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The Global Village Myth: Distance, War, and the Limits of Power
By Patrick Porter

Reviewed by Steven Metz, Director of Research at the US Army War College

The Global Village Myth is short, tightly-argued body blow to contemporary American security policy. In it Patrick Porter takes on an important but often overlooked aspect of strategy—physical distance—and critiques the popular notion that technology has diminished its importance or even rendered it irrelevant. This is a seemingly simple idea with big implications.

Porter believes underestimating the importance of physical distance has an insidious effect on American strategy by stoking what he calls “globalism.” This idea emphasizes the intricate connectivity of the world today and concludes this gives the United States a stake in stability and security everywhere. Americans fear “enemies from afar could force a sleeping America into a fight,” and thus must be defeated while still distant. (90) As President George W. Bush expressed it, “We will fight them over there so we do not have to face them in the United States of America.”

Globalists, as Porter puts it, “perceive a transformed, dangerous environment, a shrinking world where technology trumps terrain, where the offense has advantages, where America’s security interests are virtually limitless and on which American power can be imposed, if only its leaders had the will. An imperial and restless ideology, globalism is a potential force for belligerence as well as cosmopolitanism.” (216)

Although globalism in some way shaped American strategy for a century, September 11 gave it a huge boost and temporarily quelled its opponents. The American public and its elected leaders came to believe their security “rested on the security of others” and this made even remote dangers intolerable. Insecurity could—and would—spread, The only logical response from this perspective was to embrace “the projection of power far beyond its hemisphere with no obvious limit, and tame the world back into order.” (216-217) America, in other words, was “both uniquely threatened and uniquely powerful.” (113)

Porter believes the globalist position vastly overstates the extent to which conflict and threats around the world are connected, and underestimates the extent to which physical distance still matters. He demonstrates his position with three case studies: “netwar”—the idea that technology and connectivity empower weak organizations like al Qaeda against traditionally strong ones like the United States—amphibious invasions operations using a hypothetical Chinese invasion of Taiwan, and the combination of cyber warfare and drones.

Porter’s argument matters greatly to Army strategists and strategic leaders. “Deterritorializing” the concept of security, he writes, “has led to the neglect of limits, an insensitivity to strategic costs, a boundless conception of interests, and the pursuit of absolute security at almost any price.” (217) As a result, policymakers overestimate the ability of the American military to impose its will on adversaries. The burden of this chronic miscalculation falls heavily on the Army since committing it makes disengagement politically difficult. This difficulty can lead policymakers to “double down” on failed operations or those whose cost exceeds their benefits rather than writing off the effort. Think Afghanistan today.

Porter also argues the further military force is projected, the more elusive success becomes because advantage shifts to defenders. “In the unending cycle of offense versus defense,” he argues, “the military-strategic balance for some time may favor weapon systems used skillfully for defensive purposes against would-be expansionists.” (155) The observation that projecting military power long distances lowers the chances of strategic success affects the Army directly, particularly in a time when the qualitative advantage of the US military over potential opponents is shrinking as technology disperses and the size of the American armed forces shrinks.

Porter’s assessment leads him to advocate a more restrained security strategy, particularly when considering the use of military force. The United States should “proceed on the basis that it can place limits on threats, curtail adversaries’ ability to operate, and wait patiently for them to wither into an irrelevance or nuisance.” (224) Like other authors, such as Andrew Bacevich and Christopher Preble, Porter believes, “we are less powerful, but more secure than we think.” (224) That is a vitally important idea: if his assessment is accurate and if American political leaders accept it, the case for robust, expeditionary landpower weakens. The logical shape for the US Army would be something like the pre-World War II model of a small, professional force capable of modest expeditionary operations and of supporting partners; reserves would be on call for major war or those entities posing a direct rather than an indirect or theoretical threat to the United States.

This position is at odds with the thinking of the Army’s current leaders. But Porter’s assessment deserves and demands serious consideration by them: unlike calls for dramatic cuts to the Army which are motivated more by inter-service rivalry, his is based on a cold and penetrating assessment of the global security environment. The argument may or may not be right, but it must be understood by the architects of the future US military.
**Thinking Beyond Boundaries: Transnational Challenges to US Foreign Policy**

Edited by Hugh Liebert, John Griswold & Isaiah Wilson III

Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, Adjunct Research Professor, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute

*Thinking beyond Boundaries: Transnational Challenges to US Foreign Policy* is an edited work produced by Hugh Liebert, John Griswold, and Isaiah Wilson III—faculty linked to the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. All three of the editors are PhD-level scholars presently, or previously, teaching in that Department, with two of them also serving as US Army officers. The work itself is primarily drawn from papers utilized at the 63rd Student Conference on US Affairs (SCUSA) held in November 2011 and subsequently modified based on participant feedback.

The original intent of these papers—eighteen of which are showcased in this book and written by twenty-six authors primarily affiliated with the Academy—was meant to facilitate numerous small-group discussions among West Point cadets and a few hundred select undergraduate delegates from civilian universities attending SCUSA. The mission of these conferences is not only to bridge military and civilian divides but to help bond cohorts of America’s future military, policy making, and civilian leaders by looking at real world US foreign policy issues and producing collaborative policy recommendations (based on each table grouping theme). Along with these showcased papers, the work also includes a contributor listing, foreword, acknowledgements, introduction, conclusion, epilogue, and index.

The book is divided into three parts: tracing domestic issues in US foreign policy; distinguishing regional dynamics in US foreign policy; and turning global challenges into foreign-policy opportunities. Each part of the book is then divided into six chapters, each with a theme and specific title. These themes as they relate to transnational challenges—which together may result in “compound security dilemmas” (220)—are presented as follows. Part I includes institutions and US foreign policy, US foreign policymaking, federalism and education policy, federalism and immigration policy, thinking beyond civil-military boundaries, America’s wars. Part II contains China, Middle East, South and Central Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Americas. Part III is composed of cyber-space, foreign aid, proliferation, international political economy, the environment, and strategic resources. Each chapter is typically laid out with an introduction to the theme in question, a body of text addressing it along with related issues, and challenges it represents, and then a number of questions for deliberation. Various combinations of recommended readings, additional readings, and recommended resources (websites) are provided, always in addition to a notes section.

Quite a few exceptional chapters exist in the work. Chapter 18 by Anne Pope, which concerns phosphate rock as a strategic resource needed for fertilizer creation, is one example. Morocco, it turns out, holds most of the world’s high-quality phosphate reserves. As worldwide reserves are depleted, its importance—along with that of other...
source nations of this component of food production such as Tunisia and Algeria—will only continue to increase. In fact, these countries will represent a concentrated area of production far more exclusive than that which has ever been the case for oil production. (205)

Another chapter that should be highlighted is by Jeanne Godfroy and Bryan Price; it focuses on civil wars as a form of persistent conflict that has “national, regional, and global repercussions.” (66) In fact, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in February 2011, across the larger spectrum such conflict extends well beyond terrorism and insurgency. These and other chapter contributions are meant to challenge readers by inviting them to be policymakers and subsequently to reflect on policy by utilizing “a dialogue between theory and practice.” (220)

The work is an excellent resource for undergraduate American foreign policy courses—especially those attempting to get some of the SCUSA experience. An issue, of course, is the lack of freshness of material that roughly originates from the later 2011 period. Since the contributions in the work are unlikely to be updated and new challenges will emerge, their foreign policy relevance will have a limited shelf life. Additionally, while this is a superb book, it has somewhat marginal utility at the graduate level and therefore is not well suited to war college seminars. Still, this is a very useful work for facilitating undergraduate American foreign policy seminar interactions and, quite possibly, another book may be produced from a future SCUSA event to replace this work when it becomes outdated.
Psychological Warfare in the Arab-Israeli Conflict
By Ron Schleifer

Reviewed by Dr. Eado Hecht, independent analyst and Research Fellow at the
Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies

The conduct of war is a collision of material and will between rival communities. Most studies of war focus on the strategy and tactics: force ratios, maneuvers, projection of fire power and logistics. However, given that most wars, especially, but not exclusively, low intensity wars, are decided long before one side runs out of material capability, many would argue that the psychological aspects are in fact much more important than the material ones. Psychological Warfare is a specific effort to influence the result of a war via the psychological aspects. It has three separate but complementary branches: strengthening the resolve of one’s own people to stay the course despite the pain inflicted on them; weakening the resolve of the enemy’s leaders, people and combatants; and convincing outside spectators to support one’s own side in the conflict whether by playing to their cultural preferences or to the benefit they would accrue from this support or both.

Dr. Ron Schleifer is one of the few academics who studies Psychological Warfare in general and is certainly the leading expert on psychological warfare in the Arab-Israeli conflict. His previous books and articles, describing and analyzing specific events or periods, have successfully piqued the interest of professional readers. His purpose is not merely to describe what happened but also to learn lessons and to suggest principles on how to conduct psychological warfare in the future. His previous books and articles each focused on a specific chapter of the Israeli-Arab conflict – especially prominent were a very successful book focused on psychological warfare in the 1987 – 1993 Intifada, an article on psychological warfare during the fighting in Lebanon from 1985 to 2000 and another on the 2006 war in Lebanon.

As its title suggests, this book purports to cover the entire Arab-Israeli conflict. It provides abbreviated chapters from his previous books and articles and adds new ones covering the period from approximately 1945 till 1982, the misnamed Second Intifada (2000 – 2006, branding of the name itself being a psychological warfare success for the Palestinians), Operation ‘Cast Lead’ (2008 – 2009) and the Mavi Marmara affair (2010). Alongside the historical description of psychological warfare methods employed by the rivals, Schleifer deduces lessons useful for psychological warfare operators in other conflicts.

Rightly or wrongly, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been and continues to be viewed internationally as a dominant global issue since 1948. This interest in itself testifies to the importance of psychology in determining the actions of rivals and spectators in any war and emphasizes the need of any community engaged in war to invest energy in winning the psychological front. Over the past four decades, despite achieving its political goals in most of its military confrontations, many of Israel's
purely military difficulties actually stem not from the material aspects of conducting war but from the difficulty in ‘selling’ its policies and military methods in Israel and abroad. Conversely, Israel’s rivals’ ability to paint events in colors suitable to their goals and methods has been gradually improving. Schleifer analyzes the methods applied by Israel and the Arabs and attempts to explain why the Israelis are gradually losing ground on this front.

Unfortunately, though the added historical information is important, the book suffers from some serious authorial and editorial mistakes. First and foremost is that the title is misleading – in fact the book really covers the period from the 1980s till 2010 and focuses on only two fronts of this conflict – the Palestinian and the Hizbullah. The entire period from the mid-1940s to the mid-1980s is merely glossed over – 7 pages from 1948 till 1982. Even without changing the content, a more appropriate title should have been chosen. Secondly, the content itself varies in quality – the best chapters are those which were published previously on the first Intifada and on the fighting with Hizbullah. Finally, there are many editorial errors. Two typical examples: leaving the captions to a number of photographs of leaflets without the photographs themselves (pp 24 – 25), thus rendering some of the information in the captions meaningless; the first paragraph of the Epilogue, begins – “This book went into print after the Second Gaza War…” but then discusses the Second Lebanon War instead. This paragraph is a literal translation of the equivalent paragraph in a book published in Hebrew in 2007 – except that there it was written Second Lebanon War...

To summarize, a useful book about an important topic, unfortunately marred by the quality of presentation.

The Rise of Turkey: The Twenty-First Century’s First Muslim Power
By Soner Cagaptay
Reviewed by W. Andrew Terrill, PhD, Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

Soner Cagaptay’s study on Turkey delivers significantly more than the title implies. While the author unquestionably addresses Turkey’s rising global role and vastly strengthened economy, he also provides insightful analysis of Turkish social and political transformation since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) took power in 2002. This transformation centers on what the author describes as the end of Kemalism as the Turkish guiding ideology. Kemalism is the vision of Turkey’s modern founder, Kemal Ataturk, for his country’s social and political future. It is best described as a European-oriented, top-down Westernization and secularization approach, which also includes a special domestic role for the military in protecting secular democracy. According to Cagaptay, the AKP has now moved Turkey into a post-Kemalist phase as Ataturk’s political vision is increasingly set aside, and the government establishes a greater role for Islam in the public sphere. He describes some of the new AKP policies as government-imposed social conservatism and top-down social engineering. To illustrate this point, the author notes government institutions now openly discriminate against secular Turks.
in hiring and promotions, and this situation is particularly problematic for women who choose not to wear the headscarf.

The architect of this vastly changed Turkey is Tayyip Erdogan, who served as prime minister for 11 years and then became Turkey’s first elected president in August 2014. Erdogan and his party have been able to win a series of consecutive national elections by drawing on the strong support of voters from struggling low income neighborhoods, where religion is often taken very seriously. Many residents of these neighborhoods find Erdogan an appealing figure due to both his policy positions and his childhood in Kasimpasa, a tough, low income, Istanbul neighborhood. Unsurprisingly, many AKP supporters also resent their country’s secular and Westernized elites epitomized by the Republican People’s Party (CHP). Moreover, the increased strength of the economy allows the AKP government to invest in education, health care, and other social programs that benefit the poor, thereby consolidating the loyalties of many low income voters. In this environment, Erdogan is poised to remain the dominant figure in Turkish politics despite his decision to change offices in response to internal AKP rules on term limits for prime minister.

As prime minister, Erdogan, like Ataturk, used the force of his personality to impose his worldview on Turkish society. He has also governed in an increasingly authoritarian manner, and the AKP leadership has targeted some of its most assertive critics including media figures and court officials for whatever punishment it can direct at them. Steep fines have been leveled at the independent media on fairly flimsy grounds, while Turkey has now surpassed China and Iran as the country with the highest number of journalists in prison. The AKP government has also eliminated the military’s role in Turkish politics through mass arrests and intimidation of officers, often involving illegal surveillance supposedly implemented to prevent a coup. The Turkish military has been one of the most Westernized segments of Turkish society since 1826, and its leadership viewed the protection of Ataturk’s vision of a secular Turkey as one of its most important duties from the 1920s until the recent successful AKP’s moves to break the military’s political power.

Against the AKP tide is an opposition that Cagaptay characterizes as, “the other Turkey” (76). This group includes secularists who often back the CHP, and comprise a significant segment (but not a majority) of the electorate. In recent elections, the CHP has often done well with middle class and upper middle class voters (especially women) and also with Turks descended from families expelled from former Ottoman Empire territories in Europe. The liberal, minority Islamic Alevis sect was granted political freedoms by Ataturk, and overwhelmingly tends to support secular parties such as the CHP. Despite these advantages, the CHP has faced crippling difficulties due to its failure to modernize and present a more inclusive vision for the country. Cagaptay states the CHP needs to recognize and take advantage of the distinction between government-sponsored social conservatism and non-political religious devotion if it is ever to regain power. Cagaptay also includes many Kurds (especially from the southeast) as part of the “other Turkey.” He suggests this group is becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the leading political parties since it has witnessed Iraqi (and to a lesser extent Syrian)
Kurds become more autonomous, albeit in response to internal disorder in those countries. Accordingly, many within the Kurdish community support the secular Democratic Regions Party (BDP), which is a Kurdish nationalist party. Kurdish opposition to the AKP is not total however, and the party has maintained a respectable showing among conservative religious Kurds in recent elections.

Cagaptay asserts both secularists and Islamists need to find common ground if Turkey is to avoid becoming hopelessly polarized and increasingly authoritarian. He is particularly concerned about differences over possible plans to write a new constitution. The author further maintains the 1982 Constitution, written by the military, “reads like a boarding school’s ‘don’t do list’” (149), and many Turks would like to replace it. Yet, an Islamist constitution would almost certainly be a disaster for Turkey, producing massive anger among large segments of the population. Instead, Cagaptay calls for a constitution with a strong emphasis on individual rights, allowing people to express Islamist or secular ideals as they see fit. He contends a future Turkey embracing its Muslim identity while maintaining its ties to the West could emerge as a powerful global player, but this will not occur if the country is polarized by poisonous, winner-take-all attitudes towards the country’s future.

The Great War of Our Time: The CIA’S Fight Against Terrorism from al Qa’ida to ISIS
By Michael Morell

Reviewed by W. Andrew Terrill, PhD, Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

Michael Morell has written an important memoir of his 33 years in the CIA with a special emphasis on events occurring after the 9/11 strike. He was in a number of key positions during this time frame and had already assumed the plum job of CIA briefer to President George W. Bush in December 2000. The remainder of his career (including later positions as associate deputy director and the head of the CIA’s main analytic arm, the directorate of intelligence) was often focused on the struggle against terrorist organizations. Later, he rose to the rank of Deputy Director and twice to Acting Director before retiring in 2013. Unsurprisingly, Morell’s book conveys a pro-CIA viewpoint on such controversial topics as the Iraq War, Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (EITs), drone warfare, the bin Laden raid, the Benghazi controversy, the Snowden affair, and a variety of other issues. A central focus of the book is the CIA’s struggle against al-Qa’ida and its subordinate offshoot organizations such as the powerful Yemen-based al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

Morell does not criticize President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq and states that the president, “thought [the war] was necessary to protect the American people.” (78) He also states the CIA provided the president with wrong information on the issue of Iraqi chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and this flawed intelligence helped Bush decide to invade Iraq.
Morell maintains the CIA’s conclusions on Iraqi issues immediately prior to the war were one of the most important intelligence failures in the history of the agency and even uses his book to issue a public apology to former Secretary of State Colin Powell for misleading him. Such statements seem like a huge admission of failure, but they are also offered to rebut the even more serious criticism of being bullied into endorsing politicized intelligence when placed under massive political pressure to do so. Morell admits such pressure did exist on issues related to Iraq and it was severe. According to Morell, Vice President Dick Cheney’s staff was relentlessly pushing for hardline reports that could be used to justify a war with Iraq. Morell further states the degree of amateur intelligence analysis being conducted by political appointees during this time frame was unprecedented in his career. He mentions that Cheney’s Chief of Staff, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby literally yelled at one CIA official over an intelligence document in which CIA analysts refused to endorse his favored hardline conclusions. In Morell’s account, the person experiencing Libby’s anger behaved like a hero and stated he would resign before withdrawing the offending report. In a similar incident, Morell recounts how another senior Cheney aide attempted to impose a great deal of unreliable information on CIA experts in a further attempt to improve the case for war. In response to this pressure, Morell claims CIA analysts always acted with integrity and won every battle over the contents of their reports. One hopes that is the whole story, although it would seem wickedly difficult for these people to avoid at least a certain level of self-censorship when faced with what former Bush Press Secretary Scott McClellan called “our campaign to sell the war.”

In an especially controversial section of the book, Morell provides a strong defense of the Bush Administration’s detention and intensified interrogation policies, the latter of which were designated with the innocuous name Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (EITs). He had hoped that EITs would be allowed to continue under President Obama, but the new president banned them on his second full day in office. Additionally, although Morell likes and respects his former boss, CIA Director Leon Panetta, he was unhappy when Panetta stated that waterboarding was torture, a statement Morell saw as confrontational with the CIA old guard. Morell insists individuals subjected to EITs provided significantly better information than in situations where they were interrogated with more conventional techniques. He also states EITs helped alert the CIA to the importance of courier Abu Ahmed as a lead to find Osama bin Laden. Morell maintains any intelligence on bin Laden was important since he was so difficult to find. Moreover, even with intelligence gathered through a variety of means, Morell believed the case was “thin” for bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad on the eve of the May 2, 2011 raid. While the CIA leadership was delighted with the outcome of the Abbottabad raid, Morell indicates the president chose to authorize it on the basis of very limited intelligence.

In one of the most compelling discussions in the book, Morell provides a strong defense of drone warfare, and calls these systems, “the single most effective tool in the last five years for protecting the United

States from terrorists.” (137) He makes a strong case that drones are among the most precise weapons in the history of warfare and that collateral damage from their use is often “highly exaggerated.” (138) Morell effectively notes the success of drones in Yemen and Pakistan, but he does a much weaker job of discussing the reemergence of AQAP in Yemen during the mid-2000s, stating this comeback occurred primarily because of a 2006 jailbreak by AQAP prisoners in that country. This jailbreak, while brazen and clever, involved only a limited number of individuals, all but six of whom were killed or recaptured over the following year. Another factor of potentially greater importance to AQAP’s success involved the flight of significant numbers of terrorists from Saudi Arabia to Yemen bringing their connections to terrorist financing with them. Likewise, around this time, a number of battle-hardened Yemeni jihadists were returning from the fighting in Iraq and were interested in waging war against the government of their own country.2

Morell also discusses the controversy over the 2012 deaths of four US government officials in Benghazi, Libya. He is especially offended by charges that the CIA collaborated with the White House to cover up key facts about the attack, and he understandably does not enjoy being called a liar over his actions related to this incident. Morell puts forward what he views as the relevant evidence on events in Benghazi, but fears the entire episode has entered into a discussion where facts do not matter. He emphatically denies charges he doctored documents relating to the attack and methodically refutes a number of reckless statements about a White House/CIA conspiracy. In a separate discussion, he also looks closely at the Edward Snowden affair and maintains that Snowden released information that helped enable the rise of the Islamic State. He unequivocally calls him a traitor.

In sum, this is a book of strong opinions by a CIA loyalist and committed organization man. The author puts forward his perspective because he believes many CIA actions have been unfairly criticized by irresponsible elements within the media and by political leaders who have attacked his agency as a way of getting at their political opponents. Morell is critical of these individuals in polite and respectful language, but he gets his message across. All this is not to say Morell does not have an important point of view, or that he fails to provide a well-reasoned defense of many controversial CIA activities, but this book is clearly designed to persuade as well as enlighten the reader.

2 I have examined this issue in a monograph written for the US Army Strategic Studies Institute. See W. Andrew Terrill, The Conflict in Yemen and US National Security, Carlisle, PA, Strategic Studies Institute, 2011, 54-57.
In Defence of War
By Nigel Biggar

Reviewed by Dr. David L. Perry, Professor of Applied Ethics and Director of the Vann Center for Ethics, Davidson College, and former Professor of Ethics, US Army War College

The author, Dr. Nigel Biggar, is Regius Professor of Moral and Pastoral Theology and Director of the McDonald Centre for Theology, Ethics and Public Life at the University of Oxford. He has published several books and dozens of scholarly articles on Christian ethics, serves on the Editorial Advisory Board of the Journal of Military Ethics, and has lectured at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom.

I became acquainted with Professor Biggar over thirty years ago when we both studied ethics at the University of Chicago Divinity School. I do not share all of his Christian convictions, but I have always been highly impressed by the quality of his scholarship and analytical skills. In Defence of War is a tremendously impressive book, which I am happy to recommend strongly.

In chapter one, Biggar persuasively shows three influential Christian ethicists—Stanley Hauerwas, John Howard Yoder, and Richard Hays—failed to prove the New Testament to have consistently promoted strict pacifism. Chapters two and three explore whether soldiers can plausibly exhibit Christian love of enemies and right intention in combat situations. Drawing extensively on the reflections of combat veterans, Biggar demonstrates soldiers frequently do exhibit love toward their fellow troops and the innocents they protect, as well as respect for at least some enemies. (78-91) But he does not convincingly prove killing or maiming enemies can plausibly reflect love for them, leaving me unsure how soldiers, while employing deadly force, could possibly uphold Jesus’ command to love their enemies.

Then again, Biggar also insists warriors do not intend to kill or wound enemy combatants at all, “insofar as ‘intend’ means to ‘choose and want as a goal’ rather than to ‘choose and accept with reluctance,’” i.e., as a necessary and proportionate side effect “of intending something good—say, the protection of the innocent.” He recognizes that his view “tests the patience of those who have first-hand experience of war-fighting,” but insists nonetheless that it is “more Christian” than its alternative, “better calculated to restrain violence,” and “sufficiently realistic about military psychology” (103, 110). However, I frankly believe his ethical standard here is set so high almost no Christian (or anyone else) could satisfy it, and moreover, it would be unfair to expect soldiers to uphold it or blame them for failing to do so.

Chapter four by itself is well worth the price of the book. There the author examines the just-war principle of proportionality in both its jus ad bellum and jus in bello modes, focusing on whether Britain’s decision to go to war against Germany in 1914 and General Douglas Haig’s attack at the Somme in July 1916 were proportionate in those respective senses.
His answers in both cases are yes, but readers owe it to themselves to see how he arrives at them. Consistent with the teachings of Christian theologian Thomas Aquinas, et al., Biggar notes “a war that lacks just cause or right intention cannot be proportionate, since none of the evils that it causes can be justified.” (147) But one of his most startling claims in defense of Haig and others is that “a certain kind of callousness is a military virtue, and the fact that a commander’s chosen plan involves the foreseeable annihilation of whole bodies of his troops need not be culpably disproportionate.” (148)

Chapter five is devoted primarily to addressing several criticisms of just-war theory made by the philosopher David Rodin in his influential book, *War and Self-Defense*. While agreeing with some of Rodin’s concerns about international law, Biggar systematically refutes Rodin’s arguments against just-war principles. Along the way, Biggar offers many nuanced insights on the historical development of that tradition, especially from Augustine to Grotius.

Controversies regarding humanitarian military interventions, specifically NATO’s 1999 war against Serbia to stop its ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, are addressed in Biggar’s sixth chapter. NATO’s intervention has been criticized as violating the UN Charter, since Serbia did not pose a direct threat to neighboring countries and the Security Council did not authorize an intervention as permanent members Russia and China would surely have vetoed any such resolution. Biggar counters that NATO’s actions may not have violated the UN Charter, though that interpretation seems weakly supported; he thinks it unlikely those drafting the Charter would have ruled out humanitarian interventions absent Security Council approval, given Nazi atrocities were so fresh in their minds. (221-222) But he forgets (here at least) Hitler had claimed humanitarian motives in annexing the Sudetenland and invading Poland, examples which must also have worried those writing the Charter. Biggar is on more solid ground in citing humanitarian precedents in customary international law and in stating compelling moral reasons for protecting basic human rights even if international law is infringed or ignored.

In chapter seven, the author opens with concise and lucid summaries of the standard just-war criteria, and then spends seventy pages carefully applying each one to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. He reaches the rather unorthodox conclusion that it was justified overall. I would only fault him in failing to consider pre-war US claims that Saddam Hussein was producing biological weapons in mobile labs and had tried to import aluminum tubes to use as centrifuges in his nuclear weapons program. Both claims were later shown to be ridiculously false and in my view, the Bush Administration deserves grave moral blame for making them, given that they were vital in persuading the American people and Congress to support the invasion.
Unlawful Combatants: A Genealogy of the Irregular Fighter
By Sibylle Scheipers

Reviewed by Dr. David L. Perry, Professor of Applied Ethics and Director of the Vann Center for Ethics, Davidson College, and former Professor of Ethics, US Army War College

Dr. Sibylle Scheipers is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland and was previously Director of Studies for the Changing Character of War Programme at Oxford University. She earned a PhD at Humboldt University in Berlin and was a post-doctoral fellow at Chatham House. This is her second solo-authored book in addition to editing three others including Prisoners in War (Oxford, 2010) and several articles published in scholarly journals.

Early in Unlawful Combatants the author reminds us, “Under the law of armed conflict, irregular fighters such as insurgents, guerrillas, and rebels are largely excluded from the privileges and protections of prisoner-of-war (POW) status.” Her primary intent in this book is to explore “the ambiguity of the status of irregular fighters, the political opportunism entangled with categorizing someone as an irregular fighter, and…the stark consequences of such a categorization.” (2)

To a great extent Scheipers admirably succeeds in illuminating those topics through a detailed study of several specific periods in military history and related developments including international law (primarily Europe and North America from 1740 to 1815), the American Civil War, the Franco-Prussian War, the Second World War, colonial wars in Haiti, Malaya and several parts of Africa, and recent struggles against Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Iraqi insurgents. I am impressed with the myriad examples of irregular fighters Scheipers identifies through her wide-ranging research, the careful distinctions she makes among them, and the frequently problematic interpretations of those combatants she teases out of the writings of generals, politicians, and lawyers.

An intriguing theme running throughout Unlawful Combatants is irregular warfare often occurs at the edges of conventional war, and even as an authorized auxiliary to it, e.g. in the American Civil War and Franco-Prussian War (ch. 3). Scheipers also conveys how difficult it can be to establish stable and robust legal rules regarding irregular warfare, given that it includes widely disparate forms ranging from organized insurgent groups, semi-official partisans, and widespread popular uprisings against occupying uniformed troops.

One drawback of Scheipers’ approach is that by focusing on opportunistic uses of the term “irregular” and its synonyms from state apologists, she ignores ways in which typical irregular war tactics—stealth, surprise, raiding, looting, rape, indiscriminate killing etc.—were standard procedures (i.e. “regular”) throughout much of human history. For example, while discussing North American conflicts in the late eighteenth century (ch. 1), she claims:

What Europeans encountered as “Indian warfare”—that is, the conduct of Native Americans on the battlefield—was an adaptation to the new weapons technologies that Europeans had brought to America. Native American
warfare before the arrival of the gun had been mostly limited, ritualized, and rather low in mortality. (39)

But such claims are overly sweeping and misleading, as Lawrence Keeley demonstrated in his fascinating book, *War before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). While Native Americans surely did adapt some of their tactics after being introduced to European weapons, Keeley proved that mortality rates in violent conflicts between Native American cultures prior to contact with Europeans were usually much higher than mortality rates from wars waged between modern industrialized countries. Moreover, human beings most likely inherited violently aggressive tendencies and even some war tactics from the common ancestor species that also produced chimpanzees, according to Richard Wrangham and Dale Peterson, *Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1996). To be sure, Scheipers could not possibly write about every case of irregular warfare in human history, but it would be interesting to know whether her approach in *Unlawful Combatants* would have been modified by exposure to these works.

On America’s “War on Terror,” Scheipers is right to criticize the Bush Administration for denying, post-9/11, that the Geneva Conventions applied to Al Qaeda detainees. (195) She also perceptively points out the United States has supported some Afghan and Iraqi irregular fighters without clearly articulating how they differ legally or ethically from enemy irregulars. (217-221) But I am not persuaded by her claim the concept of “unlawful combatant” in itself “suffers from internal inconsistencies,” (190, 222) since that term can simply refer today to a fighter who does not satisfy all of the Geneva Convention criteria required to be accorded full POW status.

Overall, I recommend *Unlawful Combatants* enthusiastically as a detailed and thoughtful history of irregular warfare.

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**Drone Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law, and Policy**

*Reviewed by Ulrike Esther Franke, Doctoral candidate at the University of Oxford, supervised by Prof. Sir Hew Strachan*

So many books on drones and “drone warfare” have been published in the last few years that a new drone book needs a good answer to the question “is there something new in it?” Drones have become the hot topic in international relations and security studies, not least because of the substantial public interest in the matter. This has led to a plethora of news reports, newspaper articles, academic papers, and increasingly books, to be published in the last few years. Not all of them deserve to be read or reviewed.

*Drone Wars, Transforming Conflict, Law, and Policy*, edited by New America’s Vice President Peter L. Bergen and New America Fellow and Professor at Arizona State University Daniel Rothenberg certainly deserves both. In 22 essays over 512 pages, the authors – most with a background in academia, law, journalism, or politics – offer fascinating insights into different aspects of the US drone programme.
The essays are ordered into four somewhat lose sections; ‘Drones on the Ground’, ‘Drones and the Laws of War’, ‘Drones and Policy’, ‘Drones and the Future of War’. Each section begins with fascinating first-hand accounts. A journalist who was held captive for several months in Waziristan reports on having lived under constant drone surveillance. A US drone pilot, in a particularly fascinating essay, shares his experiences of fighting “war at a very intimate level”. A Special Forces commander describes his use of UAVs in Afghanistan and gives rare insights into the Afghan populations’ view of drones. A Pakistani from North Waziristan shares his fear of – but also his gratefulness for – the US drone programme, giving the reader a glimpse of the complex situation on the ground.

Depending on their previous knowledge of the topic, readers are likely to enjoy different essays. No review can do justice to an edited volume, particularly not one containing that many essays. While all the chapters are good, some offer more unique and novel insights than others. I particularly enjoyed four essays.

In “What Do Pakistanis Really Think About Drones?”, Saba Imtiaz gives an excellent overview of the US drone operations in Pakistan. This is a brilliant paper even for those familiar with the topic. Particularly, it puts the US-Pakistan drone campaign in a broader context of US-Pakistani relations, an aspect usually lacking in the discussion. Imtiaz shows how the (US-backed) Pakistani policy of allowing the strikes in secret, while publically condemning them, has created major backlashes in Pakistani-US relations and has negatively influenced Pakistani citizens’ view of both the US and Pakistani domestic politics. “The use of drones in Pakistan has become the face of US foreign policy in the country” (90), Imtiaz argues. Ultimately however, “drones are not the core problem in US-Pakistan relations, but rather a symbol [...] of what is wrong with American interventionism in general” (100).

Naureen Shah offers fascinating insights into Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and its drone operations in “A Move Within the Shadows”. With most of the public and political attention being focused on the better-known CIA ops, JSOC’s role is often neglected, its extensive involvement in US drone operations notwithstanding. Shah analyses JSOC’s development, arguing that the organisation’s novelty and the political support it enjoys means that it “remains unencumbered by many of the oversight processes and reporting requirements that developed, over time and in response to scandals and public pressure, for the CIA and conventional military forces” (175). Accordingly, it is questionable whether handing over the drone programme from the CIA to the military – and JSOC – would indeed signify an improvement in oversight as many have argued.

In the expertly researched chapter “Predator Effect”, Megan Braun discusses the development of the iconic Predator drone. She asks how revolutionary drones have really been and argues that they were transformative only in the context of the ‘War on Terror’, as they were “so ideally suited to the post 9/11 vision of the CIA” (277). Braun believes that “the current Predator program is unlikely to be replicated in the near future” (255).
Werner J.A. Dahm, previously Chief Scientist of the US Air Force, takes on the claim that increased automatisation will be the next logical step in the development of drones. Dahm explains the ‘F2T2EA’ kill chain (‘find, fix, track, target, engage, assess’), and argues that one of the public’s biggest concerns, namely, “removing humans from the engage part of the F2T2EA process”, provides “essentially no strategic gain” (351). His paper will not settle the debate on automatisation and autonomy, but it represents an informed contribution to a debate rigged with speculation.

Overall, *Drone Wars* offers many new insights and approaches that are much needed in the drone debate. The book’s essay structure makes it particularly suited for teaching, also because there is quite some disagreement between the authors on several questions, such as whether drones are revolutionary, whether the US strikes are legal, or what the future of drone operations will look like.

The book’s main flaw is its US-centric approach. Based on the premise that drones “have become a lens through which US foreign policy is understood” (1), the authors make it seem as if US foreign policy is the only lens through which drones can be understood. Other countries’ uses of drones are largely ignored, only drone proliferation is discussed. This means that the authors run the risk of seeing drones uniquely in the context of the ‘War on Terror’. Counterbalancing this US-centric view would have made the analysis stronger.
A recurring debate within US military affairs is whether change within military operations is “revolutionary” because they are a profound, distinct departure from the past, or they are “evolutionary” as the next logical steps in adapting to complex, recurring and somewhat intractable problems. In “Mission Revolution,” Professor Jennifer Taw asserts over the past two decades Defense Department civilian and military leaders have made a revolutionary shift in accepting and integrating “stability operations” as a core mission for US military forces. Faced with wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and “persistent conflict” in coming years, issuance of DoD Directive 3000.05 was the pivotal point where progressive defense leaders mandated reform and improvements of doctrine, organization and training whereby “stability operations” – the capability to establish order advancing US interests and values – were put on equal footing with offense and defense capabilities. In doing so, progressives began purposefully moving military forces from a warfighting focus on delivering “decisive force” into areas traditionally civilian-dominated efforts due to the rise of complex threats of international criminals, terrorists, and jihadists. Taw offers alternative reasons beyond the past two decades of peacekeeping and counterinsurgency experience as to why such “infamously stubborn institutions” such as the US military would adopt such changes, asserting they are mostly pragmatic and self-interested: that Pentagon leaders now embrace new, non-standard missions reinforcing the utility of military efforts in policy accomplishment in order to retain force structure during future austerity.

Taw provides an interesting overview of the historical context and doctrinal development for stability operations throughout US history, noting land forces have been constantly involved in a variety of lesser contingencies and post-war commitments exceeding the capacity and acceptable risk of civilian USG efforts. However, “warfighting” preparation has dominated readiness efforts while assuming the risk that a military prepared for conventional conflict could readily adapt to lesser contingencies where security and stability were the focus of USG efforts. These perspectives ran counter to the needs of post-Cold War Administrations who complained the Pentagon’s “all or nothing” to using military force created an expensive military with little utility in shaping and maintaining international order. Much to Secretary Rumsfeld’s frustration (who also believed the military shouldn’t “do windows”), Iraq and Afghanistan post-conflict requirements again highlighted military force in itself is rarely decisive, and significant skilled and capable military forces are required in insecure environments to accomplish sustainable political outcomes.

After this insightful analysis, Taw’s explanation of why change occurred is more problematic as she echoes popular criticisms of
“militarizing of foreign policy.” She proposes this “mission revolution” results from both “securitized instability” — with each Administration’s obsession with rising global violence as the preeminent threat to US global interests — providing “institutional privileging” for preserving DoD and military capabilities necessary to counter threats to world order by pernicious jihadists, terrorists, narco-criminal activities. She proposes DoD dominance diverts resources, atrophies other agencies capabilities and we akens long-term efforts to build resilient societies that reject violent radicalism, but she does not sufficiently explain Defense’s sister “3 D’s”— Diplomacy and Development — have not instituted their own “mission revolutions” in adapting to the challenges of an unsecure, volatile world. In all, the past decade of war has shown the opposite; DoD and military leaders are willing to divert significant funding, manning and training resources and support increased Congressional funding for civilian deployment, planning and coordination capabilities to work alongside security assistance efforts in vital, higher risk environments.

In considering military efforts from Vietnam through the Balkans to the present, many of the changes identified are less a revolution than mission-required evolution. The requirements of DoDD 3000.05 were generate capabilities to “support” and not supplant under-resourced civilian efforts operating in conflict environments – an enduring, traditional military mission. Additionally, requiring the military to devote equal emphasis to generating capabilities to “establish order” and “develop indigenous capacity” in violence prone areas is a necessary institutional reminder to military and Congressional leaders — capable and flexible forces are constantly needed by US leaders to accomplish strategic success beyond fighting and winning wars, including efforts to build partner capacity. Finally, in a world of fragile states, increasingly threatened by non-state actors, efforts appearing to be militarizing foreign policy are pragmatically the “best, worst option” given the dearth of civilian capacity to work in high-threat environments as well as countering challenges to host nation legitimacy and stability which are the foundation for long term development success.

Nevertheless, Mission Revolution is a valuable analysis of the last decade’s efforts to balance military capabilities while concurrently enabling US success across a broader range of political and military needs. It highlights the challenges of integrating the organizational cultures across the defense, diplomatic, and developmental communities to improve interagency coordination. Her informative insights provide guideposts for future decision making on how far we should move toward security-dominated solutions abroad. As a colleague recently noted, US leaders are seeking a way out of resource intensive counterinsurgency and stability operations while adversaries work their way into them. Given traditional institutional preferences across all of the 3Ds, it will be interesting as the decade of war fades into the past to see how permanent DoD’s changes will be, and whether a “revolution” will occur within civilian agencies to enable better coordination and planning with military security assistance and capacity building. As in any true revolution, we will only know when the uncertain future becomes the discernible past.
Violence After War: Explaining Instability in Post-Conflict States
By Michael J. Boyle

Reviewed by James H. Lebovic, George Washington University

Michael J. Boyle’s new book offers a welcome look at post-conflict violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Rwanda, East Timor, and Iraq. Despite its title, the book sensitizes readers more generally to the fallacy of assuming that countries have graduated to post-conflict status with the ostensible end in fighting. Conflict can persist when parties seek to “renegotiate” the terms of a peace through violence, new parties arise to stake their claim to power, or coalitions dissolve in disputes over the division of the spoils.

The book focuses accordingly on “strategic violence” which is “designed to transform the balance of power and resources in a state” (8). Such violence is most obvious when one or more of the contending parties seeks to challenge the terms of a settlement having agreed to them, perhaps, under duress or false pretenses. But strategic violence sometimes has a more complex explanation with ambiguous evidentiary support. It can occur when groups fragment to pursue their own (unclear) agendas by capitalizing on ethnic, religious, or political conflict and engaging in criminal activities by employing criminal gangs to mobilize resources and target opponents for “strategic” purposes. “Not only can such violence be unconnected or only indirectly related to the cause of the war itself, but it can also provide a space for opportunists to pursue a variety of personal or criminal vendettas, some of which will be detached from the fighting that preceded it.” In consequence, “the violence of the post-conflict period will often appear as an inchoate mix of personal attacks, criminal violence, and political-strategic violence significantly different from violence in the war that preceded it” (5). In Boyle’s terminology, strategic violence mixes with “expressive violence,” an emotional response to loss or suffering, and “instrumental violence,” undertaken for criminal or personal gain. The analytical challenge is met, as Boyle recognizes, by ascertaining the collective (not individual) motives behind the violence, as discerned from tell-tale, aggregate patterns. For that effort, Boyle marshals revealing quantitative and qualitative evidence to portray trends over time in the various conflicts.

According to Boyle, the key to understanding the role of strategic violence in post-conflict countries is appreciating the distinction between the “direct pathway” to violence in which the parties, targets, and issues in contestation remain relatively constant (from the conflict through the post-conflict periods) and the “indirect pathway” in which groups splinter and violence is a function of “multiple and overlapping bargaining games between new and emergent claimants for power and resources” (12). In discussing these pathways, Boyle’s central argument reduces to four hypotheses that derive from a “2-by-2” table, structured around two binary variables. These variables are: a) whether the original parties have accepted a settlement and b) how much control these parties exercise over their membership. Simply put, strategic violence emerges through the direct pathway when a party refuses to accept a
settlement and through the indirect pathway when the level of control is low. Consequently, strategic violence can occur simultaneously through the direct and indirect pathway when a party refuses a settlement and when the level of control is low.

In positing these hypotheses and testing them against the case evidence, Boyle moves beyond the largely descriptive focus of the early theoretical chapters to explain the occurrence of strategic violence. In its illuminating detail, the case-study analysis provides support for Boyle’s provocative arguments. Yet it also serves to highlight the book’s limitations, which are as follows:

First, the utility of Boyle’s approach rests on the viability of a 2-by-2 table that assumes implicitly that the loss of control and nonacceptance of a settlement by any side produces the same outcome. But do the effects of a loss of control depend, instead, on whether a group has accepted the status quo? If so, additional cells are required in the table. The splintering of the Mahdi Army under the leadership of Moqtada al-Sadr in Iraq, for example, testifies to the challenges for group leaders who pursue “moderate” goals – in this case, tacitly accepting a US troop presence through a declared cease fire – that alienates extremist elements. Would the same result occur, however, if “rejectionist” goals were widely shared within a group? Under these conditions, factions might engage in one-upmanship – challenging one another through competitive violence – yet operate nonetheless in broad alignment to achieve common goals. That question alludes, then, to an underlying problem in Boyle’s analysis. Despite his ostensible focus on motivation, Boyle simply assumes that a loss of control by a group over its members results (through the indirect pathway) in strategic violence. That assumption requires justification. After all, these subgroups might choose instead to defer to the existing group leadership out of fear of isolation or loyalty to a political agenda; they might try to work themselves into positions of influence to wrest power from within; they might challenge the control of leaders only when the leadership or goals of the subgroup changes; or they might channel their discontent into lucrative criminal activities.

Second, the variables in Boyle’s analysis are defined so generally and inclusively that the underlying logic is arguably circular. Boyle depicts the level of internal control as the capability to achieve compliance by inflicting costs (punishment) and distributing benefits (political positions, jobs, and profits). The analysis does not focus on any one tool or any set of mechanisms. Instead, it identifies a loss of control in the case evidence when “new” groups engage in strategic violence, and then backtracks to the reasons. A similar problem results when Boyle discusses the opportunity structure – the “cluster of features in the external environment” (90) – that facilitates or suppresses strategic violence in a country. These features include geographical barriers, the visibility and proximate presence of a target community, the flexibility of institutions, and the presence of an external force that can keep the peace. Given his broad conception of the opportunity structure, claims of an unpermissive environment could deflect any evidence that disconfirms a hypothesis. For that matter, viewing institutional flexibility as a feature of the opportunity structure (91-92) begs the question of where that structure “ends” and internal control “begins.” The validation and
invalidation of hypotheses can hinge on whether a factor is deemed to represent one or the other.

Third, Boyle could have done more to disclose the processes through which conflicts change. He contends conflicts are complex and fluid but provides little guidance for predicting if and when one pathway might give way to the other, strategic violence might give rise to instrumental violence, or expressive violence might build to the point that it becomes a strategic force, when channeled effectively by newly emergent group leaders. Thus, Boyle’s use of the phrase “as predicted” is somewhat misleading when he discusses the fit between the book’s arguments and case evidence. Boyle presents a variety of scenarios through which a conflict can unfold but, apart from his general hypotheses, he does not predict outcomes based on a set of prior conditions. His actual focus is on the dependent variable – levels and types of violence – which explains his great attention to gathering, filtering, and categorizing evidence on violence; lengthy descriptions of trends in violence in the various countries; generation of a typology for mass, scattered, occasional, and residual violence; and brief chapter conclusions. Boyle is correct that “the reasons why experts so often get it wrong when predicting violence in post-conflict states is that they underestimate the changes in the incentives and organizational structures of the combatants, which can alter the character of the violence in subtle and unexpected ways” (305). He would have well served his reader had he provided clearer guideposts as to when and where these changes might occur. “Expect the worst” is, of course, a useful guidepost but it is also reason for inaction, or overreaction, and is of little help for building predictive social scientific theory.

Notwithstanding these deficiencies, Boyle’s book offers valuable insights on an understudied phenomenon of great importance to academic researchers and policymakers. The conflict in Iraq offers powerful lessons to policymakers who anticipate a post-conflict phase that amounts to a “post-hostilities” period, with naïve disregard for the jockeying for position, unresolved tensions, emerging grievances, and new-found resources that could lead to a continuation of violence. Boyle’s book is perhaps most useful, then, if read as a sophisticated and well-argued admonition to policymakers who view military intervention as a quick fix to a security or humanitarian problem. Policymakers tend to focus on proximate causes and effects and give far less attention to the unintended and long-term consequences of policies. Reminders of these decisional failings are painfully apparent in Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and elsewhere around the world where interventions were orchestrated, some with the best of intentions.

**Shaping US Military Forces for the Asia-Pacific: Lessons from Conflict Management in Past Great Power Eras**

By Michael R. Kraig

Reviewed by LT Robert “Jake” Bebber, USN, PhD, Information Warfare officer, US Cyber Command

How should the United States address a rising China in an era where "the use of conflict management and strategic reassurance before..."
and during crises is likely to be as crucial as war-winning capabilities in a system where states are, in fact, competitors rather than all-out enemies? (20)

This becomes the central question in Kraig’s important book, *Shaping US Military Forces for the Asia-Pacific: Lessons from Conflict Management in Past Great Power Eras*. His argument can be summarized as follows:

- The modern international order has much in common with the era known as the Concert of Europe (1815 – 1914), “given that today’s ‘complex interdependence’ ties the financial, trade, and manufacturing wealth and individual quality of life within the sovereign states to the daily functioning of the ‘global common’ as a whole.” (22) This is worrisome when one considers “territory and values have more often than not been rightly linked since the rise of nationalism in the last 1700’s.” (75) Nationalism, both between states—and between groups within states—can create a volatile mix that threatens the rule of existing elites and can escalate to war.

- The “American Way of War” must be reconsidered in light of modern, 21st Century Great Power competition. Military doctrine built on such concepts as “decisive battle,” “full-spectrum dominance,” and air and naval supremacy are incompatible with an international order where strategic competition demands pragmatic management of core national interests between states.

Clausewitz’s principle of strategic defense should underpin a military force structure built on the goal of defensive denial of the adversary achieving its objectives rather than a vague notion of “victory” and enemy capitulation. (75, 200)

However, for a book whose title begins with “Shaping US Military Forces,” one must reach page 300 to find a detailed discussion of the recommendations on the nature and type of military forces. (Indeed, this discussion concludes the book and is a mere four pages long.) If the reader is familiar with many of the on-going debates among naval and air power theorists, these recommendations are not particularly new, but they remain no less important to the author’s underlying theory. Forces will be required to have the ability to “deny permanent military advantages within and even beyond the third island chain without immediately threatening strategic levels of destruction.” (300-301) Kraig characterizes this as a “medium-range force” that relies not on a few, large platforms (such as carriers and attendant support vessels or a long-range strategic bombing force) but rather a large number of smaller vessels of “modest but operationally significant stealth and self-defense characteristics.” He recommends forces be built around two operational concepts: theater sustainment and escalation control. This would include “smaller, quicker, much more numerous, and stealthier” versions of *Arleigh Burke*-class destroyers which possess “significant antisubmarine warfare, surface-to-surface, and surface-to-air attack capabilities” while still retaining the *Burke’s* missile and ISR capabilities. Long range stealth bombers like the B-2 should be replaced with “dozens if not hundreds of highly stealthy, medium-range, medium-carrying-capacity bombers” which are designed primarily to attack targets at sea rather than penetrate and attack targets on land. (301, 303) Importantly, this “medium-range force” will not be designed to denude “China’s credible and capable nuclear retaliatory forces, nor for decapitating leadership circles.” (304)
Kraig’s medium-range forces will face a daunting problem of geography and distance. It is nearly 4,000 miles from the American military bases in both Guam (an American territory) and Yokosuka, Japan (a key ally) to Hawaii. Small and medium sized surface combatants and air platforms will be hard pressed to cover such wide expanses without sufficient logistical support. One need only consider the massive extent to which the United States had to develop logistical trains to support its Pacific campaign during World War II. The reader may have appreciated this topic covered in more detail by Kraig, to include the number and type of support ships, projected costs and defense of lines of communication. Where would the medium-fighter/bomber forces he proposes be based, what sort of effective range do they need and what type and amount of air-refueling and tanker capabilities are needed? What land power capabilities are necessary to conduct forcible entry (if necessary), base hardening, ballistic missile defense and air defense? Finally, how can US military forces be assured of command-and-control in a contested electro-magnetic environment? These operational questions demand answers if we are going to reconfigure (or even maintain) military forces to operate in the Western Pacific.

These operational considerations run head-long into the geopolitical realities of permitting the entire first-island chain to come under Chinese control. Kraig argues US military forces should not be configured to threaten China’s core national interests and sovereign territory. Setting aside Taiwan, what are we to do about the fact that China has declared the entire South China Sea as its sovereign territory? China is building a navy and air force capable of enforcing these territorial claims and imposing *de facto* control over the objections of her neighbors and maritime disputants like Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. What will be the strategic and geopolitical cost to the United States if it does not possess credible military deterrence capabilities in the first and second island chains? These should probably be considered.

Kraig’s book is an important contribution to our understanding of what the future twenty-first century international environment may look like, and he raises necessary points on the posture of America’s future military capabilities. While he seems comfortable letting the “professional aviators and naval officers” deal with the detailed operational, fiscal and acquisition requirements his proposed force structure would require, further analysis of that effort would also have been helpful.
Meltdown in Haditha: The Killing of 24 Iraqi Civilians by US Marines and the Failure of Military Justice

By Kenneth F. Englade

Reviewed by Jeff A. Bovarnick, Colonel, Staff Judge Advocate, United States Army Special Operations Command

In November 2005, after an improvised explosive device killed one of their squad members, a number of United States Marines killed 24 civilians in Haditha, Iraq. Compounding the tragedy, the chain of command failed to report or investigate the deaths properly. Investigations started months after the incident led to courts-martial charges ranging from murder to dereliction of duty for the eight Marines involved in the killings and aftermath. In early 2012, after years of legal proceedings, all the Marine Corps had to show for its immense prosecutorial efforts was one conviction for one Marine who pled guilty to one specification of negligent dereliction of duty after initially being charged with 18 specifications of unpremeditated murder. How this “failure of military justice” occurred is the author’s primary focus in Meltdown in Haditha.

Meltdown is an indictment of the Marine Corps, those involved in the killings, the cover-up, and lengthy legal proceedings, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). There was a time after the killings when the word “Haditha” equated to negative connotations for the Marine Corps. If that time has passed, Kenneth Englade revives that negative image with his all-out assault on the Corps. His thesis is clear: the Corps botched the investigations, mishandled the prosecutions, and engaged in a systematic suppression and obfuscation of information from the public. The author also makes the following conclusory statement, and serious accusation, up front: Meltdown does not determine why the Corps acted as it did, it tells “how the Corps achieved its apparent purpose of burying forever (or at least the foreseeable future) particulars that would have helped fill gaps in the history of this country’s misguided attempts to bring an American solution to a Middle East problem.” (3)

If the use of numerous legal terms thus far have wearied the reader, perhaps Meltdown is not for you. Part I covers the background leading up to the Marines’ deployment to Anbar Province and the reconstruction of the 19 November 2005 ill-fated convoy, the killings, and the cover-up. The remainder of the book is devoted to the details of the investigations and numerous legal proceedings for the eight Marines charged that stretched from February 2006 to April 2012. For readers who enjoy such details, there are few non-fiction books that match Englade’s skill at describing the courts-martial process. Remarkably, with no prior experience covering military justice matters, Englade met the daunting challenge with minimal errors and omissions. For example, he provides incorrect maximum punishments for some of the accused Marines (64) and he appears to consider “customary dead shots” (double-tapping dead bodies) as acceptable while omitting any discussion of war crimes. (136)

A veteran journalist and an accomplished author, Englade has 14 books to his credit including five historical fiction novels and nine true
crime books. This first foray into the military justice arena may disappoint his true crime fans as *Meltdown* is not a legal thriller. Englade’s experience with civilian cases likely led to his frustration with military lawyers and spokespersons who are limited in what they can disclose to the press in on-going cases. When information is divulged, it will not include insight into a commander’s deliberative process or a lawyer’s prosecutorial strategy. No one involved in Haditha agreed to an interview with Englade, surely prompting these unabashed comments:

> [Marines] may become cliquish, insular, obnoxiously boastful, and openly mistrustful of anyone who is not or never has been a Marine. As an institution, the Corps is infamous in some circles for its inscrutability, its detestation of the media, its arrogance, and its refusal to divulge information that it does not consider in its own best interest. (217)

Englade’s persistence yielded key documents that enabled him to reconstruct the legal proceedings from the charging decisions and pre-trial investigations through the case dismissals and courts-martial. For fans of detailed legal processes and analysis, including appellate court opinions on issues such as Unlawful Command Influence, a qualified reporter’s privilege, and writs of mandamus, *Meltdown* is replete with informative explanations.

The author’s treatment of the convening authority for the Haditha cases, a three-star general at the time, is unrelenting in its criticism and yet, unwittingly, offers facts to paint a different picture. Consider that the general read over 9,000 pages of evidence and for four months, he held one to two strategy sessions per week with each session lasting from two to five hours. (180-81) Any suggestion that the convening authority did not exercise due diligence and make informed decisions is unwarranted. Admittedly unfamiliar with the Corps culture, Englade still offers this perplexing analogy: “An officer with four stars is like a prince, maybe the closest thing in contemporary American society to royalty.” (180) With more insight on the issue, one wonders if Englade might consider Chief Executive Officer of a Fortune 500 Company to be a more apt analogy.

While Englade states it as fact, it is for the reader to decide if the Haditha cases were a “failure of military justice.” Englade serves up this controversy with one of the most divisive issues in combat – the killing of civilians alleged to be aiding, mistaken for, or simply near the enemy. Second-guessing combat troops in the heat of battle shrouded by the fog of war is an unforgiving task for all involved in the court-martial process. Yet, it is the courts-martial process and involvement of commanders, prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges that ensure the procedural and substantive rights of military personnel are protected and they receive due process of law. Englade presents a convincing argument that there were some flaws in the Haditha cases. However, there is an equally effective (and prevailing) counter-argument that the eight charged Marines benefitted from the due process rights afforded by the UCMJ and the US Constitution. Englade’s suggestion that the Haditha cases alone will lead to an examination of the courts-martial process conflates the issues. More realistic is the acknowledgment that *Meltdown* is an important book for those engaged in the military justice debate. Military justice practitioners and those interested in courts-martial books should consider Judge John Stevens’ *Court-Martial at Parris Island: The Ribbon Creek Incident*

**Fallujah Awakens: Marines, Sheikhs, and the Battle Against Al-Qaeda**  
By Bill Ardolino

**Fallujah Redux: The Anbar Awakening and the Struggle with Al-Qaeda**  
By Daniel R. Green and William F. Mullen, III

Reviewed by Robert L. Bateman, Lieutenant Colonel US Army (Ret.)

Some military historians adhere to a fairly rigid set of standards, one of the key elements of which is the definition of what constitutes history. Stated in the simplest terms, anything written within 25 years of an event really cannot be construed as history. It may be a first-person account, or it may be very good reportage, but it does not rise to the level of history. The reasons for this are easy to understand; in less than a quarter-century there is not enough room for consideration. Emotions are still raw, sources are still sketchy or classified, and there are usually insufficient resources to analyze an event from more than one perspective. All of which is to say these two books, worthy as each is in its own way, are not “histories” of the events in and around Fallujah. They are accounts, one journalistic and one by participants, of those events. Someday they may well become part of the narrative written by historians, but for now, they are limited by the tyranny of proximity.

Bill Ardolino is what one might consider a “new journalist.” He has never been employed by a conventional news organization and does not claim to have any traditional journalistic training, or for that matter historical education or training. That being said, he is pretty damned good at what he does and demonstrates the truism that what you need to do to be a writer is to write a lot. As an “associate editor” for the online non-profit *Long War Journal* Ardolino has certainly done that. More to the point, along the way he has been redefining what it means to be a journalist, if not a historian. That is an objective observation with significant implications. Ardolino is dangerously close to being a cheerleader, which is the opposite of what journalism is supposed to be.

That being said, his account of events in the Fallujah peninsula, the narrow strip of land within the bend of the river southwest of Fallujah, is seriously good reading. It is not history, mind you, but in decades to come Ardolino’s account, meticulously researched and extensively documented will form a part of the core when historians take up this story. It is not a story about the big picture; it is a micro-story in the finest sense of the term. Ardolino gets in, deep, and tells a story he also documents; and no historian can argue with that, despite his likely bias.
Green and Mullen, on the other hand, are telling the story of what was happening in “town” at nearly the same time. If Ardolino’s is a “micro-tactical” story, then Green and Mullen are telling a tactical story at a slightly, very slightly, higher level. Of course, this being the tale of marines, there are obligatory swipes at the US Army. But one comes to expect that from marine stories. Green is a lieutenant commander in the Navy, Mullen was a battalion commander in Fallujah in ’07. Although their writing is a tad turgid, their story bears the weight of history quite well. At the tactical level they come through with the personal story of the men who really won Fallujah, the Iraqis.

That is a pretty admirable thing which both books share. They give credit where credit is due, to the Iraqis who fought, and died, and made things right for a couple of years. Rightly so as well, they give credit to some truly heroic marines who had the courage to trust, which all of us who have been downrange and in questionable situations, understand is a lot scarier than getting shot at. When they shoot at you, the questions disappear. It is when you do not know – that the heart beats a triple tango.

Both of these books will be, in the canon, minor points. But as primary sources, each will endure. Ardolino’s work is better, but narrower. Green and Mullen wrote a broader and fascinating work, which is not as well sourced, and so should be seen as the account of first-person participants, with all that implies. In both cases the lesson is loud and clear: “Listen to the locals.”

**Culture in Conflict: Irregular Warfare, Culture Policy, and the Marine Corps**

By Paula Holmes-Eber

Reviewed by Priya Dixit, PhD, Assistant Professor with the Department of Political Science at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Challenges faced by the United States Marine Corps as it confronted different, and often contradictory, government policies regarding culture is the central point of this engaging and extensively-researched book. The author, Paula Holmes-Eber, Professor of Operational Culture at Marine Corps University, has written an in-depth ethnographic study of the Marine Corps, one which will be extremely useful to academics, policymakers and the general public. This book should be mandatory reading for government officials who are deciding and enacting culture-related policies.

As Holmes-Eber writes, “the book is about cross-cultural problem solving—about the messy process of translation, interpretation, and program implementation as two different worlds struggle to make sense of one another. The focus is not upon the answer, but the process” (xvii). This is the central core of the book. She goes on to clarify the “two different worlds” are not just how the Marines interacted with locals overseas, but also how they had to deal with new US government policies regarding culture and language. Thus, Holmes-Eber directs attention to how there can be, and often are, cultural differences within the United States military and in its relations with the government.
“Cross-cultural,” here, does not just mean “how do we (United States) deal with others overseas?” but also how the Marine Corps culture is understood and formed, and how Marines understand external government directives and policy changes.

To illustrate the culture of the Marine Corps and its reactions to new policies, Holmes-Eber divides the book into two parts. The first outlines the ethos of the Marine Corps. Chapters are titled according to key Marine phrases and self-understandings. For example, Chapter 2 is called “Every marine a rifleman” and describes the egalitarian ethos of the Marine Corps. Similarly, the emphasis on being a leader is in Chapter 5 “Tip of the spear.” After outlining the culture of the Marine Corps in Part I, the second part of the book focuses on the specifics of how the Marines incorporated and, sometimes, resisted the “new culture policy” of the US government (5). Holmes-Eber claims the Marines “Marinized” the policy through simplification, translation, processing, and reshaping. Each chapter in Part II explicates one of these methods. As such, the book is very well-organized for the reader.

This work would not have been possible without Holmes-Eber’s unique access to her research participants—the Marines. Her wide-ranging research includes observations at Marine Corps educational facilities, training sessions, bases and in-depth interviews with over 80 Marines. This is supplemented by an online survey (with 2,406 responses) on “attitudes toward culture and language learning” (23). She uses the words of the Marines themselves in order to portray their world, as they see it. The results can be noted in Part I, wherein the challenges and difficulties but also the sense of accomplishment of those who pass through Marine Corp training is detailed. The Marines’ self-image is as ready and adaptable to support the “guy on the ground,” as a “hard, lean Spartan” (51), with leaders who are capable of quick decision-making in difficult situations.

Part II, however, is where much of Holmes-Eber’s wideranging research is utilized. In describing how the Marines have responded to a post-9/11 environment of a different way of war (long-term insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq) and new policy directives (needing to learn and understand the culture of where the Marines are fighting), Holmes-Eber describes how the Marines first simplified the policy directives and then reshaped them to fit their way of doing things. They did so by learning-by-doing, a practice embedded in Marine Corps culture. The discussions regarding how “throwing away the playbook” (which was often filled with outdated information, written by people who had little or no experience of the Iraqi and Afghan cultures) as well as how interpreters and “subject matter experts” were incorporated by the Marines (Chapters 6-8) are some of the best in regard to cross-cultural interactions.

If one were to ask for more information in a book already filled with wonderful anecdotes and narratives from its research participants, I would have liked to have seen more of the tensions and challenges—and the frustrations—the Marines felt at these new government directives. Holmes-Eber’s Marines are capable and practiced in simplifying and reworking culture, but surely there must have been resistance internally? Were there criticisms of government policies or frustrations at what seems like often contradictory or incomplete guidance provided by the US government? There is a wonderful statement by an interviewee on
page 111 which hints at these issues and more perspectives would have provided a fuller account of Marines’ reactions to policy changes. It would have been helpful to see more on-the-ground relations between Marines and foreign civilians. What about Marines who did not fit the Corps’ self-image of honor, adaptability and warrior-ness? Holmes-Eber claims the actions of some “young Marines” “potentially tarnished the image of the Marine Corps” (130). How did such actions impact the larger cross-cultural relations between US Marines, civilians, and officials in Iraq, Afghanistan (and elsewhere)?

Overall, this is an excellent addition to the scholarship on the Marine Corps and also on organizational learning, ethnography and military histories. The question whether organizations, in general, reshape external directives to fit their existing culture (as the Marine Corps did here) is a fascinating one deserving of further research. What about other branches of the US military? How have foreign militaries responded to their countries’ new directives on culture and language acquisition? Holmes-Eber’s book sets the foundation for further research on this topic.

One Million Steps: A Marine Platoon at War
By Bing West

How do we make sense of war? At what level of analysis do we tell the story? Is the tale one of larger power competition and bureaucratic intrigue in the formation of campaign strategy, or a story about individuals and their comrades-in-arms coming to terms with a daily fight for survival?

Bing West’s One Million Steps uses the experience of a Marine Corps infantry platoon to conduct what might best be called an ethnography of war. Through patrolling with one unit and locating its experience within a larger debate on counterinsurgency campaigns, West writes a book that operates on three distinct levels.

First, the book captures the tactical dilemmas and stories of individual heroism and tragedy in the struggle to secure Sangin District in Helmand Province. In early October 2010, Colonel Paul Kennedy ordered 3rd Battalion of the 5th Marine Regiment to seize key terrain in Sangin and attack the enemy. As part of this mission, the battalion conducted distributed operations, establishing multiple, small patrol bases from which squad-sized formations sought out and engaged Taliban fighters. The fighting pitted arrays of Taliban improvised explosive devices and complex ambushes against the Marines’ superior marksmanship and firepower. In the struggle, one unit, 3rd Platoon Kilo Company suffered the highest casualty rates.

Throughout the experience of 3rd Platoon, West tells the story of the enduring aspects of warfare at the small-unit level. He shows the resiliency of tactical formations, how individuals pull together in the face of extreme adversity. West also highlights the “push-and-pull” of adaptation. The reader witnesses 3rd Platoon using detached snipers
and maximizing close air support to destabilize the adversary and deny terrain. We see the Taliban reaction, engaging Marine patrols with harassing fire from further afield and changing how they employ IEDs to attrite foot patrols. In the narrative, adaptation appears as a bottom-up quest for survival completely separate from the larger operational and strategic debates in Kabul.

Second, the book locates 3rd Platoon’s struggle within the larger strategy in Afghanistan. West moves from the story of individual Marines to a debate about ends, ways, and means at the heart of the counterinsurgency campaign. The book characterizes a failure of strategy as misaligned objectives, the divergence between a Marine Corps focused on a “big stick approach” to counterinsurgency emphasizing breaking the will of the Taliban and an ISAF leadership advocating population-centric approaches that limit tactical engagements and focus on winning the proverbial (and elusive) “hearts and minds.”

In these passages, the book is not partisan or parochial and attacks multiple administrations and senior military leaders. West characterizes a fundamental failure to review assumptions in the formation of strategy. He lambasts the approach taken in Afghanistan as a “quixotic strategy of benevolent war” which devolved into a battle of attrition as the “absence of strategy.” And the tragedy is not over. West sees future failures on the horizon, claiming a similar lack of strategic thinking and appetite for reviewing assumptions persists. He saves his harshest comments for the US Commander-in-Chief, stating, “in place of an exit strategy, [President] Obama simply exited [Afghanistan] without a strategy.” Against this backdrop of failed leadership, West contends any tactical “success was in spite of, rather than because of, the counterinsurgency strategy.”

Third, ghosts haunt the pages. Bing West’s interactions with 3rd Platoon become a vehicle for remembering his own combat experiences in Vietnam and role of mythology in helping Marines make sense of war. These remembrances emerge, often at random, giving the narrative an almost surreal quality at times. The reader is pulled from a detailed, empirical account of tactical action to West’s memory of fighting in Combined Action Platoons, an earlier Marine experiment with distributed operations in a counterinsurgency fight. The reader sees West’s first encounter with family members who served as Marines in World War II and the stabilizing role that tales of “Marines past” provide the generations that follow. While at times disjointed, the net effect of these remembrances is to provide a portrait of how the individual makes sense of war. In the end, One Million Steps is as much about Bing West coming to terms with the tragedy and complexity of war as it is about the later stages of the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan.
This engaging memoir of a soldier's service is an altogether superb work. The author is candid, lucid, meticulous in research, and writes with verve on a wide canvas. He is forthright in assessing the political leaders, diplomats, government officials, scholars, and military officers he respected and liked—and discreet about those he didn’t. He occasionally relied on his memory to shape his narrative but mostly drew on, literally, thousands of 3X5 cards on which he scribbled notes. General Galvin also appears to have saved every scrap of paper that came into his hands over four decades, plus copies of those he originated.

This is the chronicle of a Boston Irish-American who served in the National Guard as a private, graduated from West Point, fought twice in Vietnam, and helped edit the famous Pentagon Papers. He attended the usual military schools, taught at West Point, wrote three books, and commanded a brigade in Europe. The essence of Galvin’s leadership was perhaps best illuminated by instructions to his battalion commanders. “I want to command in such a way,” he told them, “that you will feel glad you served under me. You get to command your battalion. I get to command you, not your battalion.”(241)

As a lieutenant general, Galvin commanded a corps of 83,000 soldiers in Europe before becoming a four star general with command, he notes wryly, of a joint force of 9,154 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in the Southern Command.(298) Galvin capped his service as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, or SACEUR, the top NATO assignment, during the last years of the Cold War. General Colin L.Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, liked to address General Galvin as “Charlemagne.” (347) After retiring, Galvin served as Dean of the Fletcher School at Tufts University in Boston.

Sprinkled throughout this memoir are dozens of examples of military leadership that any officer aspiring to wear stars would benefit from reading. Moreover, Galvin suggests ways to deal with the cumbersome Army bureaucracy and how to operate in an often-charged political-military sphere. He was mentored by General Andrew Goodpaster, then SACEUR, as the general’s speechwriter. Galvin points to Goodpaster’s “gentle, roundabout, but very encouraging way of telling you that you had made a mistake.” (237)

Others who could benefit from this memoir are political leaders who don’t know which end of the rifle the bullet comes out. The same is true for many diplomats in the State Department, officials in government departments other than the Pentagon, the press and so-called
defense intellectuals. Lastly, for the American public that doesn’t know much about soldiering, dipping into this memoir could be eye opening.

General Galvin’s rise was not straight up. As a major during his first tour in Vietnam, he got fired as a brigade operations officer in the 1st Infantry Division when his brigade commander, Colonel Sydney Berry, told him: “The chemistry is not there. We’re not a good combination.” (140-141) Galvin was sent to an administrative job in Saigon, a demotion many officers would consider career-damaging or career-ending. But he thrashed around and got the chief of staff of the 1st Cavalry Division, Colonel Herbert E. Wolff, to assign him as an extra hand in operations. Galvin found that the division commander, Major General John Norton, “did listen, a characteristic not too often found in commanders.” (153)

In contrast to his first tour, Galvin’s second was remarkable, first as an intelligence officer and then as a battalion commander. His chapter about that year is filled with examples of good soldiering. As an intel operative, Galvin sounds like an experienced war correspondent: “I became a circuit rider, traveling from one unit to another, thumbing rides to anyplace where I could pick up news and fit the pieces into a mosaic.” (180)

Early in his command of 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry in the 1st Cavalry Division, Galvin ran into a dicey disciplinary problem, eleven black soldiers accused of insubordination. He met with them alone and said: “Tell me what happened.” One by one, Galvin writes, the soldiers spoke “with frankness, clarity, and balance.” They pointed to “missed communications, unfairness, and frustration” but agreed there “were better ways to resolve problems than the routes they had taken.” Galvin told them: “I can get you a chance, a new start, but that’s all. You have to do the rest.” They all did. (189-190)

After a battle in which several of his soldiers died, Galvin promised himself: “I would do my best to go to them and look them in the face, and let that moment register in my mind. Then I would know more about the cost of the decisions that I made.” (192) Over the next six months, twenty soldiers in his battalion were killed and fifty-four were wounded, relatively light casualties.

A surprise running through Galvin’s memoir is his concern with nuclear weapons, not something expected of infantry commanders. From the beginning, he was exposed to nuclear issues. As he rose in rank, that became all the more evident, especially in Europe. An intense experience as SACEUR was an exercise in 1989 intended, Galvin writes, “to make sure that all senior political and military leaders of the Alliance were familiar with what would happen in the event, far-fetched or not, that nuclear weapons might be employed.” (372) The outcome: “It opened our eyes, broadened our understanding, took away much of our posturing, changed our mechanical approaches, and broke through the group think that bound us.” (379)

When the Berlin Wall came tumbling down, Galvin was anxious to learn what Soviet units in East Berlin would do. An Air Force officer suggested asking a Soviet colonel in Berlin what he had heard. The Russian said: “We have orders to stay in barracks.” (391)
Even though the end of the Cold War set off a fundamental revision of NATO, General Galvin’s attention was soon turned to the Persian Gulf as the US and its allies prepared to drive Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi dictator, out of Kuwait. Leading US forces would be Central Command, with European Command in support. Galvin set a tone, telling his staff that whenever Central Command asked for something, “our answer will be ‘yes.’ The details can come later, but the answer is always yes.” (405)

The Accidental Admiral: A Sailor Takes Command at NATO
By ADM James Stavridis, USN (Ret.)

Reviewed by Nathan K. Finney, US Army Strategist, founder and managing editor of The Bridge, an online publication focused on policy, strategy, and military affairs

In Accidental Admiral, ADM James Stavridis weaves personal narrative, recent historical events, and senior-level recommendations into a fairly compelling story about the first naval officer to simultaneously lead European Command and the military elements of NATO. One of the most prolific and recognizable senior leaders in the military, ADM Stavridis turns his formidable knowledge of recent conflicts into an informative account of the types of issues the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) must manage, as well as management principles he used to address them.

Accidental Admiral is written for a general audience, covering basic issues of military organization and the life of those serve in uniform. For the reader well-versed in the military, such as those reading Parameters, these details weigh down the first two chapters, in which Stavridis sets the stage for his rise to SACEUR and the dynamics he found at NATO. Of interest, however, was his description of his job as SACEUR, namely, he was the organization’s operations officer; the basics of the job he likened to those he learned as the operations officer on a Navy ship many years before. The process typified NATO’s production of best military advice Stavridis described – series of meetings of “two hundred-plus committees that meet in [NATO’s] endless and ultimately self-defeating search for ‘consensus’” – was fairly reminiscent of any military organization’s operations process.

Once Stavridis turns to the regional issues afflicting his time at NATO, however, he hits his stride. The core areas run the gamut of those experienced by many who served in uniform for the last decade-plus, from Afghanistan to Libya (both out-of-sector missions for EUCOM and NATO, but because they were NATO-led, the SACEUR was a key stakeholder in the efforts), Syria and Israel to Russia and the Balkans. In these chapters, Stavridis’ narrative arc peaks, addressing the most important issues in Europe and those associated with NATO.

Of most interest to me was Stavridis’ use of Libya and Syria as discussion points on the value (or dangers, as the case may be) of intervention by foreign military forces in failed countries around the world. In the case of Libya, in which Stavridis was intimately involved, the near-term tactical and operational successes led him to provide possible lessons to be applied elsewhere, with the caveat that all interventions are “dangerous, politically and militarily risky, and hard to justify under
international law.” These lessons include a pressing humanitarian need demands intervention must be considered; interventions should be a coalition affair; an understanding of the culture and region is crucial – and more importantly, acting in a way which doesn’t exacerbate said cultures; casualties must be minimized; it will be expensive; and enablers like lawyers, strategic communications, and public affairs are crucial to accurately portray the event. Stavridis summed up the political and moral ambiguity of interventions with a very pith quote, “in the case of intervention, as in that of revolution, its essence is illegality and its justification is its success.” How should this be applied to the current strategic context? Stavridis leaves that question unanswered.

The latter half of the book is a smattering of personal stories on leadership (including more famous military scandals during his time at NATO (namely McChrystal as the “Runaway General,” Petraeus’ personal indiscretions, Allen’s lack of wrongdoing, and even Stavridis’ own travel mistakes), recommended “tricks of the trade” for leaders, and the importance of innovation and diminishing need for strategic planning in Stavridis’ career. I was very gratified to see he addressed not only the leadership issues of those around him – which most well-read individuals will be already familiar with – but also the items he was accused of ultimately derailed his chances at being the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Stavridis handles the bureaucratic mess with what seems equal parts genuine regret at how it happened and acceptance for the way it turned out.

The two best chapters in Accidental Admiral, and those of most value to those serving and supporting the military today, are chapters 12 and 15 on strategic planning and “convergence” (or “What Keeps Me Awake at Night”), respectively. The former is a wonderful discussion by a well-experienced practitioner, in the staff and command roles, on the difficulties, and the ineffectiveness, of strategic planning in contemporary times. As you would expect from a walking library, Stavridis uses myths from Greek literature to describe the difficulties of long range planning in a dynamic age – including Tantalus, Sisyphus, and Prometheus – which admirably provide the necessary visual images of not quite being able to reach the desire goal, consistently pushing the rock uphill, and being subjected to eternal torment for doing the right thing. The point of these images in reference to traditional strategic planning for Stavridis is:

The pursuit of perfection, the potential for sudden catastrophic change, and the ill effects of forced transparency…made strategic planning in this brave new world grueling, frustrating, unending, and of less use than it once was.

For Stavridis, strategic planning should be much more like directing ships at sea (or troops on the battlefield) – there should be strategic guidance detailing the broad goals for five to ten years, then detailed annual planning based on this guidance. What he doesn’t cover is exactly how this would be done…or how, other than possibly being less bureaucratic, this new strategic planning could be implemented. How would this new approach be governed in a way would transcending the overly bureaucratic system we have today?

Finally, Stavridis addresses the item keeping him awake at night – convergence. This is the idea where the “sum of the danger…is far
greater than the individual threat posed by each alone.” According to Stavridis, the convergence of threats like non-state actors, cyber warfare, and weapons of mass destruction, while much less likely than each alone, would be devastating to the United States (and her allies).

Overall, _Accidental Admiral_ is a quick and entertaining read. If readers of _Parameters_ are unfamiliar with ADM Stavridis’ time as SACEUR, I recommend this book as a solid starting point for those new to the conversation about some of our most salient global issues. His chapters on leadership, strategic communications, and innovation are also useful words for all military leaders.

**Alvin York: A New Biography of the Hero of the Argonne**

By Douglas V. Mastriano

Reviewed by Lt Col Mark E. Grotelueschen, USAF, PhD, Associate Professor of History. Chief, Military History Division, Department of History, USAF Academy

The prolific English writer, journalist, and historian GK Chesterton once wrote, “Religious liberty might be supposed to mean that everybody is free to discuss religion. In practice it means that hardly anybody is allowed to mention it.” Although each person is entitled to his or her own opinion about this assertion as it applies to general society, all scholars should be concerned if it suggests historians should shy away from discussing religion and spirituality when it must be addressed. In this thorough biography of Alvin York, the American hero of the Great War and Medal of Honor recipient, Douglas Mastriano avoids that mistake and allows the role and significance of York’s devout Christianity to take center stage, which is almost certainly the way York and those who knew him best would have wanted his story told.

According to Mastriano, York’s faith is the critical thread in his life’s tapestry, and a knowledge of his religious beliefs and his spiritually motivated actions are as essential to understanding York the soldier and veteran as they are to understanding York the conscientious objector. Mastriano offers compelling evidence in support of this approach. The fact that York’s faith and behavior—characterized by hard work, humility, kindness, generosity, selflessness, and extraordinary moral and physical courage—often seems too good to be true probably says more about us and our biases than it does about York.

Mastriano moves through York’s life in a traditional, chronological way, covering his pre-conversion years as a rowdy bar-hopping troublemaker, his Christian conversion in 1915, which dramatically changed his behavior, his failed efforts to receive an exemption based on personal pacifist convictions, and his change of heart on this matter after his company and battalion commanders convinced him that the Bible did not prohibit Christians from fighting in a just war (which they believed the war with Germany was). The story continues with descriptions of York’s general competence as a soldier in training, both in the United States and in France, and York’s initiation into combat in “quiet” sectors of the Western Front. As expected, the book thoroughly describes and examines York’s amazing—he and others would
say miraculous—actions in the Argonne on 8 October 1918, when he led a small group of comrades around the flank of a German strongpoint and knocked it out by capturing 132 enemy soldiers and killing a number of others. While York’s conversion to Christianity was the fulcrum of his personal life, this combat success changed his public life beyond all recognition, making him arguably the most famous common soldier of the twentieth century.

For Mastriano, York’s superb skill with firearms, his phenomenal bravery and cool-headedness, and his very survival are all best understood as an outgrowth of his extraordinary religious life and character. But so too was what happened immediately after: York asked for permission to go back and look for the wounded directly after he turned over his prisoners. He also made no mention of his accomplishments to family and friends, refused offers to parlay his new-found fame into lucrative business deals back in the United States, and ultimately devoted his own life to improve the lives of his neighbors by working to bring roads and schools into his impoverished and neglected valley near Pall Mall, Tennessee. Only when he was convinced the telling of his story would help his nation understand the threats from Germany and Japan in 1940—and the proceeds would bring resources to his valley—did he finally agree to cooperate on a film about his life (Sergeant York, with Gary Cooper starring as York). It really is a remarkable story of human development and virtue, and Mastriano tells it well.

In addition to more fully integrating York’s faith into the story of his life as a soldier and veteran, this exhaustively researched biography gives readers the most detailed account of what happened in the Argonne in early October 1918 and exactly where in that hilly, tangled, disorienting forest York and his fellow doughboys accomplished their incredible martial feat. Mastriano’s extensive use of US Army records, German sources, archeological fieldwork, and ballistic analyses enabled him to confirm the exact location of York’s engagement. Additionally, the research that led to Mastriano’s book also contributed to the creation of the Sergeant York Historical Trail in the Argonne, which can be walked today to understand better the location of the event (this reviewer had the privilege of enjoying the trail in the fall of 2011).

Scholars of the Great War, and especially of the US Army’s experience in it, will benefit from discussions of York’s unit’s training regimen; the descriptions of small-unit battle in the Meuse-Argonne; and the clear explanation of the connections between York’s attack and the giant battle’s other most famous tale—that of the so-called “Lost Battalion.” It also provides evidence for the German Army’s continued effectiveness as a combat force as late as mid-October; like many other AEF units in the Meuse-Argonne, York’s regiment suffered severely in attacks both before and after the 8 October event. This book is invaluable to both the general reader and the scholar.
The author, US Navy Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, has done a commendable job translating General Mohamed Fawzi’s memoirs (published in Arabic in 1984), first for the US Army’s Infantry Magazine and later for this book. As an American of Egyptian background, he provides important cultural insights into Fawzi’s thinking and places the memoirs in the broader context of the 1967 Arab-Israel War and its aftermath. That war, which was a disaster not only for Egypt but also for Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinians, had profound consequences for the region. Many social scientists see it as the death knell of pan-Arab nationalism, contributing to the rise of political Islam. Of equal importance is how the defeat led military leaders like Fawzi (appointed as war minister by Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser) to restructure and rebuild demoralized Egyptian armed forces and turn them into an effective fighting force that would eventually score some impressive victories in the initial stages of the 1973 war.

Fawzi, a career military officer and a political ally of Nasser, is very candid about the problems facing the Egyptian military through the 1967 war. He was, for a time, Army Chief of Staff under Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, and explains how Amer’s aggrandizement of power and his neglect of the army’s training hurt the military’s effectiveness. Fawzi gives a first-hand account of Amer’s instability during the 1967 war when he impulsively ordered a full-scale retreat of Egyptian forces from the Sinai, without any planning, which led to chaos and the capture of thousands of Egyptian soldiers by the Israelis.

The memoirs provide a fascinating look into the “War of Attrition” (1967-1970) and the massive influx of Soviet military hardware and thousands of Soviet military advisors into Egypt. Fawzi explains how this Soviet assistance, plus extensive training of Egyptian military personnel, were able to challenge Israel’s air supremacy (particularly with the deployment of SAM sites) and help to build Egyptian military morale. He also shows how the superpowers used the “War of Attrition” to test the effectiveness of their weapons systems (the US-supplied Israelis versus the Soviet-supplied Egyptians). Lacking from Fawzi’s memoirs is any reflection on how Egypt’s dependence on the Soviets may have compromised Egypt’s independence. The presence of Soviet advisers eventually became highly controversial in Egypt, and Sadat ordered their expulsion in 1972. Fawzi was arrested by Sadat the previous year for his involvement in the attempted coup led by Ali Sabry. This leaves the reader to ponder whether Fawzi himself was pro-Soviet despite his nationalist credentials.

Unfortunately, the book contains only minimal direct excerpts from Fawzi’s writings. Instead, Aboul-Enein summarizes these writings for the reader and adds historical and political context to them. For the non-specialist, this style may be useful (and a direct translation would
probably be overwhelming), but for the specialist, it leaves the reader wanting to hear more from Fawzi directly.

There are a few mistakes in the book that should be corrected in any new edition. For example, on page 11, Aboul-Enein writes Egyptian military leaders deployed a tank regiment to Iraq in 1961 to aid Iraq’s efforts against the British in Kuwait, whereas Egypt deployed troops to Kuwait in 1961 to protect it against Iraq in large part because Nasser had become a bitter enemy of Iraqi leader Qasim. And on page 147, he writes that civil-military relations in Egypt in May 2012 “entered a critical phase with more fundamentalist Salafi groups challenging the armed forces, leading to hundreds of casualties,” whereas that month was the time of the first-round of the presidential elections and was less violent than other post-2011 periods.

Ashley’s War: The Untold Story of a Team of Women Soldiers on the Special Ops Battlefield

By Gayle Tzemach Lemmon

Reviewed by Ellen Haring, Colonel (USA, ret.)

Ashley’s War is destined to be the first women’s war story in the classic tradition of action, adventure war stories. 20th Century Fox has already purchased the film rights and Reese Witherspoon is listed as a cast member. The story chronicles one of the first groups of service-women to volunteer for special operations missions in Afghanistan. Most Americans, indeed many servicemembers are completely unaware of the selection program, the training, and the missions these women were involved in as early as 2010.

The story follows First Lieutenant Ashley White, an unassuming force of nature whose physical abilities amazed many battle tested soldiers, on her journey to the battlefield of Afghanistan. It reveals the heart wrenching struggle she has getting her husband to accept her decision and how she hides her work from her twin sister and her parents. Lemmon gives the reader an insider’s view of the team of “Alpha” women Ashley joined as it went through the rigorous Cultural Support Team selection and training program, dubbed 100 hours of hell, and eventually on direct-action night raids with Army Rangers. She examines the fear common to all soldiers when confronted with combat but more crucially the added, self-imposed burden these women experienced by their intense desire to prove women would not just succeed at this work, but would improve mission success.

As a story about the first women soldiers imbedded in elite ground combat units the story succeeds brilliantly. However, Lemmon misses an opportunity to delve into deeper issues surrounding the military’s involvement in Afghanistan and its own treatment of servicewomen. What the book fails to do is to examine the role these women played in the overall conflict or the irony behind the Special Operations community’s need to create this unique program.

After ten years of conflict in Afghanistan, the US military was casting about for new ways to reach the population in its never ending
quest to “win hearts and minds.” A number of groups, including Army civil affairs units as well as development and aide organizations had long recognized the subtle but important role women play in Afghan society. And, they knew Afghan women were not predisposed to support the Taliban. These groups had been engaging with Afghan women for years. Additionally, many support units, especially military police and intelligence units had long used their own servicewomen to search and question Afghan women. But the combat units and leaders who dominated all of the primary decision-making positions in the theater had failed to grasp the role women, from both sides, might play in the conflict.

The only reason the Cultural Support Team, (the incongruent name given to the initiative) was necessary was because the United States had no women in the combat arms community, due in large part to its obstinate rejection of servicewomen as equal partners.

But rather than highlight or even acknowledge these shortcomings in policy, strategy, and operations, Lemmon portrays the special operations community as one of innovative, critical, and creative thinkers who came up with new approaches to counterinsurgency operations. Ironically, when they finally realized the potentially important partner they had missed in Afghan women, they found their own discriminatory policies limited their tactical options for engaging with them.

Finally, and perhaps more importantly, instead of using US servicewomen in any new or truly innovative capacity they simply recruited female versions of themselves for their teams only to task them to play a stereotypically feminine support role. They thought having women on the team would not just allow them to search and question Afghan women and children but would also ease the impact of invading Afghan homes and communities.

However, it was unrealistic to think just because servicewoman were involved in direct-action night raids that residents were going to be any less traumatized by having their homes and communities raided. For a young Afghan boy or girl who has his or her home raided in the middle of the night, and has an uncle or father seized in the dark by Americans, no amount of young American servicewomen on the raid team would have made them any less fearful, or angry, or hate-filled.

Despite the book’s shortcomings, it is a timely story since the Army is considering opening all combat specialties and units to women. *Ashley’s War* is the first war story of women heroes from the last decade of war. Every young woman who has ever aspired to being a war hero will want to read *Ashley’s War*. 
The Longest Afternoon: The 400 Men Who Decided the Battle of Waterloo
By Brendan Simms

Reviewed by Dr. James D. Scudieri, Research Analyst, US Army Heritage and Education Center (AHEC), US Army War College

This latest work on the Battle of Waterloo on June 18, 1815 concerns the defense of the farm at La Haye Sainte by the Second Light Battalion, King’s German Legion (2nd Lt Bn, KGL), under the command of Maj. George Baring at the time. This unit used the Baker Rifle, already made famous by the 95th Foot (Rifle Corps) with three battalions in the battle, but also wielded by the Fifth Battalion, Sixtieth Foot (5/60th), not at Waterloo. Simms has conducted admirable research to portray as complete a picture as possible, tapping into British, German, and French sources. The use of official Hanoverian material is especially refreshing.

Chapter 1 sets the stage for the campaign and the events of the previous two days. There is a detailed explanation of the layout of the famous farmhouse, which stood forward of the middle of the Allied position, on the west side of the main road to Waterloo and Brussels. Chapter 2 describes the characteristics of the KGL not simply as a foreign unit in British service, but as an element of the British Army. Chapter 3 begins the events of June 18. Simms notes Baring’s commanders, at every level, did not give La Haye Sainte “any great thought” on that day. The logistical failure of their ammunition resupply is still a topic of debate.

Chapters 4 through 6 supply blow-by-blow accounts of the soon desperate defense. The extensive research in Hanoverian sources pays rich dividends here, juxtaposed with British and some French views. Simms includes adjacent actions, especially noting the contributions of friendly, supporting units. The battle started on the extreme Allied right, around 11:30 AM, at the much larger chateau of Hougoumont. The large French assault by d’Erlon’s I Corps, from about 1:30 PM, on the Allied left also targeted La Haye. The KGL riflemen repelled several attacks, but lost some of the farm’s environs. Ultimately, Baring decided to withdraw his survivors around 6:00 PM as the unit exhausted its ammunition without any resupply.

Chapter 7 articulates the book’s thesis that the prolonged defense of La Haye Sainte by 2nd Lt Bn, KGL was the key to the battle. Earlier French capture would have provided the opportunity to smash a weakened Allied center. Simms further states both Napoleon and the Duke of Wellington failed to appreciate its importance.

The final chapter covers the aftermath of the unit and men during the peace, an interesting case study in the post-war fate of veterans. Their stories of the battle and the emerging historiography were more complicated for the KGL after they returned to Hanover. The accomplishments of German troops in British service in the midst of a new German nationalism and unification became complex issues.
The major issue is the thesis embodied in the subtitle: the 2nd Lt Bn of the KGL in effect won the Battle of Waterloo due to its prolonged, stubborn defense. Simms presents a reasonable case, but numerous questions remain. Space precludes a detailed discussion of tactical aspects, to include the speculation had La Haye Sainte fallen much earlier in the day. Moreover, rather than propose other possible turning points, this review emphasizes the specific sequence of certain key events, which in combination resulted in French defeat.

Perhaps the greatest credit belongs to the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Blücher. They understood coalition cooperation was critical, however tentative their commitment to it was. Napoleon had delayed the start of battle to allow more time for the ground to dry for the benefit of his artillery fire; in retrospect he used time he did not have.

The late morning, excessive French dissipation against Hougoumont; the failure of d’Erlon’s initial attack; French Marshal Ney’s premature cavalry attacks; and the late capture of La Haye Sainte formed an important sequence. The Prussians had first appeared about 4:00 PM. They had been fighting at Plancenoit, less than a mile from Napoleon’s headquarters at La Belle Alliance on the road to Brussels, since 5:00 AM. Furious French counterattacks, ultimately by elements of the Old Guard, stabilized the situation temporarily—when Ney sought infantry reinforcements to exploit the capture of La Haye Sainte. The assault by elements of the vaunted Imperial Guard around 7:00 PM, whose immediate British opponents was too late—and failed. The Grande Armée of 1815 could not deal with such a failure. Moreover, by the late afternoon and evening of June 18 over 72,000 Prussians had marched to Wellington’s aid.

The Longest Afternoon is a superb case study. Simms’ meticulous research has enriched the Waterloo literature with this detailed examination of one unit’s determined fight. Whatever the decisiveness of the actions of the 2nd Light Battalion, at La Haye Sainte, of no doubt is the saying “Soldiers make a difference.”

Before Jutland: The Naval War in Northern European Waters, August 1914-February 1915
By James Goldrick

Reviewed by Larry A. Grant, CDR USN (ret.), Research Associate at The Citadel Oral History Program and Adjunct Professor, Charleston, SC

Before Jutland: The Naval War in Northern European Waters, August 1914-February 1915 grew out of a project recommended to Goldrick by naval historian Stephen Roskill. Goldrick first published his work on the opening months of the First World War North Sea naval confrontation in 1984. Now, a more sophisticated historical understanding of the pre-1914 period led him to revisit it for this edition. Goldrick also cites another reason for updating his 1984 book; he says he grew up between the first edition and this latest. Each of these factors combined to change his outlook on the subject.

Before Jutland is arranged in seventeen chapters, and roughly the first third of them present useful background material. “The Beginning”
provides a summary of the events leading to mobilization. It offers a snapshot of the condition of the principal northern fleets as they set aside their peacetime summer pursuits. The Grand Fleet’s movement to Scapa Flow and the Germans’ retreat from their summer port visits is traced during the few short weeks in July 1914 as civilian and naval leadership came to realize that war was imminent.

Three subsequent chapters introduce the players. Goldrick examines British staff issues, technological challenges, leadership, wardroom and lower decks cultures, and the state of the fleet. His review of the German navy reminds readers that many of the men responsible for its modern existence and rapid expansion—Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz and Kaiser Wilhelm II—were still in authority. Goldrick reviews the status of the Admiralstab, the officer corps, and the lower-deck sailors, and touches briefly on naval legislation and German technology.

The Russian navy rarely features in First World War naval histories, but given its position in the eastern Baltic Sea, Germany could not afford to ignore even a weak Russian navy at its back while it dealt with the British threat in the west. Goldrick reviews the state of Russia’s force in the Baltic and the country’s rebuilding efforts following the disastrous Russo-Japanese War. He also notes various obstacles, including a population that produced very few candidates suited to service in a modern navy.

Following a short summary of the war plans of the three nations, Goldrick shifts to a more traditional naval-war-at-sea narrative for the last half of the book, beginning with the August 5th sinking of the German minelayer, Königin Luise, by HMS Amphion and continuing through the battle of the Dogger Bank on January 24th, 1915. The larger engagements are well presented with good maps illustrating the movements of the ships involved, and Goldrick uses the lessons learned during those encounters as a basis for his penultimate chapter, “Seeking New Solutions,” before closing with a brief conclusion.

Before Jutland is both enlightening, particularly in its discussion of “Operational Challenges,” and entertaining in its narrative of the events during the various engagements. Anyone interested in naval history will find Goldrick’s work valuable. They would do well to heed the advice he gives in the last line of his introduction: “Now read on.” They will be glad they did so.
Leadership

Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World
By General Stanley McChrystal, with Tantum Collins, David Silverman, and Chris Fussell

Reviewed by MAJ Jason Howk, (USA, ret.) author of A Case Study in Security Sector Reform

Team of Teams offers insights into the modern practice of leadership and management required to navigate and succeed in this complex world. The book is not a military history, but instead a concise and exceptionally engaging collection of insightful ideas told through entertaining stories ranging from industry to hospital emergency rooms. I recommend it for leaders and associates from all types of organizations who need to break down the effects of siloed teams in which information flow and decision making is ineffective in today’s increasingly complex environment. If you are working your teams harder and putting more resources against a problem that isn’t improving, read this book and be prepared to look closely in the mirror.

The discussions in the book are grounded in organizational management theory and leadership methods. This is not a book about the latest way to become a great leader. In fact, it is about becoming the kind of senior leader who can develop and sustain an entire workforce of great leaders.

I do not come at this review as a scholar of organizational management but rather as a participant and recipient of the Team of Teams approach in the military where I was a leader for over twenty years. General Stan McChrystal, along with his three co-authors, believes the world is now so complex (vice complicated) the old models of command and control are extinct. I have worked with some ninety American and international organizations and I cannot think of one that would not benefit from this study.

An alternate title to this book might have been Trust and Purpose Meets Empowered Execution. The Task Force’s journey towards shared consciousness and smart autonomy starts in 2003 with the commander’s stunning realization that it was losing the strategic war against Al Qaeda. From there, the authors interlace examples and case studies of organizational models, leadership techniques, and technological advances from a myriad of areas. These include weather forecasting, basketball and soccer, engineering marvels, big data, airline customer service, aircraft crews, NASA, SEAL training, plastic surgeons at the Boston Marathon bombing, GM versus Ford, MIT studies, and the enduring effects of Ritz Carlton and Nordstrom.

The discussions found in the various chapters of the book are wide-ranging but relevant to leading all organizations in this modern world. The following should be of interest to today’s leaders: the difference between complicated and complex environments; how having more information available does not improve prediction nor lead to smarter
decisions at the top; Taylorisms and efficiency ideals may actually cost more than they save; the “need to know” fallacy; the value of using your best people as “liaison officers” or “ embeds”; how resilient people make organizations stronger because they can adapt to changing environments; learning from your adversary is time well spent—they might have a better organizational model not necessarily better people; how to delegate authority to take action until you are uncomfortable; how to build trust and a shared awareness of the big picture; “eyes on, hands off” leadership.

Missing from the book is a deeper discussion on the role of planning, plans, strategic thinking and strategy. While the Team of Teams approach allows organizations to be adaptable and resilient there is still a key role for planning and strategy. Maybe it is as simple as the old adage, “the plan is nothing but planning is everything.”