racial Bias in Pain Assessment and Treatment Recommendations, and False Beliefs about Biological Differences between Blacks and Whites,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 113, no. 16 (April 19, 2016): 4296.

53. Janice A. Sabin and Anthony G. Greenwald, “The Influence of Implicit Bias on Treatment Recommendations for 4 Common Pediatric Conditions: Pain, Urinary Tract Infection, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, and Asthma,” *American Journal of Public Health* 102, no. 5 (March 15, 2012): 988–95.

54. Cheryl A. Blackmore et al., “Is Race a Risk Factor or a Risk Marker for Preterm Delivery?,” *Ethnicity & Disease* 3, no. 4 (1993): 372–77; Catherine L. Kothari et al., “The Interplay of Race, Socioeconomic Status and Neighborhood Residence upon Birth Outcomes in a High Black Infant Mortality Community,” *SSM -Population Health* 2 (2016): 859–67; and Paula A. Braveman et al., “The Role of Socioeconomic Factors in Black-White Disparities in Preterm Birth,” *American Journal of Public Health* 105, no. 4 (April 2015): 694–702.

55. Blackmore et al., “Race a Risk Factor.”

56. Binkin and Eitelberg, *Blacks and the Military*.

57. Burk and Espinoza, “Race Relations.”

of the military justice process across branches result in an increased likelihood of Black incarceration as compared to Whites.⁵⁸

Disparate outcomes across multiple sectors of society, at multiple levels, and by social distinctions supports the proposition systemic social inequalities exist in the modern period. The power of the social majority to create narratives identifying individual and cultural differences as the cause of inequalities leads to such explanations becoming melded—often unknowingly—into structures, institutions, culture, and individuals. Per this perspective, systemic bias and racism are rarely, if ever, implicated as the causal mechanisms. As a result, oppressed groups are obligated by society to “fix” the problem of their victimization, and to do so without access to resources or power.

This pattern and its results are so well integrated and normalized in society that the average person, majority or minority, often remains unaware of its existence. Policy reforms rarely address majority oppression of minorities as the root cause of inequality, and biased systems remain entrenched, perpetuated, and can even be accelerated. In short, systemic racial oppression continues largely unrecognized, unnamed, and unchecked.

Recommendations

Award-winning journalist Jim Carrier argued America’s “most successful integration story . . . was written by its armed forces.”⁵⁹ In the 1950s and 1960s, the military was the model example for successful integration of Black Americans into a formerly openly segregated institution.⁶⁰ Even though the US military was ahead of broader society, now, 66 years after the military abolished the last all-Black active duty unit, systemic social biases and resulting racial inequalities persist despite evolving department-wide diversity and inclusion programs. These programs fall short of adequately acknowledging and addressing the impact a racialized American society has on those who serve.

The military cannot presume diversity equals or reliably translates into inclusion. These latter processes necessarily require members of social majority groups to acknowledge privilege born of systemic social bias and then commit to leveraging this privilege to create and secure opportunities to increase representation, engagement, and interaction from diverse populations across multiple dimensions of identity. Accordingly, the battle to dismantle systemic social inequalities requires persistent, pervasive, and deliberate action from members of all social groups with a vested interest in doing so.

58. US Government Accountability Office “Military Justice: DoD and the Coast Guard Need to Improve Their Capabilities to Assess Racial and Gender Disparities” (report to the Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Representatives, May 2019), <https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/699380.pdf>; and Burk and Espinoza, “Race Relations.”

59. Jim Carrier, *A Traveler’s Guide to the Civil Rights Movement* (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 2004), 28.

60. Bogart, *Desegregation of the U.S. Army*.

“In social planning, a realistic confrontation of the present is always the first step to reshaping it for the future.”⁶¹ Relying on practical consciousness to explain inequalities has failed to produce change, and inequalities in various quality of life measures persist. The military’s focus must expand beyond addressing individual prejudice to identifying fallacies and biases operating at the basic security system level as a result of a structurally biased society. By acknowledging systemic social inequalities exist within its ranks, driven by historical inertia, the military can begin to establish a foundation for a culture of inclusivity.

Inclusivity requires the military to plan for and require deliberate, everyday action at the practical, conscious level. By acknowledging ideologies of the past created power structures and an oppressive system that advantages White males and disadvantages almost all others, the military can begin to dismantle institutionalized bias as well as biases that exist at the basic security-system level. The military must then focus on the power-wielding elite, present the historicized evidence of inequalities, and create space for open conversations among diverse population groups.

Military leadership must cultivate an environment and shape policy to bring awareness to and challenge majority privilege, social biases, systemic oppression, and the resulting inequalities. Thus far, policies aimed at addressing social biases have been insufficient because they do not require a personal connection or cultivating relationships across social distinctions. To begin the process of eradicating systemic social inequalities, the social majority must care more about the well-being of minorities than protecting their own privileged position.

The research from Project Clear revealed integration was successful because soldiers of different races were forced to be in proximity to each other. Interviews revealed White soldiers in integrated units had more respect for Black soldiers, and Black soldiers in integrated units had more affinity for White soldiers and the mission.⁶² A 2015 Gallup report found Blacks attending historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs) consistently experienced a social environment on campus three times more supportive than that of non-HBCUs, regardless of the race of the professor or mentor who created a supportive environment.⁶³

This differential experience between Blacks attending HBCUs and non-HBCUs indicates Blacks are disproportionately negatively impacted by the social environment of non-HBCU institutions—institutions that do not consider social biases with which Blacks contend. Meaningful relationships and social interactions are the differentiators for greater success, evidenced in the Project Clear and Gallup findings mentioned above.

61. Bogart, *Desegregation of the U.S. Army*, 41.

62. Bogart, *Desegregation of the U.S. Army*.

63. Gallup and USA Funds, *Gallup-USA Funds Minority College Graduates Report* (Washington, DC: Gallup, 2015), <https://www.gallup.com/services/186359/gallup-usa-funds-minority-college-graduates-report-pdf.aspx>.

Through meaningful social interaction, the military elite can be challenged to leverage their social privilege for right action and relinquish exclusive elite decision-making practices. Prior recommendations from the military have included encouraging mentorship within social distinctions. This approach falls short—it maintains a power imbalance, places the responsibility of dismantling the system on minorities alone, and does not challenge social majority culture. Conversely, the military should seek mentorship programs that cross social distinctions. The culture around these relationships must promote meaningful social interactions extending beyond the office to include families and recreational activities. The military must also put measures in place to assess leadership commitment to such efforts and capture how each servicemember experiences those relationships.

Finally, the military must divorce itself from the idea it is an egalitarian meritocracy. Military culture reflects the preferences and norms of its social majority—the White male infantryman. As a result, minority cultural practices are often considered by the social majority to be pathological and dysfunctional, and result in an elitist evaluation system. Until 1972, cultural imperialism in the Armed Forces Qualification Test disadvantaged Blacks by assessing culture more than intelligence, subsequently forcing Blacks into the unskilled services and supply specialties or into the high-risk combat arms specialties.⁶⁴

Recommendations for Black soldiers to receive training on military culture assimilation to combat their higher likelihood of receiving military justice disciplinary action furthers the culturally imperialistic nature of oppression.⁶⁵ This ideology absolves the majority of responsibility and instead looks to strip social minorities of their identity by requiring they conform in order to survive. The military would be well served to closely review all regulations and methods of evaluation to determine if positive biases privilege social majority culture.

Conclusion

National security is dependent on a diverse force, but racial minorities have historically been seen as tools for White success. Permitting racial minorities to serve in conflict provided the larger force needed for mission success as far back as the Civil War. More recently, the military has valued diverse servicemembers for their contributions in multicultural environments around the globe. Opening the ranks has allowed the military to benefit from the power inherent in a large, multicultural force; but systemic and structural biases prevent the military from experiencing the benefits of an inclusive force.

Inclusivity requires the acknowledgment that every individual has value as a person, independent of an imposed valuation based on mission

64. Westheider, “African Americans.”

65. Mickey R. Dansby, “Racial Disparities in Military Incarceration Rates: An Overview and Research Strategy,” in *Managing Diversity in the Military*, ed. Mickey R. Dansby, James B. Stewart, and Schuyler C. Webb (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2001).

contribution. While quantitative diversity at every echelon and within every career field must become the norm in military culture, it cannot become the measure of success for diversity and inclusion efforts. The Department of Defense must focus efforts on renegotiating existing social majority/minority relationships in a way that acknowledges and challenges long-standing power imbalances and reevaluates the impact of cultural imperialism on biased formal standards and criteria.

In the final analysis, the military must continue to lead the way for change by example. The military must take up the charge to attack inequalities at their core by acknowledging where it finds itself wanting on these issues, how it got there, and the importance of its people in making positive changes toward a future where all groups and individuals composing them are seen, heard, and valued.

Technology and Strategic Surprise: Adapting to an Era of Open Innovation

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ABSTRACT: Technological revolutions affecting state power are either open or closed. The precursor to the digital age is not the twentieth century, with state-controlled programs yielding nuclear weapons, but the late nineteenth century, when tinkers invented the radio, airplane, and high explosives—all crucial to subsequent wars. To avoid strategic surprise, the US government must take a broader view of how today's open innovation is changing society, and adapt.

The digital revolution is happening in an open technological context different from the period when the United States achieved global ascendancy, and US strategists cannot rely on twentieth-century frameworks if they want to avoid strategic surprise. Starting in 1993, the United States deliberately opened maturing information technologies to globalized commercial development, in effect giving American competitors and adversaries as much access to advanced technologies as the United States and its allies had.

The pace of technological development seemingly accelerated as a result, but this was untrue: it just seemed faster because technologies interacted in new ways and globally diffused, affecting more dimensions of human existence, including conflict. Further, this globalization of commercial development of information technologies happened outside the US military. The key to success in warfare now is not in direct technology development: the US military cannot innovate their way out of an open technological revolution. They must work with, draw from, and adapt to it.¹

Open and Closed Technological Revolutions

Technological revolutions affecting military innovation and state power can be either open or closed.² In the twentieth century, military technological innovation was mainly closed. Crucial new systems such as nuclear weapons, battleships, jet fighters, or radar were expensive, rare, and difficult to build, usually supported by long-term government programs.

1. For further information concerning this argument, see Audrey Kurth Cronin, *Power to the People: How Open Technological Innovation is Arming Tomorrow's Terrorists* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

2. James H. Moor, "Why We Need Better Ethics for Emerging Technologies," *Ethics and Information Technology* 7, no. 3 (2005): 111–19; and Henry Chesbrough, "Open Innovation: A New Paradigm for Understanding Industrial Innovation," in *Open Innovation: Researching a New Paradigm*, ed. Henry Chesbrough, Wim Vanhaverbeke, and Joel West (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 1.

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Closed technological innovation requires high levels of specialized expertise. Military or scientific elites restrict access to advanced weapons systems through secret programs and security clearances, as well as copyrights or patents. Governments track the proliferation of high-level lethal technology and protect programs from each other, as well as from the broader public. In this context, military technology evolves by making incremental improvements on existing capabilities, such as precision-guided munitions, nuclear warhead configuration or size, or aircraft stealth capability, for example.

Closed innovation practices lead to slow, highly complex, and proprietary weapons development. The military sets requirements and drives the agenda, even as defense contractors chase hefty profits. Experts speak of dual-use capabilities, meaning parallel military and civilian applications. Over time costs climb, as major military systems—such as the F-22 Raptor, *Arleigh Burke* destroyer, or the Trident II intercontinental ballistic missile—are upgraded to reduce risk, meet demanding new standards, protect sunk costs, and maintain technological leadership in known capabilities.

By contrast, in the twenty-first century technological innovation is mainly open. Open innovation is driven by commercial processes, not by the military. Because there is popular access to potentially lethal technology, it affects everyone in society. There is no need to be a nuclear scientist or engineer to use emerging technologies or even any reason to fully understand them, because most digital platforms are cheap, user-friendly, and specifically designed to help people experiment. Companies such as Google, Facebook, and Microsoft are driving the development of these technologies and strive, above all, to expand global markets by drawing users in.

Not everyone who uses a smartphone to guide a simple unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or drive a robot, for example, understands how they work, nor do they need to. Personal phones are compact computers four times as powerful as the one the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) uses to drive the Curiosity rover, the car-sized robot that landed on Mars in 2012.³ And yet smartphones are extremely easy to operate and experiment with. Via cheap, accessible software users can livestream events, send encrypted messages, steal valuable information, or identify targets with facial recognition technology.

Historical periods of open and closed technological innovation have different dynamics, and they require different strategic analyses, terms, and modes of practice to cope with their implications. Open technological periods encourage tinkerers. *Dual use* is replaced by *multiuse* to reflect a broader range of users developing and experimenting with emerging technologies—from professionals, to professional consumers

3. Sharon Gaudin, “Your Smartphone is as Smart as the Curiosity Rover,” *Computer World*, August 8, 2012, <https://www.computerworld.com/article/2505612/nasa--your-smartphone-is-as-smart-as-the-curiosity-rover.html>; and Leslie Horn, “The iPhone Is Literally Four Times as Powerful as the Curiosity Rover,” *Gizmodo*, August 6, 2012, <https://gizmodo.com/the-iphone-is-literally-four-times-as-powerful-as-the-c-5932148>.

(or “pro-sumers”), to hobbyists and consumers.⁴ Instead of proliferating like nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, these technologies diffuse, spreading globally as telegraphs, railroads, radios, or automobiles did.⁵ The challenges presented by nuclear weapons and other high-end weapons are thus joined by the instability of lethal applications emerging from democratized technological innovation.

During open technological innovation, individuals and private groups buy, use, and distribute emerging technologies and in the process invent new purposes, new forms, and new surprise combinations of these technologies. They are deliberately designed to be fiddled with by ordinary people—tinkerers customizing their Apple I and II computers, college students building semiautonomous quadcopters, hackers accessing big databases, or hobbyists 3D printing firearms from online digital files. Sometimes new technologies are combined with older ones, such as the 2019 Hong Kong protestors using shortwave radios alongside smartphones. Open technologies facilitate widespread experimentation, enabling individuals with a wide range of proficiencies to combine clusters of technologies together and create new forms and uses, both good and bad—well beyond whatever their original inventors had in mind.

Open technological innovation has yielded clusters of technologies including smartphones, UAVs, robotics, CRISPR (clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats) gene-editing tools, additive manufacturing, machine learning, and even simple forms of artificial intelligence accessible to all. The impact and consequences of these technologies are gradually coming into focus, but taken together they are just as important to the future of warfare as the 1945 nuclear explosion in Hiroshima was. The strategies, theories, and approaches developed during the twentieth century, a period of closed military technological innovation dominated by nuclear weapons, differ from those needed to adapt in today’s era of open technological innovation.

War and Technology

Fortunately, we can learn a great deal from earlier periods of open technological innovation. A review of historical arguments about war and technology will distinguish those that apply from those no longer useful.

For about the past five centuries, the dominant historical narrative in the United States and Europe has been about major powers concentrating increasingly advanced, complex, and lethal systems under their control, culminating in the awesome destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Well-known books such as *From Crossbow to H-Bomb*, the 1962 history of the weapons and tactics of warfare by Fawn and Bernard Brodie, surveyed major technological developments like gunpowder, the

4. Alvin Toffler, *The Third Wave* (New York: William Morrow, 1980); and Eric Von Hippel, “Lead Users: A Source of Novel Product Concepts,” *Management Science* 32, no. 7 (July 1986): 791–805.

5. Everett M. Rogers, *Diffusion of Innovations*, 5th ed. (New York: Free Press, 2003).

development of early artillery, the transition from wooden to iron ships, and the race between guns and armor.⁶

The Brodies argued that while the development of weaponry had been slow for most of history, it gathered momentum in the nineteenth century, accelerated further into the twentieth century, and culminated in 1945 with the use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.⁷ In subsequent years, if any proof of the importance of state-controlled military technology were needed, the US and Soviet capacity to wipe out millions of people instantly with nuclear weapons provided it.

This centralization narrative was not watertight. European leaders outsourced their military power to private contractors during the seventeenth century.⁸ And the Brodies did not explore instances in which new military technologies were counterproductive in warfare or periods when power became more widely distributed, such as in ninth- and tenth-century Europe. Their 1973 second edition, penned in the closing phase of the Vietnam War, expressed concern the conflict had “probably resulted in a net slowing down in technological development” and included an insightful discussion about the increasing costs of major weapons systems.⁹

But the view military technological innovation drove the evolution of warfare prevailed throughout the twentieth century.¹⁰ In 1989, historian Martin Van Creveld opened *Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present* with: “The present volume rests on one very simple premise which serves as its starting point, argument and *raison d’être* rolled into one. It is that war is completely permeated by technology and governed by it.”¹¹

A focus on states gaining the technological edge vis-à-vis each other made sense—in many twentieth-century conflicts, advanced technology did indeed make the crucial difference. The history of the two world wars loomed large in most studies, as did careful analysis of innovation between the wars, because how major powers developed and employed military technology was important to the outcome.

Both academics and practitioners analyzed capital-intensive programs. Studying strategic bombing, amphibious warfare, aircraft carrier warfare, and submarines, for instance, they discovered key insights about why technologies may or may not be employed effectively for advantage in battle.¹² For example, the Germans were the most

6. Bernard Brodie and Fawn Brodie, *From Crossbow to H-Bomb: The Evolution of the Weapons and Tactics of Warfare*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973).

7. Brodie and Brodie, *Crossbow to H-Bomb*, 8.

8. David Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

9. Brodie and Brodie, *Crossbow to H-Bomb*, 280.

10. Alex Roland, *War and Technology: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 1.

11. Martin Van Creveld, *Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present* (New York: Free Press, 1989), 1.

12. Williamson R. Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

technologically advanced of any of the combatants at the outset of the Second World War yet still failed to use radar effectively.

Interservice rivalry, resistance to radar in the Luftwaffe (World War I flying General Ernst Udet reportedly said, “if you introduce that thing you’ll take all the fun out of flying!”), abandonment of shorter wavelength research, and failure to develop effective operational doctrine all contributed to Germany’s defeat.¹³ The British lagged behind the Germans technologically but more than compensated for the shortfall by the way they wove radar into every aspect of air defense, partly by necessity as they absorbed withering German air attacks during the 1940 Battle of Britain. According to Winston Churchill, “it was operational efficiency rather than novelty of equipment that was the British achievement.”¹⁴

Other human factors also determined how effectively various state belligerents capitalized on technological advantages. Sometimes military training made the difference. When the Second World War started, for example, the United States already had a robust fleet of submarines capable of long-range cruising; but commanders had been peacetime-trained to attack well-escorted enemy warships and avoid exposure, training that emphasized stealth and the use of sonar. Consequently, commanders avoided risky actions that might have revealed their location such as surfacing to periscope depth where hostile destroyers or aircraft could detect them.

This training failed during the war, when the Allied mission changed to attacking fast-moving convoys of Japanese merchant ships who had to be espied at periscope depth. Harvard political scientist Stephen Rosen calculated only 31 of 4,873 known US submarine attacks were directed by sonar.¹⁵ Yet most commanders hewed to their instinct to be invisible, missing target after target, a practice that changed only when more aggressive younger skippers took over during the war. Thirty percent of US submarine commanders were relieved for cause in 1942.¹⁶

The boom in twentieth-century studies of military innovation, doctrine, and training especially in the United States and United Kingdom produced important insights about how human elements influence military innovation and how new technologies are deployed. Nonetheless, despite limitations in high-end military innovations also revealed by these studies, the view that sophisticated military-controlled technologies were the lynchpin of strategic advantage for states prevailed.

The revolution in military affairs framework that emerged toward the end of the twentieth century followed this well-established tradition of favoring military-controlled technologies. It focused squarely on

13. David Pritchard, *The Radar War: Germany's Pioneering Achievement, 1904-45* (Wellingborough, UK: Patrick Stephens, 1989), 64.

14. Winston Churchill, *The Gathering Storm, The Second World War*, vol. I (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), 140.

15. Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 136.

16. Rosen, *Winning the Next War*, 130–47.

high-end, large-scale capabilities, arguing future technology, specifically a system of US-dominated information age technologies—precision-guided munitions, surveillance satellites, battlefield command and communications, networked operations, and other computer-dependent systems—would virtually remove any guesswork from future conflicts.¹⁷ And the overwhelming defeat of Iraq in the Persian Gulf War (1990–91) seemed to confirm it.

Some strategic thinkers even asserted information technologies had fundamentally transformed the nature of war by making the battlefield transparent and controllable. In the words of US Admiral and former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff William Owens: “When technology is correctly applied to the traditional military functions—to see, to tell, and to act—a powerful synergy is created. . . . Together, these create the three conditions for combat victory: *dominant battlespace knowledge, near-perfect mission assignment, and immediate/complete battlespace assessment*.”¹⁸

This line of argument was the logical culmination of theories gradually developed over decades of US-dominated, closed military technological innovation. Paradoxically, it was promulgated at the very time the US government was consciously opening key technologies to commercial development and global diffusion. In the 1990s, US military innovation practices began to diverge sharply from US commercial policy with respect to government-developed technology—a disconnect that only got worse as the years went by. This is why today’s era of open technological innovation has matured some 30 years later, and the US military is neither driving it nor arguably keeping up.

Pandora’s Box

The shift from closed development to open technological innovation began in 1993, spurred by deliberate US government policy in the post-Cold War euphoria about a US-dominated new world order.¹⁹ Publicly financed, government-controlled basic and applied research from the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s drove the technological boom of the 1990s, as research and development funds and tax incentives shifted from the defense to the civilian industry.²⁰ With federal government support, the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) became the Internet. Tax dollars developed the Global Positioning System. The Google founders continued the development of their search engine

17. See Dima P. Adamsky, “Through the Looking Glass: The Soviet Military-Technical Revolution and the American Revolution in Military Affairs,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 31, no. 2 (April 2008): 257–94.

18. Bill Owens with Ed Offley, *Lifting the Fog of War* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 100 (emphasis in the original).

19. William J. Broad, “Clinton to Promote High Technology with Gore in Charge,” *New York Times*, November 10, 1992, <https://www.nytimes.com/1992/11/10/science/clinton-to-promote-high-technology-with-gore-in-charge.html>.

20. William J. Clinton and Albert Gore Jr., *Technology for America’s Economic Growth: A New Direction to Build Economic Strength*, (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, February 22, 1993), <https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED355929>.

with funding from a National Science Foundation grant. All of the major components of smartphones were derived from US government programs, including microchips, touchscreens, and natural language voice activation, such as Apple's Siri system.²¹

The contrast may be most starkly illustrated by comparing the management of the highly secret Manhattan Project, which resulted in the nuclear bomb in 1945, to the current development of machine learning artificial intelligence (AI) technology. Private companies, foremost Microsoft, IBM, Facebook, Amazon, Apple, and Alphabet (Google's parent), now drive AI research. Worldwide spending on AI research is projected to reach \$35.8 billion in 2019, a 44 percent increase over what was spent in 2018, and is expected to double by 2022.²²

The Pentagon has recently established and funded its Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, but commercial actors like Microsoft, with state-of-the-art computing power, immense cloud storage and massive data sets that power new forms of deep learning, have a 10-year lead.²³ Meanwhile technology companies have entirely globalized their operations. In December 2017, for example, Google announced a new AI institute in Beijing, stating, "the science of AI has no borders."²⁴

As the Information Age barrels along, we are embarking on an era of full automation, autonomy, narrow artificial intelligence and, perhaps ultimately, artificial general intelligence. Yet most analyses of current and future threats apply concepts such as deterrence and compellence, developed during the nuclear revolution. History is indeed relevant, and the nuclear threat remains; but the scope of strategic and historical analyses must be further widened, not only beyond formal military organizations but also to periods predating the current disruptive moment. The next "big thing" in warfare may well be a bunch of little things used by ordinary people in new ways.

Lessons from the Nineteenth Century

The last comparable period of open technological innovation occurred during the second half of the nineteenth century when globalized industrialization matured in ways that mirror today's ripening information age. When innovation processes are open and there is rapid change, not just war is permeated by technology; all of society is.

During much of the nineteenth century, amateur and professional scientific communities had no clear dividing line between them. Just

21. Lewis M. Branscomb et al., *Beyond Spinoff: Military and Commercial Technologies in a Changing World* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992); David Hambling, *Weapons Grade: How Modern Warfare Gave Birth to Our High-Tech World* (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2005); and Mariana Mazzucato, *The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths* (New York: Public Affairs, 2015).

22. "Worldwide Spending on Artificial Intelligence Systems Will Grow to Nearly \$35.8 Billion in 2019, According to New IDC Spending Guide," International Data Corporation, March 11, 2019, <https://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS44911419>.

23. Brad Smith and Carol Ann Browne, *Tools and Weapons: The Promise of the Digital Age* (New York: Penguin Press, 2019), 195–7.

24. Fei-Fei Li, "Opening the Google AI China Center," Google in Asia (blog), December 13, 2017, <https://www.blog.google/around-the-globe/google-asia/google-ai-china-center/>.

as today members of the public are free to purchase quadcopters, build robots, experiment with simple gene-splicing kits, or download instructions for building 3D printed weapons, 150 years ago the public could buy wiring kits, chemicals, and explosives at the local hardware store or through the mail.²⁵ The changes underway then were even more sweeping than they are today, affecting patterns of human habitation, transportation, energy consumption, food production, sanitation, and medicine, and people wanted to understand and participate in them.²⁶

Especially in Europe and the United States, new periodicals began to appear that explained science in nontechnical terms to a newly literate public excited about the potential of new technologies. *Popular Science Review* (founded 1862) and *Nature* (1869) emerged out of Britain, for example, while *Scientific American* (1845) and *Popular Science Monthly* (1872, now called *Popular Science*) began in the United States, all designed to serve the enthusiastic layman.

The result was a burst of popular creativity by pro-sumers, hobbyists, and consumers. For example, in 1867 Alfred Nobel patented the first stable and safely detonatable high explosive—dynamite—after first experimenting with nitroglycerin in a backyard shed behind the family home in Stockholm, Sweden. Italian electrician and physicist Guglielmo Marconi invented the radio using homemade equipment in the attic of his Bologna home and patented it in 1896.²⁷ Orville and Wilbur Wright, bicycle manufacturers operating out of a home workshop in Dayton, Ohio, designed and built the Wright Flyer, which made the first sustained, powered flight in Kitty Hawk, North Carolina in 1903.

Alfred Nobel's most critical invention, the blasting cap, used one explosive (mercury fulminate) to detonate another (nitroglycerine), thus solving a key problem in the evolution of explosives and introducing a method of detonation ultimately used in everything from artillery to atom bombs. He also invented ballistite, a more controlled yet powerful explosive that launched an entire class of munitions and enabled rapid-fire artillery. Thus high explosives, radios, and airplanes all resulted from open technological innovation achieved by and for civilians, at less than \$1,000 each. All were crucial to future military operations, yet none originated in government-sponsored programs—or arguably could have done so.

Some inventions also dramatically affected global patterns of nonstate violence. Nobel's dynamite set off the first global wave of modern terrorism, the so-called anarchist wave, which spread to every continent (except Antarctica), killing or injuring thousands of civilians.²⁸

25. W. W. Huntley and F. M. Robinson, *Catalogue of Standard List-Price of Material Used by Railroads 1900* (Richmond, VA: I.N. Jones, 1900), 35.

26. Martin Wolf, "Same as It Ever Was: Why the Techno-Optimists Are Wrong," *Foreign Affairs*, July–August 2015, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/same-it-ever-was>.

27. C. Mackechnie Jarvis, "The Distribution and Utilization of Electricity," in *A History of Technology, Vol. V: The Late Nineteenth Century, 1850-1900*, ed. Charles Singer, E.J. Holmyard, Ar. G. Hall, and Trevor I. Williams (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 227–8.

28. Cronin, *Power to the People*, chaps. 3 and 4.

The resulting violence included dozens of politically destabilizing assassinations of presidents, prime ministers, and monarchs, from Russia, across Europe, to the United States. Newly laid underwater telegraph cables then spread news of what were called “dynamitings” throughout the world, in stories packed with graphic details that helped build the Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst mass-market print empires in the United States. This wave of violence was propagated by the worldwide publication of anarchist newspapers and pamphlets. At the same time, individuals could easily buy dynamite, selling in Oregon at the time for thirty-six cents per pound, for example.²⁹

By the time Archduke Franz Ferdinand was shot on June 28, 1914, a global trifecta of openly accessible lethal technology, new communications vectors, and the diffusion of individual or small-group violence was solidly in place—a situation that in some ways resembles what we face today.

Contemporary Parallels

Innovation with twenty-first-century information age technologies is driven as much by widespread popular experimentation and tinkering as by secret development projects and elites holding high-level clearances. In the same way that the key to understanding innovation in the years before World War I was not just the 1897–1914 *Dreadnought* competition between Germany and the United Kingdom, the key to understanding innovation today is not just the well-publicized US-Chinese artificial intelligence arms race.

The bigger picture before World War I included global power politics between states such as Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, and Britain, but also open technological innovations such as the civilian use of the telegraph, the invention of steel, the development of fine machine tooling, the transition from coal to petroleum, and the creation of stable high explosives. Together these commercial innovations spawned vast killing machines for which the European powers were unprepared and had no effective military responses. Rapid military innovation then happened during the war through a bloody process of trial and error, but none of the belligerents had accurately assessed the implications of a preexisting open technological context, and the cost of learning on the job was cataclysmic.

Likewise, today’s digital revolution includes a global story regarding the evolution of future war, centered on changes happening outside the military. Commercial-sector-driven technology clusters such as globalized social media, additive manufacturing, widespread robotics, driverless vehicles, Internet-connected devices, machine learning, and evolving artificial intelligence are altering how force can and will be used. Most obviously, popular mobilization and

29. Finn J. D. John, “Dynamite Used to Be a Regular Part of Oregon Life,” *Offbeat Oregon*, January 11, 2015.

psychological operations have profoundly changed through digital profiling and the weaponization of social media. But avenues of physical attack are shifting too, as cheap facial recognition tools democratize assassination and the “Internet of Things” makes everyone vulnerable to assault. Functions that for centuries required a well-funded and well-trained army are accessible now to private actors and individuals—not at the same level of competency, but good enough to kill and to have widespread political impact.

To adapt, the military must pay closer attention to accessible open technologies, especially who is using them. Violence is taking new forms, not just in the hands of authoritarian powers but also from below, degrading the future effectiveness of the US military in both state and nonstate contests. Initiatives such as the Third Offset Strategy, a well-funded, admirable effort to develop capabilities such as military robotics and human-machine teaming, actually employ the wrong historical analogy.

Unlike the Cold War period when the United States employed US technology—nuclear weapons and precision-guided munitions—to offset Soviet geographic and numerical advantages, today the United States must respond in a technological context where threats and opportunities arise from surprise commercial advances not developed for the military and not under centralized state control.

Monitoring accessible open technologies, however, does not mean ignoring the actions of potential state adversaries. In the past 20 years, Chinese technological espionage alone has been harmful to American interests and those of Allies and partners. “In effect, by stealing and exploiting U.S. and Western technical secrets, they have been able to level the technological playing field with the U.S. Joint Force, in some key military capabilities, in little less than two decades—a relative blink of an eye in a peacetime, long-term strategic competition,” former Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work and defense analyst Greg Grant rightly observed.³⁰

But it is also worth noting deliberate US decisions about privatizing and sharing digital technologies during the technoutopian 1990s leveled the playing field by making Internet-assisted economic espionage *possible* for China. China and other countries are stealing American and allied secrets because years ago we made it extremely easy for them to do so. From the vantage point of the 1990s, one person’s espionage is another person’s open access to information.

The question, now that we have opened this Pandora’s Box, shared basic technologies, and fostered a dynamic era of open innovation, is how can the US military better adapt to the consequences and come out ahead?

30. Robert O. Work and Greg Grant, *Beating the Americans at Their Own Game: An Offset Strategy with Chinese Characteristics* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, June 2019), 7.

How to Succeed

The United States is still the world's leader in the most important technologies for civilian and military purposes, including robotics and artificial intelligence. Maintaining this leadership position involves reversing the disastrous 1990s divergence between US commercial policy and US government innovation policy.³¹

First, we must reconceptualize our understanding of military technological innovation to reflect the reality of the commercially driven, open technological context. Second, we must reorganize around new strategic concepts, models that adopt a whole-of-society approach and jettison neat, state-on-state frameworks. Commercial tech companies are now much more wealthy and powerful than many states. Finally, we must work with, educate, train, and reward the personnel necessary for winning the wars of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, when surprise destabilizing threats are as likely to emerge from small groups and individuals or even private commercial entities, as they are directly from major powers—who already use them as proxies.

Technology is no longer supporting the centralization-of-force narrative that defined the Western nation-state.³² At the moment, the entities centralizing technology and power are the tech companies, and authoritarian actors such as China and Russia. Enhanced government surveillance during the COVID-19 pandemic further strengthens authoritarian state power. The United States and some of its adversaries still have massive nuclear capabilities, but these arsenals are joined by diffuse, digital-based technologies many people can access. Nuclear deterrence remains crucial for managing nuclear weapons but insufficient to counter the threat posed by the panoply of twenty-first-century technologies changing our societies.

The US military must prepare for an era where professional armies are indistinguishable from proxies, and nonstate actors develop unanticipated lethal capabilities. Cyber contests, economic espionage, Internet device hacking, and theft of intelligence happen below the level of interstate war yet pose an ongoing cumulative threat. And our domestic political polarization offers weaknesses for adversaries to exploit.

Democratized technologies favor contests of harassment, disruption, and attrition that erode our strength. Building smart regulations that minimize the risks of popular emerging technologies such as shoring up security standards for Internet-connected devices, increasing resiliency to online psychological operations, improving

31. Ash Carter, "Technology and Public Purpose: Reflections on the Dilemmas of Tech and Possible Solutions," (annual Ernest May Memorial Lecture, "Technology and National Security: Maintaining America's Edge," Aspen Strategy Group Summer Workshop 2018, Aspen, Colorado, August 3, 2018).

32. Michael Howard, *War in European History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976); and Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States: AD 990–1992* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).

privacy standards, building a legal structure for personal data rights, and preventing wholesale hacking of databases, is as much a national security imperative as a law enforcement challenge.

Second, thriving in an era of open technological innovation demands working with and encouraging tinkerers and pro-sumers, those driven by curiosity and technological creativity both in and out of the military. In the nineteenth century, Orville and Wilbur Wright did not want to join the military, nor did Alfred Nobel or Guglielmo Marconi. They wanted to invent, create, and innovate independently. Alternately, when government-sponsored programs were driving cutting-edge research, people like J. Robert Oppenheimer, Edward Teller, and Enrico Fermi left academe and went to the Manhattan Project to invent, create, and innovate.

They wanted to make a difference in the war effort, but they also knew Los Alamos was a center of pioneering nuclear research. Throughout much of the twentieth century, all of the services, along with government-funded think tanks like RAND Corporation, drew many of the best scientists because the most advanced research, especially in physics and engineering, was government funded and led.³³ This is not the situation now.

It is too late to recapture cutting-edge digital innovation in traditional military or government organizations on any large scale. Innovation within the military or even defense innovation is the wrong way to think about it. It is also inherently impossible, as well as undesirable, to try to coerce commercial companies to serve national military aims, as they do in authoritarian countries like Russia and China. But we have time to adapt. Innovation actually happens pretty slowly: the military can gain advantages by appealing to the ideals of tech innovators and offsetting their economic risk. Most tech company employees and independent entrepreneurs sincerely want to serve the public good.

Commercial tech companies such as Microsoft, Google, or Facebook should remember the long history of how paradigm-shifting, brilliant innovations are used—often regardless of inventors' intent. In July 2019 Microsoft invested \$1 billion in OpenAI, which seeks to create artificial general intelligence rivaling the human brain.³⁴ Amazon and Google are also avidly competing in this area: AI is integral to Amazon's e-commerce and Google owns DeepMind. Absent clear ethical principles and restraints and a deep understanding of history, the US commercial sector is just as likely as the US military to inadvertently set off an arms race where humanity loses.

33. Richard Rhodes, *The Making of the Atomic Bomb* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986); and Fred Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon* (1983; repr., Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991).

34. Taylor Telford, "Microsoft Invests \$1 Billion in OpenAI to Pursue Artificial Intelligence That's Smarter Than We Are," *Washington Post*, July 22, 2019.

Finally, in this period of open technological innovation, we must move beyond the military-civilian firewall in our defense institutions. For example, we must find a way to permit unorthodox talent to move horizontally in and out of US military service without penalty. The current career path of selecting and promoting officers is anachronistic and fails to provide the range of experience our military leaders need. If Army Futures Command, for example, is staffed strictly by lifelong government servants and Army officers who never experience working at a start-up, developing a cutting-edge technology, or engaging in entrepreneurial risk-taking (and even failure), it will lack the skills to work effectively with the tech sector. That will make it impossible to identify the most promising commercially driven technologies, build forward-leaning operational doctrine, and capitalize upon evolving military capabilities in military contests.³⁵

From the commercial side, notwithstanding Google employees' 2018 protests against the Department of Defense's Project Maven, the problem is not inherently cultural. A Ronald Reagan Institute survey indicates 53 percent of those under 29 still have "great confidence" in the military, and more Americans have confidence in military officers (59 percent) than in doctors (54 percent), teachers (52 percent) or clergymen (25 percent).³⁶ Young people seem as favorably disposed toward intelligence and national security as they ever were, and they have tremendous confidence in the military as the most trusted and effective American institution.

But those who are trained and driven to innovate in cutting-edge twenty-first-century technologies fear industrial-era bureaucracies, and there is little evidence to convince them otherwise.³⁷ Furloughs of highly trained government professionals only make things worse. Obtaining a US government contract is difficult, risky, expensive, and time-consuming, and the system is heavily weighted toward existing players who know how to access and navigate this byzantine system. Most tech start-ups cannot survive the process. For people with

35. Daisuke Wakabayashi and Shane Scott, "Google Will Not Renew Pentagon Contract That Upset Employees," *New York Times*, June 1, 2018; and Damon V. Coletta, "Navigating the Third Offset Strategy," *Parameters* 47, no. 4 (Winter 2017–18): 60.

36. Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute, *2018 National Defense Survey* (Boston: Anderson Robbins Research, and Austin, TX: Shaw & Company Research, November 2018), Questions 8, 11–18, <https://www.reaganfoundation.org/media/299217/reagan-survey-full-charts-112918.pdf>.

37. Jiwon Jung, Barry Bozeman, and Monica Gaughan, "Fear in Bureaucracy: Comparing Public and Private Sector Workers' Expectations of Punishment," *Administration & Society* 52, no. 2 (February 2020): 233–64.

creative new ideas, commercial markets offer better opportunities for developing and implementing them at scale and speed.³⁸

Periods of open technological innovation contain exciting potential, but also widespread societal instability, and military organizations have and will continue to be forced to respond. To understand how best to engage opportunities and minimize risks, we cannot merely consider how new technologies might be employed on the battlefield; they affect societies in uncontested environments first. Failing to appreciate the broader social context of technological innovation by private and public actors and across a broad swathe of political and economic sectors leaves us unprepared for how the next war will actually unfold. And relying on the wrong models of innovation, developed for a different technological context, yields outmoded strategy and doctrine. Technological surprise is inevitable now; it must be built into US planning. Rather than try to wrest control of the chaotic process of open technological innovation, the US government should better inspire and incentivize today's whiz kids—the Nobels, Marconis, and Wright Brothers of the twenty-first century—to channel their creative energies to serve American interests.

38. Artificial Intelligence Initiatives within the Defense Innovation Unit: Hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Michael Brown, Director of the Defense Innovation Unit), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Brown_03-12-19.pdf; and Rachel Olney, “The Rift between Silicon Valley and the Pentagon is Economic, Not Moral,” *War on the Rocks*, January 28, 2019, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/the-rift-between-silicon-valley-and-the-pentagon-is-economic-not-moral/>.

A Bizarre Pair: Counterinsurgency Lessons for Cyber Conflict

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ABSTRACT: The lessons of counterinsurgency have deeper implications for cyber conflict than previous research has identified. Two decades of experience in Iraq and Afghanistan provide insights into the cyber strategy of defending forward including treating major cybersecurity and technology companies as host-nation partners and focusing on winning the hearts and minds of global netizens.

Existing research has yielded significant insights into cyber capabilities as effective means for irregular warfare, but little research has been devoted to applying lessons from irregular warfare and counterinsurgency to winning cyber conflict. This does not mean there is a direct and deep equivalence, only that some of the mindset and culture for successful counterinsurgency can be useful for cyber warriors. For example, major cybersecurity and technology companies are, in important ways, analogous to host nations in cyberspace with unique capabilities the US military cannot replicate. Sometimes more firepower and applying overmatch wins. Sometimes—especially when civilians and civilian infrastructure cannot be separated away from battle, as in counterinsurgency and cyber—these efforts can make the problem worse. And sometimes there is no military path to victory. Ultimately, the United States may have to choose between taking the fight to the enemy and winning the support of America’s, and indeed the globe’s, netizens.

After nearly 20 years of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US military has learned hard lessons about fighting irregular warfare and counterinsurgency, but the relevance of these lessons to cyber conflict and competition have been overlooked. Though the details differ, current US cyber strategy is rooted in thinking similar to that on conventional fights in the land, sea, or air. “We must take this fight to the enemy, just as we do in other aspects of conflict,” noted General Paul Nakasone, the commander of US Cyber Command.¹ The new DoD strategy for winning in cyberspace and an associated US Cyber Command vision emphasize the lethality of US offensive capabilities, taking action to “defend forward” and “disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source.”² The overall goals are to achieve “overmatch” and “achieve

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1. Paul M. Nakasone, “A Cyber Force for Persistent Operations,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 92 (1st Quarter 2019): 11, <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1736950/a-cyber-force-for-persistent-operations/>.

2. United States Department of Defense (DoD), *Summary: Department of Defense Cyber Strategy* (Washington, DC: DoD, September 2018), 1.

and maintain superiority in the cyberspace domain.”³ “A good offense,” summarized the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, “is critical and that is the best defense.”⁴

The sustained application of initiative, maneuver, and firepower would not have seemed out of place to General Ulysses S. Grant. “The art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike him as hard as you can and as often as you can, and keep moving on.”⁵ But Iraq and Afghanistan proved warfare is not always as straightforward as Grant supposed. The dynamics of irregular warfare and counterinsurgency can be a distorted mirror image of those of the traditional battlefield.

Offensive Capabilities and Irregular Warfare

The Department of Defense defines irregular warfare as: “a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”⁶ For additional clarity, the Department further focuses on threat actors who use irregular means “such as guerrilla warfare, terrorism, sabotage, subversion, criminal activities, and insurgency.”⁷

Cyber capabilities have long been framed as especially useful as a means for such irregular warfare, a topic which featured heavily in some of the earliest research, including that of Winn Schwartau, Dorothy Denning, John Arquilla, and others. More recent research, especially at institutions of higher military learning, have examined issues like developing an “unconventional cyber warfare employment methodology” and exploring ideas like “cloud-powered foreign internal defense” and “counternetwork COIN.”⁸

The unique characteristics of cyber capabilities make them relatively easy to fold into operations across the range of irregular warfare. The most obvious examples might be cyberattacks intended to take down Ukraine’s electrical grid, the disruption of US elections, and sabotage of

3. US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), *Achieve and Maintain Cyberspace Superiority: Command Vision for US Cyber Command* (Fort Meade, MD: USCYBERCOM, April 2018), 4–5.

4. *Nomination—Milley: Hearing before the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services*, 116th Cong. (July 11, 2019) (statement of General Mark A. Milley), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/19-07-11-nomination_-_milley.

5. Eric Foner and Olivia Mahoney, *A House Divided, America in the Age of Lincoln* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2018), 113.

6. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), *Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept*, vers. 2.0 (Washington, DC: JCS, May 17, 2010), 9, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joc_iw_v2.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162021-510.

7. JCS, *Irregular Warfare*, 9.

8. Christopher R. Eidman and Gregory Scott Green, “Unconventional Cyber Warfare: Cyber Opportunities in Unconventional Warfare” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), 3; and Patrick Michael Duggan, “Strategic Development of Special Warfare in Cyberspace,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 79 (4th Quarter, 2015): 49–50, <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/621123/strategic-development-of-special-warfare-in-cyberspace/>.

the production of weapons of mass destruction.⁹ Other examples include intelligence agencies orchestrating bank and cryptocurrency heists for hundreds of millions of dollars, hacking a television station and blaming Islamic State terrorists, or using state assets to attack private companies.¹⁰ Cyber capabilities are useful to state actors. “Nobody wants full-on war. . . . It’s bad for business. Irregular warfare tactics give these states a degree of plausible deniability and nominally push the responsibility of escalation off of their shoulders.”¹¹

Lessons for Cyber from Counterinsurgency

Unlike research on cyber as a tool for irregular warfare, far less research has been devoted to understanding how irregular warfare might inform cyber strategies. In 2011, Greg Rattray and I analyzed how lessons from irregular warfare can apply to cyber, which was subsequently addressed by another scholar.¹² In 2012, we applied findings from research on counterinsurgency, irregular warfare, and stability and recovery operations to cyber conflict.¹³ More recently, practitioners summarized the major past trends in research utilizing the Counterinsurgency Diamond Model (analyzing the population, disruptors, controllers, and governance) and proposed several strategies.¹⁴ Another recent piece examined the failure to apply lessons

9. Adrian Bonenberger, “Ukrainian Elder Statesman: How Russian Hybrid War Is Changing the World Order,” *Foreign Policy*, March 21, 2017, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/21/ukrainian-elder-statesman-how-russian-hybrid-war-is-changing-the-world-order/>; Andy Greenberg, “How an Entire Nation Became Russia’s Test Lab for Cyberwar,” *Wired*, June 20, 2017, <https://www.wired.com/story/russian-hackers-attack-ukraine/>; Scott Shane and Mark Mazzetti, “The Plot to Subvert an Election: Unraveling the Russia Story So Far,” *New York Times*, September 20, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/20/us/politics/russia-interference-election-trump-clinton.html>; and Kim Zetter, “An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World’s First Digital Weapon,” *Wired*, November 3, 2014, <https://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet/>.

10. United Nations Security Council (UNSC), *Final Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)* (New York: UNSC, March 5, 2019), https://www.ncnk.org/sites/default/files/UN_POE_March2019_Final_Report.pdf; Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Cyber Operations Tracker, *Compromise of TV5 Monde*, (Washington, DC: CFR, April 2015), <https://www.cfr.org/cyber-operations/compromise-tv5-monde>; Russell Brandom, “How a DDoS Campaign Became an Act of Cyberwar,” *Verge*, March 24, 2016, <https://www.theverge.com/2016/3/24/11301876/ddos-iran-banks-dam-prosecution-indictment>; and Peter Elkind, “Sony Pictures: Inside the Hack of the Century,” *Fortune*, June 25, 2015, <https://fortune.com/longform/sony-hack-part-1/>.

11. John Costello, “China’s Irregular Warfare in the Cyber Domain,” *Real Clear Defense*, June 17, 2015, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/06/18/chinas_irregular_warfare_in_the_cyber_domain_108094.html.

12. Gregory J. Rattray and Jason Healey, “Non-State Actors and Cyber Conflict,” in *America’s Cyber Future: Security and Prosperity in the Information Age*, vol. 2 (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2011), 65–86; and Ben Whitham, “Exterminating the Cyber Flea: Irregular Warfare Lessons for Cyber Defence,” in *Proceedings of the 13th Australian Information Warfare and Security Conference* (Perth, Western Australia: Security Research Institute, Edith Cowan University, 2012).

13. Gregory J. Rattray and Jason Healey, “Non-State Actors in Cyber Conflict,” in *Addressing Cyber Instability*, ed. James C. Mulvenon and Gregory J. Rattray (Vienna, VA: Cyber Conflict Studies Association [CCSA], 2012).

14. Frank C. Sanchez, Weilin Lin, and Kent Korunka, “Applying Irregular Warfare Principles to Cyber Warfare,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 92 (1st Quarter 2019): 15–22, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-92/jfq-92_15-22_Sanchez-Lin-Korunka.pdf.

from counterterrorism efforts to cyber conflict.¹⁵ David Raymond addresses the paradoxes of counterinsurgency as this article does, but he focuses on tactical and technical aspects, gleaned lessons for offensive and defensive military cyber operators.¹⁶

That counterinsurgency may hold central lessons to deal with cyber conflict is suggested by a single sentence from John Nagl's forward to the original Army and Marine Corps field manual on counterinsurgency, "while firepower is the determinant of success in conventional warfare, the key to victory in counterinsurgency is intelligence on the location and identity of the insurgent enemy derived from a supportive population."¹⁷ This sentence hits on the three similarities of counterinsurgency strategy to cyber conflict: adversaries are hidden and depend on deception; the conflict is fought in and among the populace (and with a host nation); and the relationship between superior firepower and long-term success is not as straightforward as it is in the modern system of warfare.

Deception and the Role of Intelligence

In both counterinsurgency and cyber conflict, adversaries try to remain hidden and rely extensively on deception for success. Surprise attacks and ambushes are the norm rather than the exception and most cyber capabilities and operations are unthinkable without a healthy dose of deception.¹⁸ When it discusses attacks from adversaries, US military cyber doctrine frets the "design of the Internet lends itself to anonymity and . . . attribution will continue to be a challenge for the foreseeable future."¹⁹ Of course, this difficulty of attribution is beneficial when the United States military is looking for a "low probability of detection" for its own offense and espionage.²⁰

In a phrase very similar to those used by cyber commanders, the Army's latest FM 3-24 offers a clear assessment, "Effective counterinsurgency operations are shaped by timely, relevant, tailored, predictive, accurate, and reliable intelligence. . . . Without accurate and predictive intelligence, it is often better to not act rather than to act."²¹ A key goal of intelligence is to take away the insurgent's ability to hide,

15. Michael Senft, "Lessons Not Learned: Why Our Post-9/11 Counterterrorism Experiences Should Inform Our Cybersecurity Strategy," Modern War Institute, February 28, 2019, <https://mwi.usma.edu/lessons-not-learned-post-9-11-counterterrorism-experiences-inform-cybersecurity-strategy/>.

16. David Raymond, "Paradoxes of (Cyber) Counterinsurgency," *Cyber Defense Review*, February 9, 2015, <https://cyberdefensereview.army.mil/CDR-Content/Articles/Article-View/Article/1136129/paradoxes-of-cyber-counterinsurgency/>.

17. John A. Nagl, "The Evolution and Importance of Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency," in *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

18. Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, "Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace," *Security Studies* 24, no. 2 (2015): 316–48, https://deterrence.ucsd.edu/_files/Weaving%20Tangled%20Webs_%20Offense%20Defense%20and%20Deception%20in%20Cyberspace.pdf.

19. JCS, *Cyberspace Operations*, Joint Publication 3-12, (Washington, DC: JCS, June 8, 2018), I-12.

20. JCS, *Cyberspace Operations*, IV-8.

21. HQDA, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, Field Manual (FM) 3-24 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2014), I-19.

whether in complex terrain or among the population. This has a clear application to cyber conflict in which adversaries develop their attack and command-and-control infrastructure in “gray space” and mix their attacks and exfiltration of stolen data into legitimate traffic flows. Moreover, in both cyber and counterinsurgency there may be very thin lines distinguishing what is an intelligence operation versus a purely military operation.

Host Nation and Populace

“The host nation doing something tolerably is normally better than us doing it well,” states the original FM 3-24.²² The goal is to work by, with, and through partners who are closest to the threat and may have unique capabilities and knowledge of the local culture, geography, and human terrain.

The same holds true for cyber conflict. The only difference is the host nation is the collection of key cybersecurity companies like Symantec, FireEye, and CrowdStrike; network service providers like AT&T, Verizon, and NTT; and major information technology vendors like Microsoft, Intel, and Cisco. The private sector not only owns the vast majority of this critical infrastructure but it is on the front lines of the battle against nation-state attackers and makes the vast majority of critical decisions to thwart them. While uneven, the analogy is still useful. The key counterinsurgency problem is identifying insurgents and separating them from the population. The host nation is often a deeply imperfect partner in this task, lacking capabilities and with differing goals and perspectives than the United States.

By contrast, in cyber the private sector often has *superior* capabilities. Few if any major cybersecurity incidents have been solved by government actions.²³ Rather, the major technology and cybersecurity companies of the private sector—AT&T, Verizon, Symantec, FireEye, and CrowdStrike—have the agility, subject matter expertise, and ability to change cyberspace directly to resolve incidents decisively, usually while the government is still arguing about what should be done and which agency has the right authority. The New York Cyber Task Force found private sector actions like automatic vulnerability updates and patching, end-to-end encryption, and cloud-based security have been the most effective at shaping the terrain of cyberspace in favor of defenders and reducing sanctuaries at scale.²⁴

These companies are digital natives—their entire organizations are built around the mission of creating and shaping cyberspace. The cyber offense and intelligence organizations of the US government would face significant organizational, budget, authority, and mindset challenges

22. HQDA, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, FM 3-24 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2006), I-27–I-28.

23. Jason Healey, ed., *A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012* (Vienna, VA: CCSA, 2013).

24. New York Cyber Task Force, *Building a Defensible Cyberspace* (New York: Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs, September 2017), https://sipa.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/3668_SIPA%20Defensible%20Cyberspace-WEB.PDF.

replicating such strengths and generally only visit cyber terrain built and maintained by others.

The private sector can of course be an imperfect partner, conflicted by its pursuit of profit. But these flaws are no more severe than the government's own internal and interagency conflicts. Trade and diplomatic priorities have often trumped those of cybersecurity as has pursuing national interests through offensive cyber capabilities for the US Intelligence Community, military, and law enforcement.

Governments have their own unique and very powerful strengths: massive resources of national budgets and workforces, staying power to remain committed for years to resolve seemingly intractable problems, and additional authorities and levers of national power, including intelligence, diplomacy, and the military. Rather than trying to replicate the strengths of the private sector at great financial cost, the US government must hitch its advantages to those of the private sector.

Beyond the partnership with the host nation, successful counterinsurgency also requires a supportive population to recognize the legitimacy of the host nation and US forces. Cyber conflict may be like counterinsurgency in this way: if you lose moral legitimacy, you lose the war. If so, the US government needs to win the hearts and minds of the global population of netizens.

Cyber actors of all kinds—from criminals up to apex predators like the United States, Russia, and China—hide their infrastructure in “gray space,” which the military describes as “those portions of cyberspace” which are neither “protected by the US” nor “owned or controlled by an adversary or enemy.”²⁵ The use of this polite euphemism obscures the fact that gray space is mostly private property—devices, computers, and networks purchased and operated by people and companies around the world. Treating this private property merely as gray space reduces it to little more than a square on the chessboard of the never-ending game of constant contact between adversaries.

Especially after the Snowden revelations about the scale and intrusiveness of US espionage, the US legitimacy to play this game in the role of a defender has been challenged.²⁶ One frequent response, which might be summarized as, “of course US intelligence agencies are going to spy; don’t hate the player, hate the game,” might be true but misses the point that people have a unique and exquisitely personal relationship with their technology. This is not the Cold War when spy-versus-spy played out in Geneva or Moscow. Gray space holds our deepest secrets and connects us to beloved family members and intimate friends.

It may be true that spies are going to spy, other intelligence agencies operate with fewer restrictions, or Americans reveal far more intimate secrets—with less protection—to tech companies. It also may not

25. JCS, *Cyberspace Operations*, I-4–I-5.

26. Lawfare, “Snowden Revelations,” Lawfare (blog), n.d., <https://www.lawfareblog.com/snowden-revelations>.

matter. Retired Air Force General and former director of both the National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency Michael Hayden warned even entirely legal cyber operations conducted with proper oversight can suffer a lack of perceived legitimacy. After the Snowden revelations, many Americans said: “‘You know, I’m not so sure that constitutes consent of the governed anymore. That may actually be consent of the governors. You may have told them but you didn’t tell me.’”²⁷ The same dynamics led to citizens of Allied nations pressuring their governments to reduce security cooperation with the United States, which seemed to have no respect for their privacy.²⁸

Firepower

Many of the paradoxes of counterinsurgency deal with firepower and the use of force. “Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is. . . . military actions by themselves cannot achieve success. . . . The more successful the counterinsurgency is, the less force can be used and the more risk must be accepted.”²⁹

Until recently, the United States has been similarly hesitant to use cyber capabilities. Successive administrations have been concerned attacks might cascade or cause unknowable collateral damage, adversaries might concentrate attacks against vulnerable US cyber-connected infrastructure, or attacks would work against the preferred US goals for “an open, interoperable, secure and reliable cyberspace.”³⁰ US cyber forces were only given relatively free rein against the Islamic State, so long as cyber actions did not take place outside “the declared areas of active hostilities” in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.³¹

No longer. In 2018, then National Security Adviser John Bolton boasted the restraints on cyber response had been lifted: “Our hands are not tied as they were in the Obama administration.”³² The new cyber strategy gave US Cyber Command more leeway to “pursue attackers across networks and systems,” “continuously engaging and contesting

27. Michael Hayden, interview by Glenn Thrush, “Politico’s Glenn Thrush Interviews Michael Hayden,” *Politico*, March 28, 2016, <https://www.politico.com/story/2016/03/full-transcript-politicos-glenn-thrush-interviews-michael-hayden-221275>.

28. Natasha Lomas, “Europe’s Top Court Strikes Down ‘Safe Harbor’ Data-Transfer Agreement with U.S.,” *TechCrunch*, October 6, 2015, <https://techcrunch.com/2015/10/06/europes-top-court-strikes-down-safe-harbor-data-transfer-agreement-with-u-s/>.

29. HQDA, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, I-26–I-28.

30. Barack Obama, *International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World* (Washington, DC: White House, May 2011), 3, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf.

31. Dina Temple-Raston, “How the US Hacked ISIS,” *National Public Radio*, September 26, 2019; and *United States Cyber Command: Hearing before the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services*, 115th Cong. (May 9, 2017), <https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/17-05-09-united-states-cyber-command>.

32. John Bolton, “National Security Adviser John Bolton on Cyber Strategy (Audio Only),” September 20, 2018, <https://www.c-span.org/video/?451807-1/national-security-adviser-bolton-briefs-cyber-strategy-audio-only>.

adversaries” and to “degrade the infrastructure . . . that enable[s] our adversaries to fight in cyberspace.”³³

A direct implied relationship exists between the military’s aggressive use of cyber force and defeating—or at least disrupting or dissuading—adversaries.³⁴ But just because this makes traditional military sense does not mean it will work. As with counterinsurgency, there may be an inverse relationship between firepower and outcomes. Civilians cannot evacuate the front lines of cyberspace; the Internet is an infrastructure built around commercial and cultural needs. The caution displayed by past US administrations in employing offensive cyber operations may not have been intended to create mere bureaucratic hassle but may have been a legitimate procedural step to prevent escalation, miscalculation, and mistakes.

There are at least three clear reasons to keep cyber rules of engagement tight. First, the negative impact on legitimacy resulting from only one or two errant shots in an area crowded with civilians—and fragile critical infrastructure—can outweigh the dozens, hundreds, or thousands that hit true, as the United States learned after accidentally bombing Afghan weddings.³⁵ Second, US adversaries might benefit from the relative low cost of developing capabilities, easily keeping pace with the United States and leading to escalation. Third, if adversaries in cyberspace believe they are retaliating against a strike initiated by the United States, they are more likely to attack US military operations. And if DoD networks are too well defended, adversaries will simply target the private sector. This is not mere conjecture—after the US-Israeli Stuxnet attack on Iran’s uranium enrichment program, the Iranians did not retaliate against the Mossad, the Central Intelligence Agency, or the US military, but instead attacked American banks.³⁶

Recommendations

Some risks resulting from a forward defense posture with fewer operational restrictions are worth taking in cyber conflicts in order to achieve gains. Several recommendations follow that will help manage these risks.

First, the US government must treat the “host nation”—the major IT and cybersecurity companies—as the supported command, rather than insisting the military has some unique “secret sauce”—in the

33. Mark Pomerleau, “New Authorities Mean Lots of New Missions at Cyber Command,” Fifth Domain, May 8, 2019, <https://www.fifthdomain.com/dod/cybercom/2019/05/08/new-authorities-mean-lots-of-new-missions-at-cyber-command/>; USCYBERCOM, *Achieve and Maintain Cyberspace Superiority: Command Vision for US Cyber Command* (Fort Meade, MD: USCYBERCOM, 2018), 6; Jason Healey, “Triggering the New Forever War, in Cyberspace,” Cipher Brief, April 1, 2018; and Nakasone, “Cyber Force,” 11.

34. Jason Healey, “The Implications of Persistent (and Permanent) Engagement in Cyberspace,” *Journal of Cybersecurity* 5, no. 1 (2019): 5, <https://academic.oup.com/cybersecurity/article/5/1/tyz008/5554878>.

35. BBC South Asia, “US ‘Killed 47 Afghan Civilians,’” BBC News, July 11, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7501538.stm.

36. Ellen Nakashima, “Iran Blamed for Cyberattacks on U.S. Banks and Companies,” *Washington Post*, September 21, 2012.

words of an early commander of US Cyber Command—enabling it to be the center of American cyber defenses.³⁷ This support must go far beyond bland public-private partnerships—often more subordination than alliance—or defense support to civil authorities. In the defense support to civil authorities model, “the military’s cyber capabilities will be available to civilian leaders to help protect the networks that support government operations and critical infrastructure,” just as “during a natural disaster, like a hurricane, military troops and helicopters are often used by [the Federal Emergency Management Agency] to help deliver relief.”³⁸

Responding to major cyber incidents is not akin to delivering relief, it is active contention with an agile adversary working predominantly in private-sector networks. Accordingly it demands a new model. Erik Korn and I recently described one possibility, “defense support to the private sector,” through which critical infrastructure sectors on the front lines make direct calls for fire from the private sector, task the Intelligence Community with requirements, coordinate multi-stakeholder defensive actions, and rely on direct support by new military formations tailored to each critical infrastructure sector.³⁹

Second, the Department of Defense and Intelligence Community need to focus more on winning the support of domestic and foreign audiences—not just other governments and elites, but netizens as well. It is no longer enough, if it ever was, to defend US operations by saying our adversaries show even less restraint, all is fair in intelligence collection, or the issue is leaks about US operations and not the operations themselves. If the lessons of irregular warfare hold, then the United States must be accepted as a legitimate defender of cyberspace, a task hard to accomplish merely through the more aggressive or sustained use of offensive and intelligence cyber operations.

Third, the Department of Defense needs to be cautious in its enthusiasm regarding the role of firepower in case disrupting adversaries just emboldens enemies and alienates friends. Defending forward must be treated as an operational experiment, not settled wisdom: try something, measure what works, abandon what does not, repeat.

Fourth, the National Security Council should moderate the authorities granted to US Cyber Command with a sunset clause and require specific metrics for success and failure: How long will success

37. Shane Harris, *@War: The Rise of the Military-Internet Complex* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014), 158.

38. William J. Lynn III, “Remarks on Cyber at the RSA Conference,” (speech, RSA Conference, San Francisco, CA, February 15, 2011), <https://archive.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1535>.

39. Jason Healey and Erik B. Korn, “Defense Support to the Private Sector: New Concepts for the DoD’s National Cyber Defense Mission,” *Cyber Defense Review*, special edition (2019): 227–42, <https://cyberdefensereview.army.mil/CDR-Content/Articles/Article-View/Article/2035015/defense-support-to-the-private-sector-new-concepts-for-the-dods-national-cyber/>.

take, and how will we know it when we see it?⁴⁰ If these key questions cannot be answered, then authorities which enable defending forward must be scaled back lest the United States create another open-ended forever war, this time in cyberspace and with nuclear-armed adversaries.

It is entirely possible, perhaps even likely, a never-ending string of generals will testify, as they did for Iraq and Afghanistan, that we are “turning the corner” in cyberspace, and just one more military push will lead to success. Before the new strategy becomes too entrenched, these leaders should pause to remember counterinsurgency doctrine that reminds us, “sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction,” as it can be easy to overreact.⁴¹ There may simply be no military solution to countering adversary cyberattacks against the United States.

40. Jason Healey, “Memo to POTUS: Responding to Cyber Attacks and PPD-20,” *The Cipher Brief*, May 24, 2018, https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/memo-potus-responding-cyber-attacks-ppd-20.

41. HQDA, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, I-27.

Training Better Arab Armies

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ABSTRACT: US security force assistance missions to Arab partner states have had limited success, due in part to a tendency to impose American doctrine, which embodies American cultural values and norms, on Arab armed forces. Accordingly, US security force assistance missions should train Arab partners to fight in a manner better suited to their own cultural preferences and operational requirements.

The United States must develop a radically different method of training partner Arab militaries to help them better meet future counterterrorism, unconventional, and conventional warfare challenges.¹ Doing so will require the US military to approach the task in a very different way than it has in the past, devoting the same creativity, willingness to experiment, sustained focus, and seriousness of purpose to the security force assistance (SFA) mission, that it has to building up its own combat capabilities.² While the US military has applied cultural knowledge to the mechanics and programmatic aspects of the SFA relationship in Iraq and elsewhere, there is little evidence to suggest it has done so systematically and consistently in its efforts to create effective combat units or capable national security institutions.

Since World War II, the Middle East has been a major recipient of American arms and military assistance. Today, nearly half of all US arms exports go to the region, and US military personnel train or advise more than a dozen Arab militaries.³ Yet despite this massive, sustained effort, US SFA has not helped create competent Arab armed forces. During Operation Desert Storm in 1991, Egyptian, Saudi, and Kuwaiti forces failed to acquit themselves well despite overwhelming coalition

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2. James F. Jeffrey and Michael Eisenstadt, *U.S. Military Engagement in the Broader Middle East*, Policy Focus 143 (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2016), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus143_JeffreyEisen-4.pdf; and Eisenstadt, “Defeat Into Victory: Arab Lessons for the Iraqi Security Forces,” Policy Watch 2373 (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 17, 2015), <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeat-into-victory-arab-lessons-for-the-iraqi-security-forces>.

3. Susan B. Epstein and Liana W. Rosen, *U.S. Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Programs: Overview of Funding Trends*, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report R45091, February 1, 2018, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45091.pdf>; and Clayton Thomas, *Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy*, CRS Report R44984, October 11, 2017, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R44984.pdf>.

superiority.⁴ In June 2014, several hundred fighters from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) routed tens of thousands of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) troops when they captured the city of Mosul.⁵ And since 2015, Saudi forces leading an Arab coalition in Yemen have struggled against Houthi tribal fighters—although the small United Arab Emirates (UAE) contingent did considerably better in advancing the Emirates' diverse goals there.⁶

The US experience in Iraq and Syria since 2014 has yielded a somewhat different picture, however. In both places, the US military has made a virtue out of necessity. With successive administrations unwilling to commit large US ground combat formations to accomplish ongoing missions in the Middle East, US commanders have had to devise a method of winning wars *by, with, and through* indigenous partners.⁷ These efforts have been much more successful than previous efforts in the region in large part because American personnel have tailored operations to partner capabilities—predominantly Kurdish forces in Syria and largely Arab forces in Iraq—rather than insisting they fight like the US military.

This welcome, relatively recent operational approach has not yet been translated into formal doctrine nor has it spawned an extensive lessons-learned literature. Previous SFA efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan produced findings on a range of issues including core challenges of building tactically competent units and creating institutional capacity as well as the mechanics of SFA and its bureaucratic and programmatic aspects.⁸

4. Kenneth M. Pollack, *Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 425–46.

5. Yasir Abbas and Dan Trombly, “Inside the Collapse of the Iraqi Army’s 2nd Division,” *War on the Rocks*, July 1, 2014, <https://warontherocks.com/2014/07/inside-the-collapse-of-the-iraqi-armys-2nd-division/>; and Kenneth M. Pollack, *Armies of Sand: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 165–68.

6. Michael Knights, “Lessons from the UAE War in Yemen,” *Lawfare* (blog), August 18, 2019, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/lessons-uae-war-yemen>; and Knights, “The U.A.E. Approach to Counterinsurgency in Yemen,” *War on the Rocks*, May 23, 2016, <https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/the-u-a-e-approach-to-counterinsurgency-in-yemen/>.

7. Jim Mattis, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense (DoD), January 2018); and Joseph L. Votel and Eero R. Keravuori, “The By-With-Through Operational Approach,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 89 (2nd Quarter 2018): 40–47, <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-89.aspx>.

8. James Dubik, “Partner Capacity Building and U.S. Enabling Capabilities,” *Army Magazine*, (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, May 2012), https://www.ausa.org/sites/default/FC_Dubik_0512.pdf; Owen West, “Why Obama’s Plan to Send Advisers to Iraq Will Fail,” *New York Times*, June 18, 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/opinion/why-obamas-plan-to-send-advisers-to-iraq-will-fail.html>; DoD Office of the Inspector General (DODIG), *Assessment of DoD/USCENTCOM and Coalition Plans/Efforts to Train, Advise, and Assist the Iraqi Army to Defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant*, IG Report DODIG-2015-177 (Washington, DC: DODIG, September 30, 2015), <https://media.defense.gov/2015/Sep/30/2001714172/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2015-177.pdf>; and DoDIG, *Summary of Lessons Learned—DoD IG Assessment Oversight of “Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip” Operations by U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan*, Inspector General Report DODIG-2015-093 (Washington, DC: DODIG, March 31, 2015), <https://media.defense.gov/2015/Mar/31/2001713483/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2015-093.pdf>.

These findings, however, devoted little attention to addressing specific challenges of building capable combat formations and national security institutions in the Middle Eastern cultural and political milieu. With the exception of the effort to rebuild the ISF during the 2007–8 US surge in Iraq and again after the ISIS offensive in 2014, American SFA activities throughout the region have generally suffered from this gap between doctrine and reality. Of greatest importance, the United States did not formulate new SFA practices nor a unique doctrine for America's Arab partners. To its credit, the Army did create Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs).⁹ These SFABs are a good start, but they are not capable of formulating a new combat doctrine and have a limited capacity to devise new instructional methods more appropriate to Arab partner militaries. Moreover, they are not designed to build the necessary institutional capacity at the ministerial level to allow partner militaries to stand on their own.¹⁰

The implicit subtext of much of the lessons-learned literature is, for instance, that Iraqi soldiers need to become more like Americans and the ISF needs to operate more like the US military (with a strong noncommissioned officer [NCO] corps, for example), not that the United States should tailor its approach to its partner's cultural predilections and operational requirements—though there are signs of progress.¹¹ Unsurprisingly, efforts to train Arab militaries to fight like the US military have generally not succeeded because they require the former to operate in ways contrary to deeply rooted and culturally grounded habits and norms.¹² And while SFA efforts have been tailored to account for the skill level and experience of partner militaries, US military personnel are only just beginning to formulate, systematically, SFA doctrine for Arab militaries that is culturally relevant, and they are doing so largely on their own initiative, without formal guidance or a wider program to learn and institutionalize such practices across American training missions in the Arab world.

Arab Military Ineffectiveness

The sources of Arab military ineffectiveness run deep. They are rooted in wider Arab society, and cultural tendencies which foster patterns of behavior that have not meshed well with the demands of

9. Andrew Feikert, *Army Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs)*, In Focus 10675 (Washington, DC: CRS, October 24, 2018), <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF10675.pdf>.

10. James M. Dubik, "SFABs are Great, But They Can't Build Nations," Association of the United States Army, June 18, 2018, <https://www.ousa.org/articles/sfabs-are-great-they-can%E2%80%99t-build-nations>.

11. Ben Kesling and Matt Bradley, "Victory Marks Turnaround for Iraq Army," *Wall Street Journal*, December 29, 2015, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/iraqi-security-forces-say-they-have-liberated-ramadi-from-islamic-state-1451303441>; and Karen DeYoung, "Victory in Ramadi May Not Yet Be Proof of Strategy, but It Is a Milestone," *Washington Post*, January 1, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/victory-in-ramadi-may-not-yet-not-be-proof-of-strategy-but-it-is-a-milestone/2016/01/01/7915e874-aff5-11e5-9ab0-884d1cc4b33e_story.html.

12. Norvell B. DeAtkine, "Western Influence on Arab Militaries: Pounding Square Pegs into Round Holes," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 17, no. 1 (Spring 2013); and Pollack, *Armies of Sand: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).

modern conventional warfare and counterinsurgency. One of the most important of these societal problems is the zero-sum, winner-takes-all politics of the Arab world.¹³ Too often Arab armies have played too big a role in politics, and when they have not, Arab politicians have typically played too big a role in military affairs. Indeed since World War II, Arab states have often oscillated between military dictatorships and civilian autocracies that fettered their armed forces to defend against military coups—real or imagined.

This politicization has often hobbled war-making activity by saddling Arab armed forces with incompetent but loyal senior leaders, as well as command and control arrangements designed to coup-proof the armed forces rather than enhance their effectiveness. These measures can undermine the morale and cohesion of a military.¹⁴ This zero-sum mindset is also reflected in the brute-force approach to counterinsurgency employed by many Arab armies, which generally entails crushing insurgents and repressing, driving out, or even eliminating the supporting civilian populations.¹⁵

Underdevelopment in Arab economies has also played a role. Industrialization came late to the Muslim Middle East and never reached the extent it did in the West or in East Asia. Relatively few Arab personnel had the kind of basic understanding of machinery necessary to enable them to maintain properly or take full advantage of the capabilities of equipment used to wage modern war. Repeatedly, Arab armies, navies, and air forces could not employ weaponry to its full potential. Moreover, only a fraction of their weapons systems were typically combat ready due to inadequate maintenance.¹⁶

Ultimately, however, the greatest problems Arab armed forces experienced during the modern era derived from the dominant Arab culture.¹⁷ This is not a value judgment, merely a description of the social reality of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Behavioral patterns emphasized by the dominant Arab culture, while functional in other contexts, were not best suited for success on the modern conventional battlefield. Arab culture tends to promote a deference to group norms and authority, an emphasis on rote learning and school solutions rather than the development of critical reasoning skills, and a preoccupation with saving face, resulting in the suppression of unpalatable facts. These patterns of behavior produced conventional Arab armies that often failed at maneuver warfare because tactical leaders were inflexible; did not show initiative or innovation; and tended to obfuscate, dissemble, or lie.

13. Florence Gaub, "Why Arab States are Bad at Counterinsurgency," *Lawfare* (blog), June 21, 2015, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-arab-states-are-bad-counterinsurgency>.

14. Pollack, *Armies of Sand*, 107–232; and James T. Quinlivan, "Coup-proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East," *International Security* 24, no. 2 (Fall 1999): 131–65.

15. Gaub, "Bad at Counterinsurgency."

16. Pollack, *Armies of Sand*, 233–342.

17. Pollack, *Armies of Sand*, 343–509.

Thus Arab militaries have been consistently crippled by passive and unimaginative tactical leadership, an inability to conduct combined arms operations, and badly distorted flows of information across their chains of command, especially at tactical levels. Arab cultural preferences have also hindered effective air operations, weapons handling, and maintenance.¹⁸ This reality reflects the emphases of the dominant culture—an impact economists and social scientists have recognized as having hindered political and industrial development and economic productivity during the modern era as well.¹⁹

Training Assistance to the Arab World

Militaries reflect the societies they come from. Methods the US military devises to fight wars and train young Americans to do so do not necessarily *fit* the young people who compose the armed forces of very different societies. Given differences between Arab and American society, it is unsurprising the gulf between how Americans think things should be done and how Arabs think things should be done is wide. It is worth noting that in their efforts to train Arab militaries, the Russians have fared little better for precisely the same reasons.²⁰

Thus if the United States is going to help build better Arab militaries, it must account for the impact of culture and other aspects of Arab society and adjust accordingly. At least in the short term it should generally eschew efforts to remake partner Arab militaries in its own image—creating forces which can implement mission-type orders, staffed by officers and NCOs capable of operating with little or no guidance, and improvising as needed in response to battlefield developments. Rather, it should train them to fight in a manner better suited to their cultural preferences and operational requirements.²¹

The United States will need to experiment with new approaches to SFA, be willing to make mistakes, and recognize the road to success may be as long and as difficult as the effort to rebuild and remake the US Army between its defeat in Vietnam and its victory in the Persian

18. Pollack, *Armies of Sand*, 369–405, 439–51.

19. Gary S. Gregg, *The Middle East: A Cultural Psychology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 341–56; Pollack, *Armies of Sand*, 406–14; and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reports including Regional Bureau for Arab States (RBAS), UNDP, *Arab Human Development Report 2003: Building a Knowledge Society* (New York: RBAS, UNDP, 2003); and RBAS, UNDP, *Arab Human Development Report 2004: Towards Freedom in the Arab World* (New York: RBAS, UNDP, 2005).

20. Michael Eisenstadt and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Armies of Snow and Armies of Sand: The Impact of Soviet Military Doctrine on Arab Militaries,” *Middle East Journal* 55, no. 4 (Autumn 2001): 549–78.

21. Eisenstadt, “Defeat Into Victory.”

Gulf War.²² And to some extent these efforts will be conducted under fire, while partner and Allied militaries are dealing with domestic and external threats. In order to create more effective fighting organizations, the United States would benefit by studying successful Arab efforts to rebuild their militaries after defeat and learn from these examples.²³ Such efforts, described below, can point the way toward more effective US approaches to SFA in the Arab world.

Building Elite Formations

Arab armed forces have often dealt with challenges posed by military ineffectiveness by creating small, specially trained, elite units. These may be ad hoc, task-organized units consisting of proven performers or standing elite formations trained to a higher standard than the rest of the military with preferential access to the newest equipment.

The more a military can select those with the right skills and abilities from the wider force and concentrate them in elite formations, the more capable those formations are likely to be, due to the synergies created by having so many highly capable personnel working together. Moreover, creating smaller units increases the likelihood they can be filled with personnel with the right skills. The opposite is also true: it is harder to fill larger units with personnel with the appropriate (but, in the Arab militaries, culturally rare) skills needed for success on the modern conventional battlefield. The example of elite forces may also inspire conventional personnel and units to raise their standards and improve their performance.

Small can be beautiful when building greater military effectiveness through elite Arab formations for another reason: it can facilitate a chain of command populated with officers with the right skill sets. A competent battalion commander can be stymied and frustrated if he has to report to an incompetent brigade commander or if his company commanders lack his skills and understanding. Going small maximizes the number of officers with the right skills throughout a command structure, ensuring superior performance.

Not surprisingly, many of the more successful Arab elite formations have been special forces-type units. Those who volunteer for such units tend to be more highly motivated and, as is the case elsewhere, many are cultural outliers—individuals with uncommon skills and/or a

22. "Rebuilding the Army: Vietnam to Desert Storm," in *American Military History: Volume II: The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917–2008*, ed. Richard W. Stewart (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2010), 373–411, <https://history.army.mil/books/AMH-V2/PDF/Chapter12.pdf>; Suzanne C. Nielson, *An Army Transformed: The U.S. Army's Post-Vietnam Recovery and the Dynamics of Change in Military Organizations*, The Letort Papers (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, September 2010), <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/an-army-transformed-the-u-s-armys-post-vietnam-recovery-and-the-dynamics-of-change-in-military-organizations/>; and Barry D. Watts, *US Combat Training, Operational Art, and Strategic Competence: Problems and Opportunities*, Strategy for the Long Haul Series (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2008), <https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/2008.08.21-Combat-Training-Operational-Art-Strategic-Competence.pdf>.

23. Eisenstadt, "Defeat Into Victory"; and Pollack, *Armies of Sand*, 452–509.

greater willingness to adopt novel practices. Because they are elite, these units tend to have higher esprit de corps, morale, and unit cohesion than conventional units. Moreover, their training frequently emphasizes small-unit actions, independent operations, and improvised solutions to unexpected problems.

Various Arab militaries have tried this approach with varying degrees of success. The Syrians recognized after the Yom Kippur War (1973) and their intervention in Lebanon (1976) that the special forces regiments were their most capable units, and they transferred many of the best soldiers and officers to these formations resulting in the latter's superior performance during the Lebanon War (1982).²⁴ The Iraqis did the same on a grander scale in expanding the Republican Guard after 1986. The Guard comprised a much higher percentage of Iraqi ground force personnel than did Syrian commando units, and most Guard formations did not receive special forces training. As a result, while unquestionably more capable (and more dedicated) than the Iraqi regular army, the Guard did not perform as well as Syria's special forces.²⁵

More recently, in its efforts to support Iraq's Counterterrorism Service (CTS) during Operation Inherent Resolve in 2014–18, the US-led coalition inserted trainers and advisers throughout the Iraqi chain of command. Moreover, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization mission effectively trained and retrained much of the Iraqi Army. As a result, coalition and Iraqi commanders were able to identify the best personnel—those with the culturally rare but militarily desirable skill sets—and either lobbied for their promotion to key leadership slots and/or their transfer to the CTS. Further, the CTS was given extensive training of the type specific to special forces and enjoyed tremendous prestige and popularity. Not surprisingly, the CTS performed demonstrably better than conventional Iraqi formations and spearheaded every coalition offensive against the so-called Islamic State, though Iraq lost many of its best soldiers as a result.²⁶

Nevertheless, the success of the Iraqi CTS would not have been possible without Iraqi army critical enablers (such as tanks and bulldozers) and the help of coalition forces (intelligence, logistics, artillery, and air support). Should US trainers and advisers opt to use the CTS model as a template elsewhere, such critical enablers must be created in the partner's conventional forces, or the United States or other allies must be willing to provide them in times of need, placing a premium on joint training between US forces and Arab allies that is adaptable to various circumstances. Inevitably a trade-off is involved:

24. Pollack, *Arabs at War*, 514–51; and Michael Eisenstadt, *Arming for Peace? Syria's Elusive Quest for "Strategic Parity,"* Policy Paper No. 31 (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992), 67–68, 70–72.

25. Pollack, *Arabs at War*, 218–66.

26. David Witty, *Iraq's Post-2014 Counter-Terrorism Service*, Policy Focus 157 (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 2018), <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus157-Witty-3.pdf>; and Witty, *The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service* (Washington, DC: Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution, March 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/David-Witty-Paper_Final_Web.pdf.

teaching US partners how to integrate US enablers is cheaper and easier than trying to create these capabilities in their militaries, but it creates dependencies and implied obligations on the part of the United States that Washington may be unwilling or unable to fulfill in a crisis.²⁷

These examples underscore the limitations of this approach as well. While ideal for operations where highly competent militaries will provide the bulk of the fighting forces and only small Arab units with modest capabilities are needed, concentrating personnel with the right skills for military success in elite formations leaves an unbalanced force with limited capabilities—one insufficient for larger or more demanding missions.

Designing Military Operations

Another way Arab armed forces have learned to generate greater combat effectiveness is by designing military operations that play to their strengths. Arab armies have generally fared best when conducting static defenses, preferably from fixed, fortified positions and backed by plentiful fire support. On the offensive, Arab militaries have tended to do best performing limited deliberate assaults, especially when they can rely on firepower, surprise, and numerical advantages to overcome enemy defenses. They tend to fare better when relying on artillery rather than air support and when employing ground-based air defenses rather than fighter operations.

In the air, on the ground, or even at sea, the most effective Arab militaries have worked to avoid maneuver warfare, ad hoc operations, or other missions that demand initiative and creativity from lower-level commanders. On the offensive, Arab ground forces have consistently performed worst when ordered to conduct fast-paced breakthrough and exploitation operations meant to encircle enemy defenders and defeat enemy reserves in fluid meeting engagements. Likewise, Arab air forces have learned to eschew offensive counterair operations and complex air campaigns.

The Egyptian Armed Forces in 1973 and the Iraqi Armed Forces in 1987–88 were the best examples of Arab militaries that learned these lessons and won limited victories by employing techniques tailored to the strengths of their troops without implementing transformational solutions that would have required far-reaching cultural or institutional change.

Cairo's original plan for the 1973 war was developed with the Soviets and reflected the latter's doctrine: the crossing of the Suez Canal was to be followed by a breakout and exploitation to retake all of the Sinai Peninsula. The Egyptians eventually deemed this plan unrealistic and abandoned it. The plan they ultimately implemented instead was developed without Soviet input and embodied a limited war approach

27. Dubik, "Partner Capacity Building," 20–23.

that exploited the vulnerabilities—and temporarily neutralized the strengths—of Israel.

Specifically, it entailed a coordinated offensive to seize a bridgehead on the far side of the Suez Canal and impose heavy costs on counterattacking Israeli forces, thereby exploiting the latter's vulnerability to casualties. It also made innovative use of new antitank and air defense systems to neutralize Israel's main strengths—armor and airpower. In addition to restoring Egyptian honor, the operation discredited the Israeli assumption that the territorial status quo was sustainable and enabled Cairo to regain the Sinai in postwar diplomacy.²⁸

In the case of Iraq, facing possible defeat after losing the al-Faw Peninsula to Iran in February 1986, Saddam Hussein turned the conduct of the war over to his professional generals who then devised a new strategy employing limited, systematic offensives to defeat the Iranians and force them to accept a cease-fire. He also granted his generals greater control over organization, force generation, and doctrine, accelerating a trend of depoliticizing the military, promoting officers based on merit, and giving commanders greater latitude. As a result, the general staff developed a new approach involving extensively scripted offensives that Iraq's forces could accomplish with massive superiority in firepower, numbers, and surprise. This new scheme ultimately enabled Iraq to smash Iran's exhausted ground forces and drive them from Iraqi territory.²⁹

Both the Egyptians and Iraqis made special efforts to improve the quality of their forces by increasing the number of high school and college graduates. They studied failures and developed approaches that avoided weaknesses and built on strengths, relying on heavily scripted systematic operations obviating the need for initiative, improvisation, or coordination of combined arms. They carried out exhaustive rehearsals on detailed mockups of objectives. They reduced the responsibilities of their soldiers and officers to a small number of mission-essential tasks that could be practiced repeatedly and learned by rote, relieving them of the need to exercise initiative or independent judgment.

These examples demonstrate Arab military forces can be trained and organized to conduct certain useful military operations successfully in a matter of years without the kind of truly transformational change that could take decades to accomplish. It also illustrates operations must be crafted to work within the culturally defined skill set of Arab armed forces, avoiding operations they are ill-equipped to perform: in 1973, when the Egyptians attempted to attack beyond their bridgeheads and well-practiced scripts to seize the Sinai passes, they were crushed by smaller Israeli forces in the same fashion as in 1967. Likewise in 1991 when the US-led coalition's left-hook maneuver flanked Iraqi defenses and thwarted their planned static defensive operations and deliberate counterattacks, the Iraqi army was routed in a matter of days.

28. Eisenstadt and Pollack, "Armies of Snow," 562–66; and Pollack, *Arabs at War*, 98–106.

29. Eisenstadt and Pollack, "Armies of Snow," 568–69; and Pollack, *Arabs at War*, 218–29.

These experiences also suggest Arab partner forces are best used in circumstances allowing for meticulously planned, heavily scripted methodical operations, extensive rehearsals involving rote fulfillment of mission-essential tasks, and reliance on numbers, mass, and overwhelming firepower to defeat the enemy. This assessment does not preclude, however, the possibility of limited ad hoc, momentum-driven exploitation or pursuit operations when the adversary has been thrown off balance or scattered, though in such cases US reserves and/or standby air support should be available.

Structuring Arab Forces

A small number of Arab irregular forces have outperformed and succeeded in bloodying conventional militaries—both Arab and foreign. In the Second Lebanon War (2006), Hezbollah succeeded in inflicting more Israeli casualties per Arab fighter than had any Arab army in any previous Arab-Israeli war.³⁰ Similarly in 2014, several thousand ISIS fighters routed five divisions of the Iraqi army and conquered nearly a quarter of Iraq. Likewise, the Houthi in Yemen, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Syria, and a number of other Arab militias and insurgent groups have also fared surprisingly well in combat, especially when compared to the more dismal overall record of the armed forces of the Arab states.³¹ What factors account for the tenacity, commitment, and relative effectiveness of some of these irregular forces, and can conventional Arab armed forces exploit these factors to enhance their own military effectiveness?

Most modern armies try to mold recruits from diverse backgrounds into a *band of brothers* willing to fight and die for one another, a common goal, the nation, or an ideology or cause.³² By contrast, Arab irregular forces often start with a band of brothers who are already a tight-knit group united by family, clan, regional, and ethnosectarian solidarities, and build a military organization on this foundation.

In such groups, the trust, confidence, and sense of mutual obligation engendered by the aforementioned solidarities, as well as intensely felt religious commitments (in sectarian or faith-based militias), often create synergies that strengthen unit cohesion and ultimately enhance

30. Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey A. Friedman, *The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy* (Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2008), 76, <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/the-2006-lebanon-campaign-and-the-future-of-warfare-implications-for-army-and-defense-policy/>.

31. Hamza Hendawi and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, "Humiliation at Rout Hits Iraqi Military Hard," Associated Press, June 18, 2014; Ned Parker, Isabel Coles, and Raheem Salman, "Special Report: How Mosul Fell—An Iraqi General Disputes Baghdad's Story," Reuters, October 14, 2014; and Jessica Lewis, "The Terrorist Army Marching on Baghdad," *Wall Street Journal*, June 12, 2014.

32. Michael Eisenstadt and Kendall Bianchi, "The Ties that Bind: Families, Clans, and Hizballah's Military Effectiveness," War on the Rocks, December 15, 2017, <https://warontherocks.com/2017/12/ties-bind-families-clans-hizballahs-military-effectiveness/>; Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 12, no. 2 (Summer 1948): 280–315; Omer Bartov, "Daily Life and Motivation in War: The Wehrmacht in the Soviet Union," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 12, no. 2 (1989): 200–214; and Thomas A. Kolditz et al., *Why They Fight: Combat Motivation in the Iraq War* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, July 2003), <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB179.pdf>.

group performance.³³ This trust enables the close teamwork and cooperation needed in combat, while their religious zeal makes them formidable opponents.³⁴ By contrast, Arab conventional militaries are often weakened by wide social gaps between the officer corps and foot soldiers, the lack of a professional NCO corps to bridge these gaps, and a culturally patterned top-down command structure that induces junior officers to wait for orders from above.³⁵

Arab irregular forces, however, are not unique in their use of social solidarities to advance military ends. Various Arab regimes have created praetorian units drawn from personnel sharing tribal or ethnosectarian ties with the country's leaders in order to defend against coups or unrest.³⁶ Such units have not only proved politically reliable, but as discussed previously, generally have performed somewhat better on the battlefield than regular units from these militaries. The success of these praetorian units may be due, at least in part, to the mobilization of many of the same social solidarities the aforementioned militias have relied upon for their success.

The success of these units also has implications for US efforts to turn allied Arab militaries into effective combat organizations. Arab armies have tended to rely on the same methods used by armies elsewhere to turn civilian recruits from diverse backgrounds into soldiers and create effective units in large numbers—with little overall success. The key for Arab regimes may be to find ways—without exacerbating social tensions or engendering political strife—to strengthen their militaries by constructively harnessing solidarities that have so often undermined regime stability.

Some Arab militaries might therefore consider more broadly applying the manpower model used by irregular forces, militias, and praetorian units, which employ social solidarities to create more effective combat units. They might also look to the British regimental system for an example of a successful Western military that has often used local affiliations to enhance unit esprit and cohesion.³⁷ Certainly, organizing units along local lines would require Arab regimes to accept a degree of risk, potentially empowering competing tribal, ethnosectarian, and regional groups and encouraging centrifugal tendencies within their societies.

33. Norvell B. DeAtkine, "The Arab as Insurgent," *American Diplomacy* (September 2009), <http://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2009/09/the-arab-as-insurgent/>.

34. Ángel Gómez et al., "The Devoted Actor's Will to Fight and the Spiritual Dimension of Human Conflict," *Nature Human Behavior* 1 (2017): 673–79, <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-017-0193-3>.

35. DeAtkine, "Arab as Insurgent"; and Pollack, *Armies of Sand*, 476–509.

36. Pollack, *Armies of Sand*, 107–28; and Quinlivan, "Coups-proofing," 131–65.

37. Brian Bond, *British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1980); Alistair Irwin, "What is Best in the Regimental System?," *RUSI Journal* 149, no. 5 (2004): 32–36; and Charles Messenger, *For Love of Regiment: A History of British Infantry, Volume Two, 1915–1994*, (London: Leo Cooper, 1996).

A Different Military Culture?

Perhaps the most desirable but most difficult way to improve the effectiveness of Arab militaries is by creating a distinct military culture more conducive to success. Militaries are powerful agents of human socialization. To a certain extent, they can help reshape people's thinking—expanding identities, reorienting values, shifting priorities, and flipping default modes of conduct. At the most basic level, any truly effective army has to be able to take young soldiers and train them to do things their nature, upbringing, and education did not prepare them for like charging a machine gun nest or parachuting from a perfectly good airplane at 1,250 feet. But overcoming various tendencies inherent in Arab society—rote learning, deference to authority, and a reluctance to take the initiative—takes considerably more work than instilling the courage necessary for success in battle.

The earlier a military can start to train and teach its personnel, the more successful it is likely to be in changing fundamental patterns of behavior. Cultural inculcation begins from the earliest periods of childhood, and studies by anthropologists and social psychologists indicate the period of late childhood (roughly ages 7–13) is when cultural values and patterns of behavior are most decisively formed by family, friends, and the educational system.³⁸ If the younger personnel destined for the military can be taught differently, culturally patterned values and behavioral tendencies can be altered more easily.

Of all of the nations that attempted to improve the effectiveness of a modern Arab military, the British had the greatest success, but only in Jordan. The British created the modern Jordanian armed forces as the famed Arab Legion in 1923. They recruited its personnel almost exclusively from Bedouin tribes, accepted only volunteers, and insisted on long terms of service. The British paid reasonably well and among the Bedouin, soldiering was considered an honorable and prestigious calling, further ensuring large numbers of eager and dedicated recruits.

Crucially, the British created Legion schools with a British curriculum and British, or British-trained teachers. The Legion schools prepared Jordanian boys from the age of 10 (in the middle of the critical age range of cultural assimilation) for later service in the Legion. The Legion's formal military training, starting with basic training itself, was also conducted principally by British personnel in accordance with British practices. Indeed, the Legion was commanded mostly by British officers, along with a smaller number of Jordanians who had

38. Gary S. Gregg, *Culture and Identity in a Muslim Society* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007), 292–93; and Yasuko Minoura, “A Sensitive Period for the Incorporation of a Cultural Meaning System: A Study of Japanese Children Growing up in the United States,” *Ethos* 20, no. 3 (1992): 304–39.

been educated at Sandhurst, Camberley, and other British military educational institutions.³⁹

As a result, the Arab Legion was culturally a world apart from wider Jordanian society. It felt and functioned much more like a British colonial army with most of their strengths and weaknesses. Consequently the Legion in 1948 was arguably the most formidable foe the Israelis ever fought, demonstrating higher degrees of tactical initiative, innovation, flexibility, and responsiveness than virtually any other Arab fighting force except perhaps Hezbollah. The Legion also demonstrated the tremendously strong individual soldiering skills, marksmanship, and unit cohesion that were the hallmarks of the British Army for centuries.⁴⁰

Without question it will be difficult for Arab states to adopt this kind of model with the United States playing the role of mentor. The educational systems of nearly all the Arab states continue to underperform. And both inertial bureaucracies resistant to change and traditional elites fearful of cultural contamination from the West would likely oppose change as they have past efforts to modernize both military and civilian educational methods.⁴¹ But the UAE has partly adopted the Arab Legion model, and its example may furnish some insight into employing it more broadly. The Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, has long been a proponent of educating young Emiratis abroad. As part of his effort to bolster UAE military power, he instituted conscription and used it to bring more foreign-educated Emiratis into the officer corps. He has reinforced this focus by relying heavily on Western training methods, sending many Emirati personnel to Western military schools and employing many Westerners as trainers in Emirati programs.

Of course, the UAE has also kept its armed forces small, focused on quality, and has taken a number of other steps that have enhanced Emirati military capabilities. By consciously cultivating foreign-educated and foreign-trained military personnel, Abu Dhabi has begun to create a military culture distinctly different from its wider society, contributing

39. John Bagot Glubb, *The Story of the Arab Legion* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1948), 103–4, 171–74; Glubb, *The Changing Scenes of Life: An Autobiography* (London: Quartet, 1983), 121–28; Syed Ali El-Edroos, *The Hashemite Arab Army, 1908–1979: An Appreciation and Analysis of Military Operations* (Amman: Amman Publishing Committee, 1980), 221–36; and P. J. Vatikiotis, *Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion, 1921–1957* (London: Frank Cass, 1967), 73–75.

40. Pollack, *Arabs at War*, 269–84.

41. RBAS, *Arab Human Development Report 2003*; Marwan Muasher and Nathan J. Brown, *Engaging Society to Reform Arab Education: From Schooling to Learning* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2018), <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/11/engaging-society-to-reform-arab-education-from-schooling-to-learning-pub-77454>; Liesbet Steer, Hafez Ghanem, and Maysa Jalbout, *Arab Youth: Missing Educational Foundations for a Productive Life?* (Washington, DC: Center for Universal Education at Brookings, February 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/arabworld_learningbarometer_en.pdf; and Pollack, *Armies of Sand*, 415–38.

to its relative military effectiveness in Yemen.⁴² Attempts to apply the Emirati experience to much larger Arab states would undoubtedly face formidable challenges, however.

The foregoing analysis underscores the importance of educational reform both for the political and socioeconomic development of Arab societies and as a national security imperative. An educated manpower base is a prerequisite for the creation of an effective military. Likewise, greater emphasis must be placed on building up the training base of Arab armies, focusing more on basic soldiering skills and weapons familiarization training. Too often soldiers arrive in units without an adequate general educational foundation and only the most rudimentary military skills. It is unrealistic to expect units to make up for this deficit while also attempting to conduct collective training and managing the reception of new recruits and the release of trained conscripts from active service.

Getting the Politics Right

A revamped US concept for SFA building on elements of these four approaches—relying on small, elite formations; designing military operations to account for Arab strengths and weaknesses; structuring Arab military forces to take advantage of social solidarities; and creating military subcultures that would foster militarily desirable skills—could produce more effective Arab military partners. But transitioning to such a model will create significant organizational and political obstacles on both sides. Generally, the US military has not tailored its training to fit the cultural proclivities of other nations due to its faith in the efficacy of its own doctrine, as well as a belief that doing so would, in effect, mean providing substandard training. Instead, the United States has traditionally taken a one-size-fits-all approach, which it modifies largely to account for differences in the aptitude and abilities of its partners. This approach will have to change.

Moreover, only a special type of individual is likely to succeed as an American adviser or trainer in the unique cultural milieu of the Arab Middle East. The Army should establish a rigorous assessment and selection process to identify individuals who have the *right stuff* for the mission—the right personal and psychological attributes, open to doing things differently from the traditional *US Army way*.

Because Arab militaries are officer-centric, US train and advise efforts in the Arab world should be officer-centric as well. Personnel

42. Taylor Luck, “New Arab Military Force to Reckon with as ‘Little Sparta’ Rises,” *Christian Science Monitor*, February 28, 2019, <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2019/0228/New-Arab-military-force-to-reckon-with-as-Little-Sparta-rises>; Nael Shama, “Commentary: Ambitious UAE Flexes Military Muscle,” Reuters, August 27, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-shama-uae-commentary/commentary-ambitious-uae-flexes-military-muscle-idUSKCN1LC1EC>; Knights, “U.A.E. Approach to Counterinsurgency”; and Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “In the UAE, the United States Has a Quiet, Potent Ally Nicknamed ‘Little Sparta,’” *Washington Post*, November 9, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-the-uae-the-united-states-has-a-quiet-potent-ally-nicknamed-little-sparta/2014/11/08/3fc6a50c-643a-11e4-836c-83bc4f26eb67_story.html.

should be drawn largely from the ranks of the officer corps, and NCOs should be frocked as officers for the duration of their tours to enhance their standing and credibility in the eyes of their Arab partners. Moreover before arriving in the Middle East, advisers and trainers should attend a six- to twelve-month course to familiarize them with Arab and Arab military culture and to teach them how to train Arab soldiers and officers. They would have to be willing to volunteer for relatively long deployments of two to three years to enable relationship-building and ensure continuity of effort. This requirement alone will significantly diminish the pool of available volunteers, but it is the best way to ensure those sent will have a real impact.

Furthermore, the United States will have to develop a distinct doctrine for partner Arab forces—or possibly a family of doctrines to account for variations between states—based on what has worked for successful Arab militaries in the past (for example, Egypt in 1973 and Iraq in 1987–88) as US doctrine will often be inappropriate. The program of instruction taught to Arab partners should be modified to de-emphasize bottom-up initiative, quick decision making, and ad hoc or improvised operations, and should instead emphasize static defense, coordination of firepower, deliberate assaults for limited objectives, and sequential vice simultaneous operations. Conceivably, elite Arab special forces units could be taught doctrine and procedures closer to standard US doctrine, especially if they are comprised of soldiers and officers selected for their greater initiative, aggressiveness, and ability to improvise.

Overcoming political and bureaucratic opposition on the US side will only be part of the problem. America's Arab partners get a vote too. The first political hurdle will be convincing them to allow American trainers and advisers to teach something other than standard US doctrine as taught to American servicemembers. At least some, and possibly all, of America's Arab allies may feel shortchanged if they believe their troops are getting something other than what the US military teaches its own.

Moreover, SFA in the Arab Middle East will rarely be a narrow military-technical activity. On the contrary, because most Arab regimes ultimately depend on their militaries for survival, any tinkering with their workings is an inherently political activity touching on the most sensitive matters of state.⁴³ Accordingly, US trainers and advisers must understand the political implications of what they are trying to accomplish, especially in societies where ethnosectarian divisions, corruption, or the malign influence of neighbors may impose significant limits on what they may be able to accomplish.

Any effort to improve the effectiveness of certain units or the military writ large may have implications for the balance of power among political elites. And even if trainers and advisers succeed in making more capable forces, the zero-sum, winner-takes-all approach to politics may

43. Mara E. Karlin, *Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018).

result in their being used in a way that results in greater instability—and thus less security.

Mitigating these potential impacts might require the United States to become more deeply involved in the selection of personnel, military organizational matters, and efforts to counter meddling by neighboring states than would be considered desirable.⁴⁴ Such mitigation could require high-level intervention by senior officials on the ground and in Washington. For instance, during the 2007–8 US surge in Iraq, then Lieutenant General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker (among others) worked to protect competent officers and prevailed upon Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to fire numerous malefactors in the ISF and have competent personnel promoted in their place.⁴⁵ United States military and diplomatic officials were able to take these actions because the United States had 150,000 troops on the ground, and as a result Washington had tremendous leverage, and was highly motivated and engaged.⁴⁶ This kind of situation, however, is obviously the exception rather than the rule.

As always in politics, nothing worth doing is ever easy. But as America's strategic focus and military assets eventually shift to other regions of the world, and the US interventions of the past three decades in Iraq and elsewhere fade into the past, the United States will have no choice but to rethink its approach to SFA in the Middle East. For better or worse, the Middle East remains a region of vital interest to the United States, one still facing threats from terrorists and aspiring hegemony, and which continues to export its instability to the rest of the world, including to the United States. Unless the American people are willing to walk away from the Middle East, leaving a security vacuum that will most likely be filled by Iran and all manner of vicious extremist groups, the United States will have to find a better way to build effective Arab partners and allies. It is our hope this article will prompt a rethink of the US approach toward SFA in the Middle East and thus mark a first step toward achieving this goal.

44. Karlin, *Militaries in Fragile States*; and James M. Dubik, *Building Security Forces and Ministerial Capacity: Iraq as a Primer* (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, August 2009), http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/BuildingSecurityForces_0.pdf.

45. Joel D. Rayburn and Frank K. Sobchak, eds., *The U.S. Army in the Iraq War—Volume 2: Surge and Withdrawal, 2007–2011* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press, 2019), 114; and Mark Moyar, *A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 249–51.

46. Michael E. O'Hanlon and Ian Livingston, *Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, January 26, 2010), 22, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/index20100126.pdf>.

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The US Army and the Pacific: Legacies and Challenges

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ABSTRACT: The Indo-Pacific will loom large in the future of the US Army. The region is increasingly important to myriad US national interests and is a major playing field for great-power competition. As it deepens its Pacific orientation, the Army has a rich institutional and operational legacy to draw upon, as well as encouraging recent initiatives that auger well for its ability to support the Joint Force in this critical part of the world.

The ongoing shift in the global economic center of gravity to Asia, and the region's emergence as a node of technological innovation have profound national security implications for the United States. The theater is now a playing field for major power competition. China, already the world's second-largest economy and building an increasingly credible military, is working to put its stamp on the regional order. Russia would like to make its presence felt once again.

The theater hosts nuclear armed powers, and unresolved geostrategic tensions could potentially erupt into crisis or major power conflict involving our allies, partners, or even ourselves. Additionally, nontraditional security challenges will persist—if not grow—as a result of climate change, water security, pandemics, and demographic pressures, among other issues. The Pacific theater will play a predominant role in the future of the US Army, even as contingencies in other regions demand the Army's attention.

The current and future importance of the Pacific transcends politics. Both the Obama and Trump administrations have attempted to focus on the region with their Rebalance and Free and Open Indo-Pacific policies, amid other requirements. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, echoing his predecessor James Mattis, has reconfirmed on various occasions that the region is the department's priority theater. Consequently the Army needs to continue to deepen its Pacific orientation even as it confronts requirements in other theaters.

Legacies of the Past

The recent uptick in America's recognition of Asia's importance to our national well-being is just the latest iteration of this assessment along a time line going back to the earliest days of our country as a maritime trading nation. It is worth remembering that to secure its enduring interests in the Pacific, the United States has maintained a permanent military presence in Asia for over 180 years—almost two centuries. This permanent military presence can be traced back to 1835 when the Navy

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first established an East India Squadron, thus creating a naval force dedicated to Asia even before the United States had a Pacific coast.¹

By the early twentieth century, the Army had established a permanent ground force presence in the Pacific, predominantly in the Philippines and Hawaii, but also with lone regiments stationed in places long forgotten by many. For example, the 15th Infantry Regiment (“Can Do”) was stationed in Tianjin, China—formerly Tientsin—from 1912 to 1938, and its interwar alumni included the likes of George C. Marshall, Joseph W. Stilwell, Mathew B. Ridgway, Walton H. Walker, Albert C. Wedemeyer, and many others of note.² The Army presence in the region only became more extensive after the Second World War.

The Pacific theater during the Second World War (Map courtesy of the United States Military Academy Department of History [modified])

From an operational perspective over the course of its history in the Pacific, the Army has engaged in nearly every possible type of warfare across the spectrum of operations from “military operations other than war” to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism to total conventional warfare. It is the only theater where a nuclear device has been employed, and it was delivered by an Army asset. Until recently, the Army’s longest fight was in Asia, in Vietnam. All told, the Army has fought more major campaigns abroad in the Pacific than in any other foreign theater of

1. See Robert Erwin Johnson, *Far China Station: The U.S. Navy in Asian Waters, 1800–1898* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979).

2. See Alfred E. Cornebise, *The United States 15th Infantry Regiment in China, 1912–1938* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2004).

operations, attested to by 62 campaign streamers on the Army flag—32 percent of 192 campaign streamers.³

So to countries that would describe the United States as being an external actor or a latecomer interfering in Asian security affairs or question US willingness to defend American interests and those of our allies and partners, one could simply say, please review the historical record.⁴ But more to the point, today's Army has a firm foundation of continuity of presence and a deep operational legacy to build upon as it looks to the challenges of the present and the needs of the future.

Challenges of the Present

The region that today is referred to by the Department of Defense as the Indo-Pacific is subject to significant strategic tensions, some long-standing, others new. The post–Second World War economic, political, and security order in the region is shifting or under pressure, and various countries—US allies and partners among them—are trying to determine how best to navigate changing strategic terrain in order to secure their interests in the most opportune way.

The most significant development in the region is heightening tensions between the United States and the People's Republic of China. Tensions have been percolating for the past few years, with the relationship characterized by an uneasy admixture of cooperation and competition. Today the competitive dimensions are at the forefront, reflected in the strategic documents of both the US and China defense establishments.⁵

Strategic tensions between the United States and China range across a wide swath of issues—economic, political, technological, and informational. Many of these tensions are playing out globally, not just regionally, and China is no longer just a concern for the United States Indo-Pacific Command. In recent years, the commanders of other combatant commands, such as US Southern Command and US Africa Command, have used their congressional testimonies to voice concerns about Chinese activities in their areas of responsibility. But the Indo-Pacific region is the geostrategic epicenter of where the military dimensions of US-China competition are playing out.

In the Indo-Pacific, long-standing US military dominance is intersecting with China's expanding operational reach and increasing military capabilities, juxtaposed against rising strategic distrust. Because the military forces of the two nations are in close proximity in the region, the risk of miscalculation requires deepening risk reduction and confidence-building measures between the two defense establishments,

3. See John B. Wilson, *Campaign Streamers of the United States Army* (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Institute of Land Warfare, 2019).

4. See James C. McNaughton, *The Army in the Pacific: A Century of Engagement* (Washington, DC: US Army Center for Military History, 2012).

5. See James Mattis, *Summary of the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018); and *China's National Defense in the New Era* (Beijing: Information Office, 2019).

and the past few years of US-China military relations reflects such activity. The US Army contributes to these measures through several programs, including an annual disaster management exchange between ground forces rotating between China and the United States.

Fundamentally, the United States is determined to sustain its hitherto uncontested military dominance through forward military presence, advanced capabilities, and alliances and partnerships. China is developing military capabilities to challenge traditional US operational advantages while employing various means to attempt to weaken those military alliances and partnerships. Moreover both nations are using the other as the pacing threat for their respective military modernization programs.

Since late 2015, the Chinese armed forces have been undergoing the most ambitious reform and reorganization in the history of the People's Liberation Army (PLA).⁶ The objective of this unprecedented military reform effort is to improve the capabilities of the PLA as a joint warfighting force—one that can prevail in information-intensive joint operations in traditional and emerging high-tech domains, principally off China's littoral.

The reform enterprise is also meant to enhance the reach and expeditionary capabilities of the PLA in order to secure Beijing's growing global economic interests. While much analytic attention is rightly paid to the rise of the PLA Navy, it would be a mistake to discount the ongoing modernization of China's ground forces (PLA Army) and evolving PLA thinking about ground force roles and missions beyond China's shores, including in the joint fight off the Chinese littoral PLA strategists envision as their next most likely conflict.⁷

Against this backdrop of rising US-China strategic tensions, the Pacific remains home to several significant flash points that could escalate into crises or major conflicts, some involving nations with nuclear weapons. Of pressing importance to the US Army is the persistent potential for major ground combat operations on the Korean Peninsula. Next, Beijing continues to reaffirm its right to use force against Taiwan, although it professes a preference for a peaceful resolution of the issue. In the Philippines a counterinsurgency is still underway, with support from the United States.

Tensions persist between nuclear powers India and Pakistan. China and India, also nuclear powers, have yet to resolve their border issues, and these tensions flare-up from time to time with the most violent clash in years taking place between border forces in June 2020. Competing claims of sovereignty in the maritime domain increasingly bedevil the region—between China and Japan in the East China Sea, between China

6. See David M. Finkelstein, "Breaking the Paradigm: Drivers behind the PLA's Current Period of Reform," in *Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA*, ed. Saunders et al. (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2019).

7. See People's Liberation Army (PLA) Academy of Military Science Military Strategy Department, *Science of Military Strategy* (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, December 2013), 100–101.

and multiple claimants in the South China Sea, between Beijing and Seoul in the Yellow Sea, and between Japan and Russia in the Northern Territories, to name just a few.

In some of these scenarios, the United States may not be merely a concerned observer. For example, in 2018 the US administration publicly reaffirmed Article V of the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security covers the Senkaku (Diaoyudao) Islands in the East China Sea, and in 2019 Secretary of State Pompeo stated, “any armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations under Article 4 of our Mutual Defense Treaty.”⁸ Also of note, for the past few years Moscow has been increasing its military presence and activities in the Indo-Pacific, and the China-Russia security relationship is taking on new dimensions. Planners must confront this daunting set of issues.

The context of US-China tensions includes second-order effects on alliances and partnerships. For example, quite a few of these countries are now caught in an uncomfortable position, simultaneously looking to China for their economic security and to the United States for their military security. Some of these nations are hedging, and none are keen at the prospect of choosing between the two as problems between Beijing and Washington play out. Consequently, there is a good deal of reassurance to be done on our part.

We constantly need to keep in mind these relationships are critical to a host of strategic-level objectives the United States shares with many countries in the region. For example, our allies and partners represent a network of like-minded nations that can undergird the regional order, set norms and rules, and provide a political-military bulwark against potential challenges to this order. Operationally, allies and partners will remain critical enablers of the access and sustainment our forces must have to overcome what Pacific planners refer to as “the tyranny of distance.” Moreover, training and exercising with allies and partners will build the operational capacity, interoperability, and habits of combined operations that become force multipliers in times of crisis.

Looking Ahead

Despite the persistent pressures put upon the Army to deal with contingencies and missions around the world, the past few years have witnessed a renewed focus on the Pacific. The elevation in 2013 of the commander of the US Army Pacific (USARPAC) to a four-star position was an important move with both operational and political-military implications, including a reorientation of USARPAC’s previous focus on support to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to its role as a

8. Michael R. Pompeo “Remarks with Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin, Jr. at a Press Availability,” (joint US-Philippine press conference, Manila, Philippines, March 1, 2019), <https://www.state.gov/remarks-with-philippine-foreign-secretary-teodoro-locsin-jr/>. See also “President Donald J. Trump’s Summit Meeting with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,” White House (website), April 18, 2018, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-summit-meeting-prime-minister-shinzo-abe/>.

Theater Joint Force Land Component Command.⁹ Moreover, in 2019 USINDOPACOM certified USARPAC as a “4-Star Capable Joint Task Force Headquarters.”¹⁰ Establishing this four-star command position also made sense from an engagement perspective: the Indo-Pacific is a region in which ground force officers still dominate politically and bureaucratically in many countries, despite the maritime flavor of the area of responsibility.

From a doctrinal perspective, the inception and continuing evolution of the multi-domain operations concept is a significant development for the Army, and the Joint Force for that matter. Overseen by the Army Futures Command and being tested first in the Indo-Pacific, multi-domain operations auger well for the Army’s future ability to contribute to Joint Force operations inside an anti-access/area-denial environment—a key warfighting challenge in the Pacific.

The Army’s pilot multi-domain task force, hosted by I Corps, participated in the Navy-led combined exercise Rim of the Pacific in 2018. During the exercise the multi-domain task force engaged in land-based precision fires to sink a ship at sea successfully. Keeping with the combined nature of the Rim of the Pacific exercise, this multi-domain task force exercise included participation from Japan’s Ground Self Defense Force, a significant optic.¹¹ Moving forward, work on doctrine and other facets of Army modernization must keep a Pacific orientation at the forefront.

Another positive development in the engagement space is the promulgation of Pacific Pathways 2.0. In this iteration of the program, US Army units training with partner-nation forces in the region will stay deployed much longer than the few weeks previously the norm. Under the new scheme, some units will stay in the region for up to six months.¹² Doing so will enhance the habits of cooperation between the Army and its host-nation partners, deepen relationships, signal resolve, and provide deployed US soldiers enhanced grounding in the cultural, political, and operational realities of the region.

Going forward, these types of sustained engagement initiatives with allies and partners will be critical. It is clear the Army and other Joint Force engagers need to work very hard to reassure US allies and partners

9. See Vincent K. Brooks and Charlie H. Kim, “US Army Pacific Makes Major Moves to Face Regional Challenges,” AUSA, March 17, 2014, <https://www.ousa.org/articles/us-army-pacific-makes-major-moves-face-regional-challenges>.

10. LTC C. J. Phillips, email message to author, February 18, 2020.

11. See Todd South, “Army to Build at Least Two Multi Domain Task Forces,” *Army Times*, August 7, 2019, <https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/08/07/army-to-build-at-least-two-new-multi-domain-task-forces/>; Devon L. Suits, “What Soldiers Need to Know About Multi-domain Ops, Modernization,” US Army, (website) April 22, 2019, https://www.army.mil/article/220663/what_soldiers_need_to_know_about_multi_domain_ops_modernization; and Rachael Jeffcoat, “Army Conducts 1st RIMPAC Joint Live-Fire Sinking Exercise as Multi-Domain Task Force,” US Army, (website) July 23, 2018, https://www.army.mil/article/208852/army_conducts_1st_rimpac_joint_live_fire_sinking_exercise_as_multi_domain_task_force.

12. Sean Kimmons, “Pacific Pathways 2.0 to Bolster Presence in the Theater,” US Army, (website) June 7, 2019, https://www.army.mil/article/222783/pacific_pathways_20_to_bolster_presence_in_the_theater.

of our intentions, capabilities, and political will. We need to continue to prove we are good partners, that we understand what others need to get out of our defense relationships, and that we do not take allies and partners for granted. This is especially the case under the shadow of a rising China and, frankly, in response to concerns by some countries in the region about certain US policies and rhetoric.

Cultivating human talent has always been a strong suit for the Army. As part of its Pacific orientation, the Army must continue to invest in and expand the pool of human talent and expertise demanded by this culturally, politically, geographically, and operationally diverse region. The US Army Foreign Area Officer program, Functional Area 48 is the envy of the other services. As is the case with demand for Army strategists (Functional Area 59), combatant commanders, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and others focused on the Pacific want their share of these individuals. Do we have the right mix of Indo-Pacific foreign area officers? Is the pipeline healthy? Are we pushing them down to operational units focused on the region in addition to the Joint billets they fill? How can the Reserves, Army National Guard, and Army civilians contribute to the talent pool Army commanders operating in the region will demand?

Perhaps the greatest challenges moving forward will be those beyond the control of the Army, namely fiscal constraints and real-world contingencies. Despite the fact DoD leaders continue to declare the Indo-Pacific the priority theater, Pacific forces will continue to compete for attention and resources. Reality dictates the theater will likely never get all the focus, forces, and resources desired. Consequently, the Army's Pacific orientation will need to be a long game—adjusting doctrinal concepts, enhancing operational capabilities, deepening partnerships, cultivating human talent, and preparing the force to operate in the region even as it operates globally. We have done this before; there is no reason to believe we will not be able to do it again.

On “Military Anthropology”

Anna Simons

*This commentary addresses Montgomery McFate’s book *Military Anthropology: Soldiers, Scholars and Subjects at the Margins of Empire*, published by Oxford University Press (2018).*

It may seem unfair to use Montgomery McFate’s *Military Anthropology* to launch into a critical commentary about the utility of anthropology for the US military. But her book places her in the position of attempting to define a subfield—military anthropology—while trying to sell anthropology to the Department of Defense as well. Unfortunately, in the process she gets too much wrong and not enough right.

Without question, those of us who are McFate’s peers—other anthropologists who have worked with and for the military—would adamantly agree: anthropological sensibilities are vitally important when it comes to fashioning a more astute foreign policy in the twenty-first century, and are essential for at least some decision makers in uniform to have. But anthropology has never been a “discipline perpetually joined to the military execution of foreign policy,” despite what McFate claims (335).

Nor is it fair or historically accurate to accuse anthropology of having been colonialism’s handmaiden. This charge has become a favorite of progressive revisionists and is one McFate enjoys turning to her advantage. But the truth is, more anthropologists actually argued with authorities on behalf of the people they studied than abetted officials in oppressing or even governing them. Thus when McFate promotes the idea anthropology can—and even should—be reweaponized to serve the Department of Defense today, she treads on shaky ground. Worse, of course, is to want any academic discipline to be weaponized to do anything. The point of academe is to investigate, analyze, report, question, and even interrogate carefully what passes for conventional wisdom. Insights can certainly be used—otherwise, what is the point? But no *discipline* should be harnessed to a political endeavor of any type.

More troubling than McFate’s sins of commission, however, may be her sins of omission. Take the 10 very interesting individuals she profiles in her book. In order of appearance they are: Gerald Hickey, who worked among US military advisers in Vietnam during the 1960s; Robert Rattray, employed by the British colonial office in West Africa; Ursula Bower, who led Naga tribesmen in northeastern India during World War II; Gregory Bateson, who briefly worked for the Office of Strategic Services during World War II; Tom Harrison, who helped lead tribesmen in Borneo during World War II; John Useem, who served in Palau in the wake of World War II; Jomo Kenyatta and Louis Leakey, who operated on opposite sides of the Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya during the 1950s; Don Marshall, who participated in the Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of Vietnam study begun in 1964; and lastly, David Barrows, who

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was the assistant chief of staff G2 of the American expeditionary force sent to Siberia on the heels of the Bolshevik revolution.

Oddly, by showcasing these 10, McFate reveals a degree of ethnocentricity one hopes none of them would indulge in were they practicing anthropology today. I say this because the idea that it takes Westerners to explain foreign locals to other Westerners is hopelessly outdated. Yet this idea seems to be McFate's subtheme (minus her inclusion of Kenyatta).

Equally peculiar is that several of McFate's anthropologists weren't even anthropologists. As she tells us in her introduction, "Each chapter uses the life and times of an anthropologist who worked directly with the military" (10). Yet, at least one (John Useem) was an American sociologist not an anthropologist, while two (Ursula Bower and Tom Harrisson) lacked any formal anthropological training prior to their service with British authorities. Meanwhile, several individuals McFate profiles never worked directly for the military. So one has to wonder, what is McFate up to when she treats these 10 as paragons?

As McFate explains in her introduction, *Military Anthropology* originated as a professional military education project; the idea was every chapter could be used as a standalone lesson. Unfortunately this means McFate has saddled each of her anthropologists with helping her prove some broader point—about courage under fire, indirect rule, military leadership, information operations, unconventional warfare, governance operations, the counterinsurgency system, the strategic objective, and military execution.

In several cases her pairings work well. In other chapters, she overwhelms readers with too much extraneous or only partial information. To her credit, McFate can be a vivid writer, and her focus on strange rites and practices will likely appeal to nonanthropologists who will not be upset that she overfetishizes the exotic (a considerable anthropological sin), though why she then thinks any but the most committed graduate students will be interested in the details of recondite anthropological debates remains a mystery.

The real issue with *Military Anthropology*, however, is McFate bills it as, "a history, insofar as it explores certain key episodes in the history of military anthropology" (10). Yet her sequence is not chronological and she never relates key episodes. She does not because she cannot. Military anthropology did not exist between 1918 and 1970 when the individuals she profiles were in the field. It still does not exist. Unlike psychology with military psychology, sociology with military sociology, and history with military history, anthropology has never had a recognized military subfield. Indeed, when several of us tried to kick-start such a thing several decades ago, it was the controversy over the US Army's Human Terrain System, a program McFate conceived and helped run, that nipped our efforts in the bud.

As McFate notes, anthropology has not always been skeptical of or hostile to the military. Animus dates from the 1960s and is as much a relic of Baby Boomers' reaction to Vietnam as to a handful of projects some anthropologists assisted with in Indochina and Latin America. This enmity is why the prospect of our gaining acceptance remained touch-and-go even as several of us who were studying militaries both

here and abroad tried to affect a thaw in the late 1990s. Unfortunately with the Human Terrain System's revival of anthropologists' suspicions of the military, back into the deep freeze we went. One consequence has been that since 9/11 the military has too often deferred to pseudoanthropologists who purport to have insight into other cultures. The other consequence has been anthropology's still too primitive view of soldiers and soldiering.

As for who can be considered a bona fide *military* anthropologist today, there are still (maybe) only a dozen academic anthropologists worldwide who have pursued firsthand studies of military units. In contrast, many more anthropologists and archeologists have engaged in applied work, either directly for the military (through the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the like) or indirectly via think tanks, such as RAND.

Others, when willing, have been consulted *by* the military as regional experts, forensic experts, and other specialists. A fourth small category of anthropologists are those who teach courses in professional military education institutions and elsewhere, and who learn about the military's own service cultures in the process. And a rising fifth category is comprised of veterans now earning their PhDs. But, does this make all of us *military* anthropologists?

In some regards the differences among us might seem, well, academic—akin to those between armor, aviation, intelligence, and finance. Still, my hunch is that most of us would agree McFate's conception of what we do does not reflect what we *are* doing or can do.

I say this because if McFate had her way, our chief role would be to provide the military with useful insights, better information, and greater understanding so that it can better proceed with whatever it seeks to undertake. It is apparently not our place or our job to raise questions about the wisdom of doctrine or policy, or even to wonder whether it makes sense in the twenty-first century for one set of Americans to advise another set of Americans about what they should (or should not) be doing in someone else's country.

Yet most of us, I would like to think, recognize the days are long past when there are no educated natives who could explain *native* behavior or effectively relay local grievances, resentments, or concerns to interlopers, especially since most populations today have at least some members who can better explain what is going on locally than all but the most gifted outsiders can. After all, from whom do the best anthropologists, journalists, and other regional experts get *their* information? From well-informed locals, of course.

In 2020, the Department of Defense should not just be *acting* as though it wants to take knowledgeable locals seriously, but, given twenty-first-century sensibilities, the Department of Defense should be *taking* them more seriously. Or from a slightly different angle, consider Afghanistan and Iraq. There are Afghans and Iraqis with graduate anthropology degrees. In fact, Afghanistan's current president, Dr. Ashraf Ghani, was once on the anthropology faculty at Johns Hopkins University. Surely he had as good a sense as anyone about what might or might not have worked well in terms of US military approaches to

Afghanistan back in the early 2000s—and doubtless still has views worth listening to.

In other words, it is past time for Americans to think that only we can come up with good ideas for others, or formulate more fitting ideas than they can generate for themselves. At most, we might be able to help broaden others' horizons by offering them examples of what has or has not worked elsewhere, and we excel when it comes to technical assistance. But now to promote the notion we would better succeed at occupying other peoples' countries through a smarter application of anthropological insights ignores what anthropological insights actually suggest: doing anything these days without fully vesting others in determining their own futures dooms us, and not just them.

Something else McFate overlooks is that anthropology has never only been about better understanding others. Its dual purpose has always been to help us better see ourselves. When done well, anthropology forces us to take a good hard look at our own contradictions and inconsistencies. And certainly, an institution as large and complex as the military is rife with both, which makes it ideal terrain for anthropologists. Especially when you consider a second reality anthropologists routinely tackle.

No matter how often we Americans are enjoined to speak truth to power, no one in a hierarchy is ever apt to speak truth to power. But well-trained anthropologists will. Indeed, questioning truth *and* power have long been anthropologists' forte. So is taking an inside-out, bottom-up approach. Anthropologists are not just prone to question everything we see and hear but are primed to treat nothing as sacred, including doctrine, strategy, customs, organizational constructs, or what have you. Consequently, no one is better positioned than we are to raise critical questions about best *and* worst practices before offering objective analysis.

Although our role of perpetually asking *why* is one McFate would apparently prefer we not engage in, a number of us who have worked in and around the military have been doing our best to shake military sensibilities constructively in myriad ways for years (particularly in professional military education). But because we are a small scattered band and have acted as quiet professionals, no one yet has captured all of our endeavors. Even so, and just given the contributions of which I am already aware, numerous misconceptions will be overturned when military anthropology's history *is* finally written. Among the premises to be overturned will be most of those feted in *Military Anthropology*.

The Author Replies

Montgomery McFate

Unfortunately, Anna Simons mischaracterizes the arguments in *Military Anthropology* without actually discussing the substance of the book. Simons seems to believe my book is a marketing pitch for anthropology. However, I am certainly not trying to “sell anthropology to the Department of Defense,” nor am I promoting the idea that “anthropology can—and even should—be reweaponized to serve the Department of Defense today.” In fact, I state quite clearly the purpose of this book is to understand how military organizations have used sociocultural knowledge at the strategic, operational, and tactical level in a variety of different conflicts, and how individual anthropologists contributed their knowledge about the human condition to difficult national security problems, so that if sociocultural knowledge plays an important role in future conflict, some of the pitfalls of the past might be avoided.

If anything, my book is quite skeptical about the use of anthropology by the military since so much anthropological advice has been misused or gone unheeded. In the introduction, for example, I discuss how Gerald Hickey provided advice to the US Army in Vietnam, advocating for a viable ceasefire in accord with Vietnamese concepts of conflict resolution, arguing against forced relocation of Vietnamese peasants and Montagnard tribes to strategic hamlets, and so on. As I note, Hickey’s “predictions proved disturbingly accurate in retrospect, most of Hickey’s recommendations went unheeded” (3).

In Simons’ view, anthropologists should “investigate, analyze, report, question, and even interrogate what passes for conventional wisdom.” I agree wholeheartedly with her view. Thus the vast majority of case studies in the book detail the way in which anthropologists argued with authorities on behalf of the people they studied, sometimes while governing them. For example, the chapter on Robert Rattray details his efforts while employed as a government anthropologist in the Gold Coast (now Ghana) to convince the government to recognize the queen mothers officially, preserve African institutions, and to counter the biased, erroneous stereotypes in the minds of the administration through empirical research.

Simons takes issue with the idea of military anthropology on the grounds it is not a recognized subfield in the discipline of anthropology. Given the historic hostility of anthropologists to the military (and the government in general), it is hardly surprising anthropology does not include military anthropology as a recognized subfield. But as my book demonstrates, the history of anthropology and the military is a long and interesting one.

For example, the concluding chapter concerns the experience of a young Army lieutenant colonel named David Barrows, who struggled to understand the politics of intervention in the 1918 American intervention in Siberia. Later in his life, Barrows became the only US Army general to

have a PhD in anthropology. When I was a student at the University of California, Berkeley, I took classes in Barrows Hall, but I did not know who he was. His remarkable books and incredible life experiences are completely forgotten by anthropologists. Just because anthropologists do not recognize their own intellectual legacy does not justify its absence from history.

Simons seems very concerned about the membership of a club she does not believe should exist. She notes John Useem was a sociologist and Ursula Bower and Tom Harrisson lacked formal training. Just to address one example, Tom Harrisson lacked a PhD in anthropology. However, Harrisson did exactly what anthropologists do, and he did it with great panache. To employ Simons' words, he investigated, analyzed, reported, questioned, and even interrogated "what passes for conventional wisdom."

For example, before he served with the Office of Strategic Services in World War II, Harrisson conducted research on the island of Malekula in the New Hebrides and lived among people who still practiced ritual cannibalism. In his book about the experience living among cannibals, *Savage Civilisation* (1937), Harrisson challenged the conventional progressive liberalism of 1930s British foreign policy, arguing the Malekulans did not need Western democracy, religion, or customs because they were "in many ways as, and in some ways more, civilized than the Europeans in the same part of the world." Professor Simons' complaints about whether these historical figures count as anthropologists raises the question: is anthropology defined by *what one does*, or is it defined by an official stamp on university letterhead?

Simons characterizes my book as "promot[ing] the notion we would better succeed at occupying other peoples' countries through a smarter application of anthropological insights." Undoubtedly, as I have argued elsewhere, had the US military and policy community better understood the culture, history, politics, and economics of Iraq and Afghanistan, less blood and treasure would have been lost. But the actual argument of my book is military intervention always interferes with the local society; strategic objectives must take social conditions into account; problem framing determines problem solution; and the instrumentalism of national security often negates the objective. Because these problems arise consistently during the military execution of foreign policy (as demonstrated by the case studies in my book), intervention should not be the option of first resort.

No book is perfect, and I am certainly aware of the flaws in *Military Anthropology*. I could have perhaps chosen more illustrative cases, or included more recent material from Iraq or Afghanistan, or perhaps ensured the conclusions better followed from the premises. However, Simon's criticisms do not appear to concern the actual book I wrote, *Military Anthropology*, but rather her own notions of the role of anthropologists vis-à-vis the military. In using me as an example of a naughty anthropologist who uncritically assists the military in achieving its foreign policy objectives, she casts herself as a critical voice in the military establishment who speaks truth to power. Actually, one can do both: I have spent most of my career questioning the conventional military wisdom and then doing something about it.

On “Social Media Warriors: Leveraging a New Battlespace”

Jason W. Warren

This commentary responds to the article by Buddhika B. Jayamaha and Jahara Matisek entitled “Social Media Warriors: Leveraging a New Battlespace” published in the Winter 2018–19 issue of Parameters (vol. 48, no. 4).

The Army was all but defeated. Concentrated across the Delaware River from the advancing Redcoats and their mercenary German allies, General George Washington’s Continental Army was hemorrhaging personnel after successive defeats during the 1776 campaign. The Army, indeed the entire patriot cause, was in danger of annihilation and a bloody conclusion to the war if an opportunity had not presented itself. Information warfare (IWar) provided that strategic opportunity, altering not only the fate of the Continental Army, but also the prospects for the new nation.¹

The case of 1776 was not unique in the history of IWar as it likely has been employed in some fashion since man walked the earth in hunting groups, and certainly since the advent of recorded history in the West, with both Herodotus and Thucydides describing the use of information warfare. Today, almost 250 years after the Revolutionary War, IWar has grabbed center stage again with Russian and Chinese information warfare campaigns worldwide; it is now vitally important for the United States to redefine this concept and tie it to a larger strategic framework.

While IWar has always existed, the updated version includes the combination of modern technologically driven fields such as cyber operations and electronic warfare. The US Army War College’s Conrad Crane recently traced the origins and evolution of IWar in the Army, focusing on its influence on decision making, while demonstrating the concept is far from novel.² Yet the IWar concept is the “new” kid on the block in security circles given shorter-term institutional memories about victories back in 1776, and there is momentum to enact this concept with a transitioned US Army Cyber Command to US Army Information Warfare Command. Lingering concern over Russian interference in US elections and the continuing Chinese threat over stealing technologies contributes impetus for this effort. Buddhika B. Jayamaha and Jahara Matisek, in “Social Media Warriors: Leveraging a New Battlespace,” call for new strategies to combat this information operations threat as it exists on social media platforms.

Absent from Jayamaha and Matisek’s argument, however, is the idea that the central facet of an adversary’s attempt to undermine democracy

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1. David Hackett Fischer, *Washington’s Crossing* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 201–3.

2. Conrad Crane, “The United States Needs an Information Warfare Command: A Historical Examination,” War on the Rocks, June 14, 2019, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/06/the-united-states-needs-an-information-warfare-command-a-historical-examination/>.

is disinformation, which can be ameliorated by generating a more compelling narrative. Calls for more government intervention through the expansion of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 and more efficient domestic regulations on freedom of speech miss the point that these too will undermine democracy—and perhaps more so than Russian bots.³ Plentiful historical examples of IWar undercut the idea that it is a new concept, while the refocused efforts of the US military to converge existing information-related fields demonstrate this an issue larger than political narratives and military decision making alone.

In its vision for transformation, the Army converges and develops capabilities to identify, defend, and dominate information in the operational environment to achieve objectives and aid in winning the nation's wars. Information warfare would provide national security leaders meaningful and timely information for decisional advantage over adversaries.⁴ It is a critical element in achieving strategic landpower. Without it, the use of strategic force becomes unmoored from its political and policy antecedents. IWar bridges the military's employment of force from the realm of policy and politics, as Clausewitz described war as the latter's continuation by other means. It does so with softer informational power to influence and persuade relevant actors, while employing harder power with cyber or electronic warfare through operations in the information environment and as a means to enhance traditional combat power in other domains.

IWar provided Washington an asymmetrical opportunity. As British and Hessian units went into winter quarters local patriots undertook IWar to discredit the legitimacy of the occupying forces in New York and New Jersey. This narrative, somewhat accurate but embellished, portrayed the occupying army as committing depredations against the local inhabitants. It also highlighted the botched British effort in what practitioners now consider civil affairs and psychological operations (types of operations included in the IWar concept), failing to sustain the narrative of colonial reconciliation with the British Crown.

While Washington did not orchestrate this IWar campaign, his regular army benefited from the intelligence the campaign generated, namely that supporting forces had left Hessian General Johann Rall temporarily isolated at Trenton. IWar ultimately guided and determined Washington's successful use of force against a vulnerable adversary. The Trenton example is the American version of the type of information warfare the ancient Greeks and Persians, and modern Chinese and Russians, have used to great effect.

IWar hence creates economies of force in the traditional domains, establishing a framework to task organize by identifying adversary vulnerabilities. It allows for an economy of force mission, channeling military power toward an achievable objective. This economy of force is especially critical in the case such as Washington's strategic situation, where the adversary maintains superiority; there is similarity today with near-peer adversaries' advantages in their near abroad for the United

3. Buddhika B. Jayamaha and Jahara Matisek, "Social Media Warriors: Leveraging a New Battlespace" *Parameters* 48, no. 4 (Winter 2018–9).

4. Author's personal experience drafting "Information Warfare Transformation" plans and strategies, during spring 2020 at US Army Cyber Command, US Department of the Army.

States. The United States and its allies may face local disadvantage, which the proper employment of IWar could ameliorate.

IWar includes as a critical component an information narrative that helps commanders to burnish the why of mission accomplishment. During the Trenton-Princeton winter campaign, the patriot narrative of harsh British and German treatment ultimately caused the militia to retake the field and led to the delivery of timely and accurate intelligence to Washington's headquarters for operations against Rall. IWar thus allows for commanders to sense, understand, act, and assess, and allows combatants to focus on information key terrain to the advantage of their operations vis á vis the enemy.

IWar consists of more than maneuver forces capitalizing on advantages and tailoring forces as a result of information narratives and related intelligence. It also includes electronic warfare and cyber operations in the information environment, generating effects for the operational environment. These operations act to disable physically or logically the command and control capabilities of an adversary or even the adversary's materiel itself. Electronic warfare attempts to control the electromagnetic spectrum, attacking an adversary or impeding his electronic warfare assaults. Cyber operations proceed along physical, logical, or persona avenues of approach into a network either to defend friendly mission-relevant terrain—cyber and/or key terrain—cyber or hold that of the enemy at risk. Electronic warfare and cyber support the maneuver force in all military domains through independent action in the information environment, which reinforces both the information narrative and the operations, actions, and activities of other maneuver forces.

By focusing on social media platforms, current IWar literature misses the critical capabilities of electronic warfare and cyber focused on more than decision making and actually seeking to disable and destroy enemy materiel. Armies since the beginning of time have had the capability to raid headquarters and ambush couriers, thus the targeting of command and control nodes was still a possibility even without advanced technology, as well as focusing on information key terrain as it pertained to their historical contexts. It is worth remembering there are more traditional means to disrupt command and control—should an adversary cyberattack in the contemporary environment achieve transitory superiority on friendly networks.

The key functions embodied in IWar include the existing military operational specialties of information operations (including military deception and operational security), as well as psychological and cyber operations, civil and public affairs, electronic warfare, signals (and other) intelligence, and space.⁵ The concept is larger than its individual components, however, seeking synergy between them and is more encompassing in its relation to maneuver. It enables strategic landpower by undergirding the maneuver operational framework which links tactical operations, actions, and activities to strategic objectives.

Thus IWar incorporates information aspects that shape the friendly narrative and direct force, but also with inherent capability to act

5. Author's personal experience drafting "Information War Transformation" plans and strategies, spring 2020 at US Army Cyber Command, US Department of the Army.

independently as with electronic warfare and cyber operations inside the information environment. Friendly forces often employ cyber, electronic warfare, and information operations to target the decision-making ability and cycle of an adversary through disinformation and damage to systems that provide a conduit for communications and data. Security and defensive forces also protect the decision-making capabilities of friendly commanders through mission assurance of data, information, and communication. Given the interconnectedness of software, hardware, and information on all military platforms, and as a shaper and enabler of operations in the operating environment, IWar is integral to every aspect of warfare.

IWar ultimately assists in achieving strategic objectives by better focusing operations and lessening risk. Instead of conducting a general operation to reverse the patriot's flagging cause, the information narrative, and the intelligence it generated, provided Washington with a way to pinpoint Rall's garrison as a vulnerable target and economize his own limited capabilities. This directing of maneuver force to an achievable operational objective, redounded to success at both the strategy and policy tiers, as the colonials were able to extend the war effort with successful limited operations. New recruits and reenlistments were additional policy benefits from Trenton and Princeton as was confidence from a new information narrative that the colonials could wage conventional war against a superior enemy.

Whether strategy is defined as the balancing of ends, ways, and means or the relationship of risk and resources to political goals, IWar aligns operations to achieve strategic results. Proper employment of IWar lessened risk in the overall patriot war effort because Washington's choice of an exposed garrison reduced danger to the Continentals' main field army and Congress was better able to align resources in the dwindling war effort. With the ends, ways, means paradigm, IWar allowed Washington to fashion his ends of preserving the Army and the war effort with the ways of the Trenton-Princeton campaign at the operational level of war, as well as the tactical means of the Continental Army targeting Rall's isolated regiments and later the British supply base at Princeton. IWar hence can establish a framework for strategic results.

IWar interrelates not only to the strategic level of war, but with all levels of war and indeed every aspect of warfare as part of the national instruments of power. The information narrative, for instance, helps to fashion diplomatic overtures that inform actions across the Competition Continuum. By converging functions and tasks related to information, IWar harnesses informational power in part for decision-making advantage and to limit the decision-making capabilities of competitors and adversaries. IWar enables economic power, especially during competition with adversaries, assisting in freedom of navigation activities and protecting cyber critical infrastructure.

In the military realm, IWar undergirds all the other domains, acting to direct and focus force utilizing an information narrative (and supported by other IWar components like cyber operations) against an objective, whether in space, land, air, sea, or cyberspace. The activities of nonexclusive military entities, such as the Interagency and civilian partners, intersect with IWar as well and include the fashioning of information narratives and supporting operations such as cyber

defensive of non-DoD networks. Civilian infrastructure supports most of the military power grid at home and abroad and therefore demands partnerships for integrated security and defense. The overlap of civilian infrastructure and military operations creates potential legal pitfalls such as with *Posse Comitatus* and legal teams must carefully monitor these.

All of the components of IWar—information, intelligence, cyber, and electronic warfare operations—compose functions in the information environment. It is important to note the information environment is not disparate but intersects with the operational environment.⁶ While IWar acts outwardly to direct and tailor maneuver in the other domains, it also encompasses cyber and electronic warfare operations in the information environment, which generate their own objectives and effects. The components of IWar, however, do not orient toward independent objectives but should be planned as supporting a larger scheme of operational maneuver or strategic effects at the national level. Thus IWar is far more than simply dominating media messaging to influence audiences.

IWar complements the Army's new multi-domain operations construct and its concentration on competition below the threshold of armed conflict, while supporting its operational focus for penetrating and exploiting near-peer adversary's anti-access/area-denial capabilities.⁷ IWar as part of multi-domain operations enables the persistent engagement of foes by informing both host nation and friendly populations as to the purposes of friendly operations and shaping the battlefield in the competition portion of the warfare continuum.

IWar is adversary focused and occurs through persistent engagement of competitors and adversaries across the Competition Continuum by ensuring the delivery, reception, assessment, and protection of proactive messaging. This further develops information resiliency across the force. In the course of persistent engagement, operations in the information environment provide commanders at echelon with continuous identification of key terrain, opportunity, and risk.

Likewise, commands produce feedback to influence future operations at echelon, providing local, regional, and global input to operations in the information environment. IWar supports multi-domain operations with a calibrated force posture: mission-specific integrated information formations at echelon; reach-back operations and intelligence capabilities; and forward deployed IWar teams. With convergence, commanders will possess information capabilities to employ in the operational environment. Persistent engagement and analysis throughout the competition continuum provides commanders with the ability to posture for conflict.

IWar incorporates psychological operations to shape the perceptions of targeted audiences and creates effects through military deception and cyber operations. During high intensity combat, IWar focuses combat power on the weak links of the enemy's anti-access/area-denial capabilities to support a penetration followed by rapid exploitation

6. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0, chg. 1 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2018).

7. US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028*, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Washington, DC: US Army TRADOC, 2018).

and freedom of maneuver. IWar may identify and disable a portion of the enemy's anti-access/area-denial defenses allowing for economy of force missions, where the enemy has had local superiority of fires and maneuver elements. IWar allows for the targeting of precise areas in the enemy defenses that assets from all military domains can penetrate and exploit, with follow-on forces gaining freedom of maneuver.

Not every corner of the West's security sector is as enamored of IWar as some Army cyber operators. Discounting the ability of IWar operations, actions, and activities to produce casualties, some Israeli scholars believe the qualification for warfare is predicated on traditional forms of combat, and hence IWar does not apply in their worldview.⁸ The US Intelligence Community tends to view IWar-related capabilities as national-strategic assets meant for extremely targeted and controlled employment, and only authorized at the highest levels of government.⁹ The Army's internal and traditional branch parochialisms also are at play, as various communities of interest fight to retain siloes of authorities and power within the institution at the expense of the IWar concept. Various key players in the Army institutional power structure dislike IWar and are skeptical of its prospects if applied at echelon to Army formations.¹⁰

Then there is the problem of scale and scope in defining the battlefield. The government network—the DoD Information Network—is so large, it has proven impossible to defend.¹¹ This is just the defensive portion of cyber operations, not accounting for the complexity of offense in the cyber domain. The IWar concept will expand the scope of operations even further by accounting for all of the other information-related capabilities and their functions.

This idea of scope and scale in this new battlespace for IWar seems lost on many observers as a recent *Strategy Bridge* article demonstrated.¹² There will have to be a reckoning between the desired functionality of IWar and the budgeting of scarce resources (exacerbated by political combat between branch interests), the aversion to new command and control structures like headquarters, and the very size of this new enterprise. Even with these concerns, the fact the nation is at risk from foreign adversaries, who have meddled in US national political discourse and launched cyberattacks of all kinds, while vying for an asymmetrical advantage, will be enough to push IWar development into operation.

From the earliest times, the functions of IWar and resulting economies of force, regardless of technical capabilities over the intervening years, have acted as a guiding light for forces to achieve objectives. Whether in Washington's time with the information narrative of British and German despoliations that generated intelligence for the Trenton-Princeton campaign, or in fashioning a counternarrative

8. Email exchanges with author after a conference at St. Andrews, Scotland, April–May 2016.

9. Author's experience as Future Plans Chief, Joint Force Headquarters, DoD Information Network.

10. Author's experience as lead planner for US Army Cyber Command for transformation to Information Warfare Command effort. (As of summer 2020, the effort has been placed on hold.)

11. Author's experience as Future Plans Chief Joint Force Headquarters, DoD Information Network.

12. Jeff Edmonds and Samuel Bendett, "Russian Battlefield Awareness and Information Dominance: Improved Capabilities and Future Challenges," *Strategy Bridge*, February 26, 2019, <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/2/26/russian-battlefield-awareness-and-information-dominance-improved-capabilities-and-future-challenges>.

for Russian incursions into Eastern Europe, IWar serves as a basis for operations in all domains.

Although social media messaging and IWar effects on decision making are important, these do not represent the totality of these converged capabilities. During competition, IWar combines with ways and means enacted in other domains to deter potential adversaries and prevent conflict. With the outbreak of conflict, IWar operations actions and activities in the information environment create effects used by maneuver forces to penetrate, exploit, and regain freedom of maneuver during multi-domain operations. IWar then refocuses for the recompute stage of the competition continuum to consolidate gains and prevent future policy discord. IWar is nothing short of a crucial part of warfare spanning military history and is especially critical for the information-dominated battlefields of the twenty-first century.

The Authors Reply

Buddhika B. Jayamaha and Jahara Matissek

A fundamental axiom that the nature of war remains the same while the character of war keeps evolving overtime is increasingly under scrutiny. For several millennia, land and sea were the domains in which the fortunes of armies were decided. We know industrialization transformed the way wars were fought in World War I and World War II and further advances such as nuclear weapons altered the way wars were waged in various battlespaces throughout the Cold War. In this context, scholars such as Weigley in 1973 believed the American way of war—predicated on combined arms maneuver and a preponderance of force—was becoming antiquated.¹³ Admiral J. C. Wylie wrote in 1967 about a new vision for effective military strategy, specifically that all military tools and domains should be used to support landpower in pursuit of *control*.¹⁴ Weigley and Wylie were correct in identifying an emerging problem, but their paradigms were still predicated on land as the defining domain of warfare.

America and its allies are returning to an era of Great Power competition, as expressed in all national security documents from the current administration. Space is identified as an autonomous domain of warfare, requiring us to imagine what constitutes space power and what role the new US Space Force should play in defending American vulnerabilities. Still, while autonomous, space is just as intertwined with the day-to-day realities and joint warfighting principles as the other domains.

But the advent of cyber is something fundamentally different from the military domains of land, sea, air, and space, specifically owing to

13. Russel F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1973).

14. J. C. Wylie, *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1967).

cyberspace's intangibility and the inability to apply to it Clausewitzian ideas of *mass* and *maneuver* in a conventional sense. Thus, scholars and practitioners face conceptual and analytical challenges in attempting to analyze cyber domain threats, especially in terms of whether this domain has changed the nature and/or character of warfare. In many ways, Dr. Jason Warren's thoughts about information warfare (IWar) are on point, aligning closely with the conventional warfare thoughts espoused by Weigley and Wylie. Warren's conception of IWar is wedded to supporting strategic landpower where information plays an auxiliary shaping function and kinetic missions—the main effort—are expected to generate the desired end state.

He is correct that the United States constantly utilizes information warfare in overall campaign plans—from 1775 to Operation Inherent Resolve. The challenge we identified is the way civil society is organized and functions in liberal democracies. The unique nature of cyber as its own domain and the sinews connecting people in that domain make both cyber and civil society undefended attack surfaces state and nonstate adversaries could leverage into new battlespaces effectively with very little cost, in comparison to elaborate Cold War information warfare campaigns.

Though we are far from it, America's adversaries are increasingly realizing if things we take for granted can be weaponized by hijacking them—voluntary surveillance equipment that tracks movement, heartbeats, vehicles we drive, televisions, thermostats, and anything with the prefix “smart.” Of course, “smart electronic device” is merely a euphemism—it is linked to a third party and can be hijacked by an unauthorized third party. This is the really terrifying part—where reality can be warped. It just might be landpower, which used to be the main effort, may end up playing an auxiliary role to the main thrust of military power—cyber weapons and information-political warfare.

Civil Society and Cyberspace: Distilling into a New Battlespace

Cyber domain in its totality consists of the sinews connecting the warfighters, machines, widgets, societies, economies, governments, and people. These sinews have created a humanly devised domain integral to everything we do, just as it remains its own autonomous domain. While people are an important element of any domain of warfare, the shift of the battlespace to civil society is an existential threat due to the fact that cyberspace is increasingly embedded within the constructs of civil society, informing what reality *is* and *how* reality is socially constructed and interpreted. Influencing a civil society—people—is always part of any military campaign, as is targeting the government and army, encapsulating Clausewitz's trinity.¹⁵ Influencing civil society involves efforts to alter people's behaviors with the use (or threat) of violence, or with the use of disinformation campaigns, prior to, during, or after a military campaign.

There is a conceptual disconnect in Warren's view that current campaigns by state, state-affiliated proxies, and nonstate actors to sow discord in civil societies are nothing more than old-school

15. Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989 [1832]).

disinformation campaigns which can be ameliorated with more compelling counternarratives. Yes, the Soviet Union, China, and other adversaries actively executed disinformation campaigns against the United States and her allies during the Cold War. The world of information warfare Warren describes, however, pertains to a pre-Internet era where the traditional means of waging a dis/misinformation campaign were qualitatively different. Those Cold War-era campaigns were broad based and ideational (with multiple barriers to entry and high risk) as opposed to the targeted, individualized attacks made possible with today's technology. As a result, information-political operations were part of elaborate covert campaigns.

The emergence of the cyber domain and its real-time fidelity and linkages to what we perceive as reality in terms of daily interactions, be it with humans, news, social media, bots, foreign actors with malicious intent, etc., fundamentally changes Warren's notions of IWar on multiple levels. Social media warriors can inflict damage by relying on the power of social movements to either create or fuel new and radical politically aware groups in civil society that polarize and/or create new policy outcomes undermining state power. This influence of social media warriors over social movements has tremendous implications for liberal democracies worldwide due to the great asymmetry in power between them and their authoritarian and illiberal adversaries.

Cognitive Hacking: Weaponizing Reality

The AK-47 democratized violence and became the great equalizer during the myriad civil wars that proliferated in the twentieth century, allowing the weak to fight with some degree of comparable firepower. The cyber domain is similar in its low barriers to entry requiring only a rudimentary knowledge of networks and code, making it the AK-47 of the twenty-first century. Cyber versions of this weapon are affordable, portable, can be hidden in plain sight, and are deployable from an unsuspecting table in a peaceful café with Wi-Fi. The greatest differences, however, are the intensity, precision, and capabilities afforded in targeting and attacking, at low cost and little to no risk. Taking up physical arms against the state in the pre-Internet era was a high-risk activity with minimal payoffs; the cyber era has flipped this calculus upside down.

Cyber power in the hands of many, buttressed by state power, has only further democratized the ability of adversarial states and nonstate actors to wage political-information warfare in civil societies ostensibly not at war. Today, foreign adversaries can reach out and touch an individual in any number of platforms with targeted information, based on easy, unclassified data collection techniques that resonate with the subject's inherent cognitive biases in ways previously unimagined. This targeting, combined with big data and increasing levels of knowledge about human behavior and other elements of social science, has brought an unfathomable level of scale to information warfare.

Individual decisions are shaped by the context of information; when a hostile actor can control this context (made very specific and limited by the way we are connected) generating a cognitive hack, the result

is reinforcing ideational “echo chambers.”¹⁶ Such echo chambers pass the threshold of the imaginary and become real when individuals make decisions in terms of it.

The advent of artificial intelligence, blockchain and bitcoin technologies, quantum computing, and deepfakes, while still in their adolescence, will only further amplify the weaponization of cyberspace and targeting of civil society and individuals. These actions could deepen existing social cleavages or generate new ones where none may have existed, providing America’s adversaries multiple points of entry and empowering the “Social Media Warriors” we described in our original *Parameters* article to wreak havoc on civil society through the process of *schismogenesis*.¹⁷ Meanwhile China, as the quintessential example of an authoritarian adversary, can gerrymander their population through social credit scores, with heightened surveillance technologies ensuring any belief, idea, or value that does not fit the company line of the dear glorious Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is locked away deep in the cerebellum of Chinese citizens (for the short term at least!).

These CCP activities also highlight the asymmetry between liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes in their abilities to inoculate their respective societies. By exploiting the freedoms espoused in liberal democracies that give rise to vibrant civil societies, adversaries can gain access to those societies and use information platforms to exploit societal cleavages. Authoritarian regimes such as China socially engineer their citizens, finding innumerable ways to “sanitize” corruptive Western thought. By generating the narrative that Western ideals are dangerous, the CCP creates an information echo chamber for over a billion people.

The dear CCP official can screen all movies, music, art, poetry, history books, and any other form of information and entertainment. All of these actions of course seem abhorrent and over-controlling to those in the West. Yet the Chinese Communist Party can easily and transparently advise their citizenry that they block some Western content because it perverts Chinese values and could cause chaos, which would hurt Chinese prosperity. This relatively explicit social contract by the CCP appears readily accepted except in Hong Kong, precisely because Hong Kong natives are only now becoming exposed to Chinese censorship. The demonstrations are a reaction to the enforcement of the new CCP normal.

And while a Chinese citizen cannot use the social media platform Twitter, Chinese-based TikTok has access to American citizens, providing them biased reporting of protests in Hong Kong. In other words, the unit of analysis is the civil society at home. We cannot limit our liberties to counter our adversaries—this would mean handing our adversaries an inadvertent victory. We cannot, as Warren suggests, counter the weaponization of civil society in liberal democracies with more compelling counternarratives.

16. Elanor Colleoni, Alessandro Rozza, and Adam Arvidsson, “Echo Chamber or Public Sphere? Predicting Political Orientation and Measuring Political Homophily in Twitter Using Big Data,” *Journal of Communication* 64, no. 2 (2014): 317–32.

17. Buddhika Jayamaha and Jahara Matisek, “Social Media Warriors: Leveraging a New Battlespace,” *Parameters* 48, no. 4 (Winter 2018–19): 11–24.

Governments and state authorities in liberal democracies are not in the business of waging information operations in their own societies no matter how well intentioned. This is precisely what authoritarian regimes do, with China being the exceptional example. And counternarratives have additional dangers. As Benedict Anderson noted, the ability of a state and nation to construct an “Imagined Community” creates the most cross-cleavage unity and alliances across elites in support of the desired nation-state identity.¹⁸ China and Russia have increasingly put a stranglehold on the free exchange of ideas in order to ensure their imagined community fits the worldview of their political leadership. Simultaneously they are attempting to fracture overarching national identities in the United States and across Europe, precisely because it is easier to do in liberal democracies with myriad crisscrossing and crosscutting social cleavages.

Conclusion

The more salient puzzle of Warren’s concerns about the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act requires significant reflection on what actually made America so great to begin with. We cannot allow our security and intelligence agencies to wage information operations on home soil. Our only contention, however, is such policing of the cyber domain and defending against foreign social media warriors should include new levels of engagement by national security institutions to protect against subversion and other acts attempting to sow panic and/or undermine security.

As emerging data are already showing, the COVID-19 pandemic has given China and Russia yet another entry point to sow confusion and fear in Western civil society, such as their attempts at advertising how much better their countries are handling the crisis. This enables them to push anti-Western news and narratives on unsuspecting and concerned social media users in the West. These users, in turn, share the misleading information, conspiracies, and memes, only contributing more to the crisis and shortages, like the “Great Toilet Paper Panic of 2020.” Moreover, we contend there is tremendous information-political warfare value in referring to COVID-19 as the Chinese flu, as the Trump administration is attempting to do, precisely because it ups the counternarrative ante on China.

Finally, we do agree with Warren’s broader point that what is required is a more compelling counternarrative but one aimed at our adversaries—again—as we used to do and were exceptionally effective in doing during the Cold War. Alas, that required a consensus among national security and political elites on the nature of the threat and the desired effects such a campaign was meant to generate—people who espouse liberal democratic ideals, buttressed by a faith in free markets. Unfortunately, such a consensus is far removed at a time when a vocal minority question both liberal democracy and capitalism. Perhaps such growing skepticism is partially a function of the effective weaponization of civil society as a new battlespace.

18. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 2006 [1983]).

All we know is from Pearl Harbor to 9/11, threats to the United States have brought Americans together across the political spectrum for consensus, making the country more powerful and unified in policy decisions. But if we correctly assume the Chinese and Russians (and others) have studied the social processes of what makes America great, then they have every reason to invest in *schismogenesis* attacks against civil society, ensuring a divided and polarized America once the dust settles from the current Chinese flu pandemic and basic scientific facts pertaining to wearing a mask.

Book Reviews

DEFENSE STUDIES

The Irrational Terrorist & Other Persistent Terrorism Myths

By Darren Hudson, Arie Perliger, Riley Post, and Zachary Hohman

Reviewed by Allison Abbe, professor of organizational studies, US Army War College

In 1983, Hezbollah drove explosives-filled trucks into the military barracks housing American and French service members in Beirut, Lebanon, killing 241 US military personnel and 58 French soldiers. Thirty-two years later, 21-year-old high-school dropout Dylann Roof shot and killed nine African Americans attending evening Bible study at a church in Charleston, South Carolina, in an attempt to incite a race war. To what extent do these attacks represent the same social phenomenon? This question and others are addressed in *The Irrational Terrorist & Other Persistent Terrorism Myths*, and the multidisciplinary perspectives of the authors—an economist, a political scientist, a social psychologist, and a special forces officer—are evident throughout the book.

In debunking myths about terrorism and counterterrorism, the authors take a “meandering journey” through different social science perspectives (135). Though meandering, the journey is short. At 140 pages, the book is a concise sampling of the state of terrorism studies in the social and behavioral sciences. Sources include peer-reviewed studies from economics, communications, conflict management, criminal justice, political science, psychology, risk management, and security studies. Rather than attempt to synthesize research across disciplines, the authors present disparate theories and evidence through disciplinary lenses, shifting among them throughout but returning often to economics, the most prevalent perspective in the book, drawing upon concepts of terrorist productivity, supply and demand, cost-benefit analysis, and expected utility models.

In the insightful and well-written “Terrorists are Poor and Uneducated” chapter, the authors clearly identify and disconfirm the myth and provide a viable alternative explanation. They incorporate research on the role of poverty and education in political behavior, management perspectives on human capital challenges for terrorist organizations, economic principles of supply and demand, the role of societal institutions, and the importance of the rule of law in enhancing stability and preventing terrorism from taking hold.

Unfortunately, other chapters are not as successful. The “Religious Fundamentalism Is the Only Source of Terrorism” chapter does not directly address the myth. The authors briefly mention terrorist groups with identity-based and other motivations not religious in nature and then focus on the motives and goals of Islamic terrorism—global vs. local, religious vs. political.

Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 2020
140 pages
\$75.00

Other chapters address myths that may not really be myths, such as “I Know Terrorism When I See It” and “Terrorist Organizations Are Unsophisticated.” The authors fail to establish how these claims represent widely held beliefs about terrorist groups. Instead, they rely on anecdotal examples that are out of place in a book written by social scientists. The text also falls short in its attempt to label state terrorism a myth. The authors contradict themselves by offering examples of state violence that meet all the criteria for terrorism outlined in the pages immediately preceding.

Other chapters represent missed opportunities to offer meaningful insights. In particular, the chapter on terrorist organizations reads like a textbook, lapsing into a long exposition of organizational structure and social networks that may not engage a general audience. Similarly, in debunking the myth that terrorists are crazy, the authors catalog psychological research into the personalities and motivations of terrorists and offer a good snapshot of the research to date, but they do not provide explanations useful to practitioners, policy makers, or the public. While individual traits and characteristics have failed to identify who will become a terrorist, situational psychological dynamics, whether poverty, education, or mental illness, seem more promising, but have received insufficient attention here and from researchers.

Similarly, chapter 8, “Four Critical Myths of Counterterrorism,” offers few practical insights beyond the recommendation to include defensive measures as part of counterterrorism strategy; however, the historical perspective taken in the chapter does suggest the limitations of counterterrorism policies and interventions attempted by governments across the globe and helps chart a path for future research.

Ultimately, the authors do not demonstrate how an interdisciplinary perspective provides insights into terrorism and terrorist organizations. More a collection of chapters, the book offers little integration or coherence across disciplines, leaving it to readers to sort out. There are references between chapters but no attempt to synthesize the disparate lines of research from different disciplines; integrate different levels of analysis in societal, political, group, and individual perspectives; or provide a central organizing framework. The authors dismiss the need to do so, noting some issues are “too complex” for the book and “people are complicated.” This observation applies equally to the state of terrorism research.

The book is helpful in understanding the current state of terrorism studies and the contributions that can be made by the different perspectives of social scientists who tend to pursue their theories in isolation. Given its breadth, *The Irrational Terrorist & Other Persistent Terrorism Myths* may appeal to senior leaders already familiar with social science research and to students in need of a good introductory security or terrorism studies textbook to spark further interest in pushing the boundaries of the social sciences.

The Hell of Good Intentions: America's Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy

By Stephen M. Walt

Reviewed by LTC Joseph Buccino, US Army War College

In his engaging book *The Hell of Good Intentions*, Stephen Walt dissects the post-Cold War failures of American national security, laying blame with the foreign policy community for interventionist disasters, fruitless deployments, and missed opportunities. He proposes an alternative American grand strategy focused on select vital regions critical to American prosperity. This book is a must-read for students and practitioners of US national security affairs.

The fall of the Berlin Wall ushered in a period of rethinking America's role in world affairs. Having vanquished her greatest adversary without firing a shot, the United States could finally heed George Washington's farewell advice and disengage from unnecessary overseas ventures. America's isolationist yearning dates back to its founding, and as the world's lone great power, the United States had the opportunity to reverse the post-World War II trend toward global military expansion. Instead, US interventions and global commitments quadrupled from 1948 to 1991. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, American administrations promoted democratic ideals, expanded international treaties, and maintained enough forces and bases overseas to bolster a liberal, rule-based order.

The results of such grand ambition according to Walt? Less than 30 years after the end of the Cold War, the United States no longer sits atop a unipolar world and maintains a "global military presence" (24). Despite countless dollars spent on wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, neither country is on a path to success. Since 1992, America's national security leadership has switched hands multiple times, but the primary urge toward the global spread of liberalism has remained consistent.

Throughout this period, Walt, a renowned foreign policy expert who teaches international relations at Harvard's Kennedy School, has been a critic of the foreign policy establishment. In his 1987 book, *The Origins of Alliances*, he challenged the balance of power theory and made the essential case for international relations realism, arguing states should aggregate power and develop short-term cooperation agreements against rising threats. Since then, he has published controversial books and articles arguing against what he views as America's impulsive and wrongheaded support of Israel and proclivity for wasteful ventures in the Middle East.

This book may be Walt's best and most important work to date. He recounts the post-Cold War foreign policy missteps of the United States and holds the nation's foreign policy establishment, which he defines as senior military leaders, defense officials, senior members of the CIA

THE HELL OF GOOD INTENTIONS

AMERICA'S FOREIGN
POLICY ELITE
AND THE DECLINE
OF U.S. PRIMACY
STEPHEN M. WALT

New York: Farrar, Straus,
and Giroux, 2018
400 pages
\$28.00

and Department of State, think tanks, and national security media, to account for perpetuating a series of failures.

Walt is courageous. He identifies the reporters, analysts, and administration officials who maintain prominent positions in mainstream foreign policy despite histories of blunders. Not mentioned in *The Hell of Good Intentions* is the fact Walt has a better track record than the foreign policy “experts” he criticizes. In 2002 and early 2003, he argued against invading Iraq and remaining in Afghanistan and was ridiculed for his view. Today Walt sits outside established foreign policy circles while some of the advocates for those wars, such as Bill Kristol, Jane Harman, and Richard Haass, all of whom publicly predicted a short conflict in Iraq with a low-cost postwar reconstruction, now serve as prominent foreign policy analysts on cable news.

Walt also rightly argues the US military no longer holds itself to account at the measure the country should demand. Arguably, military leaders have little to show for the remarkable blood and treasure spent in the Middle East over the past 18 years, and the relief of senior military leaders for poor performance is rare.

In the penultimate chapter titled “How *Not* to Fix U.S. Foreign Policy,” Walt criticizes the current administration (217, italics in original). He alleges the Trump foreign policy team has conformed to tradition despite an unconventional public display and a series of promises to drain swamps, refocus on internal problems, and disentangle American forces and money from foreign wars. Walt has a point; there have been no significant troop reductions in Iraq or Afghanistan, and the Trump administration has authorized a series of new deployments to Saudi Arabia.

In the final chapter, Walt offers clear-eyed policy prescriptions the United States can follow to recover from its post-Cold War missteps and allow for a more prosperous peace. He takes a neorealist constructionist view of international relations and advocates for a policy in which military force is used only in response to direct threats to American interests. Short-duration, limited-focus troop deployments should replace nation building and long-term troop buildups. Once a rising threat is subdued, American troops should return home, leaving regime change and long-term occupation to others. While Walt has a clear agenda, he also points out foreign policy establishment successes since the close of the Cold War, including the Nunn-Lugar Program, the establishment of the World Trade Organization, and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Anyone interested in the development and implementation of foreign policy should read *The Hell of Good Intentions*. It is one of the most important books on foreign policy published in the last two years.

Bombs Without Boots: The Limits of Airpower

By Anthony M. Schinella

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Nathan K. Finney, US Army

A product of a Federal Executive Fellowship at the Brookings Institution, *Bombs Without Boots* is a thorough analysis of the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of both airpower and Landpower in twentieth-century foreign military interventions. The author, a career intelligence officer who participated in all of the case studies analyzed, is well positioned to provide analytical and qualitative assessments of a dominant approach to the Western use of power since the end of the Cold War—the use of airpower to intervene in military conflicts for strategic effect.

Schinella conducted his analysis through the examination of five case studies tailored to survey the results of a military intervention when it relied upon airpower and various levels of indigenous proxy ground forces. The interventions Schinella assesses include Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, Israel/Lebanon in 2006, and Libya in 2011. Each case study is analyzed in its own chapter, involving different formulations of airpower and proxy forces, but each supporting the overall thesis that “dropping bombs from the skies without committing boots on the ground—at best may result in an outcome in which interveners have little influence over the post-conflict environment and at worst may lead to open-ended commitment without having resolved the fundamental problem” (2).

The first case study, Bosnia, assesses a military intervention that showed the value of highly capable proxy forces. According to Schinella’s analysis, the fusion of NATO airpower and a capable Croat-Muslim Bosnian ground force led to a successful end to the conflict, however, the fact peace still stands is ultimately not due to airpower or the proxy force NATO supported, but rather the 25-year peacekeeping effort by Western forces. For Schinella, this indicates success can be tied to the time, effort, and resources expended over a significant amount of time. If not at the back door of Europe, it is unlikely Western nations would support a continued peacekeeping effort.

In the Kosovo case study, Schinella describes the challenges of working with a weak proxy force. Unable to overcome Yugoslav forces, the Kosovar proxy force was still able to provide enough support to an air campaign to force the former to the bargaining table. Neither NATO airpower nor proxy ground forces were able to stop the ethnic cleansing campaign or ultimately end the war, but both were required to put enough pressure on Yugoslav leadership—and their Russian supporters—to force a negotiated settlement. In the end, the war was “achieved by multiple other elements that airpower made possible” (95).

Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2019

391 pages

\$44.99

Like in Kosovo, the initial intervention in Afghanistan relied upon the limited options for allies on the ground. When the task involved cleaning up the battlefield after American airpower destroyed Taliban military forces, Afghan proxy forces were capable enough. As the task shifted to the complex coordination of a small American ground footprint and disparate Afghan militia forces against a prepared defense, the weakness of proxy forces was highlighted. In the end, external interventionist forces were unable to control the interests of the various groups with which they were allied. According to Schinella, this trend would only continue as interventionist forces were increased to come to terms with the long conflict in Southwest Asia.

The Israel conflict in Lebanon in 2006, the only non-American intervention covered in the book, is a case study in fighting without proxy ground force support. Because of this, Schinella determines Israel was unable to target accurately and degrade Hezbollah forces, even with significant firepower applied to a small geographic area. When Israel finally pushed ground forces into Lebanon to degrade enemy missile and rocket forces attacking their homeland, both Hezbollah and the Israeli Defense Forces took high casualties, but the latter lost more in the area of public opinion, failing to meet the expectations of the Israeli people. For Schinella, the Israelis were ultimately unsuccessful, but due to international peacekeeping forces taking over security on the ground and Hezbollah being pulled into the worsening civil war in Syria, an uneasy peace has held since 2006.

Finally, Schinella assesses the Western intervention in Libya, which shows the time and value in improving a proxy force. While airpower was able to destroy key Gadhafi capabilities that would have crushed the nascent rebel forces, it was the quick shipment and integration of foreign military assistance by Western nations that allowed those militias to overthrow the regime and take the Libyan capital. Like in Kosovo, says Schinella, “this was not a victory by airpower, it was a victory made possible by airpower” (286).

Throughout *Bombs Without Boots* Schinella is clear airpower played a key role in modern military interventions, but the key determining factor for long-term success is, as the strategist Admiral J. C. Wylie has stated, “the man on the ground with a gun.” Schinella admirably details different formulations of airpower combined with ground forces and the possible causes for success or failure; however, his case study selection may be one reason his assessments all support his theory. If he had included the analysis of other conflicts that employed airpower and a mixture of interventionist and proxy forces—such as the invasion of Iraq, Afghanistan after the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force, or the return of American forces to Iraq, and Syria, to battle the Islamic State—his conclusions may not be as clear-cut. With this in mind, *Bombs Without Boots* is an insightful and useful read for anyone interested in the use of military force abroad. It would be especially useful in professional military education courses where

officers from different services—air, ground, and sea—could discuss and debate Schinella’s conclusions.

The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West

By David Kilcullen

Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, an instructor at the Safe Communities Institute, University of Southern California

The Dragons and the Snakes focuses on the twenty-first-century global security environment containing dragons, state enemies, and snakes, nonstate enemies, that are threatening the West and developing into deadlier and deadlier foes through their continued military adaptation and coevolutionary progression. A renowned counterinsurgency practitioner and theorist, author Dr. David Kilcullen is a professor of international and political studies at the University of New South Wales, Canberra, and was the former CEO of Caerus Associates, a special adviser to the US Secretary of State from 2007–9, and a lieutenant colonel in the Australian Army. He has written a series of excellent books including *Blood Year* (2016), *Out of the Mountains* (2013), and *The Accidental Guerrilla* (2009).

Kilcullen breaks new ground here. He wades into great power conflict and, while he has extensive experience with snakes, his expertise with dragons is more limited. The well-researched, well-written book is interesting and benefits from Kilcullen’s theoretical smarts and extensive time in the field as a military officer and later as a researcher. Its pace moves quickly—less academic in nature, though well cited—and is meant more for professional and mainstream audiences. There are few faults with the book. Unfortunately, it is almost fully text based, with only a few tables and figures evident and maps used as end-of-chapter curtains.

The book includes an introduction, a very brief note on terminology, six chapters, an epilogue, acknowledgments, notes, and an index. The chapters are: chapter 1: “The Dragons and the Snakes” (introduction), chapter 2: “Adaptive Enemies” (the process behind nonstate enemy adaptation), chapter 3: “Woolsey’s Snakes” (the context behind their adaptation and mini case studies of al-Qaeda, Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and Hezbollah), chapter 4: “Liminal Warfare” (conducted by Russia), chapter 5: “Conceptual Envelopment” (conducted by China), and chapter 6: “Ebb Tide of the West” (conclusions and response guidance). Iran and North Korea as smaller dragons (adaptive state threats) are discussed throughout and primarily in chapter 3. The epilogue, *A Better Peace?* (in the spirit of J. F. C. Fuller), briefly touches upon the use of Western military methods to promote liberty and prosperity. It also encourages a refocusing on Western “societal resilience” and “domestic political reconciliation at home” (254–55).

New York: Oxford University Press, 2020

336 pages

\$27.95

Kilcullen's main arguments are "that the military model pioneered by US forces in the 1991 Gulf War—the high-tech, high-precision, high-cost suite of networked systems that won the Gulf War so quickly and brought Western powers such unprecedented battle-field dominance in the quarter century since then—is no longer working" and "what our enemies have learned in the quarter century since Woolsey's testimony—how the dragons learned from the snakes, how the snakes copied the dragons, how the rest learned to fight the West—and about what we in turn must learn if we hope to succeed in the new environment we now face" (6, 36). He draws upon the February 1993 US Senate nomination hearing of R. James Woolsey Jr., as the director of central intelligence, in which Woolsey used the emergent dragon and snake paradigm to describe the threat facing the intelligence community (9–11).

The tipping point for the West, cited by Kilcullen as taking place on March 20, 2003 at the Dora Farms complex outside of Baghdad, represented the failed "decapitation strike" against Saddam Hussein and his sons in an effort to stave off the Iraq War (217). The West's Dora Farms moment is equivalent to the Battle of Gettysburg for the Confederacy in 1863 or, more appropriately, the Battle of Adrianople in 378 when the tide fully turned against the Eastern Roman Empire and its legion-based military system. Resulting from the "Ebb Tide of the West," Kilcullen's "so what" guidance initially delves into three strategic response options: "doubling down" and rejecting the inevitability of Western decline, "embracing the suck" and mitigating the worst aspects of this decline like leading from behind, or "going Byzantine" and retrenching and reconceptualizing our strategic position (228–37).

Of these three options, Kilcullen only views "going Byzantine" as a viable and pragmatic option for the United States and its allies to follow. This entails "selective learning from the enemy" including the possible utilization of decisive shaping, liminal warfare, and hypersonic missiles (Russian); "cyber home guards" and remote engagement capabilities; and the limited use of counter-hybrid operations (241–46). The intent is to make Western forces, like Byzantine military units, extremely hard to defeat with the staying power to engage in the long game, to wear down opposing forces, and to compromise obliquely, politically, or economically, as required.

The implications of this option find the United States (and the rest of the West) in a strategic situation similar to the eastern half of the Roman Empire during the epochal shift from the classical to the medieval eras. Hence, this means a civilizational conflict approach at the level of Toynbee and Huntington, and allied to Bull's neo-medievalism, underlies the author's analysis (226–28). This reviewer, an epochal warfare theorist who has made a similar argument for more than 30 years, has Kilcullen's back in this regard. The West with its Westphalian state structure has entered its twilight. A global civilizational shift spanning technology, space-time dimensionality, economics, social class structures, and others is now fully underway.

The Dragons and the Snakes is first-rate, affordable, and extremely timely. US Army War College and affiliated audiences will benefit from the book's strategic focus and gain insights into how the West's foes have successfully developed new methods and technologies that pose a threat to the global security environment.

TECHNOLOGY AND WAR

Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2019

272 pages

\$50.00

Global Data Shock: Strategic Ambiguity, Deception, and Surprise in an Age of Information Overload

By Robert Mandel

Reviewed by Dr. Scott S. Haraburda, US Army (retired)

To make sound decisions, leaders today must understand the world and seek ways to interpret the chaotic and distorted data filling it. Logically, one could assume more data is better. Often times this is not true. In *Global Data Shock*, Robert Mandel shows how leaders trying to make better data-driven decisions encounter increased confusion, rather than improved situational awareness, from the data deluge.

While big data analysis applies complex algorithms to infer information from large amounts of data that cannot be obtained from smaller amounts, Mandel argues leaders, overwhelmed with the large amount of constantly changing data, are unable to rapidly and correctly determine what is false. This overload facilitates strategic ambiguity, deception, and surprise. Mandel challenges the validity of open-source data, the need for obtaining more data to improve the reliability of analyses, and the reliance upon internal experts for analyses.

Global Data Shock is simply organized into five chapters plus an acknowledgements section, an introduction, a conclusion, notes, and an index. The bulk of the book contains Mandel's analyses of ten case studies organized by theme. The case studies illustrate the rationale, effectiveness, perceived legitimacy, consequences, and lessons of these manipulation techniques. The book contains many difficult-to-read text figures that add very little to the discussions; however, the tables in chapter four provide an invaluable summary of the case studies and highlight their background context, offensive manipulation, defensive response, and strategic outcome. Quotations require readers to search the endnotes to identify their source and why they are included. Valuable nuggets of information, though difficult to locate, can be found throughout the book, making it worth the read.

The current way of life is highly dependent upon data and the world would collapse without it. This reliance upon data is a large vulnerability, especially when people believe numbers and data analyses reveal the truth. Tricking even educated professionals, fake news and other misinformation are difficult to detect. With too much data—including contradictory information—people now view reality as beliefs without the need for verifiable data. As Mandel points out, this data deluge is exasperated within the military community where command and control decisions are based primarily upon millions of people using networked computing devices across hundreds of installations globally. In addition

to influencing combat power and technology, the control of information has a large impact upon military actions.

Ambiguity, deception, and surprise are typical primary manipulation techniques used in military operations that can be employed with relatively short-term costs. High volumes of battlefield reports and analyses add to the excess data available to leaders, making the information ambiguous. Injection of false data and omission of critical facts lead to deceptive information. Mandel shows how the failure of leaders to distinguish between real data and noise leaves organizations vulnerable to surprise attacks and can result in the loss of valuable resources and power.

Contradictory statements, fake news accusations, misuse of statistics, and information overload decreases predictability. Often times, this ambiguity is full of hostile, negative, and fear-provoking emotions. Moreover, time pressure can impede one's ability to fact-check data. Befuddling both allies and adversaries, lack of clarity forces the public to become dependent upon the biases of analysts while cherry-picking information to support their personal opinions at the expense of ignoring the truth.

This “fog of war” will likely become denser with big data and its systems vulnerable to hacking (11). To defend against manipulation, organizations need the capability to extract valuable information from conflicting data. Relying upon imperfect veracity and logic, data analytics will not become a replacement for well-trained, experienced analysts. Instead Mandel argues critical thinking skills, such as filtering out false data, recognizing biases, and addressing knowledge gaps in those analyses, will become vital. Combining qualified analysts and automated data analytic systems is a valid way for organizations to counter data-based manipulations.

Though Mandel is not persuasive in his arguments, *Global Data Shock*—which should be read with a careful eye—provides beneficial information to augment strategic offensive and defensive manipulation plans. Senior military leaders studying relevant insights on the information component of the DIME components of national power—diplomatic, information, military, economic—will benefit from this timely book and improve their understanding of how data impacts decision making.

Amherst, NY: Cambria
Press, 2019
290 pages
\$109.99

Deglobalization and International Security

By T. X. Hammes

Reviewed by Andrew Mumford, professor of war studies, University of Nottingham, United Kingdom

Author T. X. Hammes routinely sets up his analyses in fours. His landmark text about the evolution of modern insurgency, *The Sling and the Stone*, was grounded in the concept of “Fourth Generation Warfare” and highlighted the decentralized nature of modern warfare. Now he presents the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” and its effect on international security.

For Hammes, a distinguished research fellow at the National Defense University and a former Marine Corps officer, this new industrial revolution is a “convergence of breakthroughs in bioscience, nanotechnology, robotics, artificial intelligence, autonomy, 3D printing, clean energy and material science” (xi). His central thesis is this revolution will provoke a significant reversal of the globalization of labor, goods, and service. These economic consequences of deglobalization, Hammes posits, will have an impact on international security because a combination of these technological discoveries “is creating a new generation of small, smart, and cheap weapons” that can be used by violent non-state actors and rising powers to usurp the status quo (xiv). The economic and political costs of expeditionary warfare will proliferate accordingly.

Divided into eight chapters, the book begins with a whistle-stop tour of the drivers of globalization and identifies the elements of its purported demise. It then dives deeper into the different future technologies that will combine in the coming decades to indelibly impact the interconnectedness of societies and economies around the world and, crucially effect the character of war. The second half of the book, about the military impact of deglobalization and how US forces can adapt, will be of most interest to readers. Although not explicitly pitched as such, this book is a fascinating contribution to the discussion on future warfare, and one that would appeal to Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency scientists and World Bank economists alike.

An avowed Clausewitzian, Hammes argues the nature of war will still be rooted in the trinity, but future war will have a different character due to the convergence of new technologies that can produce mass-produced, low-cost weaponry. These technologies include off-the-shelf drones for surveillance, reconnaissance, communications, and strike purposes or AI-driven navigation systems that do not rely on GPS. This section rationally demonstrates how technology and war gaming scenarios that may seemingly belong in the fanciful realm of science fiction are indeed scientific facts that are already reshaping the tactical and operational levels of war on land, on sea, and in the air—as well as in space and the cyber domain, too.

Hammes admits in the introduction the book, in part, is a product of pieces published in different venues over the past three years. If I am being picky, I believe greater editorial finesse would have created a more coherent whole to overcome the disparate parts. Not all chapters have conclusion sections, and those that do exist are cursory—just two sentences in one instance.

The intellectual curiosity and astute observations covering science, technology, economics, history, politics, and military strategy packed into the book, however, make it a compelling and thoughtful read. Although replete with some fairly pessimistic assessments of such future wars—they are, Hammes argues, likely to be “bloodier, longer, and more financially ruinous” than those of today—the final chapter constructively navigates a path for American forces to follow in order to adapt to such changes (195). Hammes bluntly lays out the inescapable impact new technologies will have on force structure and raises important questions for military planners regarding shifts in investment from legacy systems to new ones. His final rallying call is for ongoing American engagement with its existing alliance partners; this engagement must come with a reappraisal of its cost—which Hammes argues, could be reduced if emergent technologies are harnessed effectively.

Overall, Hammes’ assessment of the economic drivers of current and future change is convincing. His sketch of future battle domains imbued with nanotechnology and swarms is profoundly plausible, however, the political drivers of deglobalization are underdeveloped. Decades of ever-increasing globalization have created conditions that have exacerbated socioeconomic divides in countries around the world, and these disparities have been exploited by populists. To this extent, deglobalization is driven as much by the localizing nature of emergent technologies as it is by a calculated political push in some quarters toward isolationism. *Deglobalization* carries heavy economic overtones, and Hammes concentrates significantly on that component. *Anti-internationalism* is the politically charged synonym that remains underexplored, and one that carries huge implications for international security—as clashes between Washington and Beijing over the handling of the COVID-19 pandemic testify. The process of deglobalization is not an uncontrollable force.

REGIONAL STUDIES

Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2019
292 pages
\$49.95

The U.S. Army and the Battle for Baghdad: Lessons Learned—And Still to Be Learned

By David E. Johnson, Agnes Gereben Schaefer, Brenna Allen,
Raphael S. Cohen, Gian Gentile, James Hoobler, Michael Schwille,
Jerry M. Sollinger, and Sean M. Zeigler

Reviewed by Dr. John A. Bonin, retired professor of concepts and doctrine, US
Army War College

The *U.S. Army and the Battle for Baghdad: Lessons Learned—And Still to Be Learned* is a needed book. David Johnson and his fellow authors focus primarily on the indispensable role the US Army played during what they term, the Battle for Baghdad. The book is based on research and analysis RAND conducted on contract to the Army with a goal to “catalogue those hard-won lessons that are derived from action (and inaction) by both civilian and military leaders so that US soldiers are better prepared in future conflicts and are less likely to repeat mistakes made in Iraq” (ix). The authors identify several lessons outside the purview of the Army and focus on eight overarching lessons they view are within the authority of the Army to implement. Details are not provided on the nine authors, however, David Johnson and Gian Gentile are well-known former US Army officers and scholars.

The eight overarching lessons for the Army and the authors’ recommendations are easy to find as they are placed up front in the summary. The report is organized into seven chronological chapters based on the major phases of operations in Iraq’s capital. After a short introductory chapter, five chapters on prewar planning, occupation, the Casey period, the surge, and withdrawal discuss the lessons from these time periods which are summarized in the final chapter on overarching lessons for the US Army.

Several of the lessons and recommendations identified for the Army were not solely up to the Army to implement. Lesson one, “DoD War Plans Need to include Actions to Ensure Long-Term Stability,” recommends the Army be resourced with the requisite forces (ix, 203). While Department of Defense (DoD) directive 5100.01 recognized the Army’s function to occupy and provide military governance, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld denied either would be required in Iraq and this decision had less to do with the Army “than with a failure of strategy and policy” (41). Similarly, the Army could not provide the entire capacity for the needed “whole-of-government approach” (212). While correct, the recommendation the Army build more capacity in civil affairs units faces stiff competition with other urgent internal Army force structure priorities.

Lessons four through six concern the Army's task to train and advise foreign military forces. The recommendations include further institutionalization of Army units dedicated to tactical security assistance of partner nation forces and institutional building at ministerial levels. Since the writing of the original report, the Army has created a Security Force Assistance Command with six Security Force Assistance Brigades and an Adviser Training Academy that provide some of that dedicated capability.

Lessons seven and eight focus on the Army's preparation for future urban combat and senior leader development. The Army proved successful in innovatively and creatively addressing the complex challenges of operating in Baghdad for six years, however, the report's recommendations for this lesson lacks specificity except to continue studies of megacities. The report also criticizes Army professional military education, especially the US Army War College and its failure to better prepare Army officers for the complex situations units faced in Iraq after 2003. The recommendation of the authors for the Army's education "to provide better military advice and plans to civilian policymakers. . . . to make better decisions" is short of specifics (xxi, 232).

While RAND conducted extensive research and analysis, the book has several flaws. The first and most significant flaw is the long delay in the release of the book. Most analysis, terminated in 2015, was not significantly updated prior to publication in late 2019. As the authors note, the Army had already implemented some of the recommendations and failed to heed others. For example, while lesson three recommends the Army provide robust division, corps, and theater army operational-level headquarters capable of planning and conducting combat and stability functions, the Army reduced these headquarters by an average 25 percent after 2014. As such, the book does not consider *The U.S. Army in the Iraq War* (2 volumes), the entire revision of Army doctrine in July 2019, or the emergence of the new Army concept of multi-domain operations. The book is also overly focused on operations in and around Baghdad.

Regardless of this criticism, *The U.S. Army and the Battle for Baghdad: Lessons Learned—And Still to Be Learned* is a valuable reference for serious students of the recent history of the US Army. What is still needed, however, is a broader companion report of the US Army in the entire war in Iraq with better articulated recommendations.

Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2019
287 pages
\$45.00

The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: When Total Empire Met Total War

By Jeremy A. Yellen

Reviewed by June Teufel Dreyer, professor of political science, University of Miami

History, often said to have been written by the winners, has not been kind to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (GEACPS)—Japan’s effort to “use our power to create the world’s new order” in the words of then-Prime Minister Konoe in 1940 (3). With the West in apparent decline, and American and British dominance in jeopardy, Japan’s imperial dreams expanded to centrality in international affairs: beginning with the liberation of the peoples of the Orient from the shackles of Western Europe and ridding the region of “the white race bloc” (4). By 1941, the GEACPS dominated discourse and became the sphere’s central goal until Japan’s final defeat four years later.

For this impressive analytical history of the period, author Jeremy Yellenan—assistant professor of Japanese studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong—conducted extensive archival research in Japan, Burma, the Philippines, Britain, and the United States. He sees the GEACPS as a sincere attempt to envision a new political order for the region during a time of global crisis. Although highly oppressive and domineering, the GEACPS had the active cooperation of nationalist elites across the region—“patriotic collaborators” whose motives, liberation from the colonialism of Great Britain (India and Burma) and the United States (the Philippines)—were quite different from those of Japan (20).

Yellen’s research shows Japan’s fear the Nazi regime would expand into Asia was key to its decision to sign on to the Tripartite Pact with Italy and Germany. As Germany gained ascendancy over much of Europe, influential members of Japan’s foreign policy establishment began to suspect Berlin would seek to control the French and Dutch colonies in East Asia. Forming an alliance with Germany was a way to preclude this, with the pact not simply an agreement among fascist-leaning states. This choice explains the apparent contradiction between Japan entering into an alliance with two Western states even as it sponsored a regional order based on anti-Westernism.

Another surprise to emerge from Yellen’s research was how little thought Japan had given to the operation of the new empire. Critics pointed out the only difference was that Japan would be the ruler rather than the West. Only after Pearl Harbor, and more than a year after Konoe announced the creation of the GEACPS, was there an attempt to consider how the new empire should be constructed.

In early 1942, an investigative committee was created and charged with developing a 10-year plan for greater East Asia. Although there was consensus that Japan would stand at the apex of this imagined community, major differences of opinion existed on which component

parts were to be protectorates, which were to be directly controlled by Japan, and the degree to which they should be free to interact directly with each other to meet their national needs as opposed to going through Tokyo. Yellen observes there was the naïve expectation Japan, without first winning the hearts and minds of the occupied territories, could create a subservient relationship.

The bulk of Yellen's analysis focuses on Burma and the Philippines. Each country had received a degree of political autonomy from its colonizers and both were able to maintain a degree of independence within the GEACPS since policy makers in Tokyo saw no long-term benefit to direct colonial control of either. Elites in each country wanted independence, and while the Burmese actively accommodated Japanese forces to ensure liberation from the British Empire, the Filipinos envisioned themselves in partnership with a caretaker regime: cooperating to secure gains from Japan or, should the United States return, a grant of independence they saw as inevitable.

Meanwhile, the elites made use of their limited independence to begin state building. In Burma, the Japanese military helped create a defense establishment, even introducing its rigorous training standards to the Burma National Army. As Japan suffered reverses on the battlefield, its demands on its colonies grew, even as by 1943 it was ready to promise full independence. This proved insufficient, since the territories could see which way the battlefield wind was blowing. The Philippine government resisted pressure to declare war on the United States, and the Burmese military—in a stunning defeat for Japanese efforts—revolted against Japan and courted aid from its former British overlords.

In an improbable twist of fate at war's end, the nationalist elites found themselves in Sugamo Prison, along with Class A war criminals such as former Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki. Isolated from them, the erstwhile collaborators held spirited conversations—in English, their only common language—about who was more understanding, generous, and democratic, the Americans or the British (206).

Military officers will find much to ponder in this well-written book—how idealism can come athwart reality and even the best-laid plans can go astray, how allies may prove illusory, and how victory does not mean peace. Treaties were hardly signed when the Cold War turned areas of decolonization into theaters of conflict between liberal democratic and communist power blocs.

Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger
Security International,
2019
241 pages
\$75.00

Contemporary Security Issues in Africa

By William A. Taylor

Reviewed by Diane E. Chido, founder and president of DC Analytics

Contemporary Security Issues in Africa is a thorough and well-researched primer for anyone new to Africa and the security challenges plaguing the continent since the colonial powers began to recede. It effectively describes the key strategic-level sources of instability with two national case studies and illustrates fragility, ethno-religious conflict and civil wars, natural resource and environmental security, violent extremism, maritime security, food security, and extreme poverty. For anyone observing Africa over the past 10 years, the primer is a useful summary with very little new information provided.

The narrative contains repetitive information one more edit might have resolved and relies on old sources and information, such as commentary that companies are still awaiting clarity on the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. This is from a 2012 Congressional Research Service report; one would assume companies have determined in the past 10 years how the legislation affected their business.

The chapter on international involvement presents two case studies, one focused on the United States and the formation of US Africa Command 13 years ago, and one focused on China and its well-known infrastructure and other investments. Both topics have been studied endlessly by scholars with entire books about each. In some of the case studies on specific challenges, the author mentions involvement by other countries, with one paragraph each on Turkey and Brazil. The author, for instance, could have discussed the massive recent investments in Somalia alone by Turkey, Brazil, and the United Arab Emirates. Brazil, like Colombia, recently became a security exporter and drastically increased its participation in peacekeeping which has brought greater Brazilian interest to Africa.

Nigeria, moreover, is described as historically stable, when the country has experienced nearly a dozen coups since achieving its independence in 1960 and has dealt with violence and rioting, plus the Biafran civil war and Niger Delta militant actions, that have killed hundreds over the years, even before Boko Haram began its murderous campaigns in earnest in 2009.

The linkages described in the final chapter are also well-known: corrupt elites amassing wealth and power from natural resource exploitation, the franchising of top terrorist brands, ethnic conflict masking violence over resources, and the looming environmental and natural resource threats. The brief section on future prospects in the final chapter, which should include clear recommendations to mitigate the challenges described, simply states that understanding these challenges

is the first step to their resolution and that ultimately they can only be managed through “coordinated national, regional, and international efforts” (147). Details about these efforts are scant, only that they should “ensure a safe and secure environment within which necessary political, economic, and social reforms can occur” (147).

Most obviously missing from the book’s catalog of challenges is poor governance, the critical uniting factor for all these issues and a term that hardly appears in the text. Social reforms cannot occur without a complete reimagining of what governance means in Africa and the recognition by ruling bodies and individuals of their responsibility to ensure human security for all people within their charge, rather than financial security only for their extended family or clan.

The African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, and other regional groups are beginning to take the lead on key security challenges, as noted by Taylor, but they are doing so because many African countries are not improving governance on their own as it does not seem to be in their best interest to do so. External incentives may be needed, and regional structures may be effective vehicles for this change as they have more legitimacy in aggregate than do their constituent countries, but Taylor does not explore this phenomenon outside of listing individual efforts in specific case studies.

Taylor does touch upon some hopeful demographic prospects including young populations and urbanization. Younger populations have been the hope to save Africa for two decades. Their increasing education and desire for prosperity leads them to the cities where they either end up in the slums or through infinite combinations of networks, good luck, and hard work, they become urbane, multicultural, and focused away from sources of conflict, seeking stability for greater economic opportunity and development. Observers have also placed hope in younger leaders who have been untouched by the struggles for independence that often leads to ethnic division and militancy in leadership. Youth bulges and urbanization, however, produce multitudes of young people for whom prosperity is a distant dream. Instead of prosperity they are drawn into criminality, predation, violence, and instability and are unlikely to demand or command change.

Contemporary Security Issues in Africa is an excellent book for anyone who needs to catch up on what has been happening in Africa. It provides a concise review of the key challenges, the historical context of their causes, and the mitigation efforts undertaken. For experts who need thoughtful answers to these challenges, the book will have little value except as an easy reference guide.

BIOGRAPHY

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University Press, 2019

224 pages
\$40.00

Hunter Liggett: A Soldier's General

By Michael E. Shay

Reviewed by Colonel J. P. Clark, US Army

Author Michael Shay has done yeoman's work in recovering the outlines of the life and career of Lieutenant General Hunter Liggett, arguably the most capable general in the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) of World War I. During the Great War, Liggett commanded a division and then a corps before replacing General John J. Pershing as commander of the US First Army, a move meant to allow Pershing to focus on his strategic duties as the overall American commander. As Shay notes, Pershing, however, was initially unwilling to relinquish his operational role; the possessive chief kept returning to First Army headquarters and giving direction as if there had been no change.

After several days of this, Liggett tactfully let Pershing know he was being a micromanaging nuisance. Liggett was then—largely—left to command his forces for the remaining weeks of the war. This incident reveals qualities Shay highlights throughout this biography: Liggett's unquestioned competence paired with a deft, unassuming personal touch that brought out the best in superiors, peers, and subordinates. These traits were widely acknowledged by his contemporaries, and that high reputation remains the consensus among historians today.

Nonetheless, until now, Liggett has lacked a full-length academic biography, likely in part due to the dearth of sources. His two memoirs focused on the Great War, providing only glimpses of the remainder of his nearly 46-year military career. Neither did the childless Liggett leave a trove of letters, diaries, or other papers to the care of family or a public institution. In terms of primary source material, Shay relied mainly on the official personnel file, Liggett's two books, the memoir of his wartime aide-de-camp, and the papers of a miscellany of some surrounding figures.

This thin base of evidence gives the chronological outline of Liggett's life but yields only the occasional glimpse of his deeper nature. Indeed, Shay goes to such lengths to wring everything he can from the available records that he includes some facts best left unrecorded—for instance, the distances of various routine training marches undertaken by Liggett's company on the frontier or trivial itinerary details of trips taken or hosted while in command of occupation troops after the war. These faithfully recorded facts provide no meaningful insights into how an outstanding soldier either developed from youth or employed honed skills in maturity.

The absence of these deeper lessons from Liggett's early career is a pity. He had many fascinating experiences before arriving in France that would be of great interest to scholars and practitioners alike. Liggett was a lieutenant for 18 years in the 1880s and 1890s, a period of US Army history that has not received sufficient attention. Did such a long apprenticeship help or hinder the development of someone who would command hundreds of thousands of troops? After just a year as a regular army captain, Liggett received a temporary promotion to major for service with volunteers in the training camps for the Spanish-American War and then in the field for the Philippine-American War. How did this service with citizen soldiers influence his outlook?

One of the more revealing anecdotes—and one already recorded within the secondary literature—comes from then Major Liggett's time as part of the Fort Leavenworth garrison in the early 1900s. Several years earlier, the reforms of Secretary of War Elihu Root remade the Army's professional education system.

To take advantage of these revitalized schools, Liggett audited the course taught by then First Lieutenant George C. Marshall—more than two decades his junior—subordinating any personal vanity to professional zeal. This might have been his best preparation for later high command: the curriculum focused on corps- and division-level tactics using German textbooks that happened to employ problems set in the region of France destined to fall within the AEF sector.

Unsurprisingly, the best chapters are those covering the First World War. Shay documents some of the significant controversies of the war from the perspective of Liggett, such as the relief of Major General Clarence R. Edwards and the confused "race for Sedan." Throughout, Shay favorably contrasts the firm yet calm hand of Liggett to the demanding, domineering Pershing. Indeed, Liggett was nearly one of the many senior officers Pershing either rejected outright or quickly sacked for a perceived lack of physical vigor. Ultimately, the skeptical Pershing's decision to retain Liggett was vindicated despite his girth.

Liggett's famous admission of being overweight, documented in Edward M. Coffman's *The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I*, is a triumph of sly self-effacement: "Unquestionably, there is such a thing not only as being too old to fight, but too fat. That disqualification is the more serious if the fat is above the collar" (250).

Hunter Liggett provides a sound overview of the career of an important figure in US Army history. It will be useful to historians as an authoritative biography for citation. Military professionals and history buffs seeking a quick introduction to aspects of the AEF will also profit. Specialist readers seeking fresh insights into the frontier, the Progressive Era Army, or military leadership will have to look elsewhere.

Shay elected to keep a tight focus on Liggett rather than taking the “life and times” approach of Allan Millett’s classic biography of the Second Army commander, *The General: Robert L. Bullard and Officership in the U.S. Army, 1881–1925*. That more expansive method uses the subject of the biography as a vehicle to advance academic or professional knowledge more broadly than an individual life. Shay competently delivers the book he set out to write, however, by declining the far more ambitious task of placing Liggett within the larger context of the era, he left room for a definitive biography still to come.

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