Book Reviews

USAWC Parameters
The Irrational Terrorist & Other Persistent Terrorism Myths

By Darren Hudson, Arie Perliger, Riley Post, and Zachary Hohman

Reviewed by Allison Abbe, professor of organizational studies, US Army War College

In 1983, Hezbollah drove explosives-filled trucks into the military barracks housing American and French service members in Beirut, Lebanon, killing 241 US military personnel and 58 French soldiers. Thirty-two years later, 21-year-old high-school dropout Dylann Roof shot and killed nine African Americans attending evening Bible study at a church in Charleston, South Carolina, in an attempt to incite a race war. To what extent do these attacks represent the same social phenomenon? This question and others are addressed in The Irrational Terrorist & Other Persistent Terrorism Myths, and the multidisciplinary perspectives of the authors—an economist, a political scientist, a social psychologist, and a special forces officer—are evident throughout the book.

In debunking myths about terrorism and counterterrorism, the authors take a “meandering journey” through different social science perspectives (135). Though meandering, the journey is short. At 140 pages, the book is a concise sampling of the state of terrorism studies in the social and behavioral sciences. Sources include peer-reviewed studies from economics, communications, conflict management, criminal justice, political science, psychology, risk management, and security studies. Rather than attempt to synthesize research across disciplines, the authors present disparate theories and evidence through disciplinary lenses, shifting among them throughout but returning often to economics, the most prevalent perspective in the book, drawing upon concepts of terrorist productivity, supply and demand, cost-benefit analysis, and expected utility models.

In the insightful and well-written “Terrorists are Poor and Uneducated” chapter, the authors clearly identify and disconfirm the myth and provide a viable alternative explanation. They incorporate research on the role of poverty and education in political behavior, management perspectives on human capital challenges for terrorist organizations, economic principles of supply and demand, the role of societal institutions, and the importance of the rule of law in enhancing stability and preventing terrorism from taking hold.

Unfortunately, other chapters are not as successful. The “Religious Fundamentalism Is the Only Source of Terrorism” chapter does not directly address the myth. The authors briefly mention terrorist groups with identity-based and other motivations not religious in nature and then focus on the motives and goals of Islamic terrorism—global vs. local, religious vs. political.
Other chapters address myths that may not really be myths, such as “I Know Terrorism When I See It” and “Terrorist Organizations Are Unsophisticated.” The authors fail to establish how these claims represent widely held beliefs about terrorist groups. Instead, they rely on anecdotal examples that are out of place in a book written by social scientists. The text also falls short in its attempt to label state terrorism a myth. The authors contradict themselves by offering examples of state violence that meet all the criteria for terrorism outlined in the pages immediately preceding.

Other chapters represent missed opportunities to offer meaningful insights. In particular, the chapter on terrorist organizations reads like a textbook, lapsing into a long exposition of organizational structure and social networks that may not engage a general audience. Similarly, in debunking the myth that terrorists are crazy, the authors catalog psychological research into the personalities and motivations of terrorists and offer a good snapshot of the research to date, but they do not provide explanations useful to practitioners, policy makers, or the public. While individual traits and characteristics have failed to identify who will become a terrorist, situational psychological dynamics, whether poverty, education, or mental illness, seem more promising, but have received insufficient attention here and from researchers.

Similarly, chapter 8, “Four Critical Myths of Counterterrorism,” offers few practical insights beyond the recommendation to include defensive measures as part of counterterrorism strategy; however, the historical perspective taken in the chapter does suggest the limitations of counterterrorism policies and interventions attempted by governments across the globe and helps chart a path for future research.

Ultimately, the authors do not demonstrate how an interdisciplinary perspective provides insights into terrorism and terrorist organizations. More a collection of chapters, the book offers little integration or coherence across disciplines, leaving it to readers to sort out. There are references between chapters but no attempt to synthesize the disparate lines of research from different disciplines; integrate different levels of analysis in societal, political, group, and individual perspectives; or provide a central organizing framework. The authors dismiss the need to do so, noting some issues are “too complex” for the book and “people are complicated.” This observation applies equally to the state of terrorism research.

The book is helpful in understanding the current state of terrorism studies and the contributions that can be made by the different perspectives of social scientists who tend to pursue their theories in isolation. Given its breadth, *The Irrational Terrorist & Other Persistent Terrorism Myths* may appeal to senior leaders already familiar with social science research and to students in need of a good introductory security or terrorism studies textbook to spark further interest in pushing the boundaries of the social sciences.
The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy

By Stephen M. Walt

Reviewed by LTC Joseph Buccino, US Army War College

In his engaging book *The Hell of Good Intentions*, Stephen Walt dissects the post-Cold War failures of American national security, laying blame with the foreign policy community for interventionist disasters, fruitless deployments, and missed opportunities. He proposes an alternative American grand strategy focused on select vital regions critical to American prosperity. This book is a must-read for students and practitioners of US national security affairs.

The fall of the Berlin Wall ushered in a period of rethinking America’s role in world affairs. Having vanquished her greatest adversary without firing a shot, the United States could finally heed George Washington’s farewell advice and disengage from unnecessary overseas ventures. America’s isolationist yearning dates back to its founding, and as the world’s lone great power, the United States had the opportunity to reverse the post-World War II trend toward global military expansion. Instead, US interventions and global commitments quadrupled from 1948 to 1991. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, American administrations promoted democratic ideals, expanded international treaties, and maintained enough forces and bases overseas to bolster a liberal, rule-based order.

The results of such grand ambition according to Walt? Less than 30 years after the end of the Cold War, the United States no longer sits atop a unipolar world and maintains a “global military presence” (24). Despite countless dollars spent on wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, neither country is on a path to success. Since 1992, America’s national security leadership has switched hands multiple times, but the primary urge toward the global spread of liberalism has remained consistent.

Throughout this period, Walt, a renowned foreign policy expert who teaches international relations at Harvard’s Kennedy School, has been a critic of the foreign policy establishment. In his 1987 book, *The Origins of Alliances*, he challenged the balance of power theory and made the essential case for international relations realism, arguing states should aggregate power and develop short-term cooperation agreements against rising threats. Since then, he has published controversial books and articles arguing against what he views as America’s impulsive and wrongheaded support of Israel and proclivity for wasteful ventures in the Middle East.

This book may be Walt’s best and most important work to date. He recounts the post-Cold War foreign policy missteps of the United States and holds the nation’s foreign policy establishment, which he defines as senior military leaders, defense officials, senior members of the CIA
and Department of State, think tanks, and national security media, to account for perpetuating a series of failures.

Walt is courageous. He identifies the reporters, analysts, and administration officials who maintain prominent positions in mainstream foreign policy despite histories of blunders. Not mentioned in *The Hell of Good Intentions* is the fact Walt has a better track record than the foreign policy “experts” he criticizes. In 2002 and early 2003, he argued against invading Iraq and remaining in Afghanistan and was ridiculed for his view. Today Walt sits outside established foreign policy circles while some of the advocates for those wars, such as Bill Kristol, Jane Harman, and Richard Haass, all of whom publicly predicted a short conflict in Iraq with a low-cost postwar reconstruction, now serve as prominent foreign policy analysts on cable news.

Walt also rightly argues the US military no longer holds itself to account at the measure the country should demand. Arguably, military leaders have little to show for the remarkable blood and treasure spent in the Middle East over the past 18 years, and the relief of senior military leaders for poor performance is rare.

In the penultimate chapter titled “How *Not* to Fix U.S. Foreign Policy,” Walt criticizes the current administration (217, italics in original). He alleges the Trump foreign policy team has conformed to tradition despite an unconventional public display and a series of promises to drain swamps, refocus on internal problems, and disentangle American forces and money from foreign wars. Walt has a point; there have been no significant troop reductions in Iraq or Afghanistan, and the Trump administration has authorized a series of new deployments to Saudi Arabia.

In the final chapter, Walt offers clear-eyed policy prescriptions the United States can follow to recover from its post-Cold War missteps and allow for a more prosperous peace. He takes a neorealist constructionist view of international relations and advocates for a policy in which military force is used only in response to direct threats to American interests. Short-duration, limited-focus troop deployments should replace nation building and long-term troop buildups. Once a rising threat is subdued, American troops should return home, leaving regime change and long-term occupation to others. While Walt has a clear agenda, he also points out foreign policy establishment successes since the close of the Cold War, including the Nunn-Lugar Program, the establishment of the World Trade Organization, and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Anyone interested in the development and implementation of foreign policy should read *The Hell of Good Intentions*. It is one of the most important books on foreign policy published in the last two years.
Bombs Without Boots: The Limits of Airpower

By Anthony M. Schinella

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Nathan K. Finney, US Army

A product of a Federal Executive Fellowship at the Brookings Institution, Bombs Without Boots is a thorough analysis of the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of both airpower and Landpower in twentieth-century foreign military interventions. The author, a career intelligence officer who participated in all of the case studies analyzed, is well positioned to provide analytical and qualitative assessments of a dominant approach to the Western use of power since the end of the Cold War—the use of airpower to intervene in military conflicts for strategic effect.

Schinella conducted his analysis through the examination of five case studies tailored to survey the results of a military intervention when it relied upon airpower and various levels of indigenous proxy ground forces. The interventions Schinella assesses include Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, Israel/Lebanon in 2006, and Libya in 2011. Each case study is analyzed in its own chapter, involving different formulations of airpower and proxy forces, but each supporting the overall thesis that “dropping bombs from the skies without committing boots on the ground—at best may result in an outcome in which intervener have little influence over the post-conflict environment and at worst may lead to open-ended commitment without having resolved the fundamental problem” (2).

The first case study, Bosnia, assesses a military intervention that showed the value of highly capable proxy forces. According to Schinella’s analysis, the fusion of NATO airpower and a capable Croat-Muslim Bosnian ground force led to a successful end to the conflict, however, the fact peace still stands is ultimately not due to airpower or the proxy force NATO supported, but rather the 25-year peacekeeping effort by Western forces. For Schinella, this indicates success can be tied to the time, effort, and resources expended over a significant amount of time. If not at the back door of Europe, it is unlikely Western nations would support a continued peacekeeping effort.

In the Kosovo case study, Schinella describes the challenges of working with a weak proxy force. Unable to overcome Yugoslav forces, the Kosovar proxy force was still able to provide enough support to an air campaign to force the former to the bargaining table. Neither NATO airpower nor proxy ground forces were able to stop the ethnic cleansing campaign or ultimately end the war, but both were required to put enough pressure on Yugoslav leadership—and their Russian supporters—to force a negotiated settlement. In the end, the war was “achieved by multiple other elements that airpower made possible” (95).
Like in Kosovo, the initial intervention in Afghanistan relied upon the limited options for allies on the ground. When the task involved cleaning up the battlefield after American airpower destroyed Taliban military forces, Afghan proxy forces were capable enough. As the task shifted to the complex coordination of a small American ground footprint and disparate Afghan militia forces against a prepared defense, the weakness of proxy forces was highlighted. In the end, external interventionist forces were unable to control the interests of the various groups with which they were allied. According to Schinella, this trend would only continue as interventionist forces were increased to come to terms with the long conflict in Southwest Asia.

The Israel conflict in Lebanon in 2006, the only non-American intervention covered in the book, is a case study in fighting without proxy ground force support. Because of this, Schinella determines Israel was unable to target accurately and degrade Hezbollah forces, even with significant firepower applied to a small geographic area. When Israel finally pushed ground forces into Lebanon to degrade enemy missile and rocket forces attacking their homeland, both Hezbollah and the Israeli Defense Forces took high casualties, but the latter lost more in the area of public opinion, failing to meet the expectations of the Israeli people. For Schinella, the Israelis were ultimately unsuccessful, but due to international peacekeeping forces taking over security on the ground and Hezbollah being pulled into the worsening civil war in Syria, an uneasy peace has held since 2006.

Finally, Schinella assesses the Western intervention in Libya, which shows the time and value in improving a proxy force. While airpower was able to destroy key Gadhafi capabilities that would have crushed the nascent rebel forces, it was the quick shipment and integration of foreign military assistance by Western nations that allowed those militias to overthrow the regime and take the Libyan capital. Like in Kosovo, says Schinella, “this was not a victory by airpower, it was a victory made possible by airpower” (286).

Throughout *Bombs Without Boots* Schinella is clear airpower played a key role in modern military interventions, but the key determining factor for long-term success is, as the strategist Admiral J. C. Wylie has stated, “the man on the ground with a gun.” Schinella admirably details different formulations of airpower combined with ground forces and the possible causes for success or failure; however, his case study selection may be one reason his assessments all support his theory. If he had included the analysis of other conflicts that employed airpower and a mixture of interventionist and proxy forces—such as the invasion of Iraq, Afghanistan after the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force, or the return of American forces to Iraq, and Syria, to battle the Islamic State—his conclusions may not be as clear-cut. With this in mind, *Bombs Without Boots* is an insightful and useful read for anyone interested in the use of military force abroad. It would be especially useful in professional military education courses where
officers from different services—air, ground, and sea—could discuss and debate Schinella’s conclusions.

**The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West**

By David Kilcullen

Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, an instructor at the Safe Communities Institute, University of Southern California

*The Dragons and the Snakes* focuses on the twenty-first-century global security environment containing dragons, state enemies, and snakes, nonstate enemies, that are threatening the West and developing into deadlier and deadlier foes through their continued military adaptation and coevolutionary progression. A renowned counterinsurgency practitioner and theorist, author Dr. David Kilcullen is a professor of international and political studies at the University of New South Wales, Canberra, and was the former CEO of Caerus Associates, a special adviser to the US Secretary of State from 2007–9, and a lieutenant colonel in the Australian Army. He has written a series of excellent books including *Blood Year* (2016), *Out of the Mountains* (2013), and *The Accidental Guerrilla* (2009).

Kilcullen breaks new ground here. He wades into great power conflict and, while he has extensive experience with snakes, his expertise with dragons is more limited. The well-researched, well-written book is interesting and benefits from Kilcullen’s theoretical smarts and extensive time in the field as a military officer and later as a researcher. Its pace moves quickly—less academic in nature, though well cited—and is meant more for professional and mainstream audiences. There are few faults with the book. Unfortunately, it is almost fully text based, with only a few tables and figures evident and maps used as end-of-chapter curtains.

The book includes an introduction, a very brief note on terminology, six chapters, an epilogue, acknowledgments, notes, and an index. The chapters are: chapter 1: “The Dragons and the Snakes” (introduction), chapter 2: “Adaptive Enemies” (the process behind nonstate enemy adaptation), chapter 3: “Woolsey’s Snakes” (the context behind their adaptation and mini case studies of al-Qaeda, Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and Hezbollah), chapter 4: “Liminal Warfare” (conducted by Russia), chapter 5: “Conceptual Envelopment” (conducted by China), and chapter 6: “Ebb Tide of the West” (conclusions and response guidance). Iran and North Korea as smaller dragons (adaptive state threats) are discussed throughout and primarily in chapter 3. The epilogue, A Better Peace? (in the spirit of J. F. C Fuller), briefly touches upon the use of Western military methods to promote liberty and prosperity. It also encourages a refocusing on Western “societal resilience” and “domestic political reconciliation at home” (254–55).
Kilcullen’s main arguments are “that the military model pioneered by US forces in the 1991 Gulf War—the high-tech, high-precision, high-cost suite of networked systems that won the Gulf War so quickly and brought Western powers such unprecedented battle-field dominance in the quarter century since then—is no longer working” and “what our enemies have learned in the quarter century since Woolsey’s testimony—how the dragons learned from the snakes, how the snakes copied the dragons, how the rest learned to fight the West—and about what we in turn must learn if we hope to succeed in the new environment we now face” (6, 36). He draws upon the February 1993 US Senate nomination hearing of R. James Woolsey Jr., as the director of central intelligence, in which Woolsey used the emergent dragon and snake paradigm to describe the threat facing the intelligence community (9–11).

The tipping point for the West, cited by Kilcullen as taking place on March 20, 2003 at the Dora Farms complex outside of Baghdad, represented the failed “decapitation strike” against Saddam Hussein and his sons in an effort to stave off the Iraq War (217). The West’s Dora Farms moment is equivalent to the Battle of Gettysburg for the Confederacy in 1863 or, more appropriately, the Battle of Adrianople in 378 when the tide fully turned against the Eastern Roman Empire and its legion-based military system. Resulting from the “Ebb Tide of the West,” Kilcullen’s “so what” guidance initially delves into three strategic response options: “doubling down” and rejecting the inevitability of Western decline, “embracing the suck” and mitigating the worst aspects of this decline like leading from behind, or “going Byzantine” and retrenching and reconceptualizing our strategic position (228–37).

Of these three options, Killcullen only views “going Byzantine” as a viable and pragmatic option for the United States and its allies to follow. This entails “selective learning from the enemy” including the possible utilization of decisive shaping, liminal warfare, and hypersonic missiles (Russian); “cyber home guards” and remote engagement capabilities; and the limited use of counter-hybrid operations (241–46). The intent is to make Western forces, like Byzantine military units, extremely hard to defeat with the staying power to engage in the long game, to wear down opposing forces, and to compromise obliquely, politically, or economically, as required.

The implications of this option find the United States (and the rest of the West) in a strategic situation similar to the eastern half of the Roman Empire during the epochal shift from the classical to the medieval eras. Hence, this means a civilizational conflict approach at the level of Toynbee and Huntington, and allied to Bull’s neo-medievalism, underlies the author’s analysis (226–28). This reviewer, an epochal warfare theorist who has made a similar argument for more than 30 years, has Kilcullen’s back in this regard. The West with its Westphalian state structure has entered its twilight. A global civilizational shift spanning technology, space-time dimensionality, economics, social class structures, and others is now fully underway.
The Dragons and the Snakes is first-rate, affordable, and extremely timely. US Army War College and affiliated audiences will benefit from the book’s strategic focus and gain insights into how the West’s foes have successfully developed new methods and technologies that pose a threat to the global security environment.
Global Data Shock: Strategic Ambiguity, Deception, and Surprise in an Age of Information Overload

By Robert Mandel

Reviewed by Dr. Scott S. Haraburda, US Army (retired)

To make sound decisions, leaders today must understand the world and seek ways to interpret the chaotic and distorted data filling it. Logically, one could assume more data is better. Often times this is not true. In *Global Data Shock*, Robert Mandel shows how leaders trying to make better data-driven decisions encounter increased confusion, rather than improved situational awareness, from the data deluge.

While big data analysis applies complex algorithms to infer information from large amounts of data that cannot be obtained from smaller amounts, Mandel argues leaders, overwhelmed with the large amount of constantly changing data, are unable to rapidly and correctly determine what is false. This overload facilitates strategic ambiguity, deception, and surprise. Mandel challenges the validity of open-source data, the need for obtaining more data to improve the reliability of analyses, and the reliance upon internal experts for analyses.

*Global Data Shock* is simply organized into five chapters plus an acknowledgements section, an introduction, a conclusion, notes, and an index. The bulk of the book contains Mandel’s analyses of ten case studies organized by theme. The case studies illustrate the rationale, effectiveness, perceived legitimacy, consequences, and lessons of these manipulation techniques. The book contains many difficult-to-read text figures that add very little to the discussions; however, the tables in chapter four provide an invaluable summary of the case studies and highlight their background context, offensive manipulation, defensive response, and strategic outcome. Quotations require readers to search the endnotes to identify their source and why they are included. Valuable nuggets of information, though difficult to locate, can be found throughout the book, making it worth the read.

The current way of life is highly dependent upon data and the world would collapse without it. This reliance upon data is a large vulnerability, especially when people believe numbers and data analyses reveal the truth. Trickling even educated professionals, fake news and other misinformation are difficult to detect. With too much data—including contradictory information—people now view reality as beliefs without the need for verifiable data. As Mandel points out, this data deluge is exasperated within the military community where command and control decisions are based primarily upon millions of people using networked computing devices across hundreds of installations globally. In addition
to influencing combat power and technology, the control of information has a large impact upon military actions.

Ambiguity, deception, and surprise are typical primary manipulation techniques used in military operations that can be employed with relatively short-term costs. High volumes of battlefield reports and analyses add to the excess data available to leaders, making the information ambiguous. Injection of false data and omission of critical facts lead to deceptive information. Mandel shows how the failure of leaders to distinguish between real data and noise leaves organizations vulnerable to surprise attacks and can result in the loss of valuable resources and power.

Contradictory statements, fake news accusations, misuse of statistics, and information overload decreases predictability. Often times, this ambiguity is full of hostile, negative, and fear-provoking emotions. Moreover, time pressure can impede one’s ability to fact-check data. Befuddling both allies and adversaries, lack of clarity forces the public to become dependent upon the biases of analysts while cherry-picking information to support their personal opinions at the expense of ignoring the truth.

This “fog of war” will likely become denser with big data and its systems vulnerable to hacking (11). To defend against manipulation, organizations need the capability to extract valuable information from conflicting data. Relying upon imperfect veracity and logic, data analytics will not become a replacement for well-trained, experienced analysts. Instead Mandel argues critical thinking skills, such as filtering out false data, recognizing biases, and addressing knowledge gaps in those analyses, will become vital. Combining qualified analysts and automated data analytic systems is a valid way for organizations to counter data-based manipulations.

Though Mandel is not persuasive in his arguments, *Global Data Shock*—which should be read with a careful eye—provides beneficial information to augment strategic offensive and defensive manipulation plans. Senior military leaders studying relevant insights on the information component of the DIME components of national power—diplomatic, information, military, economic—will benefit from this timely book and improve their understanding of how data impacts decision making.
Deglobalization and International Security

By T. X. Hammes

Reviewed by Andrew Mumford, professor of war studies, University of Nottingham, United Kingdom

Author T. X. Hammes routinely sets up his analyses in fours. His landmark text about the evolution of modern insurgency, The Sling and the Stone, was grounded in the concept of “Fourth Generation Warfare” and highlighted the decentralized nature of modern warfare. Now he presents the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” and its effect on international security.

For Hammes, a distinguished research fellow at the National Defense University and a former Marine Corps officer, this new industrial revolution is a “convergence of breakthroughs in bioscience, nanotechnology, robotics, artificial intelligence, autonomy, 3D printing, clean energy and material science” (xi). His central thesis is this revolution will provoke a significant reversal of the globalization of labor, goods, and service. These economic consequences of deglobalization, Hammes posits, will have an impact on international security because a combination of these technological discoveries “is creating a new generation of small, smart, and cheap weapons” that can be used by violent non-state actors and rising powers to usurp the status quo (xiv). The economic and political costs of expeditionary warfare will proliferate accordingly.

Divided into eight chapters, the book begins with a whistle-stop tour of the drivers of globalization and identifies the elements of its purported demise. It then dives deeper into the different future technologies that will combine in the coming decades to indelibly impact the interconnectedness of societies and economies around the world and, crucially effect the character of war. The second half of the book, about the military impact of deglobalization and how US forces can adapt, will be of most interest to readers. Although not explicitly pitched as such, this book is a fascinating contribution to the discussion on future warfare, and one that would appeal to Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency scientists and World Bank economists alike.

An avowed Clausewitzian, Hammes argues the nature of war will still be rooted in the trinity, but future war will have a different character due to the convergence of new technologies that can produce mass-produced, low-cost weaponry. These technologies include off-the-shelf drones for surveillance, reconnaissance, communications, and strike purposes or AI-driven navigation systems that do not rely on GPS. This section rationally demonstrates how technology and war gaming scenarios that may seemingly belong in the fanciful realm of science fiction are indeed scientific facts that are already reshaping the tactical and operational levels of war on land, on sea, and in the air—as well as in space and the cyber domain, too.
Hammes admits in the introduction the book, in part, is a product of pieces published in different venues over the past three years. If I am being picky, I believe greater editorial finesse would have created a more coherent whole to overcome the disparate parts. Not all chapters have conclusion sections, and those that do exist are cursory—just two sentences in one instance.

The intellectual curiosity and astute observations covering science, technology, economics, history, politics, and military strategy packed into the book, however, make it a compelling and thoughtful read. Although replete with some fairly pessimistic assessments of such future wars—they are, Hammes argues, likely to be “bloodier, longer, and more financially ruinous” than those of today—the final chapter constructively navigates a path for American forces to follow in order to adapt to such changes (195). Hammes bluntly lays out the inescapable impact new technologies will have on force structure and raises important questions for military planners regarding shifts in investment from legacy systems to new ones. His final rallying call is for ongoing American engagement with its existing alliance partners; this engagement must come with a reappraisal of its cost—which Hammes argues, could be reduced if emergent technologies are harnessed effectively.

Overall, Hammes’ assessment of the economic drivers of current and future change is convincing. His sketch of future battle domains imbued with nanotechnology and swarms is profoundly plausible, however, the political drivers of deglobalization are underdeveloped. Decades of ever-increasing globalization have created conditions that have exacerbated socioeconomic divides in countries around the world, and these disparities have been exploited by populists. To this extent, deglobalization is driven as much by the localizing nature of emergent technologies as it is by a calculated political push in some quarters toward isolationism. Deglobalization carries heavy economic overtones, and Hammes concentrates significantly on that component. Anti-internationalism is the politically charged synonym that remains underexplored, and one that carries huge implications for international security—as clashes between Washington and Beijing over the handling of the COVID-19 pandemic testify. The process of deglobalization is not an uncontrollable force.
The U.S. Army and the Battle for Baghdad: Lessons Learned—And Still to Be Learned


Reviewed by Dr. John A. Bonin, retired professor of concepts and doctrine, US Army War College

The U.S. Army and the Battle for Baghdad: Lessons Learned—And Still to Be Learned is a needed book. David Johnson and his fellow authors focus primarily on the indispensable role the US Army played during what they term, the Battle for Baghdad. The book is based on research and analysis RAND conducted on contract to the Army with a goal to “catalogue those hard-won lessons that are derived from action (and inaction) by both civilian and military leaders so that US soldiers are better prepared in future conflicts and are less likely to repeat mistakes made in Iraq” (ix). The authors identify several lessons outside the purview of the Army and focus on eight overarching lessons they view are within the authority of the Army to implement. Details are not provided on the nine authors, however, David Johnson and Gian Gentile are well-known former US Army officers and scholars.

The eight overarching lessons for the Army and the authors’ recommendations are easy to find as they are placed up front in the summary. The report is organized into seven chronological chapters based on the major phases of operations in Iraq’s capital. After a short introductory chapter, five chapters on prewar planning, occupation, the Casey period, the surge, and withdrawal discuss the lessons from these time periods which are summarized in the final chapter on overarching lessons for the US Army.

Several of the lessons and recommendations identified for the Army were not solely up to the Army to implement. Lesson one, “DoD War Plans Need to include Actions to Ensure Long-Term Stability,” recommends the Army be resourced with the requisite forces (ix, 203). While Department of Defense (DoD) directive 5100.01 recognized the Army’s function to occupy and provide military governance, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld denied either would be required in Iraq and this decision had less to do with the Army “than with a failure of strategy and policy” (41). Similarly, the Army could not provide the entire capacity for the needed “whole-of-government approach” (212). While correct, the recommendation the Army build more capacity in civil affairs units faces stiff competition with other urgent internal Army force structure priorities.
Lessons four through six concern the Army’s task to train and advise foreign military forces. The recommendations include further institutionalization of Army units dedicated to tactical security assistance of partner nation forces and institutional building at ministerial levels. Since the writing of the original report, the Army has created a Security Force Assistance Command with six Security Force Assistance Brigades and an Adviser Training Academy that provide some of that dedicated capability.

Lessons seven and eight focus on the Army’s preparation for future urban combat and senior leader development. The Army proved successful in innovatively and creatively addressing the complex challenges of operating in Baghdad for six years, however, the report’s recommendations for this lesson lacks specificity except to continue studies of megacities. The report also criticizes Army professional military education, especially the US Army War College and its failure to better prepare Army officers for the complex situations units faced in Iraq after 2003. The recommendation of the authors for the Army’s education “to provide better military advice and plans to civilian policymakers... to make better decisions” is short of specifics (xxi, 232).

While RAND conducted extensive research and analysis, the book has several flaws. The first and most significant flaw is the long delay in the release of the book. Most analysis, terminated in 2015, was not significantly updated prior to publication in late 2019. As the authors note, the Army had already implemented some of the recommendations and failed to heed others. For example, while lesson three recommends the Army provide robust division, corps, and theater army operational-level headquarters capable of planning and conducting combat and stability functions, the Army reduced these headquarters by an average 25 percent after 2014. As such, the book does not consider The *U.S. Army in the Iraq War* (2 volumes), the entire revision of Army doctrine in July 2019, or the emergence of the new Army concept of multi-domain operations. The book is also overly focused on operations in and around Baghdad.

Regardless of this criticism, *The U.S. Army and the Battle for Baghdad: Lessons Learned—And Still to Be Learned* is a valuable reference for serious students of the recent history of the US Army. What is still needed, however, is a broader companion report of the US Army in the entire war in Iraq with better articulated recommendations.
The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: When Total Empire Met Total War

By Jeremy A. Yellen

Reviewed by June Teufel Dreyer, professor of political science, University of Miami

History, often said to have been written by the winners, has not been kind to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (GEACPS)—Japan’s effort to “use our power to create the world’s new order” in the words of then-Prime Minister Konoe in 1940 (3). With the West in apparent decline, and American and British dominance in jeopardy, Japan’s imperial dreams expanded to centrality in international affairs: beginning with the liberation of the peoples of the Orient from the shackles of Western Europe and ridding the region of “the white race bloc” (4). By 1941, the GEACPS dominated discourse and became the sphere’s central goal until Japan’s final defeat four years later.

For this impressive analytical history of the period, author Jeremy Yellen—an assistant professor of Japanese studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong—conducted extensive archival research in Japan, Burma, the Philippines, Britain, and the United States. He sees the GEACPS as a sincere attempt to envision a new political order for the region during a time of global crisis. Although highly oppressive and domineering, the GEACPS had the active cooperation of nationalist elites across the region—“patriotic collaborators” whose motives, liberation from the colonialism of Great Britain (India and Burma) and the United States (the Philippines)—were quite different from those of Japan (20).

Yellen’s research shows Japan’s fear the Nazi regime would expand into Asia was key to its decision to sign on to the Tripartite Pact with Italy and Germany. As Germany gained ascendancy over much of Europe, influential members of Japan’s foreign policy establishment began to suspect Berlin would seek to control the French and Dutch colonies in East Asia. Forming an alliance with Germany was a way to preclude this, with the pact not simply an agreement among fascist-leaning states. This choice explains the apparent contradiction between Japan entering into an alliance with two Western states even as it sponsored a regional order based on anti-Westernism.

Another surprise to emerge from Yellen’s research was how little thought Japan had given to the operation of the new empire. Critics pointed out the only difference was that Japan would be the ruler rather than the West. Only after Pearl Harbor, and more than a year after Konoe announced the creation of the GEACPS, was there an attempt to consider how the new empire should be constructed.

In early 1942, an investigative committee was created and charged with developing a 10-year plan for greater East Asia. Although there was consensus that Japan would stand at the apex of this imagined community, major differences of opinion existed on which component
parts were to be protectorates, which were to be directly controlled by Japan, and the degree to which they should be free to interact directly with each other to meet their national needs as opposed to going through Tokyo. Yellen observes there was the naïve expectation Japan, without first winning the hearts and minds of the occupied territories, could create a subservient relationship.

The bulk of Yellen’s analysis focuses on Burma and the Philippines. Each country had received a degree of political autonomy from its colonizers and both were able to maintain a degree of independence within the GEACPS since policy makers in Tokyo saw no long-term benefit to direct colonial control of either. Elites in each country wanted independence, and while the Burmese actively accommodated Japanese forces to ensure liberation from the British Empire, the Filipinos envisioned themselves in partnership with a caretaker regime: cooperating to secure gains from Japan or, should the United States return, a grant of independence they saw as inevitable.

Meanwhile, the elites made use of their limited independence to begin state building. In Burma, the Japanese military helped create a defense establishment, even introducing its rigorous training standards to the Burma National Army. As Japan suffered reverses on the battlefield, its demands on its colonies grew, even as by 1943 it was ready to promise full independence. This proved insufficient, since the territories could see which way the battlefield wind was blowing. The Philippine government resisted pressure to declare war on the United States, and the Burmese military—in a stunning defeat for Japanese efforts—revolted against Japan and courted aid from its former British overlords.

In an improbable twist of fate at war’s end, the nationalist elites found themselves in Sugamo Prison, along with Class A war criminals such as former Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki. Isolated from them, the erstwhile collaborators held spirited conversations—in English, their only common language—about who was more understanding, generous, and democratic, the Americans or the British (206).

Military officers will find much to ponder in this well-written book—how idealism can come athwart reality and even the best-laid plans can go astray, how allies may prove illusory, and how victory does not mean peace. Treaties were hardly signed when the Cold War turned areas of decolonization into theaters of conflict between liberal democratic and communist power blocs.
Contemporary Security Issues in Africa

By William A. Taylor

Reviewed by Diane E. Chido, founder and president of DC Analytics

Contemporary Security Issues in Africa is a thorough and well-researched primer for anyone new to Africa and the security challenges plaguing the continent since the colonial powers began to recede. It effectively describes the key strategic-level sources of instability with two national case studies and illustrates fragility, ethno-religious conflict and civil wars, natural resource and environmental security, violent extremism, maritime security, food security, and extreme poverty. For anyone observing Africa over the past 10 years, the primer is a useful summary with very little new information provided.

The narrative contains repetitive information one more edit might have resolved and relies on old sources and information, such as commentary that companies are still awaiting clarity on the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. This is from a 2012 Congressional Research Service report; one would assume companies have determined in the past 10 years how the legislation affected their business.

The chapter on international involvement presents two case studies, one focused on the United States and the formation of US Africa Command 13 years ago, and one focused on China and its well-known infrastructure and other investments. Both topics have been studied endlessly by scholars with entire books about each. In some of the case studies on specific challenges, the author mentions involvement by other countries, with one paragraph each on Turkey and Brazil. The author, for instance, could have discussed the massive recent investments in Somalia alone by Turkey, Brazil, and the United Arab Emirates. Brazil, like Colombia, recently became a security exporter and drastically increased its participation in peacekeeping which has brought greater Brazilian interest to Africa.

Nigeria, moreover, is described as historically stable, when the country has experienced nearly a dozen coups since achieving its independence in 1960 and has dealt with violence and rioting, plus the Biafran civil war and Niger Delta militant actions, that have killed hundreds over the years, even before Boko Haram began its murderous campaigns in earnest in 2009.

The linkages described in the final chapter are also well-known: corrupt elites amassing wealth and power from natural resource exploitation, the franchising of top terrorist brands, ethnic conflict masking violence over resources, and the looming environmental and natural resource threats. The brief section on future prospects in the final chapter, which should include clear recommendations to mitigate the challenges described, simply states that understanding these challenges
is the first step to their resolution and that ultimately they can only be managed through “coordinated national, regional, and international efforts” (147). Details about these efforts are scant, only that they should “ensure a safe and secure environment within which necessary political, economic, and social reforms can occur” (147).

Most obviously missing from the book’s catalog of challenges is poor governance, the critical unifying factor for all these issues and a term that hardly appears in the text. Social reforms cannot occur without a complete reimagining of what governance means in Africa and the recognition by ruling bodies and individuals of their responsibility to ensure human security for all people within their charge, rather than financial security only for their extended family or clan.

The African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, and other regional groups are beginning to take the lead on key security challenges, as noted by Taylor, but they are doing so because many African countries are not improving governance on their own as it does not seem to be in their best interest to do so. External incentives may be needed, and regional structures may be effective vehicles for this change as they have more legitimacy in aggregate than do their constituent countries, but Taylor does not explore this phenomenon outside of listing individual efforts in specific case studies.

Taylor does touch upon some hopeful demographic prospects including young populations and urbanization. Younger populations have been the hope to save Africa for two decades. Their increasing education and desire for prosperity leads them to the cities where they either end up in the slums or through infinite combinations of networks, good luck, and hard work, they become urbane, multicultural, and focused away from sources of conflict, seeking stability for greater economic opportunity and development. Observers have also placed hope in younger leaders who have been untouched by the struggles for independence that often leads to ethnic division and militancy in leadership. Youth bulges and urbanization, however, produce multitudes of young people for whom prosperity is a distant dream. Instead of prosperity they are drawn into criminality, predation, violence, and instability and are unlikely to demand or command change.

_Contemporary Security Issues in Africa_ is an excellent book for anyone who needs to catch up on what has been happening in Africa. It provides a concise review of the key challenges, the historical context of their causes, and the mitigation efforts undertaken. For experts who need thoughtful answers to these challenges, the book will have little value except as an easy reference guide.
Author Michael Shay has done yeoman’s work in recovering the outlines of the life and career of Lieutenant General Hunter Liggett, arguably the most capable general in the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) of World War I. During the Great War, Liggett commanded a division and then a corps before replacing General John J. Pershing as commander of the US First Army, a move meant to allow Pershing to focus on his strategic duties as the overall American commander. As Shay notes, Pershing, however, was initially unwilling to relinquish his operational role; the possessive chief kept returning to First Army headquarters and giving direction as if there had been no change.

After several days of this, Liggett tactfully let Pershing know he was being a micromanaging nuisance. Liggett was then—largely—left to command his forces for the remaining weeks of the war. This incident reveals qualities Shay highlights throughout this biography: Liggett’s unquestioned competence paired with a deft, unassuming personal touch that brought out the best in superiors, peers, and subordinates. These traits were widely acknowledged by his contemporaries, and that high reputation remains the consensus among historians today.

Nonetheless, until now, Liggett has lacked a full-length academic biography, likely in part due to the dearth of sources. His two memoirs focused on the Great War, providing only glimpses of the remainder of his nearly 46-year military career. Neither did the childless Liggett leave a trove of letters, diaries, or other papers to the care of family or a public institution. In terms of primary source material, Shay relied mainly on the official personnel file, Liggett’s two books, the memoir of his wartime aide-de-camp, and the papers of a miscellany of some surrounding figures.

This thin base of evidence gives the chronological outline of Liggett’s life but yields only the occasional glimpse of his deeper nature. Indeed, Shay goes to such lengths to wring everything he can from the available records that he includes some facts best left unrecorded—for instance, the distances of various routine training marches undertaken by Liggett’s company on the frontier or trivial itinerary details of trips taken or hosted while in command of occupation troops after the war. These faithfully recorded facts provide no meaningful insights into how an outstanding soldier either developed from youth or employed honed skills in maturity.
The absence of these deeper lessons from Liggett’s early career is a pity. He had many fascinating experiences before arriving in France that would be of great interest to scholars and practitioners alike. Liggett was a lieutenant for 18 years in the 1880s and 1890s, a period of US Army history that has not received sufficient attention. Did such a long apprenticeship help or hinder the development of someone who would command hundreds of thousands of troops? After just a year as a regular army captain, Liggett received a temporary promotion to major for service with volunteers in the training camps for the Spanish-American War and then in the field for the Philippine-American War. How did this service with citizen soldiers influence his outlook?

One of the more revealing anecdotes—and one already recorded within the secondary literature—comes from then Major Liggett’s time as part of the Fort Leavenworth garrison in the early 1900s. Several years earlier, the reforms of Secretary of War Elihu Root remade the Army’s professional education system.

To take advantage of these revitalized schools, Liggett audited the course taught by then First Lieutenant George C. Marshall—more than two decades his junior—subordinating any personal vanity to professional zeal. This might have been his best preparation for later high command: the curriculum focused on corps- and division-level tactics using German textbooks that happened to employ problems set in the region of France destined to fall within the AEF sector.

Unsurprisingly, the best chapters are those covering the First World War. Shay documents some of the significant controversies of the war from the perspective of Liggett, such as the relief of Major General Clarence R. Edwards and the confused “race for Sedan.” Throughout, Shay favorably contrasts the firm yet calm hand of Liggett to the demanding, domineering Pershing. Indeed, Liggett was nearly one of the many senior officers Pershing either rejected outright or quickly sacked for a perceived lack of physical vigor. Ultimately, the skeptical Pershing’s decision to retain Liggett was vindicated despite his girth.

Liggett’s famous admission of being overweight, documented in Edward M. Coffman’s The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I, is a triumph of sly self-effacement: “Unquestionably, there is such a thing not only as being too old to fight, but too fat. That disqualification is the more serious if the fat is above the collar” (250).

Hunter Liggett provides a sound overview of the career of an important figure in US Army history. It will be useful to historians as an authoritative biography for citation. Military professionals and history buffs seeking a quick introduction to aspects of the AEF will also profit. Specialist readers seeking fresh insights into the frontier, the Progressive Era Army, or military leadership will have to look elsewhere.
Shay elected to keep a tight focus on Liggett rather than taking the “life and times” approach of Allan Millett’s classic biography of the Second Army commander, *The General: Robert L. Bullard and Officership in the U.S. Army, 1881–1925*. That more expansive method uses the subject of the biography as a vehicle to advance academic or professional knowledge more broadly than an individual life. Shay competently delivers the book he set out to write, however, by declining the far more ambitious task of placing Liggett within the larger context of the era, he left room for a definitive biography still to come.