Book Reviews

USAWC Parameters
The Clausewitz Society was founded in Germany in 1961 to promote the study of Clausewitz’s ideas particularly as they relate to current strategic and political issues. This book, first published in hardback in 2011, was commissioned to celebrate the Society’s 50th year. Civilian and military scholars from 18 countries – 13 in Europe plus China, Israel, Japan, South Africa and the United States of America (the United Kingdom and Russia are notable omissions) – were asked to examine how Clausewitz’s understanding of war has been interpreted in their country and whether his thinking still plays any role in military and political affairs. The book’s title suggests Clausewitz, like trade and communications, has become globalized. However, the book’s contents indicate for the last 180 years Clausewitz has attracted relatively limited interest in most countries, is often misunderstood or misrepresented, and rarely influences strategy or policy in any identifiable fashion.

It is not clear whether contributors were asked to write to a format but certain common themes are apparent. Some authors are able to refer to Clausewitz’s visits to their country, for example, Belgium and Switzerland, with the latter claiming that Madame de Staël and August von Schlegel re-invigorated his nationalism and romanticism during his rather comfortable time as a prisoner in Castle Coppet on Lake Geneva during the French occupation. The Spanish contributor argues Clausewitz’s understanding of guerrilla war would have benefited from military service in the peninsula.

More substantially, most contributors struggle to find significant and sustained intellectual efforts in their country to come to grips with Clausewitz. On War might be translated into the relevant language, sometimes at an early date, but this does not ensure continuing an informed interest in its content. Germany and France are significant exceptions. Even so, much has depended on the work of preeminent individuals, notably Werner Hahlweg and Raymond Aron who receive due attention from Claus von Rosen and Uwe Hartmann, and from Hervé Coutau-Bégarie respectively. Yet the salience of individual writers, it is apparent, can also wreak havoc with Clausewitz’s reputation – think of Liddell Hart’s “Mahdi of mass” in Britain or René Girard’s apocalyptic interpretation in France.

Similar considerations apply to efforts to incorporate Clausewitz into the syllabus of military colleges or officer education. One or two enlightened educators introduce ideas – often competing with advocates of Jomini or Sun Tsu – but sooner or later, their influence wanes. Often officers are assigned to “teach Clausewitz” in military colleges, but do
not have time to get beyond relating his ideas to supposedly more relevant factors such as centers of gravity, the superiority of the defense or the culminating point of the offensive. At the same time, few contributors are able to refer to any substantial study of Clausewitz in civilian universities – for obvious reasons. We learn even the study of military history was actively discouraged in Austrian and Japanese universities after 1945.

Several papers attempt to find Clausewitz relevant (or not relevant) to their nation’s experience of conflict – whether national liberation, guerrilla war, Cold War, or post-Cold War conflicts. In most cases the argument is tenuous. Some contributors acknowledge how difficult it is to explain how such influence might occur, or to produce evidence of Clausewitz’s impact on policy or the conduct of war. The problem of influence is all the greater when there is misunderstanding of Clausewitzian thinking or a selective quotation is used to provide spurious authority for an argument. In public debates it is common for “Clausewitzian” to become either a term of approbation or of abhorrence.

One paper stands out from the rest, by Christopher Bassford on “Clausewitz in America today.” True, he has the advantage of reporting on a country that has a strong and extensive intellectual engagement with Clausewitz, at least since the US defeat in Vietnam and the appearance of the Howard-Paret translation of On War in 1976. But he is acutely aware of the methodological problems in demonstrating Clausewitz’s influence (hence the sub-title of his 1994 book, Clausewitz in English, refers to “reception” rather than “influence”), while he is entertainingly trenchant in his analysis of US writers on Clausewitz and forthright in his conclusion – “American military and governmental students get very little out of reading Clausewitz” (349). The volume is worth taking off the library shelf for this contribution alone.

Creative Strategy: A Guide for Innovation
By William Duggan

Reviewed by Charles D. Allen, Colonel, USA Retired, Professor, Leadership and Cultural Studies, US Army War College

Within the past decade, the Department of Defense (DOD) and its armed services have issued a call for agile leaders and adaptive organizations while stressing the need for creativity and innovation to sustain US strategic advantages. Many national security professionals will agree with the needs but our military seems continually challenged by creating an effective “how to” that can provide national security advantages. Dr. William Duggan in his latest work, Creative Strategy: A Guide for Innovation, provides insights and a framework that may be useful within DOD. He examines two traditional methods claiming to yield creative ideas for strategy: methods of creativity (developing ideas) and methods of strategy (analyze strategic situations).

Dr. Duggan is the author of three previous books on the topic of strategic intuition, which describe the process of organizational innovation: Napoleon’s Glance: The Secret of Strategy (2002); The Art of What Works:
How Success Really Happens (2003); and Strategic Intuition: The Creative Spark in Human Achievement (2007), which the journal Strategy+Business named “Best Strategy Book of the Year.”

While he is a senior lecturer at Columbia Business School (Columbia University is the source of his BA, MA, and PhD), Dr. Duggan is no stranger to the US military. He is a recurring guest lecturer at the Creative and Strategic Leadership electives at the US Army War College, has written a Strategic Studies Institute monograph, Coup d’Oeil: Strategic Intuition in Army Planning, and worked with Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. Much of what Duggan writes is a direct application of the theory and approach he espouses. He does a deep dive to find historical cases, extracts examples of solutions to pieces of the problem, and then combines them in flashes of insight as innovations addressing the initial or emergent concern.

Accordingly, Duggan takes an individual level phenomenon of what some call creative genius and develops the construct of strategic intuition. For the individual using strategic intuition, “the brain selects a set of elements from memory, combines them in a new way, and projects that new combination into the future as a course of action to follow.” Duggan then provides an organizational-level technique to solve strategic issues. Importantly, an organization’s leaders struggle with strategic questions such as determining “what course of action your company should pursue in the future . . ., where no one person has enough direct experience to give a good answer solely from that source.” Rather than rely on the lone creative individual to divine the great idea, Duggan employs techniques from big corporations such as General Electric to engage multiple elements of the organization to attack its strategic issues.

Extending his assessment of how individuals think and innovate, Duggan presents a framework for creative strategy “where you apply strategic intuition in a systemic way to find a creative solution to a strategic problem.” That framework consists of three phases: rapid appraisal, “what-works scan,” and a creative combination that requires analysis of the problem space and environment, searches for existing solutions from similar problems, and cobbles together elements for an effective and novel resolution.

Readers may claim that this is nothing really new in the area of strategy development. Duggan might agree saying “Ah. Yes, but...” In the second part of the book, he provides a short précis of existing techniques for creativity and innovation and strategy—with a list of the usual suspects. As a counter to readers’ concerns, he offers an assessment of existing “best practices” to identify shortfalls. While he may seem overly dismissive of widely accepted theories and models that have become sacred cows, Duggan asks readers to understand the organizational context and apply elements of “best practices” as appropriate to the strategic problem at hand.

As the subtitle reads, “A Guide for Innovation,” this book is an easy read and very formulaic in demonstrating how to use Duggan’s creative strategy framework. His use of real-world business examples illustrates the application of the framework under conditions of success and failure. Readers may be understandably put off by his claim all other approaches are deficient. Such is the nature of this type of book.
Military readers may draw parallels to the recent design methodology from Army and Joint doctrine as applied to operational art—frame the environment, redefine the problem, and develop operational approaches to resolve the problem. Military readers may also tend to dismiss this book as a business-centered approach and not appropriate for issues of national defense. For this reviewer, creative strategy is bigger than design and it can be applied to organizational and institutional issues. As DOD wrestles with new policy and strategic guidance, downsizing and restructuring the force, and the need to develop effective structures to provide national security, I can see no greater opportunity to give this Duggan’s framework a chance.
Yaniv Barzilai’s *102 Days of War* is a serious and eminently readable account of the beginning of America’s Afghan war. Barzilai raises fundamental issues beyond the history he chronicles, such as the relative roles of force protection versus mission accomplishment, and the correct role of the president in goal setting; themes that constantly reemerge in national security decision making.

Barzilai contends the force-protection demand for a northern base for combat search and rescue was delayed and put at risk from the beginning of the northern Afghanistan campaign. Casualty minimization may also have been a factor in General Franks’ refusal to devote more US forces to the Tora Bora battle. How much risk for what purpose needs to be considered at the most senior levels. Since Benghazi, nervous Washington leaders have tilted the balance so far towards protection that America’s diplomats are seriously impeded in getting out among the population to report and recommend policy approaches. With further withdrawals from Afghanistan, the force-protection issue will reemerge in a military context. How much of the remaining force will be devoted to protecting itself? Will that leave enough for mission accomplishment? The answers are uncertain but *102 Days of War* reminds us consequences will be born at the highest political level.

Barzilai’s major focus throughout the book is the contention President George W. Bush failed to define the priority of destroying al Qaeda and its leader Osama bin Laden. Lack of clarity confused operational planning resulting in failure to destroy the majority of al Qaeda leadership at Tora Bora. This theme is unfolded in detailed examinations of key decisions in Washington and in the field. Documents were supplemented for interviews with major decision makers.

Within this theme are two parts; one is the absence of sufficiently clear objectives, the second is the belief President Bush should have taken a far more hands-on approach at critical moments. Each is well supported but counterpoints can be raised in both cases.

First, that the absolute destruction of al Qaeda was not adequately designated as a top priority is clearly documented. Yet there is room for discussion. Bush is quoted at one point as telling his cabinet the destruction of al Qaeda and the Taliban were of equal importance (34) and, at another, he wanted Osama bin Laden “alive or dead” (27). Was this not kept clear as discussion moved forward? Is the problem with cabinet officials and commanding generals not paying due attention to the President’s guidance? One senior diplomat told me he believed both to be the case. My own policy experience is senior meetings rarely
have the clarity suggested by study after the fact and finding the right balance in strategic guidance between too much and too little detail is difficult. Mission statements are tricky enough to frame in military staffs where the concept is both accepted and trained. It is much harder among civilian decision makers who lack this background. Getting the right strategic guidance is difficult, which is why the book’s discussion is so worthwhile.

The second sub-theme is Bush delegated too broadly and should have taken a more direct role in supervising major decision points, especially the battle of Tora Bora. Contrast is made with President Obama’s detailed oversight of the Abbottabad raid that killed bin Laden. Perhaps this is true, but the issue is more complicated than Barzilai suggests. There is no reminder of the micro-management of President Johnson during the Vietnam war. Yet that history is a formative part of how modern American civilian and military leaders look at the proper wartime role of the president. Reference is made to the role of other wartime leaders including President Lincoln. But Lincoln intervened to change commanders, not to manage battles nor to dictate campaign details.

The Abbottabad raid is completely different in scale from a large battle, as well as in the time to prepare which Barzilai does recognize. When the Obama administration applied the same micro-management to other decisions, such as the months spent deciding 2015 troop levels in Afghanistan, the results were political confusion in Afghanistan and NATO, which thwarted military planning. These reservations do not make Barzilai wrong. Rather, they point to the difficulty of getting the balance right in applying—in practice—the principles of strategic leadership.

102 Days of War is both elegant and detailed in examining these and many other aspects of a crucial historical period. It raises large issues that will concern us again and again in future crises.

The Tender Soldier: A True Story of War and Sacrifice
By Vanessa M. Gezari

Reviewed by Janeen Klinger, Department of National Security and Strategy, US Army War College

The tone and style of The Tender Soldier is vaguely reminiscent of Greg Mortenson’s book, Three Cups of Tea, although the subject matter is quite different. Still, this book provides an introduction into counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan suitable for the general reader. The book touches several subjects that will be familiar to a military audience: the debate over the role of technology, and the creation of the new counter-insurgency manual, FM 3-24. By far, the book’s strongest element lies in its description of the evolution and problems associated with Human Terrain Teams (HTT). The HTT program was an effort to use social science knowledge directly on the battlefield by deploying social scientists with troops. Although military professionals may well be
aware of the program, the fact the story is told from an outside per-

spective means the book will be of interest to them.

The tender soldier of the book’s title is Paula Loyd, one member of a
human terrain team that was deployed to Afghanistan 2008, and whom
the author says was one of the best qualified social scientists working
on such a team. The book’s opening chapter describes an attack on
Loyd—she is doused with fuel and set on fire; her teammate, Don Ayala,
apprehends and shoots the assailant while the latter is handcuffed. The
story of Loyd and Ayala is interwoven into a discussion of the evolu-
tion of the program and an analysis of the problems associated with it.
Because of this interweaving, the narrative is a little disjointed but the
insights into the program and its flaws are well worth the journey.

Problems with the HTT begin with the nature of the training the
teams received. According to Gezari, all team members she inter-
viewed described the training as “disappointing.” Although the ostensible
purpose of the HTT was to provide cultural awareness to soldiers in Iraq
and Afghanistan, the author encountered some members with no such
expertise and she suggested recruitment into the program was deeply
flawed. She noted practitioners such as Paula Loyd, who are former sol-
diers with extensive experience in non-governmental organizations and
time on the ground in Afghanistan, were quite rare. Interviews with key
individuals involved with the program (Steve Fondacaro, a retired US
Army colonel; Montgomery McFate, an anthropologist) attribute flaws
in recruitment to an overly generous contract with BAI Systems, which
was responsible for supplying recruits. In addition, both Fondacaro and
McFate believe the program was expanded too rapidly. Fondacaro is
quoted as saying the program thought it had two years to build five
teams but were, in fact, required to field 26 teams immediately. McFate
describes the rapid expansion of the program as “catastrophic.”

Once the HTT were deployed the problems were compounded
by the ambiguity of their purpose. Some thought they were part of a
humanitarian aid mission while others thought they were to explain to
commanders why local people supported the insurgency. Gezari quoted
one USMC colonel in Helmand Province saying he did not know what
the team he was supervising was supposed to do—and neither did anyone
else. Consequently, the team was left to “figuring it out as they went
along.” The description of dysfunction in the HTT program suggests
the execution left much to be desired.

Two broader lessons emerge from reading The Tender Soldier. The first
involves the rather short-term memory that plagues the military and
other policy-makers. The military had tried to use social scientists in an
operational way in the 1960s, and Gezari outlines the details of Project
Camelot, which also showed dismal results. Moreover, not only were
nation-building efforts in Vietnam a failure despite the input of social
scientists, the United States had also tried to replicate the success of the
Tennessee Valley Authority in Afghanistan in 1960 with the creation
of Helmand Valley Authority. Arnold Toynbee toured the project at
Lashkar Gah and reported it “has become a piece of America inserted
into the Afghan landscape, . . . the new world they are conjuring up out of
the desert at the Helmand River’s expense is to be an America—in Asia.”
That project too hit the limits of culture and history.
The second lesson involves the fundamental ambiguity so characteristic of counter-insurgency. When Gezari returned to Kandahar to learn what she could about Paula Loyd’s killer, she encountered contradictory stories about the man’s motive, with some locals asserting he had been kidnapped by the Taliban and forced to do its bidding and others claiming he was mentally ill. The truth regarding his motive may never be ascertained, which stands as an appropriate symbol for the difficulty inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns.
For six decades, American policy toward China has been shaped by a theme called “strategic ambiguity.” The summit meeting in June between President Obama and President Xi Jinping of China in California suggested “strategic ambiguity” has run its course, and should be retired in favor of “strategic clarity, tactical ambiguity.”

This book by Dean Chen, a political scientist at the University of California, Santa Barbara, traces the evolution of “strategic ambiguity” in meticulous detail from its earliest days (before the Communist Party came to power in mainland China) to the present. The author has relied on an extensive reading of declassified files to make his case and, in so doing, shows how Washington works. In particular, he weaves a narrative of memos, position papers, directives, meetings, public speeches, and press conferences to explain how a policy is shaped.

Chen is less persuasive, however, in arguing for the continuation of strategic ambiguity. With democracy evidently having taken hold in Taiwan, Chen asserts: “Beijing should come to terms with that reality and learn to show greater respect to voices and political views that are contradictory to its own.” Given that Beijing has insisted the world accept its position on a wide range of issues, Chen’s plea is roughly akin to asking water to flow uphill.

After the Communists led by Mao Zedong took over Beijing in October 1949, President Truman and his administration struggled with a dilemma. Clearly, they did not want the United States to get into a war with the new Chinese regime. On the other hand, they did not want to see the island of Taiwan, also known by its Portuguese name, Formosa, fall under mainland control after the Nationalist Chinese had taken refuge there.

Thus, in January, 1950, President Truman issued a statement: “The United States government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China.” But the president and his advisors did not say what the United States would do to implement their policy.

Then in June, 1950, that ambiguity was hardened when North Korea attacked South Korea beginning the Korean War. President Truman, fearing Beijing would launch a parallel attack on Taiwan, announced: “I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa.” The president also called on the Nationalist Chinese to cease military operations against the mainland, further announcing: “The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done.”

In succeeding decades, strategic ambiguity became the watchword for dealing with China. During the war in Vietnam, the shift in diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979, and the emergence
of China as a regional economic, political, and military power, it was
the default position. The basic intent was to keep the Chinese guessing
about what the United States would do.

Over those same years, however, Chinese leaders have become more
firm as they identified what they call their core interests and at times
more aggressive, even belligerent. In the California summit, contrast
the tone as explained by Yang Jiechi, a senior party official and former
foreign minister, and Tom Donilon, a senior staffer for the National
Security Council. They briefed the press separately after the summit
meeting in an estate on the edge of a desert town named, perhaps appro-
priately, Rancho Mirage.

Yang was clear in stating the Chinese positions. These included
Beijing’s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan and large portions of the South
China Sea and an adamant denial China was responsible for hacking into
US cyber transmissions. In addition, he said President Xi had called for
Sino-American coordination on hotspots such as the Korean Peninsula
and Afghanistan and on peacekeeping and cyber security. Lastly, the
Chinese proposed fostering new Sino-American military relations.

Donilon, however, indicated President Obama did not respond to
those proposals. Instead, Donilon dwelled on the eight hours of con-
versation and the meeting’s atmospheres. Among the few substantive
points: Donilon said President Obama had warned President Xi that
continued Chinese hacking into US cyber systems would have adverse
consequences. But the president’s stance on China came off as soft,
vague, and perhaps even indecisive—much like the policies of several
previous administrations whether Democratic or Republican. Overall,
the absence of clear-cut US objectives may have made the chances of a
strategic miscalculation more likely.

How much better it would be if America’s China policy were based
on “strategic clarity,” in which the fundamental national interests of the
United States were publicized for all to see. The corollary would be tacti-
cal ambiguity, in which the time and place and means of defending those
interests would be kept out of the public eye. That ambiguity would be
intended to keep a potential adversary off balance and would, therefore,
be a critical component of deterrence.

Despite Chen’s appeal for strategic ambiguity to continue, his expo-
sition of the historical background makes an excellent contribution to the
running debate that erupts from time to time on what American policy
on China should be. His book, however, has one editorial flaw, which
is the unfortunate academic habit of referring to scholars, researchers,
officials, and even political leaders without identifying them. In a critical
passage, the author refers to Jack Snyder, Aaron Friedberg, Lee Teng-
hui, and Chen Shui-bian without telling the reader who they are. Many
readers will know—but many others will not.

As the famously demanding editor of the New Yorker, Harold Ross,
might have written in the margin next to each name: “Who he?”
It is not an exaggeration to say no other country in the world has attracted the attention of the United States more than the island of Cuba. Extremes of friendliness and animosity have characterized US-Cuba diplomatic relations since 7 January 1959, when the United States recognized the new Cuban government but maintained serious reservations about its leader, Fidel Castro. With the end of the Cold War and the radical transformation of the bipolar world into a unipolar one dominated by the United States, Cuba now stands at a crossroad. As the world becomes more “flat,” to use Thomas Friedman’s description, Cuba will have to reorient its foreign policy during its “special period in time of peace,” and find its own niche during this process of globalization and regionalization (3). Furthermore, domestic imperatives, diverse constituencies, and US-Cuban perceptions and misperceptions will also impact Washington’s policy toward Cuba.

In this edited anthology, Catherine Krull takes a fresh look at Cuba’s international relations in its attempt to survive its contentious relations with the United States and to build new bridges in the post-Cold War world. The political constructs of international relations—where Cubans found themselves at the center of the long geopolitical struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union—are fundamental to Cuba’s future. But so are internationalism (the promotion of increased economic and political cooperation amongst nations) and transnationalism (people-to-people rather than government-to-government relationships). Cuba, according to Krull, has been active in the international system in the aftermath of the implosion of the Soviet Union. Cuba, once described as “Moscow’s favorite Marxist-Leninist showcase in the developing world—the only socialist revolution that had succeeded in Latin America,” was taken by surprise once President Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, and introduced two new concepts into the political vocabulary of the Soviet Union: glasnost and perestroika. Perestroika was an attempt to restructure the Soviet Union’s economy, which was at the edge of collapse; while glasnost was the political opening of the Soviet Union’s authoritarian regime. Within a year, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev collapsed and its satellite states, including Cuba, lost their geopolitical value to the newly created Russian Republic. As Krull points out, “within a year Cuba’s massively important special conditions as a member of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and the international socialist division of labor were a thing of the past, and the island was soon to reel under the impact of an 80 percent drop in its purchasing power abroad and the almost total loss of its Soviet and Eastern European markets and suppliers” (51).

Recognizing the end of the Cold War and the new international political environment of the twenty-first century, Cuba’s revolutionary project would have to find new allies. The decade of the 1980s, the so-called “lost decade” in Latin America, was a period of economic hardship followed
by high unemployment, capital flight, and economic crisis. Proponents of globalization, Ronald Reagan in the United States and Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom, promised rapid economic growth and prosperity. Instead, the global economic crisis of 2008-2009 did more damage to an already frail and weak political system. As Krull points out, “damaging commodity prices, scarce line of credit, declining foreign investment, and a depressed export-import market are particularly taxing for developing countries,” including Cuba (134).

It was within this chaotic political environment that Cuba found new allies. All of them political allies who came to power with the rise of the “pink tide,” which brought to power political leaders not only of the radical left but also antagonists toward the United States and its foreign policy toward Latin America (Evo Morales in Bolivia, Nestor Kirchner in Argentina, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, Luis Inacio “Lula” da Silva in Brazil). In 2005, at the Fourth Summit of the Americas held in Mar del Plata, Argentina, members of the “pink tide” including the founding members of the MERCOSUR (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay) closed ranks with Venezuela to oppose the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) which was endorsed by the Bush administration (133). Cuba and its radical allies are also using their “soft power” to entice an enlargement of the “pink tide” membership. Joseph Nye, Jr., in his book Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (2004) defines soft power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.” (x) Cuba and Venezuela are spreading their “soft power” through the establishment of Telesur, “the hemisphere-wide, noncommercial television network set up by Venezuela, Cuba, Argentina, and Uruguay in 2005, which broadcasts anti-US hegemony programming” (131).

In addition to the radical left in Latin America, Cuba has also entered into bilateral agreements with China and Canada to enhance its “revolution.” According to Krull, in the relatively short period of twenty years since the end of the Cold War, China has become one of Cuba’s main strategic allies. In 1990, Cuba was China’s largest Latin American trading partner. China’s economic penetration of Cuba is astonishing and should be of concern to Washington. China has, in essence, replaced the Soviet Union as Cuba’s banker. Cuba and China became important markets for each other’s products. According to Carlos Alzugaray Treto, in his essay Cuban-Chinese Relations after the End of the Cold War, “trade became relatively complementary, with China importing raw sugar and nickel from Cuba, and exporting machinery, dry beans, transport equipment, and light industrial products in return. China reported bilateral trade figure of $2.29 billion in 2007, $2.27 billion in 2008, $1.55 billion in 2009, and rising to $2.43 billion in 2012” (97). For its part, Canada recognized the revolutionary government of Fidel Castro only eight months after its overthrow of the Fulgencio Batista government. Canada’s foreign policy of “constructive engagement” or “principled pragmatism” is a striking contrast with the US Government’s policy of isolating Cuba (115).

I recommend this book to anyone interested in history, politics and international relations. This text can be especially useful to students at the US Army War College and military leaders who may be called upon to engage in a “constructive engagement” with Cuba in the decades to come as the island goes through another “special period.”
Cyber is one of the fastest growing aspects of the military today; while most functions of the military are sustaining severe cuts to funding, those associated with cyber are among the few likely to see an increase in the near future. Despite its apparent importance, even leading to the creation of a sub-unified command with attendant service component commands, few military officers outside those tasked to support United States Cyber Command understand the subject, even with the publishing of frequent articles in professional journals, such as the recent article by Paul Rexton Kan in the Autumn 2013 issue of Parameters.

Fortunately, in Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know, Singer and Friedman provide an easily accessible primer. This book was designed to take complicated material and make it understandable to non-technicians and non-academics. The beauty is it does so without stripping the topic of meaning and nuance. Fellows at the Brookings Institution, Singer and Friedman skillfully pooled their resources as experts on defense and technology affairs to create an extremely useful reference for laymen and defense professionals alike.

Written in a question-and-answer format, each section is easily digested and retained, as well as referenced later. Questions are broken into three parts: historical/technical aspects of cyber, structural and operational implications, and what we can do about it. The first section is valuable to those who have not studied the history or technical aspects of cyber; the final section provides some interesting policy proposals and personal tips to secure cyberspace. However, the middle section really provides intellectual meat for military professionals.

While discussing why cyber matters in this section, the authors spend a significant amount of time on cyber security from a military perspective. I was pleased to see a robust yet concise discussion on the finer points of cyber security, including the authors’ obvious intellectual grounding in the general theory of war and the intricacies of strategy. In particular, the part that most piqued my interest was the discussion on the perceived advantage of either the offense or defense in cyber action. Singer and Friedman do a wonderful job framing the current infatuation with cyber attack as the stronger form of cyber action, drawing parallels with a similar doctrine permeating Europe in the early 20th Century. This so called “cult of the offensive” had logical groundings in military thought prior to World War I, but was subsequently proven tragically wrong in the Great War. One wonders if the same rings true in cyber space, or if this new medium truly favors the offense over the defense. Singer and Friedman do an admirable job describing the issue at hand and its inconclusive nature to date.
Though brief, readers can expect Cybersecurity and Cyberwar’s explanations, stories, and analysis to provide significant benefit to their intellectual foundations. This book should be a first stop for military professionals interested in cyber security.

Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force
By Robert M. Farley

Reviewed by Ryan D. Wadle, Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the Air Command and Staff College

Robert Farley’s Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force offers a bold, provocative thesis: the Air Force as a separate entity should be eliminated with its assets and missions distributed between the Army and Navy. Farley argues the Air Force’s independence has always rested solely on its ability to carry out strategic attack missions. Early airpower theorists such as Brigadier General William Mitchell linked the independent air service with strategic bombing theoretically capable of defeating enemies quicker and cheaper than traditional ground and naval campaigns, and this core belief continues to drive the modern Air Force. Farley argues this optimistic view of airpower’s potential violates Clausewitz’s theories on the nature of war and has never been borne out through a century of combat experience. America’s political leaders and decision makers continue to give the Air Force a privileged position because they are seduced by airpower’s assurances of efficient, almost bloodless war; but the Air Force is incapable of delivering on its promises. Since the Air Force is presently attempting to apply its own skewed, paranoid worldview to cyberspace, seemingly unable to perform its nuclear deterrent mission, and is under cultural assault by the promise of remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), Farley reasons the Air Force should be abolished.

Farley’s fundamental point about the need for defense reorganization in the wake of both the Cold War and the post-9/11 interventions is a sound one. He also identifies failings of the Air Force as a fascination with technology and frequent conflation of targeting and strategy. The author’s critique of the Air Force’s Manichean cyberspace policies and its contrasts with the Navy’s view of cyberspace as a virtual global commons is easily the highlight of Grounded. Yet, while lay readers may be entranced with Farley’s argument and see a viable path for defense reform, informed readers will find a book heavily reliant on secondary sources with oversights, conceptual flaws, and factual errors that completely undermine the book’s core thesis.

By focusing so much on the Air Force’s organizational behavior and its policymaking consequences, Farley gives short shrift to the strategic context of decision making. Unlike many defense reorganization plans, Farley specifies neither the threat he envisions the United States and its allies will face in the coming decades nor how abolishing the Air Force will help the nation overcome those challenges. There is a similar absence of strategic context in the historical examples cited as evidence. It was not by accident the two dominant sea powers of the last two centuries
– the United States and Great Britain – pursued strategic bombing and robust, independent air forces while most other great power nations did not. This fact completely escapes Farley’s attention even though it helps explain much of the cultural mindset undergirding strategic airpower. Similarly, he uses the organizational structures of airpower in the Soviet Union, Canada, and Israel as potential models for reform in the United States; yet never accounts for the vastly different security needs and priorities of these nations. Without knowing Farley’s vision of the world and the United States’ role in it, it becomes extremely difficult to assess the validity of his ideas.

Farley believes abolishing the Air Force will solve many problems confronting the defense establishment, but he paints this choice as having few, if any long term costs. Eliminating the Air Force may reduce inter-service friction in some arenas and facilitate better air-to-ground and air-to-sea coordination as the author argues, but the checkered history of “jointness” both before and after Goldwater-Nichols suggests this will not be a cure-all. Farley also never spells out the fates of several critical Air Force missions and leaves vital questions unanswered. Is the Army or Navy likely to be as interested in the strategic airlift mission as the current Air Force? These sorts of trade-offs never factor into his analysis. Even though Farley contributes to Information Dissemination, a naval affairs blog that takes a refreshingly broad view of the value of seapower, his opinion of the Air Force is too often reductive and lacks nuance.

Most importantly, Grounded presents a simplistic, distorted historical narrative that tars the modern Air Force with decades-old combat failures and overpromises of efficiency and precision. Of course, sending unescorted bombers over German skies in 1943 to destroy ball-bearing factories was the pinnacle of folly, highlighting deep organizational and cultural flaws in the Army Air Force; but Farley curiously ignores the much more effective bombing raids of 1944 and 1945, which successfully struck the Nazi fuel and transportation systems and helped neutralize Germany’s war machine. Few people should take statements of airpower supremacy following World War II and DESERT STORM seriously, just as they must also force policymakers to account for their expectation of precise, cheap, and ethically “clean” airpower campaigns over strategic choices. Most major airpower theorists and analysts writing today strongly insist airpower is only effective when employed with strategic clarity and purpose, and in concert with other military and non-military levers of power.

There is an argument to be made for defense reorganization in which the Air Force ceases to exist as an independent service, and, to his credit, Farley identifies some of what ails the Air Force and the long-term challenges the service must confront to maintain relevance. Grounded, however, is too flawed to make an effective case for abolishing the Air Force.
Military historians may someday conclude that, despite the emergence of the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV or drone) as a modern marvel of information collection, targeting, and weapons delivery, this generation’s most significant battlefield evolution involved people. Never before has a nation’s military enjoyed the capacity, facilitated by the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), to deploy an unlimited number of warfighters swiftly, without geographical limitation, and indefinitely sustain that fighting force with an unprecedented level of readiness. Such surge capacity and flexibility come at a steep price, both fiscal and moral, which will be debated for many years to come.

But for all the controversy generated by the government’s pervasive outsourcing of battlefield support, it is the post-millennial proliferation of arms-bearing contractors that roiled the human rights community and catalyzed a global conversation about the nature and future of modern warfare. This new breed of weapon-toting contractors – serving as guards, escorts, police, advisors, and trainers, but cumulatively perceived in the contingency area as soldier-like, and called everything from private military and privatized security to mercenaries—draws Ann Hagedorn’s ire and anxiety. And she is not alone.

Peter W. Singer’s now familiar Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, introduced professional readers to the increasingly sophisticated arms-bearing contractor industry and the accelerating trend of state reliance on these firms. Others, including, but by no means limited to, Deborah Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security, James Jay Carafano, Private Sector Public Wars: Contractors in Combat - Afghanistan, Iraq, and Future Conflicts, David Isenberg, Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq, Allison Stanger, One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy, and Laura Dickinson, Outsourcing War and Peace: Preserving Public Values in a World of Privatized Foreign Affairs, further illuminated a shadowy, seemingly unregulated, globalized, and disaggregated population of former soldiers, shrewd businessmen, soldiers of fortune, adventurers, opportunists, and, of course, the occasional cast-off, rogue, ruffian, and scoundrel.

Hagedorn, like many of her predecessors, struggles for objectivity, but makes no effort to hide her frustrations. Still, Invisible Soldiers fills a niche in that its publication follows the peaks and the drawdowns of the Bush and Obama administrations’ deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, in which contractors (of all types) outnumbered uniformed service-members, in both service and, at times, sacrifice. Accordingly, Invisible Soldiers offers a more complete retrospective on the proliferation of arms-bearing contractors in contingency environments peppered with a healthy dose of skepticism for the future.
A gifted story teller, Hagedorn displays the journalistic skills and instincts she honed at the Wall Street Journal by introducing her book with a lengthy, engaging, and compelling, but, ultimately irrelevant, anecdote. To be fair, Hagedorn deserves credit for leading with the unique and poignant tragedy of Kadhim Alkanni, rather than resorting to Blackwater’s Nissour Square debacle, now destined to occupy, for Iraq, the inflammatory space that the 1968 My Lai Massacre carved out in Vietnam. (That said, Nissour Square receives fully adequate coverage in Hagedorn’s book.) Other critical, and admittedly colorful, players—Tim Spicer of Sandline and Aegis, Blackwater founder Erik Prince, and Doug Brooks, who for many years was the burgeoning security industry’s organizing and sophisticated voice—feature prominently. Yet serious policy readers and military historians might be more interested in analyzing the policy role of Gary J. Motsek—DoD’s point person—on outsourcing of military and security functions, who somehow escaped mention in this volume.

Ultimately, Hagedorn recognizes the military had little control over the policy vacuum that led to the swift and dramatic dilution of the government’s traditional monopoly over the use of force. Rather than resulting from a careful, reasoned, and voluntary delegation of authority to the private sector in conformance with global trends, the US government’s outsourcing of military and security functions was necessitated by politically popular but empirically unjustified Congressional troop caps, requiring non-DoD actors to rely on arms bearing contractors for, among other things, personal security in a hostile environment. (138) “How else could the nation have engaged in two wars—Iraq and Afghanistan—simultaneously without reinstituting the draft?” (160).

The poster child anecdote was the State Department’s reliance on its Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) contract—originally a centrally managed source for private security at embassies—which morphed as the population of diplomats and related officials, employees, and support staff multiplied in Iraq. Meanwhile, scores of security firms from around the world entered the region under commercial subcontracts with the unprecedented number of contractors supporting every conceivable aspect of the Defense, State, and Agency for International Development departments’ missions in the region. References to the eclectic and incendiary Star Wars cantina scenes frequently prompted knowing head nods in conferences discussing the private security proliferation phenomenon.

Hagedorn appears to overstate the policy debate between proponents “who firmly believe...in the importance of the private military contractors and ha(ve) no intention of regulating them” (101) and opponents of the government’s reliance on private security in contingency operations. No doubt, her clear abolitionist preference is tempered by her recognition the outsourcing train left the station long ago. The realists, or, if you prefer, cynics, realize—for the foreseeable future—the heart of the matter lies in government regulation and management, not the esoteric aspiration of elimination, of private security.

Here, Hagedorn’s extensive notes and index demonstrate she took her homework seriously. As a late comer to the literature, Invisible Soldiers is able to introduce readers to the Montreaux initiative, an important and laudable global coalition aspiring to bring regulatory order to this
rapidly evolving and chaotic industry. Closer to home, Hagedorn’s frustration with the US government’s lackadaisical management of the industry is palpable: “The British, including journalists, human rights advocates, politicians, military experts, and private security executives, began sorting out the issues of private military companies years before the Americans.” (255) Hagedorn also remains justifiably skeptical of industry self-regulation. Alas, she fares no better than her colleagues in suggesting practical, concrete alternatives.

Hagedorn’s perspective and insights on arms bearing contractors, democracies, and empires—intensely personal, yet thoughtfully cognizant of policy, political theory, and philosophy—should interest readers new to the field, as well as those well versed in the issues. Outsourcing the use of force is sufficiently important to the future of democratic states that this book—as well as the growing corpus of literature it adds to—merits serious contemplation.
Military Adaptation in Afghanistan
Edited by Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga, and James A. Russell

Reviewed by Chad C. Serena, Political Scientist, RAND Corporation, Pittsburgh, PA

This edited volume provides a timely, detailed, and meticulously researched set of case studies examining the process of military adaptation in Afghanistan. While the subject of military adaptation can be complex and often difficult to frame and describe in a way that resonates with readers, especially those who may not be intimately familiar with the subject, the authors of this volume manage to simplify and explain how military adaptation occurred during the Afghan campaign; and they do so across a range of cases, and within the context of the political, strategic, operational, and tactical pressures many of the participants faced. Military Adaptation in Afghanistan is a must read for anyone interested in learning more about the process of military adaptation in general. But its particular value lies in its examination of military adaptation through the lens of the ongoing Afghan campaign.

The editors, Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga, and James A. Russell, brought together scholars with varied backgrounds, experiences, and perspectives to evaluate how participating military forces have adapted their strategies, operations, tactics, and organizations, variously, throughout (and in one chapter, prior to) the course of the war in Afghanistan. The 12 chapters are written by an expert or group of experts well respected for their knowledge of the case (or cases) they examine: Farrell opens the volume by introducing the concept of military adaptation and the analytic framework the editors developed for the book; Daniel Moran discusses previous British and Soviet campaigns in Afghanistan; Russell examines the US experience since the invasion in 2001; Sten Rynning tackles coalition innovation and adaptation in ISAF and NATO; Farrell also provides a chapter on the British military in Helmand province (2006-2011); Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen explores an often overlooked but interesting and valuable case in his review of the Danish experience in Helmand; Martijn Kitzen, Sebastiaan Rietjens, and Osinga explain the Netherlands’ adaptation in Uruzgan; Thomas Rid and Martin Zapfe take up Germany’s participation in the alliance and the challenges it faced in deploying to an area of active conflict; Stephen M. Saideman provides an essay on Canadian adaptation; Antonio Giustozzi covers a ten-year period of Taliban adaptation; and, Adam Grissom has a chapter covering the development and adaptation of the Afghan National Army (ANA) that details the struggles it still faces as ISAF and NATO forces prepare to leave the country. Osinga and Russell conclude the book with a review of the lessons of military adaptation highlighted by each author.

How the editors define military adaptation—change to strategy, force generation, and/or military plans and operations, undertaken in response to operational challenges and campaign pressures—helps to align the authors’ case study examinations at the appropriate level. This broad framework provides conceptual and analytical continuity
throughout the book, but still gives the authors the flexibility to explore the details and nuances of each case examined. While military adaptation is the central theme of the volume and coheres each of the chapters, the authors’ vantage points and the details of each case tell individualized stories of how adaptation transpired in Afghanistan, from a variety of angles and perspectives. Each chapter explores the different challenges and motivations for military adaptation the participants in the Afghan campaign faced, and continue to experience as the campaign winds down. This examination includes adaptive successes and failures and the various factors that aid, compel, or slow military adaptation, such as: pressures brought to bear by alliance politics and domestic opinion; political, economic, and budgetary factors; risk avoidance and aversion; technology and field innovation; and, changes in adversary behavior, provincial and local governance, and other important environmental factors.

Put simply, the story of military operations in Afghanistan is a story of adaptation and this work comprehensively captures how this process unfolded over the past decade-plus of operations. It is highly recommended reading for senior and mid-level officers, policy-makers, scholars, historians, and practitioners interested in the Afghan campaign generally and the process of military adaptation during this campaign specifically. No chapter disappoints, as each is well written and cogent, and provides lessons of significant value for possible future campaigns.

**Gender, Military Effectiveness, and Organizational Change: The Swedish Model**
By Robert Egnell with Petter Hojem and Hannes Berts

Reviewed by Ellen Haring, Colonel (USA Retired)

Despite annual rankings placing Sweden at the top of the UN’s list of most gender-integrated countries in the world, their military remains strongly resistant to the complete integration of women. A 1980 Swedish Equality Act opened all military occupations and positions to women. Today, Swedish women serve in all combat and combat support specialties and have done so for more than 20 years. While the military has officially opened its doors to women, they serve as a fractional minority and in almost no senior decision making positions. Sweden, acknowledging that the military has not met integration aspirations, is now tackling gender equality in its most resistant organization: their Armed Forces.

Dr. Robert Egnell’s book is an effort to capture and chronicle Sweden’s innovative and evolving approaches to organizational change within the Swedish Armed Forces. Accepting and embracing the goals established in 2000 and 2008 by UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820, which advanced the requirement for women to be included as full partners in peace and security operations, Sweden moved aggressively to create a culture that integrates a “gender perspective” in all areas of military activities. Egnell notes that Sweden’s effort is a work in progress but many emerging insights merit consideration by US policy makers.
One of the most important insights of this book is Sweden’s decision to focus on infusing the organization with a heightened gender perspective (a way of assessing gender-based differences of women and men as reflected in their social roles and interaction, the relative distribution of power and their access to resources). This gender perspective is intended to be broad based, looking both internally (at the institution itself) and externally (at operational effectiveness).

Early debates considered whether the approach should be about “what is the right thing to do” or “what is the smart thing to do.” Settling on the latter has provided a focus on military effectiveness rather than issues of equality. This focus changed the approach where developing a gender perspective came from personnel and administrative offices to where it is embedded in operations offices at every level.

In order to provide necessary training, Sweden—in partnership with Norway and Finland—established the first of its kind, “Nordic Center for Gender in Military Operations,” located just outside Stockholm. The center trains leaders at every level in aspects of developing gender awareness. It compiles lessons learned, conducts evaluations and engages in research relative to gender informed military operations. Some of the center’s research has led to changes in military operations. One example of important lessons yielded by their research is military efforts that dip into the development arena relative to women have not only failed to provide the expected outcomes (winning hearts and minds, gaining information, and providing better security) but, in many cases, have been counterproductive to the activities of those agencies that are tasked with, and better equipped to perform, development projects.

This is a necessary book for a number of groups within the US military. First, it is enormously informative for those who are currently working on integrating women into previously closed combat specialties. It highlights expected sources of resistance and offers strategies for overcoming resistance. It is important reading for the entire special operations community, specifically the civil affairs career field. Numerous sections highlight the relative importance of including gender perspectives when interacting with locals during military operations. Finally, those charged with professional military education curriculum development and delivery should read this text because, as Egnell asserts, if you do not teach it within your professional schools than it will not be viewed as important. And, the school house is the most important place to begin to effect organizational change.
Frank Leith Jones, a professor of security studies at the US Army War College and former senior defense department official, presents a biography of Robert Komer that doubles as an insightful study of American Cold War strategy and policy. Following Paul Kennedy, Jones approaches his subject as a history from the middle, and Komer offers an excellent case study of a mostly forgotten official at the Central Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon, and the White House who was one of the architects of Cold War strategy in the 1960s and 1970s. We tend to remember Komer for his role in running the “other war” in Vietnam from 1966-68. Jones, too, places Komer’s thinking about social, economic, and military approaches to pacification and counterinsurgency in Vietnam at the heart of his study, but he reminds us of Komer’s role in assessing the Soviet threat, his influence on policies toward Third World countries in the 1960s, and his position in Harold Brown’s defense department during the Carter administration, where Komer defined policy for strengthening the NATO alliance and helped translate the Carter doctrine into military strategy for the Persian Gulf and the greater Middle East.

Throughout three decades in government service, Komer remained a realist, consistently arguing for multilateral approaches to international security, and he developed a keen sense for the importance of Third World actors. By the 1960s, as Komer gained the trust and confidence of presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, he emerged as a successor to George F. Kennan—a leading strategic thinker for the global Cold War. Unlike Kennan, Komer was a pragmatist who played a central role in translating strategic thought into policy for particular crises and wars (on the Indian subcontinent, in Indonesia, in Yemen, and eventually in Vietnam). Jones’s Komer is a Clausewitzian, with a firm grasp of the national interest and the need to align means, ends, and political objectives. But despite Komer’s best efforts in Washington and Vietnam—which led to a remarkably well-integrated civilian presence in the war effort under General William Westmoreland, though it suffered later from the tense relationship between the abrasive Komer and General Creighton Abrams—improved structures for counterinsurgency operations did not yield victory.

How did Komer rise to a position of great influence and where did he form his worldview? Like Kennan, Komer was an outsider, a Midwesterner by way of Harvard University, where he studied with the historian William Langer, discovered Clausewitz, and concluded from his thesis on British strategy in World War I that, in modern war, civilian leaders were the better strategists. Komer served as a combat historian with US Fifth Army in Italy, which gave him insight into civil-military relations in the occupation of liberated areas. Langer and Komer met again in November 1950 at the CIA’s Office of National Estimates. Under
the tutelage of Langer and Sherman Kent, Komer became an expert in South Asian and Middle Eastern affairs and he closely observed the process of formulating national security policy from intelligence data. After a year at the National War College, Komer returned to the CIA as head of the Soviet estimates group and in 1958 he was appointed liaison to the National Security Council. Throughout the 1950s, Komer developed a finely tuned sense that national interests, not ideology or encrusted structures, should determine the framework for strategy and policy. Contrary to prevailing attitudes, he concluded that neutrality in the Cold War was not in itself an anti-Western position. When McGeorge Bundy reorganized the NSC staff, Komer seized the moment and made himself indispensable in carefully crafted responses to crises in Yemen, Indonesia, and India. This placed him in the inner circle of advisers in Lyndon Johnson’s White House, which in turn allowed him to shape counterinsurgency approaches during the Vietnam War.

In the Carter administration, Komer found new champions and he returned as a policymaker and strategist with a strong commitment to strengthening the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Komer’s policy proposals again were defined by realism and multilateralism. Building on his policies in the late 1970s, Komer, never one to shy away from a fight, offered sharp public opposition to John Lehman and the maritime strategy of the Reagan administration. This points at another Robert Komer, who emerges from Jones’s skillful narrative: an historian and analyst of what went wrong in Vietnam. Komer’s experience highlights the difficult relationship of civilian and military officers in a war that was never winnable by one group alone. In his studies for the RAND Corporation, Komer exposed the tensions between different agencies within the American bureaucracy.

Policymakers and strategists faced with meeting today’s threats could benefit from reading Komer’s Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on US-GVN Performance in Vietnam (1972) and Bureaucracy at War: US Performance in the Vietnam Conflict (1986). Jones’s appreciation for Komer’s thinking and the meticulous evidence he draws from government records and Komer’s memoranda, blunt press briefings, and post-war studies illustrate the complexity of the Vietnam War and the global Cold War in ways that should prove critical to understanding the pitfalls inherent in any bureaucracy and the challenges faced by a superpower with global commitments, conventional rivals, and irregular enemies. Blowtorch deserves a wide readership; anyone interested in global strategy, the Vietnam War, the Cold War in the 1960s, or institutional history should find it enlightening.

Climax at Gallipoli: The Failure of the August Offensive
By Rhys Crawley

Reviewed by W. Andrew Terrill, PhD, Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College.

It has now been over one hundred years since the First World War broke out, and April 2015 is the hundredth anniversary of the beginning
of the Gallipoli campaign. In this timely consideration, Rhys Crawley’s *Climax at Gallipoli* provides an important revisionist account of that campaign’s August 1915 final offensive by the British-led Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF). Crawley maintains the August offensive never really had a chance of defeating Ottoman forces due to deeply flawed planning, a lack of necessary resources, and other important factors. He calls the campaign an utter failure rather than the brink of victory it has been described as by historians elsewhere. Unsurprisingly, he also disagrees with key allied leaders, including MEF commander General Ian Hamilton, who portrayed the August offensive as a “very near” success (8). Consequently, Crawley’s analysis goes against a deeply-rooted historical narrative, which he has challenged through a meticulous command of the facts in this very fine-grained analysis.

Most senior British officers at Gallipoli had fought in the Boer War and learned lessons in South Africa that were badly outdated by World War I. As on the Western Front, most senior MEF officers had also been taught to accept the primacy of the offensive, and did not fully realize how new technology added to the advantages enjoyed by a defending force. While recognizing the bravery of the Ottoman troops, senior MEF officers considered them to be especially vulnerable to offensively-oriented movement involving surprise, deception, and speed. In a chauvinistic flourish on this mindset, General Hamilton characterized British troops as “superior individuals” who “are animated with a superior ideal,” and would ultimately prevail in any conflict with the Ottomans in which they led (67). Banal statements of national superiority seldom help military planning and may have partially caused the MEF leadership to overlook problems with many of their sick, exhausted, and inexperienced troops. These soldiers had been worn down by constant work, lack of sleep, and woefully inadequate medical care. Crawley maintains this force was not capable of prolonged action, but it was nevertheless required to assault well-prepared defenders in mountainous terrain that did not lend itself to mobility or coordinated forward movement.

Further complicating MEF problems, planners made a number of assumptions about Ottoman forces that were incorrect. In particular, British military leaders considered the Ottoman army to be weak, demoralized, and likely to crumble. General Hamilton stated the Ottomans favored trench warfare because “their stupid men have only simple straightforward duties to perform” (24). In this command climate, it is not surprising military intelligence repeatedly underestimated the Ottomans. Despite allied estimates to the contrary, Ottoman forces were not suffering massive health problems, morale was generally high, and many of these troops were prepared to die defending every inch of contested ground. Beyond miscalculations about the enemy, the MEF had huge gaps in its information about the terrain since ground reconnaissance was limited by forces encircling the beachheads. Making matters worse, MEF maps did not adequately depict problems with the terrain, and units became lost at crucial points in the campaign. One unit assigned to capture “Hill 10” in the August offensive seized a defended sand dune instead and then came under fire from the real Hill 10.

Crawley also makes a strong case the level of artillery support for the August offensive was inadequate, with erratic shooting and an insufficient volume of fire. Many of the guns provided for this campaign were
obsolete, and others were worn out. There were also a limited number of suitable sites for gun positions under MEF control and less ammunition available than on the Western front. Crawley notes the artillery had mostly shrapnel shells, which had limited value against sheltered defensive positions. Ominously, there was a severe shortage of high explosive shells, which could have been much more useful. Other problems included failures in artillery spotting due to the confusing terrain and bad maps. MEF aerial observation occurred at Gallipoli but was still in its early stages and coordination with the ground forces was extremely difficult. Conversely, the Ottoman side had a strong knowledge of the terrain and more accurate maps, which enabled the defenders to apply effective artillery fire. Ottoman guns frequently changed position, and many allied spotters were misled by dummy flashes and decoy smoke. Fleet guns used to support the offensive were fired at such a low trajectory they were of limited value against forces emplaced on, or behind, high ground. Additionally, the danger of German submarines deeply complicated naval fire support by limiting the areas from which the fleet could operate.

Some of the worst nightmares of Gallipoli involved logistics. Logistics in this environment had none of the advantages of the Western Front where strong road and rail networks were in place to support the movement of materials to the front lines. Unlike British forces in Europe, everything the MEF needed had to be sent by sea, mostly from 3,500 miles away. Supply ships had to travel through submarine infested waters with numerous stops, including those to repack cargo so vital supplies could be unpacked first. In most instances, it took five to six weeks to get the cargo to the troops, and sometimes supplies were not delivered until after they were no longer required. The supply system therefore worked very poorly, although there was never a complete breakdown.

Crawley notes many other problems with the campaign, but they are too numerous to examine in this review. Suffice to say the comprehensive and detailed nature of Crawley’s analysis makes a compelling case about the doomed nature of the August offensive. Crawley’s final evaluation of the MEF effort is it made some minor tactical gains during the August offensive, but these did not matter in the ultimate disposition of the battle. This study is clearly a useful addition to the growing body of revisionist literature (including Robin Prior’s 2009 study Gallipoli: The End of the Myth) helping to inform debate and perhaps alter historical understanding of this campaign. Crawley’s highly analytical and academic approach makes his case well but may also be less interesting for those interested in the human drama associated with Gallipoli.

The Yom Kippur War: Politics, Diplomacy, Legacy
Edited by Asaf Siniver

Reviewed by William F. Owen, Editor of Infinity Journal

This book is a collection of essays on the very subject of the title. As such, there is very little – if any – discussion of the military aspects of the October War of 1973. The book essentially seeks to present a new
dimension to the war by focussing on its diplomatic, political and cultural aspects, and in this regard it both succeeds and fails.

Problems always occur when attempting to understand the history of the 1973 war, even the Israel Defense Force (IDF) has yet to produce a definitive and agreed upon version of events (only it has any real access to the data), leaves the current military histories of the 1973 war rather lacking in all but the most obvious and widely agreed detail. The other aspect often forgotten is the history of this war is sometimes hostage to the political opinions of the authors. This book seems to take quite a left-wing view of events. However, that should not discourage readers from making an objective assessment of the views the book presents.

The book spans the incredible breadth of the subject matter, and even if some of the conjectures and facts are perhaps too colored by political opinion, it is a valuable addition to the library of anyone studying the 1973 war.

This problem does not obscure the need to assess some of the book’s contentions. Two of the chapters on the cultural and social memory and/or narrative of the war seem out of place in the book, and lack any sound military understanding or perspective. For example, current scholarship is beginning to reveal the IDF was not as un-prepared as most have come to believe. Firstly, the IDF was largely configured to meet a surprise attack, but the problem was not everyone understood the plan, or when the attack came it was not a raid or incursion, but a fully-fledged theatre offensive attempting to destroy Israeli formations and take ground. Thus, to claim the surprise and violence of the Egyptian and Syrian attacks created “shock” misses the point; the war ended with Syria’s almost complete defeat, and Israeli forces within Egypt able to threaten Cairo. Ultimately, the surprise failed.

Whatever anyone wishes to assert as Sadat’s motivation for the war, he did not foresee the outcome being a demilitarized Sinai gained at enormous cost or a peace treaty with Israel that would ultimately claim his life and spark a border war with Libya in 1977. Asserting Israeli society was somehow shaped and effected by the “shock of 73” is an overstatement. The war of 1948 claimed a far higher percentage of the Israeli population killed, wounded, and displaced, than any war before or since. The presumed long-term effect of the 1973 war seems pretty pale compared to the social impact of the 1982 Lebanon War and the two major Palestinian rebellions that followed.

It would be safe to say there are strong chapters written by experts comfortable with their subject matter, and there are chapters were the authors are on far less solid ground. Ultimately, the biggest problem this book has to contend with is the very nature of the subject in terms of trying to write about the 1973 war without any solid grounding in the military history, or in some cases understanding the extant nature of the debate amongst other Israeli and military history scholars.

Overall, this is not a book for the uninformed. It tends to present views that could easily be countered by different perspectives. As an attempt to try and ring fence the political, diplomatic and social or cultural aspects of the 1973 war away from the actual military conduct, the work fails since a reader familiar with the military conduct of war
would quickly sense there was perhaps some lack of understanding. For example, the book’s chapter on Jordanian participation (or not) in the war entirely fails to mention that, on the 7th of October, Israeli brigades reinforcing the Golan had been moved from the Jordan Valley, and performed that move under the direct observation of the Jordanian Army. This fact is clearly significant and highlights the dangers of attempting to divorce the political and diplomatic understanding of the conflict from the military. In contrast most military histories of the 1973 war deal adequately with the diplomatic and political dimensions.

Someone already comfortable and well acquainted with the 1973 war will find this book as a valuable source of information and interpretation on some of the conflict’s diplomatic aspects, but should not be regarded as the authoritative source on the subject.

**Law and War**

Edited by Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas and Martha Merrill Umphrey

Reviewed by Sibylle Scheipers, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of St. Andrews and a Senior Research Associate at Oxford University’s Changing Character of War Programe.

The introduction to *Law and War* opens with a brief discussion of the targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, a US citizen and suspected al-Qaeda member, who was killed on 30 September 2011 by a CIA-led Predator drone strike in Yemen. It references central figures involved in the debate over the Bush administration’s approach to the law of armed conflict, such as Benjamin Wittes and Harold Koh. It is hence not implausible for the reader to assume this edited volume sets out to reassess the relationship between war and law thirteen years into the so-called “War on Terror,” as major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have drawn to a close. However, this is not the case or, rather, if this was the aim, the book failed to achieve it.

The introduction is followed by five chapters on a variety of topics ranging from biological warfare to war crimes trials. The quality of the individual chapters differs, which is to a certain extent inevitable in an edited volume. A number of chapters, most notably Sarah Sewall’s chapter on the limits of law, Gabriella Blum’s chapter on the individualization of war and Laura K. Donohue’s chapter on pandemic disease and biological warfare, reiterate the basic tenets of the globalization narrative, according to which globalization has led to a rise in the participation of so-called “non-state actors” in armed conflict, which in turn will undermine the law of armed conflict. This view, though oft repeated, is deeply problematic, as it mistakes the exclusionary mechanisms that are internal to the law of armed for external limitations of its applicability.1

The edited volume is further marred by a number of manifest misrepresentations of authors such as Carl Schmitt: both the introduction

---

1 See also Sibylle Scheipers, “Irregular Fighters: Is the Law of Armed Conflict Outdated?” *Parameters* 43/4 (2013), 45-56
and Blum’s chapter seem to imply that for Schmitt legal constraints on warfare are irrelevant (7, 55), ostensibly deriving this conclusion from Carl Schmitt’s Concept of the Political and his Political Theology, but failing to take into account Schmitt’s emphasis on the importance of the law of armed conflict for restraining warfare in the Nomos of the Earth. Sewall includes a largely misleading reference to an article by Adam Roberts on civilian casualties in her chapter (26, note 6) and, when discussing reciprocity in “asymmetric conflicts,” does not consider pertinent recent studies on the concept, such as Mark Osiel’s seminal book The End of Reciprocity.

Samuel Moyn’s chapter on Vietnam and the “War on Terror” is quite interesting and innovative. Moyn makes the case that despite large-scale violations of the law of armed conflict, public criticism regarding the US intervention in Vietnam focused on jus ad bellum issues, whereas the critical debate on the “War on Terror” has largely seized upon jus in bello issues. Yet, Moyn’s chapter remains largely US-centric (it would have been appropriate to note that the debate on the Iraq war in the United Kingdom focused on jus ad bellum issues and jus in bello questions remained secondary in importance throughout the war). More importantly, although Moyn presents his chapter as a comparative perspective, his contribution focuses almost exclusively on Vietnam and does not discuss the debate over violations of the law of armed conflict in the “War on Terror.”

Larry May’s chapter on war crimes trials includes some substantial arguments, although it gets off to a weak start by drawing extensively on Hugo Grotius to support the argument. However, the sections on Grotius are not sufficiently compelling; and the reader is left to wonder whether the chapter had not been stronger without those sections. May’s subsequent discussion on war crimes trials misses some central considerations such as the impact of criminal prosecutions of leadership figures on the peace process.

On the whole, the chapters are not coming together to make a sufficiently strong contribution to the larger debate. For instance, Blum’s and May’s perspectives on war crimes trials differ substantially, but this difference is nowhere explicitly discussed. The introduction remains too much at the surface to give the rest of the chapters the required level of coherence. The volume also shows that more editorial work would have been needed: Donohue’s chapter, though interesting in substance, is 40 pages long, followed by 30 (!) pages of notes and references. But the most disappointing flaw of the edited volume is that issues such as torture in the “War on Terror” and the practice of targeted killing remain the proverbial elephant in the room throughout the book. These are the most problematic areas of the law of armed conflict today; yet, none of the chapters devotes any substantial thought to them. Instead, the book largely rehearses debates that are familiar from the late 1990s. This is particularly puzzling and disappointing given that most contributors are renowned scholars in this field. It would appear that despite all the public furor over violations of the law of armed conflict in the “War on Terror,” the academic debate, at least to the extent that it is reflected in this book, has still some way to go.