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Book Reviews

Biography

A Spy Named Orphan: The Enigma of Donald Maclean
By Roland Philipps

Reviewed by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, professor emeritus, US Army War College

Roland Philipps has produced an interesting and valuable biography of former British diplomat Donald Maclean, who conducted significant Soviet-sponsored espionage activities for decades as part of the “Cambridge Five” spy ring. This group was composed of five committed upper-class British communists, who after their studies and radicalization at Cambridge University, falsely claimed to have renounced their radical pasts. They then established themselves in important careers, where they acted as Soviet agents and did substantial damage to Western security interests before and during the Cold War. All of these men had developed a rigidly Marxist outlook in the 1930s during a period of political turmoil and economic depression throughout the world.

Philipps suggests certain elements of Maclean’s upbringing under the supervision of a strict and morally uncompromising father played out in unexpected ways. At Cambridge Maclean began searching for a cause and an opportunity to serve humanity. In an era of moral and political uncertainty, he felt he was beginning to find that opportunity by studying Marxism. He did so at a time when communism had become more acceptable at British universities due to the Great Depression, mass unemployment, reduced wages, and rapidly expanding and visible poverty throughout the United Kingdom and other Western societies. The widely accepted and very rosy predictions of continued growth in the Western economies following World War I dissolved in the aftermath of the Wall Street Crash of 1929. These economic problems were further complicated by the frightening rise of fascism in Europe.

In this atmosphere, young Maclean joined the popular Cambridge University Socialist Society, where about a quarter of the participants were also members of the Communist Party. Maclean was a vocal supporter of many radical causes and even identified himself as a Communist in an interview with the student newspaper. He graduated from Cambridge in June 1934 as the same morally rigid person he had always been, but this rigidity was now in the service of his belief in the need for world revolution. Moreover, Maclean’s communism was not that of a leftist academic drawing diagrams of class struggle; he was a hard-core Communist who saw the Soviet Union as the epitome of what he believed the world should be.

After graduating from Cambridge Maclean applied to the Foreign Office and sought a career in diplomacy. It was at least possible, and probably likely, that he was planning to work on behalf of the Soviet
Union even at this early stage in his life. He did well in his Foreign Office examinations and during the interview phase dismissed his radical past as a brief flirtation with an ideology, which he by then viewed as nonsense. Such an explanation appealed to his examiners who shared a widespread British upper-class view that interest in socialism or even communism was simply a “passing fancy of youth” (50). Undoubtedly, it was such a “fancy” with some candidates, but not in this case. Maclean’s examiners, correspondingly, made their country vulnerable by refusing to entertain the possibility that someone of his family, background, and upbringing could be committed to anything but establishment values. No serious investigation occurred into Maclean’s life experiences, and he was inducted into the Foreign Office as a junior official.

Perhaps even more egregious, and indicative of the same approach, Maclean’s friend, Kim Philby, was eventually inducted into the British Intelligence Service despite his own youthful record of radical activism and his secret marriage to an Austrian communist, who recruited him into Soviet service. Philby used his communist connections in Europe and put Maclean in touch with a Soviet handler, who quickly recruited Maclean to engage in espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union and its satellite organization, the Communist International (Comintern).

Philipps shows that Maclean was a brilliant and extremely productive Soviet agent throughout most of his diplomatic career. In some ways the British government made it easy for him. The Foreign Office showed almost no serious interest in document control for classified material, and Maclean freely took important secret documents home with him. This practice was well-known among his coworkers, but they wrote it off as a by-product of Maclean’s exceptionally strong work ethic. While he did work on these documents at home, Maclean usually had his Soviet handler photograph them first.

Philipps maintains Maclean conserved his self-esteem throughout most of his diplomatic career by his service to the communist cause. Maclean would become unhappy and depressed during periods when he was unable to obtain especially important documents for Moscow. He also married an American radical, and against the principles of intelligence tradecraft, he told her he was working as a spy for the Soviet Union. During his time as a Soviet agent Maclean seemed impervious to doubt about the Soviet system under Stalin. While some supporters of the Soviet Union were shaken by the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the Soviet invasion of Finland, and the Great Purges, Maclean remained sanguine, trusting in Stalin’s judgment, and a total ideologue.

As the world situation became more alarming, Maclean’s career with the Foreign Office continued to flourish, and he achieved important promotions due to his intellect, hard work, and apparent commitment to the job. He did, nevertheless, feel considerable pressure from living a double life and began drinking heavily, eventually becoming an alcoholic who was often loud, unpleasant, and sometimes violent when drunk. These clear warning signs eventually earned him a lengthy
period of leave to rest, but never caused a review of his fitness to hold a security clearance.

Yet, if British counterintelligence efforts were naive regarding Maclean, Soviet intelligence activities as Philipps shows were often stumbling and unprofessional. The Soviets initially gave Maclean the code name Orphan, which reflected his fatherless state at the time and his solitary nature. This misguided approach represented the weak Soviet tradecraft in the 1930s and 1940s. Code names sometimes reflected personal attributes of the individual in question and were therefore less effective than a random name in protecting their agent’s identity if the code name was compromised. In an even more unforgivable example of this failing, Maclean’s fellow Cambridge spy Anthony Blunt was given the code name Tony.

These mistakes were marginal compared to those brought on by the paranoia infecting the Stalinist system. Soviet handlers were often recalled to Moscow on the assumption they might have become too westernized during their time abroad regardless of their outward loyalty. They usually willingly returned as ordered, facing almost certain death after extensive torture. Ironically, the Soviets often suspected Maclean of being a double agent due to the same prejudices as the British, a general disbelief that an upper-class British civil servant would actually be willing to engage in espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. Yet, the material he provided to the Soviets was so useful they found it difficult to write him off.

As with many Soviet agents, Maclean worried about his identity being properly protected by Moscow. General Walter Krivitsky defected from Soviet intelligence in 1937 and represented a potential threat to all Soviet spies in the British government, depending upon what information he knew to pass along to British counterintelligence officers. Unfortunately, this information was fairly limited. Krivitsky told his debriefers there were two Foreign Office spies, but he did not provide details to suggest who the traitors were. Moreover, Krivitsky’s usefulness to Western intelligence came to an end when he was murdered by Soviet agents in Washington, DC, in 1941.

Maclean avoided detection in this instance but was much more seriously implicated by US intelligence personnel who decrypted important portions of various intercepted messages. Many of these messages were decoded because of Soviet shortcuts for encryption taken during and after World War II. Tipped off by Philby in Washington, DC, about the American decryptions, Maclean fled to Moscow with fellow Cambridge Five spy Guy Burgess. Together the men lost the surveillance placed on them and managed to reach France and then Switzerland before disappearing into the Soviet Union in 1951.

Moscow initially refused to acknowledge Maclean’s presence, but then allowed him to assume a more public role. He learned Russian, acquired a doctorate, and became a senior analyst for the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. Maclean’s wife and three
children joined him in Moscow, although the marriage remained under great strain due in part to his severe alcoholism.

Perhaps the most important lesson of *A Spy Named Orphan* is that loyalty cannot be taken for granted because of a person’s background, education, or apparent conformism to social and organizational values. Another lesson is the tremendous damage a single well-placed agent can do if left in place without any investigation of scandalous statements or behavior. None of these lessons will come as a surprise to intelligence officials, but a comprehensive analysis of old lessons provided by a case study such as this work can be useful. It may also convey valuable knowledge for military leaders who are not intelligence professionals but who sometimes work in classified environments.

**How Ike Led: The Principles Behind Eisenhower’s Biggest Decisions**

By Susan Eisenhower

Reviewed by Dr. Jonathan D. Arnett, research director at the Modern War Institute at the United States Military Academy

How Ike Led is a readable whirlwind tour of the life and leadership of Dwight D. Eisenhower, written by his granddaughter, Susan Eisenhower—a longtime policy strategist and author of the 1996 book *Mrs. Ike: Memories and Reflections on the Life of Mamie Eisenhower*. I highly recommend the book to readers with limited time who want to know more quickly about the general and the 34th president. Ms. Eisenhower indicates the book is a primer on Ike, a reintroduction of Dwight Eisenhower to the public, for those who did not grow up during his lifetime or who know little of him. Ms. Eisenhower relies on information garnered from scholarly works and her grandfather’s contemporaries and subordinates and intersperses childhood memories of her grandfather throughout the book—which I found interesting and very touching.

The book does not offer anything particularly new historically. Instead, Ms. Eisenhower condenses Ike’s history and highlights his critical decisions and character traits in a very personal, intimate way as only a granddaughter can do. As Ike’s granddaughter, Ms. Eisenhower illustrates more clearly and personally, the character and leadership principles that governed Ike’s success as a commander and president. She admits the book’s genesis, partially, was a reaction to 30 years of sharp criticism of the Eisenhower administration. She also claims as she grew older and dealt with more policy issues herself, she became more impressed with her grandfather’s legacy and appreciated how well he handled the challenging problems of the early Cold War. She claims criticism of Ike’s presidency has waned, and Americans increasingly are gaining an appreciation for her grandfather’s wisdom and bipartisanship. She hopes this book maintains that momentum.
I will not detail all of Ike’s big decisions and specific character traits highlighted in the book but will focus on a few. First, having worked closely for a service secretary and chief of staff, as well as three four-star combatant commanders, and supported high-stakes war planning, I have a special appreciation for Eisenhower’s strengths as a staffer, commander, and president. He had excellent judgment and seemed intuitively able to balance desired ends with available means against risks and prevail. In today’s lexicon of buzzwords and catchphrases, Ike was an exemplary “critical thinker.” While Ike may have made errors along the way—and what leaders do not—he consistently made the right calls when the stakes were highest. There were no great tragedies or catastrophes on his watch, and his record says a lot.

Second and directly related to his judgment, Ike vehemently believed in personal responsibility and accountability. Ms. Eisenhower retells the story of the famous note Ike crafted in case the Normandy invasion failed, where he accepted full responsibility for the decision and results. She also concisely retells the U-2 shoot down, and how Ike accepted responsibility for the embarrassment. I was also impressed with how Eisenhower dealt with a very subtle compromise of Operation Overlord planning. Close to D-Day, one of Ike’s senior officers hinted to a woman he desired to impress that he would be in France by mid-June. Eisenhower immediately relieved the officer. In an age when compromising legitimately protected state secrets has become sport, I admire Ike’s swift, resolute action. Regarding his integrity and objectivity, Ms. Eisenhower notes President Eisenhower repeatedly stated during his presidency that there would be no favoritism or nepotism, and reportedly, the majority of his advisers, staffers, and appointees were professionals rather than amateur or career politicians.

Third, without using the term, Ms. Eisenhower also highlights Ike’s profound stoicism. Ike believed some personal battles, some trials of mind and heart, should be fought privately. This belief was old school self-help, which is alien in a contemporary culture where leaders and celebrities relish publicly broadcasting all their fears, disabilities, and foibles. Across his youth, West Point years, and Army career, Ike learned to control himself—his passions, his anger, his selfishness. His stoicism became part and parcel of his exceptionalism.

It is a pity that in contemporary vernacular, the title Boy Scout has acquired an almost negative connotation denoting a person who is naïve or foolishly virtuous. The character traits Ms. Eisenhower highlights in her grandfather are those of the ideal Scout and are embodied in the Scout Law—“A Scout is: Trustworthy, Loyal, Helpful, Friendly” (US Boy Scouts, “Scout Law”). Reading about Ike’s humble beginnings, religious upbringing, and close-knit family reminded me of a famous old quote of our national character being great because it was good. Ike was great because he was good, with good judgment and core attributes from which his leadership flowed.
At the beginning and ending of the book, Ms. Eisenhower appears to have another subtle objective in mind in addition to creating a superb primer on General and President Eisenhower. She engages in very mild sociopolitical commentary. Essentially, she critiques a culture and political class that is transfixed by the moment and buffeted by the present with very little deep deliberation for the long-term—the strategic—what is good collectively for the entire country. Like my parents, she waxes nostalgic for a previous period in US history—the era of her youth, the era when her grandfather was president. She misses the values and principles that caused a generally united, albeit imperfect nation, to “Like Ike.”

George W. Goethals and the Army: Change and Continuity in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era

By Rory McGovern

Rory McGovern’s biography of George W. Goethals is a well-researched account of an important military officer and his career during the historical periods referred to as the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era, roughly 1880 to 1920. Goethals managed two significant efforts during this period—the construction of the Panama Canal and the reorganization of the Army’s World War I logistics enterprise. McGovern addresses the changes forced upon the Army by the rise of the United States as an international power following the Spanish-American War and uses Goethals’s career as a lens through which to examine the Army’s response to change during that period.

Goethals entered West Point in 1876 when the academy was less an educational institution than a mechanism for military acculturation. The prevailing view at the time was that the best form of education was experiential. Beyond West Point, there was little opportunity to receive what is now known as professional military education. This view was less true for the Army Corps of Engineers, of which Goethals became a part. Engineering was emerging as a professional discipline, but professional military education was still mostly experiential. Goethals, however, was fortunate. His early assignments led to his development as a competent civil engineer. McGovern notes Goethals’s career progression was more a matter of good fortune than anything done systematically by the Army to foster his professional development.

Goethals’s success across his early assignments eventually brought him into contact with W. H. Taft, then Secretary of War. About the same time, the United States had committed to the construction of the Panama Canal. For a variety of reasons, building the canal was a troubled project. US President Teddy Roosevelt wanted a construction manager who would not quit when the going got tough. That requirement suggested a
military officer. Roosevelt consulted Taft who suggested Goethals, and Roosevelt concurred. Acting through Goethals, the Army took charge of canal construction in 1907. Roosevelt's directive to Goethals was to “make the dirt fly,” and he did (96). The canal opened for traffic on August 15, 1914.

Completing the canal was a “feather in the Army’s cap” and a major career and professional accomplishment for Goethals (206). At the height of canal construction, Goethals managed a workforce nearly half the size of the entire Army, and he served as governor of the Canal Zone from 1914 until September 1916 when he returned to the United States to retire from the Army. The chapter titled “Making the Dirt Fly” was the best researched and most solidly presented portion of the book and is good reading for anyone interested in the history of the canal project (84).

The section of the book addressing organizational change and the Army’s response to that change requires a rewind to the period immediately prior to the canal project, the Spanish-American War of 1898. The Spanish-American War thrust the United States onto the world stage as a major power. That said, US conduct of the Spanish-American War was an amateurish affair on many accounts. Public and political reactions to the haphazard way in which the war was conducted resulted in several postwar investigations.

These inquiries led to Elihu Root being appointed Secretary of War. Root had no military background, but he quickly recognized the need for serious military reform affecting the Army. The resulting Root Reforms had two primary thrusts: enhanced professional military education in the form of the Army War College and a reformed Command and General Staff College and the establishment of a general staff to direct and coordinate planning across the Army. These reforms were fiercely resisted in the upper echelons of the Army’s officer corps, most notably by the then-powerful bureau chiefs. The institutions intended to enable reform were created, but they were provided no ability to generate the desired changes.

The United States entered World War I in April 1917, and Goethals reentered public service to support the war effort. He was eventually appointed the Army’s Quartermaster General responsible for reorganizing the logistics aspects of a then-failing war effort. As in previous conflicts, the Army’s organization and war preparation efforts were not up to the challenges of World War I: quickly building an expeditionary force facing high-intensity, industrial-age warfare. Building on the organizational and managerial skills he developed during the Panama Canal construction project, Goethals quickly reorganized the Army’s logistics enterprise to meet those challenges. As McGovern points out, Goethals's efforts are an interesting case study of politics, bureaucratic infighting, organizational dysfunction, and resistance to change.
Although the events described in the change and continuity portions of the book occurred more than 100 years ago, the echoes of those troubles are still with the Army today. In that sense, the book is relevant to the current period. The Army’s institutional culture is very strong, and culture is hard to change.

McGovern correctly notes large, hierarchical organizations that promote primarily from within tend to be resistant to change. Substantive change often requires a strong exogenous shock, such as those associated with the Spanish-American War or the failing war effort in late 1917. As the Army’s responses to the Root Reforms of 120 years ago illustrate and caution, institutional culture can lag and impede change initiatives. Cultural change cannot simply be commanded. Consistent and visionary leadership in the wake of crises that lead to change initiatives is essential. Such leadership was absent in the wake of the Root Reforms, and the subsequent change efforts foundered. That said, McGovern’s treatment of Army change and continuity during the historical period covered is rather shallow and not the best researched or presented aspect of the book.

The Impeachers: The Trial of Andrew Johnson and the Dream of a Just Nation
By Brenda Wineapple
Reviewed by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, professor emeritus, US Army War College

Within the last several years, a number of new books have been published on the process of impeaching an American president. Brenda Wineapple’s outstanding *The Impeachers* is distinct from the others. She examines in depth the first US presidential impeachment and all the characters involved—without using her research as groundwork for discussing contemporary political issues. Despite Wineapple’s focus on the 1800s, readers cannot help but notice the striking similarities between President Johnson and President Trump even though both men faced different political cultures and contexts. There are limits, however, to the parallels. Johnson, who came to power after Lincoln’s assassination, was never elected president and was viewed by many Americans as an accidental head of state. He did not have a powerful political base supporting him, and he faced a hostile Republican Party in Congress that regularly overrode his vetoes on the most important legislation.

Johnson was widely known to be racist. He had previously owned slaves and was offended by the idea of black people rising above menial labor. Despite his Tennessee roots, he did side with the Union during the Civil War and was the only senator from a Confederate state to oppose secession. Wineapple maintains Johnson’s motives for these actions were complex and centered on his dislike of the Southern planter elite he believed treated him in condescending ways because of his impoverished childhood and background as an indentured servant.
and tailor. Johnson also feared black equality more than he resented the Southern aristocracy, and Wineapple argues that as president Johnson sought to return former slaves to conditions very much like slavery because of his racial prejudice and fear free blacks would compete for jobs usually held by poor whites.

Johnson opposed civil rights legislation, tried to limit the effectiveness of institutions created to help ex-slaves, and discounted violence by the Ku Klux Klan as isolated incidents. He wildly used his pardon power in ways that allowed wartime Southern politicians and senior Confederate officers to return to power. This approach surprised many Washington observers since Johnson was known to resent the Southern aristocracy. Wineapple clarifies this paradox by pointing out that while Johnson’s resentment ran deep, he also coveted the respect of Southern elites, and he enjoyed it when they requested pardons from him.

Johnson also sought to limit the power of the Army to protect blacks and pro-Union whites in the former Confederate states, placing him in conflict with Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, who sought to use the Army to protect black Americans and others cooperating with federal authorities in the South. Johnson eventually removed Stanton from office and fell into a carefully laid trap. Congress had previously passed the constitutionally questionable Tenure of Office Act which denied the president the ability to fire Senate-confirmed cabinet members without the agreement of the Senate. Johnson’s violations of the Tenure of Office Act became the core of the House of Representative’s Articles of Impeachment, although Article 11 was a catchall involving Johnson’s contempt for Congress and refusal to execute important laws passed by Congress. Johnson was impeached by the House of Representatives in February 1868 with his trial in the Senate ending in late May 1868.

The impeachment trial was the most sordid and complex political machination imaginable. As the first presidential impeachment, there was no precedent to draw upon. Congress improvised its procedures based on the brief and somewhat vague principles outlined in the Constitution. Many involved had personal agendas, as Wineapple shows. Underlying these concerns was a strong belief among Republicans that if they could wait until the November election, General Ulysses S. Grant would almost certainly be voted into office as a strong Republican president.

Ultimately, Johnson avoided removal from office by one vote. Republican Senator Edmund G. Ross, who had previously promised to vote against Johnson, decided at the last minute to support him. Wineapple suggests bribery might have been the decisive factor for the changed vote, although she also quotes an observer as stating the married Ross had become “infatuated to the extent of foolishness” with a beautiful much-younger woman who was an adamant Johnson supporter (359). Johnson completed the remaining months of his presidency as a discredited and largely powerless lame duck, returned to Tennessee after the expiration of his term without attending the inauguration of General Grant, and sought for many years to regain his former position as a US
senator—then elected by state legislators. Johnson finally gained enough support in the state legislature in 1875 to return to his Senate position and served just under five months before suffering a fatal stroke.

Wineapple concludes Johnson was impeached for his efforts to restore the Union with the old Southern elite in place and most black Americans returned to slavery-like conditions. The first presidential impeachment was an extremely political process and did not look remotely like an objective legal proceeding. Johnson was impeached for political and moral reasons. Wineapple believes this may be the most interesting lesson from the first presidential impeachment, and the dominance of politics in future impeachment trials will be extremely likely if not inevitable.
Post Wall, Post Square: How Bush, Gorbachev, Kohl, and Deng Shaped the World after 1989

By Kristina Spohr

Reviewed by Dr. Ronald J. Granieri, associate professor of history, US Army War College

While history did not end in 1989, something began. Determining what that “something” might be has bedeviled the analysis of world affairs ever since. The year most famous for the fall of the Berlin Wall, with all the symbolism attached to it, marked for many Europeans and most Americans the end—or at least the beginning of the end—of the Cold War. Events in 1990–91 then marked the start of President George H. W. Bush’s new world order, which he suggested would be based on democracy, freer trade, and multinational cooperation. At the same time communism collapsed in Europe and sent shock waves to Moscow, communism triumphed in China. Anyone who lived through the first months of 1989 remembers many analysts expected to see fundamental change in Beijing, not Berlin. The decision by the Chinese communist leadership on June 4 to send tanks into the Square of Heavenly Peace appeared to bring all such dreams to an end.

As disparate as the events in Berlin and Beijing were, Kristina Spohr believes it is clear in retrospect that the contemporary world has lived in their dual shadow ever since. State socialism collapsed in Eastern Europe, but the Chinese model of state capitalism survived the challenge and has shaped the course of China and modern geopolitics. The hopefulness of the 1990s may have given way to the grim realities of 9/11 and the Global War on Terror, and now to the even-grimmer realities of pandemics and lockdowns, but there is no doubt the current multipolar world emerged from the collapse of Cold War bipolarity and the “unforeseen consequences of the design flaws in the new order improvised with such haste and ingenuity by the shapers of world affairs in 1989–92” (9).

Spohr, one of the finest of a new generation of international historians who have made their careers in the post–Cold War world, undertakes the daunting task of bringing these different stories together. In her massive and deeply researched book, she attempts to place the events and leaders in Europe, North America, and Asia into a common context to understand the “troubled birth” of the post-Wall and post-Square order as we ponder the implications of the order’s current demise (9).

Spohr mines a range of archives and sources in multiple languages to develop her narrative. Highlighting the interplay of personalities and policies, she weaves the actions of Bush, Mikhail Gorbachev,
Helmut Kohl, and Deng Xiaoping—the main actors as her title suggests—with the significant roles played by other world leaders, from Margaret Thatcher and François Mitterrand to Václav Havel, Boris Yeltsin, and Li Peng.

Spohr helps readers develop a truly global understanding of the tumultuous era from 1989–92 and see how connected the events appeared to actors at the time—especially readers who may not have experienced these events directly. Events in Beijing, combined with memories of failed popular uprisings in Eastern Europe in previous years, encouraged political leaders across the Atlantic to keep their expectations for change in Europe modest in fall 1989 and may have lulled some Eastern European communist leaders, especially Gorbachev, into a false sense of security about their ability to manage change. East German leader Erich Honecker openly speculated about a “Chinese solution” to the protests in Leipzig and other cities in October 1989 before being dissuaded from such reckless violence by more reform-minded colleagues (149). But even these colleagues, once they had pushed Honecker into retirement, underestimated the degree to which the rejection of violent repression meant the end of the East German regime altogether.

Similarly, Kohl and his colleagues in Bonn, who had spoken generally about their desire for German unification, scrambled to respond when protesters began chanting “We are one people!” (150). Kohl surprised many critics with his willingness to improvise, but the path to German reunification was far from smooth. While the happy European revolutions of 1989 would not have been possible without the enthusiasm of the crowds, the aftermath required the negotiating skills of leaders who themselves were not sure how things would turn out.

Spohr also helps readers understand the global reverberations of those heady moments in 1989. The revolutions in Europe had hardly settled down when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990, providing a further push toward a different international system, just as the failure of Gorbachev’s Soviet Union to save their former client provided further fuel for plotters to try to overthrow Gorbachev in August 1991. Nor did the surprising swift victory over Iraq guarantee re-election for Bush. In his “A Europe Whole and Free” speech in Mainz on May 31, 1989, Bush pursued a complex strategy, embracing German reunification and the development of a Europe “whole and free” while also trying to maintain Gorbachev in power and positive relations with China. American domestic politics ultimately caught up with the global statesman.

Rejecting a man they considered aloof and too focused on international affairs, American voters elected Bill Clinton, who during the campaign rejected Bush’s willingness to “coddle dictators from Baghdad to Beijing” only to become a strong advocate once in office of Chinese integration into the World Trade Organization (574). Furthermore, Bush’s last acts in office included dispatching US troops to
help war-torn Somalia—the first of many ill-fated efforts by Washington to use its influence as the world’s surviving superpower to bring about humanitarian political change.

As if the obvious number of foreshadowed events in her narrative were not enough, Spohr works in references to Donald Trump at the beginning and end of her book, both to remind readers of the consequences of decisions made in the 1990s and to reflect upon the changes in American leadership over the decades since. “Bush and his fellow managers of the 1989–91 post–Cold War transition had kept their eyes on the global balance,” Spohr concludes. “They also understood that US power had to be exercised within a framework of political alliances and economic interdependence” (598). That attitude also shaped, in varying degrees, the policies of Bush’s successors. Trump, however, had already signaled his rejection of this approach in a March 1990 interview in Playboy. Asked how President Trump would govern, Trump declared: “He would believe very strongly in extreme military strength. He wouldn’t trust anyone. He wouldn’t trust the Russians; he wouldn’t trust our allies; he’d have a huge military arsenal, perfect it, understand it” (599).

Trump’s plans for the future seemed out of step with the careful diplomatic approach of the leaders of his time. His rise to power, though, is indicative of how that careful approach sowed the seeds of its own destruction. Spohr does not say if a new era has begun in the last three years, but she does show the world has come a long way from the optimistic autumn of 1989.

**Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy: Religion, Politics, and Strategy**

By Dmitry Adamsky

Reviewed by Dr. Robert E. Hamilton, professor of Eurasian studies, US Army War College, and retired US Army colonel

Will a more religious Russia be harder to deter and more willing to coerce adversaries? Will the rise in religiosity in Russia influence the Kremlin’s decisions on when to go to war and how Russia conducts itself in war? And will the unique nexus between the Russian Orthodox Church and Russia’s nuclear forces enable the nuclear forces to win budget battles against rivals in the coming era of budget austerity? These are some of the questions Dmitry Adamsky raises in *Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy.*

Adamsky is not the first scholar to notice orthodoxy has become a key component of Russia’s post-Soviet geopolitical identity. But his argument that the Russian Orthodox Church and the nuclear community have formed a uniquely strong bond is new and deserves serious consideration. If this bond is real, it bears directly on the answers to the questions posed above. The dual phenomena of rising religiosity and the unique bond between the Orthodox Church and the nuclear community...
could raise the profile of nuclear weapons in Russian national security strategy, directly affect Russia’s willingness to use force in a crisis, and influence how it uses that force.

Adamsky notes correctly there is a lack of evidence in international relations research that military clergy restrain states from going to war or moderate their conduct in war due to moral and ethical considerations. In Russia’s case the extreme conservatism and nationalism of the Orthodox Church may have the opposite effect. The church has long seen its role as shielding Russia from the supposed threat posed by a “decadent and secular” West. And Russia’s nuclear deterrent has long been a staple of its national security strategy.

The marriage between the two thus echoes the words of National Security Council (NSC)-68 published in 1950, which warned of the threat of a nuclear-armed Soviet Union “animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own” (The Executive Secretary, “NSC-68: A Report to the National Security Council,” Naval War College Review 28, no. 3 (May–June 1975): 53). The faith then was Marxism, and the faith now is Russian Orthodoxy. The two are different in their views of history and a just world order but are alike in exhorting their followers to extreme measures to carry out their visions, and in that married to one of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals, they make Moscow a dangerous and unpredictable adversary.

Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy is exhaustively researched, logically organized, and surprisingly readable—especially for a book taking on a topic of this magnitude. Adamsky’s use of Russian and English interviews, scholarly and journalistic sources, and official records provide a firm foundation for building his argument. The book traces the evolution of the relationship between the church and the nuclear community over the three decades of Russia’s post-Soviet history.

In each decade, Adamsky examines three themes. The first theme is the general development of the church-state relationship in Russia. The second theme is the more specific development of the “faith-nuclear nexus”—the relationship between the church and Russia’s nuclear weapons community (29). The third theme is strategic mythmaking or the deliberate “reading of religious connotations into history” that sought to prove “a causal link between the spiritual support of the church and battlefield successes” (150).

Over these three decades, the partnership between the church and the nuclear community, which began as a grassroots movement in the 1990s, eventually acquired support from the top. The Russian military in the 1990s was in profound shock and systemic crisis, and the church was just emerging from decades of enforced atheism and persecution at the hands of the Communist Party. In this environment, the two institutions developed a relationship that served both. The church could provide remedies for the military problems of motivation and discipline and fill the ideological vacuum left by the collapse of Soviet communism. And for the church, the military
represented a way to expand its influence by reaching out to all social groups and reestablishing a close relationship with the government.

Sustained lobbying from Patriarchs Alexey II and Kirill in the 2000s turned the Russian Orthodox Church into a key player in Russian politics. By the end of the decade, “nuclear churching” became Kremlin policy, with support from the top supplementing the initial grassroots movement of the 1990s (168). During this decade, the church met all four of its main goals: the introduction of religious instruction in public schools, the revival of the military chaplaincy, the restitution of pre-Soviet church property, and the marginalization of “nontraditional” denominations.

An actual doctrine of nuclear orthodoxy also emerged in this decade. With the political, economic, and social crises of the 1990s behind it, Russia began the search for a new national ideal. Among the views vying for attention in a variation on the traditional competition between Slavophiles, Westerners, Atlanticists, and Eurasianists was that of Egor Kholmogorov. Kholmogorov, the author of the nuclear orthodoxy doctrine, was an ultraconservative who won the For Feminism “Sexist of the Year” poll in 2014 for advocating punching women who utter the word “sexism” (Gabrielle Tetrault-Farber, “Publicist Who Advocated Punching Women in the Face Named ‘Russia’s Sexist of the Year’,” Moscow Times, March 12, 2015). Kholmogorov’s doctrine rested on two postulates: “to stay Orthodox, Russia should be a strong nuclear power” and “to stay a strong nuclear power, Russia should be Orthodox” (161).

The last 10 years, which Adamsky calls the “Operationalization Decade,” have solidified and institutionalized the marriage between the Orthodox Church and the nuclear community in Russia (7). During this decade, Russia’s nuclear arsenal gained additional prominence in Russian national security doctrine; simultaneously, the church provided a foundation for Russia’s new geopolitical identity. Adamsky’s identification of and explanation for this nexus between the church and the nuclear community in Russia may not be the only answer to the questions this book raises. Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy, however, provides richer and more accurate answers to these questions and enhances readers’ understanding of some important phenomena in international relations and military strategy.
Why We Fight
By Mike Martin

Mike Martin’s Why We Fight belongs to a growing genre of literature, books written by junior officers based on their experiences of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This canon includes Patrick Hennessy’s The Junior Officers’ Reading Club, Patrick Bury’s Callsign Hades, Charlotte Madison’s Dressed to Kill, Evan Wright’s Generation Kill, Craig Mullaney’s The Unforgiving Minute, Emile Simpson’s War from the Ground Up, and Martin’s first book on the Helmand conflict, An Intimate War. There is nothing new about subaltern literature. Because they tend to be very literate and have experienced close combat firsthand, lieutenants and captains have written many important memoirs of the wars in which they served. Siegfried Sassoon, Wilfred Owen, Edmund Blunden, Robert Graves, and Ernst Jünger produced major works about the First World War. Even junior officers of the Vietnam War produced important contributions to this genre with Philip Caputo’s A Rumor of War, Bing West’s The Village, and, perhaps, the finest of all, Karl Marlantes’ Matterhorn and What It Is Like to Go to War.

Why We Fight is unusual in that it is not a memoir; Martin mentions his experiences in Afghanistan only obliquely. Instead, it is a general investigation of why humans go to war at all. In this, Why We Fight is most like Simpson’s War from the Ground Up. Written by two Afghan veterans, the two books form an interesting pair. While Simpson (an idealist) reduces war to its narratives, Martin (a materialist) believes war is in the genes, and the evolutionary psychology of humans compels them to fight.

For Martin war is best understood as an evolutionary adaptation. Humans go to war to protect their genes. Of course, there is an obvious conundrum here, which Martin seeks to resolve. War is a risky business, and it has been almost universally prosecuted by young men, whom it eliminates in large numbers before they have had a chance to reproduce. Consequently, as a reproductive strategy, it should be irrational for young men to fight. They are likely to die, while their cowardly but long-living brothers will have a greater chance of reproduction; paradoxically, on this account, the weak are, in evolutionary terms, fitter.

If the brave have always died young, then humans should have become less and less warlike. Martin perceptively notes, however, there is a secondary social mechanism at work. While young men might be killed if they go to war, if they shirk their collective duty to defend their community, they will definitely be excluded by it. They will be ostracized and may even suffer punishment or death. Consequently, by not going to war—for all its attendant risks—they reduce their reproductive fitness more than suffering the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune: “We fight because losing membership of our in-group—whether because it
is disintegrating, or because we’re being shunned for not fighting—is evolutionary suicide” (89). Crucially, by fighting for their community, soldiers will earn status and a sense of belonging, which Martin identifies as the two master motivations for going to war.

Martin proves historically the claim that humans fight for status and membership within their social group and also provides personal evidence of it. The book is punctuated with italicized autobiographical passages, which constitute some of the strongest prose in the book. In one passage, Martin describes how he was asked by his brother why he had volunteered for Helmand: “I pondered his question for a moment, and answered from the gut. ‘I want to see how I do,’ I replied, pausing before adding, ‘I want to prove myself’” (41). Later he describes the conflict he saw in southern Afghanistan. Against the official narratives, there was no simple war between the Taliban and the Afghan government there. Instead, there was a series of internecine struggles between power brokers, clans, and tribes against their local rivals. In each case, belligerents were motivated by immediate concerns of collective self-protection and promotion; by status and group membership, in short (124–25).

Martin’s sociological explanation of why humans are willing to fight is both powerful and economical, and sociologists, anthropologists, and many philosophers would certainly concur with him. He does not find this account sufficient, however, and proceeds, on its basis, to build a much more complex evolutionary edifice. Although humans certainly fight for status and belonging, Martin claims these emotional commitments are underpinned by biochemical mechanisms, particularly testosterone, which makes humans individually aggressive, violent, and risk-taking, and oxytocin, which heightens their attachment to their group. Humans are chemically programmed to love their kin, while also accepting—even relishing—the risks required to defend them. For Martin, these two chemicals explain why individuals can risk going to war for a social group they love.

At the same time, as a result of evolution, the human brain has become imprinted with a series of subconscious, innate modules which structure consciousness. These modules allow humans to form extremely large social groups, extending well beyond any genetic heritage. Martin identifies three major modules laid down in the Paleolithic Period: moral codes, religion, and ideology. These modules align individual human biochemistry to potential vast polities. Instead of just loving their immediate kin and being willing to fight and die for them, humans are conditioned by these modules to form oxytocin attachments to their societies, faith communities, or nations, consisting of thousands, maybe, millions of individuals. Testosterone ensures humans have been willing to fight for these attachments.

*Why We Fight* is an ingenious exposition of a long-standing philosophical problem and an evolutionary psychological explanation of war. It is an intriguing and unusual book for a former subaltern to have written and is an academic and, in places, dense inquiry. Serving
soldiers may find the book less useful and accessible than other works by Helmand veterans that deal more immediately with the experience of combat itself or Martin’s previous book on Helmand. Scholars and students of war, however, will read the book with great interest and ask why a British veteran of the Helmand campaign felt obliged to look beyond immediate strategic and political explanations in the struggle to understand the war in which he fought.

**Culture and the Soldier: Identities, Values, and Norms in Military Engagements**

**Edited by H. Christian Breede**

Reviewed by Dr. Kellie Wilson-Buford, associate professor of history, Arkansas State University

In spring 2015 a small group of senior military officers, defense policy analysts, and academics gathered at Queens University for a conference on the cultural dimensions of combat, battlefield operations, and multinational defense cooperation. The goal of the conference, hosted by the Centre for International and Defence Policy, was to develop policy recommendations to improve standards of cultural practice within the Canadian military and its partner states in addressing current and future crises worldwide. This unique book was the result of the conference.

Identifying culture as both a force that shapes military identities, values, and norms and a tool employed by militaries while conducting operations, *Culture and the Soldier* makes a compelling case for why cultural considerations should occupy a more central position in Canadian defense policy planning in particular and in defense policy planning more generally. While many studies have theorized about culture’s impact on the military, very few have analyzed how militaries have used culture as a tool to accomplish defense goals. H. Christian Breede does just that and lays the foundation for culture to be understood and employed in contemporary military engagements.

Part one, three chapters of qualitative research studies, examines how Canadian culture—its values, identities, and norms—has shaped the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) as an organization. Chapter one argues that Canadian culture shaped how the experience of combat was remembered among Francophone and Anglophone war veterans in Afghanistan and highlights the challenges a multicultural fighting force might face when trying to maintain unit cohesion and transition troops back to civilian life.

Chapter two operationalizes culture as the “attitudes toward and perceptions of gender roles and the appropriate behavior implied for all members of the military” and illustrates how evolving gender values and norms in Canadian civil society led to the CAF’s attempt at gender integration (21). The CAF’s unwillingness to conceptualize gender as
the representation of both femininity and masculinity was a key factor in this unsuccessful attempt at gender integration.

Chapter three highlights the cultural implications for the relationship between military casualties and society and argues Canadian civil culture shaped how Canadians ritualized and memorialized military casualties in Afghanistan, a view which has changed since the Korean War. Allowing for public expression of casualty rituals coincided with increased public support for the mission. Interestingly, this chapter rejects Breede’s definition of culture as vague and defines culture as the ascribed meanings given to symbols, heroes, and rituals. Despite the contested definitions of culture presented, part one offers intriguing examples of how Canadian culture has shaped the Canadian military.

Part two broadens its focus to analyze the ways militaries, governments, and security sector agencies have used culture as a tool to conduct operations. Chapters four and five explore the role of culture in the conduct of Russia’s “hybrid war within the grey zone” and reveal how the Kremlin and Russian security sector agencies leveraged propaganda and manipulated their corporate images to achieve foreign policy goals (84).

Where chapters four and five operationalize culture as popular beliefs and public perceptions about current events that organizations can manage and manipulate, chapter six defines culture as the different and often competing meanings militaries and humanitarian nongovernmental organizations ascribe to the words “security” and “success.” The chapter illustrates how efforts to enhance cooperation during crises have often resulted in short-term gains but long-term setbacks in humanitarian effectiveness. Chapters seven and nine highlight the necessity of both cultural education and a “social license to operate” for troops deployed in any country not their own as precursors to successful operations and the mental well-being of the troops involved (197). Chapter eight examines the role of international security organizations such as NATO and the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in fostering epistemic communities based on alliance and cooperation.

The strengths of this volume are its interdisciplinary scope, varied research methodologies, and contributor backgrounds that range from international relations, security studies, anthropology, and sociology to political science and literature. Notably absent from this exciting amalgam of scholars are historians whose work could provide important and necessary historical context for the various military engagements addressed.

Perhaps a side effect of the volume’s interdisciplinarity is its somewhat confusing organization. While part one focuses exclusively on the CAF, part two ranges in focus from Russia and Ukraine to Canada, the United States, and international security organizations and security schools and centers. Additionally, part two’s nearly 150 pages more than double part one’s 60 pages, leaving a significant imbalance of evidence and analysis.
The result is a very focused and compelling argument for how culture has shaped the CAF in the past few decades with little application to other militaries on the one hand and a varied and more generalized analysis of how militaries, governments, and organizations have used culture as a means to achieve specific end goals on the other.

The qualitative nature of the volume’s research does not undermine its importance in providing a useful template for future studies of culture as both a force and a factor in militaries and military operations worldwide. Despite its limitations, this volume of defense policy analysis is critical reading for anyone interested in the cultural dimensions of combat for the Canadian military and its partner states.

Lessons Unlearned: The U.S. Army’s Role in Creating the Forever Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
By Pat Proctor

In this time of great power competition and as depicted in the current US National Defense Strategy, Lessons Unlearned presents a contrary view of how the US Army sees itself. Author Pat Proctor confronts the conventional view that the Army must build itself into a formidable, technologically superior force for high-intensity conflict to counter threats that emanate from Russia or China. He argues the US Army’s culture prevents it from accepting anything else. He states the lessons that should have been learned—from the series of low-intensity engagements from the late 1980s through the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001—were ignored or never given a chance to become institutionalized due to the Army’s cultural bias, thus resulting in the decades-long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Army has failed to posture itself for success on two measures. First, it fails to embrace responsibility for engaging in the political dimension to reestablish failing or failed countries in which it must operate. Second, it repeatedly fails to create the capabilities to operate in low-intensity environments with needed capabilities like civil affairs, psychological operations, engineers, military police, and other such capabilities required in a low-intensity context. Consequently, the US Army remains prepared for the short-term high-intensity fight, but vulnerable to asymmetric threats that have caused the nation to be embroiled in the “forever wars in Iraq and Afghanistan” as a result (4).

Proctor’s exhaustingly thorough analysis includes a chapter on the lessons captured during operations in Somalia and Haiti and their effect on ongoing modernization efforts, in this case Force XXI. Emphasizing the Army’s reluctance to embrace the political dimension in both campaigns as well as the effect of operations in urban environments vis-à-vis nonstate actors created significant vulnerabilities. First, it
negated US technological advantages, exposing US forces to vicious street fighting and being outnumbered by lightly armed citizens. Second, it complicated processes for ending the fight and reestablishing stability in the country in crisis. While the lessons in Somalia were being captured, the Army concurrently proceeded with its future within the Force XXI framework.

In envisioning the force of the future, lessons from Somalia and in the soon-to-follow campaign in Haiti had not yet had time to influence new ways of thinking. Conflict was conceived to be war and operations other than war. Although the Army was to be prepared for both, Proctor clearly states that “transformation” effort in the Force XXI construct clearly presented a high-intensity bias (9). Proctor, however, feels there may have been a glimmer of hope as two organizations emerged that might have enabled a fair dialogue about low-intensity capabilities the Army needed to embrace. The Peacekeeping Institute established in 1993—and the predecessor to today’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute—joined the Army-Air Force Center for Low-Intensity Conflict (A-AFCLIC) previously established in 1986 at Langley Air Force Base. Those hopes were soon dashed in the next phase Proctor covers in the chapter on Bosnia and Herzegovina and the transformation effort to succeed Force XXI, the Army After Next focus.

While serving as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1996, General Shalikashvili shared his vision for the US Armed Forces of 2010 in his *Joint Vision 2010*. The vision was wholeheartedly embraced by General Reimer, the then serving Army Chief of Staff. Crafting the supporting Army Vision 2010, Proctor holds General Reimer most accountable for the demise of low-intensity conflict. Proctor faults General Reimer for virtually expunging low-intensity dialogue within the Army, as exemplified by decisions he made that withdrew Army participation in the A-AFCLIC—which ultimately disbanded in 1996. Concurrently, education in low-intensity conflict at Army professional military education institutions waned and virtually disappeared from the curriculum, particularly in the Command and General Staff College and the US Army War College curricula. Altogether, these decisions and outcomes served as evidence of the Army’s cultural blindness and set the conditions for unpreparedness in operations and campaigns that followed.

In the final chapter of analysis, Proctor presents further evidence of the Army’s ill-preparedness for low-intensity conflicts. He uses the campaign in Kosovo to show the Army’s inability to own its responsibilities for operating effectively in this environment to achieve the nation’s end. And in spite of General Shinseki’s original and unexpected vision of the Interim and Objective Force concept unveiled early in his tenure of office as General Reimer’s replacement, it, too, became a concept that morphed into a more-deployable version of high-intensity capability vice a force postured to also wage effective low-intensity conflict operations. Then the attacks on New York City and the Pentagon occurred, embroiling the US Army in a seemingly endless
campaign in two countries accused of harboring terrorists guilty of the attacks or the ones to follow.

This does not end well. So, why would one choose to read this book? If institutional culture is the reason for the US Army’s unpreparedness, then what should one understand about the culture? First, cultures persist over time. And over time many of its followers rarely, if ever, question why they do the things they do. They become entrenched in the culture’s practice; however, cultures are rife with implicit assumptions informed by the norms they have practiced for decades, if not longer, and these assumptions are often taken for granted and seldom challenged.

Consequently professionals should read thought-provoking works like this one. Although readers may not agree with Proctor’s analysis or the conclusions he draws from it, he creates an opportunity for readers to reflect and reexamine, to consider critically the conclusions drawn, and to accept the kernels of truth applicable—all trademarks of critically thinking professionals who owe it to their constituents to give Lessons Unlearned due consideration.
The United States has made a strategic bet on India. With the seemingly unstoppable growth in Chinese power and influence in the region, America has aggressively courted a deeper strategic partnership with India and calculated a rising India aligned with US interests will better maintain a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. While Washington is largely focused on India’s conventional military capabilities and posture, India also boasts a burgeoning nuclear weapons capability, which is the subject of *India and Nuclear Asia: Forces, Doctrine, and Dangers*.

Written by two young and accomplished scholars, this accessible and thoroughly researched book fills an important niche in the Indo-Pacific literature and should be required reading for American military leaders and strategic analysts concerned with the area. Joshi and O’Donnell systematically examine the contemporary nuclear balance between India and Pakistan and China, its chief rivals. Their opinionated analysis is informed but not weighed down by theory and history and advances two major policy recommendations in a logical and clearly structured fashion: for India, Pakistan, and China to increase transparency through dialogue and for India to conduct a public defense policy review.

Joshi and O’Donnell’s core analysis focuses on Indian, Pakistani, and Chinese nuclear capabilities and doctrines. They comprehensively survey the status of India’s fissile material capabilities, delivery systems, command and control, and missile defense and assess the historical evolution of Indian nuclear doctrine and its approach to global nonproliferation regimes.

They also analyze the implications of Pakistani and Chinese nuclear capabilities and doctrine for Indian nuclear strategy. Pakistan, for example, may have lowered the threshold for nuclear use with the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons such as the 60-kilometer range Nasr missile. “India refuses to accept that this threshold has been lowered” and continues to develop plans for rapid mobilization of conventional strikes (71). Similarly, the authors argue China’s military reforms have bolstered its conventional active defense doctrine of “seizing the initiative as early as possible, including initiating rapid escalation at the outset of a conflict” through lavish use of conventional missiles (95). In the Indo-Pacific and Indo-Chinese dyads these recent developments have raised the risk of inadvertent escalation to nuclear use, which is a recurring theme of the book.
As Joshi and O'Donnell observe, several factors bedevil Indian nuclear strategy and the analysis of it. India, unusual among nuclear powers, faces twin nuclear rivals which pull its nuclear strategy in different directions. For India, China is by far the more sophisticated and comprehensive nuclear threat, demanding longer range and more redundant Indian forces. Pakistan, however, remains the more immediate danger, given the frequency of militarized crises and the centrality of nuclear threats to Pakistani doctrine.

Another major complication in their analysis of Indian nuclear strategy is the rapid evolution in capabilities and doctrine, which presents an analytic target that is not only opaque but also fast moving. India is on the cusp of deploying its first intercontinental ballistic missile, the 5,000-kilometer Agni V, which can potentially reach all major cities in China, and is also rapidly developing a missile defense capability through indigenous technology and the acquisition of the Russian S-400 antiaircraft missile system.

Alongside its rivals, China and Pakistan, India is fielding a new nuclear ballistic-missile submarine. As Joshi and O'Donnell make clear, these and other new capabilities in the hands of India and its rivals are rapidly changing the dynamics of the regional nuclear triangle in ways their strategists and US analysts cannot yet fully appreciate.

While Joshi and O'Donnell admirably tackle some issues, other questions remain unaddressed, especially two issues that are particularly salient for American defense leaders. First, they downplay a potential, hotly debated paradigmatic shift in Indian nuclear doctrine that moves away from “No First Use” and toward preemptive counterforce targeting against enemy nuclear forces. This perspective may simply be a matter of timing.

Much of the best evidence for the shift—including, most starkly, an August 2019 statement by the serving defense minister—emerged after this book was written. In chapter 5, Joshi and O'Donnell acknowledge India is increasingly debating the unrevised 2003 nuclear doctrine and moving away from existing doctrine may be closer than they suggest. India could simply pepper its doctrine with ambiguity, without publishing new doctrine, and this action would have massive implications for regional nuclear stability.

Second, while the book’s scope is limited to nuclear strategy, readers may also benefit from the exploration of parallel developments in India’s overall security strategy. The Indian government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi has taken added risk in its crises with Pakistan and has ratcheted up its crisis responses in an effort to create space for conventional options. Again, the starkest evidence came after this book was written, when India launched an unprecedented air strike against a terrorist target in Pakistan in February 2019. This deliberate generation of risk will influence how India and Pakistan act in the next inevitable crisis and may over time shape their nuclear deterrence models.
As Joshi and O’Donnell argue persuasively, the risk of inadvertent escalation between India and its rivals is growing. *India and Nuclear Asia: Forces, Doctrine, and Dangers* is an excellent introduction for leaders and analysts seeking to understand those risks.

**Black Wave: Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Forty-Year Rivalry That Unraveled Culture, Religion, and Collective Memory in the Middle East**

By Kim Ghattas

Reviewed by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, professor emeritus, US Army War College

In *Black Wave*, journalist Kim Ghattas has produced an insightful study of the rise of political, religious, and cultural intolerance in various key Middle Eastern countries as well as adjacent Pakistan and Afghanistan since the late 1970s. The black wave in the book’s title is highly nuanced, but is summed up by Ghattas as the “intellectual and cultural darkness that slowly engulfed [the region] in the decades following the fateful year of 1979” (3).

Indeed, that year was an inflection point defined in the region by three momentous events—the Iranian revolution, a regime-threatening uprising in Mecca, and the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. Ghattas maintains all these events were important and produced changes that rippled throughout the entire region, dramatically increased religious intolerance, and fed into a new and more virulent level of sectarian strife among Sunni and Shia Muslims. Throughout the book, Ghattas includes personal stories about individuals struggling for freedom of thought and the more liberal interpretations of Islam. Many individuals were assassinated or marginalized in response to their efforts against extremist influence.

The most important 1979 event was the Iranian revolution. Ghattas notes Iran’s last shah was overthrown by a coalition of groups and not simply the followers of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, whom she characterizes as a cunning, ruthless, and power-hungry man. She maintains in addition to leftists and other anti-monarchists opposing the shah, there were also a number of moderate clerics, some of whom died under suspicious circumstances and consequently left Khomeini unchallenged for clerical leadership.

Initially, the Saudis were uncertain about the meaning of this change. They had previously worried about the shah’s regional ambitions but saw him as a competitor who would only take the rivalry so far. The new regime puzzled the Saudi leadership, but the establishment of an Islamic Republic appeared to be a manageable problem, and Saudi Arabia’s leaders were relieved Iran had not turned to a communist government.

Still, there were warning signs. Khomeini’s past writings were clearly unfriendly to them, and his hostility soon manifested itself in...
efforts to export revolution beyond Iran’s borders and brush aside the pro-American monarchies. Khomeini’s public statements and Iranian propaganda made it clear Saudi Arabia had an unbending enemy. As Ghattas notes, Iranian propaganda directed at the Saudi Shias was particularly worrisome and helped to foster unrest.

Simultaneously with the increased concerns about Iran, the Saudis had to cope with an unexpected shock in November 1979 when a large group of well-armed rebels led by a former Saudi national guardsman seized the Grand Mosque at Mecca and maintained control of it for more than two weeks. The rebels proclaimed they were acting in the name of an Islamic messiah (the mufti), who once in power would restructure religious, economic, and foreign policy under a purified Islamic regime. Saudi leaders were horrified the situation might spin out of control, leading to a wider following for the rebels.

Unfortunately, using force at the holiest site in Islam was a problem. Before they did so, the royal family sought the public approval of the senior Saudi clergy and especially the ultraconservative blind sheikh, Abdelaziz bin Baz. When they received this support and the military response went forward, the rebels were defeated, but the mosque and its environs were severely damaged in the battle. The political power of the Saudi royal family was also harmed.

According to Ghattas, before 1979, the Saudi royal family was able to dominate the clerics. After 1979, Ghattas maintains the religious establishment “had become king” by helping to prop up a wounded regime (206). The Iranians, for their part, took full advantage of the situation and continuously accused Saudi Arabia of being an unfit custodian of Islam’s two most holy mosques in Mecca and Medina. In actions that infuriated Riyadh, the Iranians called for the creation of a special Islamic Commission to take control of the holy sites.

Ghattas sees the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as the third key 1979 event that reverberated throughout the region. She maintains, for Saudi Arabia, helping the Afghan rebels fight Soviet forces was a tremendous opportunity to reclaim some of the prestige and legitimacy lost during the siege of Mecca. The Saudis, like the US leadership, provided considerable assistance to the hard-line rebels and also worked with Pakistan under Prime Minister Zia ul-Haq.

Ghattas characterizes Zia as a weak dictator who prolonged and energized his regime by seizing control of the Afghan issue while thoroughly infusing Pakistani society with ultraconservative Islam. Western leaders, who might have objected to Zia’s authoritarianism in other circumstances, were then too distracted with the Afghan War to do so. Ghattas further shows that after Zia’s death and the end of the Afghan War, generous Saudi funding continued to nurture the system through less obvious but more pervasive involvement including a religious publishing empire and a strong network of hard-line schools and seminaries.
Throughout this book, Ghattas displays a strong command of the details of her subject matter and considers the spin-off effects of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry for countries such as Egypt and Lebanon. She suggests the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was linked to Saudi and Iranian competition on questions of Islamic purity and activism. She also mentions periods of moderation and détente between Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic, but points out that these episodes have been ephemeral. Ghattas suggests there is a moderate political and religious identity throughout the Islamic world that will eventually defeat the extremists because of the bravery of good people, but this revolution remains to be seen.
Book Reviews: Technology and War

Power to the People: How Open Technological Innovation is Arming Tomorrow’s Terrorists

By Audrey Kurth Cronin

Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, instructor at the Safe Communities Institute at the University of Southern California

One of the world’s leading experts on security and terrorism, author Audrey Kurth Cronin is currently a professor of international security at American University’s School of International Service. She has been a faculty member at the US National War College, has served in the US executive branch, and has an Oxford University graduate degree.

Power to the People is the by-product of a major multiyear endeavor supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation which draws upon the Power to the People Terrorism Innovation Database (P2P-PVID) developed by Cronin, George Mason University, and American University graduate research assistants (431). Three datasets were created focusing on dynamite manufacture, adoption, and use (1867 to 1934); AK-47 manufacture, dissemination, and use (1947 to present); and contemporary drone and related autonomous systems manufacture, dissemination, and use. For transparency and validation purposes, the data is available at audreykurthcronin.com, which also serves as Cronin’s marketing site (273–81).

The book includes an introduction, three sections comprised of nine chapters, and a conclusion followed by two appendices, notes, books cited, an index, and acknowledgements for the detailed main body contexts (269–72). The book is heavily referenced with more than 100 pages of notes and book citations. My analysis of this information confirmed Cronin undertook a comprehensive literature review related to technology, war, and terrorism. A peppering of pictures, drawings, and maps can be found throughout the book.

Addressing a number of themes and issues, Power to the People is an intellectual and well-written tour de force—at times dense, yet thankfully less academic, in its writing style and in the amount of historical and contemporary information packed into its pages. First, Cronin “explores how individuals and groups who engage in political violence have repeatedly made use of emerging technologies to wreak havoc, and how they’re likely to do so in the future” (2). She ties this issue into the book’s first section which “introduces predominant ways of thinking about the innovation and diffusion of military technology and demonstrates their shortfalls as regards the current era” and “examines consistent patterns of the diffusion of lethal technology to violent nonstate actors in the modern era” (14).
Second, Cronin places “current technological advances into the historical context of key innovations used” and answers the question “why certain kinds of emerging technologies are rapidly adopted by rogue actors” with an emphasis on leveraging the dynamite and AK-47 datasets (2). She ties this issue into the book’s second section which shows how these two innovations ultimately “drove global waves of nonstate violence, in both cases culminating in major upheaval in the international order” (14).

Third, Cronin leverages the drone dataset developed and focuses “on technologies that were developed with good intentions, such as digital media and drones . . . But some of them can be fashioned into relatively low-cost, powerful, and precise weapons” (5). She argues “Today’s drones, advanced robotics, 3D printing, and autonomous systems have more in common with dynamite and Kalashnikovs than they do with military technologies like the airplane and the tank” (14).

Cronin’s core insights are clustered around five themes—“powerful economic incentives for diffusion, technological optimism and a boom in tinkering, new communications technologies are powerful incentives to violence, militaries are facing the innovator’s dilemma and disruptive private armies and the ISIS precedent” (257, 256–62). Her protectionist guidance provided against this identified threat is based on the presumption: “The most effective way to respond to the fast-moving changes of an open revolution is to align all the participants, including government, industry, and individual citizens, around incentives for developing protections” (264). Her guidance is focused on the profit motive for protections, that regulation is not necessarily strangulation, and building stronger national security (264–68).

The only disappointing element of the book is its theoretical embargo of John Robb’s well-publicized Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization (Wiley, 2007). Robb, a colorful military analyst and entrepreneur, detailed his open-source warfare construct—modeled on the open-source movement in software development—13 years prior to Cronin’s elegant work but has been ignored, or possibly overlooked, for his vital defense community contributions. In Cronin’s defense, Robb’s construct runs parallel to her and James Moor’s “‘open’ and ‘closed’ technological revolutions” focus dating back to at least 2005, and Cronin’s subsequent focus on state military power (285).

The reviewer fully endorses Power to the People as a first-rate effort and sees wisdom in the antidisruptive, protectionist-focused strategic guidance proposed for democracies derived from Cronin’s key perception that:

We must also be mindful of the scale and breadth of vulnerability we have built into our societies. The Internet of Things provides an avenue of access into millions of Internet-connected devices and appliances. With artificial intelligence, single individuals will have a shot at building armies without the need to collect large numbers of human beings. Semi-autonomous and autonomous weapons systems will enable small forces to hold their own.
against vastly superior forces. On our current trajectory, without both better
defensive measures and greater regulation of risk, the result will be wars of
attrition that democracies cannot win (267).

At the same time, Cronin’s promotion of such a dead-hand approach
will at best only temporarily stave off the epochal shift in war and
conflict that is upon the world—initially waged by nonstate actors and
now increasingly conducted by authoritarian regimes. Senior members
of the defense community would do well to integrate Cronin’s guidance
with approaches from *Brave New War* that, while of a lesser pedigree and
a more marginal budget, make up for these deficiencies with a devilish
creativity and willingness to seize the future rather than attempt to
primarily fight it in the manner Cronin advocates.

**America’s Covert War in East Africa:**
*Surveillance, Rendition, Assassination*

By Clara Usiskin

Reviewed by Dr. An Jacobs, senior lecturer of international relations,
Nottingham Trent University, and visiting fellow, Institute of Diplomacy
and International Governance, Loughborough University London

*America’s Covert War in East Africa* is a breath of fresh air—a
positive anomaly in the crowded counterterrorism literature. Usiskin challenges readers with an emotive, self-confessed descriptive
and fragmented writing style. The book is not designed to serve as
an academic manuscript, nor does it provide an in-depth analysis of
security questions or counterterrorist activity in East Africa. Instead,
the book includes narratives on issues largely absent in mainstream
counterterrorism literature (1–5).

Due to its fragmented nature, the book’s main argument is
difficult to summarize—or to even detect. The book focuses on the
forgotten or hidden consequences of the Global War on Terror—the
“collateral damage”—emphasizing issues of rule of law and human
rights (5). Usiskin enhances awareness of these consequences and takes
readers on a journey across the lesser-known effects of the Global War
on Terror.

For example, Usiskin discusses the functioning of various extra-
legal US prisons designed for the detainment and interrogation of
“high-value detainees” and includes research on the rumors of the US
detention and transit of “high-value detainees” on the British island
of Diego Garcia (27). She studies US involvement in the design of
counterterrorism policies in the region and the impact of these policies
on civil society, human rights defenders, and journalists. She explores
US cooperation with East African states with regard to counterterrorism
efforts, as well as the human rights abuses committed by the US, UK,
and East African governments in this context.
Usiskin also considers extrajudicial killings—of predominantly Muslims—in Kenya as a consequence of the war on terror and how especially Somali refugees in Kenya are negatively impacted by counterterrorism policies. She looks at the link between counterpiracy and counterterrorism and delves into the application of technology and communication as part of a “holistic US counterterrorism strategy,” including how drones are employed for surveillance and targeted killings and how the use of spyware in counterterrorism undercuts democratic practices (90).

While these topics merit an important place in the book’s broader narrative, a few chapters stand out and deserve further attention. “A Zanzibar Ghost,” for example, is quite the opening chapter. In a strongly emotive and gripping tone, Usiskin tells the story of a man from Zanzibar who is exposed to the US rendition program as a result of a counterterrorist operation. Her vivid retelling of the man’s brutal interrogation, torture, and various human rights abuses draws readers in. Subsequent chapters build upon this theme, albeit in a somewhat less-poignant manner. These chapters cover the rendition process—the often unlawful transportation of terror suspects from one country to another for interrogation—in more detail and further highlight the related practices of torture and brutality.

Other fascinating sections of the book cover the impact of counterterrorism on democratic practice and civil society, highlighting how a “rule by law” system and a clamp down on the freedom of expression have “stifled civil society” and set out to silence human rights defenders and journalists, demonstrating the failure of rule of law (141–50). Kenya’s frontline position in the Global War on Terror has had a particular impact on the fate of Somalian refugees in Kenya, who are facing the dual threat of Al-Shabaab on the one hand and prosecution by Kenyan authorities on the other, “perpetuating a long-established dynamic of exclusion and discrimination” by securitizing refugees from Somalia and “othering” Somali Kenyans (157, 163).

Usiskin further explores the impact of the Global War on Terror on democracy by focusing on the capacity of the US and Kenyan governments to spy on Kenyan residents by checking private online activity and by illustrating how surveillance powers—extended under counterterrorism legislation—can be used to act against civil society. With a specific focus on Kenya and Ethiopia, she explores how spyware and hacking tools such as FinFisher play a vital part in limiting political opposition and free speech “to carry out politically-motivated prosecutions of civil society actors under domestic counterterrorism legislation” (184).

Usiskin’s most significant strength throughout the book is her ability to bring complex stories alive through a combination of the personal accounts of victims, her own narratives, and a wealth of information from reports and government documents. It is obvious Usiskin has been in the thick of it herself, having spent extended periods in the
region and having been exposed to abuse of government power herself, which resulted in short periods of detainment and even deportation from Kenya and Uganda for her work on ongoing human rights abuses (83–88). Her expertise as a human rights investigator, her extensive research on the Global War on Terror, and her experience in the region provide readers with invaluable insights into the covert world of rendition, secret detention, and targeted killings in East Africa. Without a national security clearance or access to classified information, Usiskin has obtained fascinating information and presents it in a very clear and compelling style.

Despite the impactful nature of the book, it also has shortcomings. The most important one being its lack of coherence and a consistently applied analytical framework. Although it was never Usiskin’s intention to provide this framework, with such a wealth of data, it seems a shame not to draw meaningful conclusions. The book’s greatest merit, however, is that it goes beyond the “intended consequences” of counterterrorism and explores its “real-life” impact, which is often painful and complex (5). Usiskin “hope[s] readers will go on to engage with other points of view,” and she definitely succeeds in achieving this objective (2). Enhancing awareness and giving voice to people who have not been heard is perhaps the most meaningful contribution America’s Covert War in East Africa will make to the education of senior members of the defense community, who are generally exposed to a different counterterrorism narrative.
Command: The Twenty-First-Century General

By Anthony King

Reviewed by David G. Fivecoat, leadership consultant and retired US Army colonel

Anthony King has produced a thought-provoking book. He examines the change in division command since 1901 in the American, British, French, and German armies in World War I, World War II, Cold War counterinsurgencies, Desert Storm, Iraq, and Afghanistan and current initiatives the armies are undertaking to transform their division headquarters. Building upon Martin van Creveld’s Command in War, John Keegan’s The Mask of Command, and Peter F. Drucker’s The Effective Executive and using dozens of examples, King argues division command has transformed from a more individualistic command in the twentieth century to a more collectivized command in the last decade.

The division has existed as a military formation since the French Revolution. In the last 120 years the division has typically included 10,000 to 25,000 soldiers under the command of a major general. The division was, and is, the Landpower formation of choice—with a mature leader a division is quickly deployable yet robust enough to handle joint, combined, and multinational operations with significant combat power. Examining the division in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is a worthy task and should have been undertaken sooner. It may be worthwhile for future writers to focus on one nation’s divisions, doctrine, and actual command practices over the past 120 years to develop a more detailed analysis of how the division and its command have evolved.

One of King’s most important contributions is the concept that command at any level is comprised of three facets: mission definition, mission management, and leadership. Because I liked the concept so much, I read the chapter twice. Prior to D-Day, for instance, US Major General Maxwell Taylor defined the mission of the 101st Airborne Division as being able to surprise the enemy by conducting a parachute/glider assault, seize objectives, and defend against counterattacks. Once the mission was defined, Taylor managed the division’s preparation for and execution of the D-Day invasion and provided leadership to the Screaming Eagles. Defining the mission for a division in a counterinsurgency is more challenging—from my experience, the mission definitions of division commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan ran the gamut. Few commanders took on a broad mandate for the mission, most took a narrow view, and some failed to even consider it. The mission management and leadership styles of division commanders varied in the post-9/11 invasions and counterinsurgencies as well.
King’s second major contribution is the idea that the role of the division commander has transformed—from the concept of an individualistic, or heroic, division commander pre-9/11 to a more collectivized commander since 9/11. He defines individualistic command as a division commander, with a small staff, monopolizing the responsibility for determining the mission, managing the execution, making decisions, and providing leadership to the division. He uses examples of General Erwin Rommel, commander of the German 7th Panzer Division during the invasion of France in World War II; Major General Julian Ewell, commander of the US 9th Infantry Division in the Mekong Delta Region during the Vietnam War; General Sir Rupert Smith, commander of the UK 1st Armored Division during Desert Storm; and others to illustrate the individualistic command concept. I think most military professionals will recognize this style of division command.

More problematic to recognize is the idea of collectivized command. *The Oxford English Dictionary* defines collectivize as “organize (something) on the basis of ownership by the people.” King defines collectivized command as “commanders, their deputies, subordinates, and staff bound together in dense, professionalized decision-making communities” that collectively determine the mission, manage the solution, and provide leadership to the division (18). Here he examines British Major General Nick Carter’s leadership of Regional Command South in Afghanistan from 2009–10 and recent initiatives by the US 82nd Airborne Division, the UK 3rd Division, and the French divisional headquarters.

I agree with King that the post-9/11 division headquarters has grown in size and developed a more bureaucratic process around decision making. Larger headquarters have an insatiable appetite for more information, more meetings, and more work from themselves and their subordinate units. I have found little evidence in practice, accounts of recent division actions in other books, and even in *Command* where division commanders have collectivized the process of mission definition, management, or leadership.

The most collectivized command process I know is the council of war, used most famously in the American Civil War by Union General George Meade at the Battle of Gettysburg on the night of July 2, 1863. Although King does use General Stanley McChrystal’s networked and collaborative approach to running the US Joint Special Operations Command from 2003–8, this organization is not a division, and McChrystal’s approach was not collectivized. King disappointingly cites no solid examples of division commanders bringing their team of staff and commanders together for a collectivized approach to decide on the mission or how to manage the solution. Most telling, King’s interviews with General David Petraeus, General Sir Rupert Smith, and General James Mattis all rebuff his theory that collectivization happened in the divisions they led.
Like King, I believe the command of the division headquarters is changing, and I appreciate him for recognizing the change and starting the discussion. In the end, King’s conclusion misses the mark. The change may be that divisions have simply grown from their former nimble roots into large, bureaucratic, and unwieldy organizations. Perhaps divisions and their commanders are embracing a more networked approach, using reachback or trying to flatten the organization. The supporting evidence King cites does not convince me the division command has been collectivized.

All in all, Command is a good book since it made me think deeply about the division and division command. Even with the noted shortcomings, it is a worthwhile read for commanders and leaders at all levels who need to think about how they define the mission of their units or organizations, manage planning and execution, and lead. It is also valuable for military officers and other senior leaders who are thinking about the history and the future of the division and division command.

Subordinating Intelligence: The DoD/CIA Post—Cold War Relationship

By David P. Oakley

Reviewed by Dr. Genevieve Lester, De Serio Chair of Strategic Intelligence, US Army War College

The intelligence function is crucial to informed policy decision-making in all aspects of government. The priorities of the national agencies—the producers of this intelligence—however, change over time in response to changing threats, political context, individual relationships among senior administration leadership, and budgetary constraints. Subordinating Intelligence examines the relationship of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with the Department of Defense and considers how the relationship evolved in the period between the Cold War and the beginning of the Global War on Terror.

There are at least two sides to the debate regarding the relationship between military requirements and national intelligence. On the one hand, the lack of appropriate intelligence support to military operations has resulted in failures and the loss of life on multiple occasions. On the other hand, supporting military operations can crowd out longer-term, strategic intelligence needs and alter the balance of the CIA’s responsibilities—from supporting national policy makers to prioritizing the needs of combat support agencies such as the National Security Agency or the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. This change in balance risks the CIA’s independence and can weaken its ability to focus on its core mission (105). David Oakley offers a balanced discussion of both sides of this calculus, although the argument leads to the CIA’s minimization and the military’s ascension.
Oakley argues that a series of presidential decisions led to the CIA being ultimately “subordinated” to military operations (8). He shows how this relationship developed, focusing on the intensity of change in the post–9/11 security environment. He develops his argument with illustrative historical episodes beginning with early interoperability failures, such as the unsuccessful attempt to free US hostages from Iran (1979), the invasion of Grenada (1983), and the bombing of the barracks in Lebanon, also in 1983, that focused on the need for improved Joint operations and intelligence support to military operations (12–13).

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, with its singular reforms to the Department of Defense, emerged from this friction among the services. As Oakley points out, there was an increasing awareness that intelligence was crucial to this next stage of improved Joint operations. This vulnerability was further highlighted during Operation Desert Storm, a quick victory for the military that highlighted gaps in intelligence support for military operations (31–32). During this period the then President George H. W. Bush pushed for greater intelligence support for the military; the Clinton administration issued Presidential Decision Directive 35, which made intelligence support of military operations a top priority of the Intelligence Community (152). Obviously, these developments intensified when the CIA’s focus turned to counterterrorism and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, reducing the CIA’s strategic emphasis on the state-level threat and reinforcing its subordination to the military (155).

While the book is slim, it pursues a line of argument vigorously. A broader discussion of the context, particularly the developing political environment, could have helped guide readers through some rather arcane territory and idiom. Even with that criticism, *Subordinating Intelligence* fills an important gap in the literature on military operations and intelligence. Military requirements and intelligence tend to be much more focused on the order of battle and tactical operations. In contrast, the literature on national intelligence does not delve deeply enough into the military side and almost not at all into the integration of the two functions.

Oakley’s unique exploration of the relationship between the Department of Defense and the CIA is crucial to building a broader discussion of the issues from both the practitioner and the scholarly perspectives. Finally, as the military changes its focus from counterterrorism to near-peer competition with rival nation-states, the CIA will again be pushed to adapt to the new contingencies, and the relationship between the agency and the military will shift again. Oakley provides a valuable service in outlining the processes and interests that will drive this adaptation today and in the future.
Hitler’s First Hundred Days: When Germans Embraced the Third Reich

By Peter Fritzsche

Reviewed by Dr. Jay Lockenour, chair and associate professor, Department of History, Temple University

One is tempted to review Hitler’s First Hundred Days as the final installment of a trilogy that began with Fritzsche’s 1990 work, Rehearsals for Fascism: Populism and Political Mobilization in Weimar Germany, followed in 1997 by Germans into Nazis. All three works grapple with the fall of the Weimar Republic, the rise of the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP), and that party’s rapid establishment of a monopoly on political power. Anyone who has taught a course on the Third Reich knows students demand answer to difficult questions: “How did this happen?” Was it a culture of authoritarianism? Was it ideology or anti-Semitism? The Great War? The economy?

Fritzsche’s answer has evolved over the years. He still downplays the role of the economy and the Great Depression in terms of electoral motivation. He still cautions against emphasizing anti-Semitism, though it plays a more decisive role in this study in establishing the dictatorship. The Nazis did not establish control through political campaigning. They won a plurality in 1932, not a majority, and that plurality seemed to be shrinking as 1932 ended. The first 100 days, from January 30 to May 9, 1933, saw the Nazis turn that plurality into a dictatorship in which, Fritzsche argues, most Germans felt the Nazis were better able to satisfy their desire for national unity, political peace, and an end to crisis.

The “trilogy” also traces the evolution of historiographical trends from the 1980s to the present. Rehearsals was part of a wave of regional studies at the time and spoke the sociological language of class and electoral analysis. Hitler’s First Hundred Days, while focused on Berlin, moves around Germany more expansively and is more attentive to mythmaking and culture.

Fritzsche offers explanatory concepts that require readers to sometimes grapple with paradox. He describes the attitude of many Germans to the events of the 100 days as “no, yes,” a contradiction that effectively demonstrates the combination of reservation and enthusiasm Fritzsche found in diaries, memoirs, jokes, and other everyday materials of the period: no to the violence in the streets, yes to the destruction of the Communist Party; no to the uneducated thugs of the NSDAP, yes to national unity; no to 1918, yes to 1914 (95, 120).

That last juxtaposition is important to Fritzsche’s argument in its own right. Part of the Nazis’s success can be explained by their being on the correct side of the mythmaking around both dates. For many Germans 1918 stood for defeat, the November Revolution, and—though signed
in 1919—the Treaty of Versailles. Many nationalists, and not just the Nazis, saw that defeat as the unjust result of a “stab in the back” by Jews, socialists, and other shadowy groups who waged the revolution and established the Republic. For many Germans, and not just nationalists, 1914 represented the Burgfrieden, the period of national unity when all parties of the Kaiser’s Reichstag supported the credits necessary to fight the war. The Nazis promised to take Germany back in time from 1918 and crisis to 1914 and unity.

Between January 30 and May 9, the Nazis exploited opportunities and staged events to accomplish that time travel. The Reichstag fire, the March elections and the preceding Day of the Awakening Nation, the Day of Potsdam, the boycott of Jewish businesses, the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service, the Day of National Labor, and the book burning—technically day 101—demonstrated the sense of unity and the need to act in a state of crisis sometimes created by the Nazis and led Germans to accept “normality” as defined by the NSDAP (266).

Terror, murder, and arrest cowed the enemies of the NSDAP, but Fritzsche is also attentive to the role new technologies and simple administration played in helping the Nazis secure control. Radio played an especially important role in carrying Hitler’s message—and only Hitler’s message—to the nation as a whole, but so did paperwork. Forms necessary to prove one’s “Aryan” ancestry and to keep one’s job taught Germans (who did not already know it) the language of Nazi anti-Semitism—of insiders and outsiders—that became a part of everyday life.

Though Fritzsche makes an argument about Germany as a whole and does include evidence from Hanover, Lower Saxony, East Prussia, and other regions, the book’s center of gravity is Berlin, and Fritzsche’s affection for Berlin is palpable. The city at first seems a strange place to locate a study of Germany’s embrace of the Third Reich. “Red Berlin,” with its large, organized, Marxist working class, should have been the place where the Nazis struggled most to find support. Electoral analyses show the NSDAP received lower percentages of votes in cities than in small towns and lower percentages from the working class than from the middle class.

Of course, Berlin is the capital of Germany, and many of the events in Hitler’s First Hundred Days happen in and around the city. Choosing Berlin gives Fritzsche a physical landscape upon which to tell his story. Readers get to know the streets and neighborhoods through which the Nazis marched, in which they fought their battles with the socialists and communists. And the fact that the process Fritzsche describes takes place in “Red Berlin” as well as in Northeim—the location of W. S. Allen’s path-breaking The Nazi Seizure of Power, which shares many of this book’s strengths—makes his argument even more convincing.
Beyond Pearl Harbor: A Pacific History
Edited by Beth Bailey and David Farber

Reviewed by Dr. Michael E. Lynch, senior historian,
US Army Heritage and Education Center

The TV series Star Trek: The Next Generation included an episode titled “Darmok,” where the crew encountered a civilization that communicates only in phrases that refer to events that are so ingrained in the culture they have become metaphors. Such is the same with Pearl Harbor for Americans. Yet that cultural metaphor lies uneasily next to another belief entrenched into the national psyche: the United States is not an imperialist nation, unlike the Japanese empire that had launched the vicious surprise attack. With this common narrative in mind, Beth Bailey and David Farber have curated a collection of 10 fine essays that examine the attack on Pearl Harbor from different viewpoints but all through the lens of imperialism. The essays broaden and deepen the narrative of a well-known topic in a relatively short work that melds military and social history and gives voice to British, Australian, Chinese, Japanese, and insular American sources by examining the attack from the other-than-common American viewpoint.

In the first essay, “The Attack on Pearl Harbor . . . and Guam, Wake Island, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong,” Bailey and Farber set the stage for the examination to follow (1). Their review of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Day of Infamy” speech is an insightful look at the art of strategic communications by a master communicator. Their description of the differences between Hawaii and the other American territories helps explain the legal basis for the difference in approach to the attacks on them.

This essay provides a seamless transition to Daniel Immerwahr’s “American Lives: Pearl Harbor and the War in the US Empire” (39). He examines what it meant to be an American and how the United States assessed its overseas possessions unevenly. In one memorable phrase, he claims that “Roosevelt, in other words, was making a calculation. He was rounding the Philippines down to foreign and rounding Hawaii up to American” (41, italics in original). In a phrase that carries even more resonance today, he argues that “War is a time of danger and sacrifice, a time when risks are apportioned. Who bore those risks had a lot to do with who got recognized as ‘American.’ It was a question of who was in and who was out—of whose lives mattered” (43). Immerwahr concludes by describing the liberation of American overseas territories in the Aleutians, Guam, and the Philippines by soldiers who were unaware the civilian population being liberated was also American.

Christopher Cappozola in his essay argues that the “politics of anticipation” for the Japanese attack in the Philippines drove a series of authoritarian regimes. These regimes used the potential for an attack to consolidate power and attract money from the United States
Twin essays by Jeremy Yellen and Samuel Hideo Yamashita examine Japanese attitudes toward the attack, including public and private responses and how the mood was reflected in the popular press. They note some skeptics, but the attitude among the Japanese people was nearly uniformly positive. In another chapter, Yujin Yaguchi argues the Japanese media, since the war, has refashioned the narrative, so Pearl Harbor becomes the first step toward rapprochement and the eventual alliance of commercial superpowers, rather than a clash between empires.

Rana Mitter and Nicole Elizabeth Barnes examine the Chinese perspective on the attack that elevated Chinese prospects in numerous ways. Mitter argues the attack caused political and military leaders to think differently about the nation’s identity. “Those changes heralded the initial moves that would propel China into a new position in the postwar world” (103). China’s alliance with the Western allies gave it an advantage over the Japanese with whom it had been at war since 1937. The attack, however, also exposed the ongoing rift between Chinese nationalists and Chinese communists that led to civil war shortly after World War II ended.

Barnes provides a fascinating examination of the development of Chinese medical care during the war. The entry of the United States into the war in the Pacific pulled occupying Japanese forces away from China, which eventually stopped the air raids that were decimating the Chinese population. Chinese medical facilities were then able to shift their focus from combat-related injuries to pre- and post-natal care and preventive care, which increased the overall health of the Chinese population.

The attack also changed China’s network of support, in which the United States and the United Kingdom became its primary benefactors, replacing other nations in the Asian rim. Kate Darian-Smith in “Pearl Harbor and Australia’s War in the Pacific” notes that Pearl Harbor, the fall of Singapore, and the subsequent bombing of Darwin (known as Australia’s Pearl Harbor) signaled a shift in Pacific Rim alliances—with Australia becoming more closely aligned with the United States.

Pearl Harbor, as a simple metaphor for a singular American event, has obscured the different views of the attack from around the Pacific Rim. As American defense interests in the Pacific grow daily, strategic leaders would profit from a fresh look at a familiar subject. Most histories focus on the attack itself and the diplomatic and intelligence events leading to it.

The phrase “America Empire” falls hard on American ears; the revolt of the 13 colonies against the British Empire is deeply embedded in the nation’s cultural memory. The irony of vehemently deriding the evils of empires while simultaneously maintaining overseas possessions in Hawaii, Guam, Wake Island, and the Philippines was lost on
most Americans. Yet the views of residents living in these American territories as well as the views of their Pacific neighbors are important to our understanding of the strategic effects of the attack. Beyond Pearl Harbor provides a deeper, broader, and more strategic view of what has traditionally been assumed to be a purely American event.

The World at War, 1914–1945
By Jeremy Black

Reviewed by Dr. Michael S. Neiberg, chair of war studies, US Army War College

The frustrating and ultimately unsuccessful process of making peace in 1919 caused many contemporary observers to predict the war of 1914–18 would mark the first round of a much-longer conflict. Some of these famous observations have questionable provenance and may well be apocryphal, but two that can be easily corroborated are worth mentioning here.

The British journalist Charles à Court Repington was pessimistic—maybe prescient is a better word—enough to use the phrase “First World War” in his diary as early as September 1918. He also used it as the title of a one-volume history of the war he published highlighting his fear of a second world war breaking out as soon as the great powers could rearm and recover (The First World War [London: Constable, 1920]).

In a similar vein, American General Tasker H. Bliss wrote to his wife in April 1919. He shared his worry that “The wars are not yet over. I don’t like the treaty and it seems to me that it means another 30 years’ war, winding up with about the same grouping of states as before” (Tasker H. Bliss, “Letter to Nellie Bliss” in Bliss Papers, April 1919, US Army Heritage and Education Center).

In the years immediately following 1945, the historiographical and popular trend separated the two World Wars. In the West, this division helped to underscore the seemingly undeniable and overwhelming Western triumph in the Second World War in contrast to the muddy, ambivalent semivictory of the first. The Holocaust, the atomic bomb, and the sheer scale of war from 1939 to 1945 provided more reasons to separate the two conflicts. In the United States, one needs to go no further to prove this point than to see the contrast between the massive World War II Memorial on the National Mall and the small memorial to the men of Washington, DC, that is the only remembrance of the First World War on America’s most sacred ground of national memory.

Jeremy Black’s latest book, The World at War, 1914–1945, engages with recent formulations that treat the two World Wars as part of one unified historical dynamic. This so-called long war thesis sees the period 1914–45—sometimes continuing to the end of the Cold War in 1991—much as Repington and Bliss saw it. In a narrative and essentially chronological treatment, Black wrestles with the strengths
and weaknesses of the long war concept. While acknowledging it has grown in popularity in recent years, Black ultimately rejects the long war concept as too Eurocentric.

Black primarily employs a comparative methodology. He is less concerned with constructing a narrative arc from 1914 to 1945 than in engaging in a juxtaposition of patterns between the war of 1914–18 and the war of 1939–45. This method provides for a direct comparison and contrast of the two wars, but the jumping around, sometimes even within the same paragraph, might confuse readers less familiar with some of the book’s details.

More helpfully, Black sees the World Wars as part of a much-wider periodization. He places the European wars within the wider context of the end of empires, beginning with the 1898 Spanish-American War. The 1914–18 war ended four major terrestrial empires—namely, the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, German, and Russian empires—replacing them with the nation-states that dominate Europe and the Middle East today. The Second World War fatally undermined the overseas empires of both the vanquished and, more significantly, the nominal victors of France and Britain.

Such an analysis, Black argues, has the advantage of decentering the “German question” from the wars. This is not to say Black finds Germany irrelevant; it occupies more of the book than any other country. Rather, he argues readers may miss wider patterns not as easy to discern by focusing too much on Germany.

Black’s central argument against the long war thesis centers on events in Asia. The crucial dynamic there, he contends, begins with the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95—or even as far back as the First Opium War of 1839–42. The result was the rise to power of China and the United States as the two most dominant states in the region, an outcome few would have dared to predict at the turn of the twentieth century. The strength of the book lies in its challenge to see the period 1914–45 in ways different from how scholars and popular culture normally present it.

A Canadian memorial to the Montreal Fusiliers at Dieppe, France, to commemorate the 1942 disaster there begins its list of the regiment’s campaigns not with Dieppe itself but with the Second Battle of Ypres in 1915. Whether or not the men of 1942 understood themselves as finishing the work of their fathers in 1915 may, as The World at War, 1914–1945 challenges us to consider, be the wrong question to ask. Instead readers might ask whether they understood the irony that their imperial service represented, in the wider scheme of history, a critical element in bringing about the end of empires.
The Red Army and the Second World War

By Alexander Hill

Reviewed by Dr. Reina Pennington, Charles A. Dana Professor of History, Norwich University

This fascinating study of the Red Army adds new dimensions to the understanding of Soviet military success in the Great Patriotic War. Although part of the Cambridge University Press Armies of the Second World War series, this book is not an overview of events on the Eastern Front or another history of the war. Readers are expected to have studied at least one of the key histories by John Erickson, David Glantz and Jonathan House, Evan Mawdsley, or Chris Bellamy. Hill identifies the key factors contributing to Soviet military effectiveness, shows how the problem of Soviet reach frequently exceeded its grasp, and makes a convincing case for the ongoing qualitative improvement which “transformed [the Red Army] into a more effective fighting force” (3).

The book can be broken down into thirds: about 200 pages each devoted to the prewar period, to 1941–42, and to 1943–45. Hill’s intense evaluation of the effects of prewar experiences and how they shaped the Red Army facing the Germans in 1941 is a strength of the book. The chapters on Khalkhin Gol and Finland are particularly interesting. Few general histories highlight this context so essential for understanding Soviet choices, strengths, and weaknesses going into the war. Hill also provides a clear view of the constantly changing conditions of the war: 1944 was a whole different ball game than 1941, and the differences are detailed in the “The Ten ‘Stalinist’ Blows of 1944” and other chapters.

Hill uses a wide variety of Russian language sources and draws upon primary accounts in the post-Soviet era as well as scholarly studies. Many personal stories add human interest and on-the-ground realism to the issues illustrated. Another great strength of Hill is his use of archival and documentary sources: his 2009 The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941–45: A Documentary Reader is a good companion volume.

Hill provides thought-provoking analysis of the role of cavalry in the war, communications, rear support services, the development of reconnaissance and deception techniques, and the process by which Soviet military leaders carefully sought lessons learned and attempted to translate these lessons learned into a more-effective military effort. He stresses Stalin’s role in escalating the price paid in lives and resources. To ensure Germany’s defeat, Stalin drove his commanders to conduct offensives without adequate preparation or resources. Even so, the Red Army grew better over time. The army reduced its loss ratios, and its soldiers fought stubbornly and with increasing skill. The Red Army often had quantitative advantages, and Hill details these advantages while also analyzing the qualitative improvements vital to military success.
The detailed conclusion sums up Hill’s key arguments, emphasizing by the end of the war, both Soviet weapons and the Red Army as a whole were “well-conceived but not overly complex” and “relatively simple, robust and at the same time effective” (566). The Red Army did not solve all its problems, but played to its strengths and demonstrated a resilience which produced one of the most dramatic instances of strategic reversal in military history. Hill also offers a very useful comparison of British and Soviet experiences, pointing out “many issues noted here for the Red Army were not peculiarly Soviet” (572). Ultimately, “By the end of the Great Patriotic War the Red Army was certainly in many ways a very different creature than it had been” before—an army that had become more efficient and more effective (562).

The accessibility of the book could be improved. The chapters average 20 to 30 pages with no subheadings even though most chapters focus on two or three main topics. Paragraphs sometimes extend for two or more pages, and the text is often packed with lists of units and numbers of weapons, personnel, and casualties which would be easier to understand in chart form. There are no charts, and maps are few and overly basic. The publisher could have upgraded these aspects of the book. The illustrations, glossary, bibliography, and index, however, are nicely done, and the paper quality holds up to highlighting and note-taking, always a plus.

The story of the Eastern Front from 1939–45 is almost overwhelming—on a scale as to be almost incomprehensible. Hill’s new source-based and in-depth analysis of important and sometimes neglected aspects of Red Army successes and failures successfully drills down and adds several more layers to the comprehension of the role of the Red Army in the Second World War. The Red Army and the Second World War is a must-have addition to the library of serious students of the Eastern Front.

The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire

By A. Wess Mitchell

Reviewed by Dr. James D. Scudieri, research historian, US Army Heritage and Education Center

The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire examines the strategic statecraft of the Habsburg Empire, Austria, as a standalone security actor—from the end of the Spanish dynastic connection by 1700 and before the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary from 1867. Author A. Wess Mitchell is not an academic historian, but a State Department security professional. The preface and first chapter make four main claims for Habsburg strategy, with the three central themes of secure buffers, an army in being combined with frontier fortresses, and allied coalitions. Austria’s preeminent challenge was “interstitial,” i.e. response
to threats in time and space, so as to avoid simultaneous wars on multiple fronts (ix).

Part I concerns strategic constraints. A central position demanded a careful accounting of geography’s diplomatic and military implications, hence Austria’s investment in comprehensive mapping. No surprise, the demographic, ethnic complexity of the empire affected domestic political power, economics, and future territorial acquisition. Mitchell categorizes Austria as never “a normal Great Power” with its “complicated constitutional order” and “contested nature” of “domestic power” (79–80). Preservation of the army was central to survival of the dynasty and state.

Institutions evolved to deal with threats, variously France, Turkey, Russia, and Prussia. Increasingly sophisticated structures maximized peacetime planning and reduced wartime reaction. They incorporated Byzantine and Renaissance elements and just war traditions. Mitchell assesses these as Austrian equivalents of the US Quadrennial Defense Review and National Security Strategy.

Part II covers the “Habsburg Frontier ‘Defense Systems’” in three eras (119). The 1690s to the 1730s witnessed a rare Austrian emphasis on the military and the mobile field armies that launched counteroffensives against the Turks after the final, failed Turkish Siege of Vienna in 1683. Military efficacy rested upon Eugene of Savoy as commander of forces with organizational and technical superiority over the Ottoman Turks.

The 1740s to the 1750s marked a more sustained threat against the state. The War of Austrian Succession in 1740–48 challenged Queen Maria Theresa’s right to rule. There was no commander of Eugene’s talent, and the army could not match the tactical articulation of the Prussians. Next was the Seven Years War from 1756–63. Now Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz-Rietberg, premier diplomat for four decades, worked Prussia’s diplomatic isolation, except for Britain, a daunting paymaster, but no land power. Maria Theresa had led and encouraged major army and other governmental reforms. A far superior army emerged, but Frederick’s operational finesse within interior lines, and luck, saved Prussia. Perhaps diverging if not conflicting allied war aims played the greater role. Two concurrent Silesian Wars showcased Austrian determination to recover Silesia and humble Prussia. Throughout Austrian leaders kept the southeastern front facing the Turks quiet via appeasement and military borders.

The 1770s to the 1790s reconfirmed a preventive strategy. Austria both checked Russian ambitions and courted Russian assistance.

Napoleonic France, 1804–14, was the toughest of Austria’s foes, as Napoleon exploited the methodological seams in traditional Austrian strategic security systems. French armies were also bigger and better. Archduke Charles Louis John Joseph Laurentius, Duke of Teschen, did become the closest combination of both reformer and talented general. Of greater note were Klemens von Metternich’s efforts to turn the tide. He played for time, returned to war in 1809, and triumphed by 1814 with
Napoleon’s abdication. After allied victory over Napoleon’s Campaign of the Hundred Days in 1815, Metternich incorporated a defeated France into a European Concert to guard a new balance of power.

Part III covers 1815–66, with Austria clearly a second-rate power. Mitchell views Metternich’s work as largely successful from 1815–48, especially the sequential suppression of the Revolutions of 1848 with Russian assistance. Two other aspects merit emphasis.

First, conditions now greatly compromised traditional systems, especially the ability to orchestrate sequencing and duration. Austria thus looked beyond immediate borders. A new Deutscher Bund of 39 Germanic states replaced the 300-odd states in the eighteenth century. Mitchell compares the relationship to 39 distinct status of forces agreements. An Italian League linked Austria’s possessions there, though Mitchell sees the area as Austria’s Achilles’ heel.

Second, and Mitchell is most emphatic on this point, Austria’s defeats in the Franco-Austrian War of 1859 and the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 were not inevitable. He believes Austrian leaders erred grievously by overestimating the viability of the military instrument as a primary policy tool. First, the military wielded greater influence in the state. Second, the army became anti-intellectual and enamored with an offensive doctrine tactically and operationally. While fiscal realities likely impacted events, the military leaders devoted too little effort to force modernization.

Strategic inflexibility replaced sophisticated diplomacy, beginning with resort to the bellicose armed neutrality against Russia when pitted against a coalition in the Crimean War of 1853–56. Future Russian enmity was virtually assured. Worse, Austria at war turned to strategic offensives which ill-suited Austrian capability and capacity, and which went against traditional security approaches. Austrian strategy for decades used strategic defensives to buy time, in part for allies to rally. The early losses at Solferino in 1859 and Sadowa (Königgrätz) in 1866 were fast and decisive with Austria alone. Austria had played to enemy strengths. Incidentally, in 1859 the French had accomplished no less than a swift strategic force projection using steamships and railroads. In 1866 Prussia executed national will on its time table. Mitchell shows how these scenarios warranted more traditional strategic approaches but Austrian leaders rejected them.

Chapter 10 on the Habsburg legacy underlines the Austrian view of hard power as secondary. The army was not an instrument of annihilation. The diplomatic element showcased the Austrian state as a category apart with “necessity status” as Austria represented a nonthreatening quest for order (309). Austria’s alliances showcased its willingness to help smaller, weaker partners deter rising hegemons.

Finally, in the epilogue Mitchell articulates 13 broad principles of Habsburg strategic statecraft to inform today’s challenges that merit particular attention. Comparative analysis remains a double-edged
sword, but will raise elementary questions about America’s role in the world and who constitutes threats and why.

The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire is not light reading—329 pages of text and 45 pages of endnotes—but Mitchell has balanced a modest look at primary sources with an examination of a very wide selection of secondary literature. While the discussion is exhaustive, the result is a sweeping case study in ends, ways, and means.

**Pax Romana: War, Peace, and Conquest in the Roman World**

By Adrian Goldsworthy

Reviewed by Dr. Jason W. Warren, defense contractor supporting information and cyber defense and security policy

In 51 BC, Julius Caesar, commander and political czar of Roman efforts in Gaul, ordered the hands of captured Gallic insurgents lopped off as a means to dispirit any hope of further resistance (410). As historian Adrian Goldsworthy demonstrates in *Pax Romana*, this atrocity and others like it were part of Rome’s method for gaining empire. Usually these violent and heavy-handed approaches occurred early in the pacification of conquered peoples and not throughout the duration of occupation. Rome opted for a mixture of cooperation for mutual benefit, threats, and occasional violence, such as Caesar’s, to establish a lasting peace still noteworthy for its longevity to this day.

In this expansive and accessible account Goldsworthy, in his polite British style, implicitly pushes back on the prevailing argument that empire is a negative, especially for conquered peoples. His refreshing argument shows how, after an initial period of resistance and submission, almost all subdued tribes accepted empire and the benefits of Roman rule, indeed often citizenship. The advantages were many, including improved administration, a disruption of brigandage, the absence of internecine warfare, and above all, the status of being a friend of powerful Rome. This reviewer is reminded of the accurate Monty Python comedy sketch from *The Life of Brian*, “What Have the Romans Ever Done for Us?” where the long list of improvements on Roman-Britain is then listed, with the retort of the would-be insurgents, “well besides that.” The legion was therefore used sparingly, and stood sentinel on the borders of barbarism, far from the core of empire.

Goldsworthy goes to great lengths to maintain a balanced telling of events, refusing to gloss over occasional brutal imperial management. This balance obviates potential scholarly criticism about the upheavals and loss of freedom that subject peoples experienced. On the whole, he determines empire was best for the vast majority of individuals who came within its bounds.

Rome also chose monarchy and empire, as was the case when the Roman Senate only briefly debated a return to empire after Caligula’s...
assassination in 41 AD (179). In an implicit comparison to other empires, Rome also chose to limit the boundaries of its empire, with a few notable exceptions such as Dacia and Mesopotamia, following Augustus’s advice to his stepson Tiberius after the defeat of the legions in the Teutoburg Forest (174–75).

As was the case with his stellar *How Rome Fell*, Goldsworthy brings to life how individual agency shaped the course of the Pax. Rome successfully harnessed the ambition of talented leaders who amalgamated tribes and territory as much for personal gain as for the glory of Rome. This method of empire building existed whether during the Republican empire, the civil wars, or through the general peace, until the upheaval of the third century AD.

Unfortunately, Goldsworthy forgoes the opportunity to delve deeper into issues of human nature, as to why such peace is so rare, something he connects with his growing up during the relative quietude in the United Kingdom after the Second World War (preface). Goldsworthy labors to identify the unique nature of such a long peace, but fails to expand on this thesis—is man’s nature therefore one of Hobbesian violence and hence contrary to the widespread belief in the West that peace is the natural state of being? Such useful examinations are absent, as with Goldsworthy’s obvious failure to juxtapose American republican empire since at least 1919, and all of its attendant consequences for world history and peace. Where Goldsworthy sees such connections with the past as problematic, such an approach undermines the gaining of historical insights better to contextualize foreign policy decisions today (7–8). Just as the Pax Romana was noteworthy, so is this account for scholars and students alike, albeit coming up slightly short in this regard.