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## Book Reviews

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# Book Reviews

## STRATEGY & POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

### **Military Responses to the Arab Uprisings and the Future of Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East**


By William C. Taylor

Reviewed by W. Andrew Terrill, PhD, Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

The actions of Arab military leadership were overwhelmingly important during the recent “Arab Spring” uprisings, though they receive less scrutiny than they deserve. The narratives of these struggles are usually dominated by imagery of young people standing up to regime police and hired thugs or outmaneuvering them with social media. These aspects of the uprisings are clearly more dramatic than military officers making careful calculations before choosing a side, but the latter activities were equally important to the outcomes of the crises. William C. Taylor has correspondingly helped to fill an important gap by considering the role of national militaries in the Arab uprisings. In particular, the military leadership of all these countries had to decide whether they would remain loyal to their governments or side with the protesters. Such high-stakes decisions were not always easy.

The case studies employed in this work are Tunisia, Syria, Egypt, and Libya. The author also occasionally mentions the unrest in Bahrain and Yemen, though these countries are not addressed in any comprehensive manner. Taylor’s work is enriched by his clear expertise on the history and structure of the Arab militaries central to his case studies. Sometimes the author’s major points get a bit lost in the details, but in general Taylor’s methodical approach allows one to understand a great deal about military decision-making in each country. This work uses the concepts of interests and restraints to help define military leadership behavior. Essentially, this means the military leaders had to define their corporate interests during the uprisings and then ask themselves what they were capable of doing to influence the outcome of the struggle. They then had to decide when and if they should take strong actions. No military leader wants to be out front of a revolution that fizzles, but neither do they wish to go down with an unpopular regime.

Unsurprisingly, Arab militaries did not respond uniformly to the crises in their countries. In Tunisia, where the first uprising broke out, the police and other security forces were the dictatorship’s first line of defense. The security units’ vanguard status allowed the military to remain on the sidelines while internal security forces struggled to defeat angry protestors, often using deadly force. Tunisia’s army, which had been treated poorly by the dictator, had little incentive to fight for the regime and carefully gauged the progress of the protestors in their struggle against the detested government. When Tunisian dictator Zein al Abidine Ben Ali finally ordered General Rashid Ammar, chief of the Tunisian Armed Forces, to support faltering regime loyalists, the general refused to do so and told the dictator that he was “finished.” This was checkmate, and Ben Ali quickly fled the country to seek asylum abroad. In the aftermath of the confrontation, the military dramatically improved



New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014

363 pages  
\$100.00

its position within Tunisia's leadership structure at the expense of the pampered and arrogant security forces. General Ammar was declared a hero of the revolution.

In Egypt, pre-revolutionary circumstances were dramatically different. The military had lost a great deal of its political influence, but this change did not mean it had given up its considerable economic assets across the country or its respected role in society. Nevertheless, many officers were at least somewhat unhappy with the regime and especially with the idea that President Mubarak was grooming his son, Gamal, to succeed him as president. Gamal had never served in the military and was often seen as the vehicle for extending the life of a failing government system that could not continue indefinitely. After the uprising spread to Egypt from Tunisia, Mubarak refused to rule out the possibility his son would run for president until almost the last minute when such promises were viewed as desperate and insincere. Neither Taylor nor any other author is likely to establish the precise role of Gamal's potential succession in pushing the military away from the regime, but it may have been highly significant. Taylor also notes the military remained neutral for quite some time, balancing statements about people's legitimate rights with assertions that looting and criminality would not be tolerated. When it became clear the protestors were gaining the upper hand and the army's inaction was threatening its interests, they decided to remove Mubarak.

If the Arab Spring's changes of governments in Tunisia and Egypt were relatively rapid and decisive, events occurred in an almost totally opposite manner in Syria. In the years prior to the Assad family rule, Syria was notoriously prone to military coups. This situation changed after 1970 when the first Assad regime (under the current president's father) began. Under both Assads, every effort was made to "coup proof" the regime, which ruled largely by fear and was structured to crush any internal revolt. When a March 2011 uprising occurred in Syria, the regime had both the tools and the will to respond with overwhelming brutality. In Syria, the military leadership was dominated by members of President Assad's Alawite religious minority who, displayed "fervent support for the regime policies," fearing unyielding revenge if their sect and its allies ever relinquished the levers of power. Spikes in government brutality led to new defections among Sunni soldiers, but enough of the military remained loyal, or intimidated, to prevent regime defeat. Although the Assad regime offered limited concessions to the protesters, it relied more heavily upon its security services and the military to implement a policy of unrestrained and indiscriminate use of force. The policies have so far allowed the regime to survive.

The Libyan military was different from the other armed services considered in Taylor's study due to its lack of cohesive leadership with a strong corporate identity. Taylor notes Libyan leader, Muammar Qadhafi, had previously faced a number of coup attempts and therefore treated the armed forces with tremendous distrust. Officers were retained and promoted almost entirely on the issue of loyalty and the ranks were filled with informants and "people's commissars." Libya maintained a deeply unprofessional and demoralized military that was starved of resources except for the elite units. Regime security was provided by the security services, African mercenaries, and elite military units often under the

command of Qadhafi family members. Thus when faced with a popular uprising against the regime the military fractured. Elite and mercenary units remained loyal to the dictator, while many within the neglected, non-elite forces eventually sided with the revolutionaries. Sometimes the non-elite forces remained non-committal until the revolutionaries seemed to have a good chance of overthrowing the dictator. The NATO decision to use airpower to support the revolutionaries naturally increased the willingness of waverers to commit to the rebels, ensuring Qadhafi's defeat and leading to his death.


The final two chapters in this work concern US and other Western efforts to influence Arab militaries through programs such as the International Military Training and Education Program (IMET). Taylor maintains that previous officer involvement with IMET, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and other interactions with Western militaries had almost no effect on Arab military decision-making during the uprisings. Likewise many leaders with long exposure to the West (including London-educated Bashar Assad) showed no inclination to favor democratic values during times of crisis. Taylor states IMET has value for a variety of reasons such as improving communications between US forces and other militaries, supporting coalition-building, and familiarizing allies and potential allies with US military doctrine, but not socializing foreign officers to American values to the point they based their most important decisions on such considerations. Rather, Arab officers in the Arab Spring acted primarily on the basis of cost-benefit considerations and corporate identity. Taylor further supports his conclusions with a limited amount of survey research of officers and soldiers who have participated in US-sponsored training and military education or other forms of exposure to the West. While his conclusion that military organizations act in their own interests is not very surprising, he usefully discredits views that Arab military cravings for US-style democracy were a key motivating force for their actions during the uprisings.

## **America's Challenges in the Greater Middle East: The Obama Administration's Policies**

Edited by Shahram Akbarzadeh

Reviewed by Colonel Robert E. Friedenber, Levant Division Chief, J-5, Deputy Directorate of Middle East, Joint Staff and former US Senior Defense Official and Defense Attaché to Syria.

President Barack Obama's speech in Cairo on June 4 2009 described seven sources of tension between the United States and the Islamic World. In an attempt to draw a distinction between his and the previous administration, he declared that extremism, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran, democracy, religious freedom, women's rights and economic development were mutual interests that must be addressed so Muslim countries and the United States to forge a new relationship after the 9/11 attacks and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Only two years later, democracy and economic development in the Middle East came to the forefront when a young fruit vendor in Tunisia set himself on fire to protest the lack of either in his country. His death set off a chain of



New York, NY: Palgrave  
McMillan, 2011

288 pages  
\$34.00

events that has impacted the Middle East more than any other single event since the fall of the Ottoman Empire.

President Obama's Cairo speech is a theme that winds its way through *America's Challenges in the Greater Middle East*. Every chapter, from Shahram Akbarzadeh's introduction, through those on Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel and Palestine, to the Maghreb, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan, all deal with President Obama's attempt to distance himself from the previous administration and to reestablish a positive relationship with the Islamic Middle East.

Unfortunately, the book was published in 2011, before two events that would shape the Obama administration's relationship with the Arab world: the aftermath of the so-called Arab Spring, and the attempt to re-draw America's relationship with Iran. From the vantage point of late 2014, this book is dated. The chapters on Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Egypt all go to great lengths to describe the folly of the Bush administration's attempt to force democracy on Arab governments – and Obama's attempts to walk Bush's "democracy-first" policy back and emphasize non-intervention in internal governance. The interventions in Libya, the post-Morsi Egypt policy, and in Iraq and Syria showed events in the Middle East continue to force the Obama administration to stay active in the region and engage these governments in their internal affairs.

Another theme running through the book is how the actions of the Bush administration resulted in a loss of US credibility with Arab governments and their populations. The Cairo speech was to be the first attempt to repair that credibility. It is true that Obama has not been as close to Israel as the previous two administrations, but his administration is seen by Arabs as ineffective in keeping Israel from building new settlements and prosecuting war on Palestinians. Additionally, Sunni Gulf States led by Saudi Arabia now believe the Obama administration may be abandoning them in pursuit of what they consider is an ill-advised détente with Iran.

Most of the book's chapters simply focus on criticizing the Bush administration and lauding Obama. Chapters on Saudi Arabia, Israel and Iran focus on Bush-era mistakes and hope for Obama's success. However, in other chapters, there is some diversity and insight. Written just after the fall of Mubarak, Michele Dunne's chapter on Egypt recognizes the military junta that replaced him is not the end of the story; "Egypt's transition will unfold over years, not months." A balanced chapter on Pakistan written by Touqir Hussain recognizes Pakistan is contributing to the fight against extremism but at the same time undermining it with its support of extremists in Afghanistan and India. William Maley's chapter on Afghanistan cautions against using the number of US troops on the ground as a metric for stability.


The danger of books written about this turbulent region is they can become obsolete very quickly. Many books written subsequent to *America's Challenges in the Greater Middle East* will be more relevant and insightful to those interested in US Middle East policy. But given everything that has transpired since the book was published, Akbarzadeh's introduction contains an extremely prescient paragraph. He writes that unlike Bush, Obama's approach is seeking not to implement change in the Middle East, but to manage the existing situation. Akbarzadeh then

wonders if such an approach “further undermines the United States’ standing in the Middle East.” Given the frustration apparent from many Middle Eastern governments over the Obama administration’s lack of action against the Assad regime in Syria and its halting intervention against the Islamic State in Iraq, one wonders if in some corners of the region, there is a wistful longing for the interventionist days of his predecessor.

## STRATEGY &amp; NUCLEAR WAR

**The Permanent Crisis: Iran's Nuclear Trajectory**

By Shashank Joshi

Reviewed by Christopher J. Bolan, PhD, Professor of National Security Studies,  
US Army War College

Whitehall, London, UK:  
Royal United Services  
Institute, 2012  
160 pages  
\$25.00

The author is a young and talented scholar writing from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London. This relatively brief and clearly written analysis does an admirable job of placing Iran's nuclear activities into a broader regional and historic context, which is useful background for anyone interested in making informed judgments about the way ahead for US policy. This book has the added advantage of being organized into stand-alone chapters enabling readers to consume its insights offered efficiently.

The first substantive section “How We Got Here, and Where We Stand” ably summarizes the historical context informing and influencing contemporary policy debates over how best to deal with Iran's growing nuclear capabilities. Those familiar with this history can skim or skip this chapter entirely, but newcomers will benefit tremendously from this background. Particularly relevant is his examination of at least a “partial convergence of American and Iranian interests” on regional issues in the immediate wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Perhaps surprising for many, Shashank notes the degree of active US-Iranian cooperation in these early days of the war against terrorism. The Iranian military was actively supporting the efforts of both the CIA and US Special Forces to supply the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Iranian diplomats facilitated successful US negotiations leading to the Bonn Agreement in 2001, and the establishment of a transitional national government in Afghanistan. Moreover, Iranian officials had gone so far as to extend an offer “to work under US command to assist in building the Afghan National Army.” US policymakers debating Iran policy should remember the United States and Iran continue to share many of these same interests today in battling violent Sunni extremist groups and in fostering stability in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Shashank also correctly observes prospects for building on these limited successes virtually collapsed with President George W. Bush's inclusion of Iran in his “axis of evil” reference in his 2002 State of the Union Address and the subsequent US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Shashank also astutely tracks domestic political developments remarking the rise of increasingly conservative elements in both Tehran (Ahmadinejad) and Washington (neoconservatives) served to heighten “mutual US-Iranian threat perceptions” and seriously undermined prospects for a negotiated solution. He also notes these trends have more recently reversed with the election of President Obama and President Rouhani. Both have expressed their determination to explore a negotiated solution over the extent of Iran's nuclear programs.

The next chapter, “Policy Today,” charts the evolving negotiating positions of the Western powers and Iran. Although many “experts”

might be tempted to ignore this fairly uncontentious history, Shashank offers some discerning reminders useful for contemporary policymakers. In particular, he tracks the relative weakening of Western negotiating positions over time. He notes the West has long insisted on the unrealistic goal of eliminating all Iranian enrichment activities. In the absence of a negotiated solution, however, Iran has proceeded with the creation of new “facts on the ground,” adding to its existing nuclear capabilities and effectively providing “new areas of bargaining leverage.” Shashank also briefly covers the risks of a strategy reliant on military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities – the obvious alternative should a strategy grounded in sanctions or negotiations fail. More importantly though he makes a strong case for defining the essential objectives of a negotiated solution from a Western perspective, namely, extending the potential breakout time for an Iranian nuclear weapon and strengthen the international inspections regime in Iran.

The third major chapter, “The Implications of a Nuclear Iran,” should be read by novice and expert alike. Here Shashank is at his best in carefully examining contrasting viewpoints of the potential dangers of a nuclear-armed Iran while downplaying some of the more alarmist concerns. For example, he convincingly dismisses arguments that Iran is an irrational actor. He explains Iranian leaders are subject to traditional cost-benefit calculations which means even a nuclear-armed Iran could be effectively constrained by more traditional strategies of containment and deterrence. He examines the broader history of nuclear proliferation in Asia and concludes an Iranian nuclear weapons capability need not necessarily spur further regional proliferation. He also persuasively argues nuclear weapons will have only limited utility to leaders in Tehran – primarily as a deterrent to foreign military interventions aimed at regime change. Finally, he suggests US policymakers would be wise to begin working with Iran now to strengthen nuclear safety mechanisms. Effective controls over these nuclear-related activities will serve both Western and Iranian interests even should Iran eventually develop a nuclear weapon.

The most significant shortfall of this book is the 2012 copyright. Readers will have to refer to newspaper accounts and recent think-tank papers to fill in the gap covering important developments since then.

## On Limited Nuclear War In the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

By Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kerry M. Kartchner, editors

Reviewed by Rebecca Davis Gibbons, PhD candidate in International Relations at Georgetown University

Consider for a moment that in 2015 a single nuclear weapon has just been detonated in anger. Where did the explosion occur? What actors were involved? What was the goal of such a limited use of nuclear arms? Was this a demonstration shot, a limited counterforce strike, or perhaps an attack intended to terminate a conventional conflict?

The twelve authors in the volume *On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century*, edited by Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kerry M. Kartchner, want policy-makers to consider and plan for such possibilities. With increasing



Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014

312 pages  
\$27.95



tensions and opportunities for miscalculation in the South China Sea, a growing North Korean arsenal, unclear Iranian intentions surrounding nuclear weapons, and President Vladimir Putin posting video of himself practicing the launch of Russian strategic forces on YouTube, the authors are correct to argue that the likelihood of nuclear use may be increasing.

In his foreword to the book, the late Nobel-prize winner Thomas Schelling praises this effort to encourage deeper thinking about nuclear use in the present day: “This book is the only one I know that can induce national leaders, or their advisers, to take seriously the prospect of minimizing mutual damage in a nuclear war.”

In twelve distinct and diverse chapters, the authors consider the theory, practice, and implications of limited nuclear war. In contrast to the all-out nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union feared during the Cold War, limited war is defined by the authors as nuclear conflict restrained along one or more of five possible dimensions: numbers of nuclear weapons used, scope of the area affected, the duration of use, political objectives of use, and the targeting plan.

The volume is divided into three sections. The first, “Assessing the History of the Cold War,” examines the history and theory of limited war from the Cold War to the present. Those seeking to examine the chapters focused especially on the concept of limited war should read Andrew Ross’s comprehensive chapter on limited war theory in this section.

The second section, “Managing the Risk of Nuclear War in the 21st Century,” provides considerations for how limited nuclear war could occur today. Paul Bernstein summarizes the capabilities and interests of actors most likely to be involved in future nuclear war, while Thomas Mahnken provides five scenarios for potential future limited nuclear use. Such scenario-based thinking surrounding limited war is needed, but any grouping of five potential scenarios risks being both too narrow and far-fetched to readers. Instead, this middle section could have been improved with a chapter exclusively focused on the various theoretical bases for how nuclear weapons might come to be used in the future and then adding accompanying real-life scenarios for each theory. Theories of use are interspersed throughout the book (e.g., demonstration shots in crisis, use for war termination, etc.) but a chapter dedicated to defining a typology of employment would have been helpful for considering the scope of possible use and policy-options for addressing such contingencies.

This middle section also includes a chapter by George Quester on the nuclear taboo and how the sixty-five-year pattern of non-use could be disrupted. Quester touches on the need for the United States to consider how to reestablish this pattern, or tradition, after nuclear use. Greater consideration of this topic would also benefit US policy-makers. After an instance of nuclear use the United States and its allies will have to think quickly through how to ensure the initial nuclear use is not perceived as beneficial for the attacker. In other words, how will the United States work to send the message that nuclear use does not pay? This question is also one in which scenario planning would be beneficial.

The final section, “Confronting the Challenges of Nuclear War in the 21st Century,” includes a useful chapter in which Bruce Blair provides a net assessment of US capabilities for engaging in a limited nuclear war, noting areas where US capabilities may need to adapt.

Although there are many well-researched and thought-provoking chapters in this volume, a complete reading of the entire volume will provide the reader with a valuable tutorial on a breadth of topics related to limited nuclear use. Most importantly, perhaps, the book instills an appreciation of the great and sometimes contradictory nuclear challenges facing the United States today: reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in a world where the relevance is increasing for some actors, while maintaining a nuclear arsenal credible to allies and adversaries alike.

### **Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon**

By Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, editors

Reviewed by Bradley A. Thayer, University of Iceland/Háskóla Íslands

Once in a while a work comes along that is a pleasure to review due to the importance of its argument. Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes have brought together an essential collection of essays centered on the consequences of nuclear proliferation, with an emphasis on East and South Asia. The work makes two broad arguments. First, the world has entered what Paul Bracken termed the “Second Nuclear Age,” where proliferation has moved beyond the transatlantic environment to Asia. While there are similarities with deterrence during the Cold War, this second age promises greater complexity due to the proliferation of nuclear weapons to more states, and to the connection between nuclear weapons and the power and ambition of states in East and South Asia. Second, the authors evaluate how the Second Nuclear Age impacts the nuclear strategies of China, India, Iran, Japan, North Korea, Pakistan, and South Africa. Here is where the book makes a detailed, thoughtful, and significant contribution.

In this short review, it is not possible to give each chapter the attention deserved. Readers may be assured all chapters are well executed and insightful. Given constraints, I will only consider two. The first is by Christopher Yeaw, Andrew Erickson, and Michael Chase on China’s strategic doctrine. This chapter well captures the evolution of Chinese nuclear strategy from the Maoist period until today. In a masterful analysis, the authors consider Chinese nuclear doctrine and the growth in the Chinese arsenal. They argue, first, that China is moving away from a “minimum deterrence” posture that defined its strategy since 1964. Beijing is moving toward a larger, more diverse second-strike posture and one in which the nuclear deterrence mission is incorporated with conventional missile force strike operations. Second, this posture is a cause of great concern in Asia and to the United States and could lead to instability in a confrontation with the United States. This is because Chinese thought on crisis behavior may promote risky and dangerous actions. In this respect, a danger faced in the Cold War might be worse




Washington, DC:  
Georgetown University  
Press, 2012

256 pages  
\$32.95

today because the actions China takes to deter might cause escalation. The chapter is concise but rich in evaluation of China's strategic forces, doctrine and training; hence it should inform analyses of China's strategic direction.

The second chapter is by the editors themselves. Holmes and Yoshihara advance a useful thought experiment on why and how Japan would go nuclear. While this concern was important in the "First Nuclear Age," is has greater resonance in the "Second." This change is due to the growth in Chinese power and its consequences, particularly for power projection. For Tokyo, this possibility means thinking through the "day after Taiwan." It is also due to the reduced US conventional force structure in the region, particularly regarding the size of the Pacific fleet. While Holmes and Yoshihara do not see a nuclear Japan as especially likely, they first review possible Japanese motives to do so; second, the prospect of Japanese "nuclear hedging;" third, the technical feasibility of a rapid Japanese breakout; fourth, they review possible force structures and strategies available to Japan before considering an agenda for future research. One of their most insightful conclusions is if Japan were to acquire nuclear weapons, it would likely do so in slow motion. The chapter is a model of a policy-relevant thought experiment.

The study is well balanced and the authors cover their topics concisely. Yoshihara and Holmes' conclusions neatly underscore the importance of strategy and many of the dangers faced by the United States and the other parties in the region. The study is an excellent contribution and will remain as a useful prism through which to understanding nuclear proliferation, its consequences, and nuclear developments in South and East Asia.



Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2014  
291 pages  
\$30.00

## **Unmaking the Bomb: A Fissile Material Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation**

By Harold A. Feiveson, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, and Frank N. Von Hippel

Reviewed by Ward Wilson, award winning writer and scholar, director of the Rethinking Nuclear Weapons project, and a Senior Fellow at British American Security Information Council (BASIS)

*Unmaking the Bomb* is a book by renowned experts that ably summarizes the current situation with respect to fissile materials and suggests practical steps to "unmaking" the bomb and ensuring that it stays unmade.

Dwight D. Eisenhower believed a nation's industrial capacity was the key to victory in war.

The faculty of the Army War College—many of them veterans of the Great War—drummed this basic point into the heads of Eisenhower and his classmates. 'War today involves the whole nation', they emphasized. Most fundamental, military power is ultimately the reflection of a nation's industrial mobilization potential.<sup>1</sup>

1 Andrew P. N. Erdmann, "War No Longer Has Any Logic Whatever: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Thernonuclear Revolution," in *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945* by John Gaddis, Philip Gordon, Ernest May, and Jonathan Rosenberg.

A state's capacity to make war is of strategic significance. The army of the United States may have been small in 1939 (just behind Portugal), but that did not reflect the United States' actual strength. Once war began, the United States military became one of the pre-eminent fighting machines of the 20th century.

The authors of *Unmaking the Bomb* share a similar outlook with Eisenhower when looking at the problem of nuclear weapons. They see capacity as the crucial element in the problem, rather than numbers. Disarmament has often involved obsessing over how many nuclear missiles and nuclear warheads are in active service. Given the destructiveness of nuclear weapons this question is important. But in the long run, it is also important to focus on the larger question of national capacity. *Unmaking the Bomb* focuses on the process behind all those warheads—the capacity that underlies an arsenal.

*Unmaking the Bomb* presents, in careful and meticulous detail, a persuasive case that the best way to deal with nuclear weapons, over the coming years, is to tackle the fissile materials problem. After all, as the authors point out, the most difficult part of the process of building nuclear weapons is the refining and enrichment of the materials needed to make the explosive: fissile materials. These materials are, therefore, a “choke point” in the process of making nuclear weapons. Why build a dam where a river is widest when it is much easier to stop the flow by damming it where it is narrowest? In thinking about whether it would be feasible to eliminate the world's arsenals of nuclear weapons, the authors argue, persuasively, that fissile materials are the key. *Unmaking the Bomb* summarizes the existing situation, explains the technology and science behind the various options for producing fissile materials, and talks straightforwardly about how a path could be charted to a world in which nuclear weaponry could be effectively—and verily—eliminated.

The narration is a model of clarity, which is particularly impressive for a book that involves so much physics and so many sophisticated manufacturing issues. The four authors represent a remarkable collection of expertise in the field. Drawn from the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University, all have worked on these problems for more than 20 years and two of them have been internationally acknowledged experts in the field for much longer. The solid factual content of the book and its sober tone accurately reflect the attitude of the authors; this serious problem can only be resolved with careful thinking, meticulous scholarship, and realistic appraisals of facts on the ground.

The book opens with a brief overview of the history of nuclear weapons followed by the less well known history of producing fissile materials. The authors detail current international stockpiles of fissile materials, explain key links in the connection between nuclear power and nuclear weapons and the steps necessary to ensure that fissile materials are not diverted from commercial nuclear power plants. Looking forward, they explore how it would be possible to end the separating of plutonium and the use of high enriched uranium (HEU) for reactor fuel. In the third and final section of the book, they map out reasonable steps for ending production of fissile materials for weapons and disposing of existing stocks of fissile materials.

One of the book's great strengths is its many graphs. Collecting and visually representing data is much harder than it seems and the tables and graphs in this volume are models of careful, clear presentation. It's a relief to read a book about nuclear weapons where exaggeration, histrionics, and moralizing play no role. It is the sober and serious examination of policy where American scholars once excelled.

If you want to understand the facts about fissile materials and how they might sensibly be controlled and eventually eliminated, there is simply no better source.

## MILITARY ETHICS

**The Warrior, Military Ethics and Contemporary Warfare:  
Achilles Goes Asymmetrical**

By Pauline M. Kaurin


Reviewed by Sibylle Scheipers, PhD, senior lecturer in international relations at the University of St. Andrews

In *The Warrior, Military Ethics and Contemporary Warfare*, Pauline M. Kaurin sets out to devise a new approach to thinking about military ethics and, crucially, to teaching it to cadets and soldiers. Her basic assumption, and hence the rationale of the book, contemporary warfare is “asymmetric” and the moral approach to fighting it has to be adapted to this condition of asymmetry. The book covers a number of specific pertinent issues such as the question of the moral and legal equality of combatants, drone warfare and non-lethal weapons (though it is not entirely clear why those two are covered in the same chapter, given their moral implications are vastly different), and the application of the law of armed conflict in humanitarian interventions.

This book is well intentioned, but deeply flawed. Weaknesses include sloppy editing, lack of attention to the details of its presentation, weak positioning of the main arguments in the context of pertinent research literature, and, most importantly, a shaky foundation within the framework of the over-hyped, but analytically feeble concept of “asymmetric warfare.”

A few words on the presentation, before I turn to the more substantial problems: parts of the text are littered with typos, names of referenced authors are misspelled (Samuel Huntington is introduced as Huntingdon), and the text suffers from over-capitalization (“Military Professionalism,” “Utilitarianism,” “Justice”). At times, the author’s somewhat colloquial style sits uneasily with the complexity of the topic (“What this really boils down to [23];” “At the end of the day [134]”). The text is filled with a dizzying number of acronyms (the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy is shortened to “DADT [91]”) – but there is no list of abbreviations included.

The book’s bibliography is a mere three and a half pages long. It does reference major names in the field, but the author is oblivious to others. Mark Osiel, for instance, has presented an important argument on reciprocity and post-reciprocal military ethics, which speaks to many of the central issues which Kaurin is wrestling; yet, his book is conspicuously absent from the bibliography.<sup>1</sup> Kaurin also devotes a whole chapter to the reformulation of the distinction between combatants and civilians, in which she opts for a broadening of the range of categories from clear-cut combatants to vulnerable civilians and claims this is underpinned by “actual field practice in recent conflicts.” However, she fails to mention the International Committee of the Red Cross’ study on

Ashgate Publishing  
Company: Burlington,  
VT, 2014

150 pages


\$104.94

1 Mark Osiel, *The End of Reciprocity: Terror, Torture, and the Law of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

direct participation in hostilities, which addresses precisely this issue.<sup>2</sup> More importantly, the latter suggests a completely different approach, which upholds the dichotomy between combatants and civilians, but introduces temporary suspensions of civilian protections for those civilians who take up arms. This error is bound to lead to confusion at best (and criminal liability at worst) for those who are at the receiving end of the teaching of military ethics.

The deepest flaw of the book is its insufficient conceptual grounding in the idea of asymmetric warfare. Kaurin discusses critical assessments of the concept of asymmetric warfare. Unfortunately, she comes up with a definition that turns out to be impractical: “In other words, I see asymmetrical warfare (especially the contemporary version of it) as an attempt to alter the discourse and ground rules about what constitutes war, how it is to be waged and what counts as success or failure (9).” This definition would have also applied to contemporary perceptions of Napoleonic warfare, but surely this is not what Kaurin had in mind.

What remains, then, is a well-intentioned attempt to popularize the teaching of military ethics, which is indeed a worthwhile and often-neglected topic at staff colleges around the world. The parts in which Kaurin discusses the way moral problems should be debated are the best ones in the book, and often guided by good intuitions, for instance Kaurin’s warning that penalizing those who take up arms unlawfully could have negative moral *and* strategic implications. However, these insights are not grounded in the conceptual basis of the book. On the contrary, Kaurin’s repeated talk of “moral asymmetry” as the most basic feature of asymmetric warfare make them seem surprising, if not unconvincing.



## **The Morality of Private War. The Challenge of Private Military and Security Companies.**

By James Pattison

Reviewed by Birthe Anders, Teaching Fellow in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London

Scholars in war studies have long been concerned whether Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) are morally reprehensible and undermine the democratic control of military force — in effect, whether the companies are nothing more than modern-day mercenaries. James Pattison’s *The Morality of Private War* tackles these questions in a very comprehensive and thorough way. The short answer is, from a moral point of view, PMSCs should not be used. The longer answer is much more complex.

Pattison, a professor of politics at the University of Manchester, examines PMSCs, their employees, and their clients through the lens of Just War Theory. The book is structured in four parts: addressing individuals, the employment of PMSCs by states and alternative arrangements of military force, as well as the companies’ effect on the

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<sup>2</sup> Nils Melzer, *Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law* (Geneva: ICRC, 2009).

Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014

272 pages  
\$82.50

international system. In the final part of the book, the author summarizes by whom and in which roles PMSCs can be used, assesses the state of current regulation and proposes how military force should ideally be organized, namely, through a global monopoly on military force. This review can only provide a brief synopsis of this very dense book and highlight crucial points in Pattison's argument.

Central to the author's analysis is what he calls the Cumulative Legitimacy Approach, by which the legitimacy of the military can be assessed. Pattison argues prominent theories of civil-military relations (those of Huntington, Janowitz, and Feaver) do not adequately address the morality of force. According to the Cumulative Legitimacy Approach four factors determine legitimacy; Effectiveness, Democratic Control, Proper Treatment of Military Personnel, and Communal Bonds. These features are scalar and cumulative. Thus, not doing well on one of the criterion, can to some extent, be ameliorated by doing well on the others. Legitimacy here means how effective an agent (the military as well as PMSCs) is in promoting basic human rights and fighting just wars.

In the first part of the book, the author focusses on individual contractors and asks whether it is permissible to be a contractor, meaning whether it is allowed under just war and human rights criteria. Pattison rightly observes one of the most prominent objections to private military force is that PMSCs and their employees are mercenaries because they are (at least partially) motivated by financial gain. The author contests this objection and poses two questions not usually addressed in the literature: (a) would it actually be problematic if an individual was primarily motivated by financial gain, and (b) is that more likely to be the case for a contractor than for a soldier?

Pattison finds contractors are indeed more likely than soldiers to be primarily motivated by financial gain. Perhaps not a very surprising find, but what follows is interesting. In contrast to the dominant interpretation of this argument the author finds financial motives are not necessarily a major objection to private force. It can be permissible to be a contractor, even if part of one's motivation is financial gain. However, it cannot be the dominant motivation. The next section goes on to examine when it is permissible to be a contractor. Here, individual *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* need to be followed. These are same principles determining just wars for states, *inter alia* just cause, last resort, legitimate authority, and proportionality. It should be noted that Pattison's analysis is a theoretical one without looking at new data, which means novices to such detailed legal analyses might find the book a bit dry and tedious to read. However, if you have a taste for this kind of book, the detail and thoroughness are very enjoyable.

What could be an alternative to PMSCs? As Pattison examines in the second part of the book, contractors are not the only ones facing moral problems, state forces do as well. The all-volunteer force (AVF) is the preferable arrangement of the military as conscription faces a number of moral problems. One example is the restriction of individual autonomy. In part three of the book, the author broadens the level of analysis from individuals and companies to the international system and analyzes several ways in which the use of PMSCs negatively affects the stability of the international system. Readers might think problems with PMSCs identified in the first three parts of the book could be



alleviated by tighter and more effective regulation. Pattison considers this problem in his final chapter and summarizes existing regulations at the international and national level as well as self-regulation. He rightly points to the patchy nature of current regulation as well as to difficulties of overseeing and enforcing self-regulation by the industry.

One could also argue the answer to the question of whether it is permissible to work for a PMSC, or employ one, depends on the type of service required; logistical support services differ from armed security work. A minor flaw of the book is its sweeping use of the terms private war and private force and its focus on potential combat roles of PMSCs. While the author acknowledges PMSCs offer a variety of services (on a spectrum from logistics to armed security to combat), it has actually been many years since PMSCs were last hired by a state for direct combat.

Ultimately, the problems with private and public military force laid out in the first three parts of the book can only be solved by establishing a global public monopoly on the authorization and provision of military force. Pattison proposes a reformed UN and especially a restructured Department of Peacekeeping Operations be put in charge of such a force. It is easy to dismiss this proposal as entirely unrealistic and, indeed, the author concedes this is a valid objection; but it "...misses the point. At issue ...is the most morally desirable way of organizing military force." Thus, this ideal should be worked towards, even if its full implementation is unlikely.


Who should read *The Morality of Private War*? The book should be of use to anyone with an interest in private military and security companies, military ethics or civil-military relations. It is a welcome addition to the field of PMSC research, and should especially stimulate debate on PMSCs' effect on democratic control of the military and civil-military relations as well as on future regulations. The author does not offer much guidance for practitioners already working with PMSCs, but that is not the aim. He addresses the moral legitimacy of individual contractors, PMSCs and their clients and does it well. The book is a theoretical analysis of a practical issue, and one that should be read by anyone working with or for a PMSC.

## **The Ethics of Interrogation: Professional Responsibility in an Age of Terror**

By Paul Lauritzen.

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Douglas A. Pryer, author of *The Fight for the High Ground: The U.S. Army and Interrogation during Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003 – April 2004*.

*The Ethics of Interrogation* may sound like a philosophical discussion. This book is not one. For that, see an earlier book with a strangely similar title and cover, Michael Sherker's *An Ethics of Interrogation*. What interests Lauritzen is the internal debates of four professions on the ethics of interrogation and the importance of such debates to our republic during an age of rapidly changing security threats. The result is a fascinating, albeit flawed, study.



Washington, DC:  
Georgetown University  
Press, 2013  
227 pages  
\$26.95

Lauritzen begins by arguing the social-trustee model of professionals as servants of the public good is largely dead. In its place has arisen the view of social scientists that professions are “centers of neutral expertise.” This trend, he says, must be reversed, leading to his thesis: “I hope to show that the professions are where democratic character traits may take root and that we need to nurture a view of professionals as servants of the common good.”

He examines the acrimonious debate within the American Psychological Association (APA) about the participation of psychologists in interrogations. Soon after 9/11, APA amended its Code of Ethics to justify this participation, effectively stating members could participate even in abusive interrogations if these interrogations were legal. This stance led to a revolt within the ranks that “the dissenters won.” But, he contends, dissenters have gone too far by trying to keep psychologists out of interrogations completely, and failing to account for legitimate national security concerns.

Next, he retells the well-known story of executive branch lawyers enabling “enhanced” interrogation techniques (EITs). The American Bar Association’s reaction was an angry one, and the Office for Professional Responsibility (OPR) investigated the conduct of John Yoo and Jay Bybee. Lauritzen points out OPR’s inconsistency in failing to investigate Steven Bradbury when Bradbury later signed memoranda giving legal cover to an even more expansive list of coercive techniques. No lawyer was ever disbarred or fined, but Lauritzen believes the legal profession positively influenced its members’ conduct.

Lauritzen also looks at the torture debate within the medical profession. While the UN and American Medical Association (AMA) prohibit medical personnel from certifying the fitness of prisoners for harmful treatment, US medical personnel conducted such certifications anyway. The Office of the Surgeon General ignored this unpleasant fact by defining “participation” as direct participation in interrogations and then denying medical personnel participated in any interrogations. Lauritzen does not attribute this to prevarication. Rather, he points to the tension between the UN’s and AMA’s expansive prohibitions and “the expectation that physicians will treat detainees in need”—a tension remaining unresolved.


In subsequent chapters, Lauritzen addresses how professions use licensing and oversight boards to regulate their members’ behavior and how virtue theory relates to professions. When discussing the latter, he holds up the military profession as the exemplar. The military profession’s inculcation of virtues, he argues, is what led the military (that is, service JAGs) to oppose abusive interrogation tactics, and it would behoove other professions to follow the military’s example.

This brings us to the book’s flaws, which could be due to the author’s lack of military experience or research (or both). For one, Lauritzen fails to consider the large number of officers who embraced “enhanced” interrogation techniques. Officers commanded Gitmo, Abu Ghraib, and Bagram. Special mission units routinely employed “enhanced” interrogation techniques, as did many intelligence units supporting the conventional army in Afghanistan and Iraq. The fact that so many officers “bought into” prisoner abuse “to save lives” demonstrates either

the weakness of the profession's avowed virtues or the profession's real values are something other than advertised. It also undermines Lauritzen's thesis and the important role of professions in developing character traits.

Lauritzen also fails to consider the expertise of military interrogators when he asserts "torture works" in producing valuable intelligence. He offers the example of a true confession (torture almost always produces confessions, true or not) and cites as authoritative an increasingly discredited figure in the torture debate, Jose Gonzales. Lauritzen seems unaware of Army doctrine, which has long declared torture to be a poor and unreliable means of collecting intelligence—a conclusion supported by the overwhelming evidence of histories and memoirs and, most recently, the senate report on CIA interrogation practices.

There are other flaws, such as Lauritzen's unconvincing description of why some "enhanced" interrogation techniques recognize human choice and dignity and should be allowed (such as "walling") and others do not and should not be allowed (such as "stress positions"). Such flaws should dissuade professors from choosing this book as a text for impressionable students. Nonetheless, there remains much to commend it to the mature reader. Lauritzen argues dispassionately, clearly, and fairly (if not comprehensively), and his research not only informs, it directs the reader to many of the most important thinkers and works in the torture debate.



Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2013  
392 pages  
\$24.95

## **A Generous and Merciful Enemy: Life for German Prisoners of War during the American Revolution**

By Daniel Krebs

Reviewed by MAJ Jason W. Warren, PhD, Concepts and Doctrine Director, Center for Strategic Leadership and Development, US Army War College

Ansbach, Germany still displays the colors of its regiments deployed during the American Revolutionary War (1775-1783), and a visitor to this quaint town in Mittelfranken would not depart thinking that the Ansbachers were mercenaries. Daniel Krebs, a native German speaker, in fact claims the term was a misnomer for Germans in British employ during the war. In his well-crafted "new military history," *A Generous and Merciful Enemy*, Krebs makes excellent use of the extant primary sources to explore the social aspects of these soldiers' backgrounds, families, military experience, and life after combat. In so doing, he relates a story heretofore marginalized in Anglo-American accounts of the conflict.

This commitment of soldiers by the resource-starved tiny principalities of the Holy Roman Empire—then the sick-man of Europe—was no small matter. During and immediately after the war, German cultural elites depicted their princes' motivations for contributing troops as the greedy pursuit of a life of debauchery. Later German nationalist writers derided these rulers as insufficiently German. Krebs counters that the reality was more nuanced. Sovereigns, in addition to raising money for domestic projects (often to better their subjects' condition), also sought prestige for themselves and their kingdoms; then a not uncommon objective for royalty. There was also the matter of supporting a British

king of German ethnicity from the Hanoverian line, and the tradition of supporting Protestant war efforts, particularly after the Catholic French and Spanish joined with the American revolutionaries.

Although not all German “subsidy soldiers,” as Krebs refers to them, were Hessians, “almost the entire Hessen-Kassel army entered British service” (22) and eventually numbered 20,000 regulars (plus replacements) during the war. Krebs is able to pattern a mosaic of the varying American treatment of these soldiers by time and place because more than 14 percent of all German subsidy soldiers fell into revolutionary hands. Colonial treatment of the Germans even differed within American states, as Lancaster, Pennsylvania, at first provided generous conditions, while nearby Reading failed to provide adequate treatment. In Chapter 4, Krebs uses the topic of handling prisoners as an opportunity to detail how the Western tradition evolved over centuries in matters of military captivity. He examines how the reality of prisoners’ treatment on and after the battlefield often ran afoul of the lofty philosophical ideals of the drawing room.

The American revolutionaries deemed Pennsylvania a sound location for prisoner of war camps because of the German ethnicity of many of the state’s inhabitants, although major camps also existed in nearby Maryland, as well as Virginia and Connecticut. Language and ethnicity mattered during the war with German-American soldiers at Trenton even enticing the surrender of German subsidy soldiers’ in their native tongue (97). Indeed, the mix of volunteers, conscripts, and pressed soldiers in the German ranks often mirrored that of the American Continental Army and militia units. The topic of similarities between locales in the early modern era (and beyond) is fertile ground for future historical focus, and Krebs rightly calls for more military history of the Atlantic world (25). Kyle Zelner’s *A Rabble in Arms* is a good example of a work with similar social-history methodology focusing on the early colonial period. It details how the Essex County militia of Massachusetts Bay also consisted of pressed troops a century prior to the arrival of “Hessians” of the American Revolution.

One point in this solid monograph could use fine-tuning. Krebs argues the nascent nationalism of the American and French revolutions turned German “mercenary” troops into anachronisms. The German troops, therefore, were caught in changing social circumstances, victims of enlightenment ideals now taken root on the battlefield (32-34). Krebs’ “modern” definition for mercenaries calls for a broader discussion. Mercenary troops, as contractors in modern-day Iraq and Afghanistan may readily qualify by his definition.

Instead of looking forward to the French Revolution, Krebs would have been better served by examining the Thirty Years War, a conflict in which mercenaries came to be viewed by all sides as a threat to European civil order. The first truly professional armies since the collapse of Rome emerged from the destruction of 1618-1648, which saw Ansbach, for instance, nearly depopulated. Given the devastation and the large-scale employment of mercenaries, there were no battle standards from this era preserved in the town. I have spoken with some Ansbachers (one, a local historian), who trace their ancestry back to Austria, as Austrian-Germans repopulated the locale after marauding mercenaries decimated it. They viewed 1648 as more devastating for the region than 1945. It was

from this apocalyptic landscape that mercenaries derived a bad name. With an expanded tactical and operational approach, Krebs might have established more context for his “subsidy soldiers.” This is a weakness of the “new military history” which sometimes strays too far from what scholars have derided as a “drum and bugle” approach. The crucible of war tells us as much about ourselves in difficult circumstances—and indeed of humanity itself—no matter how unpleasant the dialogue. It is within this terrible environment that historians must analyze German subsidy-soldiers’ behavior. If many German troops in fact acted with mercenary-like behaviors on the battlefield, as some accounts indicate, then perhaps the boots fit.

This criticism notwithstanding, *A Generous and Merciful Enemy* is a much-needed account of a glossed-over American Revolutionary War topic, and one importantly related from the German perspective. Krebs’ monograph also includes useful maps depicting little-known Holy Roman Empire geography, which is part of the outstanding overall aesthetics of the book. It is an excellent edition to the Campaigns and Commanders series.

## WAR &amp; THE STATE

**Failed States and the Origins of Violence: A Comparative Analysis of State Failure as a Root Cause of Terrorism and Political Violence**


By Tiffany Howard

Reviewed by Janeen Klinger, Department of National Security and Strategy, US Army War College

The starting point for the author of *Failed States* is the lack of scholarly consensus regarding the origin of terrorists and the lack of quantitative research on the subject. Dr. Howard's purpose is to remedy the shortcoming by providing a broadly comparative approach that tests the extent to which weak and failed states are the impetus for individuals to engage in political violence. This potentially admirable effort at comparison includes chapters on sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, Southeast and South Asia, and Latin America. Howard's analysis draws links between state failure and domestic terrorism, and only touches on the issue of transnational terrorism. The first problem with Howard's analysis is, despite drawing on a number of indices of weak and failed states, her category is applied so expansively it encompasses what in an earlier era may have been termed simply the "underdeveloped" world. One example of the dubious application of the term is the characterization of the Philippines as a failing state because, Howard argues, it is "struggling to develop economically" and is facing internal upheavals.

Howard's research methodology also suffers from limitations. She draws on survey data concerning respondents' views of governance in their state and the number of people interviewed is small (1200 in each of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa). One must wonder if the views recorded are genuinely representative. Perhaps a more serious flaw than sample size is that some questions did not directly ask about governance, so the author is forced to use what she terms proxy questions and draw inferences from them. For example, the survey conducted in the Middle East and North Africa asks respondents: "In your opinion, which is the most important problem facing your country today; economic conditions, corruption, authoritarianism, ending the US occupation in Iraq, or the Arab-Israeli conflict?" Howard concludes that respondents who view authoritarianism as the most important problem are, therefore, more likely to support the use of violence against the state than respondents who chose another answer. Similarly, the survey data from Latin America asks respondents if social movements are necessary mechanisms for the development of society. Howard's leap of logic here concludes that, because social movements are antecedents to social revolutions, an affirmative answer to the question suggests support for political violence.

Even granting the validity of the survey data, do the results lead to a greater understanding of the origins of terrorism and, therefore, prove useful for national security professionals? In this book, the quantitative methods validate the obvious, that is, people living in a dangerous environment are likely to support, if not participate, in violence. In fairness




Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co, 2014

222 pages

\$119.95

to the author—she readily admits when the data contradict some of her hypotheses. For instance, in her discussion of sub-Saharan Africa, the survey data suggest the perceived presence of the state increases the probability a person will support violence—which runs contrary to Howard’s hypothesis that ungoverned spaces provide a haven for terrorists.

While using quantitative methods to confirm the obvious is relatively harmless, there remains a greater danger from a more philosophical standpoint. The extent to which quantitative methods can wrap themselves in the cloak of scientific certainty engenders the risk that policy-makers, guided by such approaches, will develop such hubris they will not be able to see or admit errors in judgment. What is missing in a quantitative approach like Howard’s is the rich historical and cultural tradition of scholarship found in classic works of comparative politics, such as Reinhard Bendix’s *Kings or People*, or Barrington Moore’s, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, which (despite their flaws) add much to our understanding of the evolution and change in societies.



Lawrence, KS: University  
Press of Kansas, 2012

328 pages  
\$39.95

## State of War: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1945-2011

By Paul A.C. Koistinen

Reviewed by Isaiah “Ike” Wilson III, Colonel (USA), Chief, Commander’s Initiative Group (CIG), US Central Command, MacDill AFB

As the fifth and final volume of Professor Paul Koistinen’s comprehensive study of the political economy underpinning America’s wars from colonial beginnings, through the great industrial wars of the 20th century, *State of War* is literally a tour de force – a walk through our nation’s comings-of-age as a nation, and after 1945, as a global superpower. As such, Professor Koistinen (in my view) achieves his intended goal of “providing a comprehensive, analytical, and interdisciplinary study of the economics of America’s wars.” Moreover, through his multivolume study, Professor Koistinen provides us with an essential appreciation for what is likely the most important factor in understanding the political economy of America’s state of war and peace: the “political” and power dynamics define, stress, as well as strengthen and re-define over cycles of time, the social patterns of American political life.

Koistinen offers three “lenses” through which to view his historical accounting of the cycles of continuity and change in economic mobilization – each lens is a view into three major stages over the course of American history, each revealing its own unique “pattern” of economic mobilization, and identifying four key factors of economic mobilization. Koistinen’s analysis reveals at least three major insights are particularly relevant to today’s challenges in rebalancing defense budget stringencies with current and future national security imperatives. Firstly, Koistinen shows harnessing the economy for war was more readily accomplished in the “transitional stage” (1816-1865) than in any other stage. Secondly, strength of economic and political systems is a determinant in not only a state’s ability to mobilize a war economy, but bring about success or defeat. Thirdly, and perhaps the most instructive, if not most worrisome

of lessons gathered, is over time and through these historical cycles, we witness a blurring of distinctions between government and industry, particularly defense industries, feeding and in some instances even creating potentially destructive civil-military imbalances.

President Eisenhower was particularly concerned about three developments: first, the rise of a technological elite; second, an unnecessary growth of large organizational systems, particularly the integration of military and business interests, to a degree of integration could cause or perpetuate international conflict; and third, his concern with technological-military-industrial alliances which were regaining their wartime ascendancy and were poised to exercise influence out of proportion to their appropriate role in a peace time democratic society. Eisenhower's January 1961 Farewell Address was itself a speech representing a transition between eras. As a warning for the future it was grounded in Eisenhower's analysis of mid-century political and cultural currents, which in turn was based upon his reflections about the momentous changes occurring during his lifetime – changes Koistinen shows us perhaps persist as past lessons gathered but unfortunately not yet learned.

The basic problem facing the United States today, in what seems could be yet another Koistinen “transitional stage” of not merely evolutionary but revolutionary change in political-military and economic affairs, stems from at least four additional and simultaneous challenges: first, a growing national debt and debt-to-GDP ratio, which is higher now than at any time since World War II; second, continued recession with slow economic recovery; third, an increasingly aging population which will significantly and persistently increase entitlement costs (Social Security, Medicaid/Medicare) over the long run, absent entitlement reform; and fourth, political polarization among policymakers, exacerbated by compressed timelines for action and pre-election year politics, structurally and procedurally impeding the ability for compromise. Any three of these would be difficult, but all four problems simultaneously, and manifest by, and within, a near-perpetual military-industrial complex (MIC)-driven war economy, are particularly problematic.

As the United States continues into a period of stark fiscal austerity, policy makers will be required to make hard choices about where best to spend declining discretionary dollars. Recognizing this as strategic choice, and understanding the bounds shaping and constraining and redefining the limits of that choice, is an important insight raised from Professor Koistinen's body of work. There is a longstanding American distaste for tragedy, or rather the want of tragic sensibility (or pragmatism) in our strategic culture has led US strategists and policymakers to mistake mere force for power. Understanding the difference between force and power is vital to America's rise as a durable and balanced global power, and not merely as a forceful hegemon. This understanding is all the more imperative at a time of compounding global security challenges and austerity. A renewed American grand strategy would acknowledge the nation's tragic flaw: its pride in its force and technology; as Koistinen shows us, a pride flawed in and by the design of a post-WWII military-industrial, political-economic complex persists. It would also acknowledge the proximity of this flaw to the nation's virtue: the set of principles and institutions for restraining force have proven in earlier periods uniquely adept at producing abundant prosperity, force,



and with them unsurpassed power; yet more recently and at present seem mostly impotent.

There are at least four critical questions raised in the pages of *State of War* central to the outcome of the struggle to redefine and resource American grand strategy. First, how will current political realities affect the range of strategic choices available to policy makers? Are some courses of action unrealistic, given the contemporary political climate? Second, how does the budget interact with and limit our strategy? Given what we know, or can estimate, regarding the cost of achieving our objectives, which options are broadly untenable? Third, how can the United States government make the best possible strategic choices given our political and budgetary constraints? Are there certain precautions our government should take to limit or control political influence over the budget? And if so, who should lead this effort? And finally, the existing tapestry of US relationships and regional partnerships must be incorporated into any new or emerging strategic framework, if for no other reason than to return an economy of scale balance to US force and defense budget expenditures. What role will these relationships play, and how should our military forces be structured both to confront new areas of interest and reassure traditional allies? American global presence must be calibrated carefully with political and budgetary constraints. What are our national priorities in the global community, and how can we organize most effectively to meet our goals?

All of these questions are, finally, questions of grand strategy; they involve the calculated relation of means to large ends. In this sense, the fundamental challenge facing the United States might be put this way: After sixty-five years of pursuing a globally-engaged grand strategy—nearly a third of which transpired without a great power rival—can the United States discover a way to navigate this new era of uncertainty while preserving American dominance as a leading power in, and of, the international system? These questions will be at the core of our political debates in the years to come. Paul Koistinen's *State of War* and his preceding volumes could not have come to us at a more important time.

## Waging War: Alliances, Coalitions, and Institutions of Interstate Violence

By Patricia A. Weitsman

Reviewed by Russ Burgos, Lecturer in Global Studies at UCLA

*Allies are the most aggravating of people. They introduce considerations of their own national politics, none of which have the faintest bearing on the matter of immediate issue [but] their most annoying characteristic is the astonishing way they seem incapable of recognizing how sound, how wise, how experienced are our views."*

Diary of Field-Marshal William J. Slim, commander of the British 14th Army in World War II



Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014

279 pages

\$27.95

In *Waging War*, Patricia A. Weitsman argues our understanding of what the late military historian Russell Weigley famously called “the American way of war” needs to be brought into the 21st-century. Weigley claimed annihilation – destroying the enemy’s armed forces and (ideally)

occupying his capital – was the basic American strategy in war. While European great powers hewed closely to the Clausewitzian understanding of war as a continuation of diplomacy by other means – a necessary limitation for nation-states embedded in a delicate continental balance of power – the United States approached war as kind of violent intermission to diplomacy: we negotiate, we fight, we negotiate again, making peace on our terms. Weigley’s thesis cohered nicely with 20th-century notions of “American Exceptionalism” and strategic unilateralism.

To Weitsman, however, that is its principal weakness: in fact, the United States doesn’t simply make war (or peace) on its terms. America is embedded in a network of global alliances, coalitions, and institutions simultaneously enabling and constraining its power. As a result, Weitsman argues, the American way of war is profoundly multilateral – profoundly *political*. “The norm of multilateralism,” she writes, “is entrenched in the American way of waging war.” This means American policymakers and strategists must take into consideration the goals, objectives, and objections of its allies and coalition partners at all stages of war fighting – compromises can, and often do, frustrate policymakers, public opinion, and even the conduct of America’s wars themselves.

*Waging War* is not a book about the operational aspects of coalition warfare, though one can glean some insights from Weitsman’s case studies. Her book is a contribution to scholarly debates about alliances and coalitions within the international relations and security studies disciplines and as a result may frustrate those professionally interested in the operational or political-military dynamics of alliance and coalition warfare.

Weitsman frames her argument in the context of what she calls “realist institutionalism,” attempting to bridge the gap between the two dominant strands of International Relations theorizing – realism, with its emphasis on interests, and neoliberalism, with its emphasis on formal and informal international institutions – showing military alliances and coalitions not only constrain America’s strategic operations in war but also facilitate the exercising of American hegemonic power across the globe. Weitsman develops her theory in five case studies, ranging from the American wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to NATO’s Kosovo and Libya interventions, emphasizing the political history of the alliance, its decision-making structure, the intra-alliance distribution of power, its size, its war-fighting effectiveness, and the impact of those factors on the perceived legitimacy of each of the military operations.

Because these “institutions of interstate violence” matter for the exercising of US power, therefore, American policymakers must attend to intra-institutional political dynamics – which often include, as Field-Marshal Slim lamented, the domestic political considerations of institution members. Frustrating as it may be, she argues, alliances and coalitions are, in effect, strategic multipliers. As a result, the US has an interest in maintaining them to its own benefit.

There is, however, a catch: the more dependent the United States becomes on coalition warfare, the greater its “alliance security dilemma” becomes: American policymakers are torn between fears of entrapment – constraints on America’s freedom of action imposed by the necessity of satisfying allies – and the fear of abandonment – the risk, in fact, the

United States will have to go it alone. Weitsman shows balancing those fears often leads to the creation of complex, overlapping, and inefficient command-and-control relationships which actually diminish military effectiveness. Given the increasingly powerful constraint of global public opinion on military action, maintaining legitimacy has in effect become a key strategic objective in any use of American military force. Weitsman notes, for example, negative European public opinion over the conduct of operations in Afghanistan became a critical problem for American policymakers; she suggests accepting the political costs and limitations imposed by coalitions has become a critical part of the new American way of war.

*Waging War* offers important insights into the strategic benefits the United States derives from the web of global coalitions it has created since World War II and into the political and operational costs attendant to maintaining them.

## INSURGENCY &amp; COUNTERINSURGENCY

**The Thai Way of Counterinsurgency**

By Jeffrey Moore

Reviewed by Marina Miron, Assistant Editor with *Infinity Journal* and PhD Candidate at the Australian Defence Force Academy, University of New South Wales Canberra

Recently, the concepts of irregular warfare and counterinsurgency (COIN) have gained attention in academic and military circles. Among the works devoted to counterinsurgency are those concerned with the various campaigns in Southeast Asia. However, certain regional conflicts, in Thailand, for instance, are understudied. With his book, *The Thai Way of Counterinsurgency*, Jeffrey Moore seeks to fill this gap. He believes his study provides useful insight for American and Thai practitioners of counterinsurgency and shows Thailand, albeit slowly and through trial and error, has gained valuable experience conducting counterinsurgency campaigns. The Thai successfully defeated two major insurgencies in recent years: the countrywide communist insurgency of 1965-1985, and the southern border insurgency from 1980-1998. However, since 2004, the country has suffered from a Pattani separatist insurgency in the southern part of the country. In addition, Moore's study aims to provide an examination of Thai national security issues and related decision-making on a broader front. Most controversially perhaps, the author claims his book can explain how to conduct COIN on strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

One of the most interesting aspects of the book is Moore's framework of analysis called, "COIN Pantheon." It uses the same three pillars of counterinsurgency – political, security, and economic – which Australian counterinsurgency theorist, David Kilcullen, uses to support his own triptych. Kilcullen's pillars are supported by a platform of information and are topped off by a roof denoting control. Moore's pantheon differs from Kilcullen's as his base is strategy and coordination, while his three pillars of political, security, and economics are covered by an additional layer called insurgent capabilities and intentions. The roof of the pantheon, rather than being control, is made up of "at-risk population" (xviii-xxii). Thus, Moore's main emphasis for achieving success in any counterinsurgency campaign falls upon the strategic dimension and the coordination that should be aimed at winning over the indigenous at-risk population. Additionally, Moore employs David Galula's and Robert Thompson's basic counterinsurgency tenets as supplementary analytical filters – as he calls them – to illustrate how "the Thai organize for and wage COIN." (xx)

Moore emphasizes the importance of strategic dimension in counterinsurgency, which enriches his analysis given that he looks beyond operational and tactical levels in order to understand how counterinsurgency functions. As part of this approach, Moore follows the population-centric tradition of Galula and Thompson regarding winning-over populations as the ultimate prize. What is implicit in Moore's analysis is, similar to Kilcullen, he assumes support of the population is




Arlington, VA: Muir Analytics, 2014  
476 pages  
\$20.00

paramount for insurgent survival and it should also attract the attention of the counter-insurgent. Moore also notes, despite his emphasis on the population, that one should not underplay the centrality of kinetic operations. As the author asserts “[k]inetic operations were a close second in importance” (73) to psychological operations during the latter phase of the Thai counterinsurgency campaign of 1980 against the communist insurgents. Vital in that specific case, he argues, was the fact that such kinetic operations were highly intelligence-driven.

At the end of each chapter, Moore applies his unique methodological framework to help explain outcomes. Despite the logical coherence of his model, however, it is difficult to see how it helps in establishing the Thai way of counterinsurgency and why he uses only Galula and Thompson given the panoply of theorists from which he could have drawn. This list includes the likes of Robert Bugeaud, Hubert Lyautey, Charles E. Callwell, Roger Trinquier and Frank Kitson.

Moore’s conclusion offers a good summary of practices implemented by the Thai government(s) in the two past insurgencies and in the ongoing one. Further, he proceeds with an evaluation of Thai principles setting them against Galula’s and Thompson’s core tenets (364-368). His findings suggest the Thai have violated two of Galula’s principles: counterinsurgent forces should not imitate the insurgents; and civilians, not the military, should take the primary lead in the counterinsurgency effort. Despite Moore’s reservations, the Thai were successful in their efforts. In the introduction, Moore stated the Thai case would have valuable lessons for US COIN doctrine, yet he does not explain which lessons are worth replicating. An elaboration would have been a valuable addition to what is otherwise a rich, historical narrative of Thai counterinsurgency.

Overall, this study – designed for readers familiar with counterinsurgency theory – is a significant contribution. Moore’s research is thorough and he uses a large number of sources including many personal interviews. He provides us with an informative account that helps us understand the peculiarities of the Thai way of counterinsurgency, rather than instructing us on how to conduct such campaigns in the future.



## **Cross-Cultural Competence For A Twenty-First-Century Military: Culture, the Flipside of COIN**

Edited By Robert Greene Sands and Allison Greene-Sands

Reviewed by Colonel Robert M. Mundell, Chairman Department of Command Leadership and Management, US Army War College

Robert Greene Sands and Allison Greene-Sands, two leading scholars on culture in the national defense community, in partnership with a host of social and behavioral scientists and practitioners, provide a comprehensive and convincing analysis of the importance of cross-cultural competence (3C) that transcends beyond advocating its counterinsurgency (COIN) specific benefit. In doing so, the authors demonstrate the relevance of 3C given the human-centric and evolving nature of war and conflict in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Importantly, the book also provides insights

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Publishing Group: Lanham,  
MD, 2012

386 pages  
\$145.98

cautioning against the notion of 3C as a niche and temporal capability declining in value as the US military transitions from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Accordingly, *Cross-Cultural Competence for a Twenty-First-Century Military* is a must read for military professionals and practitioners responsible for delivering education and training programs designed to develop the type of expert knowledge required to fight and win in complex and ambiguous security environments. As defined in the book, 3C is the knowledge, skills, and affect/motivation that enables individuals to adapt effectively in cross-cultural environments. (19)

The book's basic premise centers on three main factors validating the importance of 3C education and training programs: uncertainty and ambiguity in the international security environment will require military forces to operate in any global region; US forces will most likely operate in partnership with joint interagency, intergovernmental and multi-national forces; and a decade of lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan codify the importance of 3C in understanding and negotiating the complexities of conflict and war. Equally as important, the book identifies three impediments for advocating 3C moving forward: the challenge of communicating 3C as something other than an enabler; the reliance on sociology and behavioral science in support of 3C research and the associated difficulty in describing tangible educational and training outcomes; and the tendency to pair 3C with regional specific and language education training efforts, which can compel decision makers into an either/or decision making paradigm. All three impediments are important for decision makers to consider in an era of fiscal constraint and uncertainty.

The book is arranged in five logically sequenced sections analyzing a series of interrelated topics including the history and background of the development of 3C as a concept, an examination of 3C developmental models applicable across three military education levels (basic, intermediate, and advanced), strategies for 3C education and training programs, on-going 3C research efforts, and useful ideas and concepts for applying 3C during operations in cross-cultural environments. All five sections contain data and compelling stories demonstrating the value of 3C for the military. Of note, chapters 6, 7, and 8 are particularly useful. These three chapters provide firsthand accounts by practitioners applying their experiences to discuss and describe how 3C is developed over time and what is required to succeed in cross-cultural environments. Importantly, all three chapters emphasize how the development of 3C is a lifelong learning endeavor. Similarly, chapters 13, 14, and 15 provide thoughts allowing military professionals to transition cultural training and education from a just in time based training and education methodology to a more deliberate and enduring concept, enabling 3C to become firmly rooted in military culture.

The single most relevant idea contained in the book, in the opinion of this reviewer, centers on the importance of cross-cultural competence in relation to critical thinking—a must for current and emerging senior leaders. Specifically, the book notes the value of 3C in assisting senior leaders in making a relevant shift in how they think about others and themselves. All six 3C components, which are self-awareness, self-regulation, cultural learning, intercultural interaction, cultural perspective taking and cultural reasoning enable this shift in thinking and allow


senior leaders to apply competencies such as sense making, differentiating fact from inference, and suspending judgment in a way which allows leaders to think differently.

While generally very useful, the book does have its drawbacks. It is unnecessarily redundant in characterizing the complexity of the current operating environment and its use of Iraq and Afghanistan to emphasize the importance of culture. The vast preponderance of data and examples in the book are primarily applicable at the tactical and operational levels, and provide minimal strategic-level insights. Finally, as with many documents and publications developed over the past decade, the book continues to advocate for additional research to quantify the concept. The latter does not bode well for a military enterprise habitually constrained by clearly defined and proven outcomes required to justify resources in an era of fiscal constraint. Perhaps the insights contained in this book will aid in overcoming this cultural impediment.

## The Taliban: Afghanistan's Most Lethal Insurgents

By Mark Silinsky

Reviewed by Yaniv Barzilai; US Diplomat and author of *102 Days of War – How Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda & the Taliban Survived 2001*



Westport, CT: Praeger  
Security International (PSI)  
Publishing, 2014  
263 pages  
\$52.00

Thirteen years into the longest war in American history, precious little is known about the Taliban. Indeed, most Americans probably could not identify Mullah Omar as the leader of the Taliban by name or recognize him as one of America's top enemies from the two grainy pictures of him that exist in the public domain. *The Taliban: Afghanistan's Most Lethal Insurgents*, a part of the PSI Guide to Terrorists, Insurgents, and Armed Groups series, seeks to fill that void. A 31-year veteran of the defense intelligence community, Mark Silinsky has written a useful, concise, and readable primer on the Taliban. The book is ambitious in its scope. In less than 200 pages, Silinsky attempts to provide an account of the history of the Taliban, tactics and strategy the Taliban employs in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the connections the Taliban maintains with other militant organizations and foreign powers, and an overview of US counterinsurgency efforts against the Taliban. Scattered throughout the book are short, vivid profiles of individuals who crossed paths with the Taliban, adding color and personality to the narrative.

Perhaps the strongest aspect of *The Taliban* is the description of the way the organization operates. Silinsky succinctly discusses the structure and leadership of the Taliban, then explores how the Taliban uses violence, intimidation, and information operations to achieve its objectives. He also compares the Taliban to a criminal organization and identifies the various criminal activities it uses to support its operations. Experts looking for new information on the Taliban are unlikely to discover it in this book, but those who are less familiar with the Taliban and the US war in Afghanistan will probably enjoy Silinsky's accessible overview of what he deems "Afghanistan's most lethal insurgents." Similarly, his analysis, which is rooted within the framework of US counterinsurgency doctrine, is familiar but thoughtful.

According to the extensive notes section, Silinsky attributes most of his information to news articles. While the information presented is not necessarily wrong, other stronger and more reliable sources – including extensive scholarly research and primary documents – exist that would better support some of his claims. Perhaps for this reason, Silinsky misses some nuances and is at times imprecise in his retelling of the history of the Taliban.

Silinsky also leaves some of the most important questions unanswered, such as how the Taliban has changed since its rise to power, the existence of moderate elements within the Taliban, the prospects for a peaceful resolution to the conflict, and the relative strength of the Afghan National Security Forces. While each of these topics could merit their own books, his extensive analytical experience put him in an ideal position to discuss these critical issues further.

His final conclusion, the Taliban will ultimately lose the war because of cruel and regressive tendencies, is appealing for Westerners but not necessarily supported by historical facts. While most of the world may share this hope, the Taliban's first rise to power in the mid-1990s should be a vivid reminder that barbarous insurgents have defeated their kinder, morally superior opponents in the past.

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Ahmed Rashid's book entitled *Taliban* served as the handbook for soldiers and intelligence officials on their way to war, as well as a guide for Americans struggling to understand an obscure enemy in a distant land. Today, Mark Silinsky's *The Taliban* can serve a similar purpose. While America's role in the war is coming to an end, this book will be valuable to the small contingent of soldiers and civilians deploying to Afghanistan as well as Americans seeking answers after 13 years of war.

## **Adapting to Win: How Insurgents Fight and Defeat Foreign States**

By Noriyuki Katagiri

Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, Adjunct Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

*Adapting to Win* is written by Dr. Noriyuki Katagiri, a political scientist, who presently teaches at the Air War College. It is derived from his 2010 dissertation "Evolving to Win: Sequencing Theory of Extra-systemic Warfare" at the University of Pennsylvania. The book represents over five years of research and study on this topical area and benefits from a great deal of support, including fellowships – in both the United States and Japan. As a result, the work is extensively researched, tightly designed, and is both well written and innovative. It represents a very polished product drawing upon the Correlates of War (COW) data spanning the years 1816 to 2010.

The intent of the book is to present "...an alternative research project to the mainstream body of security studies that until recently been fixated on great power interstate conflict and civil wars" and "...to enrich the policy-making community through the study of what lessons powerful states can learn to fight foreign insurgencies (4)." It focuses on



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320 pages  
\$69.65



the concept of “extrasystemic” wars, which are a blending of civil wars in which “...a foreign government intervenes in a civil war on either side (5).” The work proposes insurgents use conflict phase-sequencing (conceptually derived from evolutionary biology and evident in revolutionary warfare) as they attempt to prevail in taking over a state.

Six models of extrasystemic war based on sequencing are evident. Each model witnesses from one to three phases derived from conventional war, guerilla war, and state-building as the starting point. The first four models (Conventional, Primitive, Degenerative, and Premature) are quite common, only possess one or two stages, and typically fail. The last two models (Maoist and Progressive—a Maoist variant) are rare, possess all three stages, and typically see their insurgencies succeed. Table 3: Six Models of Extrasystemic War (49) helps to highlight the various models and phases. Not surprisingly, “The central argument of this book is that insurgent groups are likely to defeat foreign states in war when they achieve an orderly combination of three phases: state building, guerilla war, and conventional war” (169) which is very Maoist-insurgency oriented.


The work is divided into nine chapters: how insurgents fight and defeat foreign states in war, origins and proliferation of sequencing, how sequencing theory works, presentations of the six sequencing models and case studies (the Conventional model—Dahomean war, 1890-1914, Primitive model—Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960, Degenerative model—Iraq War, 2003-2011, Premature model—Anglo-Somali War, 1900-1920, Maoist model—Guinean War of Independence, 1963-1974, and Progressive model—Indochina War, 1946-1954), and a conclusion.

Criticism of this work focuses solely on the COW data. The author has done a phenomenal job of analyzing the data. But since data drive analysis, their use is problematic from the perspective of the reviewer. Nineteenth-century extrasystemic war data are given the same value as contemporary data, which ignores the fact that the international environment is dynamic—not static—meaning the host environments in which states exist dramatically change over time. Thus, the data value of at least the first hundred extrasystemic wars should be questioned—although Fig 3: “How extrasystemic wars change over time” (48) does help to show which models are dominant over which periods, with the once highly occurring Conventional model fading away by 1960.

Further, late twentieth-century extrasystemic wars with continuity into the early 21st century have proven themselves very different from those of the past. These wars are represented by later #146-148 (COW 476-New data) case studies referring to Soviet-Afghan (1980-1989), Somalia (1992-1995), and Iraq (2003-2011) along with other conflicts not included in the work—Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq (post-2010) and the cartels in Mexico and Central America (which do not fit the typical insurgency profile and may or may not be considered extrasystemic). These conflicts exist in a security environment in which the illicit economy is pronounced, the Westphalian state system is under increasing pressure, and the preferred non-state actor goal is to create “other-than” nation-state organizational forms (eg. Caliphate or narco rule). Thus, they are “historically dissociative” from earlier insurgency types and in variance with most of the COW extrasystemic war listings.

In summation, this a superb and innovative work on historical “insurgency phase sequencing” utilizing the COW data. The question scholars, policymakers, and practitioners must ask themselves, however, is how much of data are out of synchronization with twenty-first century insurgency? The more it is, of course, the more the concluding analysis presented in this work must be considered with a critical eye. Still, some of the work’s major policy suggestions—such as “...consider[ing] wartime evolution of enemies as a central part of its strategy making in future engagements in irregular war” (175) and curbing insurgent evolution by denying them weapons, and creating a rival political structure (175)—are inherently sound. This leaves us with a bit of a conundrum as to the lessons of this work, which will ultimately come down to one’s confidence in the utility of the COW data. What cannot be denied, however, is the sequencing theory may also have potential for utility in other areas of security studies. It would, therefore, be wise to keep abreast of Dr. Katagiri’s future work, and track his use of this form of analysis as it matures and is applied to other internal security phenomena.

## WAR &amp; TECHNOLOGY



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Press, 2013  
352 pages  
\$29.95

## Napalm: An American Biography

By Robert M. Neer

Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, Adjunct Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, former Minerva Chair and Distinguished Visiting Professor

Dr. Robert Neer, an attorney and core lecturer in the History Department at Columbia University, has written a splendid and important book on the history—one could say the rise and fall—of the incendiary weapon, napalm. The author’s specialization in twentieth and twenty-first century US military power is evident in his writing of this extremely well researched and balanced work. The term napalm initially derived from “...the first two letters of naphthenate with the first four letters of palmitate,” (32) but later had no chemical meaning as the composition changed to a different metal-soap and gasoline-gel formula. The fact scientists at Harvard in early World War II undertook the actual composition and weaponization of napalm, and Neer’s book was published by a Harvard University Press, seems quite an appropriate way to close the loop on this weaponry saga.

One might ask why a book on napalm is needed. Unbeknownst to many readers, is the stark reality that the fire bombings of Japan in World War II utilizing napalm filled incendiary devices caused far more urban devastation and killed more of the Japanese populace than the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined. Napalm also represented a deadly workhorse weapon in the island fighting campaigns against Japan and was commonly used against massed North Korean and Chinese attacks in the Korean War, and against guerrillas and infantry targets throughout the Vietnam War. This weapon also saw earlier use in Europe in World War II, against northern urban targets in the Korean War, and has been utilized in other regions throughout the world. Hence napalm, representative of mass-produced industrial-age weapons, played an incredibly important part in America’s past wars and deserves to have its story told.

The work is divided into thematic sections entitled Hero, Soldier, and Pariah along with a prologue and epilogue, and notes, acknowledgements, an index, and quite a few historical photos and drawings. Five “hero” chapters exist and cover the need for development of napalm through its use in the island fighting campaigns of World War II and into the mass fire bombing of Japanese cities. The soldier theme comprises four chapters focusing primarily on the use of napalm in Korea and Vietnam along with the increasing criticism of its use in the later war as its unpopularity rose at home. The “pariah” chapters are five in number and chronicle how both US public and international views on napalm have soured and view use of the weapon as tantamount to a war crime.

The many stories woven together and insights provided about the development, history, and use of napalm are not only highly informative but also provide a good read. A compressed weapons systems lifecycle


from the entrepreneurial through the institutionalized and later the satirized phases is readily evident: from Harvard tennis players fleeing during the initial field test in July 1942 (entrepreneurial), the Island campaigns and later firebombing of Japan in 1943-1945, its use in the Korean War in 1950-1952, and in Vietnam in 1963-1972 (institutionalized), and the anti-napalm arms control movement that picked up synergy with the infamous photo of a naked nine year old Vietnamese girl—Kim Phúc—burned by napalm and the subsequent “Napalm Sticks to Kids” cadence-song parody (1972), the surreal scenes from the movie “Apocalypse Now” (1979) related to napalm use, and other negative elements promoted by popular culture (satirized).

The book contains many gems of information including highlights of the work of Harvard professor Louis Fieser and his team in developing napalm, the metrics behind testing napalm in both optimizing its weaponization characteristics and its effectiveness in burning down various forms of structures, and discussions and analyses of its battlefield use from mid-World War II into the modern era. The early ill-fated attempt to combine napalm with bats for delivery purposes is also covered along with perspectives on international law and legitimate forms of weaponry—including increased hostility to land mines and cluster munitions—affecting what can now be used in early twenty-first century warfare.

This reviewer very much agrees with the author’s contention that no mention of this weapon should be made openly in this day and age and “...napalm violates the spirit of contemporary civilization” (222). Of course, various interpretations and exceptions to the III Protocol of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CWC) still exist concerning the use of incendiary weapons in civilian areas allowing states some flexibility in the munitions that they deploy (222).

During its heyday, napalm was representative of an older style of attrition-based warfare between competing sovereign states. For this reason, Neer’s work should be considered both a biography of an important US borne-and-bred weapon as well as a commentary on how war has changed over the last seven decades. In many ways, this time was a much simpler and straightforward one, unlike what Army professionals now face. Today’s world is one in which napalm—whose imagery and effects do not play well on global news and social media—has become politically toxic.

In summation, the work is highly readable and informative with few flaws—the location of Pomona College where an anti-napalm sit-in took place in 1967 was misidentified (131), for instance. The author did a great job from the initial research through the book’s structure, writing, and editing and has to be commended for his efforts. The work has primary applicability for courses on strategic use of airpower (Pacific theater), close air support (CAS) operations during World War II through Vietnam, and the evolution of incendiary and flame weapons from early “Greek fire,” fire pots, and flamethrowers into more modern fuel-air and thermobaric weapons. It also provides us with numerous vignettes into the human costs of war and insights into how contentious the Vietnam era protests were. This book may have some secondary utility for courses on changing perspectives on international law and civil-military relations during times of national duress.



Washington, DC:  
Potomac Press, 2013  
313 pages  
\$45.00

## Air Mobility: A Brief History of the American Experience

By Robert C. Owen

Reviewed by Jill Sargent Russell, Doctoral Candidate in War Studies, King's College London

When people speak of the might of airpower, the first thought is bombing. Save for nuclear weapons, however, the decisive influence of air-delivered destruction remains debatable. On the other hand, remembering the term actually includes air mobility—transport and lift by air—argues for that part of the capability to be considered a game changer in warfare. Robert Owen's *Air Mobility: A Brief History of the American Experience* provides a narrative which makes this interpretation compelling. His book intends a significant task, to recount the rise of a pillar in 20th century American power within the framework of an age which saw major changes in warfare. Opening with air mobility's first awkward steps which accelerate with its growth, maturation and emergence as a decisive force in war, Owen's narrative covers many issues; hardware, personnel and training, organisation and structure, tactics, doctrine, strategy and politics, and the influence of wars all receive attention. Despite this complexity he weaves a sensible narrative from these threads, effecting a comprehensive review of a long historical arc. What he has written is a biography of a capability formed of a complex mix of platforms servicing diversified missions through the fluxuations of rapid development. This review focuses on the key elements—detail, narrative methodology, and decisive points in the history that deserve highlighting—which shape the quality of the work and its place on a bookshelf or in a syllabus.

Before moving on to the substance of the review, it is worth noting the book is titled in a way that belies how engagingly written it is. Given the dull caricature of a subject like logistics it would be unfortunate for some to pass it by for its unassuming presence. In this age of hype, Owen's book under-promises on its cover and over-delivers in its content.

Promised as a "brief history," the narrative covers the critical points in the trajectory of air mobility's rise. This promise might be its arguable flaw for, in brevity, the focus and detail must be constrained. Nonetheless, in a book just over 300 pages it would be foolish to expect such breadth or depth. It is entirely defensible to tell the story primarily through the lens of the United States Air Force. Secondly, the work must lack much of the detail of any given era or event. Despite these limitations, Owen renders a sufficiently thorough story of air mobility's rise and one that is well-integrated with the greater 20th century history.

The history reads as a biography with a twist. Although roughly chronological, the narrative proceeds as a series of vignettes critical to the growth of air mobility. It is an engaging approach to a biography, because individual chapters can stand nearly on their own, as with those on the Berlin Crisis and the integration of air mobility and combat in Vietnam. The first, recounting the standoff with Stalin over the fate of Berlin, provides the substance behind a strategically effective act of military symbolism, captured by the iconic image of "Airborne" Candy

Bar Diplomacy for what it meant about the resolve and logistical might of the allies. The second reveals the innovative application of rotary lift in the Vietnam War to landpower's advantages in battle, giving air mobility its bite and shaping successive American military operations.

Other chapters explain how and why air mobility developed as it did. To frame doctrinal developments that defined future capabilities, Owen engages the Congressional military airlift hearings in 1960. Seemingly relatively mild and prosaic events, they are rendered as the hammer and anvil that shaped air mobility and warfare in later decades. Alternatively, the contentious acquisition history of the C-17 highlights the complicated dynamics ruling the development of critical platforms. Withal, the structure of this book engages the reader and serves its story well.

Finally, for what they reveal about military technological development, the first chapters on the infancy of air mobility beckon for further scholarly attention. Chronicling the interaction between commercial, civil service, and military activities in the emergence of the aircraft's use to move troops and materiel, Owen depicts the decisive role civilians played in the early years of airborne lift. Such actors as the postal service and commercial aviation were, in fact, the first to use aircraft to move personnel and materiel when the military used this capability only as support to aviation units. This multi-faceted relationship is important for its role in air mobility's story, but also for the questions and insights it suggests for the contemporary era of technological transformation in the military. This is a compelling case study, which should inspire inquiry elsewhere in the history of military technology and development.

Finally, it is necessary to place this book for the reader. Among thematic surveys like Marc Levinson's *The Box* (2006), Owen's work rates highly, especially for bringing attention to a neglected corner of military history. Considered in terms of biography, it works as the briefest sketch which provides the fullest picture, reminiscent of the virtues of Mark Stoler on *George Marshall, Soldier Statesman of the American Century* (1989). It is thus quite easy to hold it out to the military historian as worthy for reading and classroom use, and I might further specifically recommend it to the USAF as a necessary reminder of its full profile. A better appreciation of air mobility might argue for it as the "King of Air Battle," which is not a half-bad achievement for a brief history.


## **The Unseen War: Allied Airpower and the Takedown of Saddam Hussein**

By Benjamin S. Lambeth

Reviewed by Dr. Conrad C. Crane, Chief of Historical Services, US Army Heritage and Education Center

After describing the overwhelming 2003 campaign to topple Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Stephen Budiansky closes his book *Air Power* (2004) with this passage:

The great historical joke on airmen was that after having struggled for a century to escape the battlefield in their quest for equal status and independence – having fought so many bitter battles to free themselves from the indignity of providing “mere support” to ground forces – it was on the



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480 pages  
\$59.95

battlefield where air power finally achieved not merely equality, but its claim to ascendancy.

That quote has caused very lively debates in classrooms at the Army War College, and now Benjamin Lambeth has provided the most thorough evaluation available of airpower's role in the 23 days of formal conventional combat that began Operation Iraqi Freedom. Lambeth is the most eloquent and enthusiastic writer on American airpower today. Though published by Naval Institute Press, his study was initially written for RAND under the sponsorship of US Air Forces Central (AFCENT), known until 2009 as US Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF). Lambeth does not claim quite as much as Budiansky, but he does argue "counterland air attack has increasingly begun to move doctrinally beyond solely the classic supporting roles of CAS (direct support) and air interdiction (indirect support) toward missions that are not intended just to support the friendly ground force, but rather to destroy the enemy's army directly and independently as the overall main weight of effort." (296) Readers who are prone to discount such assertions as USAF hype need to read Lambeth's account and think seriously about the implications of what he has to say.

While the beginning of OIF was "an all but flawless undertaking by joint and combined forces" including not only land components but indispensable contributions from "virtually the entire spectrum of allied, air, maritime and space capabilities," (4) Lambeth points out correctly the air campaign has been underreported in postwar accounts of the march on Baghdad. This was not only due to the lack of embedded reporters with air units, but also because the continuing violence in Iraq quickly overshadowed the early successes. There was far more coverage of air operations in 1991, with the long period of initial bombing before the ground attack was launched.

Lambeth aims to fill the gaps, and does so admirably. He describes the high-level planning in Washington and in headquarters at CENTCOM and CENTAF. The initial "shock and awe" plan was modified by desires to limit noncombatant casualties and to preserve infrastructure, and by General Tommy Franks' decision to attack early. That meant CENTAF's major air offensive started 28 hours after ground forces had begun their advance and had overrun many areas. As a result, only 39 percent of leadership or command and control targets initially scheduled for attack would be struck during the three-week air campaign.

However, air power had already done much with both kinetic and static operations to prepare the battlespace. Airmen in the No-Fly Zones had already suppressed Iraqi air defenses and gathered a great deal of valuable intelligence. After the full air campaign began on the night of March 21st, the nonstop precision bombardment by ground and carrier based aircraft "so resoundingly paved the way for allied ground forces that the entrance of the latter into Baghdad was a virtual fait accompli." (127) Republican Guard units around the city lost over 1000 of their 2500 tanks before they were engaged by any ground elements. Losses for other defending divisions were even more severe, severely reducing possible resistance on every front.

Lambeth spends a chapter highlighting the biggest reasons for such overwhelming success. These include improvements in air-ground

coordination and force connectivity, more time-sensitive targeting capability, better command and control, contributions from UAVs and J-STARS, and better and more inertially-aided munitions. He is also frank that Iraqi blunders and ineptitude helped. But there were still some problems encountered. Fratricide still occurred, and the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment's attempt at a deep attack failed miserably. There were difficulties coordinating joint battlespace, especially with Fire Support Coordination Lines, and some continuing shortfalls in integration and information sharing. One persistent major deficiency is the delayed process of Battle Damage Assessment, that not only lessens our own ability to evaluate and follow up operations effectively, but also gives our enemies time to control the flow of information concerning raids.

This well documented and well written book deserves serious consideration by anyone who desires to understand the current capabilities of American airpower and its role in modern war. Even as Lambeth heralds a new era where the United States has finally mastered high-intensity conventional warfare, he admits the same era also has produced "a refined mode of fourth generation asymmetric warfare" (309) to counter that preferred American methodology, and no acumen in tactics or operations can make up for flawed strategy. His closing comments, written against the backdrop of continuing strife in Iraq and Afghanistan, are more somber than Budiansky's. For Lambeth, the most enduring lesson from OIF about modern warfare "surely must be that even the most capable air weapon imaginable can never be more effective than the strategy it is intended to underwrite." (311)

## **From Above: War, Violence, and Verticality**


Edited by Peter Adey, Mark Whitehead, and Alison J. Williams

Reviewed by Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Major General (USAF Retired)

For intellectual plebeians like your reviewer, any book with a made-for-academia word like "verticality" in its title might be a bit off-putting. And, indeed, much or most of *From Above* is written for – and by – academics. The majority of the predominantly British contributors are professors of geography or the liberal arts. They are not specialists in military or strategic matters.

It would be a mistake, however, for military professionals to dismiss this volume because important chunks of it do, in fact, build the reader's intellectual database in a positive and insightful way. Moreover, it allows those who do have expertise in related military or strategic matters the opportunity to see how other thoughtful thinkers view their craft.

"Verticality," it seems, is professor-speak to describe the aerial view. According to the editors, this perspective has brought about "seismic shifts" for "life on the ground." They add that the book "makes significant moves to understand the view from above within the pathos and passions of the societies that have produced and consume[d] it, perspective that art, literature and other forms of expression have been more used to exploring."



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Hurst Publishing, 2014  
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\$30.52 (paper)



Perhaps so, but the approach the editors took presents real challenges to creating a coherent narrative as there are, in addition to the triumvirate of editors, thirteen different contributors, each of whom penned separate chapters. Getting a baker's dozen of academics to fit into any sort of logical framework is no small task. In their effort to do so, the editors divided the writings into three sections, respectively entitled "Science, Militarism and Distance;" "Aerial Aesthetics, Distortion and the View from Below;" and "From the Close to the Remote." Along with an energetic - and editorially heroic - organizational effort in the introduction, they sought to provide a context for chapters diverse not just in subject matter, but in style - and verbosity - as well.

The results were mixed, and will likely mean readers will skim or skip some chapters. For sure, a couple may be obtuse to all but the most dedicated specialist. Others - such as one laboriously entitled "Project Transparent Earth and the Autopsy of Aerial Targeting: The Visual Geopolitics of the Underground" - contain some nuggets but only if one perseveres long enough to discover them.

Still, there are, however, a few gems. The chapter on balloons is fascinating, tracing not just the technical development, but also with the psychological impact the then never-before-experienced aerial perspectives had. The author highlights individuals who grasped the military potential of verticality along with the contribution that ballooning made to "militarized aeromobility."

In his chapter, "Line of Decent," Canadian Professor Derek Gregory grapples not so much with verticality (though he sprinkles such terms as "political technology of vision" and "visuality"), but with the whole notion of aerial attack and the risk to civilians by surveying such operations from World War II bombings through drone operations in contemporary conflicts. He does an able job trying to discern the propriety of an operator striking a target from a distance vis-à-vis the risk to innocents on the ground, ultimately concluding - somewhat reluctantly it seems - that "it is a mistake to turn distance into a moral absolute."

Separate chapters address the idea of establishing and maintaining sovereignty and control via aerial means in the Falklands and also in colonial Iraq. The latter, while interesting, slides into a largely uninformed discussion of drone use in contemporary operations. Another chapter with the attention-grabbing title of "Targeting Affective Life from Above: Morale and Airpower" simply does not deliver much more than a hostile assessment that might have been more effective if it was better informed not just by the law of armed conflict, but also by a better understanding of targeting in general.

Hostility towards the military instrument flavors the entire book. For example, the much-anticipated chapter on drones is disappointing, mainly because the contributor's obvious disapproval of the technology would lead the uninformed reader to think the aircraft were autonomous weapons' systems as opposed to ones under human control.

In fact, in more than one chapter, reference to "verticality" or the "view from above" earns little more than a nod from the contributor who will then write something that may only be tangentially related. Thus, for example, a chapter entitled the "Scopic Regime of Rapid Dominance" is more a critique - and a debatable one at that - of the

Revolution in Military Affairs, the rise of precision weaponry, and effects-based operations – than “verticality” per se.


The book is also burdened by dense and ponderous writing. Consider this virtually unintelligible (to this reader anyway) passage from the chapter on photomosaics (the process of matching individual aerial photos to form a more comprehensive view):

According to this biaxial scheme, the vertical is the axis of order, paradigm, symbolic function, disutility, unimpeded sightlines and disembodied omniscience, whereas to the horizontal belong disorder, syntagm, enunciative function, utility, partial sight lines and exposure to visibility.

Whatever all that means. Sure, such language may be lucid to photomosaic experts, but in a volume which embraces such a broad range of scientific and artistic disciplines, it is unlikely that more than a few readers would.

In the end *From Above* does accomplish its mission in the sense that the reader does come away convinced the “verticality” perspective is fundamentally unique, and impacts perceptions of the ground environment more than one might think. Not for everyone’s bookshelf, but an intriguing addition for the scholarly-inclined servicemember as it is a quintessentially academic take on matters the military professional might see very differently.

## THE FIRST &amp; SECOND WORLD WARS



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312 pages  
\$25.95

## Challenge of Battle: The Real Story of the British Army in 1914

By Adrian Gilbert

Reviewed by COL Douglas V. Mastriano, PhD, Department of Military Strategy  
Plans & Operations, US Army War College

*Challenge of Battle: The Real Story of the British Army in 1914* by Adrian Gilbert is a modern retelling of the experience of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in the opening months of the First World War. Corresponding to the Centennial of the Great War, Gilbert wrote the book to offer a “realistic assessment” of the BEF. Citing distortions in the historic record, the author tried “to look afresh at the British Army during 1914” by using first-person accounts and primary archival sources.

*Challenge of Battle* begins with an exciting account of the celebrated Major Tom Bridges of the 4<sup>th</sup> Royal Dragoon Guards in Mons, Belgium on August 21, 1914. The reader is given a gripping description of the opening engagement of the war between the BEF and the Imperial German Army. After this stirring introduction, *Challenge of Battle* provides background to the BEF assembling in Great Britain and its movement across France and Belgium. Filled with personal commentary from soldiers, this book provides an excellent feel to the general mood of the BEF as it prepared to fight the German army.

After a brief description of the fighting near Mons, Belgium, *Challenge of Battle* offers an interesting description of the tragic retreat of the BEF in the face of overwhelming German force. This retreat is hampered by poor coordination with the French army, a breakdown in command and control, and lack of situational awareness. This situation, combined with reliance on antiquated tactics, brings the BEF close to destruction by the German army. After surviving the retreat, the BEF, together with the French Army counterattack and force the Germans to dig in. Thus, trench warfare becomes the defining feature of the Western Front for the next four years.

*Challenge of Battle* lives up to the author’s desire to offer a fresh look at the BEF. Without being revisionist, Adrian Gilbert provides the reader an honest assessment of the BEF’s performance, leadership and tactics in 1914. The book concludes the BEF was hampered by lack of command and control, outdated Napoleonic tactics, poor integration of artillery, infantry, cavalry and aviation and the lack of an efficient noncommissioned officer corps. These issues alone could be fatal to an army, but to compound the matter, its commander, Field Marshal John French, did not trust his counterpart, French Fifth Army Commander, General Charles Lanzerac. Adrian Gilbert says the result of this lack of trust meant, “...both armies, although deployed side-by-side, would operate and fight separately.” This situation nearly had catastrophic results for the BEF, demonstrating that personal relationships matter more than we often realize.

Although providing an excellent assessment of the BEF in 1914, *Challenge of Battle* does have several areas of concern. Foremost is the

inadequate use of German sources. One would expect a scholar to approach this topic from multiple perspectives in order to offer a more accurate history. There is perhaps no better way to offer a “fresh new look” than to see what the adversary had to say about the BEF. Yet, Gilbert uses few firsthand German sources. Also, there are virtually no French sources; the reader is left to wonder what the French view of the BEF was. Instead, we have merely the British view of the British Expeditionary Force.

Another issue is *Challenge of Battle* rehashes some analysis from Terrance Zuber’s book, *The Mons Myth*. This is problematic for serious historians. Zuber has made a habit of claiming certain ideas or events are myths that he, of course, debunks. His books have included, *The Moltke Myth* and *Inventing the Schlieffen Plan*. The latter of these was written with the idea that the Schlieffen Plan never existed (it did). Yet, some of Zuber’s ideas related to Schlieffen have been rebuffed, bringing into question his assertions on other topics. For more on this debate, see *The Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives on the German Strategy for World War I*, edited by Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans, and Gerhard P. Gross. English translation edited by David T. Zabecki, USA (Ret.)

With these concerns aside, *Challenge of Battle* is an interesting book that offers a refreshing look at the performance of the BEF in 1914. Adrian Gilbert strips away the sentimentality, without being revisionist, and provides an excellent overview of the British Expeditionary Force in the critical first few months of that catastrophic war. This book is a welcome addition to those arriving during the Centennial commemoration of that terrible period of history.

## Monty’s Men: The British Army and the Liberation of Europe

By John Buckley

Reviewed by Dr. James D. Scudieri, CRGT Research Analyst, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center (AHEC), US Army War College

This work on WW II appears very much revisionist, but it is not truly some radical revelation. Rather, it restores balance in light of previous, incomplete analyses and/or simplifications to the point of simplistic. The specific issue concerns the generally negative assessments of the British Liberation Army (BLA) in the Campaign in North West Europe (NWE), 1944-45. The focus covers Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery and mostly the British troops in 21<sup>st</sup> Army Group.

The Introduction in Chapter 1 begins with a sweeping review of historiography from soon after war’s end to the present day. This array of key WW II historians includes B. H. Liddell Hart, Max Hastings, Carlo d’Este, Cornelius Ryan, Anthony Beevor, Robert Citino, and some WW II films.

First, comparisons with their German counterparts have failed to examine the entire picture. Some post-war German interrogations and memoirs were attempts to demonstrate an apolitical distance from the Nazi regime. Second, troop effectiveness came at heavy cost. SS units exhibited great fanaticism. Compulsion in German units, when punishments could extend to entire families, not just the soldiers, attained



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serious levels. There does remain a question how the Germans had institutionalized tactical skill so thoroughly, despite heavy casualties, beyond fanaticism and fear. His dissection of the BLA leaves no such open question.

He articulates quite definitively that the BLA was a drafted, citizen army with much different government and attitudes, working towards different operational, strategic, and policy goals. The challenge was forging an effective military instrument to defeat Germany and retain it as a bargaining chip of sorts for the post-war world. Chapter 2 thus describes the army which Churchill launched across the Channel: strengths, weaknesses, preparation, and training. This chapter is important to understand the military culture with its concepts, doctrine, and techniques how best to wield the instrument. The BLA in June 1944 in general was well trained, but largely inexperienced.

The remaining chapters describe the campaign chronologically. Each one has considerable breadth and depth of carefully-explained detail. Chapter 3 covers D-Day and the first weeks back on the continent. He believes that the complexity of pre-invasion planning did not integrate the most-current intelligence, and unknown were certain 21<sup>st</sup> Panzer Division deployments along the route for the rapid seizure of Caen. Chapter 4 goes into the bloody fighting at Caen. Of particular note is Montgomery's major alteration to Operation Goodwood against the intent of British 2<sup>nd</sup> Army commander Lt. Gen. Miles Dempsey. Chapter 5 covers the ensuing, frustrating stalemate and reviews the state of BLA tactics, techniques, and procedures. Chapter 6 analyzes the breakout situation in late July which led to the British execution of Operation Bluecoat and the ramifications for the famous Falaise Gap later. Chapter 7 concerns the pursuit. It analyzes BLA capability and capacity, among which the skills of the Royal Engineers (RE) figure prominently, and aspects of the broad front or narrow thrust debate.

Buckley's assessment of Operation Market-Garden in Chapter 8 believes the key question is how it came so close to success, since it was "poorly conceived, ill considered, and deeply flawed" in higher-level planning, giving due recognizance to Allied victory disease. His crux is that the concept asked the BLA to accomplish a mission "for which it was not mentally equipped." He also addresses the issues of the degree of German recovery, the operation's air support writ large, and the relationship to Montgomery's attempt for a "semi-independent strategy."

Chapter 9 discusses the BLA's depressing winter of 1944 under adverse weather conditions. The main effort became the long-delayed clearance of the Scheldt Estuary to open Antwerp. Buckley also explains that the failure of Market-Garden to achieve a Rhine crossing still provided an active front. Chapter 10 covers multiple aspects of the Rhine crossing to the end of the war, a period still full of action, as the BLA fought on German soil.

This review can only highlight examples of Buckley's meticulous attention to detail. Continuous assessment explains how the BLA was in fact a learning organization, albeit one which had given short shrift to a unified army doctrine. The evolution of tank-infantry cooperation rightfully receives a lot of attention, as does the reliance on a powerful artillery and dominant air support. He also cites the development of a

risk-averse culture. The analysis includes specific assessments of units from division-level and below, including their evolution over time, as well as veterans vs. green troops with appropriate statistical analysis of available disciplinary, medical, and other data.

Despite extant biographies, there has been an historical tendency to focus British actions in NWE on Montgomery. This assessment has refreshing balance with meaningful discussion of 2<sup>nd</sup> Army's Lt. Gen. Miles Dempsey and VIII Corps' Lt. Gen. Richard O'Connor, famed tactical commander of Operation Compass in 1940 in the Western Desert. A further look at short-lived 8<sup>th</sup> Army commander Lt. Gen Neil Ritchie of XII Corps would have been welcome.

*Monty's Men* is a must read. The level of nuanced and sophisticated analysis is impressive. He assesses the breadth of evidence, both primary and secondary, whether the good, the bad, or the ugly. Their juxtaposition and interaction were complex. Buckley places the tactical detail in operational and strategic contexts. Finally, the perceived accomplishments and shortcomings of the BLA had major ramifications in the immediate post-war period to create the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) which supported NATO.

