In Focus: US Army Suicides
Tim Hoyt and Pamela M. Holtz

War, Gender, and Civilians
Jody M. Prescott
Andrew M. Bell
Raymond A. Millen

Lessons from Afghanistan
Jan Ångström
Philipp Münch

Regional Challenges
Philip Y. Kao
Christopher J. Bolan, Jerad I. Harper, and Joel R. Hillison
# Features

## In Focus

7  Challenging Prevailing Models of US Army Suicide  
Tim Hoyt and Pamela M. Holtz

## War, Gender, and Civilians

21  Gender Blindness in US Doctrine  
Jody M. Prescott

33  Civilians, Urban Warfare, and US Doctrine  
Andrew M. Bell

47  Stability Operations in WWII: Insights and Lessons  
Raymond A. Millen

## Lessons from Afghanistan

61  Contribution Warfare: Sweden’s Lessons from the War in Afghanistan  
Jan Ångström

73  Never Again? Germany’s Lessons from the War in Afghanistan  
Philipp Münch

## Regional Challenges

85  India and Pakistan: Managing Tensions  
Philip Y. Kao

99  Diverging Interests: US Strategy in the Middle East  
Christopher J. Bolan, Jerad I. Harper, and Joel R. Hillison

## Review and Reply

113  On “Projecting Stability: A Deployable NATO Police Command”  
Raymond E. Bell Jr.

115  The Authors Reply  
Massimo Pani and Karen J. Finkenbinder
# Book Reviews

## Biography

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Reviewed By</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td><em>A Spy Named Orphan: The Enigma of Donald Maclean</em></td>
<td>Roland Philipps</td>
<td>W. Andrew Terrill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td><em>How Ike Led: The Principles Behind Eisenhower’s Biggest Decisions</em></td>
<td>Susan Eisenhower</td>
<td>Jonathan D. Arnett</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td><em>George W. Goethals and the Army: Change and Continuity in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era</em></td>
<td>Rory McGovern</td>
<td>John K. Hawley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td><em>The Impeachers: The Trial of Andrew Johnson and the Dream of a Just Nation</em></td>
<td>Brenda Wineapple</td>
<td>W. Andrew Terrill</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Defense Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Reviewed By</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td><em>Post Wall, Post Square: How Bush, Gorbachev, Kohl, and Deng Shaped the World after 1989</em></td>
<td>Kristina Spohr</td>
<td>Ronald J. Granieri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129</td>
<td><em>Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy: Religion, Politics, and Strategy</em></td>
<td>Dmitry Adamsky</td>
<td>Robert E. Hamilton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132</td>
<td><em>Why We Fight</em></td>
<td>Mike Martin</td>
<td>Anthony King</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134</td>
<td><em>Culture and the Soldier: Identities, Values, and Norms in Military Engagements</em></td>
<td>H. Christian Breede</td>
<td>Kellie Wilson-Buford</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Regional Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Reviewed By</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>136</td>
<td><em>Lessons Unlearned: The U.S. Army’s Role in Creating the Forever Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq</em></td>
<td>Pat Proctor</td>
<td>George Woods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>139</td>
<td><em>India and Nuclear Asia: Forces, Doctrine, and Dangers</em></td>
<td>Yogesh Joshi and Frank O’Donnell</td>
<td>Arzan Tarapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141</td>
<td><em>Black Wave: Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Forty-Year Rivalry That Unraveled Culture, Religion, and Collective Memory in the Middle East</em></td>
<td>Kim Gstas</td>
<td>W. Andrew Terrill</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Technology and War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Reviewed By</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>145</td>
<td><em>Power to the People: How Open Technological Innovation is Arming Tomorrow’s Terrorists</em></td>
<td>Audrey Kurth Cronin</td>
<td>Robert J. Bunker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>147</td>
<td><em>America’s Covert War in East Africa: Surveillance, Rendition, Assassination</em></td>
<td>Clara Usiskin</td>
<td>An Jacobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Reviewed by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151</td>
<td>Command: The Twenty-First-Century General</td>
<td>Anthony King</td>
<td>David G. Fivecoat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>153</td>
<td>Subordinating Intelligence: The DoD/CIA Post–Cold War Relationship</td>
<td>David P. Oakley</td>
<td>Genevieve Lester</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155</td>
<td>Hitler’s First Hundred Days: When Germans Embraced the Third Reich</td>
<td>Peter Fritzsche</td>
<td>Jay Lockenour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>157</td>
<td>Beyond Pearl Harbor: A Pacific History</td>
<td>Beth Bailey and David Farber</td>
<td>Michael E. Lynch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>159</td>
<td>The World at War, 1914–1945</td>
<td>Jeremy Black</td>
<td>Michael S. Neiberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161</td>
<td>The Red Army and the Second World War</td>
<td>Alexander Hill</td>
<td>Reina Pennington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>162</td>
<td>The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire</td>
<td>A. Wess Mitchell</td>
<td>James D. Scudieri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165</td>
<td>Pax Romana: War, Peace, and Conquest in the Roman World</td>
<td>Adrian Goldsworthy</td>
<td>Jason W. Warren</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>169</td>
<td>Article Index, Vol. 50, 2020</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Our Winter 2020–21 issue of *Parameters* begins with an *In Focus* contribution by Tim Hoyt and Pamela Holtz entitled, “Challenging Prevailing Models of US Army Suicide.” The authors examine the inability of current models to capture accurately or predict suicides among US Army soldiers. Hoyt and Holtz recommend the Army take a more collaborative approach to this tragic health concern.


The issue’s final forum, *Regional Challenges*, offers one contribution concerning India-Pakistan and one pertaining to the Middle East. In “India and Pakistan: Managing Tensions,” Philip Kao considers the recent history of border conflict between these nuclear-armed neighbors and determines they have averted nuclear crises through means other than the framework of conventional deterrence theory. In “Diverging Interests: US Strategy in the Middle East,” Christopher Bolan, Jerad Harper, and Joel Hillison suggest ways for US foreign policy to adjust to the geopolitical realities of four key nations in the region: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Turkey. ~AJE
ABSTRACT: Statistics behind reported suicide rates in the military are often insufficiently analyzed and portray a distorted picture of reality. Several models for identifying individuals at risk for suicide have been proposed but few show adequate predictive power to be actionable. Instead, a collaborative and consistent effort to address core drivers at the individual level may be more useful.

Since the drawdown of combat action in Iraq and Afghanistan, suicide and self-inflicted injury account for more deaths annually across the armed forces than all other factors except accidents. Accordingly, suicide prevention has been a strategic priority for more than a decade. The 2015 National Military Strategy emphasized suicide prevention as a core aspect of ethical leadership requiring a culture of trust and mutual respect. Despite the sustained emphasis on prevention, however, the rate of suicide in the US Army remains largely unchanged.

This article highlights several key findings in the scientific literature in an effort to dispel myths regarding suicide rates in the US Army. It thereby provides a touch point for military leaders as they prioritize prevention initiatives and programs. Specifically, six questions are addressed:

1. What is the current trend in suicide death rates?
2. How do US Army suicide rates compare to civilian rates?
3. Can predictive models be used to predict suicide deaths?
4. What risk factors can leaders influence?
5. Have prevention programs been effective?
6. What is an appropriate target for suicide reduction?

Current Trends

Recent publications erroneously describe current trends of suicide among servicemembers as “steadily rising.” Popular media similarly

report, “suicide among troops spiked [to] crisis proportions.”\textsuperscript{5} Analysis of data, however, shows the suicide rate for the Army has not significantly changed since 2011.\textsuperscript{6} Indeed, annual suicide rates per 100,000 person-years for the US Army of 29.8 (2019), 29.9 (2018), 24.7 (2017), 27.4 (2016), 24.4 (2015), 24.6 (2014), 23.0 (2013), 29.6 (2012), and 24.8 (2011) are within the same statistical margin of error.\textsuperscript{7} These data, which contradict the typical narrative surrounding military suicide, warrant the attention of leaders who may otherwise incorrectly interpret small arithmetic changes in rates as significant.

Further, stable trends may take several years to establish and interpret—quarterly or monthly reports inherently are prone to greater uncertainty and instability of estimates. Defense Suicide Prevention Office reports, collected monthly and issued to the public quarterly, result in problematic statements such as “Army suicide deaths are up” for a given reporting period.\textsuperscript{8} Such statements can be misinterpreted by senior leaders as representing reliable trends and can, therefore, misinform efforts to formulate a strategic approach to military suicide.

Similarly, literature on military suicide suggests rates across the services nearly doubled from 10.1 per 100,000 in 2002 to 19.7 per 100,000 in 2009.\textsuperscript{9} But several intervening factors during this time period call this interpretation into question. Prior to implementation of the DoDSER in 2008, there were few systematic and standardized studies of military suicides.\textsuperscript{10} Thus, rate calculations that include data prior to the implementation of DoDSER differ depending on the case definition utilized in a particular setting.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{5} Tom Vanden Brook, “Troops at Risk for Suicide Not Getting Needed Care, Report Finds,” USA Today, August 7, 2017. Popular media might report a “20 percent spike” in military suicide deaths in a given quarter. This number is a simple comparison of number of suicide events from a given quarter compared to the previous quarter. This number does not account for normal variability in the number of suicide deaths on a quarterly basis. If there were 71 suicide deaths in Quarter 2 of 2019, and 85 suicide deaths in Quarter 3 of 2019, then numerically this is a 20 percent increase. But this comparison fails to report that any given quarter from 2017 through 2019 might have as few as 57 suicide deaths, or as many as 99 suicide deaths. In that context, 85 suicide deaths is within the typical range of quarterly suicide deaths over the previous three years and does not portray a “spike” as reported in the media.

\textsuperscript{6} Jennifer Tucker, Derek J. Smolenski, and Carrie H. Kennedy, DoDSER: Calendar Year 2018 Annual Report, no. 4-B4E204C (Washington, DC: Defense Health Agency, July 2020), 12.


\textsuperscript{10} David S. C. Chu to Assistant Secretaries of the Military Departments for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, memorandum, “Standardized DoD Suicide Data and Reporting,” June 2006, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Washington, DC.

\textsuperscript{11} Kenneth L. Cox et al., “An Examination of Potential Misclassification of Army Suicides: Results from the Army Study to Assess Risk and Resilience in Servicemembers,” Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior 47, no. 3 (June 2017): 261.
Reports prior to this time also relied primarily on medicolegal determinations by the Armed Forces Medical Examiner System and may have biased reporting toward accidents as a cause of death rather than suicide. As a further complicating factor, policy changes during the Obama administration ensured Servicemembers’ Group Life Insurance would be paid to designated beneficiaries regardless of line-of-duty determination for suicide deaths. Taken together, these biasing factors make problematic any direct comparison of suicide rate data between time periods before and after systematic data collection.

**Suicide Rates**

In contrast to the US Army suicide rate, which has remained consistent since 2011, the suicide rate for the US population has significantly increased. Recent statistics show suicide is now the tenth leading cause of death and accounts for approximately 45,000 deaths in the United States annually. Despite these facts, the most common statement in the media is the military suicide rate is “well above the national rate” for the US population.

Similarly, the academic literature frequently cites the statistic that the 2008 Army suicide rate exceeded the crude rate of the US population. Due to demographic differences between the US population and the subset of the population that serve on active duty in the US Army, a direct comparison of crude or unadjusted suicide rates between the two groups is inaccurate—the military is generally younger than the overall US population and has a greater proportion of men. Thus any statistical comparison between the two groups must be adjusted to be age- and sex-matched. But no consensus has been reached or policy guidance provided on which methods should be utilized when comparing rates—for example, direct versus indirect standardization.

An analysis of US Army suicide data from 2004 to 2015 using direct standardization to match age and sex to the US population showed

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the US Army rate was below the comparable civilian rate for 8 of the 12 years included in the data. The annual DoDSER utilizes indirect standardization to make similar comparisons of suicide rates between the two groups in order to account better for age differences. These data show the age- and sex-adjusted suicide rates in the US Army did not significantly differ from the rates for the US population for calendar years 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2017.

For three reporting years—calendar years 2011, 2012, and 2016—the adjusted US Army suicide rates were slightly higher than the US population rates. The magnitude of difference between the rates may also be of importance when considering these exception years. When comparing the calendar year 2012 data—the year in which crude rates for the Army differ most from the civilian population—there is only a one-hundredth of 1 percent difference between the two rates. These findings cast doubt on reports suggesting suicides in the US Army significantly exceed those for the US population.

**Predictive Models**

Models purporting to identify suicide deaths accurately are unlikely to show sufficient predictive power to be useful for developing suicide prevention programs. As the number of identified potential risk factors for suicide increases and these factors are better measured, the number of false positives will statistically increase due to the poor specificity of predictors. In fact, the likely upper limit of positive predictive power (the likelihood that an identified “positive” case will actually engage in suicide behavior) for suicide assessment instruments is 78 percent based on simulation studies among civilian psychiatric patients with a history of self-inflicted injury.

Thus even in the best identified statistical scenarios in high-risk populations, false positives on validated screening measures will occur 22 percent of the time. In civilian settings, a false positive prompting additional psychiatric evaluation may be considered a minor cost compared to potentially lifesaving intervention. But in the Army context, a false positive identification of suicide risk may inappropriately preclude assignment to certain missions such as recruiting duty, flight status, or assignments requiring a security clearance. These stigma-increasing outcomes are in addition to the cost of the evaluation and the opportunity cost of lost training associated with unneeded, additional

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assessments. Furthermore, false negatives may provide a false sense of security for commanders and clinicians who assume a particular soldier is not at risk.

The relatively low base rate of suicides also prevents adequate verification or cross-validation of predictive models. In order to appropriately develop predictive models, the base rate in an initial sample should be approximately 50 percent. Problems with predictive models are further exacerbated when trying to expand predictive models to groups with fewer risk factors or lower rates. Considering only crude rates, the 2016 US Army suicide rate was 27.4 per 100,000, but patients with a history of inpatient psychiatric admission have an average suicide rate of 646 per 100,000. This difference in base rates makes the use of previously validated scales for any prediction problematic.

The false positive problem is pervasive across studies of servicemembers and veterans and limits the utility of most clinical risk assessment techniques. Even the Army Study to Assess Risk and Resilience in Servicemembers (Army STARRS), the large longitudinal study of prospective suicide risk, showed an overwhelming number of false positives—96.3 percent—when attempting to model high-risk prediction.

The US Army has recently adopted the Columbia-Suicide Severity Rating Scale (C-SSRS) as a primary suicide risk assessment measure. The C-SSRS is a mandatory suicide risk screening used in a variety of Army medical settings including emergency departments, inpatient psychiatric facilities, and outpatient clinics. Nonetheless, the designation of this measure by the Defense Suicide Prevention Office and other civilian hospital settings as the gold standard for suicide risk assessment may communicate a false sense of assurance. Screening samples from the C-SSRS indicate only 8 percent of the individuals who go on to engage

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35. US Army Medical Command (MEDCOM), Behavioral Health At-Risk Management Policy, MEDCOM Policy Memo 16-096 (Fort Sam Houston, TX: MEDCOM, 2016), 8.
36. MEDCOM, MEDCOM Policy Memo 16-096.
in suicide behaviors would be identified by this screening, and 4 percent of individuals would be identified as false positives.\(^{38}\)

Other studies using this assessment measure have shown similar findings, namely, the potential for classification errors and missed cases of suicide attempts.\(^{39}\) Thus, leaders receiving risk recommendations from sources utilizing the C-SSRS must know the likelihood of false positives and false negatives. Moreover, more recent techniques (such as machine learning and predictive modeling) do not overcome the inherent weaknesses caused by a low base rate event and poor predictive power.\(^{40}\)

**Role of Leaders**

For the reasons discussed, identifying risk factors through mass screening may be of little utility in predicting the acute suicide risk of an individual soldier.\(^{41}\) In contrast, leaders should focus on the core drivers of suicide—stressors an individual associates with suicidality, which may acutely increase suicide risk.\(^{42}\) For example, at the individual soldier level, financial problems such as loss of pay due to misconduct or reduction in rank could be a significant driver.\(^{43}\)

In one of the few direct comparison studies of potential drivers for suicide death among soldiers, researchers compared groups of soldiers who died by suicide, and those who attempted suicide but did not die, with demographically matched control soldiers.\(^{44}\) The study identified that soldiers who exhibited suicide behaviors (both suicide deaths and nonfatal suicide attempts) had greater odds of experiencing legal and substance-abuse problems and failed intimate relationships in the 90 days preceding the incident, with legal problems the most significant differentiator of those servicemembers who died by suicide.\(^{45}\) Occupational problems such as nonselection for promotion or poor performance evaluations were significantly associated with nonfatal suicide attempts.\(^{46}\)

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\(^{40}\) Belsher et al., “Prediction Models for Suicide,” 642–51.


\(^{45}\) Skopp et al., “Case-Control Study.”

\(^{46}\) Skopp et al., “Case-Control Study.”
These drivers of suicide behavior—financial, legal, relationship, substance-abuse, and occupational problems—are not novel, but each issue provides leaders with a potential opportunity to mitigate emerging risk. As soon as the financial or legal problems of a soldier are identified, leaders can ensure protected time during duty hours for soldiers to resolve these issues before they become drivers of suicide behavior. Also, leaders can assign unit mentors to check in regularly with soldiers facing relationship or occupational problems to ensure these stressors have not overwhelmed them.

Commanders can also take steps to decrease risk when soldiers experience an acute driver of suicide. Throughout the past decade, personally owned firearms are the leading mechanism of injury in military suicides, accounting for 68.7 percent of all calendar year 2017 suicide deaths in the US Army. This statistic is complicated by recent findings that only one-third of servicemembers store personal firearms in their homes in a safe manner—locked and unloaded. Servicemembers reporting recent thoughts of suicide were significantly less likely to follow safe storage practices.

Restriction of firearms has been shown to reduce the risk of some suicides, but significant cultural and readiness barriers impede such restrictions for soldiers experiencing stressful life events (that may or may not become drivers for suicide). Still, commanders can mitigate this risk by emphasizing safe storage practices for personally owned firearms and by offering (rather than directing) temporary storage of these firearms in unit arms rooms when soldiers experience potential drivers of suicidal behavior. These actions can decrease the likelihood a soldier will act impulsively during a moment of crisis, as any delay allows more opportunity for the soldier to seek help.

Prevention and Treatment Programs

Outside the Clinic

The Army has invested significant time and resources on suicide prevention programs provided outside behavioral health clinics. As such, these programs should be evaluated for efficacy in preventing suicide deaths. Until May 2018, mandatory suicide prevention training was conducted using the Ask, Care, and Escort program, and gatekeepers—commanders, medical personnel, and chaplains—additionally received

52. Hoyt and Duffy, “Implementing Firearms Restriction,” 386.
Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training (ASIST).\textsuperscript{53} (The requirement for mandatory suicide prevention training was eliminated in May 2018, replaced with command discretion regarding such training.)\textsuperscript{54}

Despite these training requirements, none of these intervention programs have been systematically evaluated in military settings, and there is minimal evidence regarding their effectiveness.\textsuperscript{55} The evidence base is limited to several small-scale studies related to the facilitation of suicide prevention training. One study evaluated the use of ASIST in a small reserve unit sample and found the training was minimally effective in reducing hopelessness among participants.\textsuperscript{56}

Another study showed over 90 percent of Army chaplains and chaplain assistants had received mandatory gatekeeper suicide prevention training—ASIST—over the course of a year, and these gatekeepers reported greater efficacy in responding to suicide risk among soldiers than noncommissioned officers with similar gatekeeper training.\textsuperscript{57} A study of noncommissioned officers showed they had a greater ability to intervene than trained civilians in similar settings, such as resident advisers receiving gatekeeper training in university residence halls.\textsuperscript{58}

These same noncommissioned officers, however, indicated more reluctance to intervene than gatekeepers in university settings due to the perception they would be blamed for the death of an at-risk soldier, or that their intervention could have deleterious effects on the soldier’s career.\textsuperscript{59} These findings notwithstanding, there is no evidence gatekeeper training has a direct effect on suicide rates.\textsuperscript{60} Thus the implementation of gatekeeper training in the US Army should be clear regarding intended outcomes: whereas the training may increase knowledge, it may not necessarily increase likelihood of intervention and cannot be assumed to reduce suicide deaths.

Clinical Treatment Settings

The treatment of suicidality in US Army clinical settings generally focuses on soldiers experiencing acute or chronic suicidal ideation, plans, or intent.\textsuperscript{61} This focus can limit the applicable scope of these activities

\textsuperscript{53} Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), \textit{Army Health Promotion, Army Regulation} (AR) 600-63 (Washington, DC: HQDA, April 2015), 20–21.

\textsuperscript{54} Mark Esper, \textit{Prioritizing Efforts—Readiness and Lethality Update 7} (Washington, DC: Secretary of the Army, May 25, 2018).

\textsuperscript{55} Rajeev Ramchand et al., “Noncommissioned Officers’ Perspectives on Identifying, Caring For, and Referring Soldiers and Marines at Risk of Suicide,” \textit{Psychiatric Services} \textbf{66}, no. 10 (October 2015): 1057.


\textsuperscript{58} Ramchand et al., “Noncommissioned Officers’ Perspectives,” 1061.

\textsuperscript{59} Ramchand et al., “Noncommissioned Officers’ Perspectives,” 1059.


\textsuperscript{61} MEDCOM, MEDCOM Policy Memo 16-096.
for the Army since less than half of soldiers that died by suicide between 2004 and 2009 had sought behavioral health care. Notwithstanding this limitation, several interventions have shown empirical support in reducing suicide behavior in clinical settings.

Several former military officers developed a type of brief cognitive behavioral therapy to address suicide behavior among soldiers who had been treated for suicidality in an inpatient psychiatric facility. Soldiers who received this intervention in addition to the usual standard of care showed significantly lower rates of suicide attempts over the two years following treatment compared to soldiers receiving the usual treatment. A core component of this military-specific intervention is the development of an individualized safety or crisis response plan for each soldier.

These safety plans are developed collaboratively and individually with each soldier, often in consultation with command, and identify coping strategies and sources of support that have proven effective in reducing distress. The implementation of safety and crisis response plans are not the sole purview of treating clinicians. Army policy requires a safety plan for any soldier identified with any significant suicide risk in behavioral health care and encourages working collaboratively with command to ensure safety plans do not overly limit a soldier’s gainful employment in the unit. The overall goal of a safety or crisis response plan is to ensure the soldier has a tangible, concrete plan of action when facing a distressing situation.

A similar approach—the Collaborative Assessment and Management of Suicidality (CAMS)—also has shown promise in the scientific literature, including with military populations. This integrative treatment emphasizes a problem-focused approach, developing a treatment plan that reduces the underlying hopelessness and stress that drive suicide behavior. Clinical trials have shown the CAMS approach can significantly reduce suicidal ideation in...
soldiers and reduce emergency department visits related to suicide and psychiatric hospitalization.

Despite these findings, military clinicians have been slow to adopt these collaborative approaches and similar empirically supported clinical techniques. Strategic leaders must emphasize training in these modalities to reduce the impact of suicide behavior on readiness. Population-wide meta-analysis indicates the most powerful strategies for suicide prevention (for example, gatekeeper training and psychosocial treatment) each could account for up to a 7 percent reduction in suicide deaths. These tailored treatments are more effective than broad treatments that include suicide behavior as a secondary treatment target.

Indeed, former Air Force officer and leading military suicide researcher Dr. Craig Bryan indicates it is unlikely new treatments are needed to address the current rates of suicide in the Army, and “the next step in suicide prevention should be to adapt and refine what already works to make [treatment] work even better.” But meta-analysis also suggests these treatments may be most effective for up to three months following cessation of treatment. Leaders cannot, therefore, assume a soldier’s risk of suicide has been resolved simply because the soldier has successfully terminated treatment and is no longer required to be on a duty-limiting profile.

**Suicide Reduction**

Zero suicides have been the stated goal of many suicide reduction initiatives during the past two decades. Since suicide rates in the US Army have not significantly changed since 2011, it may be more reasonable to focus on a strategic target for reduction supported by the empirical literature. As discussed, small year-to-year changes in the suicide rate should not be interpreted as a significant increase or decrease unless backed by statistical analysis that demonstrates an index of reliable change. For example, when comparing the suicide rate for 2016 against the average rate for the previous three-year period, in order to reliably identify a statistical decrease in the US Army suicide rate, the total number of suicide deaths would need to be reduced from...
127 (2016) to 92 (in a future year) assuming an equivalent military end strength for that year.\textsuperscript{80}

To put this difference in context, a reliable 28 percent decrease would be required; this decrease would be equivalent to comparing the highest recent count of 164 suicides in 2012 to the lowest recent count of 120 suicides in 2015 (a 27 percent change).\textsuperscript{81} This reduction target should be considered in the context of the overall literature on suicide prevention techniques. Indeed, a recent meta-analysis on reducing the population suicide rate detailed a statistical model that combined all current, evidence-based suicide prevention strategies into a single, integrated strategy.\textsuperscript{82} If implemented with perfect fidelity, these data suggest a multiyear strategy hypothetically could reach a 25 percent reduction.

**Recommendations**

In summary, the data on US Army suicides differs from the typical narrative in popular media: the rate of soldier suicide does not differ from the general US population and has been at a steady state since 2011.\textsuperscript{83} This steady state indicates Army-wide interventions to decrease suicide have been ineffective at reducing the suicide rate despite the lack of specific studies evaluating the impact of prevention efforts. It is possible the comparison of trends between the US population suicide rate, which has increased over the past decade, and the US Army suicide rate, which remains steady, could be interpreted as US Army efforts being successful in preventing a corresponding increase.

But due to the very low base suicide rate in the Army, the relatively small population of soldiers compared to the general population, and year-to-year measurement error over a relatively short period, the most likely interpretation of this data is in line with more robust research findings that the US population suicide rate does not differ from the US Army suicide rate. Leaders must strive to understand that current suicide rates in the United States are not unique to the military and are occurring as part of broader societal trends. In pursuit of this goal, the authors offer four recommendations.

**Research**

First, despite demands for increasingly immediate data, any suicide rate calculations should focus on annual numbers, not quarterly reporting, and trends should only be interpreted based on multiyear comparisons rather than year-to-year variation. As the US Army seeks to eliminate suicide, interim targets for significant decreases should be set.

\textsuperscript{80} Pruitt et al., *(DoDSER): Calendar Year 2016*, 31.


\textsuperscript{82} Christensen, Cuijpers, and Reynolds, “Changing the Direction,” 435–36.

\textsuperscript{83} Pruitt et al., *(DoDSER): Calendar Year 2016*, iv.
Second, prevention efforts must be validated before widespread implementation. Whereas unit-wide suicide prevention training programs have raised awareness during the past two decades, none have been shown to reduce suicide behavior or suicide deaths.\(^84\) Additional prevention programs should not be emphasized; instead, research should be dedicated to clear demonstrations of program efficacy and adherence to implementation science practice.

**Prevention**

Third, the Army must continue to address the drivers for suicide at the individual level. The recent elimination of mandatory suicide prevention training requirements at the unit level provides leaders with an opportunity to focus on risk mitigation among those soldiers facing the greatest occupational, interpersonal, and social risks. Emerging tools to assist leaders in addressing suicide concerns among servicemembers similarly focus on a one-on-one assessment that mitigates risk at the individual level.\(^85\) Like airmen in the Air Force Limited Privilege Suicide Prevention program, soldiers facing investigations or other legal problems should be allowed to seek behavioral health support during crises without this information becoming admissible as part of the medical record or adversely affecting the soldier during legal or administrative proceedings.\(^86\)

Furthermore, formal unit-level mentoring programs for soldiers facing divorce or occupational problems can ensure individuals are aware of support options such as legal, financial, and housing assistance.\(^87\) The Army should mandate empirically supported treatment techniques in clinical settings with an emphasis on individualized safety planning that involves collaboration between the servicemember, the chain of command, and treatment providers.\(^88\)

Fourth, the US Army must become a learning organization in its approach to suicide prevention. The effectiveness of some prevention efforts during the past decade may have been hampered by frontline leaders assuming they would be held responsible if they intervened and the soldier subsequently died by suicide.\(^89\) Commanders at all levels cannot abdicate responsibility for suicide deaths in their formations, but their accountability must remain within the bounds of their control. Commanders’ critical incident reporting and fatality review boards can focus on best practices to mitigate risk associated with known drivers of suicide behavior.

Additionally, professional military education programs should set aside time for seminar discussions about frontline approaches to suicide

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\(^84\) Burnette, Ramchand, and Ayer, “Gatekeepers Training for Suicide Prevention,” 16.
\(^85\) Hoyt et al., “Development of a Leader Tool.”
\(^87\) Hoyt et al., “Development of a Leader Tool.”
\(^88\) Hoyt and Repke, “Managing Soldiers at Risk,” 429.
\(^89\) Ramchand et al., “Noncommissioned Officers’ Perspectives,” 1059.
risk mitigation. It is the authors’ experience that all senior leaders have direct familiarity with individual cases of suicide behavior in their formations. Leaders must share the successes and failures of frontline approaches to risk mitigation in order to disseminate best practices and drive innovative approaches. By addressing these areas through a culture of learning, strategic leaders may be able to facilitate a reliable decrease in the number of suicide deaths in the US Army.

Tim Hoyt
Dr. Tim Hoyt, a clinical psychologist with the Defense Health Agency Psychological Health Center of Excellence and a US Army War College graduate, served as the director of the US Army’s flagship intensive outpatient program for posttraumatic stress disorder at Madigan Army Medical Center.

Pamela M. Holtz
Dr. Pamela M. Holtz, clinical and aeromedical psychologist, currently serves on active duty with the 2nd Combat Aviation Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division. Her primary research interests focus on psychological trauma among military servicemembers.
ABSTRACT: US military Joint and Army civil affairs doctrine has failed to consider the operational relevance of gender, posing a risk to mission accomplishment and force protection. A comparison of NATO and Australian Defence Force doctrine reveals gender considerations have been included in Allied doctrine in recent years. US land-force operational planning can provide an example of how a focus on civil affairs doctrine could jump-start the process to address the larger doctrinal gender deficit quickly and effectively.

The US military’s failure to consider gender as an operational factor will result in incomplete operational pictures from the tactical to the strategic. Moreover, because US Allies such as NATO partners and Australia already factor gender into their doctrine and operations, this gap in doctrine degrades interoperability. All military doctrine must include analysis informing commanders, planners, and operators what the operational risks of failing to consider gender could be, and how these omissions could impede mission accomplishment unless appropriately mitigated.

In his influential book, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, General Sir Rupert Smith introduced the idea of “war amongst the people” as an evolving characteristic of conflict in the modern international security environment. In Smith’s view, conflict was becoming ever more civilian-centric, and adversaries found themselves contending less for key terrain on the ground and more for influence over the people living there. This evolution is in part the result of trends such as the continuing growth of the world’s population, increased urbanization, the flowering of the megacity, the global reach of the Internet, the negative impacts of climate change, and the use of social media platforms to mobilize individuals and communities of interest. Importantly, about half of these people are female.

The Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Act of 2017 carves out a role for the US military in operationalizing certain aspects of gender. Although the Department of Defense has made progress incorporating...
gender considerations into military activities and operations, implementation has been uneven and slow.

This article assesses the status of the incorporation of gender considerations into US military doctrine, highlighting recent progress and continuing overall deficits. To provide a concrete example of such deficits, this article examines the failure of US civil affairs (CA) doctrine to consider gender adequately and, by way of comparison, explores approaches taken by NATO and the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in their respective civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and civilian-related doctrines.

Next by way of remedy, this article analyzes US land-force planning doctrine to identify where and how gender considerations could be effectively included in the mission, enemy, terrain, troops available, time and civilian considerations (METT-TC) component of the planning process. Because civil affairs is the staff section expected to bring the C of “civilian considerations” into the land-force METT-TC planning tool, updating both Joint- and land-force-level CA doctrine is a profitable point from which to jump-start a reassessment of US operational doctrine in terms of gender. Finally, the article explores recently updated ADF doctrine to describe the gap that still exists between an evolving modern doctrinal approach to gender and a methodology facilitating the assessment of operational risk posed by neglecting gender considerations.

Gender in US Strategy and Doctrine

The 2019 national WPS strategy promotes “the meaningful inclusion of women in processes to prevent, mediate, resolve, and recover from deadly conflict or disaster.” To accomplish these aims, the strategy sets out four lines of interrelated efforts across the government, primarily focused on increasing the “meaningful participation of women . . . in decision making processes related to conflict and crisis” in US programs and by partner nations, promoting “the protection of women and girls’ human rights,” and adjusting international programs to boost outcomes in women’s equality and empowerment.

To accomplish its overarching objectives, the June 2020 DoD implementation plan (required by the national strategy) outlines intermediate objectives, each with effects that can be measured. One important effect is the establishment of “policy, doctrine, and training, as appropriate, to enable implementation of the WPS Strategy.” This emphasis on WPS augments meaningful work already underway at the combatant command level, such as gender-related training programs,
considerations of gender in training exercises with international partner militaries, and gender coaching programs for combatant command senior leadership. At the Joint service level, doctrine is being updated during the regular review process to include gender considerations.

Doctrine is one area where it is possible to assess the magnitude of the challenge facing the Department of Defense in meaningfully incorporating gender considerations across the spectrum of military operations and activities with some degree of quantitative certainty. The military has made important progress in some areas, such as updated joint foreign humanitarian assistance doctrine in 2019 that includes substantive references to WPS and the most recent iteration of Joint stability operations doctrine. In general, however, gender considerations barely register.

For example, Joint urban operations doctrine notes only that “culturally inappropriate interaction with women” by US soldiers might antagonize a population, and that a population analysis should include “delineating its primary attributes, such as age, wealth, gender, ethnicity, religion and employment statistics.” Thus it is not clear the regular review process is as effective as it should be. A better approach would be using US civil affairs doctrine to jump-start the inclusion of gender considerations in all levels of US military doctrine.

US Civil Affairs Joint Doctrine

On the ground, US civil affairs operations consistently consider gender. There are numerous examples of CA units and troops in the field taking a gendered approach to promote the growth of social, economic, and political stability in different areas of operation. For example, these troops assisted combat units in sponsoring women’s bazaars in Iraq so local women could earn hard currency to help support their families and learn business skills. What is missing from CA doctrine, however, is a methodology that would provide civil affairs units with a platform for more consistent implementation of these efforts and promote greater interoperability with Allied forces in conducting them.

One might expect joint CA doctrine would be first and foremost in dealing with the operational relevance of gender. Joint Publication (JP) 5-37, Civil Military Operations dashes such assumptions. Women are mentioned only three times and only in the planning context. For example, planners are advised to consider including logistic support for civil-military operations that normally falls “outside military logistics,

10. Dr. Elizabeth Lape, e-mail to author (May 22, 2019).
such as support to the civilian populace (e.g., women, children, and the elderly).”

Lastly, in preparing for negotiations, planners are advised to consider culture in setting the “appropriate construct” for a meeting, asking themselves “for example, what role do women play in the society?”

One could argue although women are only mentioned three times, men are not mentioned at all—thus the doctrine is intended to be gender neutral, and perhaps therefore nondiscriminatory. A closer review, however, confirms the doctrine is not gender neutral—it is instead male normative. The lens through which the operational environment is analyzed is male, apparently based on an assumption that what is applicable to the men in a civilian population is equally applicable to the women.

Consider, for example, the perspective conveyed in the JP 3-57 section dealing with civil information management (figure 1).

![Notional Civil Information Management Connects-the-Dots between People in the Operational Environment](image)

**Figure 1.** Civil information management (reprinted from Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), *Civil-Military Operations*, JP 3-57 [Washington, DC: JCS, 2018])

This diagram illustrates what JP 3-57 sets out as an innovative approach to interacting with local civilian leaders. This approach relates to “understanding who local leaders are; how they relate to others; and the populace’s needs, strengths, weaknesses, and limitations.” In this example, the Joint force commander, “[in accordance with] conventional wisdom,” chooses to “conduct [key leader engagement] with the [male] town mayor to influence public attitudes toward the local insurgency.”

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suggests the more fruitful path to accomplish the commander’s intent is to work through the local male religious leader, because he is related by marriage to the local insurgent leader and has more influence on the townspeople.

While this is a plausible scenario, let us look instead at the story the diagram tells visually rather than textually and assess whether the lesson it seeks to convey is truly innovative. First, the primary actors in this civilian-centric situation are the Joint force commander and troops on one side and the insurgent leader and his force on the other. The mayor, the religious leader, and the “relative or associate” have male silhouettes. The civilian populace is represented by a mixture of smaller silhouettes, and two of the five figures appear to be female.

Visually, in this civilian-centric environment in which the commander wishes to influence the attitudes of members of the population, less than 8 percent of all the actors are recognizable as female and at most only 40 percent of the population itself is female. Further, although the civilian population’s attitudes are the primary objective, the arrows between the religious leader and the populace flow only from him to them—there is no feedback loop indicating the town citizenry have input to or opinions on the matter. Further, to the extent the women have different perspectives, not only do their opinions apparently matter less than the men’s, but their views are at risk of not being conveyed back to the Joint force commander.

Finally, this scenario pivots on an unexamined assumption: the relation by marriage provides a possible influence vector simply because two key leaders have a common brother-in-law. This assumption ignores the fact a woman is likely the reason for this linkage. Her attitudes toward her brothers-in-law may have a significant impact on whether and how any information is transmitted between the men in question. The diagram and its textual explanation ignore this possibility, but human nature suggests it is entirely plausible. Rather than presenting an innovative scenario, this example reflects the conventional male-norming seen throughout the rest of the document.

**US Civil Affairs Land-Force Doctrine**

If the unspoken male-normative nature of Joint CA doctrine creates an unnecessary blind spot in operational analysis, it unfortunately is replicated in land-force-level doctrine. Some land-force-level doctrine publications simply make no mention of operational gender considerations. Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-57.20, *Multi-Service Support Techniques for Civil Affairs Support to Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, ATP 3-57.30, *Civil Affairs Support to Nation Assistance*, and ATP 3-57.70, *Civil-Military Operations Center* fall into this category.²⁸

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In other CA doctrine, operational gender considerations register, but barely. Although revisions that include gender will be published soon, Field Manual (FM) 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, does not mention gender explicitly; it only notes, in the context of populace control in providing humanitarian assistance, that women may be in the category of at-risk persons who have greater needs than others.\(^{19}\) ATP 3-57.10, Civil Affairs Support to Populace and Resources Control, and ATP 3-57.60, Civil Affairs Planning, note only that “if applicable,” the gender of host-nation persons who might be helpful to the mission be included in their descriptions.\(^{20}\) These formulations, too, reflect the male-normative nature of these doctrinal publications and suggest considering the women in the local population is optional, perhaps even unnecessary.

**NATO Doctrine**

NATO doctrine does not reflect this gender blindness. Since the 2009 publication of the first bi-strategic command directive on gender in military operations, NATO has continued to refine requirements and expectations for dealing with the operational relevance of gender.\(^{21}\) Under Bi-Strategic Command Directive 040-001 (2017), NATO emphasized the need for Alliance members to increase the number of women they provide to NATO missions and to provide qualified staff to fill headquarters-level gender adviser (GENAD) positions and civil engagement teams to work with women in the field.\(^{22}\)

Sweden is a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, and its Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations has been appointed by NATO as the department head for education and training for gender in military operations.\(^{23}\) The Centre conducts courses on gender in operations for commanders and trains GENADs and tactical-level gender focal points—troops who work on gender matters as a collateral duty.\(^{24}\) Graduates of the Centre’s courses have served as gender advisers in deployed NATO headquarters.\(^{25}\) Further, in the civil affairs context specifically, the NATO-recognized CIMIC Centre of Excellence located in The Hague, Netherlands, has strongly advocated for the inclusion

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22. ACO and ACT, Integrating UNSCR 1325.
23. ACO and ACT, Integrating UNSCR 1325, 16.
of gender considerations into CA operations, supplying practical, deployment-tested examples and best practices.26

Doctrinally, NATO sees gender as “an integral part of” crosscutting topics—such as children, armed conflict, and WPS—in the operational environment and linked “to the social attributes associated with being male and female learned through socialization . . . [which] determines a person’s position and value in a given context.”27 Accordingly, “integration of gender perspective is a way of assessing gender-based differences of women and men reflected in their social roles and interactions, in the distribution of power and the access to resources.” This integration is operationalized in an overarching manner by making gender advisers and gender focal points responsible for bringing this perspective into the “planning, execution and evaluation processes of military operations.”28

Importantly, the CIMIC staff is still responsible for providing the commander the CIMIC estimate of the operational situation to be used in planning, which is a “comprehensive analysis of the civil environment, all its components and actors and their relationships (including an integrating gender perspective).”29 Thus doctrinally, the gender advisory staff will work with and through the CIMIC staff to incorporate gender considerations into the staff analysis for the commander. This civil-military cooperation effort, however, only produces gender analysis not an operational risk analysis of neglecting gender.

**Joint Australian Defence Force Doctrine**

NATO’s efforts to include operational gender considerations in its civil affairs doctrine mark a significant advance over the US CA doctrinal approach, but the Australian Defence Force outpaces even NATO’s efforts in many instances. Australia, which has an individual partnership arrangement with NATO, has taken the lead in efforts to incorporate the operational relevance of gender into both nonkinetic and kinetic military operations.30

The ADF has established its own GENAD training course, which allows it to develop a bench of deployable gender advisers to assist in operations, and its Peace Operations Training Centre has conducted weeklong gender seminars for mixed civilian and military audiences.31

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The ADF provided course materials to assist the United States in developing and conducting its own operational gender course. The ADF has ensured the role of the gender adviser and the operational relevance of gender figure prominently in the large-scale biennial training exercise it holds with the United States, *Talisman Saber*. Finally, the ADF has provided several senior-ranking GENADs to the multinational missions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The ADF has undertaken a whole-scale revision of existing joint doctrine including the operational relevance of gender. Australian Defence Force Procedures (ADFP) 5.0.1, ed. 2, *The Joint Military Appreciation Process* (August 2019)—equivalent to the US Joint Operation Planning Process—recognizes the role of the senior gender adviser in the command group and identifies the lack of appropriate gender proportions in the force. This doctrine makes special provisions for the protection of women as potential risk elements and provides a hypothetical scenario in which the senior gender adviser consults with the J5 plans staff as part of the framing and scoping process to clarify operational problems posed to the mission. Other ADF doctrine has been, or will be, revised.

Importantly, the ADF has also created new doctrine specifically focused on gender in military operations. These documents, Air Force Doctrine Note 1-18, *Gender in Air Operations*, and Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 2-18, *Gender in Military Operations*, are pioneering efforts to establish practicable and methodological approaches for leveraging gender matters in operations. In particular, JDN 2-18 outlines the role civil-military cooperation units can play in taking a gendered approach to joint and multinational operations.

Joint Doctrine Note 2-18 recognizes actions which effect people differently on the basis of gender can have a negative impact on mission efforts to establish peace or stability, and “[a] detailed analysis of sex disaggregated reporting and data using this gender lens can also provide the commander with a richer intelligence picture and deeper understanding of the operational environment.” In this regard, JDN 2-18 distinguishes between “gender analysis” and “gender assessment.” It notes although some organizations see the terms as synonymous, “the

ADF considers a gender assessment to be standing information about a context, whereas the gender analysis entails applying that information to draw out deductions relevant to an operational context.” Importantly, these deductions are not just the impacts military forces might have on local populations, but they are also aimed at “understanding how different sections of a population might affect all phases of an operation at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.”

Joint Doctrine Note 2-18 also recognizes that gender analysis has many purposes—grounding planning decisions on facts rather than attitudes and assumptions, identifying otherwise overlooked key community actors with whom to engage, and shaping “force protection and population engagement strategies.” Importantly, gender considerations are not to become planning orphans, relegated to some obscure annex at the back of the operations plan. Instead, “gender considerations and the key implications from the gender analysis should be incorporated into the main body of all operational planning products and documents to every extent possible.”

The factors to be evaluated in this analysis are holistic: population demographics, health demographics, power structures and leadership, control and access to resources, and sex- and gender-based violence in the area of operations. What the gender analysis seems to lack, however, is a rigorous methodology for its creation. In particular, a review of the figures used to explain the development of the analysis provide a cautionary note in the development of gender analysis as it pertains to operational risk—such analysis is crucial, but at the current time it is perhaps underdeveloped.

Although joint doctrine notes are not official doctrine in the Australian doctrine hierarchy, JDN 2-18 is surprisingly directive in terms of specific responsibilities for military leaders. Not only are commanders tasked with ensuring their staffs and units have “a clear understanding of gender issues and gender awareness at all levels,” they must also ensure gender expertise is integrated at all decision-making levels and applied in all planning and decision-making processes. Senior officers and specific commanders in the ADF are charged with taking steps to incorporate gender considerations in their staffs’ and commands’ work, including the vice chief of the Defence Force, the chief of joint operations, the service chiefs, and the Australian Defence College commander. These steps are already complemented by efforts underway to consult with intelligence staff to ensure better integration of gender considerations with intelligence processes.

In contrast with US civil affairs and NATO civil-military cooperation doctrine, the entry point for gender analysis in the Australian military

38. VCDF, Gender in Military Operations, 4, 6–7.
39. VCDF, Gender in Military Operations, 8, 9.
41. VCDF, Gender in Military Operations, 10–13.
42. Major Attila Ovari, e-mail to author, January 23, 2020.
appreciation process is through the intelligence staff (with the gender adviser assisting), rather than through the CIMIC staff, as part of the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment. The CIMIC staff is expected to undertake actual actions ensuring “funding is provided for specific gendered activities and programs,” such as key leadership engagement meetings, providing “engagement and liaison with local women,” and promoting projects geared toward local women.\(^{43}\) This division of labor reflects the tendency of GENADs to work at the operational level, while CIMIC staff tends to work at the tactical level.\(^{44}\)

**Australian Land-Force Doctrine**

Although ADF joint civil-military cooperation doctrine is not available in the public domain, Australian Army doctrine is. Published in 2017, Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD) 3-8-6, *Civil-Military Cooperation*, combines its discussion of gender perspectives with the crosscutting theme of WPS. On a full page, it explains the Australian National Action Plan on WPS and related UN Security Council Resolutions. It notes as an example that quick impact projects among the local population should be “sensitive to considerations of gender, ethnicity, age and vulnerability.”\(^{45}\)

In apparent contrast with the scheme set out in JDN 2-18, LWD 3-8-6 confirms civil-military cooperation is expected to contribute a civil estimate to the intelligence preparation of the battlespace, which includes an assessment of “operational risks from threat force civil space objectives and actions, as well as consequences of friendly force actions.”\(^{46}\) Land Warfare Doctrine 3-8-6 presents a thorough methodology for developing individual key leader engagement briefing packs. This methodology includes conducting a residual assessment to determine what risks remain after mitigation actions have been taken regarding the key leader and assessing the mission and its personnel, relationships with other individuals, and unintended consequences, such as physical damage and intangible second- and third-order effects.\(^{47}\) This appendix is complemented by an annex specifically dealing with nonkinetic-effect target risk assessment.\(^{48}\)

Interestingly, LWD 3-8-6 assesses the variables present in the area of operations using the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) rubric coupled with the Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events (ASCOPE) analysis approach, revealing perhaps a slight disconnect between Australian and US planning doctrine, since the US Army would ordinarily use PMESII-PT-style analysis in Joint planning.

\(^{43}\) VCDF, *Gender in Military Operations*, A-1, B-5.

\(^{44}\) Major Attila Ovari, e-mail to author, January 23, 2020.

\(^{45}\) Commander, Headquarters, 2nd Division (HQ 2nd Div.), *Civil-Military Cooperation*, Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD) 3-8-6 (Sydney, Australia: HQ 2nd Div., 2018), 42, 95.

\(^{46}\) HQ 2nd Div., *Civil-Military Cooperation*, 58.


\(^{48}\) HQ 2nd Div., *Civil-Military Cooperation*, 157–64.
and ASCOPE to determine civil considerations in METT-TC for mission planning. This may not make a significant functional difference in the Australian Defence Force since both GENADS at the operational level and CIMIC staff at the tactical level use this tool. Similarly, although none of the information collection categories for PMESII-PT analysis explicitly include gender, assessments of the humanitarian situation in areas of operations do include information about at-risk populations. From a multinational perspective, ASCOPE could include gender in the people category, but as noted earlier, US civil affairs planning doctrine only suggests nonmilitary personnel supporting CA in the area of operations have their gender noted, “if applicable.”

In sum, at the combined and joint levels, NATO and ADF CIMIC doctrine have taken significant steps to include the operational relevance of gender into planning and operations, recognize the role of gender, and emphasize educational and training efforts to address gender. At the ADF land-force level, some gender information already exists in civil-military cooperation doctrine, and importantly, it already engages with the idea of risk as an integral part of civil-military cooperation analysis. Although the United States has undertaken important educational and training efforts, largely at the combatant command level it appears, gender is missing in most Joint and land-force civil affairs doctrine. This gap suggests while gender considerations might get attention at the highest US military planning levels, any connections between such planning measures and what is actually occurring in any given area of operations are modest.

**Conclusion**

The absence in current US civil affairs doctrine of any meaningful description of the operational relevance of gender in CA planning and operations is puzzling. Some might say this absence is purposeful because the doctrine is intended to be gender neutral. This rationalization is weak because civil affairs doctrine at its heart is male-normative. Further, while gender neutrality is important in staffing a force and affording career advancement opportunities to qualified personnel, it is a very naive lens through which to view civilian-centric missions in an area of operations. Among the different cultures and societies deployed US military personnel are expected to work with, life is rarely gender neutral. In these situations, ostensible neutrality regarding gender is not an operational virtue—as stated earlier, it is gender blindness.

Blindness to the potentially different security needs of women and girls—such as physical, food, energy, and water security—in an area of operations is imprudent and detrimental to mission accomplishment and force protection. Presuming all security needs of a population are

52. HQDA, *Civil Affairs Planning*, B-12.
homogenous irrespective of gender is inconsistent with the granular level of cultural understanding special operations forces members, such as civil affairs personnel, are expected to achieve and exercise.53

Further, failing to address the operational relevance of gender in a meaningful way could lead to operational inconsistencies with some of our closest allies and thereby compromise interoperability in multinational missions. Such failures could also negatively affect crucial domestic support in host countries for these missions. Having identified the gap, however, and recognizing the operational risks presented by neglecting gender in US civil affairs doctrine, what is the remedy?

Some might be satisfied just to include content about women, peace, and security in CA doctrine. This would be a significant improvement, but it risks implementing what Dharmapuri has cogently described as the “add women and stir” approach—by itself, it is unlikely to result in any meaningful improvement in providing commanders, planners, and operators with actionable analysis they can use to further their missions.54 Instead, the doctrinal treatment of gender considerations should be purposeful. Addressing gender in doctrine should focus on developing gender analysis for the operational environment and then analyzing risks to the mission and personnel posed by neglecting to consider gender. This comprehensive approach would allow civil affairs units at the land-force level, for example, to use the C component of METT-TC to address the full range of threats posed to the mission in any civilian-centric area of operations.

Staff planners could develop and propose solutions to mitigate these risks, and commanders and operators could then weigh the benefits and costs of these solutions in the same context as other risks. Importantly, using gender-related content in doctrine to drive an analytical methodology that could be shared with valued allies and multinational partners would help build a bridge of common understanding in shared operational environments. In this way, a targeted focus on civil affairs doctrine could push positive systemic impacts across DoD efforts and help achieve US goals for peace and security as they relate to women.

ABSTRACT: The US military must prepare for the realities of densely populated areas as it plans and conducts campaigns. This planning must include considerations of soldiers’ health and well-being. An engaged analysis of urban battlespaces in the mid-twentieth and early twenty-first centuries highlights the need for essential updates to US military doctrine and training, particularly in the areas of civilian mass casualties and civilian noncombatants in the urban battlespace.

The accelerating urbanization of human society and the locations of recent conflicts indicate future combat will likely occur within urbanized environments or even in a rising megacity.1 Spurred by the Army’s Asymmetric Warfare Group and the United States Military Academy’s Urban Warfare Project, the US military is beginning to identify the implications of such warfare and the effects of the use of force in urban environments.2 As the 2017 Joint publication Urban Operations recognizes, military operations in cities are now “both inevitable and the norm.”3 Despite this increased focus, the military has largely neglected an engaged analysis of the most salient aspects of this emerging warfare challenge: the presence of large-scale civilian populations within the battlespace, the likelihood of mass civilian casualties resulting from such warfare, and the implications of these factors for military operations. In addition to the battles of Manila (1945) and Grozny (1994–95), the campaigns in Fallujah, Mosul, Raqqa, and Marawi remind us of the inherent harm to civilians and to civilian infrastructure resulting from urban warfare.4 The increasing population density of future urban battlefields, therefore, increases the probability of mass civilian causalities.

3 Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) and Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC), Urban Operations, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-06/Marine Corps Techniques Publication (MCTP) 12-10B (Washington, DC: HQDA/HQMC, 2017), 1-1.
Moreover, current US military guidance generally fails to examine fully the possibility adversaries waging conflict in cities will leverage the asymmetric advantage of at-risk civilians to counter America’s superior military firepower and technology. Instead, the presence of civilians and civilian infrastructure is treated as a secondary complication that can be adequately mitigated through campaign planning and execution.

The guidance also neglects direct and sustained investigation of the specific impacts civilian presence and harm on the battlefield pose to America’s operations and its fighting force. As one analysis of urban warfare explains, “the human dimension of cities” is essential to discussions of urban operations. Thus America’s military must begin preparing for the potential impacts of large-scale civilian populations on the military’s ability to initiate and maintain city-based campaigns. This preparation includes planning and conducting strategic, tactical, and combatant operations that preserve the health and well-being of servicemembers.

Urbanization

The demographic trends resulting from global population growth and migration have been well cited. The United Nations estimated more than 54 percent of the world’s population (4 billion people) resided in cities during 2015 and predicted the figure to increase to two thirds of the world’s population by 2050. By 2050 populations in global cities are expected to increase by 2.5 billion people, with close to 90 percent of this urban growth taking place in Africa and Asia—a daunting fact for US security planning.

This growth is transforming the scale and space of human geography. Urbanization increases population densities and city sprawl as more people and structures expand from the centers of cities. The area of urban land in developing countries is predicted to triple by 2030, greatly outpacing city population growth. Indeed, in just over a decade, the number of megacities with 10 million inhabitants is predicted to increase from 33 to 43. Given this growth in urban density and scale, US forces will likely be called upon to conduct major operations in urban environments that include small-sized towns or ultra-large megacities.

This trend coincides with another important aspect of US military operations—the shift in doctrinal focus from population-centric to

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9 UN-Habitat, World Cities Report 2016, 7.
10 UN-EconSocial, World Urbanization.
enemy-centric operations as embodied in the Army’s emerging focus on lethality and multidomain operations. The population-centric model of counterinsurgency, illustrated by the Army’s Iraq War–era adoption of Counterinsurgency, focused explicitly on protecting civilians as the key center of gravity for achieving victory.12

Lessons developed from this period were based in a counterinsurgency environment characterized generally by small-unit actions, often conducted outside of populated areas, in which US forces largely held operational initiative. In this environment, combined strategic, ethical, and legal imperatives led to prioritizing civilian protection, which resulted in relatively low numbers of civilian casualties from US operations.

In a post–Iraq War era increasingly focused on near-peer adversaries, the US military is shifting emphasis from victory through civilian support to victory through high-intensity, kinetic operations. In this new era, the US Army—the branch most likely to be called upon to carry out large-scale urban ground operations—has embraced a vision of warfare that is, in the words of former Army Chief of Staff and current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark A. Milley, “a perfect harmony of intense violence.”13

Under this new operational focus, US commanders emphasize “sharp” war, force, and speed to annihilate the enemy even when it is embedded in civilian populations. Civilians, conversely, are no longer perceived to be the enemy’s center of gravity but are secondary to kinetic-based efforts.14 Such a shift is exemplified in the 2017 Army publication of Field Manual 3-0, Operations, which envisions future campaigns to be “more chaotic, intense, and highly destructive” than the conflicts of recent decades.15 In short, in the post-counterinsurgency era, civilians are no longer the primary consideration for US forces on the battlefield, and US commanders will likely conduct operations accordingly.

Such a shift will exacerbate the harm already experienced by civilians in urban operations. The battles of Mosul (2016–17), Ramadi (2006), and Raqqa (2017) reveal even conflicts in which combatants attempt to limit civilian casualties inherently generate high levels of noncombatant fatalities. These conflicts demonstrate limitations advanced, professionalized militaries face in protecting civilians in high-intensity urban combat. As these examples show, precision strike capability and law of armed conflict (LOAC)-based operational planning can reduce

but not prevent significant harm to civilians in densely populated urban terrain.

Despite a focus on limiting civilian casualties in the campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), independent estimates have found 8,000 to 13,000 civilians have been killed by US-led coalition operations since 2014 (coalition forces have confirmed the deaths of 1,359 civilians). Similarly, a report by the International Committee of the Red Cross found urban operations in the counter-ISIS campaign accounted for eight times more civilian fatalities—78 percent of all civilian deaths—than nonurban combat. These examples preview urban conflicts to come, revealing the extent to which high-intensity urban warfare inherently produces harm for civilians and destroys civilian infrastructure.

Implications

The infliction of harm on civilians in urban warfare creates significant strategic, operational, and tactical implications for US operations and has specific effects on the mental and psychological well-being of the military’s fighting force.

Strategic Implications

High-density populations and the likelihood of mass civilian harm have the potential to constrain the military’s ability to initiate and sustain urban campaigns. This effect has been well-documented and is outlined only briefly here: large-scale civilian casualties influence global public opinion and can shape strategic decision making for the use of force. Such influence has been exemplified in the Israeli Defense Forces campaigns in Gaza, for instance, or in the US military’s first Fallujah campaign during the Iraq War.

In Fallujah the potential for mass civilian casualties and concerns about Iraqi leadership support contributed to the George W. Bush administration’s April 2004 decision to halt the Marine Corps’ push into the city, delaying operations and ultimately necessitating a second major campaign in November 2004. Additionally, in an increasingly legalized global environment, civilian casualties will be the subject of greater

reviews by international legal actors—and the use of “lawfare”—to constrain increasingly US strategic operations.  

With US forces operating more frequently in urban environments, the potential for mass civilian casualties—and the resulting domestic and international opposition such casualties can produce—will constrain the military’s capacity to initiate and sustain major urban campaigns.

**Operational and Tactical Implications**

More directly for US military personnel, the presence of civilian populations and the potential for mass civilian casualties will impact the military’s ability to conduct kinetic operations. These impacts include repercussions for operational planning, intelligence collection and analysis, targeting, and legal review. Additionally, high-density civilian populations shift the balance of risk in force employment for commanders and combatants, influencing the operational pace and freedom of maneuver.

Urban warfare requires combined arms integration of ground and air forces at all levels of operations, which necessitates intricate coordination that is difficult to achieve in the easiest of operational environments. Because legal, ethical, and political factors generally lead US commanders to limit civilian casualties, dense civilian populations significantly complicate operational and tactical planning necessary for such integration. Thus the congested nature of the urban battlespace requires commanders devote significant resources and time to determine appropriate, feasible courses of action to minimize loss of civilian life.

Such operations also place high demands on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection and analysis capabilities required to map the urban battlespace and accurately distinguish civilians and civilian objects from enemy combatants and objects. The intricate infrastructure of cities combined with complex human terrain further increases these demands.

The complex battlespace of urban warfare, including the density of structures and line-of-sight obstructions, similarly complicates targeting and executing ground- and air-based fires, creating challenges for target identification, communication, and command and control. Urban settings hinder positive identification of targets, and the dense infrastructure increases the propensity for collateral damage. Such infrastructure creates particular problems for close air support and indirect fire.

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25 ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-10B, I-8, I-9.
Additionally civilian-dense environments test the military’s capability to conduct effective operational legal review. Under the “precautions principle” of LOAC, commanders are obligated to conduct operations in a manner that minimizes civilian casualties. The sheer number of civilians and civilian objects in the urban battlespace, along with the fast-paced, decentralized nature of tactical urban combat, can strain the ability of judge advocates general to provide effective legal guidance for targeting and operations.

Finally, the potential for high levels of civilian casualties in densely populated areas can fundamentally influence the ability of US commanders and combatants to balance the risks of employing force—a balance I call the combatant’s trilemma. Every commander and combatant faces a crucial force employment calculation based on balancing three fundamental values: military advantage, force protection, and civilian protection. Military advantage, as defined under LOAC, is the goal of achieving military objectives during combat. Force protection is the goal of protecting friendly forces from attack or loss. And civilian protection is the goal of protecting civilian lives by limiting direct targeting and indirect, collateral damage. These principles lie in inherent tension with each other, making it impossible to prioritize one without impacting the other.

Civilian-dense environments hold major implications for influencing this trilemma—balancing civilian protection against the goals of military advantage and force protection. Force employment calculations derived in less dense environments, such as those that predominate in Afghanistan and Iraq, shift significantly in urban, civilian-dense environments where operations can inflict much greater harm on civilian populations.

The presence of large numbers of civilians in the urban battlespace may influence operational and tactical US commanders and combatants in varying ways. Embracing the values of military advantage and force protection, some commanders and combatants will prioritize military objectives and security over civilian protection, accepting increased risk to the civilian population. Anecdotal evidence and combatant surveys have revealed combatants generally prioritize force protection over military advantage and civilian protection, and combatants in

high-threat environments often revert to using firepower to reduce risk to friendly forces.29

During the Iraq War, for instance, US forces in Fallujah responded to stiff insurgent resistance by shaping the battlefield with direct and indirect fire, clearing insurgent threats by preemptively destroying everything in the path of US infantry forces.30 Such tactics can limit US losses but increase risk to civilians on the ground, ultimately creating further strategic and operational impacts.

Conversely, other commanders and combatants will oppose increasing risk to noncombatants, instead placing greater priority on civilian protection and reducing emphasis on military objectives or force protection. In the former case, US commanders will alter or forego military actions with high risk of collateral damage to shield civilians from harm. In the latter case, US commanders will expose friendly forces to greater risk to mitigate collateral damage.

In both cases, these outcomes can reduce freedom of maneuver or operational pace, impacting the military’s ability to achieve battlefield objectives. Both responses—prioritizing or de-emphasizing civilian protection—show large-scale civilian populations and the potential for mass civilian casualties produce significant impacts for commanders and combatants that complicate operations.

These factors—complexity of city environments; demands of planning, targeting, and operations in confused urban warfare; and balancing risk between civilians and combatants—together significantly impact US military tactical operations in urban battlespaces.

Combatant Implications

Finally, civilian populations and the potential for mass civilian casualties can directly affect the mental and psychological well-being of the military’s fighting force.31 It has been almost 50 years since large numbers of US combatants have been exposed to warfare with engagements resulting in hundreds or thousands of civilian casualties. The mass civilian casualties inflicted during the Vietnam War produced significant psychological trauma for a generation of servicemembers. Future urban combat operations and resulting civilian casualties have the potential to produce similar trauma.32

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Recent medical and psychological studies outline the psychological trauma produced by the killing of civilians or the exposure to civilian casualties. Such harm manifests in two different dimensions. First, harm to civilians can cause significant mental trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in combatants: such trauma has been widely documented in US veterans from conflicts in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and this trauma generates long-lasting effects for the psychological well-being of many servicemembers.33

Second, urban warfare can produce moral trauma, or moral injury, which can result from exposure to civilian casualties or acts that “transgress deeply held moral beliefs.” 34 While this class of mental harm is only beginning to be understood, emerging research shows it can produce negative health effects similar to PTSD. The potential for this harm is exacerbated by the Army’s failure to prioritize training in the ethics of killing, which can result in subsequent confusion over the morality of participating in violent acts in combat.35

Military campaigns and mass civilian casualties in urban environments may produce significant psychological harm for large many servicemembers—harm that potentially lasts for years or even decades following combat. Thus the US military must prepare for the impact of mass civilian casualties on operations as well as its combatants.

Military Guidance

Military doctrine on urban warfare generally inadequately examines the impact of dense civilian populations and civilian harm directly. Doctrine is a vital aspect of how military organizations conceptualize operations and the employment of force, helping to develop common perspectives and frames of reference that serve as guidance for action.36 Doctrine is not intended to establish fixed rules or one-size-fits-all checklists for action; instead, the goal of doctrine is to foster intellectual tools for accomplishing organizational tasks that respond to challenges in security environments.

Reflecting this, current US military operational guidance primarily emphasizes maneuver and operations within urban environments, with an obvious focus on achieving military objectives and some discussion on protecting US forces. The picture such guidance paints, however, is one where civilians are secondary considerations.

on the battlefield, if considered at all. (Importantly, this article primarily examines US military doctrine on combined arms operations, particularly operations involving the application of ground forces in urban warfare.)

The current Army-Marine Corps urban warfare manual, ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-10B, avoids an in-depth review of the civilian-dense battlespace, limiting its brief guidance to advice on analyzing risk to civilians, minimizing collateral damage, and separating combatants and noncombatants. Similarly, Army manual Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain echoes the brief focus of ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-10B on minimizing collateral damage, omitting a direct, sustained examination of the role of civilians in operations, targeting, or other aspects of combat.

While not focused specifically on such warfare, ATP 3-21.8, Infantry Platoon and Squad, does examine tactical aspects of urban operations. Such review, however, focuses on small-unit tactics and does not directly examine the role of large-scale civilian populations in urban combat. The Army training circular Training for Urban Operations does proscribe the use of civilian in specific training exercises. But as noted elsewhere, existing US military urban warfare training sites lack the scale and density to simulate adequately realistic urban operations scenarios.

This neglect is also evidenced in the Army’s newest version of its capstone doctrine publication Field Manual 3-0, Operations, which similarly reflects the shift from population-centric to enemy-centric warfare. The new version of the manual eschews direct exploration of civilian harm or collateral damage, eliminates a section on the law of war and rules of engagement, and decreases its references to noncombatants from 21 in the 2008 edition to 5 passing references in the 2017 edition.

Perhaps more tellingly, the newest Army guidance on conflict, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, similarly overlooks the role of civilian populations in influencing US operations. The document devotes some analysis to urban operations, focusing on developing “the capability to conduct Multi-Domain Operations in dense urban terrain.” It fails, however, to address civilians, collateral damage, or other vital aspects of combat in civilian-dense environments. In 102 pages of analysis, the document makes only minimal reference to civilians on the battlefield.

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37 ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-10B, 2-4, 2-7.
42 HQDA, Operations, 3-0; and Mahanty and Shiel, “Protecting Civilians.”
43 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, xi, D-1–D-6.
The Marine Corps Reference Publication 12-10B.1, *Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain*, likewise provides limited guidance. The chapter on “Noncombatant Considerations in Urban Operations” does note civilians “can have a significant impact on the conduct of military operations” and “greatly impede tactical operations.” But it sketches only brief operational guidance on conduct regarding civilians and the mitigation of civilian harm. It similarly eschews any discussion of the impact of mass civilian casualties on US forces in urban operations.

Of all existing US military doctrine on urban operations, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication 3-06, *Joint Urban Operations*, places the greatest emphasis on discussing the role of civilians in urban warfare. This publication devotes attention to civilians on the battlefield, addressing their role in planning, targeting, intelligence collection, and other aspects. While it does note “combat operations in urban areas may result in large ratios of civilian to military casualties,” it provides little guidance as to the implications of such mass civilian casualties for commanders and combatants. Notably, the publication is silent on the impact of large-scale civilian casualties on US forces as well as other aspects in which mass civilian harm can affect combat.

In total, existing doctrine provides minimal direction for handling the challenges of the populated urban battlespace. It provides almost no guidance on the impact of mass civilian casualties for US forces engaged in urban operations. How should US forces react to situations in which civilians are drawn to the battlefield and interfere with operations and fires? How should US combatants respond to the use of human shields, both voluntary and involuntary? How should tactical units handle mass civilian casualties, including those with life-threatening injuries, in the midst of combat operations? How should US forces prepare and implement population-control practices in “feral” cities in which basic governance structures have dissolved?

These are just a few examples of the complications large-scale civilian populations present on the battlefield. While doctrine is not designed to provide specific recommendations for every foreseeable operational context, civilian-related issues such as these and others vital to the urban battlefield cannot be found within current US military guidance.

Recognizing this situation, a 2017 RAND analysis of US Army readiness for urban warfare assessed the Army’s “doctrine, tactics, and training have not absorbed the lessons” of previous urban operations. The source of such neglect, according to the report, is the general

perception within the military that urban combat is “messy and destructive” and “something to be avoided.”

Indeed, high-intensity warfare among civilian populations is messy and destructive. For this reason, substantive doctrine and guidance are required to guide US forces in such contexts. Instead, US doctrine appears to be based on assumptions that US forces can generally avoid the problems of large-scale civilian populations by either bypassing population centers or, conversely, evacuating city residents prior to combat operations.

Such assumptions are flawed; history shows US forces must often fight where urgent crises require, and urban infrastructure, human behavior, and the fog of war often combine to limit forces’ ability to disperse civilians from cities before fighting begins. As such, it is increasingly likely adversaries will seek out combat in urban settings to maximize asymmetrical advantages, such as the presence of human shields, provided by urban environments. In light of such realities, urban warfare experts have increasingly raised the alarm at the deficient state of current warfighting doctrine.

Unfortunately, current US military guidance provides little direct analysis to forces that must confront the challenges of dense civilian populations in conflict, thus affirming the assessment by RAND: “The Army is not ready to fight in urban combat.”

Recommendations

Ultimately, this analysis paints a picture of a military coming to terms with a growing security challenge for this century. While the combined services can be commended for beginning to push urban warfare thinking forward, the central challenge of such operations—the presence of large-scale human populations—remains beyond direct and sustained analysis within US military operational guidance.

In light of the challenges examined above, what is the way forward? How can the US military begin to better prepare its forces to handle the challenges of operating in civilian-dense city environments? While there are a number of initiatives that can help mitigate the multifaceted problems presented by city warfare, three policy foci will produce the greatest benefit.

First, US military doctrine and guidance, particularly within the Army and Marine Corps, must be updated to apply the hard-won lessons of recent and historical cases of urban combat. As noted by defense

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48 Gentile et al., Reimagining the Character.
51 Gentile et al., Reimagining the Character, xiii.
experts, the military’s lack of understanding cities and their human architectures will eventually lead to strategic incoherence and operational failure. Importantly, the most salient aspects of city environments—high-density human populations and the likelihood of mass civilian casualties—must be directly and systematically incorporated into such warfighting doctrine. To provide effective guidance, US military doctrine on urban warfare must systematically address the various impacts outlined in this article and, in particular, the operational and tactical challenges civilians present in conflict.

Second, the US military must rapidly develop operational and tactical training that emulates as realistically and authentically as possible the challenges posed by urban operations in population-dense environments. Current training environments such as the Asymmetric Warfare Training Center at Fort A. P. Hill, the Shughart-Gordon training complex at Fort Polk, or even the Atterbury-Muscatatuck Urban Training Center in Indiana are too small and sparsely developed to simulate the true complexity and demands of large-scale urban operations.

As part of this initiative, the Department of Defense must allocate major resources to ensure training reflects the operational and tactical challenges of urban combined arms operations. Such training must be conducted in a large setting densely populated with enough “civilian” and “enemy” actors to approximate the chaotic urban terrain of global cities. Above all else, scenarios must provide intensive and realistic urban training to US forces.

Third, the military must begin systematically preparing servicemembers for the psychological and moral challenges complicating combat in civilian-dense environments. Far beyond annual PowerPoint briefings on LOAC, the Defense Department must develop programs that integrate the efforts of commanders, chaplains, behavioral health specialists, and even ethicists, philosophers, and other salient actors to prepare combatants for urban combat. Such programs will mitigate psychological harm resulting from combat operations. Additionally, US military leadership must prioritize reintegration efforts that mitigate psychological and moral harms combatants face upon returning home from urban warfare.

Conclusion

American military planners are beginning to understand that continued engagement in major combat operations is a matter of when, not if. In the words of General Stephen J. Townsend, former commander of the Combined Joint Task Force—Operation Inherent Resolve, “We’re going to see battle in megacities and there’s little way to avoid it.”

Given this growing likelihood of urban conflict in the coming decades, large-scale human populations and the potential for mass civilian casualties have significant implications for the US military. Strategic, operational, tactical, and combatant impacts will affect the military’s ability to achieve victory on the battlefield and the health and well-being of the fighting force. Current doctrine, however, omits the impacts of civilian populations and the potential for mass civilian casualties. The military has begun to focus on these new operational realities. But for the success of the military, US commanders must incorporate the information into their military doctrine and training before America is again called to engage in grueling urban combat.

ABSTRACT: The stability achieved by the US military in the European Theater of Operations after D-Day was the direct result of good military governance concurrently deployed with combat operations. The role of civil affairs in securing this stability has been under-emphasized in analyses of these operations. But an examination of the historical record of these events reveals the necessity of a skilled, effective civil-military effort through civil affairs/military government detachments, civil affairs specialty pools, and G-5 staff sections.

During the Second World War, the US Army gained extensive knowledge of stability operations as it fought through France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Germany. While stability operations do not receive the same attention as other features of the war, they were instrumental to Allied military victory. Indeed, stability in the rear areas, largely a function of good military governance, was important because it allowed the Allies to maximize combat power at the front.1

The US Department of War began preparations for military government in 1942, recruiting and training thousands of civil affairs soldiers for the liberation of Axis-occupied Europe and the invasion of Germany. For the vast majority of soldiers with backgrounds in civil administration, the training only further enhanced their skill sets for civil-military operations. They served in civil affairs staff sections (G-5) within all major headquarters, provided specialty expertise in large civil affairs pools, and implemented military government in task-organized detachments.2

Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower keenly appreciated the value of the civil-military mission for the war effort. Speaking to civil affairs soldiers a month before D-Day, he explained:

You have got to get the rear areas organized—electric lights, roads, and supply—and you must keep them working and get them restored as quickly as possible to some semblance of peacetime standards, so that they can support to the utmost the armies that are fighting at the front. You must take that responsibility for dealing with civilian affairs, whether it is restoring public utilities or helping a nursing mother who cannot get milk, and if you
don’t do your job, the armies will fail [emphasis added]. A modern army is of great depth in the field. The fighting front of an army is a fringe of a tremendous organization. . . . You are part of an Allied team. Always remember that. Because your section of the army is called “Civil Affairs” you must not make the mistake of thinking you are politicians.³

With three major campaigns as Supreme Allied Commander behind him, Eisenhower understood that creating stability throughout the great breadth and depth of northwest Europe would be a colossal effort—and it was. During active combat operations, security activities largely defined stability operations though the line between security and stability often became blurred. For instance, restoring governance, law and order, and the economy in local communities enhanced stability, but at the same time it secured military lines of communication and supplies from civilian interference. Regardless, the establishment of military government was the most assured means for achieving stability in the theater rear zone.⁴

This article explores the nexus between military government and the achievement of stability in the European Theater of Operations. First, it recounts the War Department’s rationale for stability as it related to military necessity. Second, the article reviews task organization considerations, which justified the investment in military government. Last, it examines the implementation of stability tasks by civil affairs/military government (CA/MG) detachments. Accordingly, this article argues stability was not a by-product of combat operations; rather, it was the fulfillment of a considerable civil-military effort.

The Rationale for Stability

As the War Department recognized early, the war would lead to the occupation of territory resulting from the liberation of enemy-controlled countries and direct invasions of Italy, Germany, and Japan. The War Department reasoned that military necessity, along with international law and humanitarian obligations, prescribed the employment of military government for occupied territories. Doctrinally, military necessity encompassed all activities in occupied territories that facilitated the successful prosecution of military operations and swift termination of the war.⁵

Since a military invasion disrupted local civil government, international law obligated occupation forces to assume the functions of civil authority, including the establishment of security and public


order; resumption of essential services; the provision of sustenance, potable water, and medical care; and the restoration of the local economy. Due to political sensitivities, the Allies described stabilization activities in liberated countries as “civil affairs,” and in enemy countries as “military government.” But in execution, these activities were virtually indistinguishable.

While the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration initially wanted civilian agencies to administer occupied territories, senior War Department leaders and Eisenhower successfully argued the overlapping authorities of multiple civilian agencies undermined efficiency and unity of effort, thereby compromising military necessity. The purpose of military government was to impose temporary control of the populace in order to prevent civilian interference in military operations, disruptions to the lines of communication, pilferage of supplies, and civil unrest. In the end, both the Roosevelt administration and the War Department agreed once hostilities ended, military government would transition to civil control at the earliest opportunity.

For Operation Overlord, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) adopted a different organizational approach to civil-military operations than in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, where Allied military governments were ad hoc arrangements, meager in numbers, and underresourced. Informed by these experiences, SHAEF created a sophisticated civil-military mechanism: numerous, well-organized CA/MG detachments; civil affairs staff sections (G-5) in each division, corps, army, and army group headquarters as well as at SHAEF; and a large civil affairs specialty pool.

On a practical level, the establishment of military government permitted Eisenhower to optimize ground forces at the front thereby reducing the traditional need to detach units for garrison and security duties along the lines of communication. Additionally, military government pursued two supporting goals. First, it sought to minimize the diversion of military supplies and resources to indigenous populations by restoring self-government, public safety, and the local economy.
Second, it sought to utilize indigenous resources to support military activities, such as abandoned supplies and equipment, local labor, and human intelligence. Arguably, these efforts in combination contributed to the massing of sufficient combat power along the German frontier for the final offensive.

**Task Organization Considerations**

Graduates of the US School of Military Government and the Civil Affairs Training Schools program reported to the European Civil Affairs Division in Shrivenham, England, for assignments to CA/MG detachments, G-5 staffs, and the specialty pools. For field deployments on the continent, the European Civil Affairs Division assigned detachments to companies within three European Civil Affairs Regiments (ECAR). Designating the 1st ECAR for France, SHAEF then earmarked 2nd and 3rd ECAR for Germany. Experience in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations demonstrated CA/MG detachments should receive logistical support directly from tactical units operating in their areas of operation. This proved prudent since the ECARs were unable to provide logistical and often other support due to the geographic separation between ECAR companies and their assigned CA/MG detachments, especially during fluid operations.

To underscore military government as a command responsibility, SHAEF established civil affairs staff sections (G-5) throughout the military echelons of command to administer the following functional areas:

- internal affairs: local government and civil administration; public safety; education and religion; postal, telephone, and telegraph services; public health; information and public relations; and monuments, fine arts, and archives
- economics: food and administration, civilian requirements and allocations, price control and internal trade, imports and exports, labor (manpower), transportation, and public utilities
- dislocated persons, refugees, and welfare: liaison officers and welfare agencies (that is, international organizations,

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nongovernmental organizations, and indigenous populations and institutions if available)

- legal: counsel, courts, and prisons
- finance: public finance, financial institutions, currency, foreign exchange, financial intelligence, accounts and audits, and property control
- reparations and restitutions

The G-5 staff advised commanders on stability policy; issued theater stability policy directives, proclamations, and ordinances; formulated and reviewed stability plans; and supervised the implementation of plans and policies. Further, the G-5 staff harmonized stability activities with military plans, ensuring tactical units interacted with and supported CA/MG detachments operating in their immediate areas of operation.

The CA/MG detachments were the workhorses of military government, operating in local communities, districts, and provinces. Commanded by either a major, lieutenant colonel, or colonel, they were tasked and organized for local conditions, focusing on the following functions:

- local government administration
- public safety: police, fire, and civil defense
- public health: medical facilities, casualty evacuation, burial, and disease prevention
- public utilities: energy, water, sewage, communications (for example, postal and telephone), transportation, and refuse disposal
- public welfare: food, water, shelter, and refugee control
- legal: judiciary, claims, and prisons
- fiscal: banks, post offices, and depositories
- labor: burial, road clearance, building repairs, and supply in support of military operations

The size of a CA/MG detachment varied according to the level of government administration and the size of the population. While the average size was eight soldiers for towns, detachments for major cities

15. USFET, Civil Affairs and Military Government, 6–10; and Komer, Civil Affairs and Military Government, I-11.
17. Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military Government, 22.
would number well over 100 personnel. For Operation Overlord, initial CA/MG detachments received pinpoint assignments in the Normandy beachhead. As the beachhead developed, detachments expanded their jurisdictions to cover several towns within a district. Once the front moved onward, particularly after the breakout of Normandy (Operation Cobra), specific CA/MG detachments remained in their assigned areas, serving in the corps and army rear zones and eventually the theater Communications Zone. Follow-on CA/MG detachments staged in the beachhead, observing and assisting deployed CA/MG detachments, and then followed along in the wake of the US military to establish immediate stability along the lines of communication.

To create efficiencies, the SHAEF G-5 staff established a specialist pool for temporary assistance to CA/MG detachments and SHAEF country missions. The pool of personnel possessed unique skills of particular concern to the occupied country as a whole or a region of the country. Some specialists deployed to address technical problems beyond the expertise of CA/MG detachments and returned to the pool once they had rendered assistance. Through the SHAEF country missions, other civil affairs specialists helped provisional governments reestablish national functions.

Designed by SHAEF, country missions assisted provisional governments of liberated countries and later imposed military government on Germany. Incidentally, Italy had no country mission. After Italy surrendered and joined the Allies, Allied military government regarded those portions of Italy under Allied control as liberated. Since the Italian government lacked ministers and civil servants until the liberation of Rome, Allied military government administered the government. Also, SHAEF country missions published country handbooks to familiarize CA/MG detachments with Allied policies and facts about the assigned country. SHAEF expected the country missions to govern assigned countries until a national government assumed responsibility or, in the case of Germany, until civilian agencies assumed responsibility. As long as the conflict raged, their primary mission was to support the war effort with host-country resources. As an index of greater tactical cooperation, country missions fell under the command and control of the senior military headquarters in the area of operations.

19. USFET, Civil Affairs and Military Government, 29, app. 1, 1; and Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 678, 742–45.
22. Ziemke, Occupation of Germany, 149–53.
23. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 14–15, 17, 769, 790; Ziemke, Occupation of Germany, 18–20; and Zink, American Military Government, 59.
25. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 677–78; Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military Government, 13–14, 18, 26; and USFET, Civil Affairs and Military Government, 50.
For the final offensive into Germany, SHAEF envisioned the need for hundreds of military government detachments following closely behind the Allied offensive and deploying into predesignated towns and cities like the unfurling of a giant carpet—the Carpet Plan. In addition to the regular military government detachments, special mobile teams (that is, I detachments) comprised of three officers and five enlisted soldiers in two jeeps with trailers, accompanied divisions to establish immediate stability in urban areas as a stopgap measure. They were followed by temporary military government detachments during the duration of the invasion and then by permanent MG detachments for the postwar period.

Following Germany’s surrender on May 7, 1945, the widely dispersed US military units and military government detachments in northern and eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Austria withdrew to the US zone of occupation under the Static Plan. Under the authority of SHAEF’s successor, US Forces European Theater, the Third and Seventh Armies became the Eastern and Western Military Districts, and their G-5 staff sections transformed into the Office of Military Government for Bavaria and for Baden-Württemberg, respectively. In accordance with occupation policy, US Forces European Theater reduced the number of military government detachments (to a total of 269 detachments) and enlarged the size of detachments commensurate to their new mission.

It is noteworthy no civilian agency ever relieved the US military government of the occupation mission during or after the war. Accordingly, the Office of Military Government for Germany, United States “civilianized” the mission by separating military government from the US military command and replacing military personnel with civilians—many of them demobilized civil affairs personnel.

**Implementation of Stability Tasks**

Civil affairs/MG detachments served as the primary instrument for the establishment of local order and security while tactical units focused on combat operations. These detachments accompanied combat troops in the initial waves of the invasion, establishing immediate stability in ports, towns, and cities. This section explores the manifold security tasks CA/MG detachments undertook to stabilize their assigned areas.

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Aerial bombing, indirect fire, and ground combat inflicted significant damage and casualties in towns and cities and caused psychological paralysis among the inhabitants. As a result, the initial task of CA/MG detachments was to spur local authorities into action and to prioritize emergency efforts. Just as important, the implicit aim of detachments was to provide a psychological boost to the citizens, restoring confidence, optimism, morale, and hope for the future. Accordingly detachments sought to avoid the appearance of charity; instead they strove to create economic self-reliance and preserve self-dignity. In this manner, military government minimized the diversion of supplies, funding, and other resources from the primary military effort.

An incoming CA/MG detachment established its military government headquarters in the town hall or a suitable nearby facility and raised the American flag to designate its presence. The detachment commander met with or appointed a new mayor, directing him to disseminate the theater commander’s proclamations, directives, and ordinances, as well as prompting the resumption of local government. At the same time, the public safety officer met with or appointed a new chief of police to reestablish police authority. As a principle, military government governed indirectly whenever possible, limiting its activities to supervising empowered officials.

Upon entering a town, the CA/MG detachment would conduct surveys on the state of local government, shelter problems, medical issues, food conditions, and available potable water as part of its initial report to the parent G-5 staff. In response, the G-5 would dispatch medical personnel, rations, material, and civil affairs technical specialists to the communities most in need. This approach sought to minimize waste and optimize the use of limited resources.

Identifying the availability of human capital was essential for local recovery as well as supporting military operations. The CA/MG detachment conducted a census to determine population size, available labor, and important professionals such as doctors, nurses, lawyers, judges, and bankers. The issuance of ration cards for food distribution provided detachments with an accurate way to gather census information. Establishing a labor pool by age, gender, and skills, all under the control of the mayor, provided a readily available resource for myriad tasks in support of the war effort. Greater knowledge of the local

31. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 198.
professionals permitted the CA/MG detachment to draw upon their capabilities as well.35

The CA/MG detachment identified, organized, and supervised the labor details, such as longshoremen, burial parties, infrastructure repairs, and rubble clearance, in support of military activities. While the detachment provided funds from local banks or G-5 currency reserves, it was important in terms of legitimacy for the local government to pay the salaries of officials and labor details.36

Disease and potential epidemics presented a major risk to Allied soldiers, the populace, displaced persons, and refugees. Civil affairs/MG detachments conducted health inspections to determine medical needs and identify diseases. Infectious diseases such as typhus, malaria, venereal disease, and cholera were prevalent during the war, so quick responses to outbreaks staunched epidemics. From the experiences in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, medical specialists undertook preventive measures such as inoculations and DDT dusting stations to kill lice. Civil affairs/MG detachments sought out local doctors to assist in preventive measures and prompted the G-5 staffs to search for doctors in prisoner of war camps to obtain their immediate release.37

Reestablishing law enforcement in local communities was critical in order to relieve tactical units and military police of security tasks. Under the supervision of the CA/MG detachment, the chief of police reestablished an active police presence in the community. The detachment vetted all police to eliminate Fascist, Nazi, corrupt, and incompetent police officers. Often, the detachment authorized the recruitment of police auxiliaries to secure banks, government facilities, post offices, cultural facilities, enemy supplies and equipment, and anything of value or importance from looting or wanton destruction.

Police provided traffic control and posted road signs for military traffic transiting the urban area in order to forestall congestion and wrong turns. Only in dire circumstances would the detachment request tactical units or military police for security tasks. A recurring problem was Allied soldiers disarming local police, so detachments requested tactical commands inform their soldiers the police were under Allied

control.\textsuperscript{38} Also, CA/MG detachments established curfews and placed movement limitations on civilians.

Further, the detachments established police checkpoints on surrounding roads to enforce security ordinances. They issued instructions for civilians to turn in weapons, cameras, binoculars, carrier pigeons, and radio transmitters, which the local police collected and secured. Detachments issued receipts for such items with the assurance that civilians could recover them once hostilities ended. These ordinances were necessary to limit civilian congestion on roads and to deter espionage. Once the security situation permitted, detachments instituted a pass system for civilians needing to conduct authorized business such as commuting to work and labor details. Detachments also ordered civilians to provide information on enemy weapons caches or armories, supply depots, abandoned equipment, and unexploded ordinance.\textsuperscript{39}

Generally prison conditions were atrocious, so CA/MG detachments inspected prisons and jails to ensure they conformed to international law and norms. As such, detachment leaders retained the prerogative to replace corrupt or incompetent wardens and guards. Additionally detachments issued instructions to tactical commands, forbidding units from arbitrarily liberating prisoners held in jails and prisons out of a misperception they were all political prisoners.\textsuperscript{40}

The CA/MG detachments and the G-5 staff sections also revived the judicial system, opening criminal and civil courts as quickly as possible. They sought out lawyers, judges, and legal clerks in local communities and scoured prisoner of war camps for such individuals. United States military tribunals focused on cases that affected the military effort, such as the black market, curfew violations, theft of military supplies, and attacks on the military. The civil courts handled the majority of criminal and civil cases.\textsuperscript{41}

As a matter of policy, CA/MG detachments closed banks, post offices, and other financial institutions to prevent withdrawals by the enemy government, criminal organizations, and anxious civilians. Once detachments accounted for the financial assets, they reopened these facilities at the earliest opportunity for the resumption of local government and economic activities. Accordingly, local governments renewed revenue collection as the local economy recovered. Often, detachments advanced money to pay the salaries for civil servants, police, firemen, and labor, so as to keep government running and to


\textsuperscript{40} Komer, \textit{Civil Affairs and Military Government}, II-39–II-40.

restart the local economy. Nonetheless, this “seed money” was only a temporary expedient until banking and revenue collection resumed.42

The black market proved to be a significant and continual problem throughout the war. Theft of army supplies deprived the military of scarce resources for the war effort. For example in Italy, an estimated 30 percent of incoming supplies were pilfered and sold on the black market.43 Detachments discovered Axis governments had disrupted local economies by diverting food, livestock, and equipment for their war effort. Farmers in particular hoarded food and sold it on the black market.

Thus the main goal for detachments was to create economic self-sufficiency in order to ameliorate humanitarian assistance. Detachments undertook measures to regenerate local economies, such as ensuring farmers and fishermen could get their products to markets, fixing prices temporarily to combat black market prices, and discouraging hoarding. Further, local police and military police executed raids on suspected black market rings to curb that practice.44

As a matter of restoring self-sufficiency and local economies, CA/MG detachments inspected public utilities, such as water, electricity, gas, and sewage, for damage and repair. At times, repairs were easily done once parts became available. In other instances, damage was more extensive and required expertise from the specialist pool. Nonetheless, these detachments sought to exhaust local resources and solutions before requesting assistance from the G-5 staff to limit dependency on the Allies and minimize a drain on Allied resources.45

Detachments inventoried captured supplies to determine the value of these supplies for supporting military operations, provided the G-5 staff section with the inventory lists, and notified the Counter Intelligence Corps of captured documents and mail. Generally, tactical commands placed the highest value on fuel and cargo trucks for immediate use. Detachments provided all other captured supplies and material not needed for the military effort, such as rations and medical supplies, to the local communities. It is noteworthy that detachments sold abandoned and captured equipment and tools to local farmers and business owners to prevent their use in the black market and also to give such items intrinsic value to the users. Detachments sent the proceeds for such sales to the US government to defray war costs.46

Detachments organized motor pools from abandoned vehicles to assist civilians with transportation or cargo lift needs. These motor

42. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 196–97.
44. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 463, 725; and Maginnis, Military Government Journal, 54–56.
46. Maginnis, Military Government Journal, 18, 60, 95, 103, 110, 150; Gunn, “Civil Affairs Detachment,” 77–78; and Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 147, 775, 810.
pools featured fuel points, garages, and mechanics at minimum cost. Additionally, detachments arranged for the repair of public transportation—buses, streetcars, and trains—as quickly as possible for commuters, and CA organized motor pools in Italy as well. 47

Local police intelligence on enemy officials, collaborators, criminals, and friendly resistance groups proved invaluable for CA/MG detachments and the Counter Intelligence Corps. Detachments met with resistance groups to gain their cooperation and assistance with the war effort. Paradoxically, while they provided invaluable assistance to the Allies, resistance groups proved the most disruptive to stability because they appropriated civilian property and undermined law and order in liberated areas. Hence, detachments and provisional government liaison officers persuaded these groups to disarm and demobilize. As a matter of patriotism, quite a few of them enlisted in the French and Belgian armies during the war. 48

Detachments interfaced with the fire chief, inspected fire equipment, and supervised the extinguishing of fires and rescue of people trapped in damaged buildings. Frequently detachment personnel prioritized firefighting to save lives, critical infrastructure, and issues of military necessity. As a matter of course, detachments arranged for the repair or replacement of fire equipment through the G-5 staff. 49

Detachments also assisted military units transiting through urban areas on the way to the combat front with temporary accommodations. Accordingly, they coordinated with the local authorities to identify facilities such as abandoned military posts, warehouses, and dormitories and established billeting offices to accommodate units. This service limited the displacement of civilians, potential looting, and incidental damage to civilian property. 50

Naturally the war resulted in the inevitable loss of and damage to civilian property, so CA/MG detachments duly investigated and provided restitution for valid claims. Often, Allied troops “requisitioned” civilian property, which prompted detachments and G-5 staffs to admonish tactical commands that such actions undermined relations between civilians and Allied forces. After all, civilian cooperation rested on the premise Allied liberators acted better than the Axis occupiers.

Going further, G-5 staff sections marked some towns in rear areas as off-limits, established joint police and military police patrols, and publicized the prosecution of miscreant soldiers to curb misconduct. As the agent of Army provost marshal authority, detachments also marked certain urban areas off-limits such as bordellos and bars, banned the consumption of alcohol in towns, and prohibited soldiers on rest

47. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 204, 207–8, 463, 810.
49. Maginnis, Military Government Journal, 9–10, 14, 158; Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 338, 813; and Ziemke, Occupation of Germany, 253.
and recreation from carrying weapons. Prompt attention to civilian sensibilities not only promoted good relations between civilians and the military but also supported economic recovery.\(^{51}\)

Another problem threatening military operations was the sudden multitude of refugees and displaced persons on roads. Many civilians simply sought to escape the fighting, but German troops also contributed to the congestion by deliberately forcing refugees and displaced persons toward Allied lines for the purpose of disrupting Allied offensive operations. In response, G-5 staffs diverted dozens of CA/MG detachments for refugee control, care, and swift repatriation. These detachments guided refugees and displaced persons to roads away from military lines of communication and accommodated them in abandoned military garrisons or temporary camps with shelters. There, refugees received rations, medical care, clothing, and transportation back to their home communities.

Whenever the security situation and transportation allowed, detachments collaborated with civilian agencies such as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to assist in refugee care. But generally detachments performed the lion’s share of processing for these people. Literally millions of refugees and displaced persons returned to their homes quickly as a result of the organizational abilities of these detailed detachments.\(^{52}\) Achievements of the CA/MG detachments were unassuming and largely unremarked upon by historians who devoted more attention to military operations and strategy. But the myriad problems they proved capable of resolving kept tactical units on task, maintained the demands of military necessity, and facilitated spectacular tactical and operational accomplishments by the US military.

**Conclusions**

While future conflicts are unlikely to match the magnitude of the Second World War, certain practices of military government are worthy of consideration. Foremost, task organized CA/MG detachments, CA specialty pools, and multifaceted G-5 staff sections were notable achievements.

The War Department initiated US training programs early in the war for civil affairs personnel earmarked for northwest Europe, highlighting not only military government and technical skills, but also language and cultural proficiency. In England, the European Civil Affairs Division continued their training, ran practical exercises, and task organized the CA/MG detachments for the anticipated missions.


By deliberately deploying CA/MG detachments with the invasion forces (both airborne and amphibious), US units were able to establish stability on the beachhead immediately. While control of the population was the immediate concern of CA/MG detachments, they also restored local governance, public order, essential services, and the economy. This approach prompted self-sufficiency, thereby minimizing the drain on Allied personnel, supplies, and equipment. Moreover, the detachments provided local labor, captured supplies and equipment, and intelligence to military operations. They served as Allied representatives to the local populace so as to bolster legitimacy and civil relations.

As the first responders for most nontactical incidents, CA/MG detachments addressed labor disputes, the care of refugees and displaced persons, and potential pandemics. International organizations (the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the International Red Cross Joint Relief Committee) and local government organizations could not operate on the continent due to the nonpermissive environment and logistical priorities. Thus CA/MG detachments repatriated the vast majority of refugees and displaced persons on their own. Today, the United States should anticipate circumstances, similar to those experienced by CA/MG detachments in World War II, will prevent the participation of international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and US Government departments and agencies.

Lastly, military government set the conditions for the postwar occupation of Germany and the recovery of Europe in general. While the postwar conditions in Germany presented a host of new challenges, the experiences and activities of existing military government entities provided a practical foundation for the next phase of postwar reconstruction. As such, military government conducted reconstruction, economic recovery, law and order activities, and political reforms. These long-term activities set the conditions for the European Recovery Program—the Marshall Plan—and Germany’s rehabilitation as a constructive European partner.
ABSTRACT: Contribution warfare removed the influence of Sweden's politics from the Afghanistan War (2001–14) and created learning conditions favoring case-specific, tactical lessons over the strategic ones. This article applies the concept of “contribution warfare” to analyze the lessons from Sweden's involvement in the war. The inconsistent application of this knowledge resulted largely from the political and operational realities of a small nation contributing to an alliance dominated by a single actor.

While Sweden was participating in the Afghanistan War (2001–14), the country’s elite strategists who advise the government on whether to commit troops and resources to combat and who direct the execution of military tasks identified and learned many lessons. Unfortunately the parliament, which decides whether to use force internationally, and the government, which proposes the use of force and controls the armed forces, has not applied the information consistently.

During the mission in Afghanistan, Sweden’s armed forces quickly institutionalized a new section in their headquarters to identify and disseminate lessons learned. This effort identified the lack of a clear political aim for participation in the war in Afghanistan as a shortcoming. But Sweden's participation in the United Nations (UN) intervention in Mali, which similarly lacked a clear political aim that could provide strategic guidance for the use of force, provides a telling example of a lesson Sweden identified but did not quite learn. Tactical-level involvement, however, continuously yields reasons to improve and case-specific lessons Sweden’s strategists can share throughout the armed forces.

Contemporary research often intertwines innovation and learning and roundly criticizes military organizations for failures in both areas.1 Explanations of innovation failure in the military vary from bureaucratic inertia, a mismatch of conceptions of military virtue, and the particular nature of innovations. Explanations of learning failure include a lack of

processes within the structure of the armed forces that support learning.\textsuperscript{2} Explanations of the relationship between organizational culture and outcomes in learning processes are also likely true.\textsuperscript{3}

Although culture explains inertia well, in the short term, it is a constant that does not explain inconsistency, especially in learning processes. Moreover, attributing the inconsistency between tactical and strategic lessons from the Afghanistan War to the culture of the Swedish armed forces does not explain the government’s decisions. Hence, this article considers the actions of Sweden’s strategic elites.

These strategists experienced inconsistencies in the organizational learning of the Swedish armed forces that can be explained by the inherent difficulties smaller partners encounter when making their voices heard in coalitions dominated by a single actor. In this structure, smaller partners cede the establishment of the coalition’s political aims to the dominant partner. When that occurs, smaller partners make participation their main task in the coalition’s war, thus conflating the ends, means, and ways of strategy. In such instances of “contribution warfare,” smaller coalition members do not allow political direction to influence their roles in war.\textsuperscript{4}

In this context, the proposition that wars are directed from the strategic perspective becomes flawed and strategic lessons can be neglected. If participation is the only aim, then no strategic lessons that can be applied to conventional wars of self defense can be learned.

Thus, the contribution of this article to the literature is twofold. First, it provides an empirical analysis of the lessons-learned processes of the Swedish armed forces beyond the typical examination of international interventions prior to the Afghanistan War. The most common situation, arguably, is the Congo crisis in the early 1960s.\textsuperscript{5} Second, rather than focusing on organizational culture—and, as many studies do, on tactical lessons learned—this article focuses on strategic lessons.

**Organizational Learning and Coalition Warfare**

The traditional, rationalist model of organizational learning presumes military organizations, through experiential feedback loops, can identify shortcomings, acquire support for proposed solutions, and provide solutions in documents such as doctrine or standard operating


procedures. This idealized version of organizational learning indicates Sweden’s learning process was compromised by inexperience with coalition warfare, including misunderstanding how Sweden would fit into modern coalition warfare.

The reality of contribution warfare effectively removed the influence of Sweden’s politics from the war, short-circuited its strategy, and created learning conditions that favored case-specific, tactical lessons over the strategic ones. This reality is important to understanding Sweden’s application of lessons learned from the campaigns in Afghanistan.

Following the traditional model of learning, it is possible to differentiate between two critical phases in organizational learning. First, the actor needs to recognize there is something to be learned, that is, there must be a process to identify lessons. Admittedly, strategists occasionally have incentives to be secretive regarding what they learn, therefore, this article may eschew some lessons. But there are also incentives to demonstrate that strategists lead a learning organization, which is, after all, an ideal in much of the current discourse.

Second, the actor needs to act upon such identification to assess appropriately the lesson as learned. Hence, learning involves the use of “new knowledge or understanding gained from experience or study to adjust institutional norms, doctrine and procedures in ways designed to minimize previous gaps in performance.” Evidence of such learning can be identified by changes to military doctrine, force composition or force behavior, strategic goals, or decision-making processes.

In the processes of identification and learning, there are numerous pitfalls. When identifying something as a lesson, an actor may make flawed inferences about what should be learned from a militarized crisis or a war. As Elizabeth Kier demonstrated, Germany, France, and Britain drew completely different conclusions from the First World War, and arguably, the Germans got it right on the tactical level.

There is also a risk that the actor will fail to identify any lessons at all. The British, for example, failed to identify the dangers of infantry line tactics and cavalry attacks from the American Civil War (1861–65), which resulted in tremendous loss of life during the early phases of the First World War. Moreover, bureaucratic inertia or misperceptions may result in lessons learned too slowly, even if they are rapidly identified—for example, British intelligence did not update its estimate of the Japanese preference for surprise attacks after Pearl Harbor, and thus failed to prepare the defenses of Singapore, which surrendered to Japanese assault a few months after Pearl Harbor.

8. Richard Downie, quoted in Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons, 6 (emphasis added).
An Asymmetrical Learning Environment

Peculiar circumstances created when small actors participate within asymmetrical coalitions dominated by a considerably more powerful military actor might also create inconsistencies between learning and applying lessons learned from warfare. A common assumption in most research on coalition warfare involves bargaining within the coalition. Although this bargaining does not occur on equal terms, all actors are at least equally interested in discussing the same things.10

This bargaining process, in turn, should lead to a situation in which resources are used more efficiently and according to the participating states’ caveats.11 But this ideal image of coalition warfare seemingly ignores the reality that actors within coalitions have different resources and different interests at stake. Consequently, small actors within asymmetrical coalitions realize the huge imbalance between their resources and the political aims of the war. Thus, they effectively cede space for political aims to more powerful actors in the coalition. Rather than employing force for political purposes, as the concept of strategy implies, they become force providers.12

As the process of ceding political aims to the powerful members of the coalition occurs, small coalition partners neglect the politics of war. The task becomes one of providing, not directing, force. In the absence of political aims, participation becomes both means and ends, thus short-circuiting the ends, means, and ways of strategy. For small partner nations, coalition wars effectively become contributory, rather than wars fought with unity of effort and with clear, jointly agreed upon, political goals. Notably, this scenario held true for member and nonmember states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alike during the Afghanistan War.13

This dynamic does not mean instrumentality is completely lost for the small coalition partners. It is, however, severely restricted and compromised. In fact, contribution warfare entails, and is reinforced by, the idea small coalition partners seek to acquire a reputation as a good ally to gain advantages from the dominating coalition partner in other areas.14 This concept suggests small partners contribute for political

purposes, and thus use force strategically. But most notably, the political purpose of appearing to be a good ally does not in any way direct the means or the ways of strategy. Hence, you can be a good ally regardless of what you contribute and regardless of how you operate: force is not directed by a political aim.

In the case of the conflict in Afghanistan, politics did not guide and direct the use of force. As a result, strategic elites of smaller coalition actors failed to learn strategic lessons from that conflict. Even if smaller coalition partners still have strategic choices to make, relinquishing the political aim of the war means operations lack strategic direction. The great variation of military behavior in Afghanistan or Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden proves this point.\(^{15}\) War, and the continuous learning and adaptation in war, becomes a military rather than political matter. Following the logic of smaller powers in asymmetric coalitions, we can now formulate some empirical expectations.

Above all else, if politics does not guide the use of force, we must expect only comfortable, fitting lessons drawn in ways that conform to a clear distinction between the learned tactical lessons and the unlearned strategic lessons. We can also expect the lessons learned will be case-specific, compartmentalized lessons, because only in cases of asymmetric coalitions and the resulting contribution warfare, do smaller coalition partners lack the political aims that influence the use of force.

Although other tasks for the armed forces of smaller coalition partners may very well be directed with clear political aims, the stakes associated with the lowly ambition of participating in a coalition make recognizing strategic lessons from that participation less important; doing so would suggest the war in question was important. Furthermore, we can expect meta-learning, that is institutionalized improvements in learning processes, only in such cases where the mandate or discretion of the new command or headquarters were limited to case-specific, tactical lessons.

Lessons Identified and Learned

The Swedish intervention in the Afghanistan War started in January 2002 with a small special forces unit in Kabul. The early entry into the war can be understood as a lesson learned from the Kosovo conflict when Sweden was late deciding to join the Kosovo Force. The delay in joining the NATO peace enforcement mission was a source of embarrassment for the government. Thus, Sweden was determined to avoid a similar delay after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States.\(^{16}\)


\(^{16}\) Lars Wikman, “Don’t Mention the War: Forging a Foreign Policy Consensus: The Case of Swedish Military Contributions to Afghanistan” (PhD diss., Department of Government, Uppsala University, forthcoming); and Wilhelm Agrell, *Ett krig här och nu* (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2013).
In 2006 when Sweden took control of the provincial reconstruction team in Mazār-e Sharīf in northern Afghanistan, the force consisted of lightly equipped infantry. But there were sizeable reinforcements, and just over 500 soldiers were present at any given time. But among the teams in northern Afghanistan, the Swedish armed forces unit eventually stood out due to its high percentage of combat-ready troops. The increased mechanization occurred as a tactical adaptation to a gradually deteriorating security situation and increasing insurgent activity in the Swedish area of responsibility around 2008–9. This approach resulted from a lesson learned in Tuzla, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 1994 when a company of Danish main battle tanks joined a Swedish battalion. “Walk softly but carry a big stick” was one of the lessons the Swedish armed forces learned from the wars in the former Yugoslavia.17

On the tactical level, the Swedish armed forces quickly identified risks to units and were equally proficient at finding institutional solutions to the challenges. Consistent with theoretical expectations, these learned lessons have not been applied in the context of conventional wars of self-defense. The lessons have been applied, however, in the context of international missions. Moreover, some tactical lessons learned have been identified as applicable only to operations in Afghanistan.

First, when improvised explosive devices (IEDs) became a serious threat for units in northern Afghanistan, the Swedish armed forces were quick to recognize the dangers and began developing counter-IED practices. In 2009 the armed forces issued a new manual on countering IEDs and increased the protection level of the battalion vehicles. Notably, the manual explicitly refers to Afghanistan or other potential international missions, recognizing the tactics are not valid in the context of defending Sweden against foreign threats.

One report from the Swedish Defense Research Agency observes the time between detecting a particular threat and implementing new tactics and delivering new threat-mitigation equipment was as short as 12 months during the most intense and violent phase of the war.18 Considering the rotation schedule required selecting and training soldiers more than a year prior to deployment, the 12-month development of a new capability is impressive.

Second, the armed forces introduced military observation team (MOT) Juliette, an all-female group of soldiers and officers created for intelligence purposes. This initiative arose from intelligence gathering being recognized as a critical activity in the Afghanistan War. When Colonel Bengt Sandstrom returned to Sweden from the conflict, he began to experiment with different solutions. After being selected to become the commander of the entire Swedish contingent, he built a consensus within the armed forces to improve intelligence by targeting Afghan women. Access to this population was easier for female than

male soldiers and MOT Juliette was launched in 2008, four years after its inception.\textsuperscript{19}

A crucial aspect for the argument advanced here is the lessons regarding quick applications of forces and innovation were not applied to defending Sweden. Consistent with contribution warfare, what happened in Afghanistan stayed in Afghanistan. At home, the major reorganization of the armed forces in 2009–10 followed different logic that was further accentuated by the Russian interventions in Georgia and Ukraine.\textsuperscript{20}

Rather than incorporating the effective counterinsurgency lessons from Afghanistan, the dominating tactical doctrine for Sweden’s defense was based upon maneuver warfare with mechanized units. Case-specific lessons were stovepiped, ensuring neither all-female squads, nor counter-IED lessons were included in exercises or planning for national defense. Since the introduction of gender in the armed forces was couched in terms of intelligence purposes and efficiency in peace support operations, applicability to the defense of Sweden appeared irrelevant, despite a recent surge in inequality arguments within the armed forces.\textsuperscript{21}

Third, at a more general, procedural level, when the security situation deteriorated in Afghanistan, the armed forces were relatively quick to institutionalize an organizational body to deal with lessons learned. During the wars in the former Yugoslavia, the army command provisionally organized a lessons-learned function to provide incoming commanders and units with updated information. But this organization had no standard operating procedures and no formal role in the training processes or planning procedures before the missions. This involvement changed after a 2007 review that identified the provisional nature of lessons learned as a problem.

In 2010 the armed forces institutionalized the lessons-learned function as a section at the headquarters that became a node in the planning process.\textsuperscript{22} In addition to requesting other reports from Afghanistan, the lessons-learned section ordered highly structured, reports from the units in Mazār-e Sharīf. These reports were then reworked and disseminated widely within the armed forces (rather than only to the incoming commander). Consequently, the lessons-learned section initiated and maintained a continuous tactical discussion.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{20} Olof Kronvall and Magnus Peterson, Svensk säkerhetspolitik i supermakternas skugga 1945–1991 (Stockholm: Santérus, 2005); and Håkan Edström and Dennis Gyllensporre, Svensk försvarsdoktrin efter kalla kriget: Fördröjde deseminer eller runna insiktet? (Stockholm: Santérus, 2014).
\item \textsuperscript{21} Robert Egnell, Petter Hojem, and Hannes Berts, Gender, Military Effectiveness, and Organizational Change: The Swedish Model (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014).
\item \textsuperscript{22} Jan Frelin and Ann Ödlund, Ett lärande försvar? Förutsättningar för Försvarsmakten erfarenhetsbantning, FOI-R–3420–SE (Stockholm: Försvarsanalys, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, 2012); and Försvarsmakten, Erfarenheter Afghanistan (Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, 2016).
\end{itemize}
throughout the armed forces. The section was also given an uncommonly open mandate to improve its own procedures.

Noteworthy, however, the mandate of the lessons-learned section was restricted to tactical improvements for international missions. Consequently, this stovepiping ensured tactical, technical, and conceptual lessons learned from Afghanistan would not enter the national domain and be treated as general lessons learned at the land warfare school in Skövde in southern Sweden, which develops the army’s defensive tactics. Then Swedish Army Chief of Staff Major General Anders Brännström stated it would be a problem if lessons from Afghanistan were allowed to dominate army tactics in the years to come: “Battle experience from Afghanistan is not valid elsewhere.”23 He concluded, “It is not the same kind of combat needed to solve the main task: the defense of the nation.”24

While the chief of staff may have had a point regarding specific tactics—in a war for national survival, Sweden would most likely not possess air superiority—this was not the first time Swedish tactics in international conflicts were ignored on the home front. Since veterans of the Congo crisis in the early 1960s were confronted with the same arguments upon returning to their regiments, something other than pure military rationalism seems to be at work here.

Fourth, the armed forces learned relatively quickly that they needed to become internationalized in a way the Cold War neutrality policy never had allowed. Over the course of the Afghanistan War, the number of Swedish officers embedded in international staffs and headquarters increased substantially. In 2001 there were only five Swedish officers in NATO staffs and headquarters. This presence quickly increased and peaked in 2011, reaching nearly 90 Swedish officers in NATO.25 As the Afghanistan War unwound, this number quickly decreased to less than 30 officers in 2015.

Under the logic of contribution warfare, embedding officers can be expected. Sweden did not have input into the political aims of the intervention, which were determined by the United States. Therefore, it is to be expected Sweden would embed as many officers as possible at lower levels of war in order to be efficient and influential as a coalition partner. But the decreasing number of embedded officers as the war ended suggests Sweden understood the need for internationalization as strictly connected to the conflict.

Oddly, these lessons seem to be understood as case-specific, despite Sweden officially declaring it cannot defend itself alone. Since 2009, the government has maintained solidarity: “Sweden will not remain passive if another EU Member State or Nordic country suffers a disaster or an

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23. Quoted in Roosberg and Weibull, Försvarsmakten efter ISAF, 76.
24. Quoted in Roosberg and Weibull, Försvarsmakten efter ISAF, 75.
attack. We expect these countries to act in the same way if Sweden is affected. We must therefore be able both to give and receive support, civilian as well as military.”

Fifth, the government, after much deliberation, instituted a Veterans Day in 2010 and a veterans policy in 2015. This lesson was slow in coming considering Sweden has been providing forces to UN missions, occasionally violent ones, since 1956. Arguably, the veterans issue was delayed due to entanglement with vested bureaucratic interests. Specifically, the armed forces and the government struggled with whether or not officers were the only veterans or if soldiers ought to be included too.

Despite the definitional problems, perhaps the greatest challenge to the idea of veterans was its inherent logic. Being a veteran implies an individual has experienced war, at great personal cost. This concept was incompatible with the idea of Sweden being at peace for 200 years. This state of mind also fed the logic of contribution warfare. Since the war in Afghanistan was not motivated by Swedish political interests and the military effort was not directed by Sweden’s political aims, it became difficult to embrace the idea that those who served in Afghanistan were veterans.

Finally, as Magnus Johnsson has demonstrated, three Swedish colonels took individual initiatives to institutionalize tactical lessons very informally between the component commanders. The *Troika*, as it became known, was in charge of the previous, present, and future Swedish force in Afghanistan. The group conceived the transition from mentoring and stability operations to counterinsurgency operations as a direct response to the increasingly hostile environment in northern Afghanistan in early 2009. Hence, through the informal structure of the *Troika*, the commanders continuously updated one another, utilizing the individuals’ experiences, which were also case-specific and tactical.

Lessons Identified and Not Learned

As we have seen, under the logic of contribution warfare, lessons learned from the Afghanistan War are necessarily case-specific, not relevant for the defense of Sweden, and consequently stovepiped. Tactical lessons identified but not learned also confirm institutionalized processes to apply lessons learned have a clear, but limited capability to influence army tactics in general. By examining the nature of the lessons

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identified but not learned, we can see whether these can be accounted for by the particularities of contribution warfare.

At the strategic level, the ambivalence to learning from the Afghanistan War becomes quite clear. In particular, two biases derived from contribution warfare led Swedish strategic elites to learn effectively only the comfortable lessons, while merely identifying others: understanding of the problem scopes the learning as well as the legitimacy and appeal of solutions. First, learning occurs within the boundaries set by what is understood as the problem. This condition clearly aligns with contribution warfare acting as a screen through which world events are filtered.

In the Swedish case, tactical issues are understood as problems that can be solved. Strategic issues, however, are not understood to be major problems since strategy, the pursuit of political ends with military means, was never allowed to dictate the military effort. Moreover, the vague political aim of appearing to be a good ally does not provide clear political direction for the employment of military force.

A series of studies convey Sweden understands itself as an apolitical actor in international interventions. 29 When there is no political end other than participation—or too many, and sometimes even conflicting, political ends—devising a strategy becomes highly problematic. 30 In practice, strategy exists. But in the case of Afghanistan, the government and generals at the armed forces headquarters effectively withdrew from the process and left the conduct of the war to the colonels. 31 It was, in short, a decision made by a colonel whether or not “support the Afghan National Army (ANA)” ought to be translated into sitting at the camp waiting for the ANA to call for help or going out to do ANA’s work for them. 32

Hence, force was not directed toward a political aim, but toward participation. Despite the fact that the government’s own major review of Afghanistan identified the lack of political aim as a problem—hence, the lesson is identified—Swedish forces in the later Mali operation had no concrete political goals to relate to other than simply repeating the UN mandate. 33 Again, consistent with contribution warfare, to deploy forces is more important than to employ force.

29. Ångström and Honig, “Regaining Strategy.”
Since clear political aims were not involved and political guidance from the capital was absent, save the direction to participate, there were no strategic lessons to be learned: the Afghanistan War was never a political problem for small coalition partners. Ignoring strategy, however, has several negative consequences. Avoiding to think of the intervention as inherently strategic, that is, denying the action ought to result in a desired end state, creates a situation in which the effects on Afghan society are irrelevant. Thus, the important ends are to participate and to bring Swedish forces home, preferably unscathed.

Also, leaving strategy to be shaped by midlevel military officers implies a potential democratic deficit. It slowly dissolves the coherence of the strategic narrative of the military intervention. In these cases, if the government cannot clearly communicate why soldiers are put in harm’s way far from Sweden, it gradually undermines support for the intervention. In Sweden, for example, the support for international military interventions among the general population dropped from nearly 80 percent in the mid-1990s to just over 50 percent by the end of the war in Afghanistan.

The absence of politics directing the use of force also means there is hardly any reason for strong rivalries among the political parties in parliament. Consensus implies there is no danger of losing future political debates. Hence, rather than becoming politically active on the subject of Swedish participation in coalition wars, Swedish strategic elites learned to be inactive. Donald Rumsfeld learned from the initial stages of the Afghanistan War that toppling a government only required high-altitude, precision-guided bombing in combination with Special Forces. This rationale was then used as an argument for troop-size reductions in Iraq War planning. Meanwhile, in Sweden, elites learned to avoid political ends.

Second, contribution warfare narrows what actors understand as legitimate solutions to problems and, by implication, suggests which solutions ought to be pursued. In the case of Sweden in Afghanistan, this situation meant there was no reason for self-criticism to improve strategic decision making. The government review did suggest a special decision-making body be installed within the government to coordinate strategy and avoid suboptimal outcomes such as stovepiping development aid and the military effort in Afghanistan.

Such a national strategic council would be a completely new thing in Sweden. Yet since the proposal in 2017, there have been no attempts to create one. Again, the absence of political aims directing the use of force in contribution warfare can explain the lack of industry in trying

36. Wikman, “Don’t Mention.”
to improve strategic decision making. Since strategic elites did not direct warfare in Afghanistan, they did not have any incentives to create rival decision-making bodies either.

**Conclusion**

Most case-specific, tactical lessons from Sweden’s intervention in Afghanistan were quickly identified and learned, but general and strategic lessons were equally quickly ignored. Within the context of contribution warfare, this inconsistency can be best explained by Swedish strategic elites being uneasy and inexperienced with the demands of coalition warfare.

Sweden’s armed forces have been quite successful in learning tactical lessons. But these lessons have been curtailed and limited to operations in Afghanistan. Congruent with the logic of contribution warfare, tactical lessons have not been transmitted to the national domain to influence doctrine and tactics for the defense of Sweden. Meanwhile, strategic lessons were identified, but never learned—for example, even though the official governmental reviews after Afghanistan concluded Swedish international interventions should have political ends that effectively direct the use of force, the ongoing mission in Mali still lacks one. But the aims set out in the UN Security Council Resolution have been repeated.

It is important to recognize the logic of contribution warfare is not limited to lessons-learned processes. It also influences the planning for and conduct of wars. It is not limited to non-NATO members partaking in NATO-led operations, although problems for small, non-NATO members such as Sweden may be accentuated in comparison with Norway or Denmark. It should also be pointed out the structural condition of asymmetric coalitions is probably not the only reason for the emergence of contribution warfare.

The idea feeds into, and appears rational for, increasingly bureaucratic military organizations as well as political leaders who are more worried about appearances than results. Since only the United States has the capability to launch major military interventions in the foreseeable future, contribution warfare is likely here to stay.
LESSONS FROM AFGHANISTAN

Never Again? Germany’s Lessons from the War in Afghanistan

Philipp Münch
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ABSTRACT: Defense officials and politicians claimed to learn lessons from Germany’s involvement in Afghanistan. Practitioners asserted a successful mission would have required more time and resources. Politicians developed a preference for training missions instead of combat missions. While both concluded interventions intended to transform foreign societies still made sense in principle, the most logical lesson is quite the opposite: Germany must avoid such engagements.

Germany’s participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan (2002–14) did not have a unified goal. Instead, German military, diplomats, and politicians worked toward diverse and often implicit goals that did not relate to Afghanistan. This situation makes it impossible to identify general lessons learned. Military and diplomatic practitioners concluded more resources and time would be required in future interventions, and politicians implicitly concluded the country should avoid intensive combat missions—referring to what occurred in the later stage of ISAF—and instead support smaller enhancing and enabling missions. Yet practitioners and politicians both believe interventions intended to transform foreign societies make sense in principle. This article refutes this shared conclusion, arguing instead that the most logical lesson is to avoid such engagements in the future.

Background

Germany’s participation in ISAF in Afghanistan from 2002 until 2014 was the most costly—over €9 billion—and intensive military mission in its history.1 In 2010 when participation in ISAF peaked, well over 5,000 soldiers were serving in Afghanistan. By June 30, 2014, approximately 132,500 soldiers had been deployed at some point, including 30,140 who had been deployed several times.2 From 2006—the year the security situation started to deteriorate significantly in the German main area

2. Deutscher Bundestag, Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Große Anfrage der Abgeordneten Wolfgang Gehrecke, Jan Korte, Jan van Aken, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion DIE LINKE, Drucksache 18/4168 (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag, February 27, 2015), 6, 76.
of responsibility—to 2014, German soldiers were attacked at least 380 times and participated in at least 150 firefights.³

Since 2010 over 5,700 soldiers have received the combat medal.⁴ Though casualties are lower than those of some other major ISAF nations, 54 soldiers lost their lives in Afghanistan—35 through direct enemy action. More than 260 soldiers were physically wounded and an unaccounted number suffered psychological wounds.⁵ Drastically falling approval rates among voters and intensifying parliamentary debate attest that participation in ISAF became one of the most controversial foreign policy enterprises.

In light of these considerable costs and political developments, what strategic lessons did Germany learn from its participation in ISAF? First the necessary questions: did the government achieve its intended goals? If so, how completely? These questions highlight a significant shortcoming in obtaining an adequate assessment of lessons learned—the government’s goals in Afghanistan were only broadly defined and therefore cannot be clearly measured. Further, lessons learned always depend on the perspectives and interests of those who draw them. Accordingly, this article considers lessons learned by civilian and military practitioners and politicians and contrasts them with an academic perspective.

To assess informal lessons learned, this article reviews contributions by former or active senior practitioners published as private opinions. The article also looks at the major steps decision makers took in recent years with regard to interventions and assumes these decisions were (unconsciously) informed by lessons learned from ISAF. In particular, the article scrutinizes the two most crucial strategic aspects of the German contribution to ISAF—strategy making and transformation of Afghan society; it examines the goals of decision makers related to these two aspects and evaluates the level of success toward achieving these goals.

The article also highlights lessons politicians and more junior practitioners drew from the mission. The article concludes by contrasting the author’s lessons learned from the ISAF contribution with those drawn by politicians and practitioners, arguing the lessons learned by the latter were shaped by their positions in the state apparatus.

Theory

According to bureaucratic politics theory, states are not unified actors with an overarching rationality. Instead, states are constituted by representatives who try to maximize their autonomy by accumulating
resources and competencies and influencing state policy. As a result, state policy becomes a compromise of diverging interests. Interests are position driven; in the case of German politicians and national security practitioners, their respective positions in the state apparatus shape their perspectives on policy issues like lessons learned from an intervention.6

According to the bureaucratic politics model, politicians seek to create a distinctive political heritage and ensure re-election. Practitioners tasked with conducting interventions, such as diplomats who serve as special representatives for an intervention or military commanders in charge, strive for more resources for such a mission and do not doubt its usefulness.7 Members of the armed services at home, however, tend to resist interventions that could endanger force readiness.8

In the case of the German participation in ISAF, lessons learned by practitioners should be differentiated into mostly explicit—published or classified—official reports and informal, mostly implicit lessons practitioners have internalized subsequently manifested as experience or communication. Despite public and parliamentary pressure, to date neither the federal government nor the parliament (Bundestag) has commissioned a comprehensive independent assessment of the ISAF contribution—based on access to classified sources—that draws lessons learned.9 Therefore the major formal document is the November 2014 final report on progress in Afghanistan, written by the federal government’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador Michael Koch. This report also served as an ISAF final report.

In typical diplomatic fashion, the report often avoids clear statements or cushions judgments in mild diplomatic language.10 Though written for the entire government, the report tends to emphasize the position of the Federal Foreign Office. At the same time, the federal ministers responsible for Afghanistan published brief public statements in which they referred to lessons learned, which align closely with Koch’s report.11

Also during this time, the armed forces (Bundeswehr) produced a comprehensive collection of mostly operational and tactical lessons-learned reports on its ISAF mission. The reports are classified, but the strategic report was leaked to the press, which published some of the

report’s conclusions. For this contribution, an excerpt of the army’s lessons-learned report was declassified. Since ISAF was primarily a land operation, this is the most comprehensive and significant of the Bundeswehr’s reports. To assess informal lessons learned, this article reviews contributions by former or active senior practitioners published as private opinions.

The practitioners’ and politicians’ lessons learned will be contrasted with the most comprehensive academic assessment of the German ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) contributions. This study is based on numerous interviews, field research in Afghanistan, and the largest number of open or leaked documents. Its core argument is the engagement was largely self-referential and did not primarily aim at achieving anything in Afghanistan but tried to reach diverse goals, depending on the position of the actors involved.

Creating National Strategy

In accordance with their position in the state apparatus, the most senior foreign policy makers tried to achieve two goals with the contribution to ISAF. First, they sought to establish a political legacy—improving the country’s position in international relations through participation in the US-led engagement in Afghanistan following 9/11 and later through ISAF. Second, to ensure reelection, however, they tried to avoid undue public attention focused on the nation’s involvement in a major war effort.

Four years after leaving office, former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder outlined the political backdrop of his decision to go to Afghanistan:

The Bundestag’s decision [on a military intervention in Afghanistan] put an end to the chapter of Germany’s limited sovereignty after World War II. It made us an equal partner in the international community of nations, one that had obligations to meet, such as those that have arisen from the NATO alliance in the case of Afghanistan. . . . In other words, the deployment of the Bundeswehr in the Hindu Kush is an expression of Germany’s complete sovereignty over its foreign and security policy.

Indeed, nothing points to any geopolitical or other strategic aims foreign policy makers tried to realize in Afghanistan. As Michael Steiner, a foreign policy adviser to Schröder observed, the decision to join the intervention “had zero percent to do with Afghanistan and

hundred percent with the U.S. It is therefore not surprising Germany failed to develop clearly defined national goals for its engagement in Afghanistan.

The concept papers from 2003 to 2010 only included a wide range of operational tasks that helped the involved ministries highlight their expertise, thereby serving their institutional interests. Vague umbrella terms like stability or development held these tasks together. Foreign policy makers emphasized the importance of a civil-military intra-governmental approach they termed “networked security” and confused this operational concept with strategy. Politicians wanted Afghan society to improve in general, envisioning a reduction in or elimination of widespread human rights violations, mass violence, and apparent corruption, but decision makers were unable to articulate clear goals for post-conflict Afghanistan.

In contrast, the commitments and structural/operational achievements that helped give Germany a significant and visible share of ISAF were much more concrete. Throughout its existence, policy makers successfully maintained the country’s position as the third biggest troop contributor for the mission. Military members also secured major posts at the ISAF headquarters, from commander to spokesman—the public faces of the mission. Policy makers also established a leading presence in northern Afghanistan when Germany became the permanent lead nation for Regional Command North, led by a brigadier general. As large US reinforcements arrived in early 2010, Regional Command North became a German major general–led headquarters.

The fact that the nation’s contribution to ISAF occurred in a multinational context, however, did not help the strategy become more focused. First, like Germany, most non-US contributors to ISAF hoped to improve their global reputation rather than achieve anything specific. Furthermore contributors often could not agree on ISAF mission goals. In this debate, policy makers sided with policy makers from other continental European nations who endorsed a peacekeeping mission instead of one more counterterrorism-oriented, resisting attempts to merge the more heavy-handed, US-led Operation Enduring Freedom with ISAF. Eventually as a compromise, ISAF contributors agreed on a rather vague desired end state of the mission, “a self-sustaining, moderate and democratic Afghan government . . . able to exercise its authority” without ISAF security assistance.

20. See the contributions on the subject in this and the two previous issues of Parameters.
To ensure reelection, senior foreign policy makers tried to avoid tasks in ISAF that could pull soldiers into combat. In 2003 Germany only reluctantly took the temporary command together with The Netherlands and supported by NATO. The same year policy makers also authorized a presence in the north because they assumed the forces would be spared combat. To protect their forces from combat, German policy makers—like those of other troop contributors—imposed (informal) caveats on the strategic NATO operational plan for ISAF. These caveats restricted forces from regularly leaving Regional Command North and Kabul, precluded them from participating in counternarcotics operations, and ruled out some provisions of the rules of engagement that allowed German troops to take offensive action.

**Lessons Learned**

To find lessons learned, one should ask whether policy makers achieved the largely implicit strategic goals identified above. At least since the late 2000s, policy makers failed to create or maintain the perception in large parts of the domestic public that Afghanistan was improving and that the country’s ISAF engagement was a peaceful enterprise. The abstract question, whether the nation improved its international standing, is much harder to answer. One indicator is the acquisition of key positions in NATO and the UN: Germany did not gain any new key posts in the Alliance, and it did not come closer to the goal of gaining a permanent UN Security Council seat. One may argue Germany was only able to maintain its position in these organizations because of its participation in ISAF, but France—a NATO member state of roughly comparable size—did not seem to have suffered from its much more reluctant ISAF involvement.

These negative and neutral outcomes suggest involvement in ISAF did not pay off in the ways senior policy makers had hoped. Instead, policy makers lost control over this foreign engagement. Germany’s experience with ISAF demonstrates foreign policy with unclear or implicit goals is unlikely to benefit a state’s position in international relations and should be avoided at all costs.

Incidentally, the authors of the formal and published lessons-learned contributions drew very different conclusions. First, none saw a problem in terms of unclear goals or strategy. The reports only conceded the government and the international community unintentionally raised unrealistically high expectations among the Afghan population and the domestic German audience although their goals actually were quite limited from the beginning.

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Praising the high level of contributions, the reports also hinted this participation played a significant role. The minister of defense even stated the lead-nation role in the north demonstrated Germany would be “determined to take more responsibility in the alliance.”26 Secondly, the authors concluded rather generally that only the goal of destroying terrorist safe havens (not an ISAF goal) was completely achieved and determined development and democratic state building in Afghanistan made great progress, but not to a satisfactory degree. In terms of strategy formation, they drew no lessons learned.27

In contrast to the formal and published lessons-learned contributions, some of the classified military and private publications heavily criticized ISAF strategy making. According to Der Spiegel magazine, the Bundeswehr strategic lessons-learned report concluded the strategic vacuum which persisted for most of the country’s participation in ISAF had to be avoided in future conflicts.28 Unofficial publications by the then commander of the Bundeswehr Joint Forces Operations Command, Lieutenant General Rainer Glatz and Member of Parliament Roderich Kiesewetter and the joint report organized by Parliamentary Commissioner Hans-Peter Bartels also concluded ISAF strategy was not clear or measurable and would have to change in order to secure success in future engagements. Yet all the critiques depicted the strategic deficit as a technical deficit and did not ask why policy makers failed to define an explicit strategy.29

Transforming Afghan Society

NATO’s desired end state for Afghanistan effectively demanded ISAF should influence the behavior of two groups of Afghans at odds with one another: representatives of the Afghan state who ISAF could enable to exert control over Afghanistan and all nonstate actors who defied attempts by these representatives to control the country. Though difficult to distinguish in Afghan reality, ISAF mostly divided this latter group of nonstate actors into local power brokers who maintained autonomy through nonstate sources of political power and insurgents who fought the government militarily. The desired end state promulgated by NATO coincided with German goals vaguely aimed at creating a peaceful country with a capable liberal state.

In accordance with the implicit goal of senior policy makers to avoid creating warlike conditions, in working with local Afghans, soldiers generally followed a cautious, legalistic approach. Information collection on and analysis of local political conditions was persistently deficient, seriously hampering all related efforts. German soldiers preferred to work with Afghan officials—except those who overtly

did not comply with formal structures—and abstained from trying too strongly to change the local power structure by removing officials such as provincial governors, as the United States and the United Kingdom did. Despite attempts to support officials who complied with formal rules, the local power structure in the areas of the two German provincial reconstruction teams in Kunduz (2003–13) and Badakhshan (2004–12) provinces remained much the same as it was in late 2001. 30

Faulty analysis of the conflict situation in Kunduz proved the most disastrous. 31 Ignoring the very recent history of this embattled Afghan province, in 2003 policy makers selected it as the first location of a German-led provincial reconstruction team mostly on the basis of the then low number of security incidents. 32 Yet like in most other parts of Afghanistan, the main driver of the insurgency was the distribution of local political power, not ideological conviction. 33 As recent research demonstrates, even allegedly hard-core Taliban leaders like Jalaluddin Haqqani tried to negotiate a power-sharing agreement with the new Western-backed regime in late 2001 and in 2002. 34

After the 2001 intervention as reconciliation was ignored and the Afghan winners took it all, political positions were dramatically reshuffled, pushing the disgruntled into the insurgency. 35 The upsurge of the insurgency in Kunduz since the mid-2000s, which caught German ISAF forces by surprise, resulted from the same logic—local power distribution outweighed considerations of ideology. 36

Beginning in 2007 German ISAF forces tried to oppose the insurgency with increasingly offensive tactics. Trained to counter a massive Soviet/Russian conventional attack during and after the Cold War, the Bundeswehr tried to maintain this capability in Afghanistan. The military interpretation of the broad counterinsurgency concept therefore focused on fighting a combined arms battle involving mechanized vehicles like the Marder, Dachs, Biber, and PzH 2000 armored SP howitzer to take or hold decisive terrain. Since this approach ignored the human terrain—the insurgent networks that operated without being overly bound to actual terrain—it failed to reduce insurgent violence. 37

In order to enable the Afghan government to exert control over its territory, German ISAF forces focused their training and advising

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efforts on the 209th Afghan National Army (ANA) Corps, based in the north. Due to unrenewed contracts, casualties, and desertions, the exact effects of training and advice through ISAF is hard to measure. Yet as the temporary fall of Kunduz City in October 2015—the first loss of a provincial capital to the Taliban—and again in October 2016, as well as the devastating attack on the 209th ANA Corps headquarters on April 21, 2017, that killed at least 140 persons demonstrated, ISAF training and advising apparently did not sustainably improve the quality of the ANA.

In the spectrum of counterinsurgency approaches, forces cautiously engaged local leaders, trying to focus on rewards instead of punishments, and fought insurgents very conventionally. The German approach differed from the approach of the United States, the United Kingdom, and even The Netherlands, all of which forced Afghan governors of important provinces out of office. The unconventional US “carrot and stick” approach practiced in the same area of operations in northeastern Afghanistan from about late 2009 until 2011 also proved to be more successful in reducing insurgent violence. US Special Forces captured and killed numerous insurgent commanders and coopted even more by making them US-paid local security forces.38

Lessons Learned

Still, the more forceful policy adopted by some allies toward local leaders apparently did not lead to markedly different outcomes since ousted governors continued to exert power informally.39 As funding for local security forces in northeastern Afghanistan was reduced and finally eliminated in 2012, the violence increased again and continued in the long term. Given the dire results of different national approaches to move Afghan society in a desired direction, the lesson learned is any kind of long-term social engineering will fail and should not be attempted. These experiences demonstrate as long as people are paid, it is possible to influence their behavior to some degree. But when the overall goal is to create a self-sustainable political order, this approach is ineffective. In light of its totally aid-dependent economy, Afghanistan is far from achieving this outcome.

The official lessons-learned report and statements account for the many deficits mentioned above, including the lack of economic self-sustainability, but they identify more positive impacts from efforts to transform Afghan society as well. Yet Ambassador Koch also noted the problems of gathering detailed information on local conditions and advised against being too intervention eager. Finally, he drew the lesson that assisting a foreign society in transformation requires the support of that society in such efforts. Oddly, he countered the argument that intervention in such a case would be unnecessary by stating that even then security forces would need to be provided “to ensure domestic order.”40

This position contradicts his lesson drawn that for success, society in question has to support the international transformation effort—in that case, suppressing significant resistance would be unnecessary.

Official and private lessons-learned reports from senior military officers also accounted for—sometimes implicitly by formulating the lessons as implications—the extreme difficulties generating useful intelligence on Afghanistan. The army report characterized “acting upon key leaders” as a “new challenge.” In contrast to the official report, the Glatz report and the army report concluded a future engagement should involve more capable military forces from the beginning and demonstrate strength vis-à-vis the local population.

Despite the meager results of conventional style or mechanized counterinsurgency operations, the authors of the army report were eager to point out the (traditional) German concept of maneuver warfare “was confirmed as a core capability/leadership culture for the army.” They also concluded ISAF “is not a blueprint for other missions!” This perspective suggests a main concern for the army was to preserve its traditional expertise in conventional warfighting.

Reflecting on ISAF

Given the evidence presented here, the generally applicable lesson learned from the German ISAF contribution is a similar engagement should be avoided at all costs. If the most senior policy makers cannot clearly articulate a common goal for a mission and why it matters, they should abstain from such a foreign policy endeavor. Implicit goals do not substitute for explicit ones. Ensuring strategic coherence and consistency is difficult when policy makers cannot or do not want to articulate goals.

Implicit goals for costly long-term projects are also undemocratic since they cannot be debated among the electorate. Reflecting upon implicit goals is difficult, which contributes to prolonging them even if they do not make sense anymore. Finally, implicit goals help nurture conspiracy theories about hidden agendas like a secret geopolitical NATO plan to maintain a strategic position in Afghanistan vis-à-vis Russia or China.

Other lessons learned more specific to the ISAF contribution emerge. First, Germany’s engagement in Afghanistan demonstrated in the long run it was impossible for practitioners to conduct combat operations and sell the activity to the domestic public as a quasi-peacekeeping mission. A major lesson, therefore, is controlling the course of a military intervention is an illusion. In addition, applying the principles of the

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44. Kommando Heer I 1 (4), EinsAuswH, Dokumentation, 6.
German approach to maneuver warfare, as cultivated in the army, to operations in Afghanistan clearly failed. Though to date there is no absolutely convincing Western concept of counterinsurgency, it appears much more promising to employ more unconventional approaches with a stronger role for intelligence.

The official and, even more so, the private lessons learned by practitioners concluded relatively unanimously that the goals of the ISAF mission had not (yet) been achieved and were too ambitious or even too vague. Yet practitioners never questioned the assumption foreign societies might be transformed according to Western standards. They only concluded it would be much harder than previously thought. Despite the dire results, practitioners did not draw the lesson such missions should be abandoned. To the contrary, they advocated increased funding for these missions. Former military or defense representatives especially demanded that initially, dramatically more forces should be employed in interventions. Others like Koch asked for more “strategic patience” and stated such missions needed a “generational time scale.”

The key difference between the major lessons learned by practitioners and those advocated for in this article is the former suggest interventions intended to transform foreign societies require a more substantial military commitment, while the latter question their utility. The main argument throughout this article has been this difference in assessment can be most comprehensively understood by referring to the strong institutional interests associated with interventions like ISAF. These interests prevent practitioners from changing their premises—like the general utility of interventions for transforming foreign societies—but instead compel them to ask for more resources.

Practitioners apparently convinced senior foreign policy makers that interventions aiming to transform foreign societies might work in principle. Yet policy makers’ dominant lesson learned was to avoid participating in another large-scale combat mission like ISAF. They did not support the implication that even more robust forces would be necessary, and therefore did not include any combat ground forces with maneuver tasks in following interventions.

Except for observer missions, after the troop-level zenith of ISAF, Germany (almost) only participated in smaller enhancement missions: EU Training Mission Somalia (2010 until 2018, up to 20 soldiers), EU Training Mission Mali (since 2013, up to 350 soldiers), training support for Iraq/Kurdistan (2015 until 2018, up to 150 soldiers), and train, advise, assist mission Resolute Support in Afghanistan (since 2015, up to 1,300 soldiers). The only exception is the contribution to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (2016, up to 1,100 soldiers), which also includes reconnaissance forces and some security forces for base protection.

Also it appears that as part of its framework-nation concept, the country tries to outsource more dangerous military tasks to other nations under its command. Already in ISAF Regional Command North, the Bundeswehr trained and equipped Albanian, Georgian, and Mongolian forces to perform infantry tasks. For the follow-up mission to ISAF, Resolute Support, the country delegated the quick-reaction force for the north to Georgia and trained and equipped those soldiers in Germany.46

Finally, as form followed function, the major policy documents that guide interventions reflect the policy shift to less dangerous and smaller training missions. The 2016 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr positions “enhancing and enabling” missions more prominently than traditional stabilization operations.47 Also, the Federal Government of Germany Guidelines on Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace of the following year emphasize “local ownership” and a more careful and indirect approach to the transformation of fragile states. They do not mention the term “stabilization operations” at all.48

ABSTRACT: India and Pakistan, both nuclear powers, have averted crises through geopolitical weaponry rather than through the frameworks of conventional deterrence theory and mutually assured destruction. An analysis of three distinct conflicts between these two nations reveals the inadequacy of a bipolar systems-preserving model of deterrence theory to explain their responses. Future confidence-building measures must come from an emphasis on shared history and culture.

Controlling tensions and de-escalation take on distinct processes and meanings in the Indo-Pakistani context. Conventional deterrence, epitomized by a Cold War strategy of mutually assured destruction, does not fully explain the picture. The threat of mutual annihilation has never been genuine given the physical and cultural closeness of India and Pakistan; consequently, the existential bias in deterrence theory does not shape how India and Pakistan use nuclear weapons. Conventional deterrence theory flexes its analytical muscle more often in cases of immediate deterrence—during times of a pressing specific threat—than during times of general deterrence where the focus is on preventing military conflict between rival nuclear giants. As such, India and Pakistan manage (de)escalation as an exercise in geopolitical weaponry, engaging their nuclear capabilities as political tools to obtain economic and political goals within the wider international community.

As demonstrated by the early 2019 India-Pakistan military standoff, responsibility for crisis management falls on the shoulders of Indian and Pakistani leadership. They cannot count on external countries like the United States to intervene significantly and/or spearhead de-escalation.1 In the future, India and Pakistan will have to learn, adapt, and script new bilateral forms of confidence-building measures, drawing more from their shared history and culture than some abstract sense of game theory. Moreover, trilateral negotiations including permutations of the big five nuclear states—the United States, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan—are still pertinent.2 Nevertheless, such a reality will also

have to take into account nonstate actors and various terrorist/militant
groups that continue to take advantage of emergent situations.³

This article briefly discusses India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
programs and stresses the strategic interrelationships in the region
extend beyond a simple dyad. This operating framework will speak to
the limitations of the bipolar systems-preserving model of deterrence
theory when analyzing the South Asian security situation. The article
then considers three distinct military conflicts between India and
Pakistan that have occurred since 1998: the 1999 Kargil War, the
2001–2 India-Pakistan standoff, and the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The
article uses these conflicts to investigate the nature of escalation and
de-escalation—especially the role of external diplomacy in defusing
various tensions.

Finally, the article considers the conflicts in early 2019 involving
India and Pakistan, focusing on the immediate events following the 2019
Pulwama attack. This history will explain how tensions arose between
India and Pakistan and how both countries not only ratcheted up their
aggressive discourse toward one another, but more importantly how
they eventually engaged in effective crisis management. Both countries
did so in a new way that de-escalated the situation and altered their
appreciation for the role of crafting stability themselves. The United
States played a less interventionist role in early 2019; consequently, both
India and Pakistan had to contend with a situation that did not rely
on the diplomacy of external nation-states.⁴ The 2019 standoff shows
 crisis management is a process, a set of dialogues, and an ongoing
experiment necessitating limited military confrontations as operational-
cum-heuristic opportunities.

Conflict from the Beginning

Partition was the original sin. With the dissolution of the British Raj
in 1947, millions of people were displaced during the formation of India
and Pakistan as two sovereign nations. The resulting situation was not a
political vacuum in the strict sense; instead, the violent partition ensured
a complex set of relations and territorial disputes that would remain just
as contentious as on the eve of India’s independence.⁵ Despite diverse
ethnicities in their populations, India and Pakistan—secular nation-
states—share kinship with respect to history and culture.

Indo-Pakistani relations have witnessed several violent conflicts over
the past decades including the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 and countless
other border skirmishes and limited military confrontations—some

⁵. See Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali Zamindar, The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia:
having to do with Kashmir. Because of this history and the fact both countries possess nuclear weapons, their mutual hostilities have reached a level of concern. At first glance, such concern is somewhat moderated by the operating frameworks of conventional deterrence theory, or so it seems.

Yet India and Pakistan cannot be thought of as small-scale versions of larger nuclear states; their South Asian-styled path to the nuclear age was heavily influenced by external actors—the United States and China—who were inextricably part of the nuclear deterrence posture and strategy of both countries. As a result, becoming a nuclear power did not mean India and Pakistan inherited a classical deterrence theory manual that would automatically apply to conflict between them.

**Nuclear Capabilities and Intentions**

In the early 2000s pundits were debating whether India could maintain escalation dominance. India began to consider developing tactical nuclear weapons as a strategic way to pressure Pakistan to disband or dissuade anti-India terrorist groups. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) 2018 Yearbook, India and Pakistan have around 140 nuclear warheads in their respective arsenals. India has been able to produce plutonium for use in nuclear weapons, while Pakistan is working on transitioning from the production of highly enriched uranium to plutonium.

The SIPRI report also states India and Pakistan are expanding their arsenals and testing capabilities. India has air-, land-, and sea-based missiles, securing a robust second-strike capability. Meanwhile, Pakistan is working toward narrowing the gap to match India’s triad by developing a sea-based nuclear missile delivery system. Although India continues to claim a no-first-strike policy, it reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in a preemptive counterforce strike if it believes Pakistan is gearing up for a first-strike attack. Also under its current doctrine, India reserves the right to use nuclear forces first when they are attacked with biological or chemical weapons.

Recent changes in Indian military doctrine, however, raise concerns for Pakistani leadership. The Indian Army developed the Cold Start Doctrine as a fix to what it saw as a slow mobilization of forces to halt attacks coming from Pakistan. During the 2001 attacks on the Indian Parliament, Indian forces were slow to mobilize along the Line

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of Control, the de facto border between India and Pakistan. According to one source, the Cold Start Doctrine was developed to:

Facilitate smaller scale, rapid, and decisive conventional offensive operations into Pakistani territory in the event of a Pakistani-sponsored asymmetrical attack on Indian soil before the international community can actively intervene, and before Pakistan would feel compelled to launch nuclear retaliatory strikes to repel an Indian invasion. It is still unclear what CSD specifically entails, and senior Indian officers have on purpose remained ambiguous about it.10

On the Pakistan side, the first-strike policy is part of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine but is better understood in the context of its overall defense principles. The Pakistani military views its first-strike posture as purely deterrent. Pakistan reserves the right to use nuclear weapons first, but only after certain thresholds have been crossed—if an invasion is imminent. These thresholds could take the form of particular military strikes targeting more than just military assets or attacks that put the national security and sovereignty of Pakistan at severe existential risk.

A risk to strategic stability may also occur as a result of unevenness in the development of regional nuclear forces and capabilities among China, India, and Pakistan. This disparate regional nuclear development means “redundancy is weak, flexibility is limited, and the security of the deterrent’s primary arm is menaced.”11 “Their [China, India, Pakistan] land-based ballistic missile systems (along with aircraft in the Indian and Pakistani cases) serve this core function, and, when limited in size and in fixed locations, they are vulnerable to first-strike destruction by an adversary with superior nuclear forces.”12

Another facet to be taken into account pertains to how external countries intervened early in the establishment of India’s and Pakistan’s growing nuclear weapons arsenals. According to a now-declassified 1981 US State Department report, “if the two South Asian states moved to develop nuclear weapons, both China and the USSR would have strong temptations to shape relations among the four countries.”13 Another section from the same document reveals US officials trying to ascertain the Indian perspective: “From New Delhi’s vantage point, the possible nuclear threat from China has been the underlying incentive for supporting the nuclear weapons option. India believes China’s long-range goal is the domination of all of Asia.”14

Another recently declassified document confirms the United States, while not sanguine about supporting Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons, in fact turned a blind eye, much to India’s chagrin. The former Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq and Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping convinced the United States to continue providing Pakistan economic and military aid. During this period, US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said: “There are limits on our ability to aid Pakistan because of their nuclear explosive program. Although we still object to their doing so, we will now set that aside for the time being, to facilitate strengthening Pakistan against potential Soviet action.”

A 1983 State Department briefing document reveals the United States recognized a Pakistani had stolen European technology in aid of Pakistan’s active uranium enrichment program. Despite the theft and the fact the United States also knew China was assisting Pakistan in developing nuclear weapons, the then US President Ronald Reagan continued to allow aid to flow to Pakistan, citing national interest concerns. Today China matters even more. An article published during the height of the February 2019 skirmish reinforces both US and Chinese interests in South Asia. “Washington has been wooing New Delhi for the past several years, going so far as to rename its Pacific Command to ‘Indo-Pacific’ [emphasis in original] and signing weapons deals with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government, hoping to use India as a regional counterweight to China.”

Three Crises

Three recent conflicts between India and Pakistan reveal common themes and provide examples showing how escalation toward major military confrontation was avoided. The 1999 Kargil crisis was the first major conflict following the ascension of both countries to the status of nuclear powered nation-states. Pakistan provoked the crisis by sending troops across the Kargil border. According to one expert, the move by Pakistan was intended to signal to the international community Kashmir was a geopolitical issue that could merit nuclear escalation. “This aim would align with the broader perspective of India viewing Kashmir as a bilateral issue and Pakistan viewing it as one requiring the international community’s participation. . . . The Pakistani offensive in the Kargil

17. DoS, Pakistani Nuclear Program.
19. “Escalating India-Pakistan Conflict.”
district of Kashmir reflected a strategy of ‘preemptive defense,’ with Pakistan responding in anticipation of presumed Indian offensives.”

If nuclear weapons enabled and emboldened such political moves, options were dwindling in the face of fear, enlarging the scope of the Kargil incident and restraint. Consequently, the United States stepped in and the then US President Bill Clinton and United States Central Command leadership spoke to Indian and Pakistani leadership, providing political cover and an exit to withdraw from the tensions along the Line of Control. The end of the Kargil War represented a watershed moment in Indo-American dialogue. American foreign policy in India shifted focus from nonproliferation in South Asia to conflict prevention. More importantly, the United States started publicly siding with India against Pakistan’s sheltering of al-Qaida, even before the attacks of 9/11.

The 2001–2 “Twin Peaks” crisis brought India and Pakistan closer to the brink of major war. The first peak occurred when Islamic militants attacked the Indian Parliament in December 2001. India opted for compellence to convince Islamabad to stop militant/terrorist groups from infiltrating and attacking. In order to carry this out, India launched Operation Parakam, mobilizing military forces along the international Pakistan-India border. In response, Pakistan mobilized its forces along the Line of Control and the international border.

The second peak arose five months later when terrorists attacked an Indian army base located at the international border. The tension and possible threat of military conflict in the aftermath of the first peak led the international community to put pressure on the then President Pervez Musharraf to announce formally he would not let his country be the launching pad for terrorist attacks. The war in Afghanistan post-9/11 committed the United States to the region, so much so that de-escalating what might have initially been a bilateral situation became multidimensional. “The U.S. war in Afghanistan played an important role restraining India from striking Pakistan, a key U.S. ally in Afghanistan and the broader war on terrorism. This motivation was especially important because the United States did not want Pakistani troops redirected from counterterrorism operations to the Indian border.”

On November 26, 2008, 10 gunmen—thought to be associated with Pakistani-based terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Taiba—killed 170 people in Mumbai. India blamed Pakistan for allowing the gunmen to operate from its territory. Unlike the two previous crises, India did not rush to mobilize forces along the border, and as a result Pakistan resisted

the urge to match India’s provocation. The United States stepped in again, but this time swiftly ahead of any major mobilization. The exact reasons for India’s restraint in the face of the mass killing are still unknown, but the countries ultimately avoided a military standoff.

The United States was committed to defuse the situation. “Pakistan remained a critical frontline state for cooperation. Washington needed Islamabad to not only play an effective role in the Afghanistan peace process but also to support the withdrawal of its forces and war equipment from the region through Pakistan.”23 According to one observer, there were other reasons why the United States was an effective if not de facto broker and why the then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice engaged directly with both Indian and Pakistani leadership. “The United States’ intervention was considered benign by both New Delhi and Islamabad, and thereby welcomed by both despite having different expectations from the mediator and diverse outcomes of the settlement.”24

Consequences of 1999–2008

A few observations can be made regarding India’s and Pakistan’s experience with the aforementioned military conflicts and their mutual avoidance of nuclear escalation. To begin with, both countries were relatively new to the nuclear club while testing the limits of brinkmanship. They were also learning how to balance various strategic actions. For example, even though both countries could and did extend the scopes of particular crises, they did so with opportunistic pathways for improving communication and generating mutually accepted restraint mechanisms.

India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were not born from an existential Cold War framework—they were not seeking to annihilate one another from the start due to an ideological clash. For India and Pakistan, nuclear weapons’ advancement coevolved with their changing security and political interests. The notion of proxy wars and extended deterrence in the case of India and Pakistan also do not accurately capture the nature of their conflict.

For instance, given the United States is not fighting a proxy war against China on the border of India and Pakistan, nonstate actors such as terrorist organizations are able to conduct limited attacks under the nuclear cover. In other words, terrorist groups not officially sponsored by the state and that operate transnationally can carry out some attacks without being subject to the consequences of symmetric deterrence between nation-states. Such terrorist groups do not often follow the political unity and governance structures of the nation-state or even rational chains of command. As a result, retaliating against a nation-state in response to the actions of rogue terrorist groups would be hard to justify internationally.

Nonetheless, although terrorist attacks do not warrant nuclear escalation at least in the three historical cases discussed, the threat of nuclear escalation, even if deployed politically and purposively, only realizes itself in Indo-Pakistani relations when conventional forces take positions along borders such as the Line of Control. In this sense, it is conventional war and major military conflict that act as critical thresholds, opening the door to escalation.

2019 Crisis

On February 14, 2019, a suicide bomber with links to the Pakistani terrorist organization Jaish-e-Mohammed attacked a military convoy in Pulwama—a district in India’s northern region of Jammu and Kashmir—killing over 40 Indian soldiers. In response, India conducted air strikes supposedly targeting a terrorist base camp in Balakot in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. While India claimed it had killed scores of Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorists, Pakistan and later third-party satellite imagery revealed no damage was done to any of the targeted buildings.

Whether Pakistan was able to intercept the Indian Mirage 2000 jets is still uncertain. Nonetheless India launched air strikes in a calculated strategy of compellence. Conscious of not escalating tensions too close to the brink of nuclear war, and definitely with the April 11–May 23 Lok Sabha general elections in mind, Indian leadership ordered air strikes on Pakistan land, but instead of hitting real targets, India bombed wooded areas as a warning measure. A day later, Pakistan retaliated by sending in air strikes, and according to one report, Pakistani F-16s targeted Indian army positions near the Line of Control. The report noted: “A Pakistani major general said that the jets locked on to Indian targets to demonstrate capability, but then purposefully avoided causing damage. . . . The response appears to be a sort of minimum required reaction to demonstrate its resolve against the Indian military entering its territory without doing anything that would warrant a serious response.”

Both countries claimed their fighters shot down the other’s aircraft, but the only concrete evidence was an uploaded video confirming Pakistan shot down and captured an Indian pilot who was subsequently released. Meanwhile, Pakistan arrested several dozen terrorist organization members as a sign to India and the international


community that it was doing its part to curb terrorist activities within Pakistan’s borders.\textsuperscript{28} The Indian air strikes are notable for being the first time since 1971 that India struck a target within Pakistan, even if it was just an empty field. This attack was also the first time any nuclear power conducted air strikes in the territory of another nuclear power.

Notwithstanding the usual finger-pointing as to who was the aggressor, certain realities, old and new, emerged in the wake of the air strikes. Indian and Pakistani intelligence agencies were communicating constantly throughout the crisis and afterwards, even if the messages were mutual threats of nonnuclear conventional missile exchanges. (Ironically, hostilities between India and Pakistan were heating up at the same time US President Donald Trump was in Hanoi hoping to strike a deal with North Korea on its nuclear weapons program.) According to the Pakistani Foreign Minister, China and the UAE intervened and expressed their concerns regarding escalating tensions.

But if the United States was not actively involved and committed to crisis management to the same extent as it had been before, how was this tense moment defused? Are we to agree with Joshua White, a former White House official, who asserted, “Indian and Pakistani leaders have long evinced confidence that they can understand each other’s deterrence signals and can de-escalate at will”?\textsuperscript{29} Evidently so, as the Indian government rejected the Trump administration’s offer to mediate, citing the tension with Pakistan over Kashmir would be strictly bilateral.\textsuperscript{30}

During this time, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan stated: “History tells us that wars are full of miscalculation. My question is that given the weapons we have can we afford miscalculation. . . .We should sit down and talk.”\textsuperscript{31} Several weeks after the return of India’s captured pilot, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi at an election rally responded regarding the purpose of nuclear weapons. “What do we have then? Have we kept our nuclear bomb for Diwali?”\textsuperscript{32} Since Diwali is the Hindu festival of lights, equating nuclear weapons with fireworks is a Hindutva-arousing and politically effective, yet crass evocation.

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On February 14, 2019, the then US National Security Adviser John Bolton remarked that the United States “support[s] India’s right to self defense.”\footnote{“U.S. Adviser Bolton Promises India Support after Kashmir Attack,” Reuters, February 15, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir-usa/u-s-adviser-bolton-promises-india-support-after-kashmir-attack-idUSKCN1Q504T.} The timing and delivery of such diplomatic pronouncements did more damage than good; the statement not only condoned India’s reaction but emboldened India to continue pressing for a more-aggressive strategy. The Hill newspaper noted: “We should all remember this statement as the moment Bolton reset India-Pakistan relations as we’ve known them since 1947. Once a deliberate and cautious back channel intermediary on security flare-ups between the nuclear-armed rivals, the United States has taken yet another step back from Pakistan and one closer to India.”\footnote{Shamila N. Chaudhary, “Better Late Than Never: US Comes to Its Senses on India-Pakistan Conflict,” Hill, February 28, 2019, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/432031-better-late-than-never-us-comes-to-its-senses-on-india-pakistan.} By failing to mediate either willingly or not, the United States paved the way for India’s encroachment into Kashmir and Jammu just a few months later.

**Strategic Findings**

The 1999 Kargil crisis proved Pakistan could still provoke and engage in limited conflict below the threat of nuclear war. This is often known as the stability-instability paradox; “Strategic stability creates instability by making lower levels of violence relatively safe and undermining extended deterrence.”\footnote{Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 19–20.} The handling of the early 2019 crisis, however, demonstrated to India and Pakistan they could no longer depend on the United States to step in as a mediator and distributor of political favors to both sides.

Moreover, given the United States is trying to diminish its footprint in the Middle East, it will have less leverage and ability to provide politically expedient off-ramps and face-saving channels. In future crises, both countries will exercise brinkmanship in an effort to dominate escalation, but the real question is how confident India and Pakistan are regarding their ability to carry out de-escalation. “Neither India nor Pakistan would want uncontrolled escalation, but . . . on whose terms will the conflict end? For India, an extra shot would have to be fired, so to speak, for it to walk away satisfied. Pakistan, on the other hand, would want to exit immediately after it has responded to India’s initial aggression.”\footnote{Moeed Yusuf, “Banking on an Outsider: Implications for Escalation Control in South Asia,” Arms Control Today 41 (June 2011): 20–27.}

Conventional realist deterrence theory provides limited analytical purchase in understanding how India and Pakistan conceive of and leverage the threat of using nuclear weapons. Because one cannot discount the presence and role of the United States, Russia, and China in...
the region, India and Pakistan are not just aiming their nuclear strategies at one another—multiple potential adversaries are in the offing.

One expert argues even though the political actors in the region are the same, shifting trends on the ground induce new realities. Pakistan will become increasingly anxious about its immediate security because (1) India’s economy is grower stronger, (2) the United States is enhancing its partnership with India as a counterweight to China, and (3) China’s security concerns will outstrip any sense of unwavering receptiveness to relieving Pakistan’s distresses. In this new environment, regional nuclearization will not be checked by the United States alone. Such sentiment seems to be calling for a pivot in thinking away from a post–Cold War unipolar world, one which makes room for a postcolonial theory of nuclear deterrence.37

An important corrective to any working theory must contain empirical data and/or observations. For some, such a corrective entails treating the critical unit of analysis not in terms of nuclear weapons capability but rather nuclear posture. “Nuclear posture is the incorporation of some number and type of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles into a state’s overall military structure, the rules and procedures governing how those weapons are deployed, when and under what conditions they might be used, against what targets, and who has the authority to make those decisions.”38

Posture and not simply the category of abstract capabilities dictate just how one country might deter another. “This focus on postures as a variable . . . is preferable because it maintains the focus on observable [emphasis in original] capabilities, organizational procedures and interests, and patterns of behavior that are measurable both to adversaries and analysts.”39

Recommendations

Just months after the February 2019 attack, India revoked Articles 370 and 35-A of its constitution.40 On August 5, 2019, the ruling political party in India, the Bharatiya Janata Party, changed legislation ensuring the Indian-controlled portion of Kashmir would no longer hold its semiautonomous status. Needless to say, placing Jammu and Kashmir under greater Indian control will certainly cause a humanitarian and security crisis for Muslim residents living in that state, which may very well engulf India and Pakistan in yet another round of military conflict. The United States should be prepared to mediate diplomatically and proactively from the start of any such conflict.

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Some experts believe India and Pakistan should create constant lines of communication and bilateral crisis management institutions in order to manage future crises better. “Adopting proposals such as regular communication and meetings between local commanders, coordinated patrolling . . . would improve the LoC situation, serving as a major confidence-building measure to transform the political nature of the relationship.” Communication when deterrence fails also needs to be addressed and applied to cooperative military exercises and/or war gaming. Here the United States could supply command, control, and communication assets and training. The failure of deterrence may be quite different in both form and function for India than for Pakistan. Avoiding miscalculation by communicating intent and doctrinal shifts will help manage escalation should a nuclear weapon ever be launched.

Several principles will help the United States understand and contend with security in the region. For the US military, it is important to realize terrorist groups operating within Pakistan, whether or not officially endorsed by Pakistani civilian leadership, will retaliate for the recent accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India. Pakistan interprets this emboldened move by India as more than just a territorial grab; it is a provocation exacerbating the clash of identities that underlies how India and Pakistan regard the relationship between (fundamentalist) religion and nationhood. Consequently India and Pakistan will have claims to both offensive and defensive deterrence for the foreseeable future.

To make matters worse, India will see more jihadist-inspired attacks and will continue to cross into Pakistani territory to deter and punish such unconventional attacks. The US military must be cognizant of the cultural and politically contingent logics driving the escalation and de-escalation of tensions in the region. The possession of nuclear weapons has not been the sole cause or even instigator of Indo-Pakistani conflict over the past few decades. Rather, nuclear weapons have opened and closed particular options.

Next, efforts should be taken to emphasize conflict resolution rather than short-term actions geared toward de-escalation. In this regard, the United States should avoid conveying the impression it is choosing sides. Instead, it should help both India and Pakistan develop better crisis management mechanisms while “continu[ing] to de-hyphenate Pakistan and India by addressing both countries on issues beyond their mutual antagonism.” Both nations engage in bilateral relations with the United States; they are not part of any formal defense alliance.

Another possible course of action, and one the United States should champion, is potential nonproliferation treaties India and Pakistan could construct and enter bilaterally. Some experts have made the interesting case that: “India has sought to resignify the Western discourse of

nuclear responsibility such that it is linked to nuclear disarmament and equality rather than nuclear nonproliferation and hierarchy. . . . India's status as a responsible nuclear power is based, not on its compliance with international regimes or norms, but on its 'civilizational exceptionalism.' If India and Pakistan could decolonize the discourse and hegemony of Western nuclear arms control by taking the higher moral ground, both sides would learn from each other directly without having to risk the breakdown in communications and trust resulting from the involvement of middlemen.

The US Indo-Pacific Command should invest in strategies for integrating Pakistani military officers into its operations. Foreign exchange officer programs are fruitful. Additionally, holding important regional exercises featuring both Pakistani and Indian military leadership at the helm would clearly show the United States is not picking sides. The United States could also let China play a more prominent leadership role by endorsing particular conferences and security forums inviting Pakistan and India to the table, even if they take place in Beijing. The United States could also partner with China in establishing better security and economic outcomes for South Asia more broadly.

Lastly, by providing command, control, and communication technology and training support, the United States would help India and Pakistan underscore and strengthen their crisis management systems. Empowering India and Pakistan to strengthen their respective intelligence systems will allow the two nation-states to navigate disruptions emerging from a future that will inevitably involve hybrid conflicts. These gray-zone conflicts include campaigns such as (dis) information operations, troop movements, cyberattacks, and more. Providing technology and training would require the United States to engage in constant communication with India and Pakistan and transmit clear and consistent foreign policy goals.

Finally, the United States should increase strategic planning in the region with both India and Pakistan, without playing one side against the other. Developing common and relevant training relationships during peacetime with India and Pakistan together is critical. Ultimately the United States has an opportunity to fulfill its commitment to the region, not as an adversary but as a geopolitical power with well-defined priorities for peace.

ABSTRACT: The novel coronavirus is only the latest in a series of global crises with implications for the regional order in the Middle East. These changes and the diverging interests of actors in the region have implications for US strategy and provide an opportunity to rethink key US relationships there.

Major global crises, such as the Great Depression of the 1930s and the terror attacks on September 11, 2001, can result in a significant reordering of the global and regional orders. The ongoing coronavirus pandemic has the potential to accelerate a trend already well underway in the Middle East: the emergence of a new and dynamic regional order making the attainment of US interests more challenging. This latest crisis provides an opportunity for policy makers to reassess US strategy in the Middle East. For decades the region has been a focal point for American foreign policy and the object of multiple US and allied military campaigns.

Securing American national security interests in this troubled environment will require US policy makers to be flexible, creative, agile, and adaptive in managing rapidly evolving and transient relationships among actors in the region. This article briefly examines how the actions of key regional powers—Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel—diverge from US interests in the region and offers recommendations for how US policy should adapt to these shifting realities.

Key US Interests

The 2017 National Security Strategy describes the US vision of “a Middle East that is not a safe haven or breeding ground for jihadist terrorists, not dominated by any power hostile to the United States, and that contributes to a stable global energy market.” Realizing this goal requires promoting enduring US regional interests such as preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon, promoting regional stability, ensuring global access to the region’s energy resources, guaranteeing the survival of...
of Israel, limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and containing terrorism. The actions of emerging major regional powers, namely Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel, will strongly influence the ability of the United States to promote these interests.

**Iran**

Tehran’s post-revolutionary foreign policy has been aimed at countering and reducing the influence of the United States and its close regional allies. US policy since the revolution has been to isolate and contain Iranian influence. Accordingly, the United States has subjected Tehran to a network of American and international sanctions designed to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons’ technology, limit its ballistic missile program, and constrain its support of terrorist organizations.

Since the United States ended its compliance with the 2015 Iran nuclear deal—formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—it has imposed a steadily intensifying campaign of economic sanctions dedicated to compelling changes in Iran’s behavior. While this policy of intensified sanctions has clearly imposed significant damage on Iran’s economy, Iran’s malign influence continues in the region.

In response, Iran has taken steps to reduce its compliance with the nuclear accord, expand its civilian nuclear activities, and shorten the so-called breakout time required to produce a nuclear weapon. More recently, Iran temporarily denied the International Atomic Energy Agency access to some sites with suspected ties to a nuclear weapons program. These steps, while reversible, are especially worrisome as some hard-line Iranian leaders are signaling a willingness to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Similarly, Iran’s missile programs also continue to advance despite intensified and expanded American sanctions. In April 2020 Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps successfully launched its first satellite into orbit—a step the United States strongly criticized as a cover for Iran’s further development of a ballistic missile program designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons in the future.

Iran is also actively seeking to undermine regional stability through a network of Shia militia groups trained, equipped, and sponsored under the leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. This network includes a close relationship with Lebanese Hezbollah—a group the US government formally designated a foreign terrorist organization in 1997. In addition to arming Hezbollah with rockets and missiles capable of

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threatening Israeli population centers, Iran provides critical financial and military support to the Houthis militants in Yemen, enabling the group to launch missile and drone attacks on Saudi civilian and military facilities.5

In Iraq, Iran has deep and enduring ties with numerous Shia militia groups. While playing a supporting role in liberating Iraqi territories from ISIS control, these groups have also continued to launch direct attacks on US and Iraqi facilities alike.6 Meanwhile in Syria, Iran continues to recruit local fighters and Shia militia groups to bolster its only regional ally in Damascus.7 There is little sign Iran will abandon its historical support for these groups despite economic strains.8

Additionally leaders in Tehran have demonstrated the ability to attack directly US and allied energy interests in the region. In September 2019 Iran conducted missile and drone strikes on refining facilities in Saudi Arabia that temporarily cut Saudi oil production in half and reduced global supplies by 5 percent.9 While Saudi Arabia quickly restored this capability, these incidences highlighted the vulnerability of the Arab Gulf state to Iranian attacks and clearly demonstrated the limits of any US security guarantee.

As a direct consequence, Arab leaders have begun to hedge their support for an American strategy of maximum pressure on Iran by directly reaching out to Tehran to ease tensions. In early August 2019 the United Arab Emirates (UAE) sent a military delegation to Tehran to discuss coordinating security efforts to protect shipping in the Gulf and more recently sent an airplane full of medical supplies to Iran in a gesture of solidarity to help combat the coronavirus.10 Similarly, leaders in

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Riyadh have launched a quiet campaign of diplomatic outreach to Tehran in order to avoid direct conflict.11

Moreover, US allies in Europe and in some Arab capitals have sought some level of accommodation with Iran. Leaders in Germany, Britain, and France are actively seeking to preserve the Iran nuclear deal by creating alternative means of facilitating both international business investments and the provision of humanitarian goods to Iran.12

**Saudi Arabia**

Saudi Arabia has often directly contributed to US interests by using its position as a major swing producer of oil to stabilize global oil markets at critical junctures.13 But the so-called Shale Revolution has transformed the global energy market, propelling the United States into position as the world’s largest oil producer and effectively making the United States and Saudi Arabia competitors for the global market share.14 In fact, some analysts directly attribute recent Saudi efforts to flood the oil market to a campaign designed to drive US shale companies out of business.15

In addition to these newly emerging tensions, the Kingdom has a mixed record in terms of battling Islamic extremism. Terrorism expert William McCants has characterized the Saudis as “both the arsonists and firefighters” in this battle.16 Saudi Arabia has undoubtedly used its wealth to promote a puritan and reactionary Wahhabi version of Islamic theology, which now fuels many of the violent Sunni jihadi terrorist groups threatening Western interests around the globe.17 While acknowledging this troubled past, terrorism expert Daniel Byman also notes Riyadh has simultaneously proven itself to be “a vital partner in the struggle to defeat the Islamic State, al-Qaida, and other groups.”18

Moreover, Saudi Arabia is now effectively being led by Mohammed bin Salman, the King’s son, heir apparent, and at 35 years old stands to rule the country for several decades. At home he is pushing a

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forward-looking economic agenda aimed at diversifying the Kingdom’s oil-based economy, boosting the private sector, and creating a more favorable environment for foreign investment. The crown prince has also said he wants to foster a more tolerant version of Islam that is not susceptible to being hijacked by violent terrorist groups for their own purposes.

At the same time, however, bin Salman has shown no signs of undertaking any serious domestic political reforms that would be more inclusive or serve as a basis to weaken the strong ruling hand of the Saud family. Moreover, his behavior overseas has been reckless and costly. As defense minister he plunged Saudi Arabia into an ill-advised quagmire in Yemen that has highlighted Riyadh’s military incompetence, drained its fiscal coffers, and raised doubts about the wisdom of his personal leadership.

In addition, he led a regional campaign to isolate Qatar that has fractured the unity of the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council and created opportunities for Iran to expand its political, commercial, and military presence in the region—all of which work at cross-purposes with existing American strategies to isolate Iran. A continuation of these troubling behaviors could trigger potentially significant changes ahead in this long-standing partnership.

**Turkey**

When Recep Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party came to power in 2003, the United States had hoped the republic would become an example of how Islam and democracy could coexist in a secular state. Over time, Erdogan’s Islamic leanings and domestic repression have increasingly tarnished the image of Turkey as a secular democracy. After the failed 2016 coup attempt, Erdogan blamed his former ally, Fethullah Gülen, and the United States for failing to extradite Gülen from his compound in the Poconos. The Gülen issue, along with terrorism and Turkish cooperation with Russia, have increased tensions between the United States and Turkey.

The Syrian civil war has exacerbated the instability in Turkey, the Middle East, and Europe. In 2017 Turkey established observation posts in Idlib to monitor agreements with Moscow to de-escalate tensions. Since then, Turkey has sent around 20,000 troops into the Idlib province in addition to clearing Kurdish fighters from the border with Turkey. This action has not only resulted in clashes between the Turkish and


Syrian armies, it has also increased the risk of conflict with Russian and US forces in the region.

Further, the Syrian war has created a massive influx of some 3.6 million refugees and migrants that Turkey hosts today. The offensive in the Idlib province has displaced another 1 million Syrians. While the EU has at least partially compensated Turkey for this burden—over €6 billion—Turkish citizens and Erdogan are losing their patience with the refugees. To deal with the recent movement of Syrians, Erdogan has threatened to move them through Turkey to Europe. The COVID-19 virus may exacerbate tensions caused by the refugees and displaced persons, placing additional strains on Turkey.

Erdogan’s obsession with the (real but exaggerated) security threat posed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK—an organization designated as a terrorist group by Turkey, the United States, and many European countries) has led him to intervene militarily on multiple occasions into neighboring Syria and Iraq. These operations have strained Turkey’s military, which is still reeling from the massive leadership purges of senior and mid-level officers ordered by Erdogan in wake of the failed 2016 coup. These Turkish interventions into the sovereign affairs of neighbors have at various times exacerbated tensions with leaders in Baghdad, Damascus, Washington, Brussels, and Moscow alike.

Considering its concerns over the PKK, Turkey has increasingly cooperated with Russia to pursue its interests in the region. In addition, both the United States and NATO have pushed back strongly against Turkey’s deal to purchase S400 missiles from Russia, resulting in Turkey’s suspension from the F-35 fighter program.

In addition, Erdogan’s open support for the Muslim Brotherhood has placed him into open conflict with regional leaders in Riyadh, Tel Aviv, and Cairo. Meanwhile, his decision to intervene in Libya has also put Turkey at odds with Egypt, Russia, and the UAE. The recently escalated Nagorno-Karabakh conflict could also increase tensions between Russia and Turkey, although both sides are working to constrain the fighting. Further, Turkish drilling and exploration operations off the coast of Cyprus are causing tensions between Turkey and members of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum which includes Cyprus, Egypt,

24. Khurshudyan and Dadouch, “Cease-Fire in Idlib.”
Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority. Moreover, Turkey has developed a working relationship with Iran through the Astana peace process and by providing humanitarian and medical assistance for Iran to combat the coronavirus pandemic. Turkish entities such as Halkbank have also sought to evade US sanctions on Iran.

Clearly, the relationship between Turkey and the United States is in trouble. Polling in 2019 indicates over 80 percent of the Turkish public now views the United States as a threat rather than an ally. Congress has taken a harsher approach to Turkey by supporting sanctions on Turkish arms manufacturers and, symbolically, by formally recognizing the Armenian genocide in 1915.

Israel

The preservation of Israel has been a vital interest for the United States from the Cold War onward. While US support has been instrumental in aiding Israel, today a strong and confident Israel with a muscular foreign and internal security policy presents its own challenges to the US interest in regional stability. Israel’s long-running effort to guard against the external threat once posed by its Arab neighbors has been replaced by a forward defense strategy against the threat of Iran and its nonstate actor Shia Arab proxies. Meanwhile Israel’s struggle to maintain and expand control over the occupied territory of Palestine continues to complicate its relationships with Arab states who otherwise might be inclined to pursue a more formal and visible partnership.

Despite the negative stigma of its continued occupation of Palestine, Israel shares many values and a democratic political system with the United States. The country also benefits from strong and active constituencies within America’s Jewish and Evangelical Christian populations that make support for Israel a domestic and foreign policy concern for American leaders.

Regional threats to Israel’s security have eased due to extensive continued US military assistance. Both Egypt and Jordan, which traditionally posed a sustained and significant conventional military threat to Israel’s southern and eastern borders, today share Israeli concerns about the threat posed by Islamist terrorist groups and have developed effective working security relationships with Israel. More recently, US diplomacy and weapons sales have helped induce the UAE and Bahrain to normalize relations with Israel—making official what had long been quietly expanding economic and security cooperation.

Oman may soon follow and even Saudi Arabia’s crown prince reportedly favors eventual recognition.\(^33\)

To Israel’s north, Syria and Lebanon are now confronting serious political, economic, and social divisions. Such divisions are consuming the attention of leaders in Damascus and Beirut and will prevent these states from presenting a serious conventional military threat for years to come. America’s 2003 removal of Saddam Hussein and Baghdad’s current domestic political turmoil and more immediate ISIS threat effectively eliminate Iraq as a meaningful threat to Israel’s security. These developments leave Iran and its proxies in Syria and Lebanon as the most serious regional threat to Israel’s security.

In a dramatic change from the previous seven decades of its existence, Israel today benefits from the parallel security concerns of other Arab states, similarly focused on the threat posed by Iran’s growing influence. Although public opinion in the Arab Street remains anti-Israel, many regional Arab governments have quietly formed increasingly strong security ties with Israel based on their own pragmatic needs.\(^34\) These quiet partnerships complement US national security interests. Nonetheless, while this behind-the-scenes coordination and the expanding official recognition of Israel are important steps, continued Israeli occupation and the absence of a formal peace agreement with the Palestinians will act as constraints on Israeli hopes of becoming a fully integrated and accepted member of any emerging, region-wide political, economic, or security architecture. Additionally, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s plans to annex formally much of the West Bank, although temporarily suspended, continue to produce friction with Jordan and other US Gulf allies.

Israel’s concerns about the growing threat from Iran have led it to take increasingly aggressive active unilateral military and diplomatic measures. Militarily, Israel continues periodic, but extensive air strikes throughout Syria against Iranian or Iranian-backed targets and has demonstrated its willingness to risk inflammatory and potentially escalatory aftereffects.\(^35\) One strike in 2018 even led to Syrian air defenses shooting down a Russian jet in the ensuing confusion.\(^36\) More recently, Israel has expanded its reach into Iraq, including a series of summer 2019 drone strikes against Iranian proxies in Iraq that raised a potential threat to the fragile US-Iraqi relationship and could have placed US


military forces in Iraq at risk from Iranian retaliation.\textsuperscript{37} While these preemptive actions are understandable from the standpoint of an Israeli state assessing itself vulnerable and increasingly surrounded by threats, they complicate America’s efforts to counter Iranian and extremist influence throughout the region.

**Implications for US Policy**

In a region increasingly under stress, the United States will need to adopt policies that advance US interests in an increasingly complex and constantly evolving security environment. Given the tremendous uncertainties surrounding the region’s future, US policy makers should adopt a hedging approach: pursue adaptive and flexible strategies toward these states, based on the specific interests concerned; build diverse coalitions-of-the-willing to confront challenges as they emerge; and avoid large, one-sided investments in any single static group of countries or partners.

As a part of this hedging approach, bilateral relationships with these four countries will need to change. First, the United States should take a more nuanced and expansive approach to Iran. Iranian influence in the region should be resisted to the extent it harms US interests, but US policy makers should also seek constructive engagement where interests overlap. With a population of over 80 million people and significant reserves of oil and natural gas, Iran and its regional influence cannot simply be eliminated but instead must be actively opposed when necessary and channeled in positive directions where possible.

The steps Iran has taken to reconstitute components of its civilian nuclear program in the wake of US withdrawal from the nuclear deal must be at the top of US security concerns. Thus far these steps are reversible; Iran’s foreign minister has repeatedly stated Iran will return to full compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action once sanctions are lifted in accordance with the terms of the original deal.\textsuperscript{38}

Should policy makers decide to return to negotiations with Iran, the window for a potential agreement will be short due to upcoming Iranian presidential elections scheduled for early 2021. Hardliner and conservative candidates swept Iran’s parliamentary elections held in February 2020 suggesting diplomatic proposals to make open concessions to the United States will meet strong resistance.\textsuperscript{39} Taking advantage of this fleeting opportunity will require urgent and creative US diplomacy that incentivizes Iran’s return to the negotiating table and lays out a credible plan for the phased easing of sanctions tied to specific

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\textsuperscript{38} “Iran’s Fifth Step Away From the Nuclear Deal,” The Iran Primer (blog), United States Institute of Peace (USIP), January 6, 2020, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2020/jan/06/iran%E2%80%99s-fifth-step-away-nuclear-deal.

changes to Iranian activities in the region. Such diplomacy must generate sufficient international support, reassure nervous US regional allies, and refrain from generating opposition from Russia and China in the UN Security Council.  

Additionally, Iran has the potential to play constructive or destructive roles in addressing many of the region’s major security challenges whether in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, or Afghanistan. US policy makers will need to craft the right combination of pressures and incentives to channel Iranian influence.

The current COVID-19 pandemic may present an opportunity for US policy makers to reassert American leadership, build international goodwill, and open a window for renewed negotiations with Iran. Although the extent of the damage is unclear, Iran has been hit extremely hard by the coronavirus at a time when its leaders were already under intense domestic pressure. Extending an olive branch in the form of humanitarian aid and temporary conditional lessening of sanctions could offer a unique opportunity to demonstrate American support for the Iranian people. Such a move could also de-escalate mounting US-Iranian tensions.

Similarly, future policy makers could initiate international, regional, and bilateral discussions aimed at establishing the parameters for a more enduring and effective Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action targeting the full range of Iran’s problematic behavior. Such a diplomatic and economic bridge-building exercise could start with small confidence-building measures, including a targeted relaxation of sanctions and expansion of foreign investments in Iran’s economy in exchange for parallel restrictions on Iranian nuclear, missile, and other regional activities.

At the same time, the United States should seek to capitalize on the convergence of Israel and Gulf Arab interests in contesting Iran’s growing influence in the region by deepening and expanding the recently concluded normalization agreements with the UAE and Bahrain. Continuing the tradition of extensive US conventional military assistance to and cooperation with Israel and Saudi Arabia provides a strong foundation for deterring overt Iranian aggression. The United States, nonetheless, should also be careful of relying too much on Israel and Saudi Arabia as proxies to confront Iran. Ongoing Israeli air strikes into both Syria and Iraq as well as the costly Saudi intervention into Yemen demonstrate either of these partners are capable of instigating larger regional conflicts into which the United States could easily be drawn.


US regional military strategy should rely heavily on a strong—if necessarily transient—naval and air force presence to serve as a deterrent to Iranian military adventurism that directly targets the United States and its regional allies or endangers international shipping through the Hormuz Strait. Meanwhile, the US Army presence in the region should more narrowly focus on defeating ISIS and building partner capacity. This reduced US physical military presence in places like Kuwait will place primary responsibility for regional security in the hands of Arab leaders while still providing a residual on-the-ground presence to reassure allies.

Beyond military cooperation, US policy makers should also explore potential measures to forge regional and international arms control agreements that improve transparency and reduce the risks for miscalculations that could spark regional military conflict. US policy should expand both the substantive scope and roster of participants in maritime patrol operations, which would ensure freedom of navigation through critical choke points in both the Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb Straits.

A tailored US military presence should be simultaneously bolstered by an increasingly active diplomatic and economic campaign aimed at reducing prospects for a military confrontation with Iran; repairing the internal Gulf Cooperation Council rift with Qatar; forging regional solutions to the civil wars in Yemen, Syria, and Libya; and addressing the humanitarian needs of increasingly desperate refugee populations fleeing these conflicts. The roles of Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran will be a key consideration in any of these efforts.

In some ways, Turkey may be the most difficult bilateral relationship to navigate. The United States must make a concerted effort to address Turkish fears emanating from an unstable southern border and the continued threat from the PKK. The United States should also work with its European allies to continue economic support for Turkey, which has borne much of the brunt of caring for migrants and refugees since 2015. The United States should continue bilateral and multilateral exercises—under NATO—with Turkey, commit to retaining a nuclear deterrent in Turkey, and roll back Congressional efforts to sanction Turkey’s defense industry further.42

Turkey remains a force multiplier for US efforts to contain Russian adventurism, to project power in the region, and to balance Iran’s influence in the region. The United States should use its diplomatic, economic, and military instruments of power to keep Turkey in the NATO alliance, while working behind the scenes to curb Turkey’s increasingly autocratic and expansionist tendencies.

At the same time, the United States needs to push back against Erdogan courting Russia and Iran. In addition to suspending Turkey from the F-35 program, US policy makers should consider limiting

42. Gordon and Sloat, “U.S.–Turkish Alliance.”
other military sales to Turkey if Erdogan does not reverse course. The United States must also continue to work closely with Erdogan regarding Turkey’s presence in Syria and Iraq. The United States should explore alternative basing arrangements so as not to be caught flat-footed in the event Erdogan demands US forces depart Incirlik Air Base. The United States should also seek to mediate competing resource claims between Turkey, Egypt, Greece, Israel, and Cyprus in the Aegean. Finally, the United States should exert influence on Ankara to reinitiate peace talks with the PKK that were suspended in 2015 and reduce military ties with the YPG (the People’s Protection Units, a primarily Kurdish militia in Syria and the major component of the Syrian Democratic Forces) in Syria.

**Conclusion**

The future of the Middle East is more in flux than it has been for decades. The traditional poles of power emanating from Cairo, Baghdad, and Damascus have been eclipsed by the rise of non-Arab powers in Israel, Iran, and Turkey; competition from China and Russia; and increasingly divergent interests between these regional powers, Saudi Arabia, and the United States.

The COVID-19 pandemic has introduced even more uncertainty into the region. Saudi Arabia, for instance, may well have sufficient economic resources to emerge from this pandemic relatively unscathed; however, other countries including Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen may suffer damage only large-scale international assistance can hope to mitigate. In this situation, existing US policies and strategies need to adapt quickly to these challenges as they emerge in the region. Even competently led and well-resourced governments will have trouble surmounting these challenges, and such governments are in rare supply in the Middle East.

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Christopher J. Bolan
Dr. Christopher J. Bolan, professor of Middle East security studies at the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, served as a foreign policy adviser to vice presidents Al Gore and Dick Cheney.

Jerad I. Harper
Colonel Jerad I. Harper, PhD, assistant professor at the US Army War College, teaches courses in national security, the Middle East, the Indo-Pacific region, and building partner capacity.

Joel R. Hillison
Dr. Joel R. Hillison, associate professor at the US Army War College, is the author of *Stepping Up: Burden-Sharing by NATO’s Newest Members*. 
On “Projecting Stability: A Deployable NATO Police Command”

Raymond E. Bell Jr.


It will be interesting to see if a NATO Police Command will mature from a theoretical force structure to one of reality as so cogently argued by Massimo Pani and Karen J. Finkenbinder in “Projecting Stability: A Deployable NATO Police Command.” As a former brigade commander of the US Army Reserve 220th Military Police Brigade, my interest is piqued, especially when thinking about the manning of such a command.

I commend the authors for their forward thinking in developing the rationale for such a command but feel they might have taken their concept an additional step further and commented on the “who” situation in more detail. They could have addressed some of the personnel resources presently available, especially as pertains to US contributions to a US stability policing brigade but also to the other proposed necessary adjunct organizations and staff sections.

If the command were to be organized just from within today’s active duty US Army military police unit structure establishment, a difficulty would arise. The authors noted, “the most notable aspect that authorities and military commanders must understand about building a stability police force is that large numbers of novice police officers, swiftly equipped and hastily instructed, are detrimental to the success of security and stabilization operations.” This is a point well taken.

My experience was that the US Army Military Police Corps commissions officers and enlists soldiers who are what I consider the “cream of the crop.” Members must be capable of multitasking, specifically, accomplishing various police-related functions with professionalism. But by and large, the active duty corps does not have a broad-based complement of professionally mature and experienced personnel in its ranks.

The majority of the active duty, lower-ranking corps members must be considered novice police officers, although considering their high caliber, my evaluation is not to be construed as negative or degrading. Today’s enlisted individual or officer with an active duty commissioned or enlisted commitment simply does not have, nor can be expected to have, the experience gained by extended service in the corps.

Dr. Raymond E. Bell Jr., brigadier general, US Army retired, former commander of the 220th Military Police Brigade, US Army Reserves, holds a PhD in Central European history from New York University and is a military affairs and history writer.
Dr. Finkenbinder clearly has military police experience and is qualified to address the subject of effective manning. Her curriculum vitae states she served as “a municipal police officer, state police training and education specialist, and military police officer.” I suspect that hidden within those words is that she was not only on active duty service as a military police officer but also in the Army Reserve or National Guard in some military police capacity. If I am correct, then she fully appreciates from where the law enforcement professional assets can come to man a NATO police command outside the active duty Army force structure.

The law enforcement background of such Reserve component police personnel can be phenomenal. But individuals with other backgrounds related to combat, anti-criminal operations, community service, legal work, business enterprise, civilian government administration, and religious practice (to name a few) have, as noted in the essay, a place in the manning mix. That mix can be multicomponent.

In my brigade headquarters, for example, there were personnel whose performance over a four-year period showed that the integrated active duty Army, traditional Army Reserve, activated Army Guard and Army Reserve, and military technician combination of personnel worked harmoniously and effectively.

The traditional Army reservists in the brigade headquarters consisted of those with active duty Army combat arms and military police service in Vietnam, as well as those who were local and regional full-time correctional and police officers, US Department of Agriculture and US Department of State employees, college professors, civilian military intelligence and Central Intelligence Agency professionals, writers, Naval Criminal Investigative Service investigators, lawyers, hospital administrators, and clergy.

Some had advanced degrees including doctorates. All these personnel were experienced in their civilian capacities, which would have contributed effectively to mission accomplishment had the brigade ever been mobilized. Indeed, in training deployments to Egypt, Jordan, and Somalia, the personnel had many opportunities to demonstrate proficiency in projecting stability.

Accordingly, a further step in manning a US contribution to a deployable NATO police command could be organizing an Army Reserve or Army National Guard brigade composed of experienced, component-integrated personnel available on the short notice the authors have stipulated.

In sum, it is encouraging to read of organizing a deployable NATO police command, but as the authors noted, it must be appropriately manned to accomplish its different anticipated functions and missions. I would like, therefore, to see the authors consider in more detail who should be in the force’s complement, with an eye toward integrating members of all US Army components and even investigating the participation of the other branches of service in the command.
The Authors Reply

Massimo Pani and Karen J. Finkenbinder

We agree with Brigadier General Raymond Bell’s assessment regarding “civilian” policing expertise in the Army. Much of it is resident in the Reserve components as there are many civilian police officers serving within the Reserves and National Guard, however, there are broader issues at play here.

The United States is not ideal to conduct stability policing or lead any international police development program. Our decentralized, US state-centric system does not translate easily into international operations, notwithstanding one common denominator among American municipal and state police—their experience using discretion among civilians in their daily work practice, something likely not found among many military police in the active component. A civilian on a military post is quite different from one in a civilian community as the military has options to prevent entry and to remove troublesome civilians from its installations.

In contrast, stability police from gendarmerie-type forces (GTF), like the Carabinieri, have much longer training and education programs and they spend their careers in civilian communities, not on military installations. Further because of the nature of deployments, especially in recent years, GTF often have extensive experience in international operations. And they are police with civilian status and accepted by the United Nations as police.

In contrast, military police are not recognized by the United Nations as police for a police component, an important consideration as NATO missions often transition to UN or similar police or political-led missions. Similarly, the African Union and other regional organizations have similar philosophies—the military are not police. There’s a reason for that. In many countries in which there are peace operations, security forces have been (and sometimes are) bad actors, related to a predatory, corrupt political class that came into power as the result of a coup supported by the military. The civilian police (clearly delineated from the military) under civilian control are necessary to build police institutions that respect the rule of law.

Can military police do stability policing? Absolutely! And we agree their professionalism goes a long way toward setting the standard for future policing. But this doesn’t get to the longer-term institution building, built upon a civilian-control model, accepted by the population as legitimate. At best, military police can conduct stability policing for basic tasks as we get enough GTF into the operation to do it. And as the environment stabilizes, the
long-term development plan should transition supporting police to the type of police being developed.

The area of detention operations is one in which we believe military police are best suited to support, if their force structure allows. The military police, aside from one unfortunate incident in recent years, are by far the best at detention. The American Corrections Association’s accrediting of military police-led detention facilities recognizes this. The rule-bound nature of detention and the technical competence and professionalism of military police officers make them a preferred provider of detention until the capacity to detain prisoners humanely can be built. There is less risk of disenfranchising the public when providing humane and transparent detention operations.

History shows that sustainable, civilian-led police institutions are not built by militaries in a top-down approach. “Militarized” police development tends to train and equip (it risks making corrupt police more efficiently corrupt) and misses the necessary bottom-up institution building necessary for legitimacy. Additionally, many of our international partners have GTF or other deployable police assets that can do such policing. This should also make us pause before the US military provides any support to civilian police under the auspices of security cooperation. Do we inadvertently risk delegitimizing the police when they begin to use military tactics, dress, or act like the military? We have seen this occur domestically when police adopt military practices.
Roland Philipps has produced an interesting and valuable biography of former British diplomat Donald Maclean, who conducted significant Soviet-sponsored espionage activities for decades as part of the “Cambridge Five” spy ring. This group was composed of five committed upper-class British communists, who after their studies and radicalization at Cambridge University, falsely claimed to have renounced their radical pasts. They then established themselves in important careers, where they acted as Soviet agents and did substantial damage to Western security interests before and during the Cold War. All of these men had developed a rigidly Marxist outlook in the 1930s during a period of political turmoil and economic depression throughout the world.

Philipps suggests certain elements of Maclean’s upbringing under the supervision of a strict and morally uncompromising father played out in unexpected ways. At Cambridge Maclean began searching for a cause and an opportunity to serve humanity. In an era of moral and political uncertainty, he felt he was beginning to find that opportunity by studying Marxism. He did so at a time when communism had become more acceptable at British universities due to the Great Depression, mass unemployment, reduced wages, and rapidly expanding and visible poverty throughout the United Kingdom and other Western societies. The widely accepted and very rosy predictions of continued growth in the Western economies following World War I dissolved in the aftermath of the Wall Street Crash of 1929. These economic problems were further complicated by the frightening rise of fascism in Europe.

In this atmosphere, young Maclean joined the popular Cambridge University Socialist Society, where about a quarter of the participants were also members of the Communist Party. Maclean was a vocal supporter of many radical causes and even identified himself as a Communist in an interview with the student newspaper. He graduated from Cambridge in June 1934 as the same morally rigid person he had always been, but this rigidity was now in the service of his belief in the need for world revolution. Moreover, Maclean’s communism was not that of a leftist academic drawing diagrams of class struggle; he was a hard-core Communist who saw the Soviet Union as the epitome of what he believed the world should be.

After graduating from Cambridge Maclean applied to the Foreign Office and sought a career in diplomacy. It was at least possible, and probably likely, that he was planning to work on behalf of the Soviet
Union even at this early stage in his life. He did well in his Foreign Office examinations and during the interview phase dismissed his radical past as a brief flirtation with an ideology, which he by then viewed as nonsense. Such an explanation appealed to his examiners who shared a widespread British upper-class view that interest in socialism or even communism was simply a “passing fancy of youth” (50). Undoubtedly, it was such a “fancy” with some candidates, but not in this case. Maclean’s examiners, correspondingly, made their country vulnerable by refusing to entertain the possibility that someone of his family, background, and upbringing could be committed to anything but establishment values. No serious investigation occurred into Maclean’s life experiences, and he was inducted into the Foreign Office as a junior official.

Perhaps even more egregious, and indicative of the same approach, Maclean’s friend, Kim Philby, was eventually inducted into the British Intelligence Service despite his own youthful record of radical activism and his secret marriage to an Austrian communist, who recruited him into Soviet service. Philby used his communist connections in Europe and put Maclean in touch with a Soviet handler, who quickly recruited Maclean to engage in espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union and its satellite organization, the Communist International (Comintern).

Philipps shows that Maclean was a brilliant and extremely productive Soviet agent throughout most of his diplomatic career. In some ways the British government made it easy for him. The Foreign Office showed almost no serious interest in document control for classified material, and Maclean freely took important secret documents home with him. This practice was well-known among his coworkers, but they wrote it off as a by-product of Maclean’s exceptionally strong work ethic. While he did work on these documents at home, Maclean usually had his Soviet handler photograph them first.

Philipps maintains Maclean conserved his self-esteem throughout most of his diplomatic career by his service to the communist cause. Maclean would become unhappy and depressed during periods when he was unable to obtain especially important documents for Moscow. He also married an American radical, and against the principles of intelligence tradecraft, he told her he was working as a spy for the Soviet Union. During his time as a Soviet agent Maclean seemed impervious to doubt about the Soviet system under Stalin. While some supporters of the Soviet Union were shaken by the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the Soviet invasion of Finland, and the Great Purges, Maclean remained sanguine, trusting in Stalin’s judgment, and a total ideologue.

As the world situation became more alarming, Maclean’s career with the Foreign Office continued to flourish, and he achieved important promotions due to his intellect, hard work, and apparent commitment to the job. He did, nevertheless, feel considerable pressure from living a double life and began drinking heavily, eventually becoming an alcoholic who was often loud, unpleasant, and sometimes violent when drunk. These clear warning signs eventually earned him a lengthy
period of leave to rest, but never caused a review of his fitness to hold a security clearance.

Yet, if British counterintelligence efforts were naive regarding Maclean, Soviet intelligence activities as Philipps shows were often stumbling and unprofessional. The Soviets initially gave Maclean the code name Orphan, which reflected his fatherless state at the time and his solitary nature. This misguided approach represented the weak Soviet tradecraft in the 1930s and 1940s. Code names sometimes reflected personal attributes of the individual in question and were therefore less effective than a random name in protecting their agent’s identity if the code name was compromised. In an even more unforgivable example of this failing, Maclean’s fellow Cambridge spy Anthony Blunt was given the code name Tony.

These mistakes were marginal compared to those brought on by the paranoia infecting the Stalinist system. Soviet handlers were often recalled to Moscow on the assumption they might have become too westernized during their time abroad regardless of their outward loyalty. They usually willingly returned as ordered, facing almost certain death after extensive torture. Ironically, the Soviets often suspected Maclean of being a double agent due to the same prejudices as the British, a general disbelief that an upper-class British civil servant would actually be willing to engage in espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. Yet, the material he provided to the Soviets was so useful they found it difficult to write him off.

As with many Soviet agents, Maclean worried about his identity being properly protected by Moscow. General Walter Krivitsky defected from Soviet intelligence in 1937 and represented a potential threat to all Soviet spies in the British government, depending upon what information he knew to pass along to British counterintelligence officers. Unfortunately, this information was fairly limited. Krivitsky told his debriefers there were two Foreign Office spies, but he did not provide details to suggest who the traitors were. Moreover, Krivitsky’s usefulness to Western intelligence came to an end when he was murdered by Soviet agents in Washington, DC, in 1941.

Maclean avoided detection in this instance but was much more seriously implicated by US intelligence personnel who decrypted important portions of various intercepted messages. Many of these messages were decoded because of Soviet shortcuts for encryption taken during and after World War II. Tipped off by Philby in Washington, DC, about the American decryptions, Maclean fled to Moscow with fellow Cambridge Five spy Guy Burgess. Together the men lost the surveillance placed on them and managed to reach France and then Switzerland before disappearing into the Soviet Union in 1951.

Moscow initially refused to acknowledge Maclean’s presence, but then allowed him to assume a more public role. He learned Russian, acquired a doctorate, and became a senior analyst for the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. Maclean’s wife and three
children joined him in Moscow, although the marriage remained under great strain due in part to his severe alcoholism.

Perhaps the most important lesson of *A Spy Named Orphan* is that loyalty cannot be taken for granted because of a person’s background, education, or apparent conformism to social and organizational values. Another lesson is the tremendous damage a single well-placed agent can do if left in place without any investigation of scandalous statements or behavior. None of these lessons will come as a surprise to intelligence officials, but a comprehensive analysis of old lessons provided by a case study such as this work can be useful. It may also convey valuable knowledge for military leaders who are not intelligence professionals but who sometimes work in classified environments.

**How Ike Led: The Principles Behind Eisenhower's Biggest Decisions**

By Susan Eisenhower

Reviewed by Dr. Jonathan D. Arnett, research director at the Modern War Institute at the United States Military Academy

*How Ike Led* is a readable whirlwind tour of the life and leadership of Dwight D. Eisenhower, written by his granddaughter, Susan Eisenhower—a longtime policy strategist and author of the 1996 book *Mrs. Ike: Memories and Reflections on the Life of Mamie Eisenhower*. I highly recommend the book to readers with limited time who want to know more quickly about the general and the 34th president. Ms. Eisenhower indicates the book is a primer on Ike, a reintroduction of Dwight Eisenhower to the public, for those who did not grow up during his lifetime or who know little of him. Ms. Eisenhower relies on information garnered from scholarly works and her grandfather’s contemporaries and subordinates and intersperses childhood memories of her grandfather throughout the book—which I found interesting and very touching.

The book does not offer anything particularly new historically. Instead, Ms. Eisenhower condenses Ike’s history and highlights his critical decisions and character traits in a very personal, intimate way as only a granddaughter can do. As Ike’s granddaughter, Ms. Eisenhower illustrates more clearly and personally, the character and leadership principles that governed Ike’s success as a commander and president. She admits the book’s genesis, partially, was a reaction to 30 years of sharp criticism of the Eisenhower administration. She also claims as she grew older and dealt with more policy issues herself, she became more impressed with her grandfather’s legacy and appreciated how well he handled the challenging problems of the early Cold War. She claims criticism of Ike’s presidency has waned, and Americans increasingly are gaining an appreciation for her grandfather’s wisdom and bipartisanship. She hopes this book maintains that momentum.
I will not detail all of Ike’s big decisions and specific character traits highlighted in the book but will focus on a few. First, having worked closely for a service secretary and chief of staff, as well as three four-star combatant commanders, and supported high-stakes war planning, I have a special appreciation for Eisenhower’s strengths as a staffer, commander, and president. He had excellent judgment and seemed intuitively able to balance desired ends with available means against risks and prevail. In today’s lexicon of buzzwords and catchphrases, Ike was an exemplary “critical thinker.” While Ike may have made errors along the way—and what leaders do not—he consistently made the right calls when the stakes were highest. There were no great tragedies or catastrophes on his watch, and his record says a lot.

Second and directly related to his judgment, Ike vehemently believed in personal responsibility and accountability. Ms. Eisenhower retells the story of the famous note Ike crafted in case the Normandy invasion failed, where he accepted full responsibility for the decision and results. She also concisely retells the U-2 shoot down, and how Ike accepted responsibility for the embarrassment. I was also impressed with how Eisenhower dealt with a very subtle compromise of Operation Overlord planning. Close to D-Day, one of Ike’s senior officers hinted to a woman he desired to impress that he would be in France by mid-June. Eisenhower immediately relieved the officer. In an age when compromising legitimately protected state secrets has become sport, I admire Ike’s swift, resolute action. Regarding his integrity and objectivity, Ms. Eisenhower notes President Eisenhower repeatedly stated during his presidency that there would be no favoritism or nepotism, and reportedly, the majority of his advisers, staffers, and appointees were professionals rather than amateur or career politicians.

Third, without using the term, Ms. Eisenhower also highlights Ike’s profound stoicism. Ike believed some personal battles, some trials of mind and heart, should be fought privately. This belief was old school self-help, which is alien in a contemporary culture where leaders and celebrities relish publicly broadcasting all their fears, disabilities, and foibles. Across his youth, West Point years, and Army career, Ike learned to control himself—his passions, his anger, his selfishness. His stoicism became part and parcel of his exceptionalism.

It is a pity that in contemporary vernacular, the title Boy Scout has acquired an almost negative connotation denoting a person who is naive or foolishly virtuous. The character traits Ms. Eisenhower highlights in her grandfather are those of the ideal Scout and are embodied in the Scout Law—“A Scout is: Trustworthy, Loyal, Helpful, Friendly” (US Boy Scouts, “Scout Law”). Reading about Ike’s humble beginnings, religious upbringing, and close-knit family reminded me of a famous old quote of our national character being great because it was good. Ike was great because he was good, with good judgment and core attributes from which his leadership flowed.
At the beginning and ending of the book, Ms. Eisenhower appears to have another subtle objective in mind in addition to creating a superb primer on General and President Eisenhower. She engages in very mild sociopolitical commentary. Essentially, she critiques a culture and political class that is transfixed by the moment and buffeted by the present with very little deep deliberation for the long-term—the strategic—what is good collectively for the entire country. Like my parents, she waxes nostalgic for a previous period in US history—the era of her youth, the era when her grandfather was president. She misses the values and principles that caused a generally united, albeit imperfect nation, to “Like Ike.”

George W. Goethals and the Army: Change and Continuity in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era

By Rory McGovern

Reviewed by Dr. John K. Hawley, engineering psychologist, US Army Futures Command

Rory McGovern’s biography of George W. Goethals is a well-researched account of an important military officer and his career during the historical periods referred to as the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era, roughly 1880 to 1920. Goethals managed two significant efforts during this period—the construction of the Panama Canal and the reorganization of the Army’s World War I logistics enterprise. McGovern addresses the changes forced upon the Army by the rise of the United States as an international power following the Spanish-American War and uses Goethals’s career as a lens through which to examine the Army’s response to change during that period.

Goethals entered West Point in 1876 when the academy was less an educational institution than a mechanism for military acculturation. The prevailing view at the time was that the best form of education was experiential. Beyond West Point, there was little opportunity to receive what is now known as professional military education. This view was less true for the Army Corps of Engineers, of which Goethals became a part. Engineering was emerging as a professional discipline, but professional military education was still mostly experiential. Goethals, however, was fortunate. His early assignments led to his development as a competent civil engineer. McGovern notes Goethals’s career progression was more a matter of good fortune than anything done systematically by the Army to foster his professional development.

Goethals’s success across his early assignments eventually brought him into contact with W. H. Taft, then Secretary of War. About the same time, the United States had committed to the construction of the Panama Canal. For a variety of reasons, building the canal was a troubled project. US President Teddy Roosevelt wanted a construction manager who would not quit when the going got tough. That requirement suggested a
Roosevelt consulted Taft who suggested Goethals, and Roosevelt concurred. Acting through Goethals, the Army took charge of canal construction in 1907. Roosevelt’s directive to Goethals was to “make the dirt fly,” and he did (96). The canal opened for traffic on August 15, 1914.

Completing the canal was a “feather in the Army’s cap” and a major career and professional accomplishment for Goethals (206). At the height of canal construction, Goethals managed a workforce nearly half the size of the entire Army, and he served as governor of the Canal Zone from 1914 until September 1916 when he returned to the United States to retire from the Army. The chapter titled “Making the Dirt Fly” was the best researched and most solidly presented portion of the book and is good reading for anyone interested in the history of the canal project (84).

The section of the book addressing organizational change and the Army’s response to that change requires a rewind to the period immediately prior to the canal project, the Spanish-American War of 1898. The Spanish-American War thrust the United States onto the world stage as a major power. That said, US conduct of the Spanish-American War was an amateurish affair on many accounts. Public and political reactions to the haphazard way in which the war was conducted resulted in several postwar investigations.

These inquiries led to Elihu Root being appointed Secretary of War. Root had no military background, but he quickly recognized the need for serious military reform affecting the Army. The resulting Root Reforms had two primary thrusts: enhanced professional military education in the form of the Army War College and a reformed Command and General Staff College and the establishment of a general staff to direct and coordinate planning across the Army. These reforms were fiercely resisted in the upper echelons of the Army’s officer corps, most notably by the then-powerful bureau chiefs. The institutions intended to enable reform were created, but they were provided no ability to generate the desired changes.

The United States entered World War I in April 1917, and Goethals reentered public service to support the war effort. He was eventually appointed the Army’s Quartermaster General responsible for reorganizing the logistics aspects of a then-failing war effort. As in previous conflicts, the Army’s organization and war preparation efforts were not up to the challenges of World War I: quickly building an expeditionary force facing high-intensity, industrial-age warfare. Building on the organizational and managerial skills he developed during the Panama Canal construction project, Goethals quickly reorganized the Army’s logistics enterprise to meet those challenges. As McGovern points out, Goethals’s efforts are an interesting case study of politics, bureaucratic infighting, organizational dysfunction, and resistance to change.
Although the events described in the change and continuity portions of the book occurred more than 100 years ago, the echoes of those troubles are still with the Army today. In that sense, the book is relevant to the current period. The Army’s institutional culture is very strong, and culture is hard to change.

McGovern correctly notes large, hierarchical organizations that promote primarily from within tend to be resistant to change. Substantive change often requires a strong exogenous shock, such as those associated with the Spanish-American War or the failing war effort in late 1917. As the Army’s responses to the Root Reforms of 120 years ago illustrate and caution, institutional culture can lag and impede change initiatives. Cultural change cannot simply be commanded. Consistent and visionary leadership in the wake of crises that lead to change initiatives is essential. Such leadership was absent in the wake of the Root Reforms, and the subsequent change efforts foundered. That said, McGovern’s treatment of Army change and continuity during the historical period covered is rather shallow and not the best researched or presented aspect of the book.

The Impeachers: The Trial of Andrew Johnson and the Dream of a Just Nation
By Brenda Wineapple

Within the last several years, a number of new books have been published on the process of impeaching an American president. Brenda Wineapple’s outstanding The Impeachers is distinct from the others. She examines in depth the first US presidential impeachment and all the characters involved—without using her research as groundwork for discussing contemporary political issues. Despite Wineapple’s focus on the 1800s, readers cannot help but notice the striking similarities between President Johnson and President Trump even though both men faced different political cultures and contexts. There are limits, however, to the parallels. Johnson, who came to power after Lincoln’s assassination, was never elected president and was viewed by many Americans as an accidental head of state. He did not have a powerful political base supporting him, and he faced a hostile Republican Party in Congress that regularly overrode his vetoes on the most important legislation.

Johnson was widely known to be racist. He had previously owned slaves and was offended by the idea of black people rising above menial labor. Despite his Tennessee roots, he did side with the Union during the Civil War and was the only senator from a Confederate state to oppose secession. Wineapple maintains Johnson’s motives for these actions were complex and centered on his dislike of the Southern planter elite he believed treated him in condescending ways because of his impoverished childhood and background as an indentured servant.
and tailor. Johnson also feared black equality more than he resented the Southern aristocracy, and Wineapple argues that as president Johnson sought to return former slaves to conditions very much like slavery because of his racial prejudice and fear free blacks would compete for jobs usually held by poor whites.

Johnson opposed civil rights legislation, tried to limit the effectiveness of institutions created to help ex-slaves, and discounted violence by the Ku Klux Klan as isolated incidents. He wildly used his pardon power in ways that allowed wartime Southern politicians and senior Confederate officers to return to power. This approach surprised many Washington observers since Johnson was known to resent the Southern aristocracy. Wineapple clarifies this paradox by pointing out that while Johnson’s resentment ran deep, he also coveted the respect of Southern elites, and he enjoyed it when they requested pardons from him.

Johnson also sought to limit the power of the Army to protect blacks and pro-Union whites in the former Confederate states, placing him in conflict with Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, who sought to use the Army to protect black Americans and others cooperating with federal authorities in the South. Johnson eventually removed Stanton from office and fell into a carefully laid trap. Congress had previously passed the constitutionally questionable Tenure of Office Act which denied the president the ability to fire Senate-confirmed cabinet members without the agreement of the Senate. Johnson’s violations of the Tenure of Office Act became the core of the House of Representative’s Articles of Impeachment, although Article 11 was a catchall involving Johnson’s contempt for Congress and refusal to execute important laws passed by Congress. Johnson was impeached by the House of Representatives in February 1868 with his trial in the Senate ending in late May 1868.

The impeachment trial was the most sordid and complex political machination imaginable. As the first presidential impeachment, there was no precedent to draw upon. Congress improvised its procedures based on the brief and somewhat vague principles outlined in the Constitution. Many involved had personal agendas, as Wineapple shows. Underlying these concerns was a strong belief among Republicans that if they could wait until the November election, General Ulysses S. Grant would almost certainly be voted into office as a strong Republican president.

Ultimately, Johnson avoided removal from office by one vote. Republican Senator Edmund G. Ross, who had previously promised to vote against Johnson, decided at the last minute to support him. Wineapple suggests bribery might have been the decisive factor for the changed vote, although she also quotes an observer as stating the married Ross had become “infatuated to the extent of foolishness” with a beautiful much-younger woman who was an adamant Johnson supporter (359). Johnson completed the remaining months of his presidency as a discredited and largely powerless lame duck, returned to Tennessee after the expiration of his term without attending the inauguration of General Grant, and sought for many years to regain his former position as a US
senator—then elected by state legislators. Johnson finally gained enough support in the state legislature in 1875 to return to his Senate position and served just under five months before suffering a fatal stroke.

Wineapple concludes Johnson was impeached for his efforts to restore the Union with the old Southern elite in place and most black Americans returned to slavery-like conditions. The first presidential impeachment was an extremely political process and did not look remotely like an objective legal proceeding. Johnson was impeached for political and moral reasons. Wineapple believes this may be the most interesting lesson from the first presidential impeachment, and the dominance of politics in future impeachment trials will be extremely likely if not inevitable.
While history did not end in 1989, something began. Determining what that “something” might be has bedeviled the analysis of world affairs ever since. The year most famous for the fall of the Berlin Wall, with all the symbolism attached to it, marked for many Europeans and most Americans the end—or at least the beginning of the end—of the Cold War. Events in 1990–91 then marked the start of President George H. W. Bush’s new world order, which he suggested would be based on democracy, freer trade, and multinational cooperation. At the same time communism collapsed in Europe and sent shock waves to Moscow, communism triumphed in China. Anyone who lived through the first months of 1989 remembers many analysts expected to see fundamental change in Beijing, not Berlin. The decision by the Chinese communist leadership on June 4 to send tanks into the Square of Heavenly Peace appeared to bring all such dreams to an end.

As disparate as the events in Berlin and Beijing were, Kristina Spohr believes it is clear in retrospect that the contemporary world has lived in their dual shadow ever since. State socialism collapsed in Eastern Europe, but the Chinese model of state capitalism survived the challenge and has shaped the course of China and modern geopolitics. The hopefulness of the 1990s may have given way to the grim realities of 9/11 and the Global War on Terror, and now to the even-grimmer realities of pandemics and lockdowns, but there is no doubt the current multipolar world emerged from the collapse of Cold War bipolarity and the “unforeseen consequences of the design flaws in the new order improvised with such haste and ingenuity by the shapers of world affairs in 1989–92” (9).

Spohr, one of the finest of a new generation of international historians who have made their careers in the post–Cold War world, undertakes the daunting task of bringing these different stories together. In her massive and deeply researched book, she attempts to place the events and leaders in Europe, North America, and Asia into a common context to understand the “troubled birth” of the post-Wall and post-Square order as we ponder the implications of the order’s current demise (9).

Spohr mines a range of archives and sources in multiple languages to develop her narrative. Highlighting the interplay of personalities and policies, she weaves the actions of Bush, Mikhail Gorbachev, Kohl, and Deng into the fabric of world history.
Helmut Kohl, and Deng Xiaoping—the main actors as her title suggests—with the significant roles played by other world leaders, from Margaret Thatcher and François Mitterrand to Václav Havel, Boris Yeltsin, and Li Peng.

Spohr helps readers develop a truly global understanding of the tumultuous era from 1989–92 and see how connected the events appeared to actors at the time—especially readers who may not have experienced these events directly. Events in Beijing, combined with memories of failed popular uprisings in Eastern Europe in previous years, encouraged political leaders across the Atlantic to keep their expectations for change in Europe modest in fall 1989 and may have lulled some Eastern European communist leaders, especially Gorbachev, into a false sense of security about their ability to manage change. East German leader Erich Honecker openly speculated about a “Chinese solution” to the protests in Leipzig and other cities in October 1989 before being dissuaded from such reckless violence by more reform-minded colleagues (149). But even these colleagues, once they had pushed Honecker into retirement, underestimated the degree to which the rejection of violent repression meant the end of the East German regime altogether.

Similarly, Kohl and his colleagues in Bonn, who had spoken generally about their desire for German unification, scrambled to respond when protesters began chanting “We are one people!” (150). Kohl surprised many critics with his willingness to improvise, but the path to German reunification was far from smooth. While the happy European revolutions of 1989 would not have been possible without the enthusiasm of the crowds, the aftermath required the negotiating skills of leaders who themselves were not sure how things would turn out.

Spohr also helps readers understand the global reverberations of those heady moments in 1989. The revolutions in Europe had hardly settled down when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990, providing a further push toward a different international system, just as the failure of Gorbachev’s Soviet Union to save their former client provided further fuel for plotters to try to overthrow Gorbachev in August 1991. Nor did the surprising swift victory over Iraq guarantee re-election for Bush. In his “A Europe Whole and Free” speech in Mainz on May 31, 1989, Bush pursued a complex strategy, embracing German reunification and the development of a Europe “whole and free” while also trying to maintain Gorbachev in power and positive relations with China. American domestic politics ultimately caught up with the global statesman.

Rejecting a man they considered aloof and too focused on international affairs, American voters elected Bill Clinton, who during the campaign rejected Bush’s willingness to “coddle dictators from Baghdad to Beijing” only to become a strong advocate once in office of Chinese integration into the World Trade Organization (574). Furthermore, Bush’s last acts in office included dispatching US troops to
help war-torn Somalia—the first of many ill-fated efforts by Washington to use its influence as the world’s surviving superpower to bring about humanitarian political change.

As if the obvious number of foreshadowed events in her narrative were not enough, Spohr works in references to Donald Trump at the beginning and end of her book, both to remind readers of the consequences of decisions made in the 1990s and to reflect upon the changes in American leadership over the decades since. “Bush and his fellow managers of the 1989–91 post–Cold War transition had kept their eyes on the global balance,” Spohr concludes. “They also understood that US power had to be exercised within a framework of political alliances and economic interdependence” (598). That attitude also shaped, in varying degrees, the policies of Bush’s successors. Trump, however, had already signaled his rejection of this approach in a March 1990 interview in *Playboy*. Asked how President Trump would govern, Trump declared: “He would believe very strongly in extreme military strength. He wouldn’t trust anyone. He wouldn’t trust the Russians; he wouldn’t trust our allies; he’d have a huge military arsenal, perfect it, understand it” (599).

Trump’s plans for the future seemed out of step with the careful diplomatic approach of the leaders of his time. His rise to power, though, is indicative of how that careful approach sowed the seeds of its own destruction. Spohr does not say if a new era has begun in the last three years, but she does show the world has come a long way from the optimistic autumn of 1989.

**Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy: Religion, Politics, and Strategy**  
By Dmitry Adamsky

Reviewed by Dr. Robert E. Hamilton, professor of Eurasian studies, US Army War College, and retired US Army colonel

Will a more religious Russia be harder to deter and more willing to coerce adversaries? Will the rise in religiosity in Russia influence the Kremlin’s decisions on when to go to war and how Russia conducts itself in war? And will the unique nexus between the Russian Orthodox Church and Russia’s nuclear forces enable the nuclear forces to win budget battles against rivals in the coming era of budget austerity? These are some of the questions Dmitry Adamsky raises in *Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy*.

Adamsky is not the first scholar to notice orthodoxy has become a key component of Russia’s post-Soviet geopolitical identity. But his argument that the Russian Orthodox Church and the nuclear community have formed a uniquely strong bond is new and deserves serious consideration. If this bond is real, it bears directly on the answers to the questions posed above. The dual phenomena of rising religiosity and the unique bond between the Orthodox Church and the nuclear community...
could raise the profile of nuclear weapons in Russian national security strategy, directly affect Russia’s willingness to use force in a crisis, and influence how it uses that force.

Adamsky notes correctly there is a lack of evidence in international relations research that military clergy restrain states from going to war or moderate their conduct in war due to moral and ethical considerations. In Russia’s case the extreme conservatism and nationalism of the Orthodox Church may have the opposite effect. The church has long seen its role as shielding Russia from the supposed threat posed by a “decadent and secular” West. And Russia’s nuclear deterrent has long been a staple of its national security strategy.

The marriage between the two thus echoes the words of National Security Council (NSC)-68 published in 1950, which warned of the threat of a nuclear-armed Soviet Union “animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own” (The Executive Secretary, “NSC-68: A Report to the National Security Council,” Naval War College Review 28, no. 3 (May–June 1975): 53). The faith then was Marxism, and the faith now is Russian Orthodoxy. The two are different in their views of history and a just world order but are alike in exhorting their followers to extreme measures to carry out their visions, and in that married to one of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals, they make Moscow a dangerous and unpredictable adversary.

Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy is exhaustively researched, logically organized, and surprisingly readable—especially for a book taking on a topic of this magnitude. Adamsky’s use of Russian and English interviews, scholarly and journalistic sources, and official records provide a firm foundation for building his argument. The book traces the evolution of the relationship between the church and the nuclear community over the three decades of Russia’s post-Soviet history.

In each decade, Adamsky examines three themes. The first theme is the general development of the church-state relationship in Russia. The second theme is the more specific development of the “faith-nuclear nexus”—the relationship between the church and Russia’s nuclear weapons community (29). The third theme is strategic mythmaking or the deliberate “reading of religious connotations into history” that sought to prove “a causal link between the spiritual support of the church and battlefield successes” (150).

Over these three decades, the partnership between the church and the nuclear community, which began as a grassroots movement in the 1990s, eventually acquired support from the top. The Russian military in the 1990s was in profound shock and systemic crisis, and the church was just emerging from decades of enforced atheism and persecution at the hands of the Communist Party. In this environment, the two institutions developed a relationship that served both. The church could provide remedies for the military problems of motivation and discipline and fill the ideological vacuum left by the collapse of Soviet communism. And for the church, the military
represented a way to expand its influence by reaching out to all social groups and reestablishing a close relationship with the government.

Sustained lobbying from Patriarchs Alexey II and Kirill in the 2000s turned the Russian Orthodox Church into a key player in Russian politics. By the end of the decade, “nuclear churching” became Kremlin policy, with support from the top supplementing the initial grassroots movement of the 1990s (168). During this decade, the church met all four of its main goals: the introduction of religious instruction in public schools, the revival of the military chaplaincy, the restitution of pre-Soviet church property, and the marginalization of “nontraditional” denominations.

An actual doctrine of nuclear orthodoxy also emerged in this decade. With the political, economic, and social crises of the 1990s behind it, Russia began the search for a new national ideal. Among the views vying for attention in a variation on the traditional competition between Slavophiles, Westerners, Atlanticists, and Eurasianists was that of Egor Kholmogorov. Kholmogorov, the author of the nuclear orthodoxy doctrine, was an ultraconservative who won the For Feminism “Sexist of the Year” poll in 2014 for advocating punching women who utter the word “sexism” (Gabrielle Tetrault-Farber, “Publicist Who Advocated Punching Women in the Face Named ‘Russia’s Sexist of the Year’,” Moscow Times, March 12, 2015). Kholmogorov’s doctrine rested on two postulates: “to stay Orthodox, Russia should be a strong nuclear power” and “to stay a strong nuclear power, Russia should be Orthodox” (161).

The last 10 years, which Adamsky calls the “Operationalization Decade,” have solidified and institutionalized the marriage between the Orthodox Church and the nuclear community in Russia (7). During this decade, Russia’s nuclear arsenal gained additional prominence in Russian national security doctrine; simultaneously, the church provided a foundation for Russia’s new geopolitical identity. Adamsky’s identification of and explanation for this nexus between the church and the nuclear community in Russia may not be the only answer to the questions this book raises. Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy, however, provides richer and more accurate answers to these questions and enhances readers’ understanding of some important phenomena in international relations and military strategy.
Why We Fight

By Mike Martin

Reviewed by Anthony King, chair of war studies, Warwick University

Mike Martin’s Why We Fight belongs to a growing genre of literature, books written by junior officers based on their experiences of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This canon includes Patrick Hennessey’s The Junior Officers’ Reading Club, Patrick Bury’s Callsign Hades, Charlotte Madison’s Dressed to Kill, Evan Wright’s Generation Kill, Craig Mullaney’s The Unforgiving Minute, Emile Simpson’s War from the Ground Up, and Martin’s first book on the Helmand conflict, An Intimate War. There is nothing new about subaltern literature. Because they tend to be very literate and have experienced close combat firsthand, lieutenants and captains have written many important memoirs of the wars in which they served. Siegfried Sassoon, Wilfred Owen, Edmund Blunden, Robert Graves, and Ernst Jünger produced major works about the First World War. Even junior officers of the Vietnam War produced important contributions to this genre with Philip Caputo’s A Rumor of War, Bing West’s The Village, and, perhaps, the finest of all, Karl Marlantes’ Matterhorn and What It Is Like to Go to War.

Why We Fight is unusual in that it is not a memoir; Martin mentions his experiences in Afghanistan only obliquely. Instead, it is a general investigation of why humans go to war at all. In this, Why We Fight is most like Simpson’s War from the Ground Up. Written by two Afghan veterans, the two books form an interesting pair. While Simpson (an idealist) reduces war to its narratives, Martin (a materialist) believes war is in the genes, and the evolutionary psychology of humans compels them to fight.

For Martin war is best understood as an evolutionary adaptation. Humans go to war to protect their genes. Of course, there is an obvious conundrum here, which Martin seeks to resolve. War is a risky business, and it has been almost universally prosecuted by young men, whom it eliminates in large numbers before they have had a chance to reproduce. Consequently, as a reproductive strategy, it should be irrational for young men to fight. They are likely to die, while their cowardly but long-living brothers will have a greater chance of reproduction; paradoxically, on this account, the weak are, in evolutionary terms, fitter.

If the brave have always died young, then humans should have become less and less warlike. Martin perceptively notes, however, there is a secondary social mechanism at work. While young men might be killed if they go to war, if they shirk their collective duty to defend their community, they will definitely be excluded by it. They will be ostracized and may even suffer punishment or death. Consequently, by not going to war—for all its attendant risks—they reduce their reproductive fitness more than suffering the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. “We fight because losing membership of our in-group—whether because it
is disintegrating, or because we're being shunned for not fighting—is evolutionary suicide” (89). Crucially, by fighting for their community, soldiers will earn status and a sense of belonging, which Martin identifies as the two master motivations for going to war.

Martin proves historically the claim that humans fight for status and membership within their social group and also provides personal evidence of it. The book is punctuated with italicized autobiographical passages, which constitute some of the strongest prose in the book. In one passage, Martin describes how he was asked by his brother why he had volunteered for Helmand: “I pondered his question for a moment, and answered from the gut. ‘I want to see how I do,’ I replied, pausing before adding, ‘I want to prove myself’” (41). Later he describes the conflict he saw in southern Afghanistan. Against the official narratives, there was no simple war between the Taliban and the Afghan government there. Instead, there was a series of internecine struggles between power brokers, clans, and tribes against their local rivals. In each case, belligerents were motivated by immediate concerns of collective self-protection and promotion; by status and group membership, in short (124–25).

Martin’s sociological explanation of why humans are willing to fight is both powerful and economical, and sociologists, anthropologists, and many philosophers would certainly concur with him. He does not find this account sufficient, however, and proceeds, on its basis, to build a much more complex evolutionary edifice. Although humans certainly fight for status and belonging, Martin claims these emotional commitments are underpinned by biochemical mechanisms, particularly testosterone, which makes humans individually aggressive, violent, and risk-taking, and oxytocin, which heightens their attachment to their group. Humans are chemically programmed to love their kin, while also accepting—even relishing—the risks required to defend them. For Martin, these two chemicals explain why individuals can risk going to war for a social group they love.

At the same time, as a result of evolution, the human brain has become imprinted with a series of subconscious, innate modules which structure consciousness. These modules allow humans to form extremely large social groups, extending well beyond any genetic heritage. Martin identifies three major modules laid down in the Paleolithic Period: moral codes, religion, and ideology. These modules align individual human biochemistry to potential vast polities. Instead of just loving their immediate kin and being willing to fight and die for them, humans are conditioned by these modules to form oxytocin attachments to their societies, faith communities, or nations, consisting of thousands, maybe, millions of individuals. Testosterone ensures humans have been willing to fight for these attachments.

*Why We Fight* is an ingenious exposition of a long-standing philosophical problem and an evolutionary psychological explanation of war. It is an intriguing and unusual book for a former subaltern to have written and is an academic and, in places, dense inquiry. Serving
soldiers may find the book less useful and accessible than other works by Helmand veterans that deal more immediately with the experience of combat itself or Martin’s previous book on Helmand. Scholars and students of war, however, will read the book with great interest and ask why a British veteran of the Helmand campaign felt obliged to look beyond immediate strategic and political explanations in the struggle to understand the war in which he fought.

Culture and the Soldier: Identities, Values, and Norms in Military Engagements

Edited by H. Christian Breede

Reviewed by Dr. Kellie Wilson-Buford, associate professor of history, Arkansas State University

In spring 2015 a small group of senior military officers, defense policy analysts, and academics gathered at Queens University for a conference on the cultural dimensions of combat, battlefield operations, and multinational defense cooperation. The goal of the conference, hosted by the Centre for International and Defence Policy, was to develop policy recommendations to improve standards of cultural practice within the Canadian military and its partner states in addressing current and future crises worldwide. This unique book was the result of the conference.

Identifying culture as both a force that shapes military identities, values, and norms and a tool employed by militaries while conducting operations, Culture and the Soldier makes a compelling case for why cultural considerations should occupy a more central position in Canadian defense policy planning in particular and in defense policy planning more generally. While many studies have theorized about culture’s impact on the military, very few have analyzed how militaries have used culture as a tool to accomplish defense goals. H. Christian Breede does just that and lays the foundation for culture to be understood and employed in contemporary military engagements.

Part one, three chapters of qualitative research studies, examines how Canadian culture—its values, identities, and norms—has shaped the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) as an organization. Chapter one argues that Canadian culture shaped how the experience of combat was remembered among Francophone and Anglophone war veterans in Afghanistan and highlights the challenges a multicultural fighting force might face when trying to maintain unit cohesion and transition troops back to civilian life.

Chapter two operationalizes culture as the “attitudes toward and perceptions of gender roles and the appropriate behavior implied for all members of the military” and illustrates how evolving gender values and norms in Canadian civil society led to the CAF’s attempt at gender integration (21). The CAF’s unwillingness to conceptualize gender as
the representation of both femininity and masculinity was a key factor in this unsuccessful attempt at gender integration.

Chapter three highlights the cultural implications for the relationship between military casualties and society and argues Canadian civil culture shaped how Canadians ritualized and memorialized military casualties in Afghanistan, a view which has changed since the Korean War. Allowing for public expression of casualty rituals coincided with increased public support for the mission. Interestingly, this chapter rejects Breede’s definition of culture as vague and defines culture as the ascribed meanings given to symbols, heroes, and rituals. Despite the contested definitions of culture presented, part one offers intriguing examples of how Canadian culture has shaped the Canadian military.

Part two broadens its focus to analyze the ways militaries, governments, and security sector agencies have used culture as a tool to conduct operations. Chapters four and five explore the role of culture in the conduct of Russia’s “hybrid war within the grey zone” and reveal how the Kremlin and Russian security sector agencies leveraged propaganda and manipulated their corporate images to achieve foreign policy goals (84).

Where chapters four and five operationalize culture as popular beliefs and public perceptions about current events that organizations can manage and manipulate, chapter six defines culture as the different and often competing meanings militaries and humanitarian nongovernmental organizations ascribe to the words “security” and “success.” The chapter illustrates how efforts to enhance cooperation during crises have often resulted in short-term gains but long-term setbacks in humanitarian effectiveness. Chapters seven and nine highlight the necessity of both cultural education and a “social license to operate” for troops deployed in any country not their own as precursors to successful operations and the mental well-being of the troops involved (197). Chapter eight examines the role of international security organizations such as NATO and the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in fostering epistemic communities based on alliance and cooperation.

The strengths of this volume are its interdisciplinary scope, varied research methodologies, and contributor backgrounds that range from international relations, security studies, anthropology, and sociology to political science and literature. Notably absent from this exciting amalgam of scholars are historians whose work could provide important and necessary historical context for the various military engagements addressed.

Perhaps a side effect of the volume’s interdisciplinarity is its somewhat confusing organization. While part one focuses exclusively on the CAF, part two ranges in focus from Russia and Ukraine to Canada, the United States, and international security organizations and security schools and centers. Additionally, part two’s nearly 150 pages more than double part one’s 60 pages, leaving a significant imbalance of evidence and analysis.
The result is a very focused and compelling argument for how culture has shaped the CAF in the past few decades with little application to other militaries on the one hand and a varied and more generalized analysis of how militaries, governments, and organizations have used culture as a means to achieve specific end goals on the other.

The qualitative nature of the volume’s research does not undermine its importance in providing a useful template for future studies of culture as both a force and a factor in militaries and military operations worldwide. Despite its limitations, this volume of defense policy analysis is critical reading for anyone interested in the cultural dimensions of combat for the Canadian military and its partner states.

Lessons Unlearned: The U.S. Army’s Role in Creating the Forever Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq

By Pat Proctor

Reviewed by Dr. George Woods, professor of strategic leadership, US Army War College

In this time of great power competition and as depicted in the current US National Defense Strategy, Lessons Unlearned presents a contrary view of how the US Army sees itself. Author Pat Proctor confronts the conventional view that the Army must build itself into a formidable, technologically superior force for high-intensity conflict to counter threats that emanate from Russia or China. He argues the US Army’s culture prevents it from accepting anything else. He states the lessons that should have been learned—from the series of low-intensity engagements from the late 1980s through the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001—were ignored or never given a chance to become institutionalized due to the Army’s cultural bias, thus resulting in the decades-long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Army has failed to posture itself for success on two measures. First, it fails to embrace responsibility for engaging in the political dimension to reestablish failing or failed countries in which it must operate. Second, it repeatedly fails to create the capabilities to operate in low-intensity environments with needed capabilities like civil affairs, psychological operations, engineers, military police, and other such capabilities required in a low-intensity context. Consequently, the US Army remains prepared for the short-term high-intensity fight, but vulnerable to asymmetric threats that have caused the nation to be embroiled in the “forever wars in Iraq and Afghanistan” as a result (4).

Proctor’s exhaustingly thorough analysis includes a chapter on the lessons captured during operations in Somalia and Haiti and their effect on ongoing modernization efforts, in this case Force XXI. Emphasizing the Army’s reluctance to embrace the political dimension in both campaigns as well as the effect of operations in urban environments vis-à-vis nonstate actors created significant vulnerabilities. First, it
negated US technological advantages, exposing US forces to vicious street fighting and being outnumbered by lightly armed citizens. Second, it complicated processes for ending the fight and reestablishing stability in the country in crisis. While the lessons in Somalia were being captured, the Army concurrently proceeded with its future within the Force XXI framework.

In envisioning the force of the future, lessons from Somalia and in the soon-to-follow campaign in Haiti had not yet had time to influence new ways of thinking. Conflict was conceived to be war and operations other than war. Although the Army was to be prepared for both, Proctor clearly states that “transformation” effort in the Force XXI construct clearly presented a high-intensity bias (9). Proctor, however, feels there may have been a glimmer of hope as two organizations emerged that might have enabled a fair dialogue about low-intensity capabilities the Army needed to embrace. The Peacekeeping Institute established in 1993—and the predecessor to today’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute—joined the Army-Air Force Center for Low-Intensity Conflict (A-AFCLIC) previously established in 1986 at Langley Air Force Base. Those hopes were soon dashed in the next phase Proctor covers in the chapter on Bosnia and Herzegovina and the transformation effort to succeed Force XXI, the Army After Next focus.

While serving as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1996, General Shalikashvili shared his vision for the US Armed Forces of 2010 in his Joint Vision 2010. The vision was wholeheartedly embraced by General Reimer, the then serving Army Chief of Staff. Crafting the supporting Army Vision 2010, Proctor holds General Reimer most accountable for the demise of low-intensity conflict. Proctor faults General Reimer for virtually expunging low-intensity dialogue within the Army, as exemplified by decisions he made that withdrew Army participation in the A-AFCLIC—which ultimately disbanded in 1996. Concurrently, education in low-intensity conflict at Army professional military education institutions waned and virtually disappeared from the curriculum, particularly in the Command and General Staff College and the US Army War College curricula. Altogether, these decisions and outcomes served as evidence of the Army’s cultural blindness and set the conditions for unpreparedness in operations and campaigns that followed.

In the final chapter of analysis, Proctor presents further evidence of the Army’s ill-preparedness for low-intensity conflicts. He uses the campaign in Kosovo to show the Army’s inability to own its responsibilities for operating effectively in this environment to achieve the nation’s end. And in spite of General Shinseki’s original and unexpected vision of the Interim and Objective Force concept unveiled early in his tenure of office as General Reimer’s replacement, it, too, became a concept that morphed into a more-deployable version of high-intensity capability vice a force postured to also wage effective low-intensity conflict operations. Then the attacks on New York City and the Pentagon occurred, embroiling the US Army in a seemingly endless
campaign in two countries accused of harboring terrorists guilty of the attacks or the ones to follow.

This does not end well. So, why would one choose to read this book? If institutional culture is the reason for the US Army’s unpreparedness, then what should one understand about the culture? First, cultures persist over time. And over time many of its followers rarely, if ever, question why they do the things they do. They become entrenched in the culture’s practice; however, cultures are rife with implicit assumptions informed by the norms they have practiced for decades, if not longer, and these assumptions are often taken for granted and seldom challenged.

Consequently professionals should read thought-provoking works like this one. Although readers may not agree with Proctor’s analysis or the conclusions he draws from it, he creates an opportunity for readers to reflect and reexamine, to consider critically the conclusions drawn, and to accept the kernels of truth applicable—all trademarks of critically thinking professionals who owe it to their constituents to give Lessons Unlearned due consideration.
The United States has made a strategic bet on India. With the seemingly unstoppable growth in Chinese power and influence in the region, America has aggressively courted a deeper strategic partnership with India and calculated a rising India aligned with US interests will better maintain a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. While Washington is largely focused on India’s conventional military capabilities and posture, India also boasts a burgeoning nuclear weapons capability, which is the subject of *India and Nuclear Asia: Forces, Doctrine, and Dangers*.

Written by two young and accomplished scholars, this accessible and thoroughly researched book fills an important niche in the Indo-Pacific literature and should be required reading for American military leaders and strategic analysts concerned with the area. Joshi and O’Donnell systematically examine the contemporary nuclear balance between India and Pakistan and China, its chief rivals. Their opinionated analysis is informed but not weighed down by theory and history and advances two major policy recommendations in a logical and clearly structured fashion: for India, Pakistan, and China to increase transparency through dialogue and for India to conduct a public defense policy review.

Joshi and O’Donnell's core analysis focuses on Indian, Pakistani, and Chinese nuclear capabilities and doctrines. They comprehensively survey the status of India’s fissile material capabilities, delivery systems, command and control, and missile defense and assess the historical evolution of Indian nuclear doctrine and its approach to global nonproliferation regimes.

They also analyze the implications of Pakistani and Chinese nuclear capabilities and doctrine for Indian nuclear strategy. Pakistan, for example, may have lowered the threshold for nuclear use with the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons such as the 60-kilometer range Nasr missile. “India refuses to accept that this threshold has been lowered” and continues to develop plans for rapid mobilization of conventional strikes (71). Similarly, the authors argue China’s military reforms have bolstered its conventional active defense doctrine of “seizing the initiative as early as possible, including initiating rapid escalation at the outset of a conflict” through lavish use of conventional missiles (95). In the Indo-Pacific and Indo-Chinese dyads these recent developments have raised the risk of inadvertent escalation to nuclear use, which is a recurring theme of the book.
As Joshi and O’Donnell observe, several factors bedevil Indian nuclear strategy and the analysis of it. India, unusual among nuclear powers, faces twin nuclear rivals which pull its nuclear strategy in different directions. For India, China is by far the more sophisticated and comprehensive nuclear threat, demanding longer range and more redundant Indian forces. Pakistan, however, remains the more immediate danger, given the frequency of militarized crises and the centrality of nuclear threats to Pakistani doctrine.

Another major complication in their analysis of Indian nuclear strategy is the rapid evolution in capabilities and doctrine, which presents an analytic target that is not only opaque but also fast moving. India is on the cusp of deploying its first intercontinental ballistic missile, the 5,000-kilometer Agni V, which can potentially reach all major cities in China, and is also rapidly developing a missile defense capability through indigenous technology and the acquisition of the Russian S-400 antiaircraft missile system.

Alongside its rivals, China and Pakistan, India is fielding a new nuclear ballistic-missile submarine. As Joshi and O’Donnell make clear, these and other new capabilities in the hands of India and its rivals are rapidly changing the dynamics of the regional nuclear triangle in ways their strategists and US analysts cannot yet fully appreciate.

While Joshi and O’Donnell admirably tackle some issues, other questions remain unaddressed, especially two issues that are particularly salient for American defense leaders. First, they downplay a potential, hotly debated paradigmatic shift in Indian nuclear doctrine that moves away from “No First Use” and toward preemptive counterforce targeting against enemy nuclear forces. This perspective may simply be a matter of timing.

Much of the best evidence for the shift—including, most starkly, an August 2019 statement by the serving defense minister—emerged after this book was written. In chapter 5, Joshi and O’Donnell acknowledge India is increasingly debating the unrevised 2003 nuclear doctrine and moving away from existing doctrine may be closer than they suggest. India could simply pepper its doctrine with ambiguity, without publishing new doctrine, and this action would have massive implications for regional nuclear stability.

Second, while the book’s scope is limited to nuclear strategy, readers may also benefit from the exploration of parallel developments in India’s overall security strategy. The Indian government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi has taken added risk in its crises with Pakistan and has ratcheted up its crisis responses in an effort to create space for conventional options. Again, the starkest evidence came after this book was written, when India launched an unprecedented air strike against a terrorist target in Pakistan in February 2019. This deliberate generation of risk will influence how India and Pakistan act in the next inevitable crisis and may over time shape their nuclear deterrence models.
As Joshi and O’Donnell argue persuasively, the risk of inadvertent escalation between India and its rivals is growing. *India and Nuclear Asia: Forces, Doctrine, and Dangers* is an excellent introduction for leaders and analysts seeking to understand those risks.

**Black Wave: Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Forty-Year Rivalry That Unraveled Culture, Religion, and Collective Memory in the Middle East**

By Kim Ghattas

Reviewed by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, professor emeritus, US Army War College

In *Black Wave*, journalist Kim Ghattas has produced an insightful study of the rise of political, religious, and cultural intolerance in various key Middle Eastern countries as well as adjacent Pakistan and Afghanistan since the late 1970s. The black wave in the book’s title is highly nuanced, but is summed up by Ghattas as the “intellectual and cultural darkness that slowly engulfed [the region] in the decades following the fateful year of 1979” (3).

Indeed, that year was an inflection point defined in the region by three momentous events—the Iranian revolution, a regime-threatening uprising in Mecca, and the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. Ghattas maintains all these events were important and produced changes that rippled throughout the entire region, dramatically increased religious intolerance, and fed into a new and more virulent level of sectarian strife among Sunni and Shia Muslims. Throughout the book, Ghattas includes personal stories about individuals struggling for freedom of thought and the more liberal interpretations of Islam. Many individuals were assassinated or marginalized in response to their efforts against extremist influence.

The most important 1979 event was the Iranian revolution. Ghattas notes Iran’s last shah was overthrown by a coalition of groups and not simply the followers of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, whom she characterizes as a cunning, ruthless, and power-hungry man. She maintains in addition to leftists and other anti-monarchists opposing the shah, there were also a number of moderate clerics, some of whom died under suspicious circumstances and consequently left Khomeini unchallenged for clerical leadership.

Initially, the Saudis were uncertain about the meaning of this change. They had previously worried about the shah’s regional ambitions but saw him as a competitor who would only take the rivalry so far. The new regime puzzled the Saudi leadership, but the establishment of an Islamic Republic appeared to be a manageable problem, and Saudi Arabia’s leaders were relieved Iran had not turned to a communist government.

Still, there were warning signs. Khomeini’s past writings were clearly unfriendly to them, and his hostility soon manifested itself in
efforts to export revolution beyond Iran’s borders and brush aside the pro-American monarchies. Khomeini’s public statements and Iranian propaganda made it clear Saudi Arabia had an unbending enemy. As Ghattas notes, Iranian propaganda directed at the Saudi Shiias was particularly worrisome and helped to foster unrest.

Simultaneously with the increased concerns about Iran, the Saudis had to cope with an unexpected shock in November 1979 when a large group of well-armed rebels led by a former Saudi national guardsman seized the Grand Mosque at Mecca and maintained control of it for more than two weeks. The rebels proclaimed they were acting in the name of an Islamic Messiah (the mufti), who once in power would restructure religious, economic, and foreign policy under a purified Islamic regime. Saudi leaders were horrified the situation might spin out of control, leading to a wider following for the rebels.

Unfortunately, using force at the holiest site in Islam was a problem. Before they did so, the royal family sought the public approval of the senior Saudi clergy and especially the ultraconservative blind sheikh, Abdelaziz bin Baz. When they received this support and the military response went forward, the rebels were defeated, but the mosque and its environs were severely damaged in the battle. The political power of the Saudi royal family was also harmed.

According to Ghattas, before 1979, the Saudi royal family was able to dominate the clerics. After 1979, Ghattas maintains the religious establishment “had become king” by helping to prop up a wounded regime (206). The Iranians, for their part, took full advantage of the situation and continuously accused Saudi Arabia of being an unfit custodian of Islam’s two most holy mosques in Mecca and Medina. In actions that infuriated Riyadh, the Iranians called for the creation of a special Islamic Commission to take control of the holy sites.

Ghattas sees the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as the third key 1979 event that reverberated throughout the region. She maintains, for Saudi Arabia, helping the Afghan rebels fight Soviet forces was a tremendous opportunity to reclaim some of the prestige and legitimacy lost during the siege of Mecca. The Saudis, like the US leadership, provided considerable assistance to the hard-line rebels and also worked with Pakistan under Prime Minister Zia ul-Haq.

Ghattas characterizes Zia as a weak dictator who prolonged and energized his regime by seizing control of the Afghan issue while thoroughly infusing Pakistani society with ultraconservative Islam. Western leaders, who might have objected to Zia’s authoritarianism in other circumstances, were then too distracted with the Afghan War to do so. Ghattas further shows that after Zia’s death and the end of the Afghan War, generous Saudi funding continued to nurture the system through less obvious but more pervasive involvement including a religious publishing empire and a strong network of hard-line schools and seminaries.
Throughout this book, Ghattas displays a strong command of the details of her subject matter and considers the spin-off effects of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry for countries such as Egypt and Lebanon. She suggests the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was linked to Saudi and Iranian competition on questions of Islamic purity and activism. She also mentions periods of moderation and détente between Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic, but points out that these episodes have been ephemeral. Ghattas suggests there is a moderate political and religious identity throughout the Islamic world that will eventually defeat the extremists because of the bravery of good people, but this revolution remains to be seen.
Power to the People: How Open Technological Innovation is Arming Tomorrow’s Terrorists

By Audrey Kurth Cronin

Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, instructor at the Safe Communities Institute at the University of Southern California

One of the world’s leading experts on security and terrorism, author Audrey Kurth Cronin is currently a professor of international security at American University’s School of International Service. She has been a faculty member at the US National War College, has served in the US executive branch, and has an Oxford University graduate degree.

Power to the People is the by-product of a major multiyear endeavor supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation which draws upon the Power to the People Terrorism Innovation Database (P2P-PVID) developed by Cronin, George Mason University, and American University graduate research assistants (431). Three datasets were created focusing on dynamite manufacture, adoption, and use (1867 to 1934); AK-47 manufacture, dissemination, and use (1947 to present); and contemporary drone and related autonomous systems manufacture, dissemination, and use. For transparency and validation purposes, the data is available at audreykurthcronin.com, which also serves as Cronin’s marketing site (273–81).

The book includes an introduction, three sections comprised of nine chapters, and a conclusion followed by two appendices, notes, books cited, an index, and acknowledgements for the detailed main body contexts (269–72). The book is heavily referenced with more than 100 pages of notes and book citations. My analysis of this information confirmed Cronin undertook a comprehensive literature review related to technology, war, and terrorism. A peppering of pictures, drawings, and maps can be found throughout the book.

Addressing a number of themes and issues, Power to the People is an intellectual and well-written tour de force—at times dense, yet thankfully less academic, in its writing style and in the amount of historical and contemporary information packed into its pages. First, Cronin “explores how individuals and groups who engage in political violence have repeatedly made use of emerging technologies to wreak havoc, and how they’re likely to do so in the future” (2). She ties this issue into the book’s first section which “introduces predominant ways of thinking about the innovation and diffusion of military technology and demonstrates their shortfalls as regards the current era” and “examines consistent patterns of the diffusion of lethal technology to violent nonstate actors in the modern era” (14).
Second, Cronin places “current technological advances into the historical context of key innovations used” and answers the question “why certain kinds of emerging technologies are rapidly adopted by rogue actors” with an emphasis on leveraging the dynamite and AK-47 datasets (2). She ties this issue into the book’s second section which shows how these two innovations ultimately “drove global waves of nonstate violence, in both cases culminating in major upheaval in the international order” (14).

Third, Cronin leverages the drone dataset developed and focuses “on technologies that were developed with good intentions, such as digital media and drones . . . But some of them can be fashioned into relatively low-cost, powerful, and precise weapons” (5). She argues “Today’s drones, advanced robotics, 3D printing, and autonomous systems have more in common with dynamite and Kalashnikovs than they do with military technologies like the airplane and the tank” (14).

Cronin’s core insights are clustered around five themes—“powerful economic incentives for diffusion, technological optimism and a boom in tinkering, new communications technologies are powerful incentives to violence, militaries are facing the innovator’s dilemma and disruptive private armies and the ISIS precedent” (257, 256–62). Her protectionist guidance provided against this identified threat is based on the presumption: “The most effective way to respond to the fast-moving changes of an open revolution is to align all the participants, including government, industry, and individual citizens, around incentives for developing protections” (264). Her guidance is focused on the profit motive for protections, that regulation is not necessarily strangulation, and building stronger national security (264–68).

The only disappointing element of the book is its theoretical embargo of John Robb’s well-publicized Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization (Wiley, 2007). Robb, a colorful military analyst and entrepreneur, detailed his open-source warfare construct—modeled on the open-source movement in software development—13 years prior to Cronin’s elegant work but has been ignored, or possibly overlooked, for his vital defense community contributions. In Cronin’s defense, Robb’s construct runs parallel to her and James Moor’s “‘open’ and ‘closed’ technological revolutions” focus dating back to at least 2005, and Cronin’s subsequent focus on state military power (285).

The reviewer fully endorses Power to the People as a first-rate effort and sees wisdom in the antidisruptive, protectionist-focused strategic guidance proposed for democracies derived from Cronin’s key perception that:

We must also be mindful of the scale and breadth of vulnerability we have built into our societies. The Internet of Things provides an avenue of access into millions of Internet-connected devices and appliances. With artificial intelligence, single individuals will have a shot at building armies without the need to collect large numbers of human beings. Semi-autonomous and autonomous weapons systems will enable small forces to hold their own
against vastly superior forces. On our current trajectory, without both better
defensive measures and greater regulation of risk, the result will be wars of
attrition that democracies cannot win (267).

At the same time, Cronin’s promotion of such a dead-hand approach
will at best only temporarily stave off the epochal shift in war and
conflict that is upon the world—initially waged by nonstate actors and
now increasingly conducted by authoritarian regimes. Senior members
of the defense community would do well to integrate Cronin’s guidance
with approaches from Brave New War that, while of a lesser pedigree and
a more marginal budget, make up for these deficiencies with a devilish
creativity and willingness to seize the future rather than attempt to
primarily fight it in the manner Cronin advocates.

**America’s Covert War in East Africa:**
*Surveillance, Rendition, Assassination*

By Clara Usiskin

Reviewed by Dr. An Jacobs, senior lecturer of international relations,
Nottingham Trent University, and visiting fellow, Institute of Diplomacy
and International Governance, Loughborough University London

*America’s Covert War in East Africa* is a breath of fresh air—a
positive anomaly in the crowded counterterrorism literature. Usiskin challenges readers with an emotive, self-confessed descriptive
and fragmented writing style. The book is not designed to serve as
an academic manuscript, nor does it provide an in-depth analysis of
security questions or counterterrorist activity in East Africa. Instead,
the book includes narratives on issues largely absent in mainstream
counterterrorism literature (1–5).

Due to its fragmented nature, the book’s main argument is
difficult to summarize—or to even detect. The book focuses on the
forgotten or hidden consequences of the Global War on Terror—the
“collateral damage”—emphasizing issues of rule of law and human
rights (5). Usiskin enhances awareness of these consequences and takes
readers on a journey across the lesser-known effects of the Global War
on Terror.

For example, Usiskin discusses the functioning of various extra-
legal US prisons designed for the detainment and interrogation of
“high-value detainees” and includes research on the rumors of the US
detention and transit of “high-value detainees” on the British island
of Diego Garcia (27). She studies US involvement in the design of
counterterrorism policies in the region and the impact of these policies
on civil society, human rights defenders, and journalists. She explores
US cooperation with East African states with regard to counterterrorism
efforts, as well as the human rights abuses committed by the US, UK,
and East African governments in this context.
Usiskin also considers extrajudicial killings—of predominantly Muslims—in Kenya as a consequence of the war on terror and how especially Somali refugees in Kenya are negatively impacted by counterterrorism policies. She looks at the link between counterpiracy and counterterrorism and delves into the application of technology and communication as part of a “holistic US counterterrorism strategy,” including how drones are employed for surveillance and targeted killings and how the use of spyware in counterterrorism undercuts democratic practices (90).

While these topics merit an important place in the book’s broader narrative, a few chapters stand out and deserve further attention. “A Zanzibar Ghost,” for example, is quite the opening chapter. In a strongly emotive and gripping tone, Usiskin tells the story of a man from Zanzibar who is exposed to the US rendition program as a result of a counterterrorist operation. Her vivid retelling of the man’s brutal interrogation, torture, and various human rights abuses draws readers in. Subsequent chapters build upon this theme, albeit in a somewhat less-poignant manner. These chapters cover the rendition process—the often unlawful transportation of terror suspects from one country to another for interrogation—in more detail and further highlight the related practices of torture and brutality.

Other fascinating sections of the book cover the impact of counterterrorism on democratic practice and civil society, highlighting how a “rule by law” system and a clamp down on the freedom of expression have “stifled civil society” and set out to silence human rights defenders and journalists, demonstrating the failure of rule of law (141–50). Kenya’s frontline position in the Global War on Terror has had a particular impact on the fate of Somalian refugees in Kenya, who are facing the dual threat of Al-Shabaab on the one hand and prosecution by Kenyan authorities on the other, “perpetuating a long-established dynamic of exclusion and discrimination” by securitizing refugees from Somalia and “othering” Somali Kenyans (157, 163).

Usiskin further explores the impact of the Global War on Terror on democracy by focusing on the capacity of the US and Kenyan governments to spy on Kenyan residents by checking private online activity and by illustrating how surveillance powers—extended under counterterrorism legislation—can be used to act against civil society. With a specific focus on Kenya and Ethiopia, she explores how spyware and hacking tools such as FinFisher play a vital part in limiting political opposition and free speech “to carry out politically-motivated prosecutions of civil society actors under domestic counterterrorism legislation” (184).

Usiskin’s most significant strength throughout the book is her ability to bring complex stories alive through a combination of the personal accounts of victims, her own narratives, and a wealth of information from reports and government documents. It is obvious Usiskin has been in the thick of it herself, having spent extended periods in the
region and having been exposed to abuse of government power herself, which resulted in short periods of detainment and even deportation from Kenya and Uganda for her work on ongoing human rights abuses (83–88). Her expertise as a human rights investigator, her extensive research on the Global War on Terror, and her experience in the region provide readers with invaluable insights into the covert world of rendition, secret detention, and targeted killings in East Africa. Without a national security clearance or access to classified information, Usiskin has obtained fascinating information and presents it in a very clear and compelling style.

Despite the impactful nature of the book, it also has shortcomings. The most important one being its lack of coherence and a consistently applied analytical framework. Although it was never Usiskin’s intention to provide this framework, with such a wealth of data, it seems a shame not to draw meaningful conclusions. The book’s greatest merit, however, is that it goes beyond the “intended consequences” of counterterrorism and explores its “real-life” impact, which is often painful and complex (5). Usiskin “hope[s] readers will go on to engage with other points of view,” and she definitely succeeds in achieving this objective (2). Enhancing awareness and giving voice to people who have not been heard is perhaps the most meaningful contribution America’s Covert War in East Africa will make to the education of senior members of the defense community, who are generally exposed to a different counterterrorism narrative.
Command: The Twenty-First-Century General

By Anthony King

Reviewed by David G. Fivecoat, leadership consultant and retired US Army colonel

Anthony King has produced a thought-provoking book. He examines the change in division command since 1901 in the American, British, French, and German armies in World War I, World War II, Cold War counterinsurgencies, Desert Storm, Iraq, and Afghanistan and current initiatives the armies are undertaking to transform their division headquarters. Building upon Martin van Creveld’s *Command in War*, John Keegan’s *The Mask of Command*, and Peter F. Drucker’s *The Effective Executive* and using dozens of examples, King argues division command has transformed from a more individualistic command in the twentieth century to a more collectivized command in the last decade.

The division has existed as a military formation since the French Revolution. In the last 120 years the division has typically included 10,000 to 25,000 soldiers under the command of a major general. The division was, and is, the Landpower formation of choice—with a mature leader a division is quickly deployable yet robust enough to handle joint, combined, and multinational operations with significant combat power. Examining the division in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is a worthy task and should have been undertaken sooner. It may be worthwhile for future writers to focus on one nation’s divisions, doctrine, and actual command practices over the past 120 years to develop a more detailed analysis of how the division and its command have evolved.

One of King’s most important contributions is the concept that command at any level is comprised of three facets: mission definition, mission management, and leadership. Because I liked the concept so much, I read the chapter twice. Prior to D-Day, for instance, US Major General Maxwell Taylor defined the mission of the 101st Airborne Division as being able to surprise the enemy by conducting a parachute/glider assault, seize objectives, and defend against counterattacks. Once the mission was defined, Taylor managed the division’s preparation for and execution of the D-Day invasion and provided leadership to the Screaming Eagles. Defining the mission for a division in a counterinsurgency is more challenging—from my experience, the mission definitions of division commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan ran the gamut. Few commanders took on a broad mandate for the mission, most took a narrow view, and some failed to even consider it. The mission management and leadership styles of division commanders varied in the post-9/11 invasions and counterinsurgencies as well.
King’s second major contribution is the idea that the role of the division commander has transformed—from the concept of an individualistic, or heroic, division commander pre-9/11 to a more collectivized commander since 9/11. He defines individualistic command as a division commander, with a small staff, monopolizing the responsibility for determining the mission, managing the execution, making decisions, and providing leadership to the division. He uses examples of General Erwin Rommel, commander of the German 7th Panzer Division during the invasion of France in World War II; Major General Julian Ewell, commander of the US 9th Infantry Division in the Mekong Delta Region during the Vietnam War; General Sir Rupert Smith, commander of the UK 1st Armored Division during Desert Storm; and others to illustrate the individualistic command concept. I think most military professionals will recognize this style of division command.

More problematic to recognize is the idea of collectivized command. The Oxford English Dictionary defines collectivize as “organize (something) on the basis of ownership by the people.” King defines collectivized command as “commanders, their deputies, subordinates, and staff bound together in dense, professionalized decision-making communities” that collectively determine the mission, manage the solution, and provide leadership to the division (18). Here he examines British Major General Nick Carter’s leadership of Regional Command South in Afghanistan from 2009–10 and recent initiatives by the US 82nd Airborne Division, the UK 3rd Division, and the French divisional headquarters.

I agree with King that the post-9/11 division headquarters has grown in size and developed a more bureaucratic process around decision making. Larger headquarters have an insatiable appetite for more information, more meetings, and more work from themselves and their subordinate units. I have found little evidence in practice, accounts of recent division actions in other books, and even in Command where division commanders have collectivized the process of mission definition, management, or leadership.

The most collectivized command process I know is the council of war, used most famously in the American Civil War by Union General George Meade at the Battle of Gettysburg on the night of July 2, 1863. Although King does use General Stanley McChrystal’s networked and collaborative approach to running the US Joint Special Operations Command from 2003–8, this organization is not a division, and McChrystal’s approach was not collectivized. King disappointingly cites no solid examples of division commanders bringing their team of staff and commanders together for a collectivized approach to decide on the mission or how to manage the solution. Most telling, King’s interviews with General David Petraeus, General Sir Rupert Smith, and General James Mattis all rebuff his theory that collectivization happened in the divisions they led.
Like King, I believe the command of the division headquarters is changing, and I appreciate him for recognizing the change and starting the discussion. In the end, King’s conclusion misses the mark. The change may be that divisions have simply grown from their former nimble roots into large, bureaucratic, and unwieldy organizations. Perhaps divisions and their commanders are embracing a more networked approach, using reachback or trying to flatten the organization. The supporting evidence King cites does not convince me the division command has been collectivized.

All in all, Command is a good book since it made me think deeply about the division and division command. Even with the noted shortcomings, it is a worthwhile read for commanders and leaders at all levels who need to think about how they define the mission of their units or organizations, manage planning and execution, and lead. It is also valuable for military officers and other senior leaders who are thinking about the history and the future of the division and division command.

**Subordinating Intelligence: The DoD/CIA Post–Cold War Relationship**

By David P. Oakley

Reviewed by Dr. Genevieve Lester, De Serio Chair of Strategic Intelligence, US Army War College

The intelligence function is crucial to informed policy decision-making in all aspects of government. The priorities of the national agencies—the producers of this intelligence—however, change over time in response to changing threats, political context, individual relationships among senior administration leadership, and budgetary constraints. Subordinating Intelligence examines the relationship of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with the Department of Defense and considers how the relationship evolved in the period between the Cold War and the beginning of the Global War on Terror.

There are at least two sides to the debate regarding the relationship between military requirements and national intelligence. On the one hand, the lack of appropriate intelligence support to military operations has resulted in failures and the loss of life on multiple occasions. On the other hand, supporting military operations can crowd out longer-term, strategic intelligence needs and alter the balance of the CIA’s responsibilities—from supporting national policy makers to prioritizing the needs of combat support agencies such as the National Security Agency or the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. This change in balance risks the CIA’s independence and can weaken its ability to focus on its core mission (105). David Oakley offers a balanced discussion of both sides of this calculus, although the argument leads to the CIA’s minimization and the military’s ascension.
Oakley argues that a series of presidential decisions led to the CIA being ultimately “subordinated” to military operations (8). He shows how this relationship developed, focusing on the intensity of change in the post–9/11 security environment. He develops his argument with illustrative historical episodes beginning with early interoperability failures, such as the unsuccessful attempt to free US hostages from Iran (1979), the invasion of Grenada (1983), and the bombing of the barracks in Lebanon, also in 1983, that focused on the need for improved Joint operations and intelligence support to military operations (12–13).

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, with its singular reforms to the Department of Defense, emerged from this friction among the services. As Oakley points out, there was an increasing awareness that intelligence was crucial to this next stage of improved Joint operations. This vulnerability was further highlighted during Operation Desert Storm, a quick victory for the military that highlighted gaps in intelligence support for military operations (31–32). During this period the then President George H. W. Bush pushed for greater intelligence support for the military; the Clinton administration issued Presidential Decision Directive 35, which made intelligence support of military operations a top priority of the Intelligence Community (152). Obviously, these developments intensified when the CIA’s focus turned to counterterrorism and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, reducing the CIA’s strategic emphasis on the state-level threat and reinforcing its subordination to the military (155).

While the book is slim, it pursues a line of argument vigorously. A broader discussion of the context, particularly the developing political environment, could have helped guide readers through some rather arcane territory and idiom. Even with that criticism, Subordinating Intelligence fills an important gap in the literature on military operations and intelligence. Military requirements and intelligence tend to be much more focused on the order of battle and tactical operations. In contrast, the literature on national intelligence does not delve deeply enough into the military side and almost not at all into the integration of the two functions.

Oakley’s unique exploration of the relationship between the Department of Defense and the CIA is crucial to building a broader discussion of the issues from both the practitioner and the scholarly perspectives. Finally, as the military changes its focus from counterterrorism to near-peer competition with rival nation-states, the CIA will again be pushed to adapt to the new contingencies, and the relationship between the agency and the military will shift again. Oakley provides a valuable service in outlining the processes and interests that will drive this adaptation today and in the future.
Hitler’s First Hundred Days: When Germans Embraced the Third Reich

By Peter Fritzsche

Reviewed by Dr. Jay Lockenour, chair and associate professor, Department of History, Temple University

One is tempted to review Hitler’s First Hundred Days as the final installment of a trilogy that began with Fritzsche’s 1990 work, Rehearsals for Fascism: Populism and Political Mobilization in Weimar Germany, followed in 1997 by Germans into Nazis. All three works grapple with the fall of the Weimar Republic, the rise of the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP), and that party’s rapid establishment of a monopoly on political power. Anyone who has taught a course on the Third Reich knows students demand answer to difficult questions: “How did this happen?” Was it a culture of authoritarianism? Was it ideology or anti-Semitism? The Great War? The economy?

Fritzsche’s answer has evolved over the years. He still downplays the role of the economy and the Great Depression in terms of electoral motivation. He still cautions against emphasizing anti-Semitism, though it plays a more decisive role in this study in establishing the dictatorship. The Nazis did not establish control through political campaigning. They won a plurality in 1932, not a majority, and that plurality seemed to be shrinking as 1932 ended. The first 100 days, from January 30 to May 9, 1933, saw the Nazis turn that plurality into a dictatorship in which, Fritzsche argues, most Germans felt the Nazis were better able to satisfy their desire for national unity, political peace, and an end to crisis.

The “trilogy” also traces the evolution of historiographical trends from the 1980s to the present. Rehearsals was part of a wave of regional studies at the time and spoke the sociological language of class and electoral analysis. Hitler’s First Hundred Days, while focused on Berlin, moves around Germany more expansively and is more attentive to mythmaking and culture.

Fritzsche offers explanatory concepts that require readers to sometimes grapple with paradox. He describes the attitude of many Germans to the events of the 100 days as “no, yes,” a contradiction that effectively demonstrates the combination of reservation and enthusiasm Fritzsche found in diaries, memoirs, jokes, and other everyday materials of the period: no to the violence in the streets, yes to the destruction of the Communist Party; no to the uneducated thugs of the NSDAP, yes to national unity; no to 1918, yes to 1914 (95, 120).

That last juxtaposition is important to Fritzsche’s argument in its own right. Part of the Nazis’s success can be explained by their being on the correct side of the mythmaking around both dates. For many Germans 1918 stood for defeat, the November Revolution, and—though signed
in 1919—the Treaty of Versailles. Many nationalists, and not just the Nazis, saw that defeat as the unjust result of a “stab in the back” by Jews, socialists, and other shadowy groups who waged the revolution and established the Republic. For many Germans, and not just nationalists, 1914 represented the *Burgfrieden*, the period of national unity when all parties of the Kaiser’s Reichstag supported the credits necessary to fight the war. The Nazis promised to take Germany back in time from 1918 and crisis to 1914 and unity.

Between January 30 and May 9, the Nazis exploited opportunities and staged events to accomplish that time travel. The Reichstag fire, the March elections and the preceding Day of the Awakening Nation, the Day of Potsdam, the boycott of Jewish businesses, the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service, the Day of National Labor, and the book burning—technically day 101—demonstrated the sense of unity and the need to act in a state of crisis sometimes created by the Nazis and led Germans to accept “normality” as defined by the NSDAP (266).

Terror, murder, and arrest cowed the enemies of the NSDAP, but Fritzsche is also attentive to the role new technologies and simple administration played in helping the Nazis secure control. Radio played an especially important role in carrying Hitler’s message—and only Hitler’s message—to the nation as a whole, but so did paperwork. Forms necessary to prove one’s “Aryan” ancestry and to keep one’s job taught Germans (who did not already know it) the language of Nazi anti-Semitism—of insiders and outsiders—that became a part of everyday life.

Though Fritzsche makes an argument about Germany as a whole and does include evidence from Hanover, Lower Saxony, East Prussia, and other regions, the book’s center of gravity is Berlin, and Fritzsche’s affection for Berlin is palpable. The city at first seems a strange place to locate a study of Germany’s embrace of the Third Reich. “Red Berlin,” with its large, organized, Marxist working class, should have been the place where the Nazis struggled most to find support. Electoral analyses show the NSDAP received lower percentages of votes in cities than in small towns and lower percentages from the working class than from the middle class.

Of course, Berlin is the capital of Germany, and many of the events in *Hitler’s First Hundred Days* happen in and around the city. Choosing Berlin gives Fritzsche a physical landscape upon which to tell his story. Readers get to know the streets and neighborhoods through which the Nazis marched, in which they fought their battles with the socialists and communists. And the fact that the process Fritzsche describes takes place in “Red Berlin” as well as in Northeim—the location of W. S. Allen’s path-breaking *The Nazi Seizure of Power*, which shares many of this book’s strengths—makes his argument even more convincing.
Beyond Pearl Harbor: A Pacific History
Edited by Beth Bailey and David Farber

Reviewed by Dr. Michael E. Lynch, senior historian, US Army Heritage and Education Center

The TV series Star Trek: The Next Generation included an episode titled “Darmok,” where the crew encountered a civilization that communicates only in phrases that refer to events that are so ingrained in the culture they have become metaphors. Such is the same with Pearl Harbor for Americans. Yet that cultural metaphor lies uneasily next to another belief entrenched into the national psyche: the United States is not an imperialist nation, unlike the Japanese empire that had launched the vicious surprise attack. With this common narrative in mind, Beth Bailey and David Farber have curated a collection of 10 fine essays that examine the attack on Pearl Harbor from different viewpoints but all through the lens of imperialism. The essays broaden and deepen the narrative of a well-known topic in a relatively short work that melds military and social history and gives voice to British, Australian, Chinese, Japanese, and insular American sources by examining the attack from the other-than-common American viewpoint.

In the first essay, “The Attack on Pearl Harbor . . . and Guam, Wake Island, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong,” Bailey and Farber set the stage for the examination to follow (1). Their review of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Day of Infamy” speech is an insightful look at the art of strategic communications by a master communicator. Their description of the differences between Hawaii and the other American territories helps explain the legal basis for the difference in approach to the attacks on them.

This essay provides a seamless transition to Daniel Immerwahr’s “‘American Lives’: Pearl Harbor and the War in the US Empire” (39). He examines what it meant to be an American and how the United States assessed its overseas possessions unevenly. In one memorable phrase, he claims that “Roosevelt, in other words, was making a calculation. He was rounding the Philippines down to foreign and rounding Hawaii up to American” (41, italics in original). In a phrase that carries even more resonance today, he argues that “War is a time of danger and sacrifice, a time when risks are apportioned. Who bore those risks had a lot to do with who got recognized as ‘American.’ It was a question of who was in and who was out—of whose lives mattered” (43). Immerwahr concludes by describing the liberation of American overseas territories in the Aleutians, Guam, and the Philippines by soldiers who were unaware the civilian population being liberated was also American.

Christopher Cappozola in his essay argues that the “politics of anticipation” for the Japanese attack in the Philippines drove a series of authoritarian regimes. These regimes used the potential for an attack to consolidate power and attract money from the United States.
This argument is less convincing with regard to post-war, post-independence authoritarian regimes.

Twin essays by Jeremy Yellen and Samuel Hideo Yamashita examine Japanese attitudes toward the attack, including public and private responses and how the mood was reflected in the popular press. They note some skeptics, but the attitude among the Japanese people was nearly uniformly positive. In another chapter, Yujin Yaguchi argues the Japanese media, since the war, has refashioned the narrative, so Pearl Harbor becomes the first step toward rapprochement and the eventual alliance of commercial superpowers, rather than a clash between empires.

Rana Mitter and Nicole Elizabeth Barnes examine the Chinese perspective on the attack that elevated Chinese prospects in numerous ways. Mitter argues the attack caused political and military leaders to think differently about the nation’s identity. “Those changes heralded the initial moves that would propel China into a new position in the postwar world” (103). China’s alliance with the Western allies gave it an advantage over the Japanese with whom it had been at war since 1937. The attack, however, also exposed the ongoing rift between Chinese nationalists and Chinese communists that led to civil war shortly after World War II ended.

Barnes provides a fascinating examination of the development of Chinese medical care during the war. The entry of the United States into the war in the Pacific pulled occupying Japanese forces away from China, which eventually stopped the air raids that were decimating the Chinese population. Chinese medical facilities were then able to shift their focus from combat-related injuries to pre- and post-natal care and preventive care, which increased the overall health of the Chinese population.

The attack also changed China’s network of support, in which the United States and the United Kingdom became its primary benefactors, replacing other nations in the Asian rim. Kate Darian-Smith in “Pearl Harbor and Australia’s War in the Pacific” notes that Pearl Harbor, the fall of Singapore, and the subsequent bombing of Darwin (known as Australia’s Pearl Harbor) signaled a shift in Pacific Rim alliances—with Australia becoming more closely aligned with the United States.

Pearl Harbor, as a simple metaphor for a singular American event, has obscured the different views of the attack from around the Pacific Rim. As American defense interests in the Pacific grow daily, strategic leaders would profit from a fresh look at a familiar subject. Most histories focus on the attack itself and the diplomatic and intelligence events leading to it.

The phrase “America Empire” falls hard on American ears; the revolt of the 13 colonies against the British Empire is deeply embedded in the nation’s cultural memory. The irony of vehemently deriding the evils of empires while simultaneously maintaining overseas possessions in Hawaii, Guam, Wake Island, and the Philippines was lost on
most Americans. Yet the views of residents living in these American territories as well as the views of their Pacific neighbors are important to our understanding of the strategic effects of the attack. Beyond Pearl Harbor provides a deeper, broader, and more strategic view of what has traditionally been assumed to be a purely American event.

The World at War, 1914–1945

By Jeremy Black

Reviewed by Dr. Michael S. Neiberg, chair of war studies, US Army War College

The frustrating and ultimately unsuccessful process of making peace in 1919 caused many contemporary observers to predict the war of 1914–18 would mark the first round of a much-longer conflict. Some of these famous observations have questionable provenance and may well be apocryphal, but two that can be easily corroborated are worth mentioning here.

The British journalist Charles à Court Repington was pessimistic—maybe prescient is a better word—enough to use the phrase “First World War” in his diary as early as September 1918. He also used it as the title of a one-volume history of the war he published highlighting his fear of a second world war breaking out as soon as the great powers could rearm and recover (The First World War [London: Constable, 1920]).

In a similar vein, American General Tasker H. Bliss wrote to his wife in April 1919. He shared his worry that “The wars are not yet over. I don’t like the treaty and it seems to me that it means another 30 years’ war, winding up with about the same grouping of states as before” (Tasker H. Bliss, “Letter to Nellie Bliss” in Bliss Papers, April 1919, US Army Heritage and Education Center).

In the years immediately following 1945, the historiographical and popular trend separated the two World Wars. In the West, this division helped to underscore the seemingly undeniable and overwhelming Western triumph in the Second World War in contrast to the muddy, ambivalent semivictory of the first. The Holocaust, the atomic bomb, and the sheer scale of war from 1939 to 1945 provided more reasons to separate the two conflicts. In the United States, one needs to go no further to prove this point than to see the contrast between the massive World War II Memorial on the National Mall and the small memorial to the men of Washington, DC, that is the only remembrance of the First World War on America’s most sacred ground of national memory.

Jeremy Black’s latest book, The World at War, 1914–1945, engages with recent formulations that treat the two World Wars as part of one unified historical dynamic. This so-called long war thesis sees the period 1914–45—sometimes continuing to the end of the Cold War in 1991—much as Repington and Bliss saw it. In a narrative and essentially chronological treatment, Black wrestles with the strengths
and weaknesses of the long war concept. While acknowledging it has grown in popularity in recent years, Black ultimately rejects the long war concept as too Eurocentric.

Black primarily employs a comparative methodology. He is less concerned with constructing a narrative arc from 1914 to 1945 than in engaging in a juxtaposition of patterns between the war of 1914–18 and the war of 1939–45. This method provides for a direct comparison and contrast of the two wars, but the jumping around, sometimes even within the same paragraph, might confuse readers less familiar with some of the book’s details.

More helpfully, Black sees the World Wars as part of a much-wider periodization. He places the European wars within the wider context of the end of empires, beginning with the 1898 Spanish-American War. The 1914–18 war ended four major terrestrial empires—namely, the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, German, and Russian empires—replacing them with the nation-states that dominate Europe and the Middle East today. The Second World War fatally undermined the overseas empires of both the vanquished and, more significantly, the nominal victors of France and Britain.

Such an analysis, Black argues, has the advantage of decentering the “German question” from the wars. This is not to say Black finds Germany irrelevant; it occupies more of the book than any other country. Rather, he argues readers may miss wider patterns not as easy to discern by focusing too much on Germany.

Black’s central argument against the long war thesis centers on events in Asia. The crucial dynamic there, he contends, begins with the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95—or even as far back as the First Opium War of 1839–42. The result was the rise to power of China and the United States as the two most dominant states in the region, an outcome few would have dared to predict at the turn of the twentieth century. The strength of the book lies in its challenge to see the period 1914–45 in ways different from how scholars and popular culture normally present it.

A Canadian memorial to the Montreal Fusiliers at Dieppe, France, to commemorate the 1942 disaster there begins its list of the regiment’s campaigns not with Dieppe itself but with the Second Battle of Ypres in 1915. Whether or not the men of 1942 understood themselves as finishing the work of their fathers in 1915 may, as The World at War, 1914–1945 challenges us to consider, be the wrong question to ask. Instead readers might ask whether they understood the irony that their imperial service represented, in the wider scheme of history, a critical element in bringing about the end of empires.
The Red Army and the Second World War
By Alexander Hill

Reviewed by Dr. Reina Pennington, Charles A. Dana Professor of History, Norwich University

This fascinating study of the Red Army adds new dimensions to the understanding of Soviet military success in the Great Patriotic War. Although part of the Cambridge University Press Armies of the Second World War series, this book is not an overview of events on the Eastern Front or another history of the war. Readers are expected to have studied at least one of the key histories by John Erickson, David Glantz and Jonathan House, Evan Mawdsley, or Chris Bellamy. Hill identifies the key factors contributing to Soviet military effectiveness, shows how the problem of Soviet reach frequently exceeded its grasp, and makes a convincing case for the ongoing qualitative improvement which “transformed [the Red Army] into a more effective fighting force” (3).

The book can be broken down into thirds: about 200 pages each devoted to the prewar period, to 1941–42, and to 1943–45. Hill’s intense evaluation of the effects of prewar experiences and how they shaped the Red Army facing the Germans in 1941 is a strength of the book. The chapters on Khalkhin Gol and Finland are particularly interesting. Few general histories highlight this context so essential for understanding Soviet choices, strengths, and weaknesses going into the war. Hill also provides a clear view of the constantly changing conditions of the war: 1944 was a whole different ball game than 1941, and the differences are detailed in the “The Ten ‘Stalinist’ Blows of 1944” and other chapters.

Hill uses a wide variety of Russian language sources and draws upon primary accounts in the post-Soviet era as well as scholarly studies. Many personal stories add human interest and on-the-ground realism to the issues illustrated. Another great strength of Hill is his use of archival and documentary sources: his 2009 *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941–45: A Documentary Reader* is a good companion volume.

Hill provides thought-provoking analysis of the role of cavalry in the war, communications, rear support services, the development of reconnaissance and deception techniques, and the process by which Soviet military leaders carefully sought lessons learned and attempted to translate these lessons learned into a more-effective military effort. He stresses Stalin’s role in escalating the price paid in lives and resources. To ensure Germany’s defeat, Stalin drove his commanders to conduct offensives without adequate preparation or resources. Even so, the Red Army grew better over time. The army reduced its loss ratios, and its soldiers fought stubbornly and with increasing skill. The Red Army often had quantitative advantages, and Hill details these advantages while also analyzing the qualitative improvements vital to military success.
The detailed conclusion sums up Hill’s key arguments, emphasizing by the end of the war, both Soviet weapons and the Red Army as a whole were “well-conceived but not overly complex” and “relatively simple, robust and at the same time effective” (566). The Red Army did not solve all its problems, but played to its strengths and demonstrated a resilience which produced one of the most dramatic instances of strategic reversal in military history. Hill also offers a very useful comparison of British and Soviet experiences, pointing out “many issues noted here for the Red Army were not peculiarly Soviet” (572). Ultimately, “By the end of the Great Patriotic War the Red Army was certainly in many ways a very different creature than it had been” before—an army that had become more efficient and more effective (562).

The accessibility of the book could be improved. The chapters average 20 to 30 pages with no subheadings even though most chapters focus on two or three main topics. Paragraphs sometimes extend for two or more pages, and the text is often packed with lists of units and numbers of weapons, personnel, and casualties which would be easier to understand in chart form. There are no charts, and maps are few and overly basic. The publisher could have upgraded these aspects of the book. The illustrations, glossary, bibliography, and index, however, are nicely done, and the paper quality holds up to highlighting and note-taking, always a plus.

The story of the Eastern Front from 1939–45 is almost overwhelming—on a scale as to be almost incomprehensible. Hill’s new source-based and in-depth analysis of important and sometimes neglected aspects of Red Army successes and failures successfully drills down and adds several more layers to the comprehension of the role of the Red Army in the Second World War. The Red Army and the Second World War is a must-have addition to the library of serious students of the Eastern Front.

The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire

By A. Wess Mitchell

Reviewed by Dr. James D. Scudieri, research historian, US Army Heritage and Education Center

The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire examines the strategic statecraft of the Habsburg Empire, Austria, as a standalone security actor—from the end of the Spanish dynastic connection by 1700 and before the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary from 1867. Author A. Wess Mitchell is not an academic historian, but a State Department security professional. The preface and first chapter make four main claims for Habsburg strategy, with the three central themes of secure buffers, an army in being combined with frontier fortresses, and allied coalitions. Austria’s preeminent challenge was “interstitial,” i.e. response
to threats in time and space, so as to avoid simultaneous wars on multiple fronts (ix).

Part I concerns strategic constraints. A central position demanded a careful accounting of geography’s diplomatic and military implications, hence Austria’s investment in comprehensive mapping. No surprise, the demographic, ethnic complexity of the empire affected domestic political power, economics, and future territorial acquisition. Mitchell categorizes Austria as never “a normal Great Power” with its “complicated constitutional order” and “contested nature” of “domestic power” (79–80). Preservation of the army was central to survival of the dynasty and state.

Institutions evolved to deal with threats, variously France, Turkey, Russia, and Prussia. Increasingly sophisticated structures maximized peacetime planning and reduced wartime reaction. They incorporated Byzantine and Renaissance elements and just war traditions. Mitchell assesses these as Austrian equivalents of the US Quadrennial Defense Review and National Security Strategy.

Part II covers the “Habsburg Frontier ‘Defense Systems’” in three eras (119). The 1690s to the 1730s witnessed a rare Austrian emphasis on the military and the mobile field armies that launched counteroffensives against the Turks after the final, failed Turkish Siege of Vienna in 1683. Military efficacy rested upon Eugene of Savoy as commander of forces with organizational and technical superiority over the Ottoman Turks.

The 1740s to the 1750s marked a more sustained threat against the state. The War of Austrian Succession in 1740–48 challenged Queen Maria Theresa’s right to rule. There was no commander of Eugene’s talent, and the army could not match the tactical articulation of the Prussians. Next was the Seven Years War from 1756–63. Now Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz-Rietberg, premier diplomat for four decades, worked Prussia’s diplomatic isolation, except for Britain, a daunting paymaster, but no land power. Maria Theresa had led and encouraged major army and other governmental reforms. A far superior army emerged, but Frederick’s operational finesse within interior lines, and luck, saved Prussia. Perhaps diverging if not conflicting allied war aims played the greater role. Two concurrent Silesian Wars showcased Austrian determination to recover Silesia and humble Prussia. Throughout Austrian leaders kept the southeastern front facing the Turks quiet via appeasement and military borders.

The 1770s to the 1790s reconfirmed a preventive strategy. Austria both checked Russian ambitions and courted Russian assistance.

Napoleonic France, 1804–14, was the toughest of Austria’s foes, as Napoleon exploited the methodological seams in traditional Austrian strategic security systems. French armies were also bigger and better. Archduke Charles Louis John Joseph Laurentius, Duke of Teschen, did become the closest combination of both reformer and talented general. Of greater note were Klemens von Metternich’s efforts to turn the tide. He played for time, returned to war in 1809, and triumphed by 1814 with
Napoleon’s abdication. After allied victory over Napoleon’s Campaign of the Hundred Days in 1815, Metternich incorporated a defeated France into a European Concert to guard a new balance of power.

Part III covers 1815–66, with Austria clearly a second-rate power. Mitchell views Metternich’s work as largely successful from 1815–48, especially the sequential suppression of the Revolutions of 1848 with Russian assistance. Two other aspects merit emphasis.

First, conditions now greatly compromised traditional systems, especially the ability to orchestrate sequencing and duration. Austria thus looked beyond immediate borders. A new Deutscher Bund of 39 Germanic states replaced the 300-odd states in the eighteenth century. Mitchell compares the relationship to 39 distinct status of forces agreements. An Italian League linked Austria’s possessions there, though Mitchell sees the area as Austria’s Achilles’ heel.

Second, and Mitchell is most emphatic on this point, Austria’s defeats in the Franco-Austrian War of 1859 and the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 were not inevitable. He believes Austrian leaders erred grievously by overestimating the viability of the military instrument as a primary policy tool. First, the military wielded greater influence in the state. Second, the army became anti-intellectual and enamored with an offensive doctrine tactically and operationally. While fiscal realities likely impacted events, the military leaders devoted too little effort to force modernization.

Strategic inflexibility replaced sophisticated diplomacy, beginning with resort to the bellicose armed neutrality against Russia when pitted against a coalition in the Crimean War of 1853–56. Future Russian enmity was virtually assured. Worse, Austria at war turned to strategic offensives which ill-suited Austrian capability and capacity, and which went against traditional security approaches. Austrian strategy for decades used strategic defensives to buy time, in part for allies to rally. The early losses at Solferino in 1859 and Sadowa (Königgrätz) in 1866 were fast and decisive with Austria alone. Austria had played to enemy strengths. Incidentally, in 1859 the French had accomplished no less than a swift strategic force projection using steamships and railroads. In 1866 Prussia executed national will on its time table. Mitchell shows how these scenarios warranted more traditional strategic approaches but Austrian leaders rejected them.

Chapter 10 on the Habsburg legacy underlines the Austrian view of hard power as secondary. The army was not an instrument of annihilation. The diplomatic element showcased the Austrian state as a category apart with “necessity status” as Austria represented a nonthreatening quest for order (309). Austria’s alliances showcased its willingness to help smaller, weaker partners deter rising hegemons.

Finally, in the epilogue Mitchell articulates 13 broad principles of Habsburg strategic statecraft to inform today’s challenges that merit particular attention. Comparative analysis remains a double-edged
sword, but will raise elementary questions about America’s role in the world and who constitutes threats and why.

*The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire* is not light reading—329 pages of text and 45 pages of endnotes—but Mitchell has balanced a modest look at primary sources with an examination of a very wide selection of secondary literature. While the discussion is exhaustive, the result is a sweeping case study in ends, ways, and means.

**Pax Romana: War, Peace, and Conquest in the Roman World**  
By Adrian Goldsworthy

Reviewed by Dr. Jason W. Warren, defense contractor supporting information and cyber defense and security policy

In 51 BC, Julius Caesar, commander and political czar of Roman efforts in Gaul, ordered the hands of captured Gallic insurgents lopped off as a means to dispirit any hope of further resistance (410). As historian Adrian Goldsworthy demonstrates in *Pax Romana*, this atrocity and others like it were part of Rome’s method for gaining empire. Usually these violent and heavy-handed approaches occurred early in the pacification of conquered peoples and not throughout the duration of occupation. Rome opted for a mixture of cooperation for mutual benefit, threats, and occasional violence, such as Caesar’s, to establish a lasting peace still noteworthy for its longevity to this day.

In this expansive and accessible account Goldsworthy, in his politesse British style, implicitly pushes back on the prevailing argument that empire is a negative, especially for conquered peoples. His refreshing argument shows how, after an initial period of resistance and submission, almost all subdued tribes accepted empire and the benefits of Roman rule, indeed often citizenship. The advantages were many, including improved administration, a disruption of brigandage, the absence of internecine warfare, and above all, the status of being a friend of powerful Rome. This reviewer is reminded of the accurate Monty Python comedy sketch from *The Life of Brian*, “What Have the Romans Ever Done for Us?” where the long list of improvements on Roman-Britain is then listed, with the retort of the would-be insurgents, “well besides that.” The legion was therefore used sparingly, and stood sentinel on the borders of barbarism, far from the core of empire.

Goldsworthy goes to great lengths to maintain a balanced telling of events, refusing to gloss over occasional brutal imperial management. This balance obviates potential scholarly criticism about the upheavals and loss of freedom that subject peoples experienced. On the whole, he determines empire was best for the vast majority of individuals who came within its bounds.

Rome also chose monarchy and empire, as was the case when the Roman Senate only briefly debated a return to empire after Caligula’s
assassination in 41 AD (179). In an implicit comparison to other empires, Rome also chose to limit the boundaries of its empire, with a few notable exceptions such as Dacia and Mesopotamia, following Augustus’s advice to his stepson Tiberius after the defeat of the legions in the Teutoburg Forest (174–75).

As was the case with his stellar *How Rome Fell*, Goldsworthy brings to life how individual agency shaped the course of the Pax. Rome successfully harnessed the ambition of talented leaders who amalgamated tribes and territory as much for personal gain as for the glory of Rome. This method of empire building existed whether during the Republican empire, the civil wars, or through the general peace, until the upheaval of the third century AD.

Unfortunately, Goldsworthy forgoes the opportunity to delve deeper into issues of human nature, as to why such peace is so rare, something he connects with his growing up during the relative quietude in the United Kingdom after the Second World War (preface). Goldsworthy labors to identify the unique nature of such a long peace, but fails to expand on this thesis—is man’s nature therefore one of Hobbesian violence and hence contrary to the widespread belief in the West that peace is the natural state of being? Such useful examinations are absent, as with Goldsworthy’s obvious failure to juxtapose American republican empire since at least 1919, and all of its attendant consequences for world history and peace. Where Goldsworthy sees such connections with the past as problematic, such an approach undermines the gaining of historical insights better to contextualize foreign policy decisions today (7–8). Just as the Pax Romana was noteworthy, so is this account for scholars and students alike, albeit coming up slightly short in this regard.
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Statement of Ownership, Management, and Circulation

(Required by 39 U.S.C. 3685.)

1. Publication Title: Parameters
2. Publication Number: 413-530
3. Filing Date: 15 September 2020
4. Issue Frequency: Quarterly
5. Number of Issues Published Annually: 4
6. Annual Subscription Price: $26.00 (through GPO)
7. Complete Mailing Address of Known Office of Publication: US Army War College, ATTN: Parameters, 47 Ashburn Drive, Carlisle, Cumberland County, PA 17013-5238
8. Complete Mailing Address of Headquarters or General Business Office of Publisher: US Army War College, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, Cumberland County, PA 17013-5238
9. Publisher: US Army War College, same address; Editor in Chief: Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II, same address; Managing Editor: Mr. Richard K. Leach, same address
10. Owner: US Army War College, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA 17013-5238
11. Known Bondholders, Mortgages, and Other Security Holders Owning or Holding 1 Percent or More of Total Amount of Bonds, Mortgages, or Other Securities: None
12. The purpose, function, and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for federal income tax purposes have not changed during the preceding 12 months.
13. Issue Date for Circulation Below: Summer 2020
14. Extent and nature of circulation: a. Total Number of Copies: Average No. Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months (hereinafter “Average”), 12,057. No. Copies of Single Issue Published Nearest to Filing Date (hereinafter “Most Recent”), 11,666. b. Legitimate Paid and/or Requested Distribution: (1) Outside County Paid/Requested Mail Subscriptions stated on PS Form 3541: Average, 10,473. Most Recent, 10,430. (2) In-County Paid/Requested Mail Subscriptions stated on PSF Form 3541: Average, 0. Most Recent, 0. (3) Sales Through Dealers and Carriers, Street Vendors, Counter Sales, and Other Paid or Requested Distribution Outside USPS: Average, 636. Most Recent, 511. (4) Requested Copies Distributed by Other Mail Classes Through the USPS: Average, 335. Most Recent, 284. c. Total Paid and/or Requested: Average, 11,444. Most Recent, 11,225. d. Nonrequested Distribution: (1) Outside County Nonrequested Copies Stated on PS Form 3541: Average, 0. Most Recent, 0. (2) In-County Nonrequested Copies Stated on PS Form 3541: Average, 0. Most Recent, 0. (3) Nonrequested Copies Distributed Through the USPS by Other Classes of Mail: Average, 0. Most Recent, 0. (4) Nonrequested Copies Distributed Outside the Mail: Average, 704. Most Recent, 448. e. Total Nonrequested Distribution: Average, 704. Most Recent, 448. f. Total Distribution: Average, 12,148. Most Recent, 11,673. g. Copies not Distributed: Average, 90. Most Recent, 7. h. Total: Average, 12,238. Most Recent, 11,680. i. Percent Paid and/or Requested Circulation: Average, 94%. Most Recent, 96%.

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Evans, Carol V. “Future Warfare: Weaponizing Critical Infrastructure.” Parameters 50, no. 2 (Summer 2020): 35–42.


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The US Army War College Quarterly,

Parameters

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717-245-4943
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e-mail: usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@mail.mil

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