Intelligence and Espionage

Why Spy? The Art of Intelligence
By Brian Stewart and Samantha Newbery

Reviewed by Adrian Wolfberg, PhD, Chair of Defense Intelligence, School of Strategic Landpower, US Army War College

Stewart’s book, Why Spy?, is written for the British public and its intelligence practitioners and scholars. Few British intelligence practitioners have shared their experiences, and Stewart’s book adds richness to the limited genre.

Americans, on the other hand, are familiar with the litany of articles and books about national security intelligence; American practitioners have authored many of these, its scholars too. The American public had its eyes opened to intelligence in the aftermath of Watergate and the Church and Pike Committees of the 1970s. Even Kent and Kendall, practitioners of intelligence, talked openly about the intelligence domain in 1949, and from then to the present, American practitioners and scholars have had a continued conversation about it.

The relative openness about intelligence that Americans take for granted is only a fairly recent phenomenon in the United Kingdom. It was not until the end of the twentieth century that the existence of MI5 (the Security Service focused on foreign threats inside the United Kingdom), MI6 (the Secret Intelligence Service focused on foreign threats outside the United Kingdom), and the Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ), the equivalent of America’s National Security Agency, were acknowledged by British officials.

American intelligence practitioners and scholars should appreciate this contextual divide between the relative well-established public treatment of intelligence in the United States and the relative new treatment in the United Kingdom in order to find new and interesting value in Why Spy? American consumers of intelligence—civilian and military decision makers—will find this very readable book of considerable value.

Stewart was an intelligence analyst in Britain’s MI6, who rose to chair the United Kingdom’s Joint Intelligence Committee from 1968-1972, and who retired in 1978. Stewart, who died in 2015, was the primary author of Why Spy? written just prior to his death at the age of 93. He spent 50 years working in the intelligence field.

Stewart presents two key areas, not typically addressed by American authors, but of potential interest to all audiences. First, using his personal experiences serving in Malaya in the late 1940s and early 1950s, in Vietnam in the 1960s, and in China on and off from the 1940s to the 1980s, he convincingly argues that living in the country for which one is responsible produces much better quality analysis than without such experience. He identifies the lack of truly understanding the nuances and complexities of a culture as a central problem of Western intelligence agencies.
Second, Stewart calls attention to the distinction between intelligence and covert action. He carefully defines intelligence as “…the business of collecting information, analyzing it, assessing it, and presenting it to those known as customers to assist their policymaking and decisions,” an activity not purely practiced within the domain of government but in business as well. He juxtaposes intelligence with covert actions as activities “not concerned with intelligence gathering or assessment… but to affect events.” Stewart raises the question of whether intelligence agencies should carry out covert action, or whether other parts of government, like the military, should. He does not advocate the military, rather, he observes it is an easy target to pin this policy-effecting activity on, and that democracies should open the debate of who should own covert action capability. Implicitly, Stewart is asking whether covert action is intelligence, or something else. He comes down on the side of the latter.

Stewart’s insider view of the United Kingdom’s foreign intelligence service highlights four topics that will be of interest to a British audience. These topics, well documented in American literature on intelligence, are not especially new or insightful. However, Stewart discusses these topics in a very accessible and personalized way that will be of interest to the combat arms military professional. First, he outlines the relationship between analyst and customer—the policymaker and the operational military commander—and their responsibilities: the analyst to ensure the customer takes notice of what is presented, and the customer for not ignoring or rejecting inconvenient information. Second, he identifies common cognitive limitations of analysts, including mirror imaging, groupthink, over-reliance on the importance of numbers, wishful thinking, and thinking the adversary is better equipped and prepared. Third, Stewart talks about the moral aspects of intelligence, primarily with regard to torture and interrogation. Fourth, he reviews intelligence failures surrounding Pearl Harbor in the 1940s, Cuba in the 1960s, and Iraq in the early 2000s. These reviews were not based on Stewart’s personal experiences and were not particularly well documented in terms of references.

Why Spy? is a great introduction to the intelligence field, especially for American consumers of intelligence: the policymaker and the military decision maker.

The Future of Foreign Intelligence: Privacy and Surveillance in a Digital Age
By Laura K. Donohue

Reviewed by Richard H. Immerman, Francis W. DeSerio Chair in Strategic Intelligence, US Army War College, and Edward J. Buthusiem Distinguished Faculty Fellow in History, Temple University

A synthesis of history, constitutional law, and political theory, The Future of Foreign Intelligence powerfully explores the tension between security and civil liberties that has pervaded America since the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. This tension has waxed and waned throughout the course of US history. We think of the Alien
and Sedition Acts; Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus; the Palmer Raids; the internment of Japanese-Americans; McCarthyism; and the catalysts for the Church Committee Hearings; enactment of the Hughes-Ryan and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Acts; and establishment of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. That list is far from complete. But it is sufficient to suggest although America’s pendulum historically swung back and forth, US citizens could count on the restoration of a proper balance.

In this slim book, Laura K. Donohue explains why she fears restoring this balance may no longer be possible, and why American’s civil liberties will be the loser. The new technologies so central to contemporary life have served as game changers in terms of defining a “search” and a “reasonable expectation of privacy” and of distinguishing between what is foreign and what is domestic. Frequently, but not always, following the recommendations of the intelligence agencies, the White House, Congress, and the courts have progressively institutionalized the erosion of the Fourth Amendment. Donohue, a professor of law at Georgetown University whom the US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) appointed to serve as an amicus curiae, does not evaluate what damage Edward Snowden’s revelations about National Security Agency (NSA) programs may have caused America’s security. But she does highlight the evidence they provide about the damage these and attendant programs have done to the core values of America’s Constitution. She recommends some reforms, but they do not seem sufficient.

Though short and lightly footnoted, this book is not easy to read. Donohue writes coherently and fluidly, but the nature of her subject requires employing legalese to drill down deeply into case law. Still, she succeeds in making intelligible the evolution of the legal framework put in place since the 1970s to guide the collection of intelligence, especially foreign intelligence. Donohue pays particular attention to the protections afforded US citizens, and it is in this area the definitions of “search” and a “reasonable expectation of privacy” emerge as so salient. She argues persuasively the legislation and executive orders implemented during the administrations of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan manifested bipartisan agreement on the “need to provide heightened protections for US citizens.” (11) Even after the Oklahoma bombings and rise of al-Qaeda in the 1990s, these protections remained largely intact. Then came 9/11. Arguing that in an instant everything changed, Donohue is again persuasive. The Intelligence Community proposed Congress and the Bush administration roll back the pre-existing protections, and the new technologies provided instruments to achieve that end.

Donohue also makes explicit her judgment these changes have not been for the better. Put bluntly, she assesses the post-9/11 surveillance programs as legally problematic and unwarranted. She implies, and here the reader would have benefited from deeper analysis and fuller development, the legal framework created in the 1970s, and amended in the 1980s and 1990s, could have adequately provided security for Americans citizens without violating their constitutional rights and American values. But the tragedy of 9/11 generated a political culture that allowed the government to act precipitously, surreptitiously, and, from Donohue’s point of view, recklessly. Beginning with STELLAR
WIND, the NSA program launched before the end of 2001, Donohue uses the Patriot Act, the 2008 FISA Amendments Act, the FISC’s authorization of PRISM and upstream collection, and parallel initiatives to construct her case. These legal, constitutional, and technological details are often overwhelming. She introduces the reader to “pen registers” and “trap-and-trace devices,” and she devotes entire chapters to “metadata,” and “content.” She also interrupts the narrative to present a history of the Fourth Amendment and the prohibition against general warrants that dates back to England’s Magna Carta in the 13th century. The arc of her story, nevertheless, is unmistakable: A founding precept of the United States was the “positive right to secure in one’s person, home, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search and seizure.” (84-85) This positive right was inviolate—until 9/11.

The America Donohue portrays is an America far different than what the Founding Fathers imagined. She implores Americans to ask themselves if this is the America they want.
David Price provides the reader with a descriptive narrative of the relationship that grew between the US government and anthropologists during the Cold War, and that was anchored to funding provided for anthropological research by various government agencies. Price’s concern is this relationship distorted anthropology to the extent its practitioners became thralls of the US military and the CIA. Indeed, Price spends three chapters describing the controversy and divisive impact such ties had on the internal workings of anthropology’s flagship organization, the American Anthropology Association. Therefore, this book may be of greater interest to anthropologists wishing to learn about the evolution of their discipline. Other readers might find much of the narrative to be a tedious laundry list of who produced work for which US agency.

Price recognizes that ties with the government between anthropologists and other social scientists emerged during World War II in such organizations as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Office of War Information (OWI). Continuing these ties after the war was a logical extension of this earlier work. However necessary the wartime collaborations may have been, Price questions the ethics of these collaborations for what he sees as the less noble post-war objective of maintaining the American empire. On this point, anthropologists may well be more sensitive concerning the ethics of ties to the government than other social scientists because some anthropological work in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was used by the colonial powers to maintain their imperial control. Moreover, the discipline was shaken by charges made by noted anthropologist Franz Boas in 1919 that four anthropologists had “prostituted” their science by using it as a cover for spying in World War I. American policy.” Yet that game plan is contained in NSC-68 as written by Paul Nitze, whose ideas varied from those of Kennan. Inaccurately stating the context of Cold War strategy in this way is especially damaging for Price because he criticizes anthropologists who fail to include recognition of the broader political context in their works.

Given the themes of this book, it can be located as part of that literature from the political left critical of American Cold War foreign policy. As such, the book suffers from two of that literature’s flaws. First, like other critical examinations of American Cold War foreign policy—especially those dealing with developing countries—the author is surprised, and perhaps even offended, the United States pursued goals of national interest rather than humanitarian ones. This tendency is repeated throughout contemporary evaluations of Cold War modernization theory where scholars seem equally surprised the purpose the theory served was not humanitarian but strategic. Such views do not
take into account the fact that at the heart of a realist foreign policy that pursues strategic national interest lies a profoundly ethical concern. Hans Morgenthau, the father of the American realist school, illustrated this ethical concern when he asserted national survival is itself a moral principle with prudence as the supreme virtue in international politics. He went on to admonish those seeking moral crusades in foreign policy:

The lighthearted equations between a particular nationalism and the counsels of Providence is morally indefensible, for it is that very sin of pride against which the Greek tragedians and the Biblical prophets have warned rulers and ruled. That equation is also politically pernicious, for it is liable to engender the distortion in judgment which in the blindness of crusading frenzy, destroys nations and civilizations, in the name of moral principle, ideal or God himself.¹

A second flaw in this book relates to factual oversights and simplifications concerning Cold War American policy. One factual oversight is the misstatement concerning the relationship between Project Troy and the creation of MIT’s Center for International Studies (CENIS). Project Troy led to the establishment of CENIS, not the reverse as the author suggests. The author’s simplification relates to his view that it was George Kennan’s “Cold War game plan that aggressively guided

Perhaps it is appropriate to observe in this era of intense polarization in American politics that both the right and the left are guilty of tarnishing the American government. From the right, we hear the Reaganesque view that the most frightening words in the English language are “I’m from the government and I’m here to help” that suggests a certain illegitimacy of domestic government activity. From the left—as this book illustrates—we come away with the idea that pursuit of the national interest is an illegitimate basis for foreign policy. Both views contribute to the impoverishment of the very notion of governance and political responsibility.

**Afterwar: Healing the Moral Wounds of Our Soldiers**

By Nancy Sherman

Nancy Sherman’s book *Afterwar* makes an important contribution to what it means for a nation to go to war in the twenty-first century. It emphasizes soldiers’ struggles to reintegrate into society after returning from war and provides clear messages to multiple audiences in the critical areas of individual and collective responsibility, civil-military relations, and leadership. The book also has important lessons for individual soldiers, the public they serve, and the commanders and supervisors who have the best opportunity—and the greatest responsibility—to ensure the moral wounds associated with warfare are given the opportunity to heal.

Sherman builds on her previous works concerning how the “traditional” stoic ethos the military instills in its personnel prepares them well

for fighting in war, but at the expense of living well in peace. Stoicism’s
detachment from personal desire and its emphasis on responsibility has
bred combatants who willfully accept extreme hardship and who are
prepared to hold themselves accountable for events that may be beyond
their control. While great for warfighting, these traits can interfere with
their ability to handle the moral wounds with which they return.

Sherman describes a marine sergeant who was racked with guilt over
the loss of two other marines in Afghanistan and, as a result, developed
symptoms associated with Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). In
both cases, the sergeant pointed to an act he could have performed but
did not think of at the time. Here Sherman makes an important contri-
bution to understanding moral injury in war. Generally speaking, moral
injury occurs in the presence of grievous moral transgressions, whether
committed by oneself or others, that “overwhelm one’s sense of good-
ness and humanity.” However, the striking thing about war is moral
injury can occur even when the transgression is relatively trivial or, as
in other cases Sherman describes, when one has done nothing wrong.
This point suggests military leaders need to rethink what “command
responsibility” means so soldiers can fight effectively without causing
needless harm to themselves or those they lead.

Such injuries, Sherman argues, can also be exacerbated by soldiers’
sense of justice for the cause for which they fight. Psychologically, it is
easier to bear loss when tangible good results. In this regard, Sherman
has a message for the public these soldiers nominally defend. In her
excellent chapter, “Don’t Just Tell Me Thank You,” she discusses the
gap in civil-military relations that has inexplicably widened even after
more than a decade of war. Noting that less than one percent of the
US population serves, Sherman aptly describes how well-intentioned
expressions of gratitude by many of the 99 percent who do not serve
creates resentment. This resentment arises because civilians are largely
distanced from the cost of war and, as a result, the ubiquitous “thank
you for your service” can seem too cheap to count as sharing any part
of the burden. This distance further contributes to confusion among
soldiers and civilians alike about why exactly we are at war. If civilians
are not invested in the cause, we have only our leaders’ words that it is
both just and worthwhile. In today’s cynical society, that word is often
not enough.

Sherman’s point is not that civilians should not express gratitude.
As members of the public, they share enough responsibility for the war
that they owe those who fight more than “thank you,” if their senti-
ment is to be judged genuine. While Sherman offers a number of ways
civilians can constructively bear this burden, she boils it down to this:
“assurance from civilian and military leaders and, collectively, from a
nation, that they (soldiers) are never just forces, never just an asset to
be used (or preserved) instrumentally as a part of military necessity
in achieving missions (and continuing the fight).” Civilians should be
invested enough in the war effort to make their voices heard by electing
leaders who will fight the right wars in the right ways, and who are held
accountable when they do not.

Sherman also relates stories of women in combat zones who raised
concerns to their commanding officers regarding sexual harassment.
Sherman’s point is leaders should be especially sensitive where issues closely associated with identity—like sexuality—are involved.

The most important contribution of *Afterwar* is the lesson that the effective transition of soldiers back to society has to begin before the war starts. We need to pay attention to what we teach soldiers about responsibility, civilians about their duties, and leaders about how to build trust and hope in their subordinates to ensure they will be resilient in the face of adversity. While moral injury may be as unavoidable in war as physical injury, we have much to do before we fully realize our responsibilities to address it.
Lost in the cacophony of twitter-friendly bluster that passes for a pre-electoral conversation on national security is the cold reality of an America unprepared for technological attacks—whether by cyber, chemical and biological, or a slew of nuclear devices. This is not news; however the vast majority of Americans do not fully appreciate how the current threats fit into a larger context, what means are at our disposal to address them, and how the nation’s much-vaunted uberpwer status is not quite all it is cracked up to be. In no small measure, this unpreparedness is because we have managed to squander our enormous advantages by naively, myopically, or incompetently, failing to protect them.

For this problem and more, there is now a fascinating new book, Technology Security and National Power, by leading technology security expert Stephen D. Bryen. A former political science professor, his vast experience ranges from leading the Pentagon’s technology policy efforts during the Reagan years, serving on the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and vastly increasing the assets of a large aerospace and defense and high-technology company when he served as president of its North American branch.

Yet this is no “techy” tome; Bryen’s clear and lucid prose renders even highly technical material accessible to the general reader. The narrative begins with the Bible and underscores the critical, if not decisive, effect of technological superiority in determining “winners vs. losers,” with particular emphasis on the recent past—and the American experience in particular.

History, unsurprisingly, turns out to have been far more contingent than it appears in hindsight, and in ways that are still, stubbornly, relevant. For example, though most people know Germany’s atomic program had been very advanced in the 1940s, often neglected are Japan’s efforts, which consisted of two programs—one of which belonged to the Japanese army and was based on Japan’s mainland, while the other was run by Japan’s navy in what is now…North Korea. Bryen concludes that “Russia’s hurried late entry in the war against Japan and occupation of part of Korea, should be seen for what it most likely was: an effort to stop Japan from getting a bomb.” The rest is not just history; it is now.

The story of chemical and biological weapons is of particular interest, considering how easy they are to obtain and to use, and how many companies (Bryen estimates, “countless”) worldwide are willing to sell precursor materials and specialized manufacturing equipment to facilitate the production of such weapons. Though all but useless against modern armies equipped with protective gear and antidotes against nerve gases and anthrax, their deployment against civilians is
worrisome enough as instruments of terror, with great potential for blackmail and just plain mindless destruction.

Added to the continued danger from al-Qaeda, whose demise has been greatly exaggerated, are ongoing threats, notably from unstable Pakistan—which may have already acquired tactical nuclear weapons in addition to the uranium bomb—and Iran, which may decide to start supplying its surrogates, Hamas and Hezbollah, with chemical and biological weapons currently at its disposal. Argues Bryen: “Anyone today who believes that Iran is following only one path to make a bomb would be naive. No country exposed to Iran’s growing nuclear capability can afford to bet that Iran will abide by restrictions imposed by outsiders.” Naivety is a luxury that few outside the United States can afford.

But of all threats, perhaps the most likely—and most dangerous—in the near future is cyberwar. Though everyone knows the United States no longer has any control over the proliferation of electronic technology, the fact that even the Pentagon has turned to commercial off-the-shelf technology means it faces a huge set of vulnerabilities. Bryen points to an obvious, though under-reported, fallout from the infamous leaks by Edward Snowden: they undermined confidence in all security products from the United States. “Today American encryption products are under suspicion both at home and especially abroad.”

While the topics with contemporary relevance are more urgent, Technology Security and National Power is especially enjoyable for its richly detailed historical case studies which give it the flair of a detective story. For though we mostly know the ending, who won and who lost, the closeness of the outcome in too many cases should serve as a warning that happy endings are mostly made in Hollywood. Hoping to outsmart our enemies is proving increasingly difficult. This book will go a long way toward remedying that problem.

A Theory of the Drone
By Grégoire Chamayou; translated by Janet Lloyd

Reviewed by LTC Philip W. Reynolds, PhD Candidate, University of Hawaii-Manoa

Grégoire Chamayou’s A Theory of the Drone delves into the ethical and moral effects raised by the United States’ position as a dominant state, its hyperbolic capabilities, the use of drones, and the increasing commonality of signature strikes. The technology has become basic: drones were hypothesized as far back as the 1930s with their usefulness quickly converted to the battlefield. The theory of armed drones has hybridized police and army functions into what Chamayou calls a “conceptual monstrosity” (33). Their use is predicated on the legal justification of the needs of armed conflict, and the laws of war, in their ancient sense, were the codification of morality. Change the definitional underpinnings of armed conflict and one frees oneself from legal restriction. Chamayou (57) explains this causal juxtaposition, by which the threats that need pre-empting are everywhere, in turn requiring a new understanding of the geography of killing in which the combatant on the
battlefield has been flipped so that the battlefield is the combatant. This new foundational premise fundamentally changes war.

Clausewitz described war as a duel between protagonists when explaining his principles of battle. Instead of armies and battlefronts, to Chamayou drone warfare is a manhunt. Instead of combatants confronting each other, one is the hunter, and the other is the prey who flees and hides. This transitions war from what we knew to a war of the hunt. The changing relationship between what the state offers and what the citizen demands requires a change in the imposition of security. Anti-terrorism has as its tactic the elimination of the emerging threats. Chamayou’s calculus is killing breeds more terrorists, an assumption buttressed by a program and its statistics of success which are misleadingly simple. The positive reinforcement of the tactics of pre-emption leads to more killing in an amaranthine loop. Military professionals are familiar with the *ne plus ultra* of irregular war where the hunter must kill to win, while the hunted simply has to avoid death to win. War has become hunting and combat has become assassination.

The seduction of the drone has been the promised inevitable invulnerability. In its current form, airpower is the new mythical hero, the latest in a line stretching back to Achilles, Ajax, Isfenidiyar and Baldur. Like the giants of old, the technologization of warfare reveals the built-in weakness that invulnerability has—the valuation of human life, specifically Americans. Previously expected to close with and destroy the enemy, drones are the answer to America’s allergic reaction to the fate of combat (77). As the ability to preempt casualties has increased to the point of pondering riskless wars, the death threshold—that level at which America is willing to sustain deaths for a cause—has dropped precipitously. Only 18 dead in Mogadishu was enough to force a retreat. The subsequent death tolls in Iraq and Afghanistan—some 4,495 and 2,380 respectively—has seen a correlative increase in drone strikes. The Obama administration’s campaign promises of ending those wars saw an increase of some 700 percent, expanding from Pakistan to Somalia and Yemen.¹

Political expediency will continue to drive the automation of drone warfare. In an effort to avoid the odium of war and potential charges of public responsibility, increasingly complex algorithms will match behavior to predetermined guilt. The desire to kill from a distance is not new, indeed it is the goal of all commanders. Chamayou dismisses this important facet of the discussion of drone wars in his goal to maximize his argument and minimize those to whom a drone is, literally, the difference between life and death. Technological supremacy gives giant advantage to one side or the other, with spectacular results: General Lord Kitchener’s machine guns mowing down 10,000 Mahdi at Omdurman at only the cost of 50 British. The implication is there is a disguised element of racism in the use of untouchable technologically advanced weapons against tribes not far removed from witchcraft and magic.

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Chamayou’s most important contribution to the philosophy of war is life at both ends of killing demands a pause, an acceptance that combat is a most unfortunate option and to reject the idea of riskless war. The lesson of *A Theory of the Drone* is that it is not *recherché* to kill the defenseless, even one intent on murder.
Barak Mendelsohn has written a comprehensive and well-considered study of why al-Qaeda chose to associate itself with a number of largely autonomous, often uncontrollable, and geographically distant terrorist organizations under a “branching out” strategy widely known as “franchising.” Mendelsohn examines a number of important questions about al-Qaeda’s franchising effort, including a consideration of how well it has succeeded in advancing al-Qaeda’s interests. Throughout much of the work, he considers the potential gains and even higher risks of a franchising strategy, which have led al-Qaeda to accept various terrorist organizations as autonomous parts of their organization. He further asks why some franchises are more effective and loyal to the core organization than others and under what circumstances does franchising appear to be an attractive strategy.

Mendelsohn explains al-Qaeda did not begin its franchising strategy until 2003 rather than when the organization was at the height of its power and prestige immediately after the 9/11 strikes. He argues the franchising effort was al-Qaeda’s response to its rapidly declining fortunes following the US-led invasion of Afghanistan but prior to what he identifies as a jihadist renewal following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Mendelsohn further maintains al-Qaeda’s inflated views of its own importance after 9/11 required it to prove its ability to continue the struggle in the face of aggressive counter-terrorism measures. Unfortunately for bin Laden, al-Qaeda lacked sufficient capabilities to send its own members to establish multiple branches in new geographical arenas by 2003. Franchising existing terrorist organizations became the easy, cheap, but also risky response to this problem.

The al-Qaeda strategy of franchising has been organized as a two-tier structure with a central command (often called “al-Qaeda central” by both organization leaders and the media) and various subordinate branches, each of which is responsible for a particular geographical region. The central organization is formally responsible for high-level strategy and direction, while the franchises conduct daily operations often including local target selection, propaganda, recruitment, and coordination with potentially friendly organizations and individuals. Establishing franchises with local terrorist organizations also lowered al-Qaeda’s start-up costs by providing a pre-existing infrastructure and presenting the possibility of an immediate operational impact with local resources. An existing terrorist infrastructure usually includes operatives, support personnel, media, and logistical assets such as safe houses and access to weapons and money. Conversely, a central problem with franchises is that they are often extremely difficult to control. Franchises often provide late and incomplete information to their parent
organization, making it more difficult for the leadership to employ the
group effectively as part of a larger strategy. Whether or not the fran-
chise follows the parent group’s instructions to any serious extent often
depends on the affiliate’s reservoir of good will and if the group depends
on the parent organization financially.

There have also been different kinds of al-Qaeda franchises. In Iraq,
Algeria, and Somalia, that organization merged with existing radical
groups by mutual agreement. In Yemen and Saudi Arabia, they used
their own members to establish and organize the franchise. Under these
circumstances, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), operating
first out of Saudi Arabia and then Yemen, became al-Qaeda’s most
loyal supporter. Unsurprisingly, other affiliates without a history of
cooperation have showed much less loyalty and sometimes embarrassed
al-Qaeda by their undisciplined and counterproductive actions. In the
case of Somalia, for example, the merger with the local terrorist group
al-Shabab became a major problem. In this instance, al-Qaeda partnered
with a self-destructive group, with an authoritarian and paranoid leader,
Ahmed Abdi Godane, who weakened his organization through internal
purges and even killed foreign volunteers. In this environment, some
al-Shabab members chose to surrender to the government rather than
die at the hands of Godane’s executioners. Elsewhere, Algeria’s Salafist
Group for Preaching and Combat (French abbreviation: GSPC), became
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) after long and detailed nego-
tiations with bin Laden. This group appeared to have a great deal of
potential, but it never played out in the way the al-Qaeda leadership had
expected. Instead, AQIM basically operated as a criminal and smuggling
group and showed no capacity to strike at Europe as bin Laden had
hoped. Still, once foreign terrorist groups had become part of al-Qaeda,
between bin Laden and his deputy and eventual successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri,
remained reluctant to renounce undisciplined affiliates. Some members
of al-Qaeda central advocated that their organization sever ties with
rogue branches, but bin Laden believed these actions would have
required an unacceptable level of public disclosure about severe internal
differences within al-Qaeda.

Despite significant difficulties in Somalia and Algeria, the most
serious franchise problems for al-Qaeda clearly came from Iraq where
bin Laden sought and obtained an affiliation with Tawhid wal-Jihad
(TWJ), led by the deeply problematic and untrustworthy Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi. TWJ, which had been operating in Iraq since before the war,
agreed to affiliate with al-Qaeda and became al-Qaeda in the Land of
Two Rivers (often shortened to al-Qaeda in Iraq or AQI). The merger
allowed al-Qaeda to maintain that it was fighting in the central battle
against US forces in the Middle East, but TWJ demanded as a condition
for union that they be allowed to continue prioritizing fighting against
Iraq’s Shi’a Muslims, whom Zarqawi hated. The al-Qaeda leadership
requested that Zarqawi place his war against the Shi’as on the back-
burner, but both he and his later successors were unwilling to do so.
Under pressure to show relevance, al-Qaeda accepted the union of the
two organizations on Zarqawi’s terms, and terrorism against Iraqi Shi’as
continued unabated. By late 2006 (shortly after Zarqawi’s death), AQI
merged with several smaller terrorist organizations to form the Islamic
State of Iraq (ISI), making these moves without bothering to consult the
al-Qaeda leadership. ISI later expanded into Syria and changed its name to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to reflect the organization’s operations in both theaters. When Zawahiri (by then the head of al-Qaeda) ordered ISIS to focus its activities on Iraq and allow al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate the Nusra Front to lead the jihadist efforts there he was met with open ISIS defiance.

The ISIS rebellion against al-Qaeda’s authority after bin Laden’s death exposed the new al-Qaeda leader’s inability to control its affiliates. While it was easier for ISIS to rebel against Zawahiri than bin Laden, Mendelsohn maintains that the rebellion was probably inevitable in any event. In ISIS, al-Qaeda faced a franchise that turned dramatically against them rather than simply an affiliate that tarnished the organization’s reputation. In response to this hostility, on February 2, 2014, al-Qaeda issued a statement announcing that it had severed its ties with ISIS and no longer considered the group to be one of its branches. At this point, it was clear Zawahiri had been deftly outmaneuvered by a strong and power-hungry competitor which successfully replaced al-Qaeda as the leading force in the global jihadist movement. Not long after these events, a number of al-Qaeda members in a variety of its franchises defected from the organization and pledged loyalty to ISIS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who was eventually to rename his organization the Islamic State.

In his conclusion, Mendelsohn maintains al-Qaeda’s franchising effort was a failure driven by the need to maintain leadership of the jihadist movement rather than a serious cost/benefit analysis of the wisdom of affiliating with various radical groups. Currently, al-Qaeda’s relevance has been almost completely displaced by the Islamic State, which even under heavy coalition bombing remains the most important organization within the jihadist movement. In contrast, Mendelsohn assesses al-Qaeda to be weaker than any time since it claimed the leadership of global jihadism. Perhaps its only franchise that continues to matter is AQAP, which has gradually been replacing al-Qaeda central by assuming greater responsibility for the future of the organization. Mendelsohn maintains there is almost no chance for al-Qaeda to recover its former status while Zawahiri is at the helm, and it has few accomplishments to show its constituency and financial supporters as the memory of 9/11 has faded. Under these circumstances, it is fully possible that the Islamic State will replace al-Qaeda in its few remaining sanctuaries such as Yemen and Pakistan, and that al-Qaeda will continue to recede into insignificance.

Iran’s Strategic Penetration of Latin America
Edited by Joseph M. Humire and Ilan Berman

Reviewed by Dr. José de Arimatéia da Cruz. Visiting Research Professor at the US Army War College and Professor of International Relations and Comparative Politics at Armstrong State University, Savannah, GA

Iran’s influence in Latin America and its national security implications have finally caught the attention of US policy makers in Washington. This greater interaction would go unnoticed were it not for the partnerships established between Iran and some of the Latin American countries.
Ahmadinejad’s political goal was to establish a policy toward Latin America that was anti-American. As he has publicly stated, “Tehran is pursuing a strategy that promotes its own ideology and influence in Latin America at Washington’s expense.” This foreign policy posture creates what the late Hugo Chavez referred to as “the axis of unity” foreign policy against the United States’ “imperialist” foreign policy. In one of Ahmadinejad’s many trips to Latin America in 2009, Chavez referred to him as a “gladiator of anti-imperialist struggles.” In Iran’s Strategic Penetration of Latin America, Joseph M. Humire and Ilan Berman call our attention to what they consider to be the most complex security challenge in the Western Hemisphere today, which is how deeply the Islamic Republic of Iran has penetrated the internal affairs of Latin America and what it means from a foreign policy perspective to the United States.

The book is divided into fourteen chapters, each addressing Iran’s relations with a specific country in Latin America. Within the book the authors focus on the organization known as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) founded by the late Hugo Chavez. Humire and Berman argue Iran’s expansion into areas not traditionally associated with its sphere of influence requires a global response since it represents an imminent threat to the rest of the world. America should play particular attention to Iran’s expanding influence since most of Iran’s diplomatic meddling is taking place in the US’s backyard.

Iran’s Latin American partners are part of the so-called “pink tide” that came to power between the years of 1998 and 2009. The “pink tide” nations are united by their strong contempt of Washington’s policies and anti-American sentiment. Despite the fact that the “pink tide” did not have a clear-cut ideology, they were united in opposition to the Washington Consensus, a laundry list of demands imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its economic policy toward the region. An alliance between the “pink tide” nations of Latin American and Iran represents an alternative to the United States and its intrusive foreign policy dictates. The book highlights how Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Colombia have become pawns in the Iranian chess game in its attempt to find an alternative to its economic and diplomatic isolation imposed by the United States resulting from the passage of the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012. Berman argues in the chapter “What Iran Wants in the Americas,” Iran’s goal in Latin America is to build support in the Americas for its diplomatic isolation as a rogue nation by establishing a presence in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Iran is also expanding its economic ties with the region by signing close to 500 cooperative agreements. Latin America provides Iran with an alternative for its quest for strategic resources. Again, Berman points out that, “since the mid-2000s Iran has become a major speculator in Latin America’s resource wealth.” (4) He also claims Iran’s Quds Force are deeply involved in Latin America “stationing operatives in foreign embassies, charities, and religious/cultural institutions to foster relationships with people, often building on existing socio-economic ties with the well-established Shia Diaspora.” (5)

Iran’s penetration of Latin America has also been facilitated by a marriage of radical ideologies. This marriage involves the union of radical
Islam with the radical left that has come to power with the rise of the “pink tide.” ALBA, according to Joel Hirst, is a revolutionary organization which challenges the Western world’s rule of law and representative democracy and seeks to replace it with a new authoritarian model of governance (21). Iran’s association with ALBA increases Iran’s diplomatic allies in the region, allows for engagement in economic trade while bypassing US economic sanctions, and allows Iran to further increase its participation in criminal activity such as supporting Hezbollah’s activities in the Tri-Border Area (Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay) and recruiting, indoctrinating and proselytizing Latin American citizens (27). The union of Iran with the ALBA axis represents “Washington’s greatest challenge in the Hemisphere” (30). Secretary of State Kerry’s Fall 2013 announcement that the “Era of Monroe Doctrine is Over” in a speech before the Organization of American States caused some Latin American leaders to believe the United States does not care about the region. The perception is Latin America will once again be a traditional “benign neglect” problem to be dealt with only when necessary.

Students at the US Army War College and future military leaders will greatly benefit from reading Iran’s Strategic Penetration of Latin America. Whether we agree with the authors’ overall assessment of Iran’s role in the region, one thing is for sure: Iran’s penetration of Latin America in such a short period of time presents a serious challenge to US national security interests in the Western Hemisphere. The US government and its army can ignore Iran’s influence and meddling in the region or cautiously begin to assess what implications it will present in the future of US-Latin American relations in the post-hegemonic American era of the twenty-first century.
It is often forgotten just how “German” the United States was when the First World War broke out: the German-American community produced hundreds of German-language newspapers, the use of German in Lutheran church services was widespread, and the “German vote” mattered in many regional or state elections. Reaching out to this community to influence public opinion in the United States made perfect sense for the German leadership, and it is to the great credit of Chad Fulwider’s book that he explores these attempts in detail for the first time. He begins with one of Britain’s first actions of the war—the cutting of the submarine cables that denied Berlin the swift communications with the other side of the Atlantic that London continued to enjoy. He then examines the activities of official propaganda units such as the German Information Office in New York as well as self-motivated activists and academics. The story Fulwider narrates is dominated by misunderstandings: the first one was the idea that all German speakers in the United States belonged to one coherent community that fully supported Kaiser Wilhelm II and the German war effort. Yet, many had emigrated before Germany had even been unified, and they saw Germany primarily as a “Kulturnation,” a national community defined by language, culture and religion. Wilhelmian militarism and aggressive imperialism had only become pervasive in German society after most German-Americans had left.

The second problem was that much of this propaganda was published in German. While some of the largest newspapers such as the New Yorker Staatszeitung realized the need to publish English translations of their leading articles, many continued to engage in what Fulwider describes as “preaching to the choir.” But reaching out to mainstream America was vital as Britain had successfully pioneered the use of “atrocity propaganda” by defining the violation of Belgian neutrality as the “Rape of Belgium,” with a strong focus on allegations of widespread sexual violence. Given that many of these allegations proved to be wrong, German propaganda should have had a chance to counter that narrative, but Fulwider argues there was a conscious decision not to lower the tone and engage with what were perceived as yellow press methods. Instead, German propaganda relied on a sober and factual tone that to non-Germans seemed ponderous and boring. Moreover, articles often highlighted the fact that they came straight from the Imperial government to exploit the traditional German deference to state authority. Against the British propaganda machine in Wellington House, so adept

at focusing on catchy narratives and hiding the state-funded nature of its message, this very German approach stood little chance.

These inadequacies have hidden the fact that the German case in the early months of the war was better than is often assumed: the British blockade had extremely shaky legal foundations and openly interfered with US export interests not only to Germany, but also to neighboring countries such as the Netherlands. Woodrow Wilson worried that Britain might provoke the spirit of 1812 and America’s identity as the proud defender of neutral rights and the freedom of the seas, and some of the best German propaganda efforts attempted to tap into this narrative while ridiculing pro-British voices as pining for the days of King George III. So effective were some of the articles written by Harvard psychologist Hugo Münsterberg that a London businessman offered a $10 million donation if the professor was sacked—Harvard refused. Yet Münsterberg and his fellow German professors in the United States, such as Moritz Julius Bonn or Eugen Kühnemann, failed to prevent the establishment of an alternative narrative that saw Britain and the United States united in their respect for law and civilization and in their disgust for German brutality. German propaganda never recovered from the sinking of the Lusitania in May 1915, and Fulwider describes the increasingly desperate attempts by the US-based diplomats to explain to the Berlin government just how offensive these sinkings were to the US public. Therefore, the German propaganda effort lost battle after battle, whether it was about the decision not to ban the export of arms and munitions, the lifting of the ban on raising war loans in New York, or the eventual decision allowing British customers to buy much-needed supplies on credit. Taken together, these decisions had an enormous impact on the allied war effort.

At this point, Fulwider’s book shifts focus and looks at the German sabotage efforts on US and Canadian soil. Some of these were quite ingenious, especially a clever attempt to corner the market for vital specialist equipment and raw materials for munitions production by secretly setting up a German-run munitions factory that never planned to deliver on the large orders it took from Britain. Still, it is telling that the German government ran the propaganda and sabotage programs as one coordinated effort, despite the obvious problems for Germany’s public image when the latter became public, as it inevitably did. Military attaché Franz von Papen was expelled from the country, with charges relating to arson at munitions factories only dropped after he became German chancellor in 1932.

Once the German high command had decided to resume unrestricted submarine warfare, German propaganda attempts on American soil were doomed, and the book effectively ends in 1916. This is justifiable, but it is disappointing that the author has failed to consult any books published after he was awarded his PhD in 2008. Many recent works on US neutrality, German-Americans or indeed German First World War propaganda have been missed, and that omission leaves the task of putting Fulwider’s results into the context of recent research
to the reader. They do fit in rather well though, confirming a global pattern of well-funded, but improvised propaganda efforts marred by an unwillingness to learn from, and adapt to, Britain’s innovations.

**In Peace Prepared: Innovation and Adaptation in Canada’s Cold War Army**

By Andrew B. Godefroy

Reviewed by Major H. Christian Breede, CD PhD, Assistant Professor of Political Science, The Royal Military College of Canada and Deputy Director of the Centre for International Defence Policy, Queen’s University

Appendices, those extra pages of graphs, charts, and tangential explanatory material found at the end of academic works, are at the best of times glanced at and more often ignored. Doing so in Andrew Godefroy’s *In Peace Prepared* would be a shame. In particular, nestled before an extensive set of notes and a comprehensive bibliography, this book’s fourth appendix presents a chilling and compelling narrative the likes of which Harry Turtledove would have approved. The passage recounts what the employment of a battlefield nuclear weapon would have looked like for the soldiers of a rifle company from the 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group occupying a non-descript piece of ground somewhere in central Europe in the late 1950s or early 1960s. The passage is horrifying and illuminating.

Although a reproduction of an original piece that appeared in a 1959 Canadian Army training manual, the passage grippingly underlines a key theme in Godefroy’s book, namely, that combat development (known more conventionally today as force development or how we think about how we fight) is indeed an important process. Put simply, force development during the 1950s—the dawn of the Cold War—had led the militaries of the newly minted North Atlantic Treaty Organization to conceive of operational plans that included the employment of nuclear weapons at the tactical level. This plan was known as MC-48 and was the blueprint for the defense of Europe until the 1960s.

That this plan persisted for as long as it did is as equally terrifying as the naïve view that one could actually fight in such an irradiated environment (to say nothing of the strategic error of seeing such nuclear exchanges as limited to the field of battle in question). Only with the introduction of the strategic concept of “flexible response” and the recognition of many senior political and military leaders who, as Godefroy states, saw “tactical nuclear war as folly” and something that “should be

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avoided at all costs,” was the inevitable and unavoidable strategic nature of nuclear weapons fully recognized. As a result, NATO began urging member-states to modernize and expand their forces to meet the Soviet threat conventionally. The process of force development played a large part in bringing about this change and how this happened is one of the major themes in *In Peace Prepared*.

Godefroy’s book, in tracing this Cold War history of force development in Canada (specifically Canada’s Army), provides a detailed and unique contribution not just to the existing body of Cold War history (as he ably points out in his first chapter), but also to the broader discussions of civil-military relations in Canada which no doubt will resonate elsewhere, too. Indeed, his discussion on the tension between political expediency and military necessity that seemed to hamper force development during the 1950s and 1960s is not unique to that period. His story of the ill-fated Bobcat armored personnel carrier as well as his discussion on the unification of the armed forces in Canada (the removal of individual elemental identities and the formation of one Canadian Forces) are two examples of a long history of this tension. Particularly in the Canadian context, examinations of Canada’s decades-long efforts to replace its aging maritime helicopters or the recent cancellation of the close-combat vehicle are modern examples of this same tension at play.

What is interesting to note, and not mentioned in Godefroy’s book, is that this tension is unavoidable as political and military interests—especially in peacetime—will often diverge. This recognition, while unpleasant, does help explain a key challenge to force development not just in Canada’s military but in others as well. A rigorous, overt, and replicable force development process—the history of which Godefroy cleanly and clearly presents in his book—is still simply a tool with which to make a recommendation for a decision. This decision is not made by those in uniform, rather it is made by elected officials, and it is here where the divergent interests lie. When the political and military interests align, the process is clear and worthwhile, however, when these interests diverge, political interest will win the day and the military will make do. Godefroy’s book shows this clearly with his discussion on the creation of Mobile Command in the 1960s—effectively an organization that needed to find a role for itself after it was created.

*In Peace Prepared* is a great read. It is clean and jargon-free and written by that rare combination of a soldier (Godefroy is a serving officer in Canada’s Army) and a scholar (he holds a doctorate in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada). Although a clear contribution to early Cold War history, this book is also a valuable insight into the civil-military relations of the time and reveals that although the context may have changed, the challenges facing militaries as they think, prepare, and fight perhaps has not.