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Book Reviews

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For my promotion, John Nagl gave me a copy of Fred Kaplan’s *The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War* signed by the military journalist himself. And so, the book opens: “A few days shy of his 25th birthday, John Nagl saw his future disappear.” The book chronicles a small group’s attempt to shift the American way of war from one of high-tech, big weapons focused on enemy combatants, to one that held people as the center of gravity. Kaplan’s account—there are others, and there will be more—is worth a read, even if Nagl isn’t your friend.

*Kaplan provides the reader a play-by-play account of the intellectual wrangling that occurred within the Pentagon, inside the national security decisionmaking apparatus of the Bush and Obama Administrations, and on the ground in Iraq. He builds to the implication that the consequence of the group’s effort was the replacement of one doctrine (air-land battle) with another (COIN). This took a herculean effort by a unique group of true believers to recalibrate the machine, but once accomplished, the machine could not get the entire job done. He excuses the leaders of the COIN movement by concluding that some wars are winnable (Iraq) and some are not (Afghanistan).*
The overlap of the two sets is mostly limited to one man, David Petraeus—a conceptual thinker who starts with an understanding of the problem and the big ideas associated with it, values academia and multiple perspectives, is hyper-efficient in his habits, made it his job to master his role in the body politic, and has the personal fortitude to operationalize all of it. So I am able to put a better point on the exasperation expressed above: it is the rarity of the combination Petraeus embodies that damns the military culture, and so we have yet another author criticizing the dearth of creative thinking and courage among the military’s ranks.

Indeed, Kaplan cannot help but take jabs at the military as he chronicles the struggle it took to adapt. He says “only the most confident and nurtured young officer” would take on the Army establishment as Petraeus did with an article he ghost wrote for Galvin. He implies Nagl’s retirement as a lieutenant colonel had to do with writing that the Army was not a learning organization. He characterizes the “Sosh” Department as comprised of officers who doubted the judgment of their superiors, implying they were correct to do so. He states that during the Cold War, being an MP or a Civil Affairs officer was “no way to get ahead, so the best officers steered clear”. He writes, “TRADOC got a new commander who saw no point in long range thinking” during the 1990s. Is Kaplan correct in his commentary about the Army? Where there’s smoke there’s bound to be fire, but the truth is almost always in the middle. Those who cling to the centrality of force-on-force do so for good reason; but given that military power alone will be decisive only in the most limited-objective scenarios, DOD must ensure the conventional force culture does not preclude the agility and creativity required to provide a full range of options essential to safeguarding the interests of the American people.

The book has one other major flaw: it digs deep into Iraq but skims over Afghanistan. Let’s set aside the questions of whether or not we really “won” in Iraq, and whether we thoughtlessly conflated COIN planning and doctrine with the strategic objectives we tried to achieve in Afghanistan. Did the “COINdinistas” get it right? Perhaps so in Iraq and Kaplan explains that well. Afghanistan was, and is, another matter, and his explanation is unsatisfying on two levels.

By the surge in Afghanistan, operationally, COIN had perhaps turned into “dogma,” but not because the COIN leaders held onto it as written in 2006. Rather, because, as Kaplan does not quite say, they did not hang onto it . . . and did not proclaim this rejection publicly. By publicly espousing a comprehensive COIN strategy and privately rejecting all but the emphasis on security (and indeed, General Petraeus put significant personal energy into the Afghan Local Police program), the opportunity to adapt the broader COIN doctrine and strategy was precluded. To my mind, watching and participating one level down, General Petraeus accepted Galula’s necessary preconditions for success in a counterinsurgency campaign, and finding none of them in Afghanistan, changed course. He inherited a COIN campaign plan that may or may not have been right, and then quietly used members of the original COIN team, Jack Keane and the Kagans in particular, to focus almost exclusively on kill-capture. The potential result is ironic and harmful: no more COIN.
But Kaplan also does not quite say that General Petraeus was astutely reading the political writing on the wall and probably knew the mission was not going to be resourced as much or as long as required—which was the biggest problem of all with Afghanistan. And here Kaplan really comes up short: he seems to credit and even applaud the administration with out-foxing its military leaders, and provides no further analysis on whether or not that was the correct thing to do with regard to mission accomplishment. In fact, I could not help but feel I was taken on a bit of a ride. Kaplan spends a good deal of the book building up Petraeus and the group, only to take some glee by ultimately implying not only that they got what they deserved in Afghanistan, but that the Obama administration was brighter than the best of the brightest.

Kaplan writes of the eventual recognition that “Afghanistan is not Iraq.” Right, it’s not. But understanding did not lead to meaningful adaptation operationally or politically. We simply have to understand where we went wrong in Afghanistan in all realms. We cannot thoughtlessly throw the COIN bathwater out with the Afghanistan baby. Kaplan tap-dances around these most critical issues. Perhaps he had a foregone conclusion about the Afghan mission; perhaps he felt he had to tread carefully with regard to General Petraeus while lauding the Obama administration.

Nor is it my intent to tarnish anyone’s armor. Simply because a mentor and role model reaches a super-human limit (in part due to the bottom-line principle under which we operate—civilian control of the military), does not negate his super-human contributions. The Insurgents throws something else into stark relief—as indefatigable as General Petraeus is, it is somehow unbelievable and unfair that we as a nation should have been so dependent on the energy, intellect, leadership, and savvy of one man for so long. Regardless of whether or not he cultivated that position, when he was finally “beat” we should take no satisfaction in it. I can’t help but think of lives lost.

The “plot to change the American way of war” had a larger point: the requirement to meet national objectives in situations in which an adversary’s military forces are not the center of gravity is enduring. Regardless of “we won’t do long, big COIN operations anymore” proclamations, the country will undoubtedly need those skills for small, short missions . . . or, indeed, another unexpectedly long, big war.

An interagency group should conduct a comprehensive lessons-learned analysis of this toughest of COIN scenarios—the strategic case study that is Afghanistan. In this reviewer’s opinion, the required security-governance progression was much less linear in Afghanistan than Iraq; the development effort should have started with strengths instead of the bottomless “needs” pit; the effort needed rational decisiveness from Washington with regard to handling the Karzai regime; and “Af-Pak” should have gone beyond titular.

If we arrive at a dead end, only then should we say Kaplan’s conclusions were right after all—some wars are not winnable no matter what brain power you throw at them. Call it countercultural for an Army officer to believe mission accomplishment of any kind is impossible. Or call it a necessary part of being a member of a learning organization.
War From The Ground Up: Twenty-First-Century Combat as Politics
By Emile Simpson

Reviewed by Dr. Richard M. Swain, Colonel, USA Retired

War From the Ground Up is a theoretical reflection on the meaning of the Afghanistan counterinsurgency for war theory. It was written during an Oxford Defense Fellowship by a wonderfully literate infantry officer who served in Helmand with the Royal Gurkha Rifles. The author’s core insight is that counterinsurgency differs from traditional interstate war in the sense that, whereas the latter seeks to create, by battle and maneuver, a military condition that can be the basis of a political result; military action in counterinsurgency “directly seeks political, as opposed to specifically military, outcomes . . . .” The result, at least in Afghanistan (elaborating on David Kilkullen and Antonio Giustozzi), is a conflict more like a domestic political contest than a Clausewitzian “bipolar” struggle. The value of the book is less this observation than what the author does with it, and how well he does what he sets out to do. He presents an argument that stands, as Sir Michael Howard has observed elsewhere, as a “coda” on Clausewitz, filling out the master’s description of limited war in the particular context of the early twenty-first century.

Simpson points out that Clausewitz’s simplifying description of war as a two-sided (“bi-polar”) confrontation does not fit the highly fragmented, largely “domestic,” political struggle in Afghanistan or the expansion of the relevant strategic audience imposed by the ubiquity of immediate global communications. He adopts the view that combat becomes a form of public communication. From this, he draws a distinction between the idea of strategy as the instrumental use of force, and the now especially critical function of providing an interpretive framework within which to convey a desired meaning to critical audiences. Not just battle, but war itself is instrumental.

In addition to constructing a sophisticated updating of Clausewitzian theory, Simpson addresses the importance of what this reviewer might characterize as “dialogic command,” an authoritative relationship sensitive to the need for negotiating the tension between the desired and the possible outcomes from policy to execution. Simpson calls this “Strategic dialog . . . the reciprocal interaction between policy, in the sense of the political decisions and intentions of the state, and how policy is articulated as actual operations . . . .” His concern involves the compound danger of naive decisionmakers at the top and the ubiquity below of the figure Americans call the “strategic corporal,” the relatively minor tactical leader whose actions or inactions can advance or derail the grander efforts of which they are part.

Here again, Simpson shows his mettle with a critique, perhaps a bit rigid, of Samuel Huntington’s 1957 treatise on civil-military relations, Soldier and the State. Simpson’s point, very much like Eliot Cohen’s Supreme Command, is that strict separation of the military function and civil direction has long since become counterproductive. He might have, but does not, observe that the descriptive social science on which Soldier
and the State was based was old at the time Huntington wrote, and the character of professions has evolved a good deal since 1957. Simpson makes a minor historical error subordinating Moltke to Bismarck in their famous struggle outside Paris in 1871. In that event, the struggle took place because the general and chancellor were parallel officials, both directly subordinate to the Prussian King. To use Huntington to draw a sharp distinction between constitutional and strategic imperatives of civil-military relations, Simpson ignores the advisory function that professional soldiers owe to their constitutional masters as well as final obedience, Cohen’s “unequal dialog.”

The structure of the book seems a bit out of balance, first between emphasis on the particular case of counterinsurgency as opposed to the broader category of limited war, then on the relative importance of action versus interpretation. In the first case, a fine chapter on the “British Strategy in the Borneo Confrontation, 1962-6” approaches making the more general case, but never quite closes on the point. In the latter, the penultimate two chapters, which address strategic narrative, leave a sense that the entire discussion has been pointed toward predominance of interpretation over action. Grounded on concepts from Aristotle’s Rhetoric, they are excellent in their own right, but might better have been located earlier in the text.

Neither the introduction nor conclusion conveys fully the great wealth of thought that lies between. The great strength of the book is in the author’s clarity of explanation and his theoretical sense, firmly based on useful definition and clear, didactic distinctions. This book should find an important place in War College, School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting (SAWS), and Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS) seminars.
Although the war in Afghanistan has lasted appreciably longer than America’s war in Iraq, the shorter conflict has generated both more and better literature and analysis. There are a stack of books on Iraq that will bear the test of time, from George Packer’s *The Assassins’ Gate* and Tom Ricks’s *Fiasco* to Michael Gordon and Mick Trainor’s comprehensive trilogy on the war. The longer Afghan campaign can claim no such body of work is likely to last. Carter Malkasian’s *War Comes to Garmser* is a sparkling depiction of the conflict in a province, but there is as yet no overview of the war as a whole that will endure.

Army Colonel Bob Cassidy has attempted to fill the gap with *War, Will, and Warlords: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001-2011*, published by the Marine Corps University Press and freely available on the internet. Bob is well placed to do so, having written two previous books on counterinsurgency and spending a year working at the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Command, which coordinates the campaign at the operational level of war. The book meets some of the need for a comprehensive analysis of the Afghan conflict, but is hobbled by two shortcomings—one unavoidable, one not—that leave the field at least partially open for a great campaign history.

The unavoidable shortcoming of *War, Will, and Warlords* comes in its subtitle; the book only carries the reader through 2011, concentrating most heavily on fighting since the Obama administration prioritized Afghanistan over Iraq in 2009. While Cassidy is correct in noting that before late 2009, “the war in Afghanistan lacked both a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign plan and an operational-level headquarters to orchestrate the campaign,” the Afghan campaign has become more interesting, not less, since he completed his analysis in 2011, and the trend is likely to continue. Although the Afghan endgame cannot yet be written, the president decided to draw down the American troop commitment and turn over responsibility for the continuing counterinsurgency campaign to the Afghan security forces by the end of 2014. This is high adventure; while the Anbar Awakening and the Surge broke the back of the insurgency in Iraq before the American drawdown there, the Pashtun insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan is likely to remain a significant threat to Afghan governance when the American combat role ends. Cassidy deserves credit for attempting to capture the history of the war up until 2011, but the climactic acts of this play have not yet happened.

The avoidable shortcoming is Dr. Cassidy’s writing style. Bob is an old friend and former partner in crime at the US Military Academy, where we taught international relations together at the Department of Social Sciences; from that time through today, Bob has never been able to
resist inserting the most complicated possible word in his writing. Thus, on the second page of his Preface, Bob explains that his book “posits that explanations for the catalysts of these two insurgencies relate to a paucity of analysis and resources that exacerbated or created grievances among the local populations, excessive or inappropriate applications of lethal force, and ill-prepared approaches to information operations that failed to integrate information narratives with the use of military force.” This rather convoluted sentence is in fact a road map to the major lenses through which Bob analyzes the counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Pakistan: legitimacy; use of force; and information operations, both during the enemy-focused period from 2001 through 2009, labeled “The Pursuit of Evil,” and during the population-security focused “Pursuit of Peace” from 2009 through 2011. The lenses work well and provide significant insight, as does the bifurcation of the campaign into two phases.

There is much more goodness in the book, and it fully meets its self-described purpose of exploring “the U.S.-led Coalition and the U.S.-supported Pakistani efforts in countering the Taliban/al-Qaeda insurgencies in both of these countries to date.” Bob does a real service by pointing out not just how under-resourced the AfPak campaign was until President Obama’s arrival, but also to what extent the Durand Line fails to demarcate a conflict that America and her allies have to conduct in very different ways on different sides of the Afghan/Pakistan border. Here his eloquence is both appropriate and enjoyable: “If Afghanistan is a challenging conundrum, Pakistan is the puzzle nested within the enigma that relates directly and inexorably to security and stability in Afghanistan.” After asking whether Pakistan is “With Us or Against Us?” in Chapter 3, he concludes that the Pashtun Belt in Pakistan is “Hard and Not Hopeful” in Chapter 5. The more one learns of Pakistan, here and from other sources, the more discouraging—and more correct—this conclusion appears.

Cassidy is on firm ground when he notes that “Very few counterinsurgencies throughout history have met with success when the insurgents have benefited from unimpeded sanctuary and external support.” Given that fact and Pakistan’s long track record of perfidy, it is hard to echo Cassidy’s cautious optimism about “being more sanguine, albeit in a qualified way” about Pakistan’s willingness to stop supporting, much less begin fighting against, the Taliban who pass freely from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas into Afghanistan and back.

The last chapter of War, Will, and Warlords is a history of the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) titled “Operational Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan until 2011.” While Bob is somewhat more impressed with the significance of the IJC’s contributions than am I, his first-person and on-the-ground perspective make this chapter—like the book as a whole—a significant contribution to the analysis of America’s longest war, regardless of the fact that it remains too soon for even the most perspicacious interlocutor to conclusively determine the ultimate trajectory of the conflict.
The Twilight War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran
By David Crist

David Crist’s *The Twilight War* is a methodical and comprehensive description and analysis of the US-Iranian relationship from the 1979 Iranian revolution until the first three years of the Obama administration. As such, it is an important contribution to the effort to understand the US-Iranian relationship which comes at a time when serious commentators throughout the world routinely speak of the possibility of war between the two nations. Crist is particularly qualified to write this study as a US government historian who wrote his doctoral dissertation on this subject and continued his research on this subject for a number of additional years. He is also an officer in the US Marine Corps Reserve with extensive Middle East service and the son of a former commander of US Central Command (USCENTCOM). As preparation for writing this book, he conducted a substantial number of interviews with US government officials involved in formulating Iranian policy, including many people at the top level of the policymaking process. He also made extensive and productive use of large numbers of declassified documents. The result of this effort is a masterpiece, developed through his skills as a historian as well as his understanding of US governmental processes and military operations and strategy.

Throughout the work, Crist notes the activities and views of various personalities in the White House, the State and Defense Departments, USCENTCOM, and other organizations involved in formulating and implementing Iran policy. An additional strength of the book is Crist’s discussion of efforts by various regional allies to influence US policies toward Iran. Saudi Arabia is a particularly important player in this effort, although a number of other regional countries including Israel have sought to influence Iran policy as well. More to the point of the title, Crist uses declassified information to provide surprisingly comprehensive discussions of US espionage and covert actions in Iran as well as the activities of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). He further provides an extensive and fine-grained analysis of the numerous confrontations at sea between US and Iranian naval forces as well as Iranian-sponsored terrorist attacks against US targets in Lebanon. All of this is done with a straightforward and compelling writing style.

The actions of the Reagan administration consume a significant portion of this work. There are some solid intellectual reasons for this approach, since the 1980-88 timeframe witnessed a prolonged US confrontation of an energized Iran as well as the Iran-Iraq War. This was also one of the most critical eras for individuals in both nations to decide if reconciliation was possible or not. The Reagan administration leadership, especially the president, basically believed most of the problems the United States faced overseas resulted from the efforts of the Soviet Union. The US administration correspondingly viewed Iranian
events through the filter of the Cold War, and Reagan had hoped the two religious nations could align against the Soviets. This improvement of relations clearly did not occur, and the two countries instead entered into a quasi-war involving confrontations at sea, armed clashes involving Iranian proxies in Lebanon, and extensive efforts at covert action. Yet Reagan was never fully prepared to give up on Tehran and is described as deeply hopeful that the secret supply of weapons provided to Iran during the Iran-Contra Affair could yield important results. Instead, the initiative declined into nothing more than a weapons-for-hostages swap and then a major political scandal. Future presidents would take these events as a warning of the dangers of dealing with Iran.

Crist also writes a valuable and insightful account of the relations between later administrations and Iran, but his access to declassified source material clearly thins out over time. President George H. W. Bush is portrayed as cautiously seeking improved relations with Tehran for some of the same reasons as the Reagan administration, but mutual suspicions made this effort impossible and the president backed away from promised goodwill gestures that were to follow the release of remaining US hostages in Lebanon. President Clinton and Iranian President Khatami also showed some interest in accommodation, but Khatami was too internally weak to respond to the modest American hints about improving relations. Things changed again after Clinton left office. Relatively early in his administration, President George W. Bush included Iran in a rhetorical “axis of evil.” This statement took the Iranians by surprise since they had been working in tandem with US interests in Afghanistan, and did not expect such a harsh denunciation from the administration. The rapid defeat of Iraq's conventional military in 2003 also alarmed the Iranians and caused them to show an increased interest in a rapprochement with the United States. Such a rapprochement had no appeal for the Bush administration, which expected US interests to be secured by a post-Saddam, democratic Iraq that would inspire other Arab nations and Iran to overthrow undemocratic leaders. The administration, therefore, rejected the concept of dialogue on the basis of neoconservative ideology, although it remains uncertain what accommodations Iran would actually make. According to Iranian documents provided through Swiss intermediaries, they were prepared to give up a great deal, but these suggestions of accommodation were never tested. Also, as the United States became more bogged down in Iraq, the Iranians became much less fearful that they faced a serious threat from the United States. Their interest in an accommodation declined accordingly.

President Obama came into office openly hoping to improve US-Iranian relations but eventually shifted to a policy of sanctions and preparations for war, which Crist describes as “a policy nearly identical to that of his predecessor.” Crist does not directly assert US involvement in the Stuxnet computer malware attack on Iranian sites as David Sanger does in Confront and Conceal, but he does state that “[s]ecurity experts believed the evidence pointed to a joint US and Israeli program.” Obama had initially hoped that Iran might be willing to respond to his entreaties for better relations with at least some limited gestures of goodwill, but Tehran chose instead to behave in ways that the US State Department described as “disappointing and unconstructive.” Crist, nevertheless, identifies Obama’s policy of seeking negotiations as a much more
sophisticated approach than has been widely realized. Once the initial policy of diplomacy failed to gain the desired results, Obama’s credibility in seeking global sanctions against Iran was dramatically greater. Thus, the United States and Iran were again locked in a hostile relationship that threatened to become more difficult as the Iranians continued to move forward on a nuclear capability.

Crist’s book does not end optimistically. He suggests that anti-Americanism remains a pillar of the Iranian government policies and that this approach is unlikely to change while members of the revolutionary generation remain in power. But does that mean that war is inevitable or even likely? Crist’s study ended long before the most recent policies of economic sanctions really caught fire. Obama has now applied a very serious stick, and Iran can hardly ignore its contracting economy or the significant drop in the value of its currency. While anti-Americanism may be popular among the Iranian leadership, economic misery may be even more unpopular than agreeing to US demands on nuclear weapons issues. The shah of Iran was overthrown in 1979 partially because he lost the support of the urban poor. These people are now struggling under sanctions, although not starving due to the artificially low price of staple foods. The lesson of a discontented underclass would not be lost on the revolutionary generation, and the rise of new and more pragmatic Iranian leaders is also at least vaguely possible. Meanwhile, the United States and Iran remain engaged in something at least akin to a twilight war.
**The Rise and Fall of American Military Power**

**Drift: The Unmooring of American Military Power**

By Rachel Maddow

Reviewed by Colonel Charles D. Allen, USA Ret., Professor of Leadership and Cultural Studies, US Army War College.

Rachel Maddow is probably the best well-known woman commentator in the twenty-first century. Host of *The Rachel Maddow Show* on MSNBC, her brand is one of biting humor and striking analysis from a liberal perspective. I expect she would be amused and flattered that a review of her book, *Drift*, is included in *Parameters*. To dismiss Maddow out-of-hand as a liberal policy wonk would be imprudent given her credentials as a Rhodes Scholar who holds a Doctorate of Philosophy in Politics from Oxford University.

*Drift* is her first book and could easily have been written as a string of half-hour commentaries on the state of the US military. Given the nine chapters with prologue and epilogue, this would fit the format of a week-long series for her news show. As the “Unmooring” title suggests, Maddow’s premise is the manifestation of American military power is insufficiently linked to the national discourse on its use. Her concerns are American military power has migrated from that envisioned by the founding fathers, debate between the executive and legislative branches on its use is ineffective, and, perhaps most important, there is a dangerous lack of engagement and accountability with the American people.

Maddow opens the book with a 1795 quote from then-Congressman (and “Father of the Constitution”) James Madison, “Of all enemies to public liberty, war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded. . . . War is the parent of armies; from these proceed debts and taxes. . . . In war, too, the discretionary power of the Executive is extended . . . and all the means of seducing the minds are added to those of subduing the force of the people.”

Her focus is on military power that emerged with the national experience of the Vietnam War. Two key items sprung from that conflict—the restructuring of the Army Guard and Reserve by then-Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams and the War Powers Resolution of 1973—serve as the foundation of Maddow’s discourse on the American attitude toward persistent conflict and war. She contends it is, “as if peace . . . made us edgy, as if we no longer knew, absent an armed conflict, how to be our best selves.”

Her analysis of modern US history has four main tenets that interested this reviewer, which individually and collectively decoupled the US military from its society. The reforms of General Abrams were designed to ensure that citizen-soldiers were inextricably bound to deployments for major military operations, such that when the president and Congress committed to war, the nation was also committed across a wide swath of its population. Concurrently, the War Powers Resolution was a clear attempt by Congress to check the presidential power to commit US forces without informing Congress and obtaining its authorization. While enacted during the term of a Republican president (Richard Nixon), the challenge to executive power existed prior to and since with
presidents of both political parties. Maddow provides several examples from Grenada, Iraq, and Bosnia to contemporary operations.

The restructuring of the US military as a volunteer force with limited numbers to perform the “inherently governmental in nature” functions of warfighting led to the understandable emergence of outsourcing other functions with programs such as the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). The use of contractors has become an accepted practice where the number of contract personnel (those that can be counted) routinely exceeds the number of deployed uniformed servicemembers in the operations of the past two decades. Maddow has two issues with this—first, this shadow military in the guise of contractors exists with little or no oversight and, second, its members are not held accountable for their misdeeds in theaters of operations. The results, she posits, is the president and Congress can deploy the military without directly affecting the majority of the US population. If uniformed members performed the contracted functions, then a larger number of reserve component servicemembers would be involved in military operations—hence, more “skin in the game” for our citizens. The last tenet is the overlapping responsibilities of warfighting between the US military, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency, where the latter two have little oversight from Congress and virtually no visibility with the American people who fund their operations.

Conservatives will take issue with Maddow’s deconstruction of President Ronald Reagan, who is their icon of executive leadership and power. Military readers may be uncomfortable with her examination and critique of military operations over the past two decades. The value of Maddow’s work is the presentation of facts and her journalistic interpretation of their impact. The reader may be distracted by quips and stinging commentary—focus instead on the themes and the logic of her argument. This reviewer found several parallels to the analysis and conclusions of conservative scholar Andrew Bacevich in his *The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War* (see Parameters review Winter 2005-2006).

What we see is the incremental adjustment of policy to adapt to changing environmental conditions and to address existing problems. The rationale for individual decisions are understandable—presidents want the power to respond to developing problems and crises, senior military leaders seek to have the will of the nation (read people) supporting the force, and both civilian and military leaders have been educated to protect core competencies by otherwise sourcing enabling functions. The collective impact is a loosely coupled manifestation of military power in its institutional structure, its delineated responsibilities, and the national discourse of how it is applied.

Maddow effectively makes the case “drift” has occurred and provides the challenge to US leaders to examine our current position in the global landscape and, with intentionality, to firmly reattach the lines to our dock of national values and interest. As such, this book is a highly recommended addition to the library of national security professionals who value diverse perspectives and well-reasoned analysis.
Honor in the Dust: Theodore Roosevelt, War in the Philippines, and the Rise and Fall of America’s Imperial Dream
By Gregg Jones

Reviewed by Leonard J. Fullenkamp, COL (USA Retired), Professor of Military History, US Army War College

America went to war in 1898 for a noble cause—to lift the yoke of Spanish colonial oppression from the peoples of Cuba and the Philippines. Although ill-equipped for expeditionary warfare, the United States Army, Navy, and fledgling Marine Corps, managed in short order to deploy forces sufficiently capable of securing victories in both the Caribbean island and distant archipelago in the Pacific. Flush with the spoils of its easy victories, the United States quickly installed a compliant government in the Philippines, with the objective of developing the former Spanish colony into a distant outpost from where parochial national interests could be looked after. Filipino nationalists, led by Emilio Aguinaldo, objected to the replacement of one colonial power with another, sparking an insurgency that spread throughout the islands. Years of counterinsurgency warfare followed, during which time American values were sorely tested as allegations of torture and brutality toward enemy soldiers and the civilian population who supported them became a daily staple of reporting in the newspapers of William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer. American honor, so highly trumpeted at the onset of the war, became mired in the dust of discouragement and disappointment as victory in the war against the insurgents proved elusive.

Gregg Jones’s account of America’s well-intentioned, but ill-fated, experiment with colonialism is told in a narrative style that reminds the reader of the author’s roots as a journalist. There is much in the story that appeals to these sometimes prurient instincts, such as the prologue, which begins with a vivid description of US troops using a form of interrogation euphemistically referred to as “the water cure” on a suspected insurgent. From the outset it is clear that Jones finds many parallels between the War in the Philippines and America’s experiences in later wars in general, and the Global War on Terror in particular.

For many readers this will be an introduction to a forgotten chapter in our nation’s history. The book begins with an overview of events leading to the outbreak of war; fighting in Cuba, to include an account of Roosevelt’s Rough Riders and Kettle Hill; and Dewey’s defeat of the Spanish navy in Manila Bay. With the onset of a counterinsurgency campaign, the narrative gathers a momentum that carries through the rest of the book. How American values fell victim to the charges that would tarnish the nation’s honor is the question Jones finds morbidly interesting. In short, at the tactical level of war, the answer lies with badly trained and poorly led troops confronting an unfamiliar style of warfare and resorting to brutal tactics, including torture, in their efforts to defeat the insurgents. At the strategic level, the explanations are far more complex, involving a moral struggle over American values and interests. The fighting in the Philippines leads to a war of ideas and values, where factions within Congress, the press, and interest groups...
collectively known as Imperialists and Anti-Imperialists, debate the wisdom, legitimacy, and morality of a minor war in a distant land.

Jones finds all this fascinating and his enthusiasm for the subject infuses the narrative. His accounts of soldiers and marines burning villages, shooting unarmed insurgents, and torturing suspects for information crackle with an energy common to investigative journalism. Is he, the reader is given to wonder from time to time, commenting on some aspect of the counterinsurgency effort in the Philippines, or none too subtly inviting us to consider our recent experiences in the Global War on Terror, with its allegations of water boarding, civilian casualties and collateral damages, and the untidy and seemingly open-ended commitment to an endeavor of an uncertain and perhaps unwise outcome? Intended or not, one finds in Honor in the Dust familiar parallels with America's experiences in Vietnam, Somali, Iraq, and Afghanistan. They all started so well and ended so badly. Why did we not know better? Haven't we been there before?

For many readers this will be their first encounter with the history of this period, which is an unfortunate commentary on so many levels. For most, this will inform them on an obscure chapter of American history. Military readers with more than casual interest in counterinsurgency would do well to look to the expert on this period. Professor Brian Linn's The Philippine War, 1899-1902 is without doubt the best, most informed, and balanced account of America's effort to subdue the Philippine insurgents. Linn's account of the fighting is sophisticated, nuanced, and brimming with insights on counterinsurgency warfare.

As the subtitle suggests, there is more to this book than a discussion of the war itself. Theodore Roosevelt, whose rise to national prominence catches fire on the notoriety he gained for his heroic exploits in Cuba, transformed success on the battlefield into success in politics. When the assassination of William McKinley catapulted him into the White House, T.R. was left to grapple with the untidy, unconventional war he had helped create. Domestic politics, and the struggle between the Imperialists and the Anti-Imperialists, dominates the last quarter of the book. Among the many interesting characters who shape the debate are Senators Albert Beveridge, Indiana, who gives voice to the Imperialists, and Massachusetts Senator George Frisbie Hoar for the Anti-Imperialists, a member of Roosevelt's own political party who asserted that acquisition of territory by force of arms “has been the ruin of empires and republics of former times,” and, moreover, was “forbidden to us by our Constitution, by our political principles, by every lesson of our own and of all history.” One need only reflect briefly on the US war against Mexico to see the wind in his argument, though few at the time bothered to do so. The “yellow press” sorted out those for and against the war, and those for and against the factions. Roosevelt eventually tired of the war, but had to be led to an “honorable exit,” for which he was indebted to his brilliant Secretary of War, Elihu Root. For much of the material on Roosevelt, Jones looks to the work of Edmund Morris. Rightly, he recommends that readers with a taste for more on Roosevelt’s soldier exploits, as well as his direction of the war, his battles with Congress, and the opponents of imperialism, look to Morris's three-volume biography on the twenty-sixth president.
If there is a disappointment with this book it is with the missed opportunity to introduce the reader to the transformational changes that took place within the Army as a result of the war. Two legacies of the Philippine War are with us today. Intent on reducing the influence and authorities of the Commanding General of the Army, Nelson Miles, with whom Roosevelt was at odds over the handling of reports of “torture, summary executions, and other extreme actions by US soldiers in the Philippines,” the President transformed the Army’s senior general officer from a Commanding General to Chief of Staff to the Secretary of War. Jones glosses too quickly over this bit of bureaucratic maneuvering and fails to see its significance. The second missed opportunity is particularly glaring to this reviewer as Jones makes no mention of the creation of the Army War College as a direct result of the shortcomings in preparing for, executing, and ending the Philippine War. Secretary of War Root was dismayed that the superb Union Army of 1865, capable of fighting distributed, long-duration operations, over vast distances, had simply dissolved in the decades after the Civil War, taking with it the hard-learned insights and lessons so painfully acquired during the war. Root, determined not to repeat the errors of the past where knowledge and experience was allowed to evaporate, ordered the establishment of the Army War College, where professional officers would meet and discuss what he referred to as the three great problems of war—command, strategy, and the conduct of military operations—three subjects that still form the basis of the War College curriculum. Moreover, it is from Elihu Root that the Army War College received its motto, “Not to promote war, but to preserve peace.” The scaring experiences of the Philippine War shaped Root’s views, and those in turn shaped the Army War College.

Jones can be forgiven for overlooking these opportunities. *Honor in the Dust* is a readable, interesting, entertaining, and cautionary account of yet another of America’s forgotten wars. As such, I recommend it.
U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror
By Walter E. Kretchik

Reviewed by Dr. John A. Bonin, Professor of Concepts and Doctrine, US Army War College

U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror is an ambitious book. Walter Kretchik attempts to capture a previously ignored complex and esoteric subject in a comprehensible manner. He is a member of a small group of contemporary military historians who are unafraid to study previously unappealing topics in institutional history, in this case, Army doctrine. Kretchik is a retired Army officer and an associate professor of history at Western Illinois University.

Kretchik seeks to provide an overview of the US Army’s dominant doctrinal publications and some of the individuals who shaped its operations from 1779 to 2008. Kretchik considers doctrine to be a subcategory of military literature distinguished by two characteristics: approval by a government authority and mandatory use. As an approved and prescribed publication, doctrine stands juxtaposed to “informal practice” which evolves from custom, tradition, and actual experience. His primary focus is how Army leadership perceived the conduct of military operations, with less attention paid to administration or sustainment. The author acknowledges he does not consider every Army doctrinal publication during this long period, but establishes what constituted the service’s “keystone” manual during a particular era and judges its impact in preparing the Army to accomplish its mission.

Prior to 1779, no American warfighting doctrine existed as Colonial militia and Ranger units followed “informal practice.” According to Kretchik, General George Washington realized by 1778 that the Continental Army needed a standardized doctrine to regulate tactical warfare procedures. Baron von Steuben’s Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States Army were approved by Congress in April 1779 and constituted the US Army’s first doctrine. Adaptations of French or Prussian tactics, essentially branch tactical drill manuals, constituted the first era of Army doctrine from 1779-1904. This changed in 1905 when the Root reforms fixed doctrinal responsibility with the new Army general staff. The Field Service Regulations of 1905 shifted from pure tactical branch matters to regulating broader combined arms service behavior in the field, with the division as the basic combat organization. Post-World War I, the Field Service Regulations of 1923 captured the lessons of that war and emphasized field forces within a theater of operations from groups of armies to divisions, while including considerations of tanks, the air service, and chemical weapons. On the eve of World War II in 1939, the Army split Field Service Regulations into three parts: FM 100-5, Operations; FM 100-10, Administration; and FM 100-15, Large Units. Unfortunately, from this point on, Kretchik only traces FM 100-5 and its successor, FM 3-0. In 1944, FM 100-5 became multiservice with the acknowledged requirement for mutual support from the Navy or Air
Force. Later, in 1962, Army doctrine in FM 100-5 became noticeably more multinational. General Donn Starry’s 1982 AirLand Battle version reversed the defensive posture of General William DePuy’s 1976 manual and assumed a more maneuver-oriented offensive stance. After 1991, and the end of the Cold War, Army FM 100-5, Operations, contained more interagency considerations. In addition, as a concession to the growth of joint doctrine in 2001, the Army renumbered FM 100-5 as FM 3-0, Operations. Overall, Kretchik believes that doctrine has served the Army well in preparation for conventional war, but the Army has noticeably neglected unconventional operations. General Petraeus’s FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, from 2006 was a notable exception.

While the research for this book is extensive, I believe Kretchik fails to completely identify the Army’s dominant publication in all eras. For example, he selects the 1891 Infantry Drill Regulations, and its update the 1895 Infantry Drill Regulations, as the keystone publication of its era. “Tactics were explained in clearer language.” He acknowledges, however, this manual deleted “divisional and brigade movements.” In addition, Kretchik didn’t consider the 1896 Drill Regulations for Cavalry that described “independent cavalry” which had strategic raids among its missions. In addition, by not tracing the evolution of the 1939 FM 100-15, Large Units, or its successor doctrinal publication such as FM 100-7, Decisive Force: Theater Army Operations of 1995, Kretchik fails to adequately describe the evolution of the Army’s doctrine at the operational to theater strategic level, but instead follows the more tactically oriented FM 100-5/3-0 doctrinal evolutions. Unfortunately, Kretchik ended his account with FM 3-0, Operations of 2008 and thereby lacks the entire revision of Army doctrine started in 2010 and resulted in FM 3-0 split into Army Doctrinal Pub (ADP) 3-0 and Army Doctrinal Reference Pub (ADRP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations by 2012. Finally, Kretchik missed the increasing significance of FM 100-1, later FM 1 and now ADP 1, The Army. This has been the Army Chief of Staff’s personal document and now provides a superior presentation of the Army to external audiences than does ADP 3-0.

Regardless of this criticism, U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror, is a valuable book for serious students of the history of the US Army and a must for readers interested in the evolution of FM 100-5/3-0, Operations. However, what is still needed is a companion history of the evolution of the Army’s doctrine for larger units at the operational level.
This volume is not another narrative history of Wellington’s Peninsular War. Rather, it is an analysis of the demographics and behavior of the famed British redcoats. The gist of Coss’s thesis is that these soldiers were not Britain’s societal rejects. Moreover, their unmatchable cohesion rested upon a loyalty and mutual trust developed within their small groups.

The book begins with the Duke of Wellington’s famous quote about his army’s common soldiers being the scum of the earth. Coss provides Wellington’s later observation in an endnote, i.e., that the Army had made fine fellows of them. However, this oft-quoted, initial comment forms the basis for the work’s thesis.

Coss has accomplished phenomenal research. He compiled a British Soldier Compendium with demographics on 7,300 soldiers, the great majority from line infantry regiments. He uses a three-tiered model of compliance theory developed by Steven Westbrook to help interpret this voluminous data for individuals and small groups. Coss places these statistics and interpretations in the larger sphere of British society, e.g., the severe stresses of industrialization and their costs, both individual and collective. No less than 78 tables accompany the text. These statistics range from the usual to analyze social origins and economic status to a fascinating, sweeping examination of soldiers’ nutritional intake. He admits that he cannot verify how many of the 7,300 served in the Peninsula between 1808 and 1814. This inability does not detract from the work, which is a micro-analysis of an army’s soldiery.

The work balances demographics with individual accounts, e.g., memoirs and journals. He is well aware of both their benefits and pitfalls. Coss focuses on one man in particular, William Lawrence, as a case study. His use of these primary sources is generally astute, and adds a genuinely human dimension. One caveat is that commentaries from soldiers in rifle and light infantry units do not represent “typical” soldiers.

He places his interpretation within the context of one the most concise analyses of the famed British two-deep line’s battle tactics in print, indicative of his effort to dissect this force in action. He agrees that the British possessed no such light troops to support that line until 1800. Such agreement should not dismiss the major accomplishments of British light troops in the previous century, especially as they often performed as both skirmishers and shock troops. He deals frankly and honestly, as best as the extant evidence permits, with the excesses in the hellish sieges of the Peninsular War.

The work’s comparative analysis states that the British Army of the Napoleonic Wars was unique with its life-long period of service for soldiers. Granted, the French term of service of 6 years became standard with the Jordan Law of 1798. The discussion omits the Russians, but they represent a stark difference. Indeed, the fatalistic farewell from
family, household, and village for a conscript was terminal in nature, given the term of service was 25 years. The Austrians conscripted for life. The reforms initiated by Archduke Charles reducing the term to 10 years in the infantry began in 1808. The Prussians, humbled and humiliated at Jena and Auerstädt in 1806, initiated necessary, but carefully and circumspectly, reforms afterwards.

The larger issue is that comparison of terms of service can skew perspective without a commensurate understanding of the effects. The allies changed recruiting practices well in the midst of prolonged conflict. There is no indication what proportion of soldiers served shorter enlistments or when. Such a study is certainly well beyond his scope, but an understanding is necessary for an effective comparison. The only release for lifers was death or incapacitation.

The British Army, conversely, went through the greatest fluctuations in strength upon the outbreak of war, only to shrink as dramatically at war's end—as it had in previous conflicts. During the American Revolution, some 27 percent of British infantry were war-duration and three-year recruits. For the unprecedented effort against Napoleon, a force of just over 150,000 in 1804 exceeded 200,000 after 1807, surpassed 250,000 in 1813, fell to 233,852 in 1815, only to drop to an authorized 150,000 after Waterloo, a decrease of 38 percent—after the cumulative losses of nearly a decade of war against just the First Empire. Coss shows that only a quarter of the men opted for the optional 7-year term for soldiers after 1808, but there is no discussion of the ramifications of the inevitable drawdown to which the British Army had become accustomed. Some life-long recruits were not. There remain questions on the wider impacts of resort to the militia as a recruiting pool for transfers, whether a substitute or not.

The work exhibits some hyperbole due to excessive focus on the demographic statistics with the small-group dynamics. Richard Holmes in Acts of War (1985) and Holmes with John Keegan in Soldiers (1986) highlighted the paramount need for multiple factors to promote cohesion, obedience, and collective aggression vice apathy among soldiers' groups. M. Snape in The Redcoat and Religion (2005) covers the period of "horse-and-musket" warfare. J. E. Cookson's "Regimental Worlds" in Soldiers, Citizens, and Civilians (2008) considered the range of experiences of British soldiers during the Napoleonic Wars. Coss may deem these interpretations excessive or flawed, but the monograph takes little account of them and none of religion as motivating, unifying, and steadying factors.

Philip Haythornthwaite in The Armies of Wellington (1994), Holmes in Redcoat (2001) and Haythornthwaite again in Redcoats (2012) are the latest recognitions of the social and economic qualifiers for the "lowly origin" of British rank and file. Wellington's infamous comment reflected upon the army's widespread looting when long out of action, at the expense of the wounded and follow-on operations after Vittoria. Moreover, he showcased the differences between Britain's voluntary enlistment and European conscription. The fact only one quarter of British recruits took advantage of a 7-year vice life term of service after 1807 to take a bigger bounty is a telling commentary. How many faced pre- and post-war life in the Georgian workhouse was likely significant. These realities
reinforced society’s low regard for soldiers, an attitude which the British Army’s internal police function merely compounded.

There is insufficient consideration of institutional contributions to positive group behavior. There is no comprehensive commentary on the role of company and battalion officers to unit cohesion. Similarly, there is no assessment of the centrality of the British regimental system or the increased identification with the infantry division after 1810, the latter as presented by Antony Brett-James in *Life in Wellington’s Army* (1972). Conversely, Coss’s detailed account of periods of prolonged deprivation is telling yet hardly unique among the armies of the time and their predecessors for decades. Soldiering was a hard life. An old saying about campaigning in Spain was that small armies perished and large ones starved.

*All for the King’s Shilling* has blazed a new trail. It provides very detailed, demographic data set in a wider context. The major effort to link those statistics with the battlefield, behavioral dynamics, and small-group psychology makes it a praiseworthy contribution in multidisciplinary studies, but excessive in emphasis, at the expense of other evidence. The book is still a key monograph on the maintenance of an army during prolonged, major combat operations for a society with Anglo-Saxon political reservations on the nature of a regular, standing army—the essence behind voluntary recruitment vice conscription.
Are you thirsting to find evidence that Otto von Bismarck is the greatest master of state power politics of all time, and Neville Chamberlain the worst? You’ll find that and more in this rich anthology providing seven case studies on the forging—successful and unsuccessful—of grand strategy by statesmen over the ages.

Beginning with some “Thoughts on Grand Strategy” and how the phrase may be understood—the “intertwining of political, social, and economic realities with military power as well as a recognition that politics must, in nearly all cases, drive military necessity”—the collection of insightful essays first leads us to explore historical examples of ineffective strategic approaches.

Interestingly, an analysis of Louis XIV is the first such study, and it largely focuses on Louis’s strategic failure in abandoning alliances in favor of unilateral actions that overstretched his state’s resources and military, bearing striking resemblance to current US travails. “British Grand Strategy, 1933-1942” is another provocative case study underscoring what not to do, as it details Neville Chamberlain’s strategic blunder in focusing on preventing war even as Germany rearmed, ignored the Munich Conference, and marched on and occupied Czechoslovakia. Both are great lessons underscoring the importance of matching strategy with reality, and describing what happens when that does not occur.

Reversing course and providing examples in effective grand strategy, the authors then take us on a journey detailing the strategic acumen of Bismarck, Winston Churchill, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and Harry Truman. From Bismarck’s diplomatic and military genius in establishing Prussia’s dominant power status in Europe, to Roosevelt’s decision in prioritizing the European theater over the Pacific, and finally to Truman’s containment policy, there is much to learn from what they got right, making this a valuable tome in the professional libraries of scholars and statesmen alike.

The authors, who comprise university professors and scholars alike, are compelling and thoughtful in their detailed analyses, and the implications for US grand strategy are clear, if not explicit. In the chapters detailing the reign of Louis XIV and the British strategic shift prior to World War I, references to US overstretch are plainly stated and mostly convincing. Also implied in the effective strategies of Roosevelt and Truman is the importance of prioritizing world challenges, though there are no notable recommendations given for US policymakers and thinkers today.

The authors are also careful to point out that grand strategy is largely determined by uncertainty, such that, in the words of Bismarck, “man
cannot create the current of events. He can only float with it and steer.”
This is an important point that gains attention throughout the work.
It is certainly nice to see an acknowledgement of the lack of control
world leaders may have over their states’ affairs and the unpredictable
dynamics of the international system, but if there is a shortcoming in
this collection, it is in its almost apologetic tone for the predictive value
of its own case studies.

For example, one editor observes that “conditions encouraging even
the formulation, let alone the prolonged execution, of grand strategy
as deliberate method seem to be uncommon at best, and even then
impermanent.” The reader is first led to believe in the political talent
of Bismarck only to be let down when he later learns that the Prussian
leader’s artfully-constructed European balance of power was uniformly
and unabashedly dismantled by Kaiser Wilhelm II. In the book’s sum-
marizing chapter, we are told that only two of the seven cases—both
involving the United States—suggest a deliberate, preconceived strategy
that resulted from analysis of the challenge in question. The lesson all
too frequently seems to be that successful grand strategy resides at the
intersection of chance and luck, with intellectual prowess, vision, and
leadership playing only a combined secondary role. This is a bitter pill
to swallow for earnest visionaries.

Although it is quite evident the editors intended each chapter to be
a stand-alone study in grand strategy (the book is wonderful for the uni-
versity professor or military instructor in this regard), the organization
of the anthology would likely benefit from smoother transitions. It is
quite an intellectual jump from “The Grand Strategy of the Grand Siècle:
Learning from the Wars of Louis XIV” at the beginning to “Harry S.
Truman and the Forming of American Grand Strategy in the Cold War,
1945-1953” at the end. This is a lot of ground to cover in 269 pages, and
it requires some mental agility from the reader, particularly with the rich
and dense nature of each chapter. As Lieutenant Colonel Frank Slade,
played by Al Pacino, says in Scent of a Woman, “Too big a leap for me right
now, Charlie.”

All told, The Shaping of Grand Strategy is a worthwhile read, for both
the historian and the strategist. Strong in theory and concrete in its
examples, the work serves as a practical guide for avoiding the pitfalls of
some and seizing on the attributes of others. It would be desirable to find
a second volume of this work, perhaps with case studies examining the
grand strategy—or lack thereof—of world players in the post-Cold War
era. The authors have done a nice job of setting the conditions for such
a follow-on work that could connect the dots between Bismarck and
statesmen and women today who must strategize in a modern era when
the nation-state lines are not as clear, and the role of nonstate actors is
more prominent.
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Foreign Powers and Intervention in Armed Conflicts
By Aysegul Aydin

Reviewed by CPT(P) Charles D. Lewis, Instructor of American Politics, Policy, and Strategy, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy at West Point

Reasons are always abundant when the United States decides to intervene in an internal conflict. Politicians justify responses out of national interest. The media provide lasting images from the conflict, sometimes turning public opinion. International organizations react to violations of their laws or articles. While each reason might play a small role in intervention, Aysegul Aydin in *Foreign Powers and Intervention in Armed Conflicts* demonstrates domestic politics and economic concerns dominate intervention decisions.

Aydin advocates a framework emphasizing the role of domestic economic interests in international affairs. Viewing intervention through the lens of *economic liberalism*—explaining issues “around the core relationship of economic interests and their reflection on foreign policy through domestic political processes”—this book brings to the forefront internal dynamics in intervention. Beginning with the classification and definition of many frameworks, Aydin takes the reader through a literature review of scholarly intervention work to highlight liberalism as a substitute for realism. Shifting to quantitative data to stress the role of international trade, Aydin closes with a series of case studies highlighting the United States’ involvement in both civil wars and international conflicts.

For any reader outside the academic community, the beauty of the book does not appear until Chapter 5. The previous chapters present the reader with an exhaustive and dense theoretical framework that creates a link between economics and a state’s international role. Aydin then uses Chapter 2 to clarify multiple versions of intervention. Ranging from the classic response to war, to postconflict involvement to preserve peace, this chapter discusses the timing of the intervention, international law through the United Nations, and when coalitions are involved.

Once through the meticulous and tedious definition of intervention, Aydin breaks liberalism down in Chapter 3, "Defending Economic Interests Abroad." Liberalism—at least to Aydin—is not meant to replace other theories, nor does it suggest that force must be eliminated from conflict. Instead, liberalism describes the circumstances surrounding the likelihood of force and highlights the relationship between foreign policy and economic interests. This understanding comes from a “bottom-up view of political decision making” that identifies the fundamental role individuals and private groups play. While the influence individuals have on public policy and intervention might seem distasteful—especially given the effects of any intervention—this chapter clarifies the role of small groups in different types of governments. Overall, Aydin does an excellent job of highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of economic liberalism, but loses readers due to this section’s length, which would benefit from a consolidation of definitions.
Unfortunately, the reader turns the page to Chapter 4, "In International Conflicts," and is faced with a slog of quantitative data. While empirical data is needed to prove the validity of Aydin’s hypotheses, the presentation challenges any reader unfamiliar with regression tables. As a result, the amount of models tested can overwhelm some and limits this book’s audience to only those familiar with, or interested in, these techniques.

The book closes strongly with a case study analysis as a test of Aydin’s theory. Aydin reengages readers by intertwining economic liberalism with a brief history of American intervention. Through cases on twentieth-century conflict, Aydin focuses on two themes of US involvement: containing regional aggressors who threaten stability and keeping “direct military involvement at the minimum level possible.” At first glance, the second theme appears weak but is later clarified as Aydin uses case studies to demonstrate influence through trade and ally relationships. Taking readers back through American history, Aydin uses Central American policy and Eisenhower’s actions in the Middle East to invite the reader back into this book. Readers in the defense community will appreciate the successful application of Aydin’s theory without the need to overemphasize quantitative data. In reading these cases, we come to understand the role trade and preserving the status quo plays in international policy.

Taking the case study analysis one step further, Aydin provides a chapter relevant to ongoing intervention debates in countries like Syria. Aydin ties together both quantitative and case study analyses to show that economic liberalism can also explain intervention in civil wars in Africa. Through this chapter’s analysis, the book provides the reader insight into the decline in international conflict and today’s increase in “civil violence.” Despite the change in the type of conflict, intervention still occurs through diplomacy to maintain the same themes—status quo and limited direct military intervention—potentially explaining current American policies.

Not for all readers, Foreign Powers and Intervention in Armed Conflicts provides an economic view of intervention where states try to limit involvement until conflict affects the public good. Not quite providing the reasons most Americans are used to hearing on the nightly news, Aydin’s book is also not what the reader expects when picking up a book this size. While the book would benefit from combining the data with the case studies, Aydin’s economic liberalism proposal provides another alternative to when countries intervene, allowing the defense professional to add another perspective.
Book Reviews: Grand Strategy, Armed Intervention, and War Termination

Beyond Guns and Steel: A War Termination Strategy
By Dominic J. Caraccilo

Reviewed by Major Ruth A. Mower, Instructor of International Relations and Comparative Politics, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy

As the United States continues to fight in the Global War on Terror over a decade after its start, Dominic J. Caraccilo’s Beyond Guns and Steel: A War Termination Strategy is long overdue and a welcome addition to the literature on war termination and conflict resolution. Much too often in today’s ambiguous operational environment America’s national command authority lacks concise strategic objectives, which is why the United States unfortunately finds it is merely conducting crisis management, at best resulting in a murky transition from conflict to peace. Colonel Caraccilo ultimately hopes that with his words the “fog of postwar” activities can finally lift.

While Colonel Caraccilo led multiple Army units in combat during Operation Iraqi Freedom, he noticed that a fine line existed between the tasks the military was expected to perform in comparison to those under the purview of civilian agencies and locally elected governance. Needless-to-say, a plan that went beyond simply defeating the enemy was not established prior to the start of the war in Iraq as Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Thomas E. Ricks, Bob Woodward, and many other authors have since revealed in embarrassing and excruciating detail. Therefore, Colonel Caraccilo asserts nations need a grand strategy when it comes to conflict: clear and concise objectives prior to the start of actual conflict should become a required part of the planning process and remain an absolute necessity.

To arrive at how nations can determine these objectives, Colonel Caraccilo first describes why nations choose to conduct war and what events usually occur that ultimately affect how and when nations decide to end conflicts. Specifically, Colonel Caraccilo defines and provides examples of the six general categories that war termination rationale fall under as devised by B. G. Clarke in his rational model for conflict termination. Colonel Caraccilo then maintains that ten additional categories dedicated to conflict resolution, instead of only the six which address war termination, should also be used by nations during initial planning phases to include: nation building, economic development, humanitarian relief, and establishing democratic nations just to name a few. Next, Colonel Caraccilo defines in great detail many of the strategic terms used when discussing war termination, as well as briefly discussing how strategy, grand strategy, policy, and strategic communications relate.

Colonel Caraccilo offers “good” examples of when nations successfully plan war termination, conflict resolution, and definitive exit strategies as a part of their formulation and execution of national policy. Positive case studies analyzed include: the United States’ Marshall Plan following WWII; Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty as a part of American action in Panama; Operation Desert Storm; the Global War on Terror and its use of COIN theorems; Operation Iraqi Freedom; and even a non-US example involving Uruguay and the Tupamaro. Of
course, “bad” examples are also needed to help prove why the fusion of war termination and conflict resolution is so vital: the Korean War; the 1956 Suez Crisis; the Global War on Terror and its focus on ideology; US involvement in Vietnam, Somalia, and Bosnia; and America’s on-going involvement in Afghanistan. After these case studies, Colonel Caraccilo reveals how interagency inadequacies in the US government are the primary culprits as to why war termination and conflict resolution are often overlooked. Hence, Colonel Caraccilo stresses such agencies need to better nest their goals and objectives to observe and realize how these desired end-states relate to the nation’s grand strategy. Finally, Colonel Caraccilo describes how extensive interagency planning teams are needed to define how and when military transition after conflict should occur, which will also simultaneously address the frequent absence of a fully developed approach to conflict termination within America’s warfighting doctrine.

Colonel Caraccilo’s chapter on definitions, as well as the extensive list of references used throughout the book, are some of his work’s most impressive attributes; if one wishes to analyze any aspect of conflict resolution and war termination, this is the book to refer to to find pivotal publications on the matter, and to fundamentally understand government agencies’ jargon. Yet some of his case studies are a bit confusing since they tend to weaken his overall argument. How can the War on Terror, regardless of what aspect of it is analyzed, be considered both a success and a failure? Plus, why is Operation Iraqi Freedom presented in the introduction as a massive failure when it comes to war termination and conflict resolution, and then placed in the success chapter regardless if new, effective leadership is what helped bring the longer than initially expected war to a close? Additionally, the entire chapter on the categories of war termination seemed redundant; if the six war termination classifications of B. G. Clarke are widely accepted, more emphasis should have then been placed on why Colonel Caraccilo feels so strongly his additional ten categories for conflict resolution are more important even if frequently overlooked. Had Colonel Caraccilo cut this portion, he would have also had more space to dedicate to further enhancing his subsequent chapters.

While Colonel Caraccilo did touch on the fact that resources frequently dictate necessity, he can and should analyze in greater detail and define what America’s current grand strategic objectives are. Only when those objectives align with nation building, establishing democracy, humanitarian assistance, economic development, and the many other conflict resolution classifications that Colonel Caraccilo presents, will money transition from one national agency to another, thus lowering some of the competing interests that various components of the US government have. Then, many more levels of the American government might actually feel compelled to work toward both war termination and conflict resolution if and when the nation finds itself at war, which Colonel Caraccilo correctly highlights as one of the most pressing issues facing both military and civilian planners today.