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Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War
By Paul Scharre
Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, adjunct research professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

Army of None represents a ten-year intellectual effort that draws upon Paul Scharre’s deep subject matter expertise related to autonomous weapons systems and the concurrent ethical and policy considerations that come with their development, fielding, and use. Scharre—a former US Army Ranger with multiple tours in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Office of the Secretary of Defense working group leader for Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems, November 21, 2012—is a senior fellow and director, Technology and National Security, Center for a New American Security.

Scharre accedes to technological determinism and military pragmatism; he recognizes autonomous systems and artificial intelligence (AI) have gradually emerged in the arsenals of the world’s great powers and will proliferate over time into those of lesser political entities and even the more bellicose nonstate actors. The work focuses on this military evolutionary process and the many issues surrounding it. Just as AIs could conceivably engage in sociopathic behaviors for end-state fulfillment, it could be said that Army of None also possesses its own inherent contradictions that, at times, provide us with a sense of an analytic amorality (238). This is because the author is attempting to balance military necessity—the United States must gain dominance in these new systems—while simultaneously promoting liberal democratic and basic human values.

The book is divided into six parts with the following thematic foci—part 1, “Robopocalypse Now”; part 2, “Building the Terminator”; part 3, “Runaway Gun”; part 4, “Flash War”; part 5, “The Fight to Ban Autonomous Weapons”; and part 6, “Averting Armageddon: The Weapon of Policy.” Within each of these parts of the book, three to five chapters are clustered together to develop a thematic focus of the twenty-one book chapters. The book also contains an introduction, robust notes (tied to sentence fragment quote strings), acknowledgements, abbreviations, an index, 31 black and white photos, and various tables, figures, and diagrams. However, no formal reference listing exists for the reader to do follow-on topical reading. Scharre’s institutional knowledge of the subject matter and “topical access” derived from numerous Department of Defense and related organizational personage interviews—with policymakers and officials, scientists and weaponeers, and philosophers and ethicists—provide context and additional insider accuracy to his writing and analysis.

The work logically progresses from one part to the next. For those new to AI, a host of new concepts and terminology are provided such as that of “perverse instantiation,” “ethical governor,” and “centaur...
An interweaving of real world military history, operations, and technology with science fiction works and movies makes for a lively juxtaposition of the real and the imagined. An interesting component of this detailed book is that glimpses of countermeasures to armed AI robots appear within it. These include “hidden exploits”—deep neural nets perceiving image patterns that humans don’t, which allow AI to be manipulated and attempt to trick AI into misunderstanding human intent by mimicking conditions such as hors de combat or surrender behavior (183–88, 258–60). Additionally, the preconditions have been laid within the work to look deeper into human, centaur (human/AI), and AI ground force combinations and their pros and cons for future combat scenarios. A continuum of military tradeoffs exists with speed, complexity, and morality representing some of the dominant factors. While humans in and on the loop are always preferred, the demands of some future engagements will quickly surpass human cognitive loads that will likely take us into Faustian dilemmas related to the costs of victory and how it was achieved.

Coming from a professional military and defense analyst perspective, criticisms of the work are relatively muted as it is well researched and written. Arms control advocates of the “Stop Killer Robots” variety, however, see this subject matter very differently and are aghast that Scharre and others like him who represent great power interests have moved beyond the debate and are accepting these systems as a fait accompli. Still, it must be remembered that relying too much on AI in the future—especially that of the more artificial general intelligence variety—is reminiscent of World War I-like mobilization protocols, which once tripped, were out of human ability to stop (231–33). Additionally, Terminator and Skynet archetypes, which draw upon historical lessons related to armed slaves turning on their masters, will also always haunt us vis-à-vis armed autonomous systems.

Even with such concerns, this is a superb and accessible book actually deserving of the media hype surrounding it. It is set at an affordable price (and even more so when the cheaper paperback version is released). The reviewer readily endorses the work for war college and graduate level national security courses. He also concurs with the assessment of many other defense professionals that Army of None represents a tour de force concerning autonomous weapons, the moral implications stemming from their use, and the combat potentials—and pitfalls—of utilizing militarized AI itself.

**Strategy, Evolution, and War: From Apes to Artificial Intelligence**

By Kenneth Payne

Reviewed by Dr. Richard M. Meinhart, professor of defense and joint processes, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, US Army War College

*Strategy, Evolution, and War* by Kenneth Payne deeply explores the evolution of strategy in war from a human perspective while considering how artificial intelligence (AI) may influence tactical and
strategic perspectives of future strategy development. The book’s front cover engages the reader’s mind in an inquisitive manner with the subtitle *From Apes to Artificial Intelligence* and an image of an artificial person with a weapon developed from a few hundred 0s and 1s. Key strategy insights from a war perspective that integrate different theories, strategists, and a variety of historical and current examples are well supported by almost 400 academic sources. The complexity associated with Payne’s many insights requires careful reading and reflection to fully appreciate and apply them.

In the introduction’s first two paragraphs, Payne succinctly identifies the book’s focus and conclusion. He defines strategy as “the purposeful use of violence for political ends.” Hence, the book’s focus is on war versus other strategy-related endeavors. He then states “strategy is soon to undergo something of a dramatic transformation because machines will make important decisions about war and will do so without input from human minds.” He summarizes the psychology of strategy, its historical evolution from ancient Greece to nuclear weapons, and the tactical and strategic influence of artificial intelligence that sets the stage for the book’s eight chapters, which are organized in three key parts: “The Evolution of Strategists,” “Culture Meets Evolved Strategy,” and “Artificial Intelligence and Strategy.”

The first chapter, “Defining Strategy as Psychology,” provides context for strategy’s overall psychological evolution from human and cultural perspectives dating from classical Greek Thucydidan insights on the Peloponnesian War to a more distinct strategy in Europe’s eighteenth century with key examples associated with Carl von Clausewitz and the Napoleonic Wars. Building on the psychology of strategy, the next chapter delves deeper into the inseparability of strategic and human evolution. Payne provides examples of how cognitive abilities and consciousness have changed from chimps to humans, who organize into larger social groups, and the strategy implications of warfare. The last chapter of part 1 examines how a leader’s strategy, which is ultimately a distinct choice, can be greatly influenced by heuristics and biases. He discusses different biases that can favor groups or actions, including risk assessment, that can influence decision-making. Included in this cognitive discussion are examples of the connectedness of emotions and consciousness when making strategy decisions as well as ways to ameliorate heuristic errors.

Part 2 provides three chapters on the history of human culture and war affecting the psychology of behavior and strategy based upon ancient Greece and the Peloponnesian War, Carl von Clausewitz on warfare and strategy associated with the Napoleonic Wars, and the influence of nuclear weapons strategy. The discussion on ancient Greece illustrates how writing and inquiry provided cultural and strategic insights on the interaction of weapons, warriors, and society changing overtime. The chapter on Clausewitz and the Napoleonic Wars explores how the character of war changed to generate and employ force including fog and friction as well as determining a center of gravity. While technology and weaponry changed, key strategy insights included the intimate connection between armed forces and society. The last chapter of part 2 provides examples of how nuclear weapons were profoundly disruptive and influenced thinking on the use of force through examining the Cold War in general and the Cuban missile crisis specifically. A key point
Payne makes is that nuclear weapons influenced the rationality and consciousness of strategy decisions due to the consequences of using such weapons. But overall, he did not consider this psychologically revolutionary for strategy.

While the book’s first two parts discuss strategy from psychological, historical, and human perspectives that have been widely examined in multiple academic venues, part 3 examines the potential AI will have on strategy from both tactical and strategic perspectives. The chapter entitled “Tactical Artificial Intelligence Arrives” focuses on battlefield strategy using AI technology, algorithms, and computing power versus human decisions on when and how to attack in multiple warfighting domains. Key points Payne makes are that tactical AI lacks a sense of meaning, AI decisions will be much quicker with an offensive versus defensive focus, and AI tactical decisions can have strategic consequences. He also identifies how AI technology may dramatically shift the balance of military power between states and how humans may be out of the decision loop, which undercuts a mission-command philosophy. The “Artificial General Intelligence Does Strategy” chapter is somewhat speculative regarding what-might-happen or what-could-happen events. He identifies that AGI’s potential future development and strategy implications should be considered even though “defining AGI (artificial general intelligence) is no easy matter as the concept is rather underspecified,” and there are differences between AGI and human intelligence.

Strategy, Evolution, and War insightfully examines strategy’s evolution in warfare and potential for the future. The influence of nuclear weapons on strategy in the recent past is very relevant to national security and military professionals as nuclear capabilities and strategy are currently being discussed in today’s national security environment. Similarly, the use and potential growth of AI can have far-reaching effects on future warfare strategy decisions. In today’s evolving security environment, these factors must be well understood by senior leaders to preclude blind spots in decision-making relating to the future of AI across the many levels and domains of warfighting.

**Outsourcing War to Machines: The Military Robotics Revolution**

By Paul J. Springer

Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, adjunct research professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

The author of *Outsourcing War to Machines*, Dr. Paul J. Springer, is a military historian and a professor at the Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. He also authored *Military Robots and Drones: A Reference Handbook* and contributed to two more recent works on cyberwarfare. His new effort refocuses his academic efforts on robotic systems, including unmanned and primarily human teleoperated equipment, that can be utilized for a variety of military missions. As such, the work “provide[s] context to the rise and deployment of military...”
robotics. It raises issues with the legality and morality of using these advanced systems and critiques the ways in which they have been used in recent conflicts” (3). The work is contemporary and US-focused given our extensive use of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and armed drones in the Global War on Terror and the fact that we are promoting most of the technological advancement in this area.

The book’s initial chapter lays out research design, breaks down topics in each chapter, and offers background information related to definitions, artificial intelligence (AI) and cognition, and war on terror antecedents. The second chapter provides an overview to revolution in military affairs (RMA) thinking and how military robots may be viewed as representative of such a new revolution. The third chapter represents a historical overview of robotics from the ancient past up to the point that the decision was made to first weaponize a Predator drone in 2001. Chapter 4 focuses on the dominant robots that have been deployed in the Global War on Terror, which include the Reaper, multi-function agile remote control robots (MARCbots), and PackBot systems. The rise of mercenary forces and the lethal targeting of American citizens overseas who have committed treason are also covered. The fifth chapter highlights how military robots are viewed within the laws of armed conflict, how their use may require changes in such laws, and how technology is changing American use-of-force behaviors. Chapter 6 looks at armed robots vis-à-vis ethics in war, analyses the relationship of these systems to concepts of proportionality, discrimination, and military necessity and highlights the amoral nature of machines based on programming logic. Chapter 7 provides a contemporary treatment of cyberwarfare—this tangential topical focus will be addressed later in the review. The final chapter provides what is acknowledged to be a light treatment of military robotics futures.

The strengths of the work are that it is well written and logically laid out by an expert in this subject matter. Further, I found the work to be well researched and referenced. It is also priced reasonably well for a hardcover academic text. Many of the discussions provided in the book made for engaging reads such as the historical treatment of the subject.

A specific weakness with the work, however, exists with chapter 7, “The Global Competition.” The author principally focuses on cyberwarfare related to Russia, China, Israel, and Iran instead of on emerging armed robotics trends and considerations. This gives the reviewer the impression that cyberwarfare filler was utilized, rather than undertaking new research to flesh out that chapter. The relationship between the emergence of military robotics to the phalanx, gunpowder, and nuclear RMAs in chapter 2 could have also been analyzed more in depth—especially at the force structure, strategic, and most importantly, political organizational form level. The phalanx was an early product of city-states while gunpowder-based weaponry was a manifestation of dynastic states that later transitioned into nation-states. Nuclear weapons represent a late nation-state military capability. This begs to question what political organizational form military robots—most importantly weaponized AI-based ones—may portend.

Overall, the work intentionally focuses more on the context and history behind the military robotics revolution rather than attempting to analyze or project where that revolution may be heading—an
established scholar, Springer specifically points out the folly in making such predictions (195). One of the concluding insights he offers is that “an outright ban on military robotics is unlikely to have much of an effect” (214). Further, outright slaughter will likely be required before any meaningful international bans will be enacted. Related concerns are made earlier concerning the dangers these systems represent—especially in regard to militarized robotics and artificial intelligence—with the 2015 petition circulated against such new revolutionary weaponry (220).

In summation, *Outsourcing War to Machines* will likely continue to exist in the shadow of Paul Scharre’s higher profile, more popularized, and affordable work *Army of None*. Springer’s book, however, fulfills a much needed contextual and historical grounding in this topic that the student of war should undertake prior to reading more focused efforts on robotic and autonomous systems on the contemporary and future battlefield.
Harsh Lessons: Iraq, Afghanistan and
the Changing Character of War
By Ben Barry

Reviewed by Andrew Byers, co-founder, Counter Extremism Network

Ben Barry, OBE, a retired Brigadier and Senior Fellow for Land Warfare at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, has set out to draw lessons for future US and allied military operations, as well as arguments about the changing character of war, from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Harsh Lessons is comprised of five substantive chapters to analyze “the changing character of conflict in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, with a view to identifying pointers to the future character of conflict” (12). By “character of war,” Barry means the Clausewitzian sense, “which encompasses the varying ways and means by which war is fought” (11).

Barry argues the United States came close to strategic defeat in both Iraq and Afghanistan—taking several years to realize that its ends, ways, and means in both conflicts were insufficient for the task. It is from US failures, as well as its successes, that Barry draws his lessons for the future of war.

Chapter 1 provides brief histories of the two conflicts from 2001 through 2015, offering a good, if brief, overview of the two wars—this chapter is not the definitive history of either conflict, nor does it try to be. To Barry, these wars have validated the interdependence of war and politics at the tactical level as well as the effectiveness of the “clear, hold, build” approach in Afghanistan. He argues US defeat in both wars was narrowly avoided by adding personnel surges to conduct counterinsurgency campaigns though he acknowledges that security deteriorated in both cases after responsibility was transferred to Baghdad and Kabul. This outcome suggests a major disconnect in the viability of long-term stability operations and the need for local partners able and willing to provide effective security for civilian populations.

I am skeptical of one claim that Barry makes: the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have validated US counterinsurgency doctrine (34). This claim seems especially spurious in the case of Afghanistan, a conflict that drags on seventeen years (at the time of this writing) after it began. Afghanistan is surely not a strongly positive case study in the efficacy of US counterinsurgency operations.

Chapter 2 explores the formulation and execution of strategy in both conflicts, command and control, and alliance/coalition command. In the case of Iraq, Barry argues there were interlinked strategic failures: failure to plan adequately for postconflict stabilization, failure to respond to actual (rather than anticipated) conditions after successful regime change, and failure to impose security rapidly in Baghdad, the country’s political center of gravity. Barry also highlights the need for unity of effort, which proved to be a significant problem in Afghanistan—only
in 2010 were all US troops placed under a unified command. This chapter does highlight one problem with the book: at times, there is too much blurring of the two conflicts, with Iraq and Afghanistan treated as a single pool of experiences and lessons to be learned without adequately differentiating them.

Chapter 3 analyzes the military capabilities, tactics, and operations of both sides in the two conflicts. The strength of this chapter is in Barry’s identification of key areas in which a lack of understanding or expertise proved especially deleterious—for example, lack of understanding of cultural differences, such as the problems stemming from the use of dogs inside Iraqi homes; poor intelligence at the tactical level; and a lack of expertise in handling detainees, who could have been important sources of intelligence if treated properly. Barry also points out the limited use of lessons learned from one conflict to another.

Chapter 4 discusses the concept of military adaptation in Iraq and Afghanistan and the need to rapidly change equipment, organization, and methods during war. In both cases, this is largely a story in which insurgents rapidly adapted while the United States and allies struggled to adjust to the conflicts’ changing conditions and opponents’ actions and capabilities (such as the use of improvised explosive devices).

Chapter 5 explores the utility of force, which allows Barry to examine the conduct and character of contemporary warfare. Here he emphasizes the complexity of war and the unpredictability of enemy actions, providing further discussion of the strategic corporal concept. Just as small unit leaders and actions taken at the tactical level can have disproportionately great effects, they can also have vastly negative effects on the overall war effort, as scandals like the abuse of prisoners at places like Abu Ghraib demonstrated.

Barry’s conclusion provides a synthesis of his major arguments on the nature of these wars and likely prospects for future conflicts. He argues the United States deployed inadequate forces and overall effort in building state capacity, after regime changes. In part, this was the product of overconfidence, slowness to adapt to the changing character of war, and too much attraction to the revolution in military affairs, which offered little help in stabilization operations. One of Barry’s conclusions deserves repeating: unless regime change is followed by successful stabilization efforts and state institution-building, the resulting conditions are likely to be no better and possibly worse than prior to the campaign (141).

_Harsh Lessons_ is recommended because of its valuable insights about US and allied experiences in the two conflicts. Reading it sparks a great many conversations about the course of these wars, and what they may presage about the future of warfare. While we must be cautious about “overlearning” the lessons of past conflicts—no future conflict will unfold the way that either Iraq or Afghanistan did, and future conflicts with near-peer adversaries will likely look nothing like these campaigns—Barry’s effort here is a worthy one.
Raphael D. Marcus examines the military history of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah since 1985. The first part of the book assesses strategic adaptation with an emphasis on Israel’s deterrence policy towards Hezbollah. The second examines operational adaptation with a focus on what shaped the Israel Defense Forces’s (IDF’s) planning and Hezbollah’s transformation. Marcus explains how the IDF continuously adjusted its defense policy and its understanding of Hezbollah with each conflict. The author examines key battles and assesses the strategy from the perspectives of Israel and Hezbollah as well as the development and application of the IDF operational warfighting concept in Lebanon. Marcus leads the reader from the beginning of the conflict, through the counterguerrilla campaign, to the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, and throughout the war.

The first four chapters of the book provide Hezbollah’s background as an unorganized militant group that spearheaded the use of suicide bombings and relied heavily on kidnappings and terrorist attacks. Early in its development, Hezbollah was trained by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in “explosive demolition, field intelligence, reconnaissance, and other military skills” (44). Throughout the first decade of Hezbollah’s existence, the group engaged in guerrilla warfare, which the IDF fought conventionally. As the author notes, the IDF “conceptually viewed Hezbollah as a routine security threat that was easily dealt with in reactive, low intensity operations” (50). Following the IDF’s assassination of Hezbollah’s leader, Abbas al-Musawi, in 1992, Hezbollah sought retribution. But high casualty rates during the first decade of the conflict also encouraged the group to reevaluate its technique and strategy towards the IDF. During the 1990s Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s current secretary-general, came to the forefront of Hezbollah’s strategic command. Under his leadership, the group evolved from a “terrorist militia to a guerilla force to a commando force” (72). In response, Israel developed the Egoz, which was designed as a clandestine reconnaissance unit that became proficient in concealment techniques, intelligence collection, and urban warfare. This new elite unit was able to embed in southern Lebanon for long periods.

While Hezbollah continued to transform its strategy, the IDF was slow to respond. This is a major theme within the book. Defense Minister Moshe Arens finally adapted the IDF’s strategy in the late 1990s with a policy of deterrence. But leveraging the Lebanese government against Syria and Hezbollah was not enough. Domestic pressure led Prime Minister Ehud Barak to unilaterally withdraw the IDF from Lebanon in May 2000, which showed the major rift in civil-military affairs in Israel. As Marcus notes, the IDF’s strategic mistake was “the mischaracterization of the nature of the enemy and slow conceptual adaptation” (113). Eventually the IDF changed course and, in 1999, paid greater attention to the threat by acquiring new weapon systems, adjusting its defense
budget, and addressing manpower issues. These changes equated to an Israeli revolution in military affairs (RMA). The author references the IDF perspective on successful US military operations at the onset of the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, which “validated the utility of the RMA and associated precision technologies” (136). The second half of the book delves deeper into this concept and the Second Lebanon War.

Throughout the course of the book, Marcus demonstrates Hezbollah’s effort to take the lessons learned and adapt them to IDF strategy. Although Hezbollah continued persistent rocket fire despite being bombarded by the IDF in 1993 and 1996 conflicts, the author’s focus on the 2006 campaign is most noteworthy. Marcus described the IDF’s trajectory from the beginning of the conflict with Hezbollah and explained how the force did not manage to respond accordingly. Israel did not lose the war, but neither did Hezbollah; for Hezbollah, it is “victory by not losing” (207). Air campaigns were not sufficient and the authorization to use limited ground operations came later than it should have. What made the fight more difficult for ground operations was that some Hezbollah fighters were uniformed and others were not. It later became apparent that Hezbollah fired rockets from civilian dwellings. Survivability, Iranian assistance, and embedded fighters were some of the challenges the IDF faced. Hezbollah’s operational approach blended irregular and guerrilla elements and the IDF was not prepared to fight this type of campaign.

Ultimately, Marcus adequately presents the military history of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict. He features the processes of Israel’s political echelons and military officials as well as Hezbollah’s leaders, and how both sides adapted their strategies and warfighting techniques with each conflict. Israel’s Long War explains the IDF’s difficulty with military adaptation and conceptualizing the Hezbollah threat. While there are a number of available works covering the long Israel-Hezbollah history, Marcus’s work is in the minority that details the operational and strategic aspects of both sides. The book is a significant contribution to the study of this conflict and of Hezbollah. But it also serves as a case study on how militaries—both state and nonstate—can learn from battlefield mistakes and evolve to match threats. The afterword briefly discusses Hezbollah’s continued transformation with Iranian and Russian assistance in Syria. Hezbollah has endured losses since the Syrian Civil War started in 2011, but it has also gained invaluable battlefield experiences against the Islamic State and other groups countering Bashar al-Assad’s forces. This book is worth the attention of anyone interested in learning the intricacies of the civil-military dynamic and those who seek a deeper knowledge of the military history surrounding the Israel-Hezbollah conflict.
The 1st Infantry Division and the US Army Transformed: 
Road to Victory in Desert Storm, 1970–1991

By Gregory Fontenot

Reviewed by Colonel Tarn Warren, former chair, Department of Military 
Strategy, Planning and Operations, US Army War College

Colonel Gregory Fontenot’s The 1st Infantry Division and the US Army Transformed: Road to Victory in Desert Storm, 1970–1991 brings to life the “Big Red One” by telling the story of a US infantry division, reborn from the post-Vietnam malaise, forged into an effective fighting unit, tested in fast-paced conventional combat, and emerging victorious. The book provides a historical narrative that will interest a wide range of readers, from young soldiers and leaders to national policymakers. Indeed, the author exposes several lessons that should leave lasting impressions on those who would contemplate warfare and those who would serve in it. He also thickens the historiography of this topic and uses a wide range of primary and secondary sources, that include hundreds of personal interviews, to tell the story and make his points.

The book starts big, gains focus by plowing through incredible tactical details, and ends big, again with valuable insights. Appropriately, the author begins by providing some context. He adeptly describes the post-Vietnam Army-wide challenges and their negative impact on such elements as force development, training, logistics, and morale. The 1st Infantry Division (1st ID) was hit particularly hard because it was not considered a high-priority unit. As a result of these problems, the book describes how senior Army leadership in the 1970s and 1980s implemented new concepts, doctrine, programs, and equipment such as AirLand Battle, Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercises, Field Manual 100-5, various weapon systems, and the National Training Center to attempt positive transformation of the force and regain high-end combat effectiveness. More specifically, the author relates how two successive division commanders, General Gordon R. Sullivan and Lieutenant General Thomas G. Rhame, made the most of few resources to slowly improve, in fits and starts, the 1st Infantry Division’s combat readiness up to the beginning of the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Fontenot makes it clear they did much with little.

Leading up to the Gulf War, the narrative provides some needed background on Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s war with Iran, and Iraq’s strategic view at that time. Shifting to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the US-led coalition responded and the Big Red One played a significant role. Now the book dives deep and stays there among the division’s tactical units until the end, popping up at brief intervals for some strategic air. Fontenot places the reader in the midst of the 1st Infantry Division’s battalions and brigades as they struggle to uncoil from Fort Riley, rail to port, load ships, sail and fly to Saudi Arabia, unload, and move 500 kilometers to their assembly areas. A Herculean effort, to be sure, made tougher by never having enough of anything. Throughout, the book also commendably exposes how the fog of war and demands of combat impact key-leader decisions, relationships, and command and control at

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526 pages
$36.95
all levels from US Central Command down through VII Corps to the 1st Infantry Division and its subordinate tactical units.

Readers are immersed in the intensive preparations for the attack north and the great “left hook” to roll up the enemy’s right flank. With precision and clarity, Fontenot weaves a narrative of leaders and soldiers dealing with confusion, scarcity, surprise, culmination, euphoria, and ultimately, victory—all buoyed by faith in purpose and mission command. Importantly, the book is candid and balanced, exposing failures and fratricide. The author does not cheerlead; instead, through the words of those who were there, he reminds us that the preparation for, and conduct of, large-scale combat operations is hard, really hard.

With an entire mechanized corps on the move, the author makes a big desert small. The author devotes several riveting chapters to the Big Red One’s initial breach and subsequent offensive operations, moving the point of view from tank turrets, to resupply columns, to higher operations centers, and to his own tank battalion. As the 100-hour war unfolds, the story grips the reader with first enemy contacts, lost fuel convoys, and navigating at night in a featureless desert without global positioning systems, all in pursuit of the Iraqi Republican Guard. After more than three straight days of combat, fatigue bites hard, and with units stretched out over hundreds of miles, effective command and control is severely strained, if not absent. Fontenot convincingly describes the culmination of VII Corps and the 1st ID on February 28, now well inside Kuwait, due mainly to a lack of gas and sleep. The story concludes with the Big Red One’s hasty and difficult transition to improvised stability operations in Kuwait and the long road home, ending back at Fort Riley.

The book concludes with some important points for Army leaders at all levels. First, rigorous training pays off—eventually. The huge investments in concepts, doctrine, equipment, and the National Training Center helped foster success against the fourth largest army in the world at the time. Second, good leadership is decisive amid the chaos of combat, and the US belief in mission command and commanders’ intent remains a key, if not unique, strength. Third, Fontenot vividly relates how strained operational and tactical sustainment can be a greater threat to success than enemy resistance. These lessons have particular relevance today as the United States Army refocuses on near-peer competitors. The main criticism of this book is that it could have been shorter and delivered the same effect. The breadth and volume of tactical detail was at times too scattered, somewhat affecting coherence. Nonetheless, through dedicated research and gripping personal accounts, Fontenot tells a worthy war story with timeless lessons for future conflict.
Anatomy of a Campaign: The British Fiasco in Norway, 1940

By John Kiszley

Reviewed by Dr. James Corum, lecturer, Department of Politics and Contemporary History, Salford University, United Kingdom

The campaign in Norway, which lasted from April to June 1940, is one of the understudied campaigns of World War II. After all, Norway never assumed the decisive importance that both the Germans and the British thought it would have. After the German offensive in the west in May 1940, it was seen as something of a sideshow. Yet the Norwegian campaign highlights an incredible level of deficiencies in the British wartime command and control system at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels at the outset of the war. It was a campaign that the British, French, and Norwegian forces might well have won if only they had possessed a basic competence in joint operations and a command system capable of effective and rapid planning and response. Unfortunately, the Germans possessed an effective command system and understanding of operational warfare in 1940 while the British did not.

Retired Lieutenant General John P. Kiszely, an officer with an impressive background in command and higher staff positions, has written about the 1940 campaign in Norway with a new perspective that focuses on British leadership and command. Few historians would have the insights into the personalities of high command that General Kiszely has, simply because the author spent years in the senior staffs in Whitehall and has a clear understanding of what commanders need to know and do. Thus, his analysis, based on a careful reading of the minutes of the staff conferences, is pretty damning in terms of the performance of Britain’s military chiefs in April and May 1940.

In this thoroughly researched and documented study, General Kiszely dissects the campaign and explains how the world’s top navy, alongside a very capable air force and a less capable army, could fail so badly. A British campaign that included poor planning, muddled decision-making, failed coalition operations, and a lack of any operational concept or interservice cooperation plagued the allies from the start. The title describing the British fight in Norway as a “fiasco” is apt, and in Kiszely’s analysis none of the major British strategic players—the service chiefs, the military staffs, the war cabinet and First Lord of the Admiralty Sir Winston Churchill—performed well.

Both the Germans and the British saw Norway as strategically important, and the military staffs of both countries began planning for major operations there in December 1939. The contrast in planning is remarkable. The German navy, Luftwaffe, and army staffs worked closely together, understanding this campaign would be the first campaign in warfare in which all three services would play a major and essential role. The German plan identified the forces to be allocated, which included almost all the German navy’s surface fleet, a few recently raised infantry divisions not needed for the upcoming spring offensive, and a sizeable and well-balanced air component. German operational planning anticipated some of the obvious requirements of the campaign.
Widely separated task forces would require a lot of communications, and the Germans built a considerable signals force into their initial landing plan. A joint operation would require close interservice cooperation, and the German staffs established an effective liaison and command system under a theater headquarters. At the lower level, the German army task forces ensured they had a good mix of supporting arms, especially antiaircraft and engineers, in the first attack wave.

The contrast with the British approach to planning is striking. At the lower levels, the British Army planning for deploying forces to Norway were abysmal. Little thought was given to ensuring adequate communications, liaison with the other services, or in ensuring adequate anti-aircraft cover. In short, pretty basic stuff was ignored. There was no British theater headquarters or commander, and when the fight came, the different British landing forces in central Norway and Narvik all reported to different commanders in London.

On paper the British seemed prepared for joint warfare. Britain had the Military Coordination Committee with some exceptionally capable officers assigned to it. But at this stage of the war, the committee had no real staff and limited powers, and its role had not been clearly defined. The war cabinet providing strategic policy was too large to be effective. Interservice rivalry was intense. Poor communications kept the military chiefs in London in the dark about the conditions in Norway. The British did not appoint a senior liaison officer to the Norwegian Army and this considerable force, eager and ready to fight, was virtually ignored in British operations. The British effort at the tactical level included some successes in the fight for central Norway and in the Royal Navy’s destruction of ten German destroyers at Narvik. But the confused headquarters in London failed to exploit tactical success.

General Kiszely demonstrates how the personalities of the service chiefs can have a decisive impact on a campaign. In the case of the British service chiefs, all were seasoned professionals with good reputations, but none were perfect, and all exhibited serious flaws in their command style. Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Dudley Pound, was already worn out and exhibited little interest in issues that did not directly involve his service. Chief of the Air Staff Sir Cyril Newall was known as a talented administrator, but had a weak understanding of doctrine and operations. Like Pound, he declined to get involved in issues of joint operations. Chief of the Imperial General Staff Sir Edmund Ironside had a superb military record but had always served as a field commander, had never served on the senior staff, and had no experience in strategic level planning. The senior officers of each service well knew much better candidates for these jobs were available.

The technology of war has greatly changed since 1940, but the human aspects including the essentials of command, planning, and coordination have not changed. This is why I highly recommend this book as essential reading for all military officers and civilian leaders to understand the dynamics of decision-making, operational planning, and execution in modern conflict. As we have learned from some recent conflicts, experienced and highly educated senior officers can get campaign planning and execution horribly wrong. Sometimes we need to highlight a campaign that offers some concentrated lessons on the basics of senior leadership and organization.
The Fighters: Americans in Combat in Afghanistan and Iraq
By C. J. Chivers

Reviewed by Russell W. Glenn, director, Plans and Policy, G2, US Army Training and Doctrine Command

The Fighters provides an overview of US military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq via the experiences of six American military personnel—three from the Army (a helicopter pilot, member of the special operations community, and infantry soldier), two from the Navy (a corpsman and an aviator), and one Marine Corps officer (infantry platoon leader)—with a total of more than seventeen years of combat experience in those countries. Chivers, a former marine, repeatedly visited the two theaters, meeting four of his subjects there and complementing his reconstruction of the events with additional interviews in the United States. Individuals contacted in these later instances include the subjects, servicemembers from their units, and family members. The result is combat related through the eyes of men and women who have seen the elephant and others close to them, individuals who make known their doubts regarding the conduct, purpose, and chances of success in the two ongoing contingencies.

This is ever a view from the bottom up. The perspectives are personal, the takes tactical. Readers will find little consideration of concerns at the operational and strategic levels of war. Such a focus is deliberate. Combined with the multiple standpoints through which we view each combatant are moments wherein Chivers relates the same event through very different lenses. For example, one member of a trio is killed in a rocket attack as the men approach a PX trailer. His companions reflect on the event as they recover from their own wounds, one finding confirmation of his faith in survival, the other marveling at the play of chance as dictator of whether one lives or dies, mends or is forever crippled. The tactical perspective also offers validation of the unfortunate truth that lessons learned are too often lessons later forgotten.

Some readers will, at times, find themselves dissatisfied as The Fighters’ prose slips into the subjective. That Chivers has little sympathy for decision makers at higher echelons is immediately apparent in the preface where he concludes the lives of Afghanistan and Iraq veterans have been “harnessed to wars that ran far past the pursuit of justice” and were “betrayed not by their neighbors, but by their leaders” (xxii–xxiii). The naval aviator repeatedly expresses fear and remorse that his strikes might have killed innocents; he is thankful when a sortie does not require him to release munitions. Readers would have benefited from deeper probing into why a leader so fearful of war’s play of friction and chance chooses to return to theater on multiple tours.

Successfully mining the ore of human emotions during combat is a task often undertaken but rarely accomplished. Many of the elite works, perhaps most, are firsthand accounts. E. B. Sledge’s With the Old Breed does so with gripping and gritty recollections from World War II foxholes in the Pacific as We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young, coauthored...
Breed does so with gripping and gritty recollections from World War II foxholes in the Pacific as We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young, coauthored by journalist Joe Galloway and then Lieutenant Colonel Hal Moore, does primarily from LZ X-ray in the la Drang Valley of Vietnam. Clinton Romesha’s Red Platoon more recently antes up with its gut-wrenching recall of fighting at Combat Outpost Keating in Afghanistan. Students of leadership still await a post-Second World War equivalent of Defeat into Victory, Field-Marshal Viscount Slim’s masterful blend of tactical, operational, and command considerations in recounting the campaign that ousted the Japanese from WWII India.

The task is harder yet when the telling is not from a first-person combatant’s pen. Recent accomplishments that hurdle this obstacle include Mark Bowden’s Black Hawk Down, David Zucchino’s Thunder Run narration regarding the first days of US forces in 2003 Baghdad, and the likewise exceptional yet little known, Dead Men Risen regarding the British Army’s Welsh Guards in Afghanistan by Toby Harnden. Other offerings can add to our understanding, if less so. They might accomplish this end via an occasional unique observation that provides insights regarding the ever-evolving being that is the combat soldier. These remind leaders of the view from the sharp end of the spear, that of the combatants who benefit from or suffer the consequences of decisions made at higher echelons. It is an invaluable perspective however maintained.
Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement

By Alexander Thurston

Reviewed by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, professor emeritus, US Army War College

Alexander Thurston has written an excellent study on the development, evolution, rise, and decline of the African terrorist group Boko Haram, which operates in Nigeria with some spillover into Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. The group’s name is based on the Hausa word Boko meaning Western education (and implying culture) and the Arabic word Haram referring to things that are forbidden by Islam. Over time, the group, which was always radical, became increasingly violent and eventually inured itself to the deaths of Muslim bystanders to its actions. It also unsuccessfully attempted to join al-Qaeda but later was able to affiliate with the Islamic State at a nominal level. Thurston’s study addresses numerous factors contributing to the rise of Boko Haram and its turn to violence in 2009 as well as its later expansion and setbacks.

The author notes that Boko Haram originated with radical Salafi preacher Mohammed Yusuf who operated from the city of Maiduguri in northern Nigeria. As the leader of Boko Haram, Yusuf preached a doctrine of religious exclusivism and railed against democracy (which he said was used to replace the rule of God), secular laws, Christians, and Muslim minorities such as Shiites and Sufis. He presented his fiery sermons to audiences of ordinary people in northern Nigeria’s vernacular languages, establishing a populous niche that helped him advance his own status and agenda.

In the early 2000s, the government considered Yusuf to be a minor nuisance and did not seriously oppose him. Yet, his movement was growing, and his sermons often addressed topics of concern to some Muslims. Yusuf’s criticisms of Nigerian government corruption seemed honest, and many parents were also afraid that Western-style schools would lead their children to become Christians or atheists.

When oil revenues fell in the early 1980s, the governmental program for universal primary education collapsed leaving many young people unable to obtain either a Western or Islamic education. Under these circumstances, a number of young men entered into criminal gangs, substantially increasing violence in northern cities and shantytowns, making life there almost intolerable. Moreover, by the mid-1980s, some Nigerian Muslims believed their country had failed at all major secular forms of government: parliamentary, presidential, and military, as well as capitalism and small amounts of socialism. Islamic government may have seemed like a way to roll back kleptocracy and nepotism and to reestablish some level of order.

As the northern crisis deepened, Nigerian leaders became increasingly concerned about Boko Haram and eventually moved against it within the larger context of an antibandit campaign. The campaign during 2009 was authentic, but it was also used as cover to
strike the organization, with several battles paralyzing Maiduguri before
the government defeated the radicals. In this struggle, hundreds of Boko
Haram members were killed, and Yusuf was captured and killed in what
was almost certainly an extrajudicial murder. After these events, the
Nigerian leadership believed that the danger had passed. But it had
not. The new Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau, was determined
to rebuild in a way that radically expanded the use of violence. Under
his leadership, the organization evolved from the broken fragments of
a mass preaching movement into an exceptionally brutal terrorist and
guerrilla-warfare organization.

Correspondingly, Boko Haram prioritized efforts to obtain military-
grade weapons and learn how to manufacture bombs. It also had
considerable success in attacking prisons, freeing at least hundreds of
incarcerated members to replenish the organization’s ranks. By 2013, the
organization sought territorial conquest and displayed a willingness to
confront Nigerian forces in open battles. In late 2014, Shekau declared
that territory under Boko Haram’s control was no longer part of Nigeria.
Rather, it was a new territory defined by devotion to true Islam.

As the struggle developed, Boko Haram also faced a number
of problems in part due to its extensive and often arbitrary brutality
and murder. Concurrent with his many successful efforts to rebuild
the organization, Shekau also adopted broad and savage criteria for
declaring other Muslims to be unbelievers who had to be killed. Such
actions provoked fear and backlash among the northern population and
became a problem for Boko Haram when the government created an
official vigilante force to assist military units and provide them with local
intelligence. Further complicating the situation, in late 2011 breakaway
members of Boko Haram formed a less murderous splinter group.

Disaffected senior members would later accuse Shekau of killing
civilians on a whim or for his personal benefit. The most infamous of
the Boko Haram attacks, the kidnapping of 276 Chibok school girls in
mid-April 2014, led to increased Western military aid to the Nigerian
government for its struggle to destroy the organization. In early 2015,
the Nigerian president, under severe domestic and foreign pressure,
instantiated an offensive to destroy Boko Haram that also involved the
militaries of Chad, Niger, and some foreign mercenaries. In December
2015, the Nigerian president announced the defeat of the group, which
had lost most of its territory, but clearly continued to exist.

In considering this struggle, Thurston also discusses Boko Haram’s
ties with radical groups such as al-Qaeda and its affiliates and the
Islamic State. He acknowledges information on such ties is limited,
and his conclusions have to be tentative. According to Thurston, Boko
Haram seems to have maintained only limited contact with al-Qaeda
in Pakistan and Afghanistan. But the group sought to improve these
ties to obtain weapons, money, and training. They further sought to
reach out to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), one of the
core organization’s most important affiliates. AQIM may have initially
provided limited support, but Shekau appears to have undermined his
case for further aid by ordering the murder of several Nigerian jihadists
within Boko Haram, whom AQIM knew and respected. Al-Qaeda
central appears to have decided against any agreement with Shekau as
he increasingly appeared headstrong, erratic, and willing to engage in
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Thurston also doubts that the Islamic State provided much support to Boko Haram even after it declared loyalty to the Caliphate in March 2015. At that point, Islamic State leaders might have viewed Nigeria as a marginal sideshow, although this situation may yet change.

Thurston doubts the Nigerian government will permanently defeat Boko Haram or its descendants as long as poverty, unemployment, and corruption dominate northern Nigeria. He also states that harsh Nigerian military tactics can harm civilians and inadvertently strengthen Boko Haram. Unfortunately, his search for alternatives does not come up with much. He likes the concept of a deradicalization program, but such efforts have often failed outside of Saudi Arabia, where they are exceptionally well funded in ways that few other countries can duplicate. Nevertheless, Thurston is clearly correct that efforts to destroy Boko Haram will need a political as well as a military component and that the government needs to make a strong effort to win the loyalty of all its northern citizens. Finally, a central lesson of this study is that Boko Haram rose from the ashes once in its history and could do so again as the result of Nigerian and world complacency.

Congo’s Violent Peace: Conflict and Struggle Since the Great African War

By Kris Berwouts

Reviewed by Diane Chido, author of Intelligence Sharing on Transnational Organized Crime in Peace Keeping Environments

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) strives to prove the central theme of George Friedman’s book, Flashpoints: the most dangerous thing in the world to be is rich and weak. With nearly 20 years of experience working and living in the country for which he expresses great love and despair, author Kris Berwouts endeavors to overcome the casual observer’s tendency to miss the region’s complexity and nuance and to dismiss the frequent and intense violence as “senseless savagery.” He provides a cogent analysis of the three root causes of conflict as the dismemberment of the Congolese state, the extension of the Rwandan conflict, and the illicit exploitation of Congo’s natural resources.

The key takeaway of this book is an appreciation of Congo as a nation of extremes. It is the largest country in sub-Saharan Africa. It has the greatest variety and amount of natural resources. It has borne the deadliest series of conflicts since World War II. And, its 2006 election was so heavily supported by the European Union that it has been called the most expensive poll in history. The dizzying array of violent armed groups, which Berwouts terms “social bandits” exacerbating violent conflict in Congo, caused this analyst to long for a social network map, but the acronym list provided a critical reference.

For a brief historical recap, King Afonso I ascended the Congolese throne in 1506, soon after the first Portuguese settlers arrived, and reigned for the next 40 years as the slave trade gained momentum and utterly transformed the region. Afonso sent many letters to King John
III in Lisbon imploring him to only send priests and teachers to Congo and not the traders with their Western wares for which “a monstrous greed” had adversely affected his subjects.

Foreshadowing modern Western involvement that would have little regard for what the Congolese want or need, the slave trade continued and with the reign of Belgian King Leopold II from 1865, conditions for the population of Congo only became increasingly worse. Although Western interest in exploiting Congo has not waned and should not be excused, regional and domestic corruption and avarice are the more immediate causes maintaining this “violent peace.”

Mobutu Sese Seko’s harsh autocratic 32-year rule continued the enslavement of the population and provided very little healthcare, education, or economic opportunity, much less political freedom under the one-party system. Deep entanglements with neighboring Rwanda also prevent peaceful development, as does the unfortunate role of the Congolese defense forces as more of a problem than a solution to Congo’s many ills.

Berdwouts argues the end of the Cold War and Mobutu’s departure in 1997 caused Congo’s current disarray and frequent violence as societal institutions and networks were dismantled in a rush to democratization, as in contemporaneous Yugoslavia, while the autocratic rule at the top lost its patrons and was no longer able to suppress the fires of nationalist secession. Although the overt genocide in Rwanda during 1994 appeared to be managed, the struggle between Hutus and Tutsis has continued with Congo as a new battlefield.

While Mobutu was deathly ill, Rwanda and Uganda supported Laurent Desire Kabila as the only warlord who, while enriching himself in Tanzania, had not been a Mobutu crony. The first phase of their great African war fought on Congolese territory installed Kabila as president about 10 days after Mobutu had left the country for medical treatment. By July 1998, Kabila was viewed as Rwanda and Uganda’s puppet, so he ousted Rwandan officials to save his domestic reputation. These former allies returned with their armies in an effort to replace him. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) sent a multinational contingent to restore stability, but the war still resulted in massive displacement and the creation of huge and vulnerable refugee camps that remain targets for political wrangling and violence. Thus delivered, Kabila presided over the fractious DRC until his assassination in 2001. He was then succeeded by his son, Joseph, who has held power since.

Berdwouts painstakingly describes the various players and their wrangling, with elections and a fragile peace process as a backdrop, emphasizing that the cause of the continuing violence was not the great African war but rather the ready availability of exploitable resources that enable all of the elite and armed factions involved to continue to fund themselves and their personal battles for territory and power. Their nationalism is a thin veneer as they form alliances of convenience across ethnic lines, thus reducing the population to the status of pawns.

The failure of colonial Europeans to understand the natural fluidity of identity led to the creation of national and subnational borders that were assumed to be related to the populations that lived in given
locations, but for the populations, ethnicity was not a binary concept. The new maps and their enforcement created territorial enclaves that solidified identity, and thus today’s identity-based politics. These associations were exacerbated by the Belgians importing labor, creating a sense of nativism versus foreigner, even within the same ethnic group.

With democracy and land ownership came new a concept that the size of a constituency mattered for elections, so implementing exclusionary rules for determining who is a citizen with voting and landowning rights coupled with targeted violence made perfect sense. Such outcomes resulted in communities and individuals with economic interests who perceived a need to form armed militias. Thus, it is clear that the savagery is by no means senseless.

Berwouts concludes that the international community continues to “benevolently” impose new peace and stability efforts on DRC and the region as a whole that ignore local realities. A lack of political will within the domestic arena, along with the failure of the international community to hold DRC to recommended security sector reforms, as well as police and military leaders who see their territories as personal piggybanks, have led to a continued vortex of violence and exploitation.

Berwouts describes the use of rape as a calculated weapon of war that has three decisive effects. First, women are used as a spoil of war to define the victor. Then in the spirit of genocide, as a direct attack on the reproductive capacity of the target group. And finally, just when it seems the conflict is over, security forces, and even local members of a community, engage in such acts with impunity, thus solidifying the poison of conflict in the population’s culture.

With greed, a lack of legitimacy and governance, and stalled security sector reform, Congo has been exploited since its “discovery” without pause for its valuable resources, including its people. In fact, Berwouts posits “kleptocracy” was coined to describe Congo, leaving the reader with a feeling of dread for the country’s future.

**Militarised Responses to Transnational Organised Crime: The War on Crime**

Edited by Tuesday Reitano, Lucia Bird Ruiz-Benitez de Lugo, and Sasha Jesperson

Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, adjunct research professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army

*Militarised Responses to Transnational Organised Crime* is drawn from a series of conference papers—delivered at expert seminars in London in November 2015 and in Geneva in February 2016 by sixteen contributors—along with introductory and concluding contextual essays penned by two of the editors. British and European scholarly thinking and perceptions primarily influence the work that has direct linkages to the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime based in Geneva and the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies based in London.
The book focuses on militarized responses to organized criminal actors engaging in four forms of illicit activity: wildlife crime, piracy, smuggling of migrants, and drug trafficking. It concerns the decades old “blurred crime and war” operational environment—both these activities and the responses to them are covered within. A key statement found in the introduction related to militarized response to transnational organized crime (TOC) is as follows:

Militarised approaches are at one end of a spectrum that extends to people-centred development approaches. In light of the discussions around comprehensive approaches, responses to organised crime should sit near the centre of this spectrum. They should constitute a mix of security responses that combine intelligence, law enforcement, and the direct pursuit of criminals with development strategies that engage with the factors that make a country vulnerable to organised crime. (3)

Unfortunately the “spectrum” insight is not further developed within the work—nor is a more in-depth treatment of the proposed integrated response later advocated in the concluding chapter (346–47). Conceptually, the term “ungoverned” as opposed to “alternatively governed” spaces is utilized for a sectional header, which represents a missed nuance (5). Nature abhors a vacuum, and when the state was never present in an area or has since been forced to retreat, criminal actors actively fill the void with their own form of street governance.

We also get a sense of the sizes and monetary values of some of the economies related to the different illicit activities focused upon, but this was never made fully clear within the book. The intractability of these illicit activities is summed up at the end of the work: “The conclusion therefore is for the urgent need to build awareness and capacity in policymakers to view organised crime as a nuanced threat—one that often has deep socio-economic roots and few easy solutions” (348).

This, however, then takes us down the path of requiring a “multidimensional harm reduction narrative” and monitoring “the evolution of war talk” to help mitigate the propensity for militarized response (348). What results is a catch-22 situation regarding development—formal economy creation is desperately needed to address underlying socio-economic conditions in areas where organized crime is taking root, but development is not taking or simply cannot take place. In a globalized economy where multinational corporations and sovereign wealth funds are constantly shifting assets to achieve the highest annualized returns—and at times either indirectly or directly profit from the illicit economy—investing in development for its own sake is a minor consideration. As a result, with organized crime either outgunning or co-opting the policing and law enforcing institutions of beleaguered states, the only remaining viable responses to such activity are either military (institutional) or vigilante (armed citizen) or mercenary (paid corporate contractor).

The work itself is composed of two introductory essays, four thematic illicit activity sections (wildlife crime, piracy, migrant smuggling, and drug trafficking) each comprised of four essays, a conclusion, and an index. Endnotes and the authors biographies are provided at the back of each of the nineteen essays found within the book. A number of figures also exist within the well-referenced work. Of the four thematic essay clusters, the reviewer found wildlife crime to be the most interesting.
followed by piracy, migrant smuggling, and then drug trafficking—though this may well be due to his in depth knowledge related to the latter. A most illustrative essay, by Julian Rademeyer, on rhino poaching in South Africa’s Kruger National Park provides an overview of what has become an increasingly militarized and unwinnable conflict between park rangers and gangs of armed poachers (43–59). That these poachers should be celebrated by locals in songs and considered victimized when killed—as opposed to the dwindling herds of rhinos preyed upon or the rangers defending them—adds a surreal nature to these criminal acts.

A minor difficulty with the work is that the individual essays are drawn from two expert seminars then grouped together in thematic clusters. This creates a bit of uneven coverage of the topical areas of emphasis as well as generates some noticeable differences in the quality of the contributions themselves. Another more pressing issue with the work is its steep cost. This suggests that it will be accessed primarily through university libraries or interlibrary loan, which will greatly limit its impact.

A final assessment of Militarised Responses to Transnational Organised Crime is that it only has marginal utility for the majority of senior defense community members. Unless such a community member has a specific need to address militarized responses to TOC (either generally or related to a specific form of illicit activity), the work is too specialized a read. Further, the overall gestalt of the work, which is more military response debate, focused essentially long on what is wrong with such responses but offered little on what to do about them (3). Thus, interest will be higher among academic readers. Given the volume is meant to fill an analytical and research gap in this area of policy studies, it should be considered more an exploratory effort than a more mature study for defense community application.
The Angel: The Egyptian Spy Who Saved Israel
By Uri Bar-Joseph

Reviewed by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, professor emeritus, US Army War College

The Angel is an interesting and important examination of one of Israel’s most successful espionage efforts. This operation began in 1970 and involved the penetration of the highest level of Egyptian political and military decision-making by a spy within Egypt’s political elite. The author of this study, Uri Bar-Joseph, is an Israeli scholar with a background as a military intelligence officer and access to a variety of declassified Israeli military files. Bar-Joseph identifies Ashraf Marwan as Egypt’s most important traitor as well as the most valuable spy in Israeli history. Marwan was the son-in-law of Egypt’s President Gamal Abdul Nasser, and became a key advisor to President Anwar Sadat after Nasser’s death. Perhaps surprisingly, Marwan played only a marginal role in the Nasser government since his father-in-law disliked him and thought he had married his daughter, Mona, as a career move. Nasser also obtained evidence that Marwan had received money through personal corruption and then angrily pressured Mona to divorce her husband. Mona steadfastly refused to do so, and Nasser grudgingly allowed his son-in-law to continue work as a minor official in the president’s office under the supervision of Sami Sharaf, Nasser’s despotic chief of staff.

Unsurprisingly, Marwan was miserable in his job, which (along with his wife’s salary) allowed him only a frugal middle-class lifestyle, far less than what he had expected at the time of his marriage. He probably hated Nasser, who continued to view him with contempt, and he also did not enjoy enforced private austerity. Thus, for whatever mix of reasons, in the summer of 1970, Marwan chose to contact Israeli intelligence operatives via the embassy in London, England, where he occasionally traveled and volunteered for service as a paid Mossad spy. All intelligence agencies are suspicious of such “walk-ins,” but the Israelis were also intrigued. Although Marwan was not an important decision maker within Nasser’s staff, he did have access to important documents, and quickly demonstrated his ability to obtain valuable information, which seemed genuine and could be at least partially validated by other sources. Mossad gave Marwan the codename of “The Angel” which referred to the 1960s television series, The Saint, broadcast in Israel as The Angel.

Nasser’s September 1970 death gave Marwan an opportunity for advancement within the Egyptian hierarchy, but only if he could find a patron who viewed him as useful and perhaps was not so puritanical about corruption. He placed his hopes on President Anwar Sadat, Nasser’s vice president and successor, who was widely viewed as a caretaker who would quickly be brushed aside by powerful opponents. Moreover, Sadat, unlike his rivals, did not have a network of loyalists and had to take his help where he could get it. Threatened with ouster, Sadat made his move in May 1971 when he undertook what he called the “Corrective Revolution” and removed his most powerful enemies
from positions of power. Bar-Joseph maintains that all sources on this power struggle agree that Marwan “played a central role in helping Sadat overcome his opponents and establish his rule over Egypt” apparently by providing the president with incriminating documents about his rivals (88). These assessments of Marwan’s actions in the crisis appear to have been borne out by his rapid and dramatic promotion to the important posts of presidential secretary and Sadat’s personal emissary to Libya and Saudi Arabia. Without Nasser’s restraint, Marwan again began enriching himself through graft, while maintaining his lucrative financial sideline of selling secrets to Israel.

The most pressing question for Israeli intelligence at this time was under what conditions would Egypt consider itself ready to attack Israel, even if only for limited war aims in Sinai. According to Bar-Joseph, Marwan provided important and detailed documents indicating how Egyptian forces planned to cross the Suez Canal. This information on Egyptian strategic thinking helped provide the framework for “the Concept,” an overarching paradigm that guided Israeli strategic planning and military decision-making from late 1970 until October 1973. The Concept dictated that the Egyptians would not attack into the Sinai Peninsula without first developing a way of compensating for Israeli air superiority other than surface-to-air missiles on the west bank of the Suez Canal (many of which were at fixed sites). Additionally, according to the Concept, Sadat would fear attacking Israeli forces under any circumstances without a deterrent force to threaten Israeli cities and thereby prevent a process of escalation that might include bombing of Egyptian targets throughout the country. Such sites could not be protected by the Egyptian Air Force. Bar-Joseph bluntly maintains that Israeli military intelligence was then under the command of a group of officers whose commitment to the Concept was “unwavering, almost religious” (189).

In early 1973, Marwan reported that Egypt was becoming increasingly interested in a limited war to challenge a status quo that its leaders viewed as intolerable. Sadat had by then made some progress in obtaining appropriate aircraft and Scud missiles able to provide some sort of minimal deterrent against Israeli strikes on Egypt’s urban areas. In this environment, Marwan became a key source of information about Egyptian changes in strategic thinking and the development of a workable plan for attacking Israeli forces. Unfortunately for them, many Israeli military leaders refused to abandon or even modify the Concept, which was by now deeply rooted in their strategic outlook.

Additionally, Sadat closely protected the exact date of the attack, and Marwan found out only by accident one day before the initial Egyptian and Syrian strikes. He passed this information on to his Israeli contacts, although some key military intelligence officials doubted the warnings. Under these circumstances, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir made the hard choice of overruling her defense minister and fully mobilized Israeli reserve forces. Bar-Joseph maintains that this action prevented an even larger Israeli defeat than occurred in the first week of the war, before Israel was able to turn the situation around.

After the war, Marwan’s relationship with Sadat cooled, and he was dismissed from his role in the president’s office in March 1976 in order to lead an industrial consortium. Marwan’s power within the Egyptian
leadership then ended when Sadat was assassinated in 1981 and Vice President Hosni Mubarak (whom Marwan disliked) took power. Correspondingly, Marwan moved to London in 1981 where he sought to make money, making good use of his contacts throughout the Arab world and continuing to provide what information he could to Mossad. At this time, Marwan faced some serious problems as information started to leak about his activities with Mossad. Bar-Joseph accuses a former head of Israeli military intelligence of leaking this information on the basis of his belief that Marwan was a double agent, a charge he dismisses as “baseless fantasy” (228).

As sometimes happens with spies, in June 2007, Marwan died a mysterious death when he jumped, or was pushed, from the balcony of his London apartment. Bar-Joseph believes he was killed by Egyptian intelligence, although Marwan’s widow, Mona, later told the Observer that Mossad had killed him for being a double agent for Egypt. Bar-Joseph strongly maintains that Mossad leaders saw his death as a disaster since they now looked incapable of protecting their spies, something that could seriously undermine future recruitment.

Bar-Joseph’s book is well researched and well reasoned, but early books on complex and multidimensional intelligence operations using authoritative but incomplete sources can often be unreliable. Bar-Joseph is aware of this shortcoming and expresses his hope that this work survives the test of time. While some formerly classified Israeli information on this matter has been released, Mossad files on Marwan remain closed, and the organization has little incentive to release them in the foreseeable future. Bar-Joseph has therefore written the most complete and authoritative book that can be expected under contemporary circumstances, but there may be many plot twists to this story that remain unknown, at least for now.

Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States

By Mara E. Karlin

Reviewed by MAJ Jonathan Freeman, strategic planner, Headquarters, US Army

Those interested in building partner militaries should be delighted to find that Mara E. Karlin’s book is extremely well written and very well organized. A reader can easily navigate through the chapters and the concepts. Those who have read a fair share of national security policy-oriented books will appreciate the author’s writing style and clear language, which make the book a relatively easy read.

In focusing on internal rather than external threats, Karlin magnifies the focus against the popular idea within the national security community that more is always the answer. As someone who deployed to Iraq in 2007 as part of the Military Transition Teams, I understood and appreciated the more nuanced argument: “To effectively strengthen partner militaries in fragile states, the US military must transform its engagement with them” (2).
Karlin’s case study selections are excellent. Though her choice of Vietnam as an example of failure was a little obvious, she did a very good job of staying on her point and avoiding the likely pitfalls. While the choice of Greece as an example of successful buildup of partner militaries is interesting, the dichotomy of the two Lebanese cases makes this book unique. In the first case, Karlin makes a solid argument that US support for the Lebanese military partially failed due to the involvement of regional actors. The second case, however, truly displays the complications of building partner militaries when she discusses how the Lebanese both criticized US assistance although the Lebanese officials and also failed to take full advantage of that assistance. A perfect example was the number of Lebanese officials that declared they were more pleased with American training than equipment, while placing an officer recently trained in counterterrorism in charge of the gym at the Beirut officers’ club.

The critiques of Building Militaries in Fragile States involve the definitions, charts, graphs, and the Vietnamese case study. The definitions avoid taking a strong stance, which makes the book read more like a history than a social science-based policy book. Whether referring to military assistance, security force assistance, or something else entirely, Karlin is in a unique position to enlighten her readers about her definitions of concepts, and even how those definitions evolved during her career in academe and policy. The charts and graphs seemed to be more of a distraction than a visual enhancement for the argument. More than likely, these unnecessary illustrations were added at the behest of senior academics.

Lastly, the Vietnamese case study was problematic. Though the conclusions are understandable and correct, the manner in which Karlin comes to them will likely concern people far more knowledgeable of Vietnam than me. Karlin operates on the theory that the failures in Vietnam of the Military Assistance Advisory Groups and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam were due primarily to the lack of focus on internal security and the toxic leadership of Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams. Appreciating that this study focused on the military, there can be no denying that government corruption of the Republic of Vietnam was a major factor in losing hearts and minds. From the aspect that the failure of Vietnam was due to Williams’s specific personality, there was little mention of either President Diem Ngo Dinh or Major General Edward G. Lansdale, both of whom could have easily had the failure of Vietnam laid at their feet.

In summary, Building Militaries in Fragile States is an excellent policy book trying to wrestle with a problem that has confounded the United States for many, many years. Karlin speaks from a unique academic and policy background, making a case that few can. She neither tries to cheapen her argument with easy fixes or silly analogies but charges all academic, government, and military professionals to continue searching for answers. Her main point emphasizing how is one that policymakers should, and hopefully will, be more considerate of. For those interested in becoming acquainted with the topic or those trying to consider different solutions to age-old problems, I highly recommend this book both for its content and readability.