

The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters

Volume 47
Number 1 *Parameters Spring 2017*

Article 15

Spring 3-1-2017

Book Reviews

USAWC Press

Follow this and additional works at: <https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters>



Part of the [Defense and Security Studies Commons](#), [Military History Commons](#), [Military, War, and Peace Commons](#), and the [National Security Law Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

USAWC Press, "Book Reviews," *Parameters* 47, no. 1 (2017), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.2844.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters by an authorized editor of USAWC Press.

Book Reviews

COUNTERINSURGENCY

Cassandra in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War


By Conrad C. Crane

Reviewed by Russell W. Glenn, Assistant G-2, Plans and Policy, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, and author of *Reconsidering Western Approaches to Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Post-Colonial Conflict*

Subtitle notwithstanding, military historian Conrad Crane's *Cassandra in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War* is less what he describes as "a story about trying to influence large institutions to change, ideally in the right direction for the right reasons," than an autobiographical excursion describing his role as member of the team tasked with creating the December 2006 Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, and his experiences during the months immediately following its publication. Additionally—if secondarily—the book is a consideration of the publication's impact on operations in Iraq. There is also a very brief synopsis of US involvement in Afghanistan counterinsurgency (COIN) activities.

Despite the several foci, there are a number of worthy insights provided vis-à-vis COIN operations in Iraq. These observations include that all soldiers and marines are potentially intelligence collectors, that better synchronization of special operations units' activities with conventional units' activities remains a crying need even after more than a decade's presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, that trust between representatives of an external coalition force and members of the host nation population is fundamental to success, and that haste in holding elections during a counterinsurgency is unwise, the last only too evident in the often counterproductive behaviors of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki government in Baghdad. While few of these perceptions, drawn from Crane's personal experience and interviews in Iraq, will be new to those familiar with the war, many are sufficiently valuable to bear the repetition. Also notable in this regard is a point too infrequently recognized, one no less valid as operations continue today: "The most adept sociocultural briefings . . . came from soldiers and [m]arines who had probably conducted enough field research . . . to earn a PhD back at a civilian university." In COIN, no less than other forms of conflict, the wisdom of the soldier is both invaluable and an ore too little mined.

Crane obviously took copious notes during his weeks as a member of the FM 3-24 writing team and in-theater travels thereafter. His frequent listing of partners in the undertaking and myriad others attending conferences, working groups, or otherwise influencing the doctrine's creation and application in the field is impressive. The cataloging makes it clear the manual was raised by a quite populous village. Crane's firsthand participation in this community, combined with both his training and practice as a historian, undeniably makes him an appropriate vehicle for the tale's telling. There are times, however, in which he seems a bit too willing to give credit to those closest to him in the endeavor. One such participant is noted for his consistent championing of the need for a counterinsurgency force to continue to



Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2016
307 pages
\$39.95


learn and adapt. Such points unquestionably merit prominence in COIN doctrine; however, essentiality of learning and adapting (and anticipation as a third consideration) was adroitly presented 15 years previously in *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*, a valuable book coauthored by Eliot A. Cohen who was also among those influencing the manual's development. So too, the figure on page 88 depicting the evolving emphasis a unit puts on mission type (denoting the relative weights allotted offense, defense, and stability over time) initially appeared in 2001 in Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*.

Cassandra in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War concludes with a series of additional observations by the author that are certainly worthy of attention. An appendix presents a "Mission Matrix for Iraq," its list of tasks providing further material of value to commanders and staffs who may find COIN or nation-building responsibilities in their "mission-set" during future contingencies. In sum, senior members of the defense community and others seeking analysis of past counterinsurgencies in the service of future field application will find pithier sources elsewhere. Other readers looking for the history of the development of one of America's most influential and necessary doctrinal publications in recent history will find that history here in admirable detail.

Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army

By Benjamin M. Jensen

Reviewed by James H. Joyner Jr., Associate Professor of Strategic Studies, US Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council



Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016
216 pages
\$24.95

Organizational change literature argues large bureaucracies tend to remain in a state of inertia absent either catastrophic failure, extreme pressure from external leadership, or strong fear of losing out on resources to a competing bureaucracy. In *Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Changes in the U.S. Army*, Benjamin M. Jensen demonstrates how these explanations have not held true for the US Army, at least in the post-Vietnam period. Despite the popular perception of military brass as "unimaginative bureaucrats trapped in an iron cage," the Army has repeatedly revised its capstone doctrine because visionary top-level leadership continually assessed its "theory of victory" for fighting the next war based on an evolving operational environment.

Through a series of case studies, Jensen concludes "doctrinal change requires incubators, informal subunits established outside the hierarchy, and advocacy networks championing new concepts that emerge from incubators." The former, he argues, are essential because professionals "require safe spaces to visualize new forms of warfare." The latter, meanwhile, spread these new ideas within the community and help socialize them and build "buy in." While not a core argument of the book, Jensen also refutes the myth on constant interservice rivalry, pointing to several examples of seamless cooperation between the Army and Air Force.

Since 1975, the Army has rewritten its capstone doctrinal Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, seven times. Jensen focuses on three

of these revisions—the 1976 Active Defense, the 1982 AirLand Battle, and the 1993 Full-Dimensional Operations concepts—which represented a fundamental change in the Army’s “theory of victory.” He also examines the bureaucratic struggle over the 2006 Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency.

In 1973, a series of events forced Army leaders to reorient the institution. The end of conscription and the dawn of an all-volunteer force fundamentally changed the composition of the US military. The end of American combat operations in Vietnam meant a drawdown to an Army with half the strength it had at the height of the conflict. And, the short Yom Kippur War demonstrated a radical change in the range, accuracy, lethality, and logistical sustainment requirements of modern tank warfare while highlighting a fundamental change in the role of tactical airpower.

Into the breach stepped General William E. DePuy, who would become the first head of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and personally oversee the rewriting of the operations manual. He established a “boathouse gang” of senior leaders and thinkers to write individual chapters and to serve as a “sounding board” for new ideas, which were then field tested with corps-level exercises. The group soon realized adequate close air support would only be possible with air supremacy—which meant the Army would not only need support from the Air Force but would also need to support the Air Force in the early stages of conflict to suppress enemy air defenses. The resulting doctrine, dubbed Active Defense, radically changed the Army theory of victory in Europe from one in which a trip-wire force held off the Soviets until reinforcements could arrive to one of “winning the first battle.” Throughout the development phase, DePuy personally socialized the new findings to key stakeholders within the Army and the Pentagon, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, and members of the think tank community.

Almost immediately after the Army adopted the Active Defense doctrine, the Soviets changed their doctrine and command and control capability and introduced modernized weapons. In response, the Department of Defense devised an offset strategy to counter Soviet numerical advantages with vastly improved command, control, and precision technology. Additionally, the twin shocks of 1979—the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—led to the Carter doctrine and a demand for the Army to be ready for low-intensity fights in addition to high-intensity maneuver warfare. General Donn A. Starry, part of the boathouse gang who helped write the 1976 doctrine, succeeded DePuy at TRADOC and oversaw the 1982 manual that introduced AirLand Battle in response to the new operating environment. Like his predecessor, Starry networked the development with key stakeholders, especially the Air Force, which was invited to contribute during the development phase.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War in 1991, Army leadership was faced with a completely new landscape. Not only would troop levels be cut to the lowest levels since 1939, but it soon became apparent ground forces would be required to respond to a much wider and more complex mission set without the advantage of prepositioned forces and ready bases. Additionally, the Goldwater-Nichols

Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 meant the services had less autonomy in crafting their own doctrine. In response, Gordon R. Sullivan, the Army Chief of Staff, personally pushed for reforms toward his vision of a “post-industrial” force. Frederick M. Franks Jr., the new TRADOC commander, used the Army’s branch schools as “battle labs” to incubate new ideas and mimicked the Louisiana Maneuvers of the 1940s as a testing ground. This resulted in the publication of the full-spectrum dimensional operations doctrine in 1994 that outlined the Army’s vision for being able to win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars while also being engaged in all manner of small wars and operations other than war lower on the spectrum. As in the previous examples, stakeholders inside and outside the Army were courted throughout the process for their input and buy in, and the doctrine was developed in parallel with Air Force doctrinal revisions.

The writing of the 2006 counterinsurgency manual is different from the other cases. Rather than a new overall theory of war for the Army, it was a new theory of victory for a particular fight. Further, as Jensen notes, the actual change was “much less than heralded at the time.” Still, it was an important example of doctrinal change, coming in the midst of America’s largest conflict since Vietnam. Unlike the previous examples, this was neither top-down nor even Army-centric. Army Lieutenant General David Petraeus and Marine Corps Lieutenant General James Mattis led the project and recruited a brain trust of midlevel leaders from their services and a handful of outside experts from the “COINdinita” camp. Capitalizing on the star power of the two leaders, the team engaged in a months-long media blitz spreading their ideas through a series of speeches and within professional and policy journals.

Jensen notes the successful examples discussed in *Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army* were driven by thoughtful professionals who worked in small groups—not drained of creativity by gigantic staffs. To that end, Jensen concludes with a plea for continued emphasis on education, testing new ideas in war games and writing in professional journals, and encouragement of constant challenging of the status quo.



New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2014
110 pages
\$49.99

“Soft” Counterinsurgency: Human Terrain Teams and US Military Strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan

By Paul Joseph

Reviewed by Michael C. Davies, coauthor of *Human Terrain Teams: An Organizational Innovation for Sociocultural Knowledge in Irregular Warfare*

The now-defunct Human Terrain System (HTS) was developed to improve the military decision-making process by facilitating a better understanding of the local population—the human terrain. The program garnered significant press attention, suffered from internal disquiet, and was the focus of numerous denunciations. Paul Joseph, professor of sociology at Tufts University, was one of the first external reviewers of the program. He gained insider access during the program’s early days, and *“Soft” Counterinsurgency* is the outcome of the time he spent with program participants.

Joseph's work centers on the narratives that defined the program at its beginning and questioned whether it could be considered effective. He excels at answering this question. Based on interviews with 30 individuals as well as a large-group session of 20 more participants, Joseph tackles the key debates and concerns of the program from the perspectives of the participants—something distinctly lacking in all but a few works on HTS—while adding his expert analysis to each issue.

The book assesses five major topics, from the program's history and structure to its impact on military commanders, how success can be defined and claimed, the program's effect on operations, and the relationship between HTS and the broader US strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan. Joseph is blunt in his conclusion on whether HTS achieved its stated objective of altering military perceptions of the battle space and transforming operational outcomes: "No, it did not."

Like the assessments on HTS, Joseph outlines relevant examples of Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) embedded in combat units who provided soldiers and commanders with quality assessments of the human terrain. In providing a full account of the words of team members, Joseph shows the limited impact achieved; that while HTTs provided, "a generally accurate assessment of the situation [they] did not contribute to a needed revision" of US strategy in terms of goals, execution, or resources, let alone all three iteratively. This is the unique contribution Joseph brings to the literature on HTS.


The "cultural turn" and HTS may have correctly seen sociocultural awareness as the necessary first step to effective strategy and eventual victory. However, it is political governance, both emergent and institutional, from the local through the national levels, that is at the core of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Because this issue was ignored, pushed aside, or overwhelmed by other factors, victory remained fleeting, if impossible from the start. The quality and quantity of the human terrain assessments could therefore only be effective up to a certain point.

Joseph is not the first to recognize this problem, but he fails to tap into other researchers who support his reasoning. As *"Soft" Counterinsurgency* is a slim volume, adding the works of Jenkins, Komer, Krepinevich, the Project for National Security Reform, and others, all of whom have made the same conclusions about how elements of the US government operate on the battlefield, would have brought additional weight to Joseph's argument.

Nevertheless, Joseph shines a light on the other side of the strategy bridge. He asks the question: if war is the continuation of politics, and politics at the ground level is never considered in strategic interaction, why should we be surprised when defeat occurs? He concludes the United States consistently fails to link the two sides through effective and sustainable governance built on an understanding of local politics. And this failure is the core reason the United States lost the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—and other operations. It is also why the United States has learned little from these failures.

"Soft" Counterinsurgency offers an incisive view into one of the most publicized programs from the 9/11 era. In attempting to answer the

question, however imperfectly, of why the United States has struggled so much in the wars that followed, Joseph's conclusion—that strategic interaction between ground truth, operational concepts, and political goals has been unbridgeable from the beginning—should give all civilian and military senior leaders pause.



New York: Oxford
University Press, 2016
329 pages
\$21.95

War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of Conflict on the Afghan Frontier

By Carter Malkasian

Reviewed by M. Chris Mason, Professor of National Security Affairs, US Army War College. Dr. Mason was the State Department political officer in the Paktika Province of Afghanistan in 2005.

Carter Malkasian purposefully and successfully styles *War Comes to Garmser* after Jeffrey Race's *War Comes to Long An* (1972), a classic in the academic literature of Vietnam. Like Race's book, which tells the story of the struggle for control of one district in Vietnam between the end of the French war and the beginning of the American war, *War Comes to Garmser* chronicles the local politics and the battle for control of the Garmser District in the Helmand Province of Afghanistan.

For those not familiar with Malkasian, he began his unlikely path to the Garmser District with a doctorate in history from Oxford and a position as professor of military history at Loyola Marymount University, but a relative, who served as a Navy medical officer in Vietnam with 1st Battalion 9th Marines (*The Walking Dead*), persuaded Malkasian he needed to experience war personally if he was going to write about it. So Malkasian took a job as a State Department contractor, working first in the Kunar Province of Afghanistan and then the Anbar Province of Iraq. He agreed to go back to Afghanistan only if he could go to a hot spot. Sent to work in the Helmand Province's violent Garmser District, he got his wish. His success in pacifying the local political situation there and shaping a local, indigenous resistance to the Taliban between 2009–11 brought him national attention and resulted in *War Comes to Garmser*.

True to his inspiration, Malkasian's book succeeds and remains timeless for much the same reason *War Comes to Long An* does: Malkasian never tries to do too much. He remains focused on the conflict in his district, telling the story of the Garmser District over some 30 years, and he avoids offering advice or the bromides about the larger conflict that often litter other books about Afghanistan written from a single perspective. Instead, Malkasian does a fine job of recording the history of the Garmser District, from the large-scale US Agency for International Development (USAID) irrigation and agricultural development projects of the 1950s up to 2011, when he left the district. A postscript to this paperback edition brings the story of Garmser up to 2015.

As few Americans ever could, or even attempted to do, Malkasian understood the tangled, ever-shifting web of social conflicts in Garmser, which pitted rival tribes against one another, indigenous landed farmers against recently arrived squatters, and local strongmen against religious leaders, and he explains them in a way that is accessible even to readers

unfamiliar with Afghanistan. What emerges is strong evidence that at the district level, as was the case in Long An, resistance to the Taliban and the Viet Cong was a local, personal matter, driven by family feuds, tribal politics, land disputes, and village political economies. Malkasian and Race show clearly that in both wars, local resistance to guerillas in remote districts was devoid of any notion of support for predatory and corrupt national governments in capital cities—or even provincial capitals—which were so removed from local lives they might as well have been on the moon. Whether intentionally or not, in so doing they debunk the great fallacy of counterinsurgency theory—the idea that such isolated “ink spots” of resistance can somehow be linked up and transmogrified into a pan-national movement in support of an illegitimate government in time of terrible local violence in primitive, deeply fractured tribal societies with no conception of national identity. Indeed, no counterinsurgency in modern history has succeeded where there was no pervasive, preexisting sense of national identity and where the national government was not seen as legitimate by the great majority of its citizens. Empirical data also shows no government has ever seen its popular support increase during an insurgency or civil war.

Other lessons from *War Comes to Garmser* are less obvious. While many men might have written a book about Vietnam like *War Comes to Long An*, probably only Malkasian could have written this companion volume about the war in Afghanistan. Malkasian’s success in Garmser was almost unique: no other State Department official or military officer anywhere else in the Pashto-speaking south and east of the country (where until recently the conflict was largely confined) achieved anything like what was accomplished in Garmser. The reason for this, which undermined the US effort in the country, was simple: while overall US involvement in Afghanistan closely mirrored the effort in Vietnam in virtually every other respect, there was one critical difference.

During the 12 years of the Vietnam War from 1960 to 1972, the United States trained tens of thousands of American military and civilian personnel to functional fluency in Vietnamese. In the 16 years of the Afghanistan conflict, the United States trained less than 50 to functional fluency in Pashto, with most of them assigned to Kabul. With admirable determination, Malkasian taught himself Pashto, and as the *Washington Post* noted in 2011, his ability to communicate effectively and directly with the elders and other local leaders in Garmser made his success possible. Virtually everywhere else in the Pashtun south and east, US personnel relied on the disastrously ineffective, unreliable, and indirect method of interpreters, very few of whom were native Pashtuns and a majority of whom had, at best, a questionable grip on the nuances of a language which relies heavily on parables, folk sayings, and other culturally derived idioms. This practice made impactful personal relationships, trust, and even meaningful conversations between Americans and Pashtuns all but impossible. In no small part, the US war in Afghanistan was lost in translation.

Twice in 50 years, the United States took sides in a civil war in Asia, occupied a country with large numbers of troops, imposed a culturally illegitimate form of government on an illiterate peasantry, manipulated elections, glossed over fraudulent outcomes, and propped up deeply

unpopular governments riddled with drug lords. In both Vietnam and Afghanistan, the US government misunderstood an elusive and dedicated enemy, mistrusted a national army it created in its own image (which was decimated by desertions and lacked the will to fight for kleptocratic elites in a distant capital), and thought that somehow all these issues could be overcome with superior firepower and slapdash rural development.

The irony of *War Comes to Garmser* is that Malkasian successfully crafts his book as a companion volume to *War Comes to Long An*, but apparently he never saw the Afghan War itself as a reboot of the Vietnam War and missed Race's central lesson: the Vietminh understood the war was about imposing social order from the bottom up, and military conflict was secondary. As one former Vietminh cadre tells Race in *War Comes to Long An*: "You have the central government, then the province, district, and village. But the lowest of the four is the level that lies with the people. If the village level is weak, then I guarantee you, no matter how strong the central government is, it won't be able to do a thing." The United States spent the entire war in Afghanistan trying to build up the national, provincial, and district governments, while the Taliban controlled the villages and imposed an acceptable social order. Garmser is back under Taliban control.

FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY


Mission Failure: America and the World in the Post-Cold War Era by Michael Mandelbaum

Reviewed by COL Michael Dhunjishah, US Army War College Student

Having attended Yale University at the same time as President George W. Bush and having known President Bill Clinton from Oxford, Michael Mandelbaum wanted to examine what went wrong with US foreign policy when his generation was put in charge. It was the end of the Cold War and the United States was the most powerful nation in the world, but all that power did not necessarily equate to the United States being able to remake the world in its image. Why?

In his most recent book, *Mission Failure: America and the World in the Post-Cold War Era*, Mandelbaum lays out a convincing argument explaining how, even with the best of intentions, US foreign policy failed to produce the more democratic and peaceful post-Cold War world everyone expected. He contends that after the Cold War the United States shifted towards acting more on its values than its interests, and by doing so became focused on putting countries "on the road to Denmark," moving them to a more liberal, democratic system. The failure, however, to realize the enormity of the task resulted in the United States getting bogged down in nation- and state-building—which, as always, are inherently difficult.

Throughout the book, Mandelbaum does an excellent job of looking at all angles of these complex problems. As an example, he is



New York: Oxford
University Press, 2016
504 pages
\$29.95


quick to refute criticism placed on L. Paul Bremer III for the failure of postinvasion Iraq, namely de-Baathification and disbanding of the Iraqi military. Mandelbaum emphasizes that no one really knows what would have happened if the Baathists remained in charge of Iraq after the invasion or if Bremer had left the Iraqi army in place. He does, however, explain Bremer's logic in making these decisions and argues that keeping both oppressive institutions in place might have exacerbated issues with the Shia population and the Kurds. Although this is counter to conventional wisdom, Mandelbaum is not afraid to look at these issues from all points of view and provide more mature, seasoned analysis of causes and effects.

Additionally, Mandelbaum is not afraid to call it like he sees it. Although he worked on Clinton's first campaign for president, Mandelbaum provides a reasonably objective view of foreign policy decisions regardless of party affiliation or his personal ties with those in power. He finds fault with the foreign policy of Presidents Clinton and Barack Obama, just as easily as he does with President Bush. In today's supercharged environment of political partisanship, this book focuses more on what went wrong rather than blaming one party or the other. This refreshing take allows readers to understand how and why the United States got into problems in Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq over the past 25 years. Mandelbaum walks readers down the decision-making path of these leaders who, despite their best intentions, for one reason or another, ended up leading the country into situations where the United States failed to meet its stated objectives.

One of the strengths of the book is also one of its weaknesses. Focusing on the last 25 years, many of the endeavors covered are still ongoing or have recently ended. The benefit of this is that the book serves as an initial compilation of strategic lessons learned or a "history hot wash," providing current foreign policy practitioners valuable insights that may help shape future decisions. Because this is a first draft of history, however, there are many aspects to these relationships, events, and long-term consequences that are unknown at this time. As with any historical event, a more complete understanding does not manifest itself until well after the events have taken place (typically after decades). Nevertheless, *Mission Failure* provides a necessary historical overview on issues currently facing the United States, thereby offering current foreign policy practitioners and strategic leaders much-needed analysis and perspective that might help them avoid making the same mistakes in the future.

Finally, Mandelbaum hangs a little too much on the decision to expand the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). His assertion that the United States now faces a Russia that is hostile to the West due to the expansion of NATO in the 1990s may eventually prove to be correct, but placing all, or at least the majority, of the blame for the poor state of US-Russia relations today on the expansion of NATO seems myopic. Although it can be argued that the expansion of NATO led to some of the issues between the two countries, the US relationship with Russia is more complex and placing blame on one particular action is problematic. Just as Mandelbaum is quick to question blaming Bremer for all the failures in Iraq, it is shortsighted to blame all the failures of US-Russia relations on the decision to expand NATO.

Overall, *Mission Failure* is a terrific book that holds value for foreign policy students, strategic leaders, and casual readers. Mandelbaum's style allows readers from all backgrounds to understand the intricacies of US foreign policy as it played out in the post-Cold War era. His clear prose, strong research, logical organization, and well-reasoned arguments keep readers engaged throughout the book. *Mission Failure* should be required reading for every military strategic leader and foreign policy practitioner.



New York: Penguin Press,
2017
339 pages
\$28.00

A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order

By Richard Haass

Reviewed by W. Andrew Terrill, Professor Emeritus, US Army War College

A World in Disarray is an examination of the changing international system and the implications of these changes for US foreign policy. In considering these issues, Richard Haass begins with a general overview of international relations from the mid-seventeenth century until contemporary times. He then provides brief reflections and recommendations on many current global issues and emerging crises. According to Haass, new and complex global dilemmas have raised the possibility that one historical era is ending and another beginning. In this evolving environment, new ways of thinking will be required to deal with challenges such as climate change, the regulation of cyberspace, and the possible rise of pandemic diseases that may kill millions.

Unfortunately, Haass also sees a simultaneous rise in world disorder, whereby the level of international cooperation needed to overcome these problems has eroded. He suggests the United Kingdom's planned withdrawal from the European Union (EU) could lead to the breakup of the country and a partial unraveling of the EU. He further points out that the post-World War I order is unraveling in significant areas within the Middle East leading to huge problems with instability in this part of the world. Complicating everything, the US share of global power is shrinking and being partially redistributed into more hands including both state and nonstate entities. Thus, in Haass's view, multilateral cooperation with a variety of countries and nonsovereign international entities has become more essential than ever.

Haass states that no global orders can be automatic or self-sustaining even when they serve the interests of a variety of countries that should rationally seek to bolster such orders but do not always do so. To deal with current and future problems in a more multilateral way, Haass puts forward a concept he calls sovereign obligation, which he claims is an updating of political realism. This set of ideas stresses governmental obligations to work together with other countries to manage global problems including slow-motion crises such as climate change and potentially lightning-fast catastrophes such as pandemic disease, all of which call for strong international agreements negotiated in advance. Sovereign obligation would also call upon countries to work with other nations to solve domestic problems (such as the rise of international terrorist groups in their ungoverned spaces) that have important international implications. Beyond multilateralism among states, Haass

believes there is a vital, positive international role for nonsovereign international entities such as multinational corporations, charities such as the Gates Foundation, and nongovernmental organizations such as Doctors Without Borders (255). According to Haass, an international system can only become an international society when the latter reflects a degree of buy in on the part of the participants including states and important international nonstate entities.

Having identified multilateralism as an important part of the solution for global problems, Haass notes the need for the United States to maintain acceptable relations with other major countries that could serve as partners in addressing some issues, while inevitably remaining rivals on others. In this regard, Haass believes China and the United States have managed to maintain a mostly mutual beneficial relationship, albeit with some deterioration of friendly ties during recent years over issues such as the South China Sea. He also states the United States should have done more to help the Soviet Union, and then Russia, make the transition from a controlled political and economic system to a more democratic political structure and a market economy. Haass further believes the United States supported rapid and provocative North Atlantic Treaty Organization expansion, and this process now needs to be paused to help prevent further damage to US-Russian relations. According to Haass, the central challenge for the United States in shaping relations with both China and Russia is to discourage bad behavior in a way that does not preclude selective and valuable cooperation on global and regional challenges.

Haass states Iran's Islamic Republic is now approaching four decades in age and can therefore be considered politically secure. This statement is true enough to serve as a basis for strategic planning, but he also views Iran with a great deal of concern. In particular, Haass expresses reservations about the Iranian nuclear agreement with the United States and its negotiating partners and maintains the Obama administration, "committed the cardinal negotiating sin wanting an agreement too much and therefore compromising too much" (133). He also takes an extremely hard line on the 2013 crisis with Syria, in which President Obama withdrew a previous threat (a so-called redline) to bomb Assad regime military forces and infrastructure following the regime's use of chemical weapons against Syrian civilians. Instead, the administration chose a policy of restraint in exchange for the verifiable destruction of most of Assad's chemical weapons and the infrastructure for synthesizing, maintaining, and storing them. Often, when a country obtains its objectives through diplomacy rather than violence, this result is viewed as both a victory and an act of political maturity, but Haass dismisses the Syrian surrender of such formidable capabilities as "a plus" but certainly not a major factor justifying the decision. This evaluation is surely his only step toward a dogmatic form of conservatism in a study that is otherwise characterized by national interest-based pragmatism.

In summary, *A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order* stands as a collection of the author's insights, opinions, and perhaps prejudices. As a kaleidoscopic introduction to global issues, the book certainly has potential value for students, and more seasoned scholars may find many of the ideas presented well worth their consideration. The central concept of sovereign obligation is hardly


unknown even if Haass has developed a new phrase to describe it, but his efforts to add some nuance to the concept are clearly useful. Thus, the work is a rational, reflective, and useful look at global problems and the US place in dealing with these problems as part of a wider world.

GRAND STRATEGY

American Power & Liberal Order: A Conservative Internationalist Grand Strategy

By Paul D. Miller

Reviewed by Lukas Milevski, Lecturer, University of Leiden



Washington, DC:
Georgetown University
Press, 2016

322 pages

\$32.95

Ever since the end of the Cold War, grand strategy has become a fixation among academics writing about American foreign policy and international relations. With the successful conclusion of containment, many believed the United States required a new guiding idea to lead it through a changed world. This thought triggered a sustained debate throughout the 1990s, which abated only slightly during the Global War on Terror, and which has returned with a vengeance in the past decade. Paul Miller, currently associate director of the Clements Center for National Security at the University of Texas at Austin, but once an actor within the actual national security apparatus, including the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, has now waded into this unending debate with his newest book *American Power & Liberal Order*. The book is aimed primarily, but not exclusively, at national security professionals and real policymakers.

Miller's main argument is the United States should not step away from the world, as advocates of restraint or offshore balancing would ask. But rather, the United States should maintain active engagement to sustain the extant liberal order. To support this basic thesis, Miller relies on a number of interrelated historical and theoretical arguments. The main theoretical argument is American power and liberal order are mutually reinforcing—American power sustains the liberal order, but the liberal order, in turn, contributes to the sustenance of American power and security. The prime historical argument is American power and realism in foreign affairs, along with liberal order abroad, have been the twin driving forces in American foreign affairs for more than a century. In other words, American policymakers have long recognized the relationship between American power and the liberal order and have sought to protect and increase the latter, often, if not usually, with beneficial results for both.

The theoretical and historical relationship between American power and international liberal order is well argued. But it forms only the foundation upon which the true purpose of the book is built. Miller (deservedly) proudly notes one major distinction between his book and those of most other academics is that he tackles the fundamental hard question which separates a workable policy from an unworkable one—implementation. How could a grand strategy focusing on maintaining liberal order be implemented in practice? Miller argues against mainstream

opinion in suggesting counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and stability operations have important roles to play in such a grand strategy.

Miller recognizes selectivity in intervention is vital; he bases his criteria on global power distribution, which is made up of three factors—gross domestic product, material capabilities, and military spending. He posits that it is worth intervening to shore up or install liberal order in states which represent substantial contributions to the aggregate power of democratic and liberal states in the world. For example, Somalia is out, but for a number of reasons Afghanistan remains an important front line. Miller examines every major region in the world, identifying certain countries as being potential opportunities and others as being overly troublesome spots not worth the effort required to transform them. Miller also considers his proposed grand strategy from the instrumental perspective, discussing in his final section various instruments of national power and the vital role each has to play in implementation.

Miller has produced a thoughtful work on American power and liberal order, complete with an initial discussion on how to implement his preferred grand strategy (and he is emphatic it is only the starting point for sustained serious thinking). It is, of course, entirely arguable. His theoretical and historical chapters are largely convincing and thought-provoking. But once he turns to implementation further assumptions seep into his argument. He wholly accepts the veracity of democratic peace theory and implicitly suggests democracy is the most important factor in any international relationship—above history, culture, and so forth. The democracies aggregate into one international camp, and authoritarian regimes similarly form the opposing side. One might wonder how India's great power aspirations fit within this picture. Miller's vision of implementation is bound to be contentious, but this is no surprise. Implementation is usually the most controversial aspect of any policy, as it is in the details that policies are made or broken and real-world consequences occur.


American Power & Liberal Order: A Conservative Internationalist Grand Strategy will hopefully spark debate—both academic and official—on the future direction of American grand strategy and, with its emphasis also on the difficult questions of implementation, may set a new standard for this particular genre of academic textual endeavor. It is a book very much worth a read; in agreement or disagreement, it will provoke thought.

The Spartan Regime: Its Character, Origins, and Grand Strategy

By Paul A. Rahe

Reviewed by LTC Jason W. Warren, Concepts and Doctrine Director, Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College

Paul A. Rahe's account of the Spartan regime of the late archaic and early classical periods demonstrates how the peculiar social mores and resulting political values of this *polis* underpinned Lacedaemon's strategic efficacy during its long Peloponnesian hegemony. Unlike his previous *Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta*, which I reviewed in this



New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016
212 pages
\$35.00

journal, Rahe's new volume is an eminently readable, well presented, and pithy affair, coming in around 124 pages of text. Relying on a host of primary and secondary sources, Rahe succeeds in elucidating the social and cultural backbone of what he considers a Spartan "grand strategy." Rahe repackages through the lens of political analysis Spartan-enforced social cohesion in what would otherwise be well-tread intellectual ground covered by the likes of Paul Cartledge, Stephen Hodkinson, and N. M. Kennell. The strength of this volume also results in its weaknesses, however, as some of the material in *The Spartan Regime: Its Character, Origins, and Grand Strategy* is overly anachronistic, while digressions into the fog of the eighth and early seventh centuries (BC) serve as a distraction.

Successfully avoiding the pitfall of presenting yet another account on Spartan peculiarities, Rahe frames his discussion in a "political science" and intellectual history framework. He considers this method a lost political science of earlier eras, focusing more on human nature and its limitations in producing sound leaders and political stability than current theory. There are frequent allusions to classical philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, the latter of whom comes in for favorable commentary, and whose ideas Rahe especially utilizes as a vehicle for his analysis. Rahe also projects back into time the thinking of Enlightenment philosophes and early American political leaders to help explain the checks and balances inherent in the Spartan regime, but also how Lacedaemon differed from other such mixed-governments. This setting uniquely places this volume apart.

Reaching forward to analyze backwards is not without literary risks, however, and some of Rahe's examples are unhelpful anachronisms. For example, interjections such as "At least while the Atlantic and Pacific oceans sufficed to isolate and protect it, the liberal republic established by the American Founding Fathers could almost do without men of a warlike demeanor" (40). This would be news to *Parameters* readers, given an armed entity known as the US Army has existed since 1775 and before as colonial militias, and has fought in every decade since the American Revolutionary War. There is nothing added with these comparisons, opening the text to criticism and detracting from a focus best left to earlier times. The same can be said about the idea of a "grand strategy," which in its current connotation anticipates a settled nation-state capable of projecting worldwide economic, diplomatic, cultural, and military power, something the confines of Sparta's 3,300 square-mile holdings could never approximate (93). Sparta's strategy was not grand, but insular, and perhaps the concept of a "strategic culture" would have better served Rahe's purposes.

Rahe begins by describing the *paideia* or, as he defines it, the "education and moral formation [of the community] in the broadest and most comprehensive sense" (xiv). He then analyzes the unique Spartan institutions, laws, and constitution which together formed its *politeia*. This is a rational and beneficial way of beginning the discussion on the cultural factors that ultimately underlay the author's portrayal of a Spartan "grand strategy." He then sets about detailing his conception of nomadic groups of ethnic Dorians, which invaded the Peloponnese in the Greek dark ages after the collapse of Mycenaean civilization. Rahe lingers a bit too long here, attempting to piece together controversial and sparse evidence into a coherent picture that is simply very difficult

to establish. He could have better utilized this text space to demonstrate a firmer link between Sparta's social institutions and its supposed "grand strategy," the latter of which he does not come around to until later in the book and then only again in the conclusion (105). Further consideration of the structural shortcomings of property consolidation resulting from a slackening pure-Spartan population and aristocratic land grabbing would have proven more useful.

The book's coverage of Sparta's servile system as the foundational element of its strategy and alliance is quite worthwhile. Particularly enlightening is Rahe's focus on the Spartan's subjugation and enslaving of the neighboring Messenians and the formation of the "Spartan Alliance," later expanded to the Peloponnesian League that would face down Persia and the Delian League alike (106–20). For it was the serfdom of the Messenians, predicated on Lacedaemon's earlier treatment of the Helots, which advanced a Spartiate class that constantly prepared for war. Not having to concern itself with farming for sustenance, Sparta concentrated on its army. Pure-born Spartan men were cast into barracks at the tender age of seven and not allowed to leave their particular cohort of comrades, if they survived, until military retirement at 45 (interestingly not far off a current 20-year Army retirement once the "cadet" Spartiates achieved full status around age 20). Rahe implies this focus on war was a result of military defeats such as the so-called Battles of the Hysiae and the Fetters against neighboring *poleis* in the first half of the seventh century. Thus, Sparta's grand strategy as the *polis* rose in fame and power rested on the backs of oppressed peoples, while even posturing as a champion of liberty among tyrants and seemingly without irony given the servile system, which allowed this very championing. This necessitated keeping the slaves down and the warlike Argives of the northeastern Peloponnesians out, often with the help of allies—the original members of the Peloponnesian League.


The Spartan Regime will be of interest to classical scholars and readers motivated by comparing a classical notion of political philosophy to the Spartan regimes of the archaic and classical eras. The volume is replete with excellent maps, which will help readers in this endeavor. The idea of establishing a political framework for "grand strategy" based on social and cultural bedrocks is an extremely useful concept at a time when American and Western societies are generally disengaged with wars around the globe fought on its behalf. Rahe's piece serves as a useful reminder, and perhaps a warning, that this current order of events is not as it should be, and that even when cultural and military values align for sound strategy, a nation-state is still at risk for defeat and subjugation. Sparta learned this in the first third of the fourth century at the hands of Epaminondas' Thebans, and later, Philip II of Macedon.

MILITARY HISTORY

Air Power: A Global History

By Jeremy Black

Reviewed by Conrad C. Crane, Chief of Historical Services, US Army Heritage and Education Center, and author of multiple books on airpower history



Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016

372 pages

\$38.00

Jeremy Black, professor of history at the University of Exeter, is the most prolific writer of military history today. He seems to publish a new book every few months. *Air Power: A Global History* is typical of his products, another well-written summary of a broad topic. Readers are undoubtedly aware of the phrase “a mile wide and an inch deep,” and this work begins a kilometer wide and a centimeter deep, until Black gets to the Cold War about halfway through. From that point on, except for sparse coverage of the Korean War, the narrative is richer and more comprehensive, and fully as global as the title implies.

Air Power is a book about technology and events, not people or theories. Black deals with the famous aces of World War I in one sentence, while providing a detailed analysis of the British development of superior synchronizing gears to fire through propellers—an advantage over the Germans the Royal Air Force was able to maintain into World War II. Few notable air leaders appear, and rarely do any theorists get more than passing mention. Only John Warden merits a more lengthy discussion, but even that is incomplete. Black, however, does much better in his descriptions of the evolution of aircraft. He is obviously a big fan of the B-52, and a strong critic of the F-35, which he argues “may prove to be an expense too far and an entirely unnecessary system” (289). He favors specialized airplanes over multipurpose models, a course difficult to pursue in times of tight defense budgets.

Black acknowledges the United States has made a unique commitment to airpower, and that it is “part and parcel of the American identity” (8). But, he never deals with the intellectual roots of the military application of US airpower developed in the interwar years, and except for some vague references to the influence of California, never covers commercial or civil aspects of aviation at all. One cannot understand American air-mindedness without analyzing that aspect of airpower, the most glaring deficiency of the book. In contrast, Black’s coverage of Eurasian military developments is very thorough, including Japan and China. He also does well with naval airpower and discusses advances in air defenses, missiles, and unmanned systems.

Throughout the book, Black maintains a skeptical tone about the independent strategic accomplishments of airpower, emphasizing instead its essential importance as part of a joint force. He argues that Western airpower today is in a state of crisis. Air forces are very expensive and hard to justify against other competing social and political agendas, while international competitors are also building cutting-edge aircraft. Airpower also seems less relevant against enemies pursuing irregular warfare amidst populations, and other services seem better suited for counterterrorism or counterinsurgency.

Air Power: A Global History will be most useful for readers new to the topic who are looking for a beginning overview. More knowledgeable readers will still find much of interest, but they will also be more cognizant of what has been left out.

Victory Was beyond Their Grasp: With the 272nd Volks-Grenadier Division from the Hürtgen Forest to the Heart of the Reich

By Douglas E. Nash

Reviewed by Richard L. Dinardo, Professor of National Security Affairs, US Marine Corps Command and Staff College

When it comes to studying the German army of World War II, one notes that there are gaps in the record. These gaps get bigger the lower one goes in the military hierarchy, and one can see this at The National Archives at College Park, Maryland. The German records on microfilm there are extensive for the Wehrmacht high command and the army high command. The same can be said for army groups, armies, and corps. Records for divisions get spotty. There are, for example, no extant records for the 352nd Infantry Division for June 1944. Below that, records are almost nonexistent. One might find regimental reports occasionally nested within division records, but that is about it.

In 1994, Douglas Nash, a retired army officer who now works for the Marine Corps History Division at Quantico, Virginia, acquired a suitcase with a most interesting set of contents—the records of the 272nd Fusilier Company, part of the 272nd Volks-Grenadier Division. Once armed with these records, Nash very carefully supplemented this source with other German records from College Park and the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany, the captured German officer manuscript series, extensive American records of the units facing the 272nd Volks-Grenadier Division, and the secondary literature. The result is the fascinating study provided in *Victory Was beyond Their Grasp: With the 272nd Volks-Grenadier Division from the Hürtgen Forest to the Heart of the Reich*.

Nash provides extensive background on the creation of the 272nd Volks-Grenadier Division. Its immediate antecedent, the 272nd Infantry Division, had been badly mauled in Normandy. Enough of the division had survived, however, so it could be reconstituted, though this involved drawing elements from other divisions that had been too severely damaged to reconstitute. With the old territorial system of generating replacements destroyed, the new creation had to incorporate replacements drawn from excess Luftwaffe and navy personnel. Nash also presents detailed analysis of the volks-grenadier division as an organization. The new division's slightly smaller size in relation to the older infantry division was offset by improvements in firepower, particularly in the infantry elements.

Nash then follows the division from its initial commitment in the latter stages of the fighting in the Hürtgen Forest to the division's surrender in the Ruhr Pocket, while some elements were able to retreat to the Harz Mountains before surrendering. A trained field grade officer



Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2015

373 pages
\$34.95

with long service, Nash has an excellent eye for tactical situations and the ability to describe and analyze them clearly. His analysis, spread throughout the book, would have benefited from a short concluding chapter offering broader conclusions about the volks-grenadier division within the broader context of the German army.

Given the volks-grenadier division was created largely for defensive purposes, having the records of the 272nd Fusilier Company was a major asset to Nash's research, as the company was the division's counterattack unit, in effect its fire brigade, and fortunate to have a cadre of officers and noncommissioned officers who were able and experienced. Nash's description of events illustrates the combat philosophy of the German army that the outcome of tactical battles often depended upon the actions of one or two individuals. Thus, having an experienced officer or noncommissioned officer was critical to maintaining the combat effectiveness of a company. Nash also describes clearly the situation of the German army in the west in late 1944 in ways one does not always consider. While it was well known the German army was short of artillery ammunition, the army also experienced a shortage of small arms ammunition, especially for some of the more modern weapons fielded by the German army, such as the MP44.

One negative aspect of Nash's book is due to a factor beyond his control. The 272nd Volks-Grenadier Division played a relatively minor role in the campaign. The unit was scheduled to play a role in the forthcoming Ardennes offensive, but instead got sucked into the fighting in the Hürtgen Forest, where a temporary commitment became a long-term one. The story of the 272nd Volks-Grenadier Division, nonetheless, is an excellent illustration of how the enemy often gets a vote in the planning and conduct of operations.


To be sure, Nash does assume readers are familiar with the course of the 1944 campaign in the west; however, novices will benefit from his knowledge of the German army, its men, and its equipment at that stage of the war. For students of the German army in World War II, as well as students interested in the late 1944 campaign, *Victory Was beyond Their Grasp* is a must read.

The Great War & the Middle East: A Strategic Study

By Rob Johnson

Reviewed by Michael S. Neiberg, Chair of War Studies and Professor of History, US Army War College

Rob Johnson, in *The Great War & the Middle East: A Strategic Study*, challenges the conventional notion that great power meddling in the Middle East during World War I left poisonous legacies from which the region still struggles to recover. That history, or at least the version common in much of Europe and the Middle East today, posits that the British in particular, while trying to find local allies to help dismember the Ottoman Empire, made contradictory and dishonest promises to mutually contentious groups. These deals included the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) that carved much of the Middle East into French and British spheres of influence, the Husayn-McMahon correspondence (1915) that



New York: Oxford
University Press, 2016

354 pages

\$34.95

promised the Hashemites an expansive postwar Arab kingdom, and the Balfour Declaration (1917) that promised the Jewish people a homeland in Palestine.

This version of history places the blame for the tensions and violence of the region on the British and, by extension, the Zionists in Palestine whom the British allegedly favored to serve as their colonial agents. By creating artificial borders and working with questionable rulers, the British and French left the region too fractured and unstable to deal with the problems of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Photographs of Islamic State bulldozers eradicating the Sykes-Picot borders graphically show the self-styled Caliphate erasing a shameful past imposed by foreign interference.

The book's thesis that World War I alone is not responsible for the region's many problems is certainly a valid and welcome one. Jewish-Arab tensions, the Sunni-Shia rivalry, and frustrations that bubbled up in the Arab Spring may have root causes dating to the war, but a great deal happened both before and since. Johnson, therefore, makes an important argument in trying to return agency to the Arabs themselves, riven as they were by internal rivalries, differing attitudes toward the British, and an inability to compromise.


Johnson outlines his thesis logically and reasonably in a solidly argued introduction. Having served in the British army in the Middle East, he has a sense of both the continuity and change in the region's endemic conflicts since 1914. He argues that the British came to the Middle East without a clearly articulated strategy to replace the Ottomans. Indeed, it had been British policy until 1915 to keep the Ottoman Empire intact as a bulwark against Russian expansion into the Dardanelles and central Asia. British policy evolved as the war progressed and as various elements of the British government in London, Cairo, and New Delhi, as well as in the field, contended for control.

The remainder of the book, however, is a fairly conventional account of the war in the Middle East, seen almost exclusively from the British perspective. The first chapter is mainly tangential to the arguments so well articulated in the introduction, dealing with the nature of strategy as seen from London in the years immediately prior to the war. The remaining chapters largely follow the major British campaigns from Sinai to Gallipoli to Mesopotamia.

Readers interested in the Gallipoli Campaign will note Johnson's much more sanguine assessment of an effort usually seen as an unmitigated disaster. While acknowledging the campaign's futility on the operational and tactical levels, he defends Gallipoli as a strategic success, relieving pressure on Russia and altering the strategic environment in Mesopotamia and elsewhere on the Ottoman periphery. He is similarly sanguine about the strategic value of Britain's costly advance in Mesopotamia in 1917–18. In both cases, he cites the British need to maintain prestige in the face of its millions of Muslim citizens in India. More depth on this topic would have solidified this part of Johnson's argument.

Specialists will not find much new information in *The Great War & the Middle East*. The book reads best as a survey of major British

campaigns in the region. Johnson recognizes the global context of the war, with decisions made in Russia, the United States, and France all playing key roles in the outcome of the war in the Middle East. He also understands how to employ the standard ends, ways, and means approach to the evaluation of strategy, although he discusses operations and tactics much more often than the subtitle suggests. While the book does not quite reach the potential of its introduction, it does provide a solid military history on a part of the world where the embers of 1914–18 have yet to cool.



Gloucestershire, UK: The History Press, 2015

432 pages

\$35.00

“A Delicate Affair” on the Western Front: America Learns How to Fight a Modern War in the Woëvre Trenches

By Terrence J. Finnegan

Reviewed by Greg Pickell, LTC, US Army (Ret.)

A great deal has been written about the entry of the United States into the latter stages of the First World War. All too often, this coverage takes the form of high-level histories or narrative descriptions of well-known actions like Belleau Wood or Meuse-Argonne. These books are sometimes described as coffee table decorations. *“A Delicate Affair”* is not one of those books. This meticulously researched history of one of the very first US combat actions on the Western Front succeeds in getting below the over-done high-level narrative and “into the trenches.” Author Terrence Finnegan helps readers understand the nightmarish complexity and daunting challenges involved in trench warfare in a way seldom matched in other works on the subject. Hauntingly, his detailed assessment also looks in great detail at the German approach to the action. In doing so, he provides discerning readers much of the conceptual blueprint for the German blitzkrieg seen 22 years later.

A Delicate Affair chronicles the experiences of the US 26th “Yankee” Division as it entered the trenches near the destroyed village of Seicheprey in mid-April 1918. The event was significant. Although other American units entered the trenches before them, the 26th Division was to encounter the first planned German attack specifically focused on testing the mettle of the newly arrived American troops.

Not surprisingly, subsequent events were not kind to the 26th, which was soundly beaten during the course of the engagement. Employing the fruits of years of experience and refined tactics, the assaulting German force succeeded in breaking through the lines on a relatively wide front while taking almost 200 prisoners. Indeed, what the Americans later thought was their success in halting the drive and forcing the Germans back was really little more than a planned German withdrawal following a successful large-scale raid.

The narrative of the 26th aside, *A Delicate Affair* is a significant addition to the body of knowledge on World War I for several reasons. First, the book succeeds in conveying the incredible complexity involved in the movement and activity of any large body of troops. Finnegan then multiplies this challenge by discussing in detail the activities of the 26th before and during the battle. In the end, it becomes clear the myriad of

actions required to employ the men of the 26th effectively was beyond the capability of the inexperienced leadership at the time—and perhaps beyond the means of any army faced with the challenges that confronted the newly arriving Americans.

A second important point made by the author lies in the effective working relationship enjoyed by the Americans and their French counterparts. While the French may not have learned the lessons of trench warfare as comprehensively as their German foes, they had in fact made significant strides, and these lessons were passed on to members of the 26th Division. Cooperation between US and French leaders was similarly close, and stands in significant contrast to the experiences of other American formations as well as the senior US leadership. The close working relationship enjoyed by the soldiers and leaders of the Yankee Division and their French hosts likely prevented the Americans' baptism of fire from being even more painful.

Perhaps the most interesting part of *A Delicate Affair* lies in its presentation of the planning and execution of the attack from the German perspective. Of all the major combatants in the First World War, the German army proved to be the most adaptable, and their attack at Seicheprey employed four years of hard-earned experience. Their tactical use of artillery and mortars in synchronization with assaulting infantry provides a model that remains valid even today. More important was the Germans' use of infiltration tactics. This technique, in which attacking units flowed around and past centers of resistance to achieve dislocation of the defense, can be directly linked to the blitzkrieg tactics used by the German Wehrmacht in the opening stages of the Second World War more than two decades later. This approach, often overlooked by historians due to the differences in speed and scale involved in infantry versus mechanized movements, was completely missed by the French during this period.

A Delicate Affair is what a serious history should be—detailed, comprehensive, and capable of providing answers to root-cause questions that rarely see the light of day. The story of the 26th and the aftermath of the battle may not be the most inspirational ever written, but that is not the point. War is truly hell, and this book is ironically and appropriately less than delicate in making that point. Exhaustively documented with an extensive array of maps, tactical diagrams, and technical data, *A Delicate Affair* is essential reading for leaders seeking a real understanding of World War I in the trenches and the US entry into that fateful conflict.

MILITARY TECHNOLOGY

**America Inc.? Innovation and Enterprise
in the National Security State**

By Linda Weiss

Reviewed by Richard A. Lacquement Jr., Dean, School of Strategic Landpower,
US Army War College, and author of *Shaping American Military Capabilities
after the Cold War*



Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2014
262 pages
\$24.95

America Inc.?: Innovation and Enterprise in the National Security State is an important, thought-provoking book that deserves careful attention from both military and civilian strategic-level national security professionals. Dr. Linda Weiss, professor emeritus of comparative politics at the University of Sydney, offers a rich, fascinating, and accessible analysis of one of the most important aspects of American national security prowess—leadership in technological innovation. The implications of her analysis are far-reaching. Reading her book will be especially valuable to anyone engaged in the enterprises of defense management, research, capabilities development, and acquisition.

Weiss argues America's extraordinary success in technological innovation since World War II presents a puzzle other analysts have not adequately explained. In her book, she explores why the United States has been so successful in leading technological innovation for an extended period of history, masterfully weaving together an analysis of US political economy and national security that describes American success since World War II, explains the emergence of various techniques of state and market interplay that produced this success, and speculates about future US prospects to sustain such an impressive record.

Her analysis starts with a major contrast. The United States did not lead technological innovation, particularly in the military realm, by any appreciable margin before World War II. In contrast, since World War II the United States has led technological innovation, often by wide margins, in the areas of atomic energy, missile technology, computers, antibacterial drugs, the Internet, the Global Positioning System, semiconductors, microwave technology, lasers, and jet aircraft. These and many other innovations have been valuable for security and, in many cases, have delivered significant ancillary benefits to society. So, why has the United States been more successful since World War II?

Weiss identifies two prominent explanations common in national security literature that she then challenges. One explanation identifies innovation as a function of the hidden hand of free market capitalism. The other finds the strong hand of government guiding defense spending as a form of national industrial policy. Her close scrutiny demonstrates neither explanation is sufficient, and her more compelling explanation, which she terms "hybridization," runs between:

America's propensity for radical innovation is not a 'stateless' story and free-market capitalism is not how the United States achieved high-technology leadership. Through an extensive array of public-private alliances and innovation hybrids, technology development programs and investment funds, the United States has created not a liberal, but a hybrid political economy—one that is shaped by a national security state deeply entwined with the commercial sector." (195)

The hybridization explanation offers a useful way to consider the potential for continued American success and highlights potential obstacles more clearly. Weiss shows there is no way to explain American technological innovation without attention to the catalytic role of the government and, in particular, the wide-ranging combination of national government entities she terms the "National Security State" or NSS. The NSS role is especially significant in the early, high-risk stages of innovation. It is also important to note other key players in the NSS, in addition to the Department of Defense and the intelligence community, include the Department of Energy (with nuclear power and weapons), the National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

American technological innovation benefitted from an array of national laboratories, higher education institutions, and corporations, as well as from a permissive regulatory environment that allowed innovators to benefit from commercial incentives. Examples of key players include universities such as Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford, Caltech, Carnegie Mellon, and Chicago; federally funded research and development centers such as the Los Alamos National Lab, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the Sandia National Laboratories, the Lincoln Laboratory, and the Mitre Corporation; and venture capital investment entities such as the Small Business Investment Company (sponsored by the Small Business Administration) and In-Q-Tel (sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency).

Looking forward, Weiss suggests there is little time for the United States to rest on its laurels. Potential competitors are narrowing the gap in technological capabilities. Her cautionary conclusion suggests a pair of political and economic factors could impede continued US technological innovation (such as the ongoing efforts of the third offset strategy). One factor is a hyperpartisan domestic political environment that may well sunder the bipartisan support that has permitted the success of hybridization (particularly the effective role the state has played in underwriting risk in the name of long-term potential gains) and an economic system fixated on "financialism" that places short-term gains at such a premium that innovative advancements are less likely to flourish at the hands of the market alone.

America Inc.? is not an easy read, but it is nonetheless very accessible. Weiss builds her complex argument carefully and steps readers through it with a steady hand. The political economy of technical innovation is generally not a story of dramatic events and catalytic moments (although the sense of alarm and the subsequent response to the 1957 Soviet launch of Sputnik is a major exception). Rather, the main story line is about the accretion of choices over decades by many actors and agencies navigating partisan politics and American culture. The argument is

important and nuanced. The overarching history and associated vignettes are fascinating and well chosen. Weiss brings the wisdom derived from decades of study to a complex subject with great force.

The author's argument is an important one for the United States and its allies. Liberal civil society and its complex architecture are often strained in times of crisis by the requirements of national defense. The United States and Great Britain before it have been able to withstand such pressures because of their abilities to find a firebreak, if you will, that limits the magnitude of resource mobilization to counter adversaries. High defense resource demands can be a powerful excuse for clamping down on the inefficiencies and chaotic domestic conflicts at the heart of pluralist, liberal democratic polities and free market economics. For Britain, the most dramatic of firebreaks was the use of a limited portion of its population and resources to build and operate the wooden walls of the Royal Navy that could exploit the geographic advantages of its island location. Similarly, the maintenance of military capabilities strongly enabled by cutting-edge technologies has allowed the United States to limit its resources and the portion of its population devoted to national security. But as threats mount and geography shrinks, the costs of maintaining an effective qualitative advantage become more daunting.

America Inc.? provides trenchant analysis and raises important questions for policymakers and national security professionals to contemplate in linking technological innovation to national security.



New York: Oxford
University Press, 2016
427 pages
\$27.95

The Politics of Innovation: Why Some Countries Are Better Than Others at Science & Technology

By Mark Zachary Taylor

Reviewed by Charles D. Allen, Professor of Leadership and Cultural Studies, US Army War College

Popular literature has focused on creative individuals (Walter Isaacson's *Innovators*, 2015) and innovative organizations (Schmidt and Rosenberg's *How Google Works*, 2014) in attempts to discern key traits, processes, and cultures that produce the "secret sauce" and lead to success. At the heart of this success is the ability of individuals and organizations to develop and exploit new technologies with phenomenal results. At a higher level of analysis, scholars seek to discern the factors and conditions among nations that support growth in science and technology. Arguably, science and technology fuel the engines of national economies and are linked inextricably to security interests.

One such scholar is Mark Zachary Taylor, a political scientist with a doctorate from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His continued interest in technology and the behavior of nations has resulted in several publications on national innovation and political economy—the latest is *The Politics of Innovation*. An associate professor of international affairs at Georgia Institute of Technology, Taylor is well equipped to determine "why some countries are better at science and technology."

Taylor is intrigued by the analysis of British historian Donald Cardwell which led to Cardwell's Law: "no nation has been very creative for more than a historically short period. Fortunately, as each leader has

flagged, there has always been, up to now, a nation or nations to take over the torch” (3). Thus, in *The Politics of Innovation*, Taylor examines historical and regional cases of nation-states to test the law and in doing so uncovers his insights. The introductory chapter includes a section, “The American Imperative,” that demonstrates the applicability of Cardwell’s Law to the United States. An obvious inference is the United States is faltering as a leader in innovation and must therefore understand the critical contributing factors in order to regain and sustain its global leadership.

Taylor presents a comprehensive and systematic analysis of international innovation practices, results, and trends. He provides a series of definitions for often-used terms in science, technology, and innovation that enable the use of frameworks and accepted metrics for his wide-ranging examination. One framework is the “five pillars” of innovation—“intellectual property rights, research subsidies, education, research universities, and trade policies” (74)—he uses to scrutinize the performance of countries. In chapter 5, “Why Nations Fail,” and in chapter 6, “How Nations Succeed,” Taylor finds, “domestic institutions and policies do not determine the rate and direction of national inventive activities . . . institutions and policies do influence outcomes, but are not, causal factors” (139) and “successful science and technology states are typified by international networks of trade, finance, production, knowledge, and human-capital flows that play important roles in determining national innovation rates” (178). He also concludes that domestic policies seeking to encourage innovation may have a paradoxical effect of impeding it because of stakeholder resistance; therefore, governmental intervention is necessary to sustain the effort. A major portion of the book focuses on how nations innovate through the use of institutions, policies, and networks. In the end, the interplay of political agendas among powerful members within a society has the greatest impact on national innovation performance.

Taylor introduces the concept of “creative insecurity” to propose why nations innovate. Creative insecurity is “the positive difference between the threats of economic or military competition from abroad and the dangers of political-economic rivalries at home” (13). Taylor’s analysis confirms the use of external threats as the impetus for national-level innovation in both the economic and military domains. While he does not name the military-industrial complex as a major driver and benefactor of research-and-development and science-and-technology programs, he provides several cases where defense funding is viewed as investments that generate innovation spin-offs for civilian use. Because of the potential consequences of state-on-state conflict, he cautions against constructing and contriving external threats for the purpose of creating growth in innovation.

In the United States of the twenty-first century, we have had several calls to pursue science, technology, engineering, and mathematics as education policy and to invest in research and development through economic and defense policies aimed at securing national-level interests. In a November 2014 memorandum, then-US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced the Defense Innovation Initiative, a major component in the development of the Department of Defense Third Offset Strategy. The initiative’s charter is to “pursue innovative ways


to sustain and advance our military superiority for the 21st century and improve business operations throughout the Department.” Hagel closed the memo with: “America’s continued strategic dominance will rely on innovation and adaptability across our defense enterprise.” For this reviewer, Taylor’s caution about threat narratives rings true—witness current concerns about the emerging power of China, the resurgence of Russia, and the recurring call to regain technological overmatch over potential adversaries.

Parameters readers will be interested in the four-page section “Military Resistance to Innovation” where Taylor asserts:

“Innovation is threatening to military personnel because changes to their technology can sometimes demand changes to long-established strategic doctrines, battlefield tactics, or bureaucratic organizations. Military advancement is built on these things . . . new military technologies can privilege one branch or mission over another, thereby triggering interservice or intraservice rivalries.” (191)

We have seen the introduction of new technologies (e.g., stealth, precision-guided munitions, sensors, cyber, etc.) that have shaped new strategic and operational concepts—and met resistance from many within the US military.

Taylor’s work is well researched, enlightening, and a worthy read. His major contribution offers the lens of political science to the strategic choices nations make in search of competitive advantage in the global environment. National security professionals will recognize this book is about the interaction among the instruments of national power—diplomatic, information, military, and economic—and thus the innovation performance of nations is based ultimately on political decisions. Whether Cardwell’s Law will hold for the United States remains to be seen.



New York: Oxford
University Press, 2015
416 pages
\$27.95

Sudden Justice: America’s Secret Drone Wars

By Chris Woods

Reviewed by Whitney Grespin, Director of Strategic Studies, Precision Integrated Programs, PhD Candidate, Defence Studies Department, King’s College London, and Graduate Teaching Assistant at the UK Joint Services Command and Staff College

Public discourse about unmanned aerial systems—drones, colloquially—has proliferated in years past, yet scholarly literature on the topic has only recently begun to accumulate. In *Sudden Justice: America’s Secret Drone Wars*, Chris Woods documents and assesses the use of armed drones by the United States (and in some cases its close allies).

It is unclear whether the goal of the book is to serve as a thorough historical record or a comprehensive policy prescription. Unfortunately, the book does neither completely. The disjointed chapters largely record the increasing utilization of drones for kinetic missions since 2001 in both Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as missions further afield in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. Interspersed amongst these fragmented vignettes are underdeveloped ruminations on the legal and moral

implications of using the technology in asymmetric warfare to combat nontraditional enemies.

I hoped to be impressed by the book; however, I was generally underwhelmed by its lack of a nuanced understanding of both the individual players as well as the broader game. Coming from the unmanned industry perspective, *Sudden Justice* presents a superficial overview of drone applications. For example, the widely accepted military parlance for drones is less alarmist and articulates what they are—unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which are the aircraft platforms used as part of a larger unmanned aerial system (UAS), which may be comprised of multiple UAVs, as well as a ground control system, and other launch/recovery equipment or communications devices. The heavy reliance on the word drone triggers visions of nightly news reporting on tragic deaths and their categorization as “collateral damage.”

Adding to the sensationalist tone are myriad anecdotes that capture retrospective criticisms of military and intelligence professionals about lessons learned in the early years of UAS operations. As in any application of new technology in a complex environment, there were many lessons learned from successes, failures, and after-action reports, which form today’s best practices in the field of UAS operations. Historically, these lessons are important to record in this book. Practically, their presentation comes across as condescending criticisms, implying those responsible should have known better or acted otherwise.

Another perspective I found imbalanced was the chapter titled “Game Face On: The Intimacy of Remote Killing.” While Woods presents the issue of killing from afar as a new phenomenon that mental health professionals are struggling to deal with alongside the operator (remote pilot) community, it could instead be compared against the literature on the psychological experiences of sniper teams—“eyes from a hide” versus “eyes from the sky” (all the more relevant given the author referred to an unmanned aircraft as an “aerial sniper rifle”).


In addition to melodramatic tone and word choices, there are also basic factual discrepancies, such as Woods’s reference to the College of William & Mary as “William and Mary University.” Furthermore, at multiple points, Woods muddies the terminology and responsibilities of US Special Forces (a distinct component of the US Army) with broader US Special Operations Forces, while littering the book with superficial and misleading assessments of well-documented, elite military elements, making me question the depth of his understanding about these topics. There are also instances where the relationship between quotes and their endnote citations lacked context or clarity of intent, thus presenting an opportunity for misinterpretation.

Woods also focuses on and criticizes kinetic applications, rather than balancing his commentary with equally in-depth accounting of their vast use as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) gathering platforms. While I respect Woods’s background and journalistic bona fides, he bounces back and forth between praising drone technology as “the most precise weapon in the history of warfare” and highlighting failures of the precision and efficacy of drone strikes in the early years of the technology’s use.

If Woods's intent for the book was to issue a call for public demand of increased government accountability and military procedural transparency, then he hit his mark. But he could have done so to a wider audience in an op-ed piece rather than a book. If his intent was to document the history of increased reliance on, and preference for, UAS capabilities, then he would have done well to pick up where Richard Whittle's *Predator: The Secret Origins of the Drone Revolution* left off. As-is, the book comes across as a disjointed historical record with an inconsistent mix of condemnation and praise of the technology's capabilities.

Is the topic of drone strikes interesting? Yes. Is increased discourse about this public policy issue both important and appropriate? Yes. Does *Sudden Justice* offer both breadth and depth sufficient to be considered an authoritative source to inform all aspects of such discussions? No. Readers may walk away better informed about relevant issues in a general sense, but without a comprehensive understanding and coherent policy perspective on the myriad capabilities of this technology—both kinetic and otherwise—to improve the warfighting advantage for the United States and its allies.

REGIONAL STUDIES: AFRICA



Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2014

212 pages

\$46.95

Exploiting Africa: The Influence of Maoist China in Algeria, Ghana, and Tanzania

By Donovan C. Chau

Reviewed by José de Arimatéia da Cruz, Adjunct Professor, US Army War College, and Professor, International Relations and Comparative Politics, Armstrong State University

In *Exploiting Africa*, Donovan Chau examines China's relations with Algeria, Ghana, and Tanzania from the 1950s to the 1970s. He claims China's current official African policy is reminiscent of past Maoist-era policies (148) and the policy is largely based on China's identification as a member of the developing world, or Global South, tied to the African continent by a common sense of historic neglect and subjugation by imperialist forces. Chau believes China's African foreign policy is a "long-term, pragmatic behavior from the very beginning on the continent" (148)—in other words, China's policy has been strictly "über-realist." Viewed from historic and strategic perspectives, China's current presence demonstrates continuity with the past rather than a renewed focus in the present or an altered direction for the future (3).

According to Chau, China's rapprochement toward the African continent from the 1950s to the 1970s, much like its twenty-first-century foreign policy, demonstrated China's desire to achieve superpower status through a primary strategy of resource acquisition. To accomplish this objective, China's diplomatic relations with Algeria, Ghana, and Tanzania "used a mix of international political support, tangible development aid, and economic and security assistance, both covert and overt" (4). Given China's central objective of attaining superpower status, Africa, with its

abundance of natural and mineral resources, fit squarely into China's long-term plans and appetite for industrial development.

In addition to traditional means of diplomacy such as trade, commerce, bilateral agreements, and the military, China used domestic and international organizations to advance its political, military, and strategic relations (22). While these government and nongovernmental organizations varied from region to region, they affected tangibly the targeted individuals and organizations (32). The New China News Agency collected and disseminated news at home and abroad (22–23) and was strategically located in countries and regions around the world at a time when China did not maintain official diplomatic relations with many nation-states (23). Another important organization, the Commission for the Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, performed intelligence work and sponsored the exchange of cultural and scientific delegations. Finally, the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, promoted solidarity among African and Asian peoples; however, its true objective was to promote anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, both of which were secondary objectives of Communist China (29).

Through three detailed case studies, Chau reviews China's presence in Africa, beginning in 1958 when China became the first country to establish official diplomatic relations with the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic after its formation by Ferhat Abbas (44). While China provided the newly independent Algeria with economic and military aid, the Chinese used Algeria as a platform for a political message of developing world and international unity (68).


Next, Chau describes China's penetration of Tanzania as a smooth process due to newly elected Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere. Diplomatic relations, established in 1962 when China opened its embassy in the capital Dar es Salaam, were rooted in shared imperial and colonial experiences. To further cement their relationship, China and Tanzania in 1965 signed a treaty of friendship and released a joint communique in which Nyerere reaffirmed Tanzania's commitment to Communist China as the only representative of the Chinese people. China's multidimensional activities in Tanzania included political, development, and security projects, including the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority rail line.

Finally, Chau shows how China's early attempts to establish diplomatic relations with Ghana after its independence in 1957 faced opposition from President Kwame Nkrumah. For Nkrumah, it was necessary to "search for African unity" (77) before establishing diplomatic relations. Ghana finally recognized Communist China as a sovereign independent state in July 1960, the second African country to do so. As Chau points out, given Nkrumah's political ideology emulated the thinking of China's Mao Zedong, Ghana became China's base of revolutionary operations "focused mainly on the training and arming of African fighters" (91). Cozy diplomatic relations came to an end in February 1966 when a military coup d'état ousted Nkrumah. China and Ghana did not reestablish diplomatic relations until 1972.

In the twenty-first century, China is attempting to ascend to its rightful place among the world's superpowers by securing its economic

needs—an ascendancy which began with the pragmatic moderates who came to power under Deng Xiaoping and the establishment of China's special economic zones. Political commentators and pundits assume China is pursuing a realist foreign policy, however, as Chau shows, “today China is actively seeking opportunities of influence on the continent [of Africa] by using the same general strategic approach as it did in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s” (148). While China's actions in world affairs are still driven by revolutionary ideals, Chinese leaders prioritize strategic objectives over ideological pursuits. China wants to offer the world an alternative to the Washington Consensus with its strict laundry list of rules, regulations, and obligations that are imposed upon the developing world. Instead, the Beijing Consensus does not care what kind of government or leadership a nation-state embraces as long as the nation-state is willing to trade with China and recognize there is only one China representative of the Chinese people.

Exploiting Africa makes a valuable contribution to understanding China's past involvement and continued presence in Africa. I highly recommend this book to readers interested in world politics, international affairs, and political science—and, most importantly, to current and future military leaders.



Quantico, VA: Marine
Corps University Press,
2016
239 pages
Free

The Crisis of the African State: Globalization, Tribalism, and Jihadism in the Twenty-First Century

Edited by Anthony N. Celso and Robert Nalbandov

Reviewed by LTC (P) Jason B. Nicholson, Foreign Area Officer for Sub-Saharan Africa

In *The Crisis of the African State: Globalization, Tribalism, and Jihadism in the Twenty-First Century*, editors Anthony N. Celso and Robert Nalbandov present select case studies on contemporary African security issues. Bringing together scholars and practitioners, this volume specifically addresses the types of problems most likely to involve the United States and its allies and partners—either directly or indirectly. Broadly organized into three sections, the book's eight chapters explore the challenges faced by African states posed by modernity, ethnic conflict, and violent Islamic extremism.

The first section considers the impacts and opportunities offered by the Arab Spring for northwest African jihadist movements. In chapter one, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross explores Tunisia's hesitant policy of accommodation and confrontation with extremists that facilitated their ability to survive and expand operationally following the collapse of the regime led by dictator Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali. In chapters two and three, both Celso and Henri Boré examine the French-led intervention to drive al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its allies out of northern Mali in 2013 and suggest how this conflict informed potential future regional counterterrorism operations.

The second section evaluates civil wars and the transition from rebel groups to government. Reviewing the Eritrean, Ethiopian, and Rwandan civil wars in chapter four, Ian S. Spears describes how victorious rebel factions consolidated and legitimized their rule. In chapter five, Robert

E. Gribbin analyzes the Rwandan genocide's myriad effects upon society and the government's response to those challenges in the first five years after the killing stopped. France and Libya's interventions in Chad from the 1960s to the 1990s are examined by Nalbandov in chapter six, demonstrating the role of conflict continuation and peacemaking failure as by-products of external power proxy conflicts during civil war.

The last section highlights the cumulative consequences of the social, political, and security problems identified in the earlier sections. Clarence J. Bouchat discusses Nigeria as a microcosm of the structural challenges facing African states in their attempts to provide legitimate and peaceful means of political conflict resolution for their often highly diverse populations. The summary chapter by Celso and Nalbandov suggests that while Africa's political problems are substantial, the singular case studies demonstrate successful solutions are possible if domestic political elites create functional institutions to allocate resources equitably, protect minorities, and govern legitimately.

The political processes discussed throughout the book, such as modernization and democratization, imply winning and losing as outcomes. Identity formation through nationalism is often accompanied by ethnic cleansing and violence to establish in- and out-group identities upon which to base societal resource distribution resulting from greater productivity. Political development of the nation-state is deeply shaped by the effects of industrialization upon identity construction. War, particularly ethnic conflicts in nonindustrialized societies, also plays a causal role in identity formation.

These themes make further study of African political dynamics relevant because they are directly related to the authors' discussions of globalization, tribalism, and jihadism. The "fourth wave" of democratization accompanying the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellites may now be superseded by a "fifth wave." Some of the last Cold War regimes are in Africa (Tunisia and Egypt) and the Middle East (Iraq and Syria). The political forces present in these states apart have also been slowly emerging in sub-Saharan Africa where other remaining Cold War vestigial regimes continue to exist.

Contemporary conflicts in the Middle East have assumed an ethnic dimension suggestive of the forces of nationalism and identity formation. The political unraveling of the Cold War order in the Balkans during the fourth wave of democratization also resulted in highly destructive ethnic conflicts. Political, defense, and security policymakers should read *The Crisis of the African State* as indicative of the problems confronting weak states that govern ethnically diverse populations in Africa. These challenges possess the potential to activate populations politically in ways they have not been mobilized previously. Understanding the root causes of such conflicts facilitates addressing them now through sustained engagement with African nations to develop legitimate, representative, and democratic institutions that can withstand the strains imposed by inevitable further development of the continent.

