Encyclopedic in scope and inductive in method, Sir Lawrence Freedman’s grand volume: *Strategy: A History*, presents the fruits of a life-long exploration into the meaning and utility of the concept of strategy. In many respects an intellectual voyage of discovery, Freedman begins by describing the evolution of strategy through its pre-Napoleonic history and then, in turns, explores its development and use in three distinct provinces: military, revolutionary-political, and business-corporate. In the grand tradition of his British predecessors who wrote during the age of exploration, Freedman casts a perceptive and discerning eye on the territory he surveys. The result is a trove of keen observations and insights owing much for its success to Freedman’s lucid and engaging prose.

While acknowledging the word “strategy” did not come into common usage until the early part of the nineteenth century, Freedman takes the view that strategy in the sense of “practical problem-solving” is as old as history (72). He thus begins his excursion (Part I) with observations on the interrelationships bordering communities of chimpanzees; proceeds to review examples of strategy in the Hebrew Bible and the world of Classical Greece; reviews the canonical texts of Sun Tzu and Machiavelli and completes his examination of the origins of strategy with a review of Milton’s *Paradise Lost*. A clear dichotomy emphasized throughout this opening section and one reappraised to good effect in other sections of the book is the difference between strategies based on force and strategies based on guile; in other words – strategies of strength or strategies of cunning.1 Subsequently, however, particularly after considering the advent of the *levee on masse*, Freedman concludes “[o]nce warfare moved to mass armies with complex organizations, there would be limits to what could be achieved by means of guile. The emphasis would be on force” (65).

And so in Part II, “Strategies of Force,” the modern history of military strategy is charted beyond way-points recognized by students: decisive battle; wars of annihilation or attrition; maneuver; the indirect approach; deterrence; guerilla warfare; counterinsurgency and a myriad of others. Here, as well, broader concepts such as geopolitics; continental, maritime, naval and air power; and game theory with its special relationship to nuclear strategy, are also analyzed. Although the main contours are familiar terrain, the history and theory covered in this section are viewed frequently from a unique vantage point revealing fresh insights. An example is the observation that, while Clausewitz recognized the

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1 This dichotomy also is highlighted in Charles Hill, *Grand Strategy: Literature, Statercraft, and World Order* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010)
subordination of war to policy, the prevailing assumption at that time was “a political victory would naturally follow a military victory” and further “[i]f the assumption was wrong, then strategy’s focus on military affairs was insufficient” (94). The point is prescient with a continuing relevance to modern day strategic challenges.

In Part III, “Strategies from Below,” Freedman chronicles in detail the political strategies of radicals and revolutionaries including Marx, Gandhi, Che Guevara and others. In the American domestic political context he surveys the political strategies of Martin Luther King, the Civil Rights movement, as well as other individuals and causes over the last several decades. While decidedly underdogs in the political process, each individual or group struggled to mobilize political forces in efforts to cause radical change or overthrow existing political elites and make a claim on political power. For most national security professionals, this section represents less familiar terrain made more challenging by the surfeit of biographical detail that at times clouds more salient perspectives on strategy. Nevertheless, some essential points relevant to strategy in any context may be gleaned. Among them is the significance of marshaling popular opinion in support of an ideological or political strategy, by means of, as Freedman notes (quoting Harold Lasswell) “the management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols” (339). This point has modern echoes in discussions over “strategic narratives.” Freedman ends this section with some poignant observations about electoral politics in the United States and the party strategies related to the “permanent campaign.”

In the final section of field observations Part IV “Strategy from Above” Freedman surveys the extensive literature on business strategy noting the volume of this literature now exceeds that on military strategy. The search for strategy in business, based on the developing “science of management” throughout the 1950s and 1960s, led to the relentless pursuit of optimal solutions based on mathematical precision and calculation. Strategic planning became paramount in large corporations. Later, when results based on strict rationality proved less satisfactory than expected, a backlash against rigid planning models ensued. In a vignette reflecting this changed view, Freedman cites former General Electric CEO Jack Welch, who cited approvingly a letter to the editor in Fortune magazine condemning strategic planning as an “endless quest by managers for a paint-by-numbers approach, which would automatically give them answers” (504). Subsequent popular approaches to applying the strategic lessons of history’s great military commanders to the business environment (The Leadership Secrets of Attila the Hun, for example) also seemed to deliver less than advertised as the basis for sound business strategies.

It is in the final chapter of this section where we begin to see, having explored the nature of strategy in three distinct areas, the process of induction moving us from observation to generalization. Referring to an article by Henry Mintzberg and James Waters, Freedman identifies a major dichotomy in the field of business strategy as that “between deliberate or emergent strategies” (554). Is strategy a rationally calcu-

lated plan, developed at higher echelons and provided to subunits for implementation, or, rather, a product of fluid decision-making described by Mintzberg and Waters as “a pattern in a stream of decisions[?]” Freedman’s answer to this question is one of the central themes of the book and is therefore worth tracking in some detail.

As early as the book’s opening epigram, the offhandish quote from the heavyweight prize-fighter Michael Tyson: “Everyone has a plan ‘till they get punched in the mouth” (ix), the reader is aware of the author’s skepticism for likening strategy to a calculated plan. This theme winds throughout the main sections of the book - throughout the fields of military, political and business strategy. From von Moltke’s famous dictum, “no plan survives contact with the enemy” (104) to Jack Welch’s dismissal (noted above) of efforts to fashion a “paint-by-number” approach to strategy, Sir Lawrence Freedman casts doubt on the idea of strategy as the prescriptive result of a rational calculation and direction. Indeed, titles of several of the book’s chapters: “The False Science”; “The Myth of the Master Strategist”; and “Formulas, Myths and Propaganda”, indicate a central objective of Freedman’s book: to de-mythologize the idea of strategy as a master plan. By the end of the book, having observed this to be the case in those domains visited, Freedman concludes: “The various strands of literature examined in this book all began confidently with a belief that given the right measures demanding objectives could be achieved on a regular basis. […] In all three cases, experience undermined the foundations of this confidence” (608).

Sir Lawrence Freedman identifies two basic obstacles to strategy as a rational progression of deliberate steps: the essentially conflictual nature of the strategic environment, and the role of chance and unpredictability. On the first point, given that strategy typically involves interaction with willful opponents or competitors, predicting how they will act/react introduces a significant element of uncertainty into strategic calculation. Further, as the second point suggests, chance and unpredictability bedevil any future-oriented efforts to plan and act. Taken together, these points call into question the very nature of strategic planning and strategy making.

Is strategy then an illusion, “not worth an empty eggshell,” as suggested by the ant-strategist Leo Tolstoy (98)? Counseling skepticism, but not fatalism, Freedman’s answer seems to be “not necessarily.” Although difficult, and demonstrably not the result of a perfectly rational process, strategy, Freedman concludes, is still important and necessary. He counsels: “…we have little choice but to identify a way forward dependent on human agency which might lead to a good outcome. It is as well to avoid illusions of control, but in the end all we can do is act as if we can influence events. To do otherwise is to succumb to fatalism” (622). In this respect, Freedman’s answer to the question of whether strategy is a deliberate or emergent process reflects Mintzberg’s view: “strategy formation walks on two feet, one deliberate, the other emergent” (555). Seen in this light, the simple shorthand of strategists: the ends-ways-means construct, appears too linear and must be grounded in a broader understanding of chance, contingency, and uncertainty. We are reminded of Murray and Grimsley’s observation on Clausewitz’s remarkable trinity (emotion, chance, and reason). “Although Clausewitz
intended this trinity to describe the nature of armed conflict, it applies with equal relevance to the conduct of strategy in peace as well as war.”

The creative strategist is thus free to roam throughout the realms of chance and probability, all the while focused on strategy as an instrument of policy.

Like any good volume on exploration, Freedman’s *Strategy* is full of suggestions for profitable follow-on voyages. One such potentially productive route for exploration is Freedman’s association of strategy and power. In the book’s preface he provides a brief definition of strategy as a political art: “the art of creating power” (xii). In political science, “power” is a fundamentally contested concept with understandings ranging from “power over resources” to “power over outcomes.” Freedman recognizes this essential distinction in a discussion of revolutionary politics (372-373) but a more detailed discussion of power, and strategy as the art of creating power, could have been beneficial. Indeed, in previous work, Freedman focused on the relationship of power and strategy to good effect.4 Tellingly, in this work, in addition to examining the concept of power, Freedman defined strategy as “the art of creating power to obtain the maximum political objectives using available military means.”5 Given the scope of the book under review, a working definition of strategy as “the art of creating power to obtain the maximum ______ objectives,” where the blank might be filled in alternately with the words military, political, or economic, would seem fitting. Adding the concept of objectives to the definition precludes criticism that strategy as simply “creating power” would amount to no more than a purposeless accumulation of resources. Recognizing at an early point the conception of strategy in this book is “governed by the starting point, and not the end point” (xi), it nevertheless seems that strategy requires both. In fact, Freedman concludes as much later in the book when discussing strategy as a process of managing emerging variables: “[t]his does not mean that it is easy to manage without a view of a desired end state. Without some sense of where the journey should be leading it will be difficult to evaluate alternative outcomes” (611). The central idea of strategy that emerges from the book is one that is part plan, part process - a combination of rational calculation and adaptation to evolving conditions. This notion is summarized agreeably in the letter to *Fortune* magazine quoted by Jack Welch and noted by Freedman: “Strategy was not a lengthy action plan. It was the evolution of a central idea through continually changing circumstances” (504).

*Strategy: A History,* is a grand exploration and at times takes the reader through uncharted terrain. The book’s concluding chapters (Part V, “Theories of Strategy”) offer not so much theories of strategy making derived through inductive observation, but rather thoughts on how recent scholarship in cognitive psychology and philosophy might help frame scripts or strategic narratives useful in advancing the process of making strategy. Here, as throughout, the observations are keen and suggest many areas for potentially productive follow-up. Early in the book,

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5 Ibid., 283.
observing that “apes were astute when it came to working out power balances” (8), Freedman suggests forming coalitions is a time-honored and effective strategic approach. Given his focus on the relationship between strategy and power, additional work on the concept of balance of power, and its importance in strategy particularly, would be useful.

For the arm-chair traveler (or arm-chair strategist, as the case may be) Sir Lawrence Freedman’s voyage of discovery through the world of strategy is enriching and thought-provoking. One hopes he remains intrepid and continues to help fill the “blank spots” on our mental maps. One such important spot that receives increased attention is the province of “grand strategy.” Should Freedman embark to explore this domain one would be tempted to sign on as a deckhand.

The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective
By Hew Strachan

Reviewed by Dr. Richard Swain, COL US Army Retired, Lawton, OK

This book, a collection of papers composed over a ten-year period, is subject to multiple legitimate readings. Some British reviewers have seen it simply as a critique of contemporary British and American military policy. However, the theme announced by the author, the Chichele Professor of the History of War at Oxford, is an exploration of “strategy, what we understand by it, and how that understanding has changed” (4). That seems to be the proper basis for evaluation.

Strachan indicts Huntington’s Soldier and the State with corrupting professional-political dialog in both the United States, where he acknowledges it may reflect Constitutional norms, and in the United Kingdom, where he argues it does not (76-77). Indeed, much of the book is engaged with criticism of institutional arrangements for strategy formulation in the United Kingdom and United States. Not surprisingly, the author is better informed about the complexities of the former than the latter; he probably overstates the influence of the Weinberger and Powell doctrines, while understating the role of the National Security Council system and the effects of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. He undergirds his arguments with what he sees as a corrective to an overly Anglophone reading of Clausewitz (5) and Thucydides (257).

The most prominent idea in the Direction of War is the argument that the understandings of policy and strategy have become so confused the distinction between them has been lost, largely to the detriment of strategic practice. In part, this confusion has been the result of the intensification of wars in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, critically in the First World War, when the higher direction of war in the form of grand strategy came to comprehend the mobilization of all national (and allied) means in pursuit of military victory. This result was compounded after the Second World War by the speculative theoretical flights of deterrence theorists, mostly American academics.
The greatest insight in Strachan’s argument lies precisely in his separation of policy and strategy as distinct and diverging influences with often conflicting logics, both of which must be accommodated by the policy maker and strategist. He does this first by pointing to the need to set strategy in the context of the adversarial nature of war; doing so corrects for what he indicts as overemphasis on the instrumental function of war derived from Clausewitz’s statement that “war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means” which first appears in a Note of 10 July 1827 and later in Book I, “On the Nature of War.” This is not, he reminds us, “a statement about the nature of war.” It is a statement about the use of war, something made clearer, he feels, in Book VIII, “War Plans.” He then expands on this point with the Policy-Politics distinction, more or less glossed by Clausewitz’s use of the German term Politik for both. “Politics,” he reminds us, “are inherently adversarial...Policy has a more unilateral thrust...a policy...remains a statement of one government’s intent...War,” he concludes, “is therefore no longer the unilateral application of policy but the product of reciprocal exchanges between diverging policies” (13).

In short, Strachan restores competitive reciprocity to the practice of national strategy, which, in turn, accounts for the unpredictability of strategic outcomes that reflect not the logical extension of one’s own efforts but the sum of conflicting efforts of all actors to achieve diverging goals. Later, looking back at Winston Churchill and Alan Brooke in World War II, he observes that the policy maker and strategist must be concerned with “what to do each day in the light of that day’s events, of the situation on the ground and of real-time intelligence” (242-243). Evolving strategic possibilities can require changes in policy even as they conform with it. The effect of this on policy makers should be increased modesty about the predictability of strategic effects; and on strategists, increased attention to the need for continuous reassessment and adjustment, notably something Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen addressed in his March 3, 2010 Landon Lecture at Kansas State University6 (229).

A collection of related essays does not a treatise make and it is probably a mistake to read this one as though it does. Written over time, for diverse purposes, the essays may address common themes, but even reworking does not remove discontinuities in thought that result from new insights or limitations imposed by the essay form. Strachan is surely right to point out that the instrumental use of war suggested in Clausewitz’s note of 1827, and Book I of On War, has sometimes been misunderstood as a statement of some organic condition rather than a requirement for war’s rational use. In a more comprehensive treatment, the author might be free to begin with deeper reflection on the implicit distinction between strategy as a noun, defined more or less as a program or pattern of actions intended to achieve some purpose, associated as it must be with a predictive theory of success; and strategy (-making) as an activity or verb, sensitive to the fluid and unpredictable outcome of the clash of opposing wills and actions by multiple actors.

This is the distinction, after all, which creates the contrast the author highlights between *On War*’s Book I and the discussion of war-making in Book VIII, both of which include the “instrumental” insight of the 1827 note.

American readers should take seriously Strachan’s critique of Huntington’s half-century old thesis on civil military relations, in light of the quarter-century experience with the results of the Goldwater-Nichols Act within the NSC System. Finally, a great deal of thought must be given about whether the notion of strategy can still be limited to the use of military forces, on which Strachan insists, or whether, as a practical matter, the concept has been more expansive for over a century and is likely to remain so because of the requirements of contemporary and future conflicts. It is notable the Lawrence Freedman’s recent book *Strategy, A History* (Oxford, 2013) considers the applicability of the idea in business writing, perhaps clarifying the concept by generalizing its use.

This collection is in many ways a journal of the author’s own journey of learning over a ten-year period in which he moved from the writing of traditional military history to the role of policy advisor. It is a valuable book that succeeds in reframing the idea of strategy and offers numerous insights into its practice in the direction of war.
Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War
By Robert M. Gates

Reviewed by Dr. Steven Metz, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute

Duty is Robert Gates’ second volume of memoirs and covers his time as Secretary of Defense in the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations. Few people are better versed in how Washington works (or doesn’t work) than Gates. He spent twenty-seven years in the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Council before becoming the only Secretary of Defense asked to stay in office when the White House changed hands between political parties. Because of this, the book’s release caused a major stir, particularly in Washington.

Gates’ anger and unvarnished opinions about senior policymakers and elected officials, including some still holding office drew the most initial attention. While he respects the two presidents he served, Gates indicts Washington’s hyperpartisan climate in general and Congress in particular which he describes as “Uncivil, incompetent in fulfilling basic constitutional responsibilities (such as time appropriates), micromanagerial, parochial, thin-skinned, [and] often putting self (and reelection) before country.” He is particularly disdainful of Senator Harry Reid, Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi, and Vice President Joe Biden, at times resorting to unnecessary low blows as when he sarcastically writes that Biden “presumed to understand how to make CT (counterterrorism) work better than Stan (McChrystal)” even though Biden was talking about policy and strategy and General McChrystal’s expertise was at the operational level of war.

Like any memoir, Duty does not weigh all sides of the story equally but concentrates on explaining Gates’ position on key issues, particularly the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. One theme that will appeal to military readers was Gates’ fierce dedication to the men and women in uniform, particularly those in combat zones. Time after time he excoriates the Department of Defense for its preoccupation “with planning, equipping, and training for future major wars with other nation-states, while assigning lesser priority to current conflicts and other forms of conflict, such as irregular or asymmetric war.” At times this compelled him to take things into his own hands. He proudly recounts his efforts at forcing improvements in the care of wounded warriors and jamming through production of Mine Resistant, Ambush Protected (MRAP) armored fighting vehicles and increased intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.

The crush of managing two wars and the daily operations of one of the world’s largest and most complex organizations left Gates little time for broad questions about American strategy. But there is also no indication in Duty that he would have done so even if given the opportunity. For all of his talents, Secretary Gates was not a strategic visionary. For instance, there is no indication that he seriously questioned the assumptions that justified US involvement in Afghanistan even during
the Obama administration's major review of US strategy. Gates, like the rest of the administration, accepted the idea that without a major American effort, the Taliban would regain control over large parts or all of Afghanistan and again provide a base for al Qaeda; and that al Qaeda wanted to restore its base in Afghanistan, and having this would increase the chances it would pull off another September 11-level attack on the United States or US targets abroad. The failure to scrutinize the basic assumptions of American strategy (or to mention such scrutiny if it did take place) is a puzzling omission since by the time of the Obama strategic review, much of the American public and Congress had begun to doubt whether the security gained by US military involvement justified the monetary and blood costs. There are times when policymakers must grapple with big strategic issues rather than the most immediate ones. This did not happen while Gates was Defense Secretary.

While Gates did succeed in holding off congressional pressure and buying additional time for his military commanders, the fact that neither Iraq nor Afghanistan are likely to be seen as strategic victories for the United States should send a stark message to the US military. The United States treated its conflict with a transnational, nonstate enemy as a war less because doing so was most effective than because the military was the most powerful tool available. This problem has not gone away. Today the United States remains organized to use its high-tech and high-quality forces to fight relatively short, politically unambiguous campaigns against other conventional militaries. It is not organized to fight transnational nonstate enemies, whether ideological ones like al Qaeda or criminal syndicates, even though every indication is that this sort of conflict will persist. Gates understood this but there was little he could do other than implore the rest of the US government, particularly the State Department, to provide additional resources for Iraq and Afghanistan.

Through herculean and even heroic efforts, Gates helped prevent Iraq and Afghanistan from becoming utter fiascos. He was not, however, able to turn them into strategic successes or do more than nudge the Department of Defense in a new direction. But then no one else could have, and probably no one could have done more to stave off disaster than Gates did. The Department of Defense and American national security strategy were not demonstrably better after his leadership, but they also were no worse. Ultimately, Duty holds grim but important lessons for the Army's current and future strategic leaders: they will face a hyperpartisan political climate and missions that devolve to the military less because it is designed for them than because it is the least bad option. As they read Gates' memoirs—and all should—most will share his anger and frustration but, like Gates himself, most will also be determined to make the best of it they can.
First, understand that this is a book about a unique form of leadership at the strategic level, in the words of the author a “generic political phenomenon seemingly never to have been systematically studied and which remains a neglected – indeed, virtually an unrecognized – topic of scholarly investigation and analysis.”

Thus, as the title states, the author’s attempt is to provide such a systematic inquiry into the role of our “proconsuls,” Skirting scholarly debates about an American empire while using their language, he further defines: “the core of the proconsular function is political-military leadership...that in the best of cases rises to statesmanship; its chief challenge is the coordination of civil and military authority in the periphery and the alignment with political-military leadership at the center.” Few authors could attempt such a broad inquiry into uncharted scholarship, but Professor Lord is imminently qualified to do so, and as we shall see, does so with remarkably fine results. With two earned doctorates (Yale-classics; Cornell-political science), over a decade in the national-security policy arena in Washington in the 1980s and 1990s (National Security Council; Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs; Distinguished Fellow at the National Defense University), and three previous books in the field, he was uniquely qualified for such an inquiry.

While the background is drawn from Rome, the focus of the book is clearly on America as a modern democracy and great power —“an effort has been made to include at least some discussion of all of the most important figures who can plausibly be identified as proconsuls in the properly functional sense of the term, from Spanish-American War to the present [2012].” The most prominent among them are General Leonard Wood and William Howard Taft in Cuba and the Philippines in the early twentieth century; MacArthur in the Philippines, Japan, and Korea from 1936-1951; General Lucius Clay in Germany in the late 1940’s; the intelligence operative Edward Lansdale in the Philippines and Vietnam in the early 1950s; Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and General Maxwell Taylor in Vietnam in the early 1960s; General Creighton Abrams, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and William Colby in Vietnam in the late 1960 and early 1970s; General Wesley Clark in the Balkans in the late 1990s; Ambassador L. Paul Bremer in Iraq in 2003-04; and General David Petraeus in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2006 [to 2011].

Each era, along with its American proconsuls, is presented in the richly documented detail expected from an eminent scholar and practitioner of our national security affairs. But to this reader it is not the individual analyses that are most informative for our work today and into the future. Rather, it is the synthesis that Professor Lord brings in the final chapter(s) when he gets to the “so what?” question: “Is proconsular leadership a good thing?” His main conclusion is unremarkable in
its barest statement—“...that delegated political-military leadership had been a significant independent variable in American national security decision-making from the end of the nineteenth century to the present; or more simply stated, that it has made a strategic difference.” But when he develops this thesis in two broad directions by drawing from the chapters of research, we see the major contribution of his endeavor in the book.

First, with respect to individual proconsuls the author presents what he considers to be a “respectable balance sheet”—“It reflects, above all, the high caliber of these men and others like them who have served the American Republic in high office since the nation’s emergence as a great power. They were more than mere imperial functionaries. Though not lacking in personal ambition, they were both American patriots and change agents who seized opportunities available to them to shape or steer national policy in the best interests of the United States and what it stands for. In this regard they exercised leadership in the proper sense of that term.”

After enjoying the more recent and familiar eras on that balance sheet—Clark in Kosovo; Bremer in Iraq; Petraeus in the Middle East—and setting them alongside the less familiar—MacArthur in the Far East; Clay in Germany, and Lodge, et al. in Vietnam—it strikes me that the author is a bit too generous in his overall assessment. In contrast, his individual assessments are correctly negative in several cases, well-documented and convincingly analyzed.

But it is the second broad direction in which he generalizes that I believe most readers will find very fruitful insights for the current period of defense reductions and beyond. In his discussion of whether or not the institutions, cultures, and processes of national security decision-making and policy implementation, and particularly as they enable the proconsular role, are as functional as they might be, he strongly reinforces the current consensus. He ruefully notes that while proconsular leadership in the proper sense of the term seems to call for unity of command in the field, the fundamental problem facing American proconsuls is that political and military decision making have long been institutionally split, and still remain so even after the Goldwater-Nichols reforms of 1986. Here Professor Lord is quite correctly critical, indeed skeptical, in his assessment: “There is no easy solution to his problem.” That said, however he does include a very thoughtful set of ruminations on the urgent necessity to rethink fundamentally the role of our regional unified commands, and as well the often-adapted Unified Command Plan which defines them.

While no book can be extended to all of the logical implications of its main thesis, I find one omission to be worth noting. Given his own experiences and the richness of the research into individual proconsuls, their successes and failure, it would have been helpful for Professor Lord to have advanced his own ideas on the needed professional development of such future leaders, both civilian and military. To this reader, it is but one more area in which Professor Lord’s conclusion is apt: “Suffice it to say, proconsular leadership, which so plainly offers danger as well as opportunity, is an instrument in need of adult supervision at the imperial center.”
These two books approach the same topic, the all-volunteer force, from different analytic perspectives. While the term all-volunteer force is meant to include all armed services, the focus of these works is the service with the largest manpower component, the United States Army. Preserving the nation’s security is a critical issue in this age of fiscal austerity facing the US government amid the struggles within the Congress, its political parties, and the executive branch. The challenge is to manage the national debt while providing for the security of American citizens. All indications point toward significant near-term reductions in Department of Defense budgets with resulting cutbacks in manpower, modernization, and readiness. The US military consumes over fifty percent of the discretionary spending of the federal government. Absent existential threats, it should be scrutinized for funding cuts.

Laich retired as a major general in the Army Reserve after 35 years of service; he held command at colonel and flag officer ranks. Bacevich graduated from West Point and was commissioned an armored officer; he rose to command the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Upon military retirement, Bacevich earned a Princeton PhD and recently retired as a professor of history and international relations at Boston University. Ironically, both authors have inherited Smedley’s syndrome from “War is a Racket.” Bacevich opens Chapter 8 with the description of a senior officer who, “in retirement deflects…calling into questions officially sanctioned truths…[after a decade of unquestioning subservience to the national security state” (115).

In this case, the “officially sanctioned truth” is the success of the all-volunteer force as a highly professional force, vastly superior to the conscripted force it replaced in July 1973. Laich and Bacevich served in the Vietnam-era draft Army, then during the presumptive validation of the all-volunteer force in the Persian Gulf War. National security professionals and military members of the touted all-volunteer force will find portions of these books difficult to accept since their core identities and motivations are under assault. Military readers will probably find convenient scapegoats in the civilian and political leaders whom they believe tend to overcommit the force—or with the citizens who go shopping while service members go to war on their behalf.

In Skin in the Game, Laich offers a simple framework with which to evaluate the all-volunteer force—fairness, efficiency, and sustainability. His assessment is presented rhetorically, and he offers the following disclaimer in the Preface: “This book is not intended to be a rigorous...
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academic product or a reference source. In fact, it could be characterized as a very long op-ed piece intended to promote dialogue” (xiii). The reader must keep this disclaimer in mind as Laich provides a brief summary of the development of the all-volunteer force at the close of the Vietnam War, which he regards as a political expedient of President Nixon. Most informative is his presentation of the rationale conveyed by the Gates Commission, which Nixon directed to examine the alternative to conscription. Along with the objectives, assumptions, and nine objections for the all-volunteer force, Laich provides his view of the “reality” that has transpired over the past four decades since the all-volunteer force’s inception. Laich believes that the all-volunteer force is not fair since people across the social economic spectrum do not serve equally (all-volunteer force soldiers are “poor kids and patriots”). It is also inefficient because the Army has outsourced some logistics and security competencies to private corporations to conduct its recent operations. Lastly, the all-volunteer force is not sustainable because of prohibitive personnel costs required to recruit and retain active component service members. Those costs include paying for rehabilitation from combat wounds and psychological trauma as well as retirement pensions.

Bacevich’s *Breach of Trust* provides a much more scholarly treatment; it continues the arguments of his previous works *The New American Militarism* (2005) and *Washington Rules* (2010). Bacevich asserts that the American way of life and its quest for global preeminence has placed the nation in a perpetual state of conflict and war. In protecting and projecting US values, national leaders have chosen the military instrument of national power by default, which in turn requires global presence of its force. The establishment and evolution of the all-volunteer force enable this presence. For the US political elite, the all-volunteer force is the blunt instrument for asserting preeminence: For senior military officers, the all-volunteer force has become the manifestation of a professional force with the prized autonomy that it entails.

To quote Shakespeare’s Hamlet, “ay, there’s the rub!” Bacevich contends that the Departments of Defense and the Army have aligned with societal views of race, gender, and sexual orientation (most recently with the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”). Thus, the American public has little interest or concern about its military, apart from the feel-good patriotic fanfare at sporting events and occasional encounters with uniformed service members at airports. The all-volunteer force, with its complementarity with the National Guard and Reserve forces, was designed to link US forces with the American people, such that employments of the military would be noticed, felt, and supported by the public. Alas, that has not been the case, as Rachel Maddow has documented in *Drift: The Unmooring of American Military Power* (Parameters review, Summer 2013).

With less than one percent of the US population currently serving, the all-volunteer force has become separated physically and socially from the American people. Repeatedly, the civilian political elite has succumbed to the temptation to assert US preeminence and then used the nation’s impressive and available military force without constraint or accountability. While several national polls reflect a US military held in high esteem, Bacevich contends that it has not been effective in winning current wars and has abrogated elements of its professional jurisdiction
to private security organizations. He foresees a bleak future characterized by “more needless wars or shadow conflicts sold by a militarized and irresponsible political elite; more wars mismanaged by an intellectually sclerotic and unimaginative senior officer corps; more wars that exact huge penalties without yielding promised outcomes…” (190). Bacevich decries the warrior-professional who has supplanted the citizen-soldier through the “conversion of military service from collective obligation to personal preference [for service]” (79). Accordingly, Bacevich charges the nation’s political elites, senior military officers, and disengaged citizenry with a breach of trust with American service members.

Both authors buttress their arguments on the founding documents of our nation—The Declaration of Independence and The US Constitution. They refer frequently to the principle of no large standing forces. They assert that greatly reduced numbers in the armed forces would limit leaders’ desire and ability to launch military operations. To man the forces needed for peacetime engagement, the authors offer alternatives to the all-volunteer force, but they are equally pessimistic about the viability of military conscription. Laich proposes a hybrid of a draft lottery for the reserve component with the option of enrolling in college Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs. Bacevich suggests a two-year requirement for national service that would enhance citizens’ sense of obligation to contribute to their nation. Any form of mandatory service would have to provide safeguards against the inequities that have plagued past conscription programs. All citizens must bear equal risk and share the burden of service.

It is appropriate to evaluate the viability of the all-volunteer force after its inception forty years ago—especially as we face the uncertainty of future decades. The strategic question remains a philosophical one: “What do we want the role of the United States to be in the world?” The answers to this fundamental query determine the role of U.S. armed forces, its composition, and the capabilities required to secure national interests. To inform such discourse, national security professionals and military members should consider the arguments and recommendations presented in these two works. Our nation can ill afford a breach of trust between its citizenry and those who serve to secure their collective interests.

Generals of the Army: Marshall, MacArthur, Eisenhower, Arnold, Bradley
Edited by James H. Willbanks

Reviewed by Major General David T. Zabecki, PhD, USA (Ret.), Honorary Senior Research Fellow, War Studies Programme, University of Birmingham (UK)

In 2013, the United States Mint issued a set of commemorative coins honoring the only five officers to achieve the five-star rank of General of the Army. The half-dollar coin features Henry H. “Hap” Arnold and Omar N. Bradley. The dollar features George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Douglas MacArthur appears on the five-dollar gold piece. Authorized by an act of Congress that was sponsored by the US Army
Generals of the Army was written as a companion piece to that special set of coins. Edited by Professor James H. Willbanks, the General of the Army George C. Marshall Chair of Military History and Director of the Department of Military History at CGSC, the book contains a chapter on each of the five-star generals, with an emphasis on their Fort Leavenworth experiences. The first chapter, “Officer Education and the Fort Leavenworth Schools, 1881-1940,” by Jonathan M. House, is an excellent capsule history of mid-level officer education in the US Army. That chapter alone is worth the price of the book. Volumes have been written about each of these US Army legends, and all but Marshall published their own memoirs. Yet, this handy little single-volume reference provides a tightly written set of profiles for comparing these five very different careers. Those careers also intertwined in different and sometimes ironic ways.

Douglas MacArthur never really attended a Leavenworth school; nor did he formally serve there as an instructor. He did serve as the commander of an engineer company at Leavenworth, and while there he lectured informally at the General Services School and the Cavalry School. Perhaps the most controversial of the major figures of American military history, MacArthur was the only general officer to serve in three major wars (World Wars I and II and Korea). He also reached five-star rank as a field marshal in the Philippine army several years before the rank existed in the US Army.

George C. Marshall never held a command in combat, but he is widely recognized as the “Organizer of Victory” in World War II. After the war, he went on to serve as Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense. He received the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in establishing the Marshall Plan for the recovery of Europe. Thanks to his foresight, Germany today remains one of America’s staunchest allies in the world. In 1906, Marshall attended the Infantry and Cavalry School (shortly renamed the School of the Line). Graduating first in his class, he was selected to attend the Staff College, and then served for two more years as an instructor in the Staff College’s Department of Engineering. Although MacArthur was far senior in terms of rank and time in the service, Marshall was the first army officer appointed to the newly established five-star rank in December 1944—one day after the promotion of Admiral William D. Lahey, chief of staff to President Roosevelt. As Secretary of Defense, Marshall in April 1951 supported President Harry Truman’s decision to relieve MacArthur from his command in Korea. Marshall also was the only five-star officer who was not a military academy graduate.

Dwight D. Eisenhower was convinced that his career was on a dead-end track after he was not assigned overseas during World War I. Nor had he even attended an officers’ branch school. But thanks to the mentorship of Major General Fox Conner, Eisenhower attended CGSC during 1925-26, and graduated first in his class. During the interwar years, Eisenhower as a major and then a lieutenant colonel served as MacArthur’s aide-de-camp, first when MacArthur was Chief of Staff of the Army, and then when MacArthur went to the Philippines. During World War II, Eisenhower’s rise in rank was meteoric, from
his promotion to colonel in March 1941 to general of the Army on 20 December 1944. The fact that his former aide received his fifth star only two days after MacArthur received his, always seemed to be a sore point with MacArthur. At one point in late 1951, MacArthur was also seen as Eisenhower’s primary competition for the Republican presidential nomination.

Hap Arnold was the last promoted of the four original five-star officers authorized by the Congress for the army. The commander of US Army Air Forces during World War II, Arnold also was a semi-official member of the ad hoc Joint Chiefs of Staff. Trained as a pilot in the school established by the Wright Brothers, Arnold was a life-long advocate for military aviation. He also had the least promising interwar career of any World War II senior general. He received less-than-stellar evaluation reports and, after the court-martial of General Billy Mitchell, Arnold was exiled to a number of make-work assignments in remote places. On top of that, he thoroughly hated his time as a student at CSSC and even considered retiring from the army early because of that experience. Yet he persevered and ultimately presided over history’s biggest expansion in military aviation. Two years after the US Air Force became a separate service in 1947, Congress approved changing Arnold’s rank to General of the Air Force.

Omar N. Bradley was the last American officer promoted to five-star rank. During World War II, Congress authorized only four five-star positions each for the Army and Navy. But with the conversion of Arnold’s rank to General of the Air Force in 1949, the Army could argue it had one allocation left. As the commander of the 12th Army Group during World War II, the Chief of Staff of the Army succeeding Eisenhower in 1948, and the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Bradley was the natural choice. He was promoted to General of the Army in September 1950. Like Eisenhower, Bradley did not serve overseas during World War I. Unlike Arnold, Bradley valued his time as a student at CGSC, and after graduating he went on to Fort Benning as an instructor at the Infantry School, where he came to the attention of Marshall who was then the assistant commandant of the school. In February 1941, Bradley was promoted to brigadier general, seven months ahead of Eisenhower. As Chairman of the Joint’s Chiefs of Staff, Bradley supported President Truman’s decision to relieve MacArthur, an officer who was already a brigadier general in June 1918 when Bradley was still a captain.

More than sixty years after the last US Army officer was promoted to five-star rank, Fort Leavenworth remains the crossroads of the US Army’s officer corps, and almost every senior officer in the last hundred years has come through one of the Leavenworth Schools. Those who made it to the five-star level lived in a far different world strategically and politically than we do today, and the institution they served has likewise changed in many ways. Yet there remains a core foundation to the Profession of Arms that is timeless, and today’s offices can still learn much by studying the careers of those who preceded us—especially these five.
Over the past sixty years, the US military has gotten into the habit of planning in an unconstrained environment, whether in developing budgetary requirements or planning for contingencies. This luxury is no longer feasible. As Winston Churchill is purported to have said, “Now that we are out of money we have to think.” It is in this context that Moises Naim’s, *The End of Power*, should be considered. Moises Naim is an eminent scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former editor of *Foreign Policy*. His recent book is a thought-provoking and insightful examination of the changing nature of power in today’s world.

As the title suggests, *The End of Power* suggests that traditional notions (and levers) of power are outdated: power isn’t what it used to be. As the extensive literature on globalization has pointed out, power is becoming more diffuse and accessible. In the complex and volatile world today, brute force is often ineffective or counterproductive. Traditional icons in the exercise of power, from presidents to popes, are increasingly constrained in their ability to translate power into desired outcomes. As Robert Zoellick mentioned in his Wall Street Journal review of this book, “seemingly powerful actors in societies have a harder time getting things done.”

Naim begins with a discussion of power, how to conceptualize it, use it, and keep it. He does a nice job summarizing the Weberian conception of power and how bigger became better with regards to the exercise of power. Max Weber, a famous German social scientist, suggested states were those entities that maintained a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within a prescribed boundary. He also advocated stronger, hierarchical bureaucracies as the mechanisms for states to exert authority and power. Naim explains how this Weberian structure, so successful after World War I, has begun to crumble. Even as the concentration of power is increasing in some sectors, the ability to use it to achieve a desired outcome and the probability of retaining it is more volatile and uncertain than ever.

Perhaps the most interesting portion of the book is the typology Naim establishes to categorize how power has transformed with globalization and other recent changes. This typology discusses a tripartite revolution against the conventional notions and effectiveness of power: more, mobility, and mentality. The “more” component expounds upon the growth in actors, ideas, and world population. All of these factors complicate the possession and exercise of control by more traditional actors, such as states. In Weber’s world, barriers to entry and the
efficiencies of scale reduced the number of potential actors in critical sectors such as governance and industry. In today’s world, those barriers have been reduced and the same structures that provided economies of scale have often hindered the ability to adapt quickly to changing situations. The “mobility” revolution refers to the expansion of options. Not only do people and things have greater ability to traverse the globe, so does information. This revolution has contributed to the reduction of the barriers to entry discussed above and has allowed a greater number and diversity of the actors to interact on a local, regional or global level. Finally, Naim discusses the “mentality” revolution. This development, closely related to the first two, discusses how rapidly ideas and norms can proliferate, changing expectations and traditional social contracts. Again, the revolution is antithetical to the hierarchical structures of power touted by Weber.

Naim’s argument fits nicely with a much older debate captured by Jeffrey Issac in his classic, “Beyond the Three Faces of Power: A Realist Critique.” In that article, a distinction was made between the “power to” and the “power over.” The three “M” revolutions have increased the ability of everyone, including nonstate actors, to exert power in ways that were unimaginable in the past (power to). Inversely, these same revolutions have decreased the ability of traditional power brokers, such as states and armies, to exercise or sustain power over other actors (power over). In addition, power has to be considered within the social structures within which humans interact. Thus, the ability to understand and explain is as important as the ability to do something about the physical phenomenon. This context coincides with Naim’s call for a “framework to help make sense of the changes taking place.”

Overall, this book is well-written and readable. Though much of what is described is well-known, Naim ties it together in an original and thought-provoking manner. For those interested in the role of landpower, this book provides some exceptional insights in conceptualizing the roles and functions of the US Army and Marine Corps. If power is so dispersed and the problems more complex, how should the Army define its role? Certainly, the military must retain the ability to dominate other state-based military threats to ensure the nation’s survival and to promote the vital interests of the country. However, what type of force structure is needed to give our national leaders the flexibility they need to respond to the VUCA international system in a resource constrained environment? If you accept Naim’s conclusions, perhaps the Army’s fight to maintain end strength is not a realistic or affordable approach given the “more, mobility, and mentality” revolutions.

This book is also worth reading for foreign policy enthusiasts and senior political and military leaders who are struggling to develop effective policies and strategies during times of fiscal constraint. As the traditional sources and structures of power decay, senior leaders, policymakers, and strategists have to adapt. Leaders have to be more comfortable with a lack of direct control. Success will reside in the ability to monitor and shape ideas associated with the mentality revolution from the lowest to the very highest levels. Hypocrisy and mistakes will be quickly identified and disseminated by various actors. While the military should retain those capabilities where it maintains a comparative advantage, such as strategic mobility, it must look for more alternative
solutions to the problems at hand. Knowing the limitations of military power might be just as important as knowing its capabilities.

**Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama**

by Stephen Sestanovich

Reviewed by Colonel Michael J. Daniels, student, US Army War College

The recent spate of writing decrying the decline of American power and influence centers on issues of domestic decay and turmoil, with the view that the United States has somehow lost its way in the world. Some authors argue these domestic political, economic, and social challenges have hamstrung the current administration in pursuing the kind of aggressive, engaged foreign policy needed in this volatile time. Stephan Sestanovich, author of *Maximalist*, shows the current challenges of the Obama administration are not new, but part of a cycle that can be traced back to the post-World War II Truman administration.

Sestanovich is a former US diplomat, who served under both Presidents Reagan and Clinton. He is currently a professor of international relations at Columbia, as well as a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Sestanovich has written a highly-readable and thorough history of US foreign policy since 1947. The book does not offer much in the way of new research or detail. However, the author succeeded in repackaging previous works and incorporating a great many anecdotes to retell this story with a slightly new twist. It is a worthy addition to US foreign policy scholarship, and should be read by any serious student of diplomatic history, or for anyone in a position to advise on or craft future foreign policy.

The book expands on the author’s earlier thesis, regarding the “maximalist” tradition in US foreign policy, one advanced in a Spring 2005 article in The National Interest. Sestanovich, describes foreign policy and diplomacy in a continuum cycling between periods of maximalism and retrenchment. One criticism of the book is the author never defines these two terms, which are so central to his argument. The reader quickly summarizes that maximalism equals overreach, with retrenchment the “do less” corollary that follows when America must pick up the pieces. The author details the approach administrations have taken cycling between these two extremes: the maximalist Truman followed by a retrenching Eisenhower; who is then followed by maximalist Kennedy/Johnson administrations; then by a long period of retrenchment under presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter; the maximalism of Reagan; a pause in the cycle under presidents George H.W. Bush and Clinton; the maximalism of George W. Bush; and finally this current period of retrenchment under President Obama.

A few unanswered questions linger below the surface of a linear story long on narrative but short on analysis. My central criticism is the cycle is described as far too simplistic. Can any administration be categorized as purely maximalist or retrenching? The author concedes most administrations made decisions and set policies that ran counter to the general direction of their foreign policy. These decisions were almost always influenced by external events, beyond the influences of
the president and his team of advisors. Sestanovich was unable to categorize the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations cleanly for these very reasons, and the author notes it was not President George W. Bush’s initial intent to be a maximalist. The second- and third-order effects of policy decisions are often to blame for these shifts. The decisions of our partners and allies, unforeseen world events, and black swans such as 9-11 are also responsible for shifts in focus. Campaign rhetoric and an administration’s “going-in position” rarely survive first contact with future realities. The author would have been better served to incorporate more of this dynamic into his analysis, and to examine why presidents seem so often to misjudge or fail to anticipate events that shake their preferred interrelationship with the world.

Sestanovich spends most of the book examining the foreign policy realm of presidential decision making, and what drives administrations to “go large” or “go small” when pursuing national interests and exporting American values. This examination is interesting but it is also incomplete. Sestanovich, like many other scholars, fails to account for domestic political dynamics and issues that influence our ability to act globally. It is as if the author believes international credibility trumps domestic will. This Innenpolitik—Realpolitik interplay and tension—best explained in Peter Trubowitz’s book Politics and Strategy, is ground-zero for grand strategic development. Just as unforeseen events abroad can derail foreign policy, so too domestic challenges will often cause an administration to be more inward-focused. Sestanovich’s argument would have been strengthened by acknowledging this relationship and implicitly weaving more examples throughout his narrative.

The author’s lack of detailed analysis weakens his argument that the United States must remain actively engaged in the world, and be more a maximalist than a retrencher. Sestanovich never convinces the reader why a more balanced and pragmatic policy position, similar to that taken by the Obama administration, can be an effective, or at least a suitable course for present realities. These criticisms aside, Maximalist remains an excellent history of US foreign policy, and provides yet another lens through which to view presidential decision-making in the modern era. Future policy makers, politicians and strategists would do well to take note.
In *Treasury’s War*, Juan Zarate, a former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crime and federal prosecutor, earnestly presents an insider’s view of the US Treasury’s response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In all, this book is an important, enjoyable and often contradictory history vital to understanding the contemporary US practice of financial-based power projection, and the Treasury’s new role in national security.

The author begins with a brief introduction to the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which is “the US government’s primary tool for going after the assets of enemy regimes” domiciled within Washington’s jurisdiction, as well as prohibiting American citizens, banks, or businesses from transacting with Specially Designated Nationals, (individuals, businesses, groups or entities) sanctioned by law. North Korea, Cuba and Iran were all subject to lawful economic sanctions, administered by Treasury prior to 9/11.

Mr. Zarate’s “Treasury tale” begins after 9/11 with three lawyers, Treasury General Counsel David Aufhauser, his Deputy George Wolfe and Chief Adviser Bill Fox, crafting the contours of what would become Executive Order 13224, authorizing Treasury to designate administratively the financial enablers of terrorism and, more importantly, those associated with them. Zarate, a Senior Advisor to the Undersecretary of the Treasury for Enforcement, ran the Executive Office for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, which was combined with the Treasury Office of Intelligence and Analysis, making him the first Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes.

With the stage set, the book’s second half details Treasury’s warfare. Directed by Executive Order 13224 and armed with section 311 of the Patriot Act (2001), Treasury began administratively designating enablers and associates of sanctioned entities in 2005. Weighing the risk of becoming an “associate” and losing access to US markets, many banks and insurance companies cut off relationships with sanctioned entities isolating them from the global financial system. Outside US legal authority or enforcement, designated entities were frozen out of global markets by international actions in what Zarate termed a “virtuous cycle of self-isolation.” By all accounts, it was highly successful. From there, Treasury was off to the races designating Iranian persons, banks and shipping companies, Lebanese banks, Al Qaeda, Al Shaabab and Taliban financiers, and Russian criminal networks, among others. Along the way, the Treasury became the center of gravity for US financial-based power projection and the de-facto, but explicit, system administrator for global finance.
Zarate’s history clearly conveys the intent of Treasury’s approach. As such, *Treasury’s War* should be required reading for policy makers. However, with a decade of on-the-ground policy implementation, *Treasury’s War* should be more than a triumphal recitation. Mr. Zarate’s assessments of the efficiency, efficacy, coherence and limitations of Treasury’s policy would have strengthened the book. The most serious, yet unspoken, limitation of Treasury’s approach is that it does not project power. It works by reduction, isolating US finance from designated entities and their associates. The logical endpoint of any such system is US self-isolation, not power projection. Secondly, created and administered by lawyers and prosecutors, Treasury’s approach maintains the petite fiction of domestic legality when, in fact, the policy was designed to operate beyond US legal jurisdiction where informal American diplomatic influence has failed. Additionally, much of *Treasury’s War* operates on an administrative basis, not a legal basis. The US government can designate entities administratively and is not required to demonstrate whether target has either specific knowledge or intent beforehand. Regardless of the legal terminology, framework, or perspective of the participants and their talk of pursuing international scofflaws, it is an exercise in US power projection not criminal enforcement. Lastly, the book leaves one Rubicon uncrossed. *Treasury’s War* describes systemic manipulation of the global financial system for US objectives. Systems are dynamic, adaptive, and adopt new equilibria as a result of interventions or shocks; otherwise they do not survive. The balance between specific intervention versus system regulation remains an open question.

The book’s last chapter, “The Coming Financial Wars,” looks at some emerging challenges to Treasury’s war and serves as the basis for Zarate’s *Parameters* article (Winter 2013-14). The author approaches the finite future of both the dollar as world reserve currency and American as financial hegemon with a touch of melancholy. This approach leaves unanswered the question of how the United States will continue to harness international financial self-interest to its national policy aims. He approaches networked asset creation—companies such as Facebook, Google, and Bitcoin, which create value by their network and network position and not of themselves—as problems to solve not horses to harness. It is a decidedly twentieth century perspective. To give Zarate his due, the epilogue of *Treasury’s War* contains nuanced musings on the role and limits of national power projection through financial means. Those questions and his answers deserve expansion into another book.

**Planning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare and the First World War**

By Nicholas A. Lambert

Reviewed by Sarandis Papadopoulos, Ph.D., principal co-author Pentagon 9/11 and Secretariat Historian, Department of the Navy

Naval power in the First World War seemingly served only defensive purposes. Fleets protected Entente trade, while German U-boats tried to stifle delivery of supplies. The Dardanelles campaign, the failed naval attempt to bypass deadlock in France and Flanders, sought to buttress Russia with equipment and keep it in the war. During the conflict,
this argument goes, blockade predictably weakened Germany slowly, but only four years of land warfare clinched victory.

Nicholas Lambert now convincingly argues the Royal Navy instead perceived “economic warfare” as a way to trigger quick collapse. Drawing from his 1998 *Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution*, Lambert traces the service’s understanding that a “close” blockade of German ports would be hopeless in the face of new mine, torpedo and submarine threats, but then sought other measures. After evaluating British vulnerability during the 1905 Moroccan Crisis, the Navy recognized economic warfare’s potential to deprive Germany of materiel and financing. Exploiting Britain’s central position at the world’s shipping, communications (telegraph cables), insurance (Lloyd’s) and banking systems offered to deter the *Kaisereich* or quickly defeat it. By 1912 the Cabinet-level Committee on Imperial Defence had “pre-delegated” authority to embargo trade and credit to Germany, allowing initiation of sanctions the day war started on 5 August 1914 (178).

Once the world war began, however, market panic worked too well alongside these measures. The July war scare, with August’s tight wartime British controls, froze credit worldwide with investors buying gold or Sterling; every stock exchange closed (187). The plunging US dollar forced Treasury Secretary William McAdoo to shutter Wall Street for four months as the market for American cotton collapsed weeks before mid-term Congressional elections. Despite government guarantees for London banks’ payment instruments, “bills of exchange,” international commerce halted and employers laid-off workers, raising the specter of domestic revolution in many countries.

Economic warfare had run off the rails and the British pulled back to mitigate its consequences. The period to February 1916 saw arguments on limited blockade. For Lambert, the adversaries were the Admiralty on one side (albeit with differing views within the service), with the Foreign Office, War Office (Army) and Board of Trade (the economics and merchant shipping ministry) generally on the other. Each agency played a role in counting or controlling trade flow into Germany’s neutral neighbors, but faced difficulties in so doing. All leaders ultimately realized the lure of wartime profit was not limited to Swedish, Danish or Dutch re-export businesses, nor to American oil firms, but to British shipping companies as well. Economic warfare, a key ingredient of an “off-shore balancing” strategy some describe today, needed stringency to function, a non-existent commodity until 1916.

To be fair, politics compelled behavior contradictory to waging war. Merchant firms, and the Board of Trade, fiercely rejected government meddling in the free market even to prevent shipments to the enemy. Despite repeated reports of goods being re-exported to Germany, the Foreign Office sought to appease neutrals, hoping they would voluntarily stop trade with the Central Powers through quotas on cargoes. The War Office needed to mobilize arms and food, as well as conscript personnel, which threatened domestic British political stability (332). The Royal Navy intercepted blockade runners, only to see British Prize Courts refuse to “condemn” cargoes because ownership could not be proven, allowing the merchant vessels to resume passage even when carrying supplies the *Kaisereich* needed. Atop it all, Asquith’s parliamentary coalition could collapse if any these constituencies withdrew support.
Only continued failure on the battlefield and the 1916 conscription crisis created the circumstances needed for economic warfare to begin in earnest.

Researched to the limits of remaining sources, Planning Armageddon is complex. It needs a close reading to master its myriad issues and many characters, civilian and military, whose roles changed over a decade. Cruiser operations for sanction enforcement are tangential here, more the backdrop to Cabinet debate and international diplomacy. But the book profitably uncovers key elements. Despite war’s public approval in 1914, British firms traded across the North Sea for eighteen months. Britain attacked the Dardanelles in 1915 not simply to equip the Czar’s armies, but to allow export of Russian wheat to stabilize domestic grain prices (320). Most centrally, in 1912 the British government authorized the Royal Navy to win a war quickly, a decisive “Schlieffen Plan” from the sea, (1) before its 1914 decision to put the British Expeditionary Force into France. That neither the navy nor the government it served properly calculated the measures needed to make economic warfare work reflected the real height of the goals they sought. Strategic planners seeking to arrange the same methods in future conflicts ought to read this book and bear such needs in mind.
The Cartels: The Story of Mexico’s Most Dangerous Criminal Organizations and Their Impact on U.S. Security
By George W. Grayson

Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, Distinguished Visiting Professor and Minerva Chair at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

The Cartels, written by George Grayson, a noted expert on Mexico and Emeritus Professor at the College of William & Mary, is a no-holds barred expose of the criminal violence, corruption, and crisis of governance gripping Mexico. The author has over two-hundred research trips to Latin America, two recent books on the topic—one focusing on Los Zetas (2012; with Sam Logan) and the other on narco-violence and Mexican failed state potentials (2010)—and three recent US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, monographs concerning La Familia cartel (2010), the rise of vigilantism (2011), and Felipe Calderón’s policies influencing the Mexican armed forces (2013). The reviewer, having read all of these more specialized works, can see where material has been drawn from them for this new endeavor. This book, in fact, can be considered Dr. Grayson’s production of a more generalized work on the subject much akin to Sylvia Longmire’s Cartel (2011), Paul Rexton Kan’s Cartels at War (2012), and Ioan Grillo’s El Narco (2012).

The work, which was published at the end of 2013, draws upon very up-to-date Spanish and English language works, interviews, and email correspondence providing as current a picture as possible when it went to press. It is composed of preface and acknowledgements, introduction, ten chapters, thirteen appendices, notes, selected bibliography, and an index. Its chapters can be grouped into four basic themes, each of which will be discussed in turn. The first theme, comprising the introduction and Chapter 1, is that of the historical era when drug traffickers were subordinate to an autocratic state. It begins with the story of Mexican president Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) and his Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) successors through Ernesto Zedillo (ending Nov 2000). The rise of Miguel “El Padrino” Gallardo and the relationship of traffickers to the government are also discussed along with the fact that, if the rules were not followed, enforcer teams would be dispatched from Mexico City to levy PRI extra-judicial justice. The second theme, comprising Chapters 2-4, is that of the transitional era in Colombia, South Florida, and Mexico when the fortunes of the Colombian cartels waned and the Mexican cartels become ascendant. It chronicles the shift in cocaine flow from Florida to Mexico and then provides information on the Gulf, Los Zetas, Sinaloa, Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO), Juárez, La Familia (Knights Templars), and Arellano Félix Organization (AFO) cartels. Also covered is the National Action Party (PAN) policy shift—under Vicente Fox (Dec 2000-Nov 2006)—of no longer sending out governmental kill-teams to punish traffickers who got out of line. The resulting second-order effects, along with other factors, inadvertently contributed to the power balance reversal between the cartels and the federal government.
The third theme, comprising Chapters 5-6, focuses on the Calderón era (Dec 2006-Nov 2012). It is one of direct confrontation, with the cartels spurred on by the increasing national security threat they represented to the Mexican state. This second PAN administration’s approach, one with a kingpin strategy focus, reliance on the armed forces, and close coordination with the United States, is highlighted. The experiences of the Mexican military are also chronicled; as a mission for which they were ill prepared to undertake as well as the impacts, including human rights abuses, this has had on Mexican society. Military engagements (firefights and arrests) with municipal and state police forces in the pay of the cartels are also detailed. The final theme, comprising Chapters 7-10, is on the present administration of Enrique Peña Nieto (Dec 2012-Current). This new administration has engaged in campaign ploys—like the stillborn Gendarmería Nacional program—and media spin, downplaying the extent of the cartel threat, to further its public image and Machiavellian agendas for the benefit of the PRI now once again in power. The increasing rise of vigilantism in Mexico is also covered within this theme along with the enablers of organized crime which include elements of the Church, banking and business interests, and Mexican state governors, whom (due to the executive-legislative impasse in Mexico City since the late 1990s) have increasingly gained in political power and wealth, resulting in their either looking the other way or directly colluding with the cartels.

Many of components of the work are highly informative and provide great insights into the relationships and animosities of the cartels to the Mexican government under the various administrations—both PRI and PAN—and to each other. Further, the writing benefits from Grayson’s approach to categorizing information in such a way that it is easily digestible. For instance, the table with the “Ten Commandments of ‘El Padrino’” (23) is extremely useful in showing the subordination of the narco-syndicates to the old PRI political machine. Of note from this table is how executions of opposing traffickers were to take place north of the US border, if possible (Commandment 4)—what we would call spillover. Yet, American civilians were not to be kidnapped, extorted, or killed either south or north of the border so as not to incur the wrath of the US government (Commandment 5). Other tables show us the differences between the drug wars in Colombia and Mexico (96), a general history of drug activities (228-232), and military desertion rates in Mexico—which between 1997 and 2012 number over two-hundred and twenty thousand personnel and beg the question how many of these individuals have gone over to the cartels (264).

Criticism, of what is otherwise an excellent overview of the recent history of the Mexican cartels and their interrelationship to Mexican politics, focuses on the fact that quite a few typos can be found within its pages; better proofing would have been beneficial. The work is also thin on analyzing cartel impacts on US security, making that part of the subtitle a misnomer. About two pages discuss corruption of US personnel (209-211) while the Mérida Initiative, from which the new PRI administration has distanced itself, is mentioned in more sections of the book (93-104, 175-176) additional analysis of its and other impacts seemed warranted. While it is recognized that Mexico is the major transit point of illicit narcotics flow into the United States and anything negative
taking place in Mexico—such as loss of territories, ongoing corruption and violence, and regional failure due to cartel activities may have a direct US homeland security impact—some sort of focused discussion of these threats vis-à-vis Peña Nieto’s policies in the conclusion would have been beneficial to the reader.

Still, in summation, The Cartels is a well-researched and highly readable work that would make for an excellent college textbook and be of interest to more general readers such as military officers and policy makers interested in this subject matter. The various tables and many appendices for organizing information are also useful. The work very much deserves its rightful place in both personal and college libraries next to other general works published on the Mexican cartels over the last few years.

**Studies in Gangs and Cartels**  
**By Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan**

Reviewed by José de Arimatéia da Cruz, Professor of International Relations and Comparative Politics at Armstrong Atlantic State University, Savannah, GA and Visiting Research Professor at the US Army War College

*Studies in Gangs and Cartels* is written by two eminent scholars in the field of law enforcement and transnational criminal organizations. Robert J. Bunker was a Distinguished Visiting Professor and Minerva Chair at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College; while John P. Sullivan is a career police officer and an Adjunct Researcher at the Scientific Vortex Foundation, Bogotá, Colombia. This important work is the culmination of the authors’ works from the mid-1990s to the present with new chapters written specifically for this anthology. Readers will see the progression of gangs and cartels and their nefarious activities from third-generation or third-phase cartel typologies.

*Studies in Gangs and Cartels* addresses the broader challenges gangs and organized crime can present to states. (1) Gangs and cartels in the twenty-first century have become more than an annoyance to governmental authorities and law enforcement agencies. Crime and criminally illicit activities have become more global in scope and can destroy the social fabric of a society while also undermining the authority and legitimacy of a state. One only has to think of the current situations in Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil to realize the impact of criminal elements in society and its detrimental effects. As Bunker and Sullivan point out, “extending their reach and influence by co-opting individuals and organizations through bribery, coercion and intimidation to facilitate, enhance, and protect their activities, transnational criminal organizations are emerging as a serious impediment to democratic governance and a free market economy. This danger is particularly evident in Colombia, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, and other parts of the former Soviet Union where corruption has become particularly insidious and pervasive” (63). The traditional view of crime as a localized issue and therefore a concern only to the police on the beat is no longer valid in the twenty-first century. As Bunker and Sullivan argue, “rather than being viewed only as misguided youth or opportunistic criminals or, in their mature forms, as criminal organizations with no broader social
or political agenda, more evolved gangs and cartels are instead seen as developing political, mercenary, and state-challenging capabilities” (xi).

Criminal organizations and cartels are emerging phenomena of the third-generation street gang typology advanced in the *Studies in Gangs and Cartels*. According to Bunker and Sullivan, third-generation gangs have sophisticated political aims. “They operate—or seek to operate—at the global end of the spectrum, using their sophistication to gain and secure power, drive financial acquisition, and engage in mercenary-type activities” (3). This proliferation of street-level gangs across neighborhoods, cities, and countries is partially a consequence of the process of globalization, that is, the greater interconnection of the world due to advancements in transportation, economics, the death of distance facilitated by the internet, and interdependence. In the globalized world of the twenty-first century, gangs have become transnational when the following characteristics are present. First, the criminal organization is active and operational in more than one country. Second, criminal operations committed by gangsters in one country are planned, directed, and controlled by leadership in another country. Third, criminal organizations are mobile and adapt to new areas of operations. Finally, their criminal activities and enterprises are sophisticated and transcend borders (3-4).

In the globalized post-Cold War world of the twenty-first century, gangs and cartels represent a “new warrior class” (41). The “new warrior class” includes those individuals in society, part of the “bottom billion,” who have lost all hope of a better future and social advancement, and use force to partake in the spoils of society. As Bunker and Sullivan point out, individuals alienated from the rule of law will provide the basis of the new threat to the nation-state (41). As eminent military historian Marin van Creveld points it out in *The Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict Since Clausewitz* (1991), “in the future, war will not be waged by armies but by groups whom we today call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits, and robbers, but who will undoubtedly hit on more formal titles to describe themselves” (Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, 197). As Paul Rexton Kan noted, “drug-fueled conflicts often produce a wartime economy alongside local disenempowerment and steadily diminishing political stability and personal security” (Paul Rexton Kan, *Drugs and Contemporary Warfare*, 93). This new class of “warrior,” the disenfranchised of society, will likely fill the ranks-and-files of private military companies in order to participate in the spoils of war. Gangs and cartels in the post-Cold War international system, are “a potential conflict generator: not only do they contribute to violence in their home community, but given the confluence of a number of factors they could well emerge as a true threat to national security” (55). Examples of gangs and cartels as potential conflict generators abound, but the cases of Sierra Leon, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mexico, and Brazil are worth mentioning. Third-generation gangs and cartels are not only proliferating in the post-Cold War international system, but their methods and techniques in the war making process are also becoming more lethal and more daring. Gangs and cartels “challenge states in several ways. They undermine the rule of law, break the state monopoly on use of force, and foster corruption and insecurity” (186).
In conclusion, I highly recommend this work to students and academics in the field of political science and criminal justice as well as the military, especially the US Army, which may be called upon to address the drug trafficking in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil. I also recommend this work to law enforcement agencies dealing with the new disease of the twenty-first century: third-generation gangs and cartels. In the final analysis, it is wise to remember the words of Hannah Arendt: “The practice of violence, like all action, changes the world, but the most probable change is to a more violent world” (60).
Despite an awkward title, this book makes an indisputable case for interim law enforcement when a failed state is occupied (or liberated) by a military coalition. Robert Perito, a retired Foreign Service Officer, who had a tour with the Department of Justice International Criminal Investigative Training Program, argues that the United States should create a standing constabulary force to manage the disorder and violence in post-conflict situations, such as those encountered in the past few decades. He uses four case studies to illustrate the scope of the law enforcement problem: Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, he does not provide any detail or design for an American solution.

A description of the French Gendarmerie, Italian Carabinieri, and Spanish Guardia Nationale identifies national police forces that can be mobilized with cohesion and deployed as para-military formations to provide law enforcement and training. Such forces are normally under the control of each country’s respective Ministry of Interior, for which the United States has no counterpart. The US Department of Interior operates the Bureau of Land Management, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Forrest Service; it does not have a national police force. When the United States has contributed to an international police component, it has always been an ad hoc collection of city police officers, deputy sheriffs, and highway patrolmen who lack common training, procedures, equipment, and rank structure.

In response to the Bosnian Civil War, a NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) was activated in 1995. Ambassador Holbrooke, the American diplomat who managed the Dayton Accords which led to IFOR, argued for an armed and forceful coalition police force. He was opposed by his European counterparts who did not want an aggressive police component in Bosnia without a new constitution and legal system within which it could work. Ironically, American military planners also objected to a robust police capacity that might compete with the military coalition going into Bosnia. The result was a modest, unarmed, ad hoc police component that arrived in Bosnia six months after IFOR intervened, with the capacity only to advise the abusive ethnic-based local police forces. The gap between the local police and IFOR occupation forces led to frequent violence and continued ethnic abuses, with IFOR military forces reluctant to take on police tasks.

In August 1998, the coalition deployed a 350-person police component (later expanded to 750) to Bosnia based around an Italian Carabinieri battalion that could take on more aggressive constabulary tasks, a proficient formation that might have been established earlier. When a smaller
coalition military force entered Kosovo in 1999 to provide stabilization, it included a comparable Italian Carabinieri battalion as a base for 350-person police formation to serve in the constabulary role.

In 2003, the Bush Administration dismissed lessons from Bosnia and Kosovo when it invaded Iraq without a police component to provide interim law enforcement or to help reform the Iraqi police forces. Officials in the State and Justice Departments knew better and argued for standing up an appropriate police component before the military invasion, but Secretary Rumsfeld and others in the Administration would not provide the funding and believed the Iraqis would use their liberation to reform the police on their own. When that did not happen and Ambassador Bremer fired 30,000 members of the Ba'athist Party and disbanded the Iraqi Army (400,000 soldiers), the American-led coalition encountered a perfect storm of violent instability for which it was ill prepared. Not until 2007 were the Italian Carabinieri again called upon to form a paramilitary police component to assist with stability operations.

In Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was deployed in 2002 with 5,000 troops and a modest German police element to help reform the Afghan police. When internal conflicts demanded more soldiers and police, the American military component quickly formed, trained, and employed additional army and police forces. The large scope of that program provided substantial numbers of Afghan police with limited training, which failed to make it an effective force. Both in Iraq and Afghanistan poor planning for the law enforcement followed by excessive police expansion without limited training produced an inadequate police force grappling with continued violence and instability.

Each case study makes a compelling argument for early planning in a post-conflict situation for a robust interim law enforcement component to provide stability, and to help rebuild and reform local police forces. Paramilitary police such as the Italian Carabinieri have proved effective for such a role. Perito laments the reluctance on the part of each coalition to provide military forces with the authority to exercise law enforcement. That seems to argue for the establishment of martial law by the military occupation force.

Perito’s plea to stand up an American counterpart to the Carabinieri is vague in design and not probable during a period of military austerity. But such a component may exist now in the American military structure. The United States Army has five deployable military police brigades and 16 military police battalions; in addition, there are about as many military police brigades and battalions in the National Guard and Reserves. There is a military police training brigade with three training battalions at the Military Police School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Properly packaged, large Army military police formations should be properly prepared to engage in the constabulary role identified.

In an era where post-conflict is engaged with coalition formations, it is improbable that the United States would take on such a task alone; thus, the Lone Ranger theme seems inappropriate. Nor is it probable that the Army would stand up a new single purpose constabulary formation while reducing force structure. It would make more sense to employ the military police formations the Army has now in better ways.
The importance of their tasks may be the best reason to protect those military police formations as Army force structure is reduced.

**Improving the U.S. Military’s Understanding of Unstable Environments Vulnerable to Violent Extremist Groups: Insights from Social Science**

By David E. Thaler, Ryan Andrew Brown, Gabriella C. Gonzalez, Blake W. Mobley, and Parisa Roshan

Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, Distinguished Visiting Professor and Minerva Chair at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

The research report *Improving the US Military’s Understanding of Unstable Environments Vulnerable to Violent Extremist Groups* by the RAND Arroyo Center is a densely packed—yet extremely well executed—and timely work of great strategic interest to Army thinkers and students of irregular warfare. The Army sponsored this research under contract, and while drawing upon the social sciences, the product is meant ultimately to facilitate practical and proactive application by the United States and her partners. Specifically, it applies to “Phase 0” operations, that is, the pre-conflict phase that “minimizes both cost and the need for intervention with U.S. ground forces” (xiii).

The research is a great complement to the ongoing Office of the Secretary of Defense Minerva Initiative—though not a component of that program—and documents the progressive Center for Army Analysis commissioned study “Improving Understanding of the Environment of Irregular Warfare” from mid-2011 to mid-2012. I was very motivated to analyze and critique this report because its focus—the problematic issue of host environments creating and sustaining violent nonstate actors—played prominently in my earlier *Parameters* Winter 2013-14 essay.

The report identified twelve factors associated with environments vulnerable to conflict (key concepts only): (1) external support; (2) government is considered illegitimate or ineffective; (3) history of resisting state rule; (4) poverty and inequality; (5) local government is fragmented, weak, or vulnerable; (6) ungoverned space; (7) multiple violent, nonstate groups competing for power; (8) the level of government restriction on political or ideological dissent; (9) the level of consistency and/or agreement; (10) groups perceive faltering government commitment; (11) the capacity, resources, and expertise of violent extremist groups; and (12) social networks. These factors are said to be neither static nor disconnected. They and their interactions were then applied to two conflict case studies, selected by the sponsoring agency due to their familiarity, as proofs of concept—the Shining Path in Peru (1980-1992) and the Maoist insurgency in Nepal (1997-2006).

With the admission that “…measuring factors related to environments vulnerable to insurgency and terrorism is exceedingly difficult,” (47) the study then goes on to create metrics (quantitative and qualitative) for detecting and assessing factors along with metric justification and data sources (47-58). Seven key research findings are then provided in paragraph form (59-60) that go into Army doctrinal views on this subject matter and social science utility to irregular warfare. More
importantly for the warfighter—or in this instance the peacebringer, four action recommendations for the US Army defense community are then provided:

- Incorporate factors and associated metrics into irregular warfare-related analytic games and models.
- Evaluate levels of potential instability and extremist violence using the assessment scheme outlined in this report.
- Conduct research to probe and map overlays and interrelationships among factors in specific cases.
- Develop a prioritization approach based on the factors and assessment scheme that helps indicate where best to allocate analytic and security assistance resources (xv).

The report also offers appendices including the “Factor Matrix” and factor presence in the thirty RAND case studies and the useful inverse COIN factors (countermeasures to insurgencies) (87-88).

My impressions of the research report (written by a very talented and eclectic team of social scientists) are highly favorable. It was a joy to read and the recommendations are timely and well measured. Plenty of time, effort, and resources went into this project and it shows. This form of research is critical to our gaining a better understanding of the unstable environments that create and nurture violent extremist groups and other armed non-state actors.

A few impressions really hit the reviewer while analyzing the RAND report. What was found fascinating in the report is the inherent tension between old and new forms of insurgency. While the thirty detailed COIN case studies used for validation purposes all fall under the political insurgency paradigm, five of the factor examples are from Mexico and are cartel and gang—mostly Los Zetas—related (Factors 3, 6, 7, 9, & 11), which fall under the organized crime/criminal insurgency paradigm. This is a paradigm considered antithetical to more mainstream and traditionalist COIN perceptions. Further, while Factor 1 which addresses external support (e.g. money, weapons) may be integral to political insurgencies, criminal actors draw their resources directly from the illicit economy such as narcotics trafficking, local taxation via extortion, and related activities. This variable is partially captured in Factor 11 concerning resources available to a group, but its importance appears to be understated especially when illicit economies in the tens of billions of dollars help to sustain such criminal actors.

Given that criminal entities are growing in strength and capability (as many regions of Latin America attest) it is the impression of this reviewer that follow-on research conducted by the Arroyo Center on unstable environments would greatly increase the relevance and utility of the product. It would be helpful to model the factors indicative to such threat groups along with the more traditional violent (political) extremist forms and the hybrid (convergence) entities now rising. Additionally, while the reviewer agrees that the two case studies set in Peru and Nepal were required for proof of concept purposes and were something the sponsoring agency requested, it is pretty clear that applying such analysis to the ongoing situation in Mexico—specifically to Los Zetas, Los
Caballeros Templarios, and the Sinaloa cartel—should be considered one option for the next logical step in its development.

**Learning to Forget: US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq**

By David Fitzgerald

Reviewed by David H. Ucko, Associated Professor, College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University.

In *Learning to Forget*, David Fitzgerald traces the effects of the Vietnam War's legacy on the US Army's understanding and approach to counterinsurgency. Fitzgerald, a Lecturer in International Politics at University College Cork, Ireland, broaches this topic chronologically, assessing first the role of counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War and then how the memory and lessons of that conflict shaped future institutional attempts to avoid, learn from, repeat, or even recall whatever it was that happened. The overarching argument is the memory of Vietnam has been neither static nor uncontested, but reinterpreted depending on the dominant context and personalities at any given time. The legacy, thus, remains “fluid and open to reconstruction” (210-211) and is used to justify a range of often incompatible arguments. As Fitzgerald implies, this historiographical tug-of-war reveals the long shadow the conflict still casts over the US Army as an institution.

The book’s strengths include its argumentation and structure; it is an eminently readable text. It weaves its way from Vietnam and the codification of its immediate lessons in the 1970s, to the re-encounter with irregular challenges in Central America in the 1980s, and then to the peace operations of the 1990s, and their relationship to the Army’s counterinsurgency legacy. The last two chapters consider the spectacular highs and lows of counterinsurgency during the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Throughout, counterinsurgency has most commonly been marginalized as an institutional priority and area of investment, a trend bucked only by “major traumatic events,” (206) most recently the fear of utter failure during the civil war in Iraq.

A second strength of the book is its measured tone and analysis. Fitzgerald has authored a sober and dispassionate study that resists the hyperbole and sensationalism typical of other related works. Perhaps Fitzgerald’s distance from the debate, as an Ireland-based academic, affords him the necessary perspective. Nonetheless, the nuanced take on this all-too-often overheated topic is refreshing and, also, necessary.

Third, the research is thorough and well documented in over sixty pages of footnotes. It is clear that Fitzgerald has consulted the relevant works, which he applies with due recognition of contending interpretations. The eye to detail and fastidious sourcing may be explained by the book’s origins as Fitzgerald’s own doctoral thesis, something evident in the book’s initial literature review and primer on methodology.

This last point relates also to one of the book’s two weaknesses. Whereas Fitzgerald’s analysis is commendably detached, one might wish he more often established his own view on controversial and divisive topics. He cites the dominant voices both for and against
counterinsurgency’s inclusion as a US military priority but refrains from presenting his own verdict. He covers the Iraq and Afghanistan wars well, but it is never explained why Fitzgerald thinks counterinsurgency succeeded in the former yet “failed to produce the tangible results it needed” in Afghanistan (198). Similarly, he presents all major interpretations of what went right and wrong in Vietnam, but it is difficult to glean what Fitzgerald himself, on the basis of his research, sees as the more convincing explanation.

Second, with the multitude of works now available on the US military’s engagement, aversion, and re-encounter with counterinsurgency, Fitzgerald’s contribution feels somewhat familiar. With the exception of a few added anecdotes and some notable sources, particularly in the first half of the book, the interpretation of past and present campaigns differs in no substantive way from previous accounts, be it Richard Downies’ *Learning from Conflict*, Robert Cassidy’s *Peacekeeping in the Abyss*, Richard Lock-Pullan’s *US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation*, or my own, *The New Counterinsurgency Era*, which covers similar ground and comes to very similar conclusions. Fitzgerald refers to these works in his introduction, but his implicit moving past and building upon the existing literature are not always convincing. The book’s novelty lies in its emphasis on how the memory of Vietnam, specifically, affected and was affected by subsequent events, but this focus is not consistent throughout and can, at times, feel contrived.

On this latter point, it is not obvious how Vietnam and its 58,000 US casualties related to the peacekeeping operations of 1990s; the discussions appear related to the far more recent traumas of Somalia and the limited US national interests at stake. Going further, the book establishes continuity between Vietnam and subsequent “military operations other than war” but never fully integrates the point made by Dale Andrade, that Vietnam was both a conventional and an irregular effort, and that US strategy had to counter a credible communist army along with a potent insurgent foe. Given this balancing act, how comparable (or even relevant) is Vietnam to the 1994-95 intervention in Haiti or the Bosnia campaign thereafter? Even the attempt to compare Vietnam with Afghanistan or Iraq faces serious problems, ones that the book may perhaps have benefited from broaching more directly.

On the whole, *Learning to Forget* is a well researched and superbly written addition to the ongoing study of counterinsurgency and the US Army. At a time of urgent reflection for the US Army, and the United States as a whole, Fitzgerald reminds us of the fluidity of historical interpretation and the unpredictability of what we actually learn. John Lewis Gaddis sees historians as mandated “to interpret the past for the purposes of the present with a view to managing the future but [critically] without suspending the capacity to assess the particular circumstances in which one might have to act, or the relevance of past actions to them” (*The Landscape of History*, 2002). Michael Howard’s paraphrasing of Jakob Burckhardt, cited by Fitzgerald, is therefore apt: “the true use of history, whether military or civil, is…not to make men clever for next time; it is to make them wise forever” (211). The book is recommended to all serious scholars of counterinsurgency, the US Army, and intervention.
Do not pick up this book unless you are looking for a general overview of US Army Special Forces conducting basic Foreign Internal Defense (FID) in Afghanistan. While an easy read with some entertaining stories, the book omits way too much to be of use to serious students of irregular warfare.

One Hundred Victories presents two main points as it spins the story of the successes, failures and challenges of Green Beret Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police Development (VSO/ALP). The author’s first proposition is that after Special Operations Forces’ (SOF) initial catastrophic successes in Afghanistan, SOF leadership failed to articulate a solid game plan to stabilize Afghanistan. Despite having the training, doctrine, and experience to do so, it allowed conventional forces, and itself, to focus on combat ops when Foreign Internal Defense and capacity building should have been the strategy. After years of chasing targets, in 2009-2010 the Army’s Special Forces finally remembered their way and led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) effort to build security capacity via VSO/ALP. In this endeavor, they fought against not only the Taliban, but also conventional units and senior leadership.

Robinson’s second main idea is that a key reason for failures in Afghanistan was SOF’s lack of a staffed, theater-level command capable of interfacing with its own and conventional units. Unable to channel the power of its mature, experienced and intelligent personnel, SOF could not seize the initial opportunity to shape Afghanistan’s strategy and this mistake hampered special operations throughout the war.

This second proposition has merit, but Robinson fails to articulate why SOF preferred to fight by “SOF tribe” rather than as a comprehensive whole, and tries to convince the reader the only relevant SOF mission is Foreign Internal Defense. By only telling 1/11th of the story (there are eleven SOF critical activities), she misrepresents the challenges and complications of establishing a true unified headquarters. Her slant towards Green Berets, and their primary mission, is evident and prevents the reader from gaining a full understanding of the vignettes she uses throughout the book.

It is in her thesis that Foreign Internal Defense and capacity building are the keys to success in Afghanistan where Robinson’s biases really emerge, and where the book truly misses its mark. Despite repeatedly making the point that stability comes from developing Afghans, all her good tales focus on raids or combat. She gives short shrift to Military Information Support Operations, Civil Affairs, various non-military developmental organizations, and conventional force development initiatives. One Hundred Victories leads one to believe only SOF can conduct...
Foreign Internal Defense, and the author accomplishes this by neglecting large swaths of the Afghanistan story while focusing on selected differences between Special Forces and other units. Lastly, it implies SOF leadership took the lead in turning the war’s focus from one of hunting Taliban to one of developing police. It does so despite significant evidence, both from Iraq and Afghanistan, that it was conventional leaders who had to pull SOF out of its direct action myopia and get it back into Foreign Internal Defense.

A final critique of this book is that it fails to address many of the questions it brings forward. A few examples include:

- Why did SOF lose its way in 2003? What factors, other than the lack of a sizable headquarters, caused it to forget Foreign Internal Defense and focus on direct action?
- Were the claims that Special Forces personnel became cowboys true? And what actions, other than relieving Major Gant, did anyone take to address this concern?
- What was the impact of lessons from Iraq toward how Afghanistan’s Foreign Internal Defense mission was fought?
- How much of an impact did the establishment of an Afghanistan-Pakistan buffer zone actually have on the war?

*One Hundred Victories* is not a great action story. It is too flawed to provide significant strategic lessons, and the author has obvious biases that prevent a good historical analysis of the campaign in Afghanistan. This book is not worth the time of a professional strategic or operational leader.