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Contemporary War

It Takes More than a Network: The Iraqi Insurgency and Organizational Adaptation
By Chad C. Serena

Reviewed by Ross Harrison, School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Middle Eastern Politics at University of Pittsburgh

Chad Serena’s book makes a major contribution to our understanding of the nuts and bolts of the Iraqi insurgency, at a time when the United States is actually encountering remnants of that insurgency in the form of ISIS. He pulls back the veil on the insurgency movement with the most systematic and methodologically clear treatment to date. He uses his skill as a political scientist and experience at Rand to dissect the insurgency, exposing its strengths but also its weaknesses, which he claims are manifold. Serena drives home the point about the weaknesses of the Iraqi insurgency network by contrasting it with the more effective Afghan network.

His basic thesis, enshrined in the title of his impressive volume is the insurgency in Iraq is not unified, but involves a network with multiple strengths, but also many vulnerabilities. By very effectively analyzing network dynamics, he debunks the notion this kind organizational model is necessarily more adaptive or leads to greater effectiveness. This insight makes a major contribution, since some conventional wisdom shows networks, particularly for non-state actors like al-Qaeda, generally confer strength. Serena essentially argues networks neither confer strengths nor weaknesses. Rather, whether a network is a robust model depends on its nature, such as size, diversity, and information transfer.

Like networks themselves, the book has strengths but also several weaknesses. Because Serena relies so heavily on his framework, the book has more the feel of a political science primer on networks than a book about the political dynamics of the insurgency of Iraq. Rather than using the framework suggestively to tease out insights, he applies it more rigidly, using the Iraqi insurgency almost as a case study to amplify his insights about networks. This has an impact on the reader, as we are left feeling we are observing the Iraqi insurgency at 30,000 feet rather than at ground level. Because of this, the book seems almost apolitical. There is always the danger when dissecting something of losing sight of its essence. The Iraqi insurgency was messy, dynamic and ever changing. The book treats it too antiseptically.

The most puzzling omission was the failure to mention how during the Sunni Awakening, General David Petraeus used some of the vulnerabilities Serena identified to drive a wedge between Al-Qaeda in Iraq (which later became ISIS) and the Sunni tribal leaders, something that would have added to the texture of the book and made it more relevant for today. Many of the issues the United States and its coalition partners are facing today in Iraq concern both the strengths and vulnerabilities of a Sunni network. Serena could have made this less of a textbook and more of a policy book by pulling the argument forward a bit. While ISIS
did not gain international notoriety until 2014, the signs of its strengthening were evident at the time of the publication of the book.

That said, Serena makes a valuable scholarly contribution by giving us a systematic treatment of the Iraqi insurgency. In a world where much of the work on Iraq is descriptive and off-the-cuff, Serena’s methodologically sound treatment adds tremendous value.

**War Without Fighting? The Reintegration of Former Combatants in Afghanistan Seen Through the Lens of Strategic Thought**

By Uwe Hartmann

Reviewed by Daniel J. Glickstein, Corporal, US Army National Guard, Research Analyst, and National Security Education Program (Boren) Scholarship recipient

War Without Fighting by German officer Uwe Hartmann emphasizes the primacy of reintegration in resolving protracted conflicts. Reintegration here is defined as “the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income.”

Hartmann’s work nestles within the existing disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration field, but adds a key twist by insisting policy-makers pursue reintegration during a conflict, instead of waiting until hostilities have ceased. His additional expertise on Carl von Clausewitz and a chapter devoted to civil-military relations are welcome bonuses in his book.

Counterinsurgency, Reintegration, Kinetic Operations?

Hartmann asserts the failure to connect counterinsurgency (COIN) with a broader, overarching political strategy has been a critical shortcoming in military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. “Reintegration should not be a means to COIN, but instead COIN should be a means to support reintegration. Reintegration, in order to be successful, must be seen as the overall political concept that directs COIN.” This line of thinking echoes similar COIN-phrases such as the importance of connecting military and political aims, and the idea that you “can’t kill yourself out of an insurgency.” But Hartmann’s work shines when fleshing out subtler concepts within the reintegration process.

Moving beyond catchphrases and mantras, Hartmann devotes careful attention to the social science underpinning support or mistrust in insurgencies. Beginning at the basic level, he discusses how government legitimacy and capability (or lack thereof) can make or break popular support. He then moves further into detailing the side-effects of negative capability and legitimacy. These detract from popular perception and create skepticism and lead to hedging.

Perception is my preferred term for the much-maligned “hearts and minds” phrase. Put simply, how populations perceive the ruling governments will directly impact their actions. This phrasing is also useful in clarifying the chain of action here; positive or negative government actions dictate the population’s perception. It is an input-output relationship, and trying to bolster community relations without changing the actual government will do nothing to solve underlying problems.
Hedging is tackled later: when a new government is faltering and its stability is unclear, “the buy-in of local leaders may remain limited, so long as they perceive a need to hedge their communities against insurgents.” (23) This is a logical thought, and one seen especially often in Afghanistan (the example cited in the book is of an Afghan family who has one son in the Taliban and one in the Afghan National Army), yet it has garnered hushed discussion at best.

This hedging behavior explains the tug-of-war between insurgents and government forces, and is a topic well-worth further study. But there is no “critical mass” within a specific area for insurgents to win or lose. Every case is subjective, and there is no mathematic formula to predict when popular support will shift. For example, rural Afghan villagers in a region with a limited Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) presence are at high-risk of being intimidated and harmed at night by insurgents. Hearts and minds are irrelevant here; when civilians are facing mortal danger on a regular basis they are unlikely to unfurl an Afghan flag and proclaim full support for the government.

*Filling in the Blanks*

Given the situational nature of low-intensity conflicts and reintegration processes, developing universal laws and guidance can be stumbling blocks. As seen with American counter-insurgency doctrine, theorists can develop broad statements, but no one can write standard operating procedures for one thousand different situations with guarantees of appropriateness and success.

Thus, Hartmann’s work leaves us with a sturdy platform to conduct further thinking, research, and writing. His overall thesis is the primacy of reintegration is useful and correct. Yet the devil is in the details, and future practitioners will have to forge ahead themselves and discover unique approaches; for example, how to pursue transitional justice regarding human rights violations while reintegrating enemy forces into a new government.
As global jihadist organizations continue to ramp up targeting of the West and its allies – [both as a result of collaboration with one another, and as a means of vying for primacy within their collective movement] – the United States will continue to look to deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) as a valuable counterterrorism tool, enabling the use of precise lethal force with comparatively little risk to non-combatants on the ground, and zero risk of American casualties. While drones have undoubtedly provided the American warfighter with significant tactical advantage over an asymmetric enemy that operates without legal or moral constraint, their prominence in the targeted killing component of U.S. counterterrorism efforts has ignited substantial debate over the legality and advisability of using such weapons for this purpose, particularly away from the so-called “hot” battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq.

In *Drones and Targeted Killings: Ethics, Law, Politics*, Prof. Sarah Knuckey of Columbia Law School endeavors to introduce readers to the various contours of this debate. Drawing from numerous sources from within and outside government, Knuckey compiles several speeches and articles (or excerpts thereof) covering drone strikes, and divides them into four categories: 1) Are drone strikes effective? 2) Are drone strikes ethical? 3) Are drones strikes legal? and 4) Transparency and Accountability–Efforts and Obstacles.

Knuckey frames her objective as follows: “*Drones and Targeted Killings* was designed to stimulate debate among those who are new to the issues. It brings to the fore human rights, civil liberties, and civilian protection issues, while introducing readers to a range of diverse views from a variety of sources.” She succeeds in achieving these goals in some respects, but falls short in others.

The effectiveness section strikes a reasonable balance between those who argue drone strikes are effective in countering terrorist operatives and organizations, and those who argue they are ineffective or even counterproductive. Thoughtful arguments asserting effectiveness – including from CIA Director John Brennan, American University law professor Kenneth Anderson, and Daniel Byman of Georgetown University – are paired with likewise thoughtful counter-arguments from the Stimson Center and Micah Zenko of the Council on Foreign Relations, exploring at times concepts such as the extent and importance of “blowback” vis-à-vis drone strikes; the reliability of data on civilian casualties resulting from drone strikes; and the extent to which US drone strike practice could affect how other nations use their own drones in the future.
The ethics section is similarly balanced, exploring varying points of view on whether US drone strike practice is moral or immoral. Some themes emerging in this section include 1) the impact of the drone’s precision on the ethics question. For instance, Kenneth Anderson and New York Times journalist Scott Shane argues the precision of drones, particularly relative to other weapons, could be used on counterterrorism missions but would result in higher numbers of civilian deaths; and Professors John Kaag and Sarah Kreps, and Conor Friedersdorf of The Atlantic, argue the precision capabilities of drones could paradoxically encourage more frequent and less judicious use of force and 2) the extent to which the remoteness of drone operators from the battlefield risks creating a videogame mentality towards lethal force – an especially important contribution in this regard comes from the late journalist Matthew Power, whose profile of drone sensor operator Brandon Bryant’s struggles with post-traumatic stress disorder provides a snapshot of how drone operators can be deeply affected by their missions, even if operating from thousands of miles away.

Perhaps the most contentious area of debate on the subject of US drone strikes, however, has been their legality under domestic and international law, which makes Knuckey’s construction of the legal section problematic. The balance the reader finds present in the effectiveness and ethics sections is regrettably lacking with respect to the legal discussion. While Knuckey does offer up a lengthy excerpt from then-Attorney General Eric Holder’s address at Northwestern University defending the legality of the drone strike program, the rest of the selections in this section are weighted heavily towards arguing the illegality of the program, an arrangement which casts the Obama administration as alone in arguing against what is portrayed as the preponderance of non-governmental analysis on this question. It would have been helpful for Knuckey to include a couple of writings from a range of scholars who have written in defense of the program’s legality, including Steven Groves, James Carafano, Prof. Michael Lewis, Prof. Jordan Paust, Prof. Charles Dunlap (USAF, Ret.), and David French, to name just a few. The transparency section similarly lacks representation from non-governmental analysis arguing in favor of less transparency regarding the US drone strike program, although that is perhaps a more understandable omission given what would appear to be a relative lack of such sources.

Drones and Targeted Killings: Ethics, Law, Politics is a good read, up to a point, for those seeking a variety of views on select aspects of the drone strike debate. Knuckey, however, is more faithful to her objective of “introducing readers to a diverse range of views” in the first half than in the latter.

Terrorism in Cyberspace: The Next Generation
By Gabriel Weimann

Reviewed by Jeffrey L. Caton, Colonel (USAF, Retired), President, Kepler Strategies LLC

Gabriel Weimann opens Terrorism in Cyberspace: The Next Generation by asking “Can we declare the war on terrorism to be over?” Clearly we cannot, or so the author contends as he builds the case “that terrorists’
presence and the use of cyberspace is today more sophisticated, richer, and broader than a decade ago. While Weimann offers credible articles, reports, and case studies to illustrate his assertions, he does so through the lens of the same 9/11 goggles with which he opened his 2006 work, *Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges*. As is the case with many sequels, his new book repeats a significant amount of the content from its predecessor. Ironically, it fails to capture the wealth of data concerning changes in terrorist groups, cyberspace capabilities, and societal habits that have emerged in the intervening nine years.

*Terrorism in Cyberspace* narrows the scope of the diverse world of terrorism and ignores many of the operations addressed in the first book, such as those by groups like the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The result is an interesting recitation of vignettes of Islamic extremists’ use of the Internet that, unfortunately, is lacking in broader critical analysis of all current forms of terrorism in cyberspace, let alone future ones. In short, this book is a disappointment; it does not deliver the material implicitly promised by the title, and it does not deliver on its own explicit criteria.

Weimann states that the book is written to address three research questions: What are the new faces of online terrorism? What can be expected in the near future? How can we counter these trends? These questions receive uneven treatment covered in 11 chapters separated into three parts that surprisingly do not parallel these questions.

Part I, “Terrorism Enters Cyberspace,” is largely a repeat of the first four chapters of *Terror on the Internet* updated with new examples. It is here that Weimann fails to provide the fundamental context necessary for readers to comprehend the topic’s scope. Specifically, some of the most basic definitions and metrics on terrorist incidents—such as the actual growth (or decline); the criteria that links them to cyberspace; and the criteria that links them to terrorists—are not addressed. The only historical data presented are two graphs showing the number of academic publications and the number of articles (*Washington Post* and *New York Times*) written on Internet terrorism from 1996 to 2013. Sadly, the reader is left wondering if cyberspace-related terrorist acts number in the tens, hundreds, or thousands. If the reader happens to be a senior leader entrusted with decision making for resources and priorities, these are vital statistics.

Part II, “Emerging Trends,” provides interesting insights with regard to cyberspace-related means and methods—such as “narrowcasting,” social media, and “online fatwas”—used by terrorist groups to identify and groom recruits. Among these are the “lone wolf terrorists” that Weimann claims to be “the fastest growing form of terrorism.” But again, the reader must accept this assertion on faith; no evidence in terms of number of lone wolf attacks and their severity is included. Also, the discourse makes simplistic cause-and-effect connections between such attacks and any alleged cyberspace means. In this, Weimann fails to distinguish the ills attributed to changes in terrorist tools and activities on the web from similar extreme behavior that society writ large wrestles with on the Internet, such as addictions to online pornography or gambling.
Included in Part III, “Future Threats and Challenges,” is the discussion of countermeasures and counter narratives. While Weimann does introduce the concepts of the “noise” and MUD (monitoring, using, disrupting) models as well as potential roles of public-private partners, the material is broadly descriptive with few practical details. *Terrorism in Cyberspace* ends abruptly with a single paragraph in the last chapter. There the author wraps up the journey of both books with “we live in a dangerous world threatened by terrorism, and intelligence agencies should do their utmost to protect us against terrorist plots.” While it’s hard to argue with this conclusion, readers probably expect more at the end of almost 600 collective pages.

Perhaps this book could serve well as a primer or narrative annotated bibliography for an undergraduate class interested in the narrow topic of Islamic-related extremist groups’ use of various instruments in cyberspace. Weimann conducted his research with the backing of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, an organization that aims to inform national leadership in a nonpartisan forum. No doubt his 14-year long research efforts have considerable merit toward this goal. However, with its paucity of context and rigor, *Terrorism in Cyberspace* is not adequate to inform actionable ideas on threats for the full diversity of terrorism in the dynamic environment of cyberspace.

**Governing Military Technologies in the 21st Century**  
By Richard Michael O’Meara

Reviewed by Dr. José de Arimatéia da Cruz. Visiting Research Professor at the US Army War College and Professor of International Relations and Comparative Politics at Armstrong State University, Savannah, Georgia

Conflicts in the twenty-first century will not take place in the jungles of Southeast Asia or some other exotic location around the world. Most conflicts in the twenty-first century will take place in major metropolitan areas. Also, conflicts in the twenty-first century will be heavily dependent on new forms of technologies previously non-existent and those new technologies will have a tremendous impact in the conduct of war in new technological environments. Given the new emerging technologies and how they will impact the conduct of war in the future, we need to rethink national security and how the new technologies will impact the conduct of war. Retired US Army Brigadier General Richard M. O’Meara examines the big five emerging technologies that are shaping and are being shaped by the environments in which they have been employed. O’Meara examines emerging military technologies including nanotech, robotics, cyberwar, human enhancement, and non-lethal weapons. O’Meara also describes the technological uncertainty of the environment in which they are created, and engages the reader in the discussion regarding past attempts to govern technologies and the potential for future governance. As O’Meara points out, governance of military technologies must reflect the legal and ethical concerns of the people the military is sworn to protect; yet it must also recognize the existential need for soldiers to accomplish a myriad of violent and dangerous tasks while at the same time looking out for the welfare of soldiers. (80)
O'Meara’s focus in this timely book is not on the particular technology itself, but rather “the ability of the group to envision and organize its application, conceive of its relationship and use with other technologies, and otherwise maximize its benefits as it competes with other groups.” (4) The advancement of new technologies in the war making environment is no longer just limited to the superpowers of the world. With the democratization of technology even rogue nations will have the ability to acquire those newly developed technologies as part of its arsenal of war making. O’Meara argues, “technology is available democratically, it is innovation in a space of technological uncertainty and its power to change the way humans operate on all levels is staggering.” (99) Another characteristic of democratization of technology is the fact that it “will continue to be pervasive, and their use has considerable impact on the ways humankind operates.” (6)

Given the fact that the theoretical “genie has come out of the bottle” in regards to technology in the twenty-first century, the question becomes who gets to decide what to design, when to design it, and how to use particular technology in future conflicts? The debate regarding the development, implementation, and regulation of new technologies has been polarizing between two competing schools of thought. The libertarian school argues that, “society should not and cannot put constraints on the development of new technology.” (81) The other school of thought is composed of a “heterogeneous group with moral concerns about biotechnology, consisting of those who have religious convictions, environmentalists with a belief in the sanctity of nature, opponents of new technology, and people on the Left who are worried about the possibility of eugenics.” (83) While the debates goes on, O’Meara suggests several mechanisms that “may be useful should one wish to seek international regulation of the various specific issues with each technology brings to the table.” (84) For example, international treaties; prohibitions and limitations on the acquisition of certain weapons; prohibitions and limitations on research and development; prohibitions and limitations on testing; prohibitions and limitations on deployment; prohibitions and limitations on transfer/proliferation; and finally, prohibitions and limitations on use.

The military of the twenty-first century will not be the military of the twentieth century. These radical changes are the results of recent developments in technology that will forever have a tremendous impact on the conduct of conflicts in the twenty-first century. Students at the US Army War College will do themselves a favor by reading US Army Brigadier General O’Meara timely book on the governing military technologies in the twentieth century. As General O’Meara concludes, “this book argues that failure to act will not stop the use of these technologies. Rather, military technologies will continue to emerge with or without restraint, their unanticipated consequences are a matter of record. The genie is out of the bottle and [its] supervision is possible but not inevitable.” (102-103)
Trust is a recurring theme within the United States military’s recent study of the profession of arms. Within the profession, it is the trust among its members: officers and enlisted as well as the senior and junior members of the armed services. More important is the trust between the profession and the society it serves. Such trust is enabled through the civil-military relations of elected officials and uniformed members of the US Armed Services. In our nation, two civilian bodies are constitutionally obligated to control the military—the Office of the President and the US Congress. While civilian supremacy is most demonstrated by the direction and orders of the Commander in Chief, equally vital roles of regulation and oversight are provided by the Congress. Hence the necessity to explore and understand this aspect of civil-military relations. National War College professors Colton Campbell and David Auerswald have compiled such a primer for national security professionals.

Campbell and Auerswald, editors of Congress and Civil-Military Relations, have gathered a diverse group of scholars, political scientists, and practitioners from academia, professional military education, and those who have served in US government. Within their areas of expertise and experience, each author addresses a unique element of the many facets of civil-military relations by offering a short history, establishing context with current concerns, and then providing implications for the future of defense policy making. Their contributions result in an edited work that is neither comprehensive nor exhaustive, but gives readers an appreciation of the enduring nature of civil military relations as well as its shifting character through the use of well-chosen cases.

In their Chapter 1 introduction, the editors assert the congressional role is underappreciated and show how Congress shapes the culture and behavior of the US military by using four main tools. The tools are: “selection of military officers, determining how much authority is delegated to the military, oversight of the military, and establishing incentives (positive and negative) for appropriate military behavior.” Accordingly, the first part of the book consists of chapters that illustrate the evolution and application of each tool. Chapter 2 reviews processes for the appointment, selection, and promotion of officers; this is especially interesting given by October 2016 each of seven four-star members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff nominated by President Obama will require confirmation by the Congress before assuming the most senior positions within the US military.

Chapter 3, “A Safety Valve” is informative and very effective in recounting the leadership of then Senator Harry Truman and the actions of the Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program in the prelude to and onset of World War II. Concerns about the lack
of military preparedness as well as “revelations of graft, greed, and corruption among defense contractors” provide an historical analogy to consider as the US seeks to discern its lessons learned during the War on Terror in this twenty-first century. For World War II, as with most wars, the call for expediency in the name of military necessity quickly became suspect with accounts of poor planning and mismanagement leading to ineffectiveness and inefficiency in providing military capability and sustained capacity for national security. Decades later the Truman committee became the exemplar for a series of post-Vietnam War ad hoc congressional defense commissions detailed in Chapter 4. The chapter author contends in addition to the goal to conduct oversight of the Department of Defense, congressional commissions are created to advance an agenda or policy reform, to avoid blame, or to delay action—“kicking the can down the road”—on particularly controversial matters. Such is the case in Chapters 5 and 6 as congressional members respectively embrace the reserve component for its state support versus federal role or the TRICARE-FOR-LIFE entitlements for veterans among their constituents.

While the six chapters of Part I provides historical context of the use of tools by Congress, Part II offers a more interesting examination of the debates within the two Houses of the legislative branch and, in turn, with the executive branch on the use of military force to support US foreign policy. Readers will be familiar with the discourse in Chapter 7 on lack of the consensus within the US government or its political parties on the national policy agenda. This discord has been attributed to increased polarization rather than parochialism. From Chapter 8, debates beginning with defense roles and missions affect force structure in the active component-reserve component mix of the US military. Subsequently, Congress becomes part of the political mechanism to exploit technologies that may generate new capabilities and mitigate emergent threats in the twenty-first century (see Chapter 9 cases on Cyber and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles/Drones). Chapters 10 and 11 examine the role of Congress facing the challenges of consistency in the demonstration of US national values as provided in the cases of closure of Guantanamo detention facility and the support of human rights in Latin America.

Some observers may naively bash Congress for its deference to the executive branch out of tradition or necessity, its ambivalence to issues not directly affecting local constituency or party agenda, or its abdication in areas deemed too messy or politically untenable. Former Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill often said, “All politics is local” referring to congressional members acting in short and long-term interests of their voters, which may be seemingly contrary to ambiguous national interests.

The challenge for an edited volume such as Congress and Civil-Military Relations is to determine how much material to include and what to leave out. A deeper discussion of the Budget Control Act of 2011 and the potential impact of its associated sequestration measures deserved more consideration since it stills looms over defense policy with implications for military readiness and force structure. Acknowledgement of the view of Congress by those in uniform as a practical and important aspect of civil-military relations is also missing from the text.
Accordingly, Campbell and Auerswald author the concluding chapter, which derives three policy issues from the contributors: ongoing congressional debate on future of the defense budget following the major operations of the War on Terror; congressional intent and ability to shape social and international agendas through US defense policy, and the growing civil-military divide between an increasing polarized Congress and a confident, professionalized military. The editors have produced a useful book for those seeking to understand the often overlooked, but critical aspect of US civil-military relations. As a primer, their work can start the conversation and spark deeper inquiry and discourse among national security professionals.

The Politics of Civil-Military Cooperation: Canada in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan
By Christopher Ankersen

Reviewed by Dr. José de Arimatéia da Cruz. Visiting Research Professor at the US Army War College and Professor of International Relations and Comparative Politics at Armstrong State University, Savannah, Georgia

Civil-military cooperation is a hallmark of contemporary military operations in the twenty-first century. Yet, as Christopher Ankersen articulates in his book *The Politics of Civil-Military Cooperation*, little has been written about this important concept/idea from a theoretical perspective. Ankersen’s book concentrates on civil-military cooperation from the military’s point of view. According to the author, this focus is warranted for several reasons. First, while civil-military cooperation is the product of a Trinitarian relationship within a given society, it is largely carried out by only one of those actors—the military. Second, there are some indications that this may be beginning to change, but in the time period under examination (1999-2007), “civil military cooperation” is a military practice. Ankersen’s operational definition of civil-military cooperation is a long one but worth quoting verbatim:

> All measures undertaken between commanders and national authorities, civil, military, and para-military, which concern the relationship between (military forces), the national governments and civil populations in an area where...military forces are deployed or plan to be deployed, supported, or employed. Such measures would also include cooperation and co-ordination of activities between commanders and non-governmental or international agencies, organizations and authorities.

While Ankersen’s operational definition of civil-military cooperation is useful, there are problems with it. First, the term is a value-laden one, in that it assumes a degree of cooperation or partnership that is by no means universally present. (3) Second, the term connotes collaboration or coordination of, not necessarily direct involvement in, a range of activities.

Ankersen’s *The Politics of Civil-Military Cooperation* most important contribution to the civil-military cooperation debate is his Clausewitzian framework. By examining Canada’s civil-military cooperation efforts in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Afghanistan through the lens of Clausewitz’s
“Remarkable Trinity,” Ankersen shows that military action is the product of influences from the government, the Armed Forces, and the people at home. As Clausewitz pointed out in his seminal work *On War*, “a theory that ignores any of them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.” Ankersen also argues that, “Clausewitz tells us that war (and by extension, all military operations) is not purely a military activity. Rather, it is the result of inputs from all aspects of a state. The people contribute passion; the government provided direction; and the military applies its skill within the realm of chance to affect a result.” (69)

In chapter 5 (The People); chapter 6 (The Government); and chapter 7 (the Military), Ankersen examines each of the three elements of the Clausewitzian holy trinity. While the Clausewitzian holy trinity concept has been widely used as a fundamental tool for the study of war, Ankersen utilizes it to study civil-military cooperation within the context of the Canadian military involvements in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. In chapter 5 (The People), Ankersen argues that the Canadian people, while perhaps not projecting “hatred and enmity,” certainly provides the government and the military with a degree of passion to be harnessed. (71) In chapter 6 (The Government), the second prong of the Clausewitzian holy trinity, Ankersen shows that in the context of the Canadian government, Canadian policy guidance can be seen, above all, to maintain political legitimacy in the particular Canadian setting. (86) That is, the government’s role in the Clausewitzian framework is a crucial element. As Ankersen argues, “they [the Government] have harnessed the emotion of the people, turning it from raw, inchoate desire, into a refined and structured direction that the military can then execute.” (99-100) Ankersen, in chapter 7 (the Military), argues that “the thinking about civil-military cooperation in Canada was not very sophisticated.” (115) This lack of sophistication is partially due to the “institutional military in Canada ha[ving] a love-hate relationship with civil-military cooperation.” (103) Yet, as part of the Clausewitzian holy trinity, the military “exists first and foremost: to protect vital national interests; to contribute to international peace and security; and to promote national unity and well-being.” (111)

Ankersen’s *The Politics of Civil-Military Cooperation* is a single country study rather than a comparative study. While the focus on a single country (Canada) may seem like a weakness of Ankersen’s study, the author makes a compelling case that by concentrating on a single country, “the dynamics behind civil-military cooperation can be understood as richly as possible.” (11) Ankersen has chosen a single country for two main reasons. First, Canada is a country of particular relevance in terms of military participation in international security operations. Second, Canada is a representative of other middle and small powers, in a way that major and Great Powers, are not. Ankersen draws on a variety of interviews with politicians and members of the Canadian military to provide an in-depth examination that civil-military cooperation is not just about soldiers following orders but also about negotiations, vested interests, and contested group identities.

As the military is called upon to different parts of the world not only to fight but also to act as “social workers,” Ankersen’s *The Politics of Civil-Military Cooperation* should be read by all US Army College students.
Daniel Neep’s study of the French occupation of Syria during the post-World War I mandate era is an interesting consideration of the ideology, justification, and vocabulary of colonialism as well as an analysis of colonial warfare. After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, the French sought to dominate the Levant through the League of Nations mandate system to safeguard their perceived economic, strategic, and even religious interests (involving the protection of Christian communities) in the region. The French government also viewed their efforts in Syria as a “civilizing mission,” which was not to be disrupted by anything as trivial as the wishes of the indigenous population. In this spirit, the 23-year French mandate involved more than simply the military imposition of nominal French rule. Rather, it entailed efforts to transform completely the social, political, and economic systems of Syrian society in ways designed to Westernize the population and guarantee the future of French influence. In keeping with this outlook, Syrian armed opposition to French rule was viewed as either irrational reactionary resistance to modernization or mere banditry masquerading as a national movement.

French authorities viewed the Levant as a “mosaic society” with largely closed ethno-sectarian communities characterized by mutual mistrust and internecine warfare. This “mosaic” was composed of such groups as the Circassians, Druze, Alawites, Kurds, Shi’ite Arabs, Christians, and Sunni Arabs made up the Syrian population. The French based their strategies for Syria on the mosaic framework and were not interested in alternative policies possibly uniting the Syrian population into a single national identity, which they saw as threatening to their interests. Colonial ethnological visions of Syria’s mosaic society were consequently translated into institutional reality with separate policies developed for different groups. Additionally, the French also undertook detailed sociological studies to understand the nature of the indigenous societies and cleavages within them. In describing this process, Neep calls the science of ethnography a modern weapon of colonial warfare within a divide and rule policy.

In considering the French attitude toward force, Neep draws a distinction between “discipline,” which seeks complete military control over an administered territory, and “security,” a cheaper and more preferred method which involves measures ensuring the effective management of the territory without direct control or military oversight. By the time of the mandate, France had a great deal of experience as an imperial state and French theories about colonial administration were well developed. Despite this experience, French military efforts had to undergo considerable adaptation to address recurring difficulties which
often forced them to use “discipline” rather than “security” to control territory. Heavy French columns were continuously outmaneuvered by light insurgent units, which often employed hit-and-run tactics. In response, the French transitioned from their heavy supply-laden columns to more agile formations, which also had less firepower. They also used their own irregular troops drawn from friendly elements of the Syrian and Lebanese populations. Roadbuilding (with conscripted local labor) became central to French ability to enable their units to respond quickly to unrest. Additionally, in the unforgiving calculus of colonialism, village populations fell into one of three sweeping categories: friendly (often Christian), suspect, or enemy. Villages in the last two categories were in particular danger of being razed in times of confrontation between rebels and colonial authorities. During Syria’s Great Revolt of 1925, Neep describes the French burning of such villages as routine.

Syrian accounts of the French occupation unsurprisingly did not accept the concept of a civilizing mission. Rather, they identified the mandatory power as an alien presence serving as a continuation of Ottoman despotism, which had to be fought. In resisting French authority, the rebels faced a number of difficulties beyond the disparity in military capabilities. These types of difficulties included problems in coordinating military actions in a way that could place maximum pressure on the occupation force. Rebel recruits often joined guerrilla bands from their local area in units often coming from the same social and sectarian background. It is extremely difficult to wage a meaningful anti-colonial struggle if different bands are fighting different wars without any substantial coordination. Some rebel groups also fit the French stereotype for them and were primarily interested in seeking plunder. The rebel movement suffered from the lack of an effective plan to suppress such activities.

The Syrian rebels had some advantages as well. A large number of prominent fighters and rebel leaders had been trained as officers by the Ottomans, and gained exposure to European military innovations at Ottoman academies. Some former Ottoman officers who were Syrian also served in the army of King Faysal during World War I and thereby gained valuable combat and leadership experience fighting against the Turks. German and Turkish rifles and other weapons left from World War I were also available to many Syrian fighters. The Bedouin alone had about 18,000 fighters armed with such weapons. Moreover, some common purposes developed between different groups even while serious military coordination remained elusive. These Syria fighters never defeated the French, although Paris had considerable difficulty re-establishing authority following World War II. After more than 400 people were killed in a 1945 French bombing of Damascus, the international and domestic outcry against these actions was so severe that continuing French dominance over Syria became untenable. French troops were replaced by British soldiers on the streets in Damascus as a transitional measure, and Syria became independent in August 1946.

Neep’s work is interesting and valuable, but some caution is also appropriate. The work appears to draw heavily from his doctoral dissertation. As such, it is meticulously researched, but also makes extensive use of the ponderous and tiresome jargon of historical sociology. The work also mentions how French policies for Syria contributed to
contemporary problems, although considering these links was not the main focus of the book and were not fully developed. It is hardly the author’s fault for choosing his own topic when the topic is an important one, but many contemporary readers may at least be moderately concerned about current Syrian problems. Subsequently, for an especially comprehensive understanding of the link between French mandate policies and the contemporary Syrian civil war, Neep’s book can be amiabley supplemented with Nikolaos Van Dam’s often reprinted classic *The Struggle for Power in Syria.*

**Gulf Security and the US Military: Regime Survival and the Politics of Basing**

*By Geoffrey F. Gresh*

Reviewed by Russ Burgos, Associate Professor, Joint Special Operations Master of Arts program, National Defense University, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

In *Gulf Security and the US Military,* Geoffrey F. Gresh makes an important contribution to studies of American overseas military basing policy and US security assistance; he also adds to an increasingly rich literature on the strategic significance of the Persian Gulf to America’s global security. Based on extensive archival research and an excellent command of the secondary literature, Gresh argues, convincingly, that when analyzing American basing policy in the Gulf region, one must bear in mind basing decisions are *bilateral*—host nations’ decisions to extend or withdraw basing rights are largely a function of politics, domestic and foreign. It is not the case (as one so often hears in popular discourses and mass media) that the USA simply “puts” its military bases here and there, as if host nations were blank canvasses against which American strategists fling olive drab paint. Just as importantly, Gresh does not overstate the importance of oil in US strategic calculations; inasmuch as all great powers have had an interest in secure (or deniable) sources of Middle East oil, oil is a constant, rather than a variable, and therefore does little to explain how the United States and its partners reach basing decisions.

This book calls our attention to the strategic interaction inherent in all overseas military basing decisions and shows how the internal politics of Gulf states—which, as rentier states, often confront quite delicate tradeoffs in their dealings with civil society—play vital roles in determining the circumstances under which American military forces will be hosted. The book starts by situating the question of overseas basing policy within the framework of power politics, pointing out “military presence has been essential for...power projection,” especially given changes in military technology. (5)

Using case-study methods pioneered by the late scholar Alexander L. George, Gresh analyzes the history of US basing policy in three Gulf nations—Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia—and concludes with a re-assessment of US-Saudi basing politics post-1991. Of the three, the Saudi case study is the best developed, no doubt because the US-Saudi relationship historically has been of greater significance to American strategic calculations than those with Bahrain and Oman. Because each of the three partner nations is a rentier state, the decision over hosting...
American military forces is both political (i.e., domestic politics) and strategic, where ruling elites are confronted with often orthogonal political needs: to maintain the legitimacy of their rule and satisfy key domestic constituencies on the one hand and to balance external threats to their nation-states (in the case of the three case study partners, most often Iran and Iraq) on the other. Further complicating the task of sustaining internal regime legitimacy and balancing external regime threats is the unpredictable impact of local and regional reactions to US policy initiatives elsewhere. An American military installation can both ensure and jeopardize the survival of a regime.

Gresh concludes with a valuable “lessons-learned” overview, emphasizing a very important point that should animate future US basing decisions – the growing threat of basing “blowback.” As delicate as partner-nation politics can be, they are increasingly problematic for US national security policy. The presence of US forces in Saudi Arabia, he reminds us, was directly implicated in Osama bin Laden’s decision to issue fatwas declaring global jihad against the United States and was, therefore, a proximate cause of the 9/11 terror attacks and, consequently, of the now many years of warfare that have followed. Where once a coaling station or airbase was the solution to some strategic problem, the politics of overseas basing are creating their own set of strategic challenges. Geoffrey Gresh’s fine book is an excellent start to what is certain to be an important and long-running national security debate.

Peacekeeping in South Sudan: One Year of Lessons from Under the Blue Beret
By Robert B. Munson

Reviewed by Dr. Kersti Larsdotter, Assistant Professor at the Swedish Defence University

The UN has been deployed since 2005 in what today is South Sudan. After a six-year peace process, South Sudan became independent in July 2011, and the previous UN mission was converted into the UN Mission in South Sudan, UNMISS. The author, Robert B. Munson, was deployed as the Chief of Planning (J5) to the mission for one year in 2011 and 2012. He also has a solid academic background.

Peacekeeping in South Sudan is, however, not primarily about the UN mission in South Sudan. Instead, it provides a personal account of daily life as an American military staff officer on a UN mission. Particularly, it sheds light on two different, but interlinked, issues. First, it contributes to our understanding of how differences in culture, language and identity influence work in a multinational and multidimensional mission. This issue has been extensively dealt with elsewhere, and the book offers few new insights. It does, however, provide a personal, well written, and entertaining account of it. Second, and more novel, the book sheds much needed light on how previous experiences and academic education influence an individual’s understanding of the task at hand, and what impact it has on the effectiveness of one’s work.

After introducing the reader to the American understanding of UN peacekeeping missions and giving a short background of the conflict
and the UN presence in Sudan and South Sudan, the book primarily focuses on how the different cultures, identities and languages of the UNMISS staff play out in day-to-day life. Among other things, Munson gives several examples of how maddening by slow the bureaucracy of a UN mission is, and offers the diverse background of the staff and the complexity of the organization as an explanation.

In a nuanced and reflective way, Munson describes how, among other things, the culture of officers occupying key positions influence the general working environment, how language barriers impede a common understanding, and how it all contributes to the lack of long term planning, a common understanding of the mission – in this case the protection of civilians, and even difficulties in solving day-to-day problems. He also delicately addresses the question of how different motives of the individual to join the mission as well as the inherent double loyalties of working for UN – partly to the aim of the UN mission, partly to the home country – contribute to incompatible mind sets and ambitions. He concludes that patience is of utmost importance, that different backgrounds and cultures also contributes to a more nuanced way of understanding the task at hand, and that many and long meetings should actually not be discarded since it contributes to a common understanding between people.

In addition, Munson provides the reader with an amusing narrative of what it is like to live on a camp, in very close quarters, together with people from highly different cultures and with different habits, and how it is to be a UN officer on the streets of Juba, the city in South Sudan in which the camp is located. Here, the style is less analytical but more entertaining. Before the conclusions, Munson offers a detailed and personal account of how his own religious background helps him to relate to the religious life of the South Sudanese people.

The book leaves the reader with surprisingly little knowledge about the UN mission in South Sudan, and only a few insights in the particulars of the mission. Instead, it offers an intriguing and well written account of Munson's personal experiences of working in a multinational operation, as well as an unique and reflective account of how experiences, education and identities plays out in this context. He conclude that his previous education, for example, his knowledge about Africa, acquired during fieldwork in Tanzania during his PhD education, has contributed to a better understanding of current events in South Sudan, that his knowledge about “tribes” have helped him to navigate among the different “tribes” of UNMISS, and that his language skills have facilitated communication between colleagues from different countries.

He also emphasises how his “academic exposure to differing ideas, opinions, and ways of working,” in a more general way helped him to be “intellectually flexible and better tackle the tasks and take advantage of the opportunities,” thereby making him more effective at work. (142) Munson's ability of critical thinking is clearly shown in his skillfully balanced narrative of his time in UNMISS. The only thing missing is a more explicit analysis throughout the book of how this ability of his played out during his time in the mission.
America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam

By Christopher A. Lawrence

Reviewed by David Fitzgerald, School of History, University College Cork, Ireland

America’s counterinsurgency wars have attracted no little scholarly attention in recent years. In America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam, Christopher A. Lawrence of the Dupuy Institute aims to provide some insight into the nature of these conflicts by putting them in the context of eighty other post-World War II insurgencies. Using a database of 83 such insurgencies (including a number of peacekeeping operations), Lawrence uses a quantitative approach to search for answers to some of the major questions and assumptions given rise to by the literature on counterinsurgency.

The book’s title is thus something of a misnomer – the work is much more focused on providing some general insights on insurgencies broadly defined, and offers specific analyses of America’s wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam only in three brief chapters towards the end – but it does offer some thought-provoking lessons for those interested in studying the phenomenon of insurgency.

The book’s origin as a series of reports commissioned by various US government agencies (primarily, it seems, the US Army Center for Army Analysis) is clear, as the chapters are often quite brief and limited in their analytical depth. Lawrence’s quantitative approach may not appeal to all readers but his findings do reward close attention. In 25 short chapters, he offers a number of sometimes counterintuitive conclusions about the importance of force ratios, rules of engagement, insurgent sanctuaries and host of other factors. Rather than providing an overarching narrative, or a general theory of insurgency, the book instead provides a wealth of specific insights. If we adopt Isaiah Berlin’s taxonomy of ideas, this book is a fox that knows many things rather than a hedgehog that knows one important thing.

Lawrence has two major findings: (1) force ratios – the ratio between counterinsurgent and insurgent forces rather than counterinsurgent to population – and (2) insurgent causes matter quite a bit in terms of predicting the outcome of the conflict. The higher the counterinsurgent to insurgent ratio, the more likely the counterinsurgency campaign is to succeed. The other crucially important factor in this analysis is insurgent motivation. Insurgencies based on broadly appealing rationales, such as nationalism, tend to succeed, whereas those based on more limited, factional interests do not. According to Lawrence, other factors, such as the presence of sanctuaries, third party support and the ratio of insurgents to the general population do not matter nearly as much.

These findings are interesting, but should be considered as a starting point for further research rather than conclusions in their own right. Lawrence’s approach is sometimes haphazard, perhaps an artifact of the
book’s origin as a series of reports for government agencies. In a host of chapters, he offers a very brief analysis based on his database, and then some conclusions without ever really unpacking his assumptions in any great depth, or working through the inevitable problems of correlation and causation.

For instance, Lawrence’s finding that insurgent motivation is substantially important in determining the outcome of a conflict is worthy of further study. But the author never provides an explanation for his choice of three political concepts to categorize insurgencies (limited [regional or factional], central idea [like nationalism] or overarching idea [like communism]) or indeed his method for grouping conflicts into the various categories. The French War in Indochina is classed as a nationalist war whereas the Vietnam War (itself broken into two phases – 1961-64 and 1965-73) is described as an insurgency defined by communism. Given the continuities between the Viet Minh and the National Liberation Front and the strong undercurrent of nationalism present in both conflicts, such a choice is confusing and surely worthy of further comment.

Similarly, the author’s inclusion of a variety of peacekeeping missions in the database (although certainly not all post-1945 UN peacekeeping operations) muddies the waters quite a bit as classifying the results of such operations as an “insurgent” or “counterinsurgent” win is surely oversimplifying things, especially when these conflicts often involve more than two parties.

Lastly, it would have been useful to see the author update his literature review on insurgency and counterinsurgency. Lawrence provides us with an overview of some of the classical scholarship on insurgencies, but there is little to be seen of the vast post-2004 outpouring of work on these conflicts. David Kilcullen is mentioned only in passing, and we hear nothing of John Mackinlay, Stathis Kalyvas, Paul Staniland and all the other scholars who have done much to advance our understanding of the nature of insurgency in recent years.

The most problematic omission is the lack of any deep engagement with some of the more interesting quantitative work that has been carried out on insurgencies in recent years. For instance, there is some brief commentary on the Iraq troop surge, but there is no reference to or engagement with the work of Biddle, Friedman and Shapiro, who used quantitative approaches to test the reasons for the decline in violence. Nor does the book address Berman, Shapiro and Felter’s work on the economics of counterinsurgency in Iraq. While these studies operate at a less general level than Lawrence, they still could have enriched his model. Similarly, Lyall and Wilson’s work on explaining counterinsurgency wars, which relies on a large database of 286 insurgencies would have been worth engaging, as it offers some conclusions at odds with this book.

Even so, America’s Modern Wars will still be of interest to those who wish to understand more about what governs success in insurgency and counterinsurgency. Lawrence has posed a number of interesting questions for scholars of counterinsurgency and engagement with his conclusions could provide valuable new insights for the field.
Billed as a comprehensive survey of American military history for undergraduates, this work achieves much. Matthew Muehlbauer and David Ulbrich do the heavy lifting to produce a text which, given the breadth of the subject, is both comprehensive and compelling. Furthermore, against the standard of a university textbook, it is readable, quick-paced, and offers just enough thought-provoking commentary to encourage young scholars further in military history. I have no qualms recommending this book for its intended function, it being entirely fit for purpose as an introductory text. Notwithstanding this broad success, the comparatively insignificant place accorded to the naval component in American military history is an important flaw which must be acknowledged.

Given its length, it is impossible to spend this review considering details and what was done well. However, a few points should be made. Turning first to what this book is and is not, we must be clear that it is a text for beginner use. Although certain generalizations and omissions in the narrative must be accepted, this survey still succeeds in taking good account of the strengths and trends in recent scholarship. There is as well a clear desire to address peripheral issues often left out by similar texts, such as logistics or social themes. These are interesting and useful, although at times it feels they are mentioned without sufficient further consideration. Taking logistics, the chapter on the Interwar period covers aircraft and vehicles, but the narrative limits itself to their application and development as weapons of war. And yet, mighty though tanks, bombers, and fighters were, it was the truck and the promise of air mobility which transformed American warfare. For the consideration of Parameters readers the work would serve well the needs of an ROTC course.

What is troubling is the relative absence of the navy and the maritime component of history. Although a significant shortcoming in the coverage of this book, it is a larger problem reflecting much about the field of military history generally. Bluntly put, the field does not always deal well with the naval component: nor give due credit to what constitutes seapower in peacetime. Too often constrained by Mahanian expectations, the tough sinews of transportation and seamanship are given short shrift. But it is upon these factors that wartime success often depends. For instance, the authors write that following the Revolution, “Beyond fighting pirates, the US Navy saw little combat in the 20 years after the Algerian War.” Granted, the title is “Ways of War,” but the subtitle is more broadly conceived as American military history, and as such it is rather meant to include more than merely the conflicts. The US Navy in the early 19th century may not have been fighting many battles, but it was upon the seas and growing as an institution. In Chapter 6 on the Civil War, the military capabilities of the Union and Confederacy
contemplates only those of the armies, even as the former’s dominance of the seas would hamstring the Confederate cause as much as it had the Patriot cause nearly a century before. This general preference for a land-centric focus continues throughout the book.

If this book were about “ways of war” then it would seem to argue that the United States has relied predominantly upon landpower. But the strength and security of the nation, its military and strategic experience, has been of a maritime nature and has always depended as much upon the navy as the army. Going forward, in contemplation of future editions and revisions, it would be good to see the naval story more developed and better incorporated into the larger narrative. Until then, however, Muehlbauer and Ulbrich’s work more than suffices to welcome new students to the subject.

**Power, Law and the End of Privateering**

*By Jan Martin Lemnitzer*

Reviewed by Martin Murphy, PhD, Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax and Visiting Fellow at the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies at King’s College, London.

Jan Martin Lemnitzer has written a book that is important, timely, and astonishing.

It is important in several ways. First, because many of the norms, notions of sovereignty and international legal constructs that shape our world have arisen first in the maritime domain. Of these none is arguably more important than the center-piece of this book, the Declaration of Paris, signed in 1856. Secondly, because the purpose of the Declaration was, by outlawing privateering, securing the rights of neutrals and placing limits on blockade to make the seas safe for the transport of goods in times of conflict, it is a reminder of the central importance of the relationship between economics and naval power. This is something that was downgraded – at least by the US Navy – for much of the Cold War and in the years of strategic uncertainly that have followed. It is timely because, as China grows in importance as an international trading power, the US Navy may now need to pay as much attention to its own economic role as it does to Beijing’s rising challenge to maritime order in the East and South China Seas. It is astonishing because, as Lemnitzer admits, his book explores the borderland between law and war, a region many students of both subjects find “infuriatingly complex and mildly dull.” (4) Nonetheless, Lemnitzer has produced a book that is at once an eye-opener and (for the most part)a page-turner.

Prior to the congress in Paris that brought the Crimean War to a close in 1856, a mechanism to enable agreement on international norms was almost non-existent. Yes, the concept of state sovereignty and recognition of basic religious freedoms had been established at Westphalia in 1648, and the international slave trade had been outlawed at Vienna in 1815; but these amounted to almost isolated events.

For a similar period, British naval power had rested on its asserted right to blockade enemy ports and search neutral shipping for contraband; that is to say for goods, as defined by Britain, of use to an enemy
in wartime. It had backed its words by building a navy capable of carrying out these missions of search and blockade globally, including the creation of a battle fleet large enough to resist any power attempting to interfere.

Neutral states had opposed this bitterly and on two occasions in the early years of the epic struggle with France between 1793 and 1815 had combined together in sufficient strength to cause Britain problems. Nelson’s mission at Copenhagen in 1801 had been to smash one such neutral alliance. However, in the early days and weeks of the Crimean War, Britain—to cement its alliance with France and to prevent neutral states from banding together and frustrating their joint war aims—announced it would soften its traditional hardline position regarding the transport of contraband by neutral shipping for the duration of hostilities.

Not surprisingly, once the fighting ceased, France, which had suffered the effects of Britain’s policy during the Napoleonic Wars particularly, was keen to see Britain’s softer position continue by enshrining it in an international declaration. The surprise was that Britain accepted without protest.

Lemnitzer’s purpose is to establish why it did so, and why—even though Britain gained huge advantages from its restraint—the Declaration came under sustained attack in Britain as much as it did elsewhere prior to World War I, before disintegrating during the war itself. He also asks why the terms of the Declaration, which laid the foundation for what has been referred to subsequently as the world’s first period of globalization, have never been revived.

Britain agreed because it was being squeezed from two directions. First, its own trade had expanded exponentially since 1815; its import dependency had become vulnerable to any state that sanctioned privateers: the states which presented the greatest threat were the United States (which regarded privateering as its main strategic weapon against Britain) and Russia (which more than once schemed to issue letters of marque to willing US captains). Secondly, returning to the old right of search would likely antagonize too many neutrals in a British-dominated world of globalized trade. If Britain was forced to fight an alliance of neutral states, or if the United States was joined by Russia or France in a privateering war, either could impose an intolerable strain on even Britain’s considerable naval resources.

Lemnitzer argues previous historians have paid too little attention to this dilemma, assuming the Palmerston government in Britain signed the Declaration either in a swoon of liberal ideology or in a typically British act of calculated perfidiousness. His explanation is much simpler: the threat of privateering was too great to allow it to continue and the price of neutral support in its elimination too small not to pay it.

In effect Britain turned the naval order of the oceans on its head. Neutral states, instead of combining to limit British naval power, a hugely risky undertaking, now had Britain on their side. Any belligerent violating the rights of neutral shipping “could not avoid hurting the interests of British merchants and ship-owners” triggered a reaction from the British government and, ultimately, the Royal Navy. (179) The freedom of neutrals to trade was elevated almost overnight from a desired objective
to a norm that over the next twenty years spread around the globe. It was, moreover, enforced by British sea power working in cooperation with all commercial nations interested in the uninterrupted movement of goods. “International law,” writes Lemnitzer, “was by far the most effective means of securing this freedom everywhere on the high seas.” But underlying this fact was the implied threat of overwhelming British (and neutral) force “against anyone who tried to defy or subvert the rules.” (179) To achieve this end Britain signed-up to a revolution in international law making.

The detail with which Lemnitzer invests his account is essential reading, even if it might slow the page-turning pace in the middle chapters. In these, he recounts the history of the significant and contentious Marcy and Cass Amendments. Britain would have balked at the former, but would have stood alone in doing so. It could thank Bismarck for sparing it from diplomatic defeat. The great statesman misunderstood the role of the Declaration in the increasingly interwoven late-nineteenth century world; he rejected the treaty as unreliable, which set Germany on a course that eventually led it to adopt unrestricted submarine warfare with a clear conscience (and disastrous strategic results).

This attitudinal shift by a major power against the predominantly liberal thrust of the Declaration did not sink the agreement immediately. It did, however, chime with the rise of Social Darwinism, a new “spirit of the age” that encouraged an unrestrained pursuit of national advantage which ran counter to the Declaration’s principals. At sea, this spirit was channeled into the use of mines, the newly invented torpedo, specialized motor torpedo boats, cruisers and naval concepts such the French Jeune Ecole that aimed to attack British trade without regard for the niceties of international law.

The 1909 Declaration of London which aimed to revive the Declaration of Paris achieved some success but in the end defeated itself. It complicated the Paris Declaration by adding new rules that unintentionally allowed competing interpretations of what was meant by blockade and contraband to emerge. Here Lemnitzer overlaps with Nicholas Lambert who describes in Planning Armageddon (2012) how the British Admiralty, by now thoroughly disillusioned at the direction neutral rights were taking, planned, in the years prior to World War I, to ignore them completely and bring Germany to its knees with a lightning campaign of financial warfare that would be over before any neutral power could respond. Why this failed is left best to Lambert, but Lemnitzer’s work adds additional legal and political context to Lambert’s economic and political thesis.

Finally, and to reinforce the relevance of Lemnitzer’s work for contemporary concerns, it is important to remember the Declaration of Paris still remains in force. Its rules on neutral trade populate the pages of naval commanders’ handbooks the world over; yet, the enforcement mechanism that for so long made it effective – that is say the de facto alliance between the world’s greatest naval power and the world’s maritime trading nations – has been, at best, downgraded. As Lemnitzer writes, navies, “unlike in the 19th century…offer no guarantee or even reassurance that belligerents will respect the rights of those not involved in their conflict to use the oceans as they wish.” (190)
With this in mind it is disappointing to observe the US Navy, which in the original 2007 version of its current strategy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st-Century Seapower*, grasped the importance of economics and its role as the naval guardian of the global maritime order, is now retreating from this position in the 2015 revision, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st-Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready*. This document reasserts the Navy’s Mahanian-derived emphasis on “warfighting,” and power projection in a new framework which it terms “all-domain access.” These are legitimate and necessary naval objectives. However, to re-emphasize them in a world where China, America’s nearest peer competitor, is consciously aiming to become a global maritime trading and naval power, and is seeking to realize oceanic preeminence in ways that are at odds with the global maritime order of the past two hundred years, appears to be perverse unless they are anchored in an overarching economic mission.

China was one of the first signatories of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the UN treaty which has been described as a “constitution for the oceans.” Yet, like Bismark’s Germany, it is clearly working to undermine provisions in the treaty that safeguard neutral rights. It is doing so, moreover, as it builds a mass of air, naval, and paramilitary power sufficient to take on the US Navy, the naval force that neutrals look to for leadership and protection against any power that seeks to defy or subvert the rules that permit free use of the sea.

Jan Lemnitzer has written an important and timely book; it is both an erudite history and a work of contemporary relevance. It is also, most astonishingly, a page-turner. It deserves the widest possible audience.

**The Next Great War? The Roots of World War I and the Risk of US-China Conflict**

Edited by Richard N. Rosecrance and Steven E. Miller

Reviewed by Michael S. Neiberg, PhD, US Army War College

When I wrote my own book on 1914, I got into the habit of noticing news items that a scholar a century from now might use to make the argument that a war between China and the United States was inevitable. Indeed, such a case might not be too hard to make in retrospect. One might point to the accidental American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, the EP3 plane incident in 2001, and Sino-American tension over the dispute about the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands as steps along the way to war. Or, one could take the structural approach and look at the rapid rise of Chinese power to argue that war resulted from a tectonic shift in the global order. My point in this small exercise was less to argue that war between the United States and China is or is not inevitable than to show how much easier large processes in history look in retrospect than they do to contemporaries.

Still, the China analogy will not go away. Those who use it argue that our world looks increasingly like the world of 1914, with a rising China taking the place of a rising Germany and the United States playing the role of Great Britain, the established global power that is struggling to maintain its place in the face of a new challenger. As with most historical
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analogies, this one can often obfuscate as much as it clarifies, but it remains in the public and scholarly discourse.

_The Next Great War?_ provides the fullest exploration of the analogy yet. The authors are a veritable all-star cast of political scientists supplemented by a few historians and the former Australian prime Minister Kevin Rudd. As might be expected, the authors do not agree on all points and the quality of the essays is inconsistent, especially in their use of the latest historical scholarship. Still, the book is thought-provoking and insightful, especially when the subject is in the hands of thinkers like Graham Allison and Joseph Nye.

The authors do tend to agree on a few salient points. They see much value in the analogy of World War I to the current situation in the western Pacific, but they appropriately acknowledge that similarity does not imply inevitability. Any decisions for war will be made by real people, responding to real events rather than sterile actors trapped in geopolitical structures predetermined by a century-old conflict. The value of studying the analogy, then, is not in seeking formulaic answers (other than the obvious one of avoiding the 1914 nightmare at all costs short of national survival) than in what it might help us think through as the two superpowers negotiate their shared future.

They also agree that three factors in our world that were absent in 1914 are likely to help limit the chances of a war. First, because each side has nuclear weapons, the cost of going to war may become prohibitive, forcing the two sides to come to diplomatic agreement instead. Second, because they share (and dominate) an interconnected global economy, war is likely to cost far more than it could possibly achieve. Third, international institutions are far stronger than they were in 1914, thus providing more opportunities for resolution of conflict short of war.

The book also has a number of essays that refer to the so-called Thucydides trap. The phrase normally refers to the way the perception of growth of one state's power (Athens or China) can stoke fear in another (Sparta or the United States), making the latter more likely to go to war. Thus, to return to 1914, a power on the decline like Austria-Hungary can be more destabilizing to the international order than a rising one. The Thucydides trap can also refer to the ways great powers can get drawn into wars on behalf of an ally like Corcyra, Corinth, North Korea, or Japan. This latter problem seems most likely to create trouble, especially given America's many bilateral treaty obligations.

The strength of the book comes in the variety of approaches and methods the authors use. Its greatest weakness is the tendency of some authors to lean on the most popular historians rather than the best-respected. As a result, a few old saws appear here, like the myth of enthusiasm for war in 1914 and the dominance of military planners in the decisions for war. Still, the book gives us much to contemplate and is well worth the time spent wrestling with its core ideas.