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In reviewing Paul Rahe’s *The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta*, I am faced with a dilemma, just as the Spartans’ so-called “grand strategy” confronted from the 6th through 4th centuries B.C. Rahe’s volume, in his projected trilogy dedicated to “diplomacy and war” of classical Sparta, is richly detailed and elegantly written, yet the work fails to encompass the title, losing its theme in the densely detailed text. (xv) The Spartans could not easily project power given the inherently limited demographic base of its slavocracy, which its complex oligarchy had established in the southern Peloponnese. Yet Sparta risked irreplaceable Spartiate casualties when giving battle to suppress, in succession, the neighboring Argives, the invading Persians (and their Greek allies), the Athenians, and the Thebans. Spartan “grand strategy,” as Rahe would have it, succeeded over the better part of three centuries before collapsing under its flawed demographic calculus, while it was a necessity to the “freedom” of the Greek *poleis*. His tome is also requisite, but based on an apparatus of an underdeveloped strategic theme.

Rahe begins by detailing the peculiar (and immoral) Spartan social system, which was ultimately the basis for its grand strategy. *The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta* serves as a critical reminder to those engaged in crafting strategy at the national level that the ends, ways, and means of strategy dedicated to projecting state power ultimately derive potency from its particular political community. For this aspect alone, Rahe’s book is important. He succeeds in tying the scant-in-numbers-pure-birth Spartan male warrior class, which was cultivated at a young age to endure incredible hardships in a violent barracks life away from the nuclear family and resting on slave labor working the nearby fields, to the city-state’s reticence to deploy military force. As Spartans could not intermarry with the surrounding Helot or Messenian slave class or outsiders, and were only allowed clandestine conjugal visits, while also suffering increasing casualties from endemic conflict, this was a recipe for demographic disaster. With skill, Rahe links this system to the necessity of fighting in a turbulent half-millennium that required the ultimate committing of Spartiates to defend Spartan and Greek freedom, from the Persian menace, as detailed in this volume.

Rahe is not the first scholar to make the claim for the “clash of civilizations,” with the Persian threat, as he refers to it, but does not incorporate this salient body of knowledge. (xiii) Victor Davis Hanson’s *The Western War of War and Carnage and Culture* established this paradigm in the literature decades ago, but there is neither reference in Rahe’s first volume to these works, nor the scholarly debate, which ensued (although he very briefly acknowledges A.R. Burns’ fifty-year old Persia and the Greeks, 391). Perhaps he addresses this in the future volumes, but as it stands here, this is an oversight. More of a detractor from this
work given his focus on “grand strategy,” is Rahe’s failure to establish a viable framework for what he means by this term. In today’s parlance, “strategy” is very much a debated, fluid, idea (see Colin Gray, Antulio Echevarria, Lawrence Freedman et al), and Rahe leaves it to the fifth footnote of the Prologue to attempt any meaningful relation. Given the fecundity of detail in this volume, an occasional reminder of the theme of Spartan strategy interwoven in the elegant text would have served as a signpost to the reader. Spartan strategy is infrequently mentioned from the Prologue through the Ionian revolt, a third of the way through the book.

The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta is suitable for a specialist audience. This passage serves as an example of this challenging read:

On the first occasion, ‘the men of the plain’ near Athens itself, led by a shadowy figure named Lycurgus (almost certainly a member of the Eteobutad clan), joined with ‘the men of the shore’ from the coastal areas near Cape Sunium, led by Megacles, scion of the Alcmaeonid clan, to overwhelm Peisistratus’ supporters—‘the men from the hills’—and drive the bodyguards he had been voted by the Athenian assembly from their perch on the acropolis. (79)

The level of detail, while indispensable for the scholar, will pose a tough slog for the non-specialist.

These criticisms aside, Rahe’s work serves as a repository, dealing with a myriad of important topics, not the least of which is the inner-workings of the Persian regime that posed a critical threat to the freedom of the Greek poleis. Sparta was the crucial component in the intra-city-state defense against the Persian Empire and its Greek allies, and its viability, though ultimately secured on a quicksand demographic system, served to protect Greek freedom from its establishment through the rise of Macedon. Add this edition to your classical library.

Toward a New Maritime Strategy: American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era
By Peter D. Haynes

Reviewed by Martin N. Murphy, political-strategic analyst and Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax and Visiting Fellow at the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies at King’s College, London.

It is asserted frequently, particularly in naval circles, that America is a “maritime nation.” This is, at the very least, questionable. The reason it falls short of being a maritime nation, and therefore a maritime power, is the question this authoritative and meticulously written book seeks to answer.

Haynes makes three main points: the US Navy’s ability to write strategy is fundamentally flawed and, as a result, the strategies it has pursued since the end of the Cold War have, with a single exception, been as flawed as the process that made them.

Haynes’ research provides the reader with an extraordinary history of the intellectual thinking, political pressure, bureaucratic infighting,
personalities and budgetary constraints that have shaped strategy making in the Department of the Navy over this time. Colin Gray is correct when he writes in his endorsement that “it will make uncomfortable reading to many, but read it they must.”

From Haynes’ analysis three particularly disturbing trends stand out. First, naval strategy, as it is practiced by the US Navy, consists of day-to-day policy and program choices. This may have delivered sufficient superiority during the long years of Soviet containment but, when that ended, the Navy found itself bereft of the strategic skills to plot a new course and justify it to its administrative and legislative masters.

Secondly, the pursuit of jointness and the restrictions this has placed on the ability of all the individual service chiefs to influence strategy. The consequences for the Navy, for which centralized command never came naturally, have been particularly acute.

During the Cold War the US focused on military threats and the very American use of technology to solve them. In that warfare-dominated environment, the persistent application of pressure with which naval force has traditionally achieved effect was dismissed repeatedly as too slow to play any worthwhile role in defeating Soviet power. Consequently, the Navy retreated to a position where it was contingent operationally, which it achieved by ensuring it was forward deployed and offensively-minded.

The collapse of Soviet power did not usher in new strategic thinking that measured up to the momentousness of the moment. The Navy’s first post-Cold War strategic vision statement, “...From the Sea,” issued in 1992, continued to explain the Navy’s existence as being “to provide the regional CINCs with a breadth of capabilities, none more important than striking targets ashore on exceptionally short notice.” (86) The Navy effectively acquiesced to the prevailing patterns of US military thought which, following the first Gulf War, were about jointness, warfighting, and “revolutionary” precision strike. This ordering of priorities and the Navy’s willingness to accept them revealed the degree to which the Navy had lost sight of the distinction between a naval and a maritime strategy.

This is Haynes’ third point: not just to describe a flawed process but a flawed outcome. Although the ideas of “national” and “systemic” security are kept firmly separate in the minds of most naval officers and defense officials, in reality they are so closely interwoven as to be virtually indistinguishable in practice; and will continue to be unless America decides to withdraw from its global role or its economy loses its competitive edge and declines in global importance. A globalized world is an American world.

If there are any heroes in Haynes’ history they are Admiral Mike Mullen (Chief of Naval Operations, 2005 to 2007) and Mullen’s N3/5 head Vice-Admiral John Morgan. They recognized the importance of globalization and the link between the security of the global economy, naval power and US national interests, and fought to have this trinity reflected in the US Navy’s 2007 strategic vision document, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st-Century (CS21).
Although China was not mentioned directly, its analysts took a clear message from what they read. The strategy advanced an argument about the defense of the global system. They took this as meaning that the United States would defend the system it had designed and led and that the strategy was intended to help the United States retain its global leadership position. It would do it, moreover, in cooperation with other states with common interests in a secure and stable global maritime order.

Securing and sustaining that re-balance, however, found a less sympathetic audience in the land of its birth. No force structure was put in place to support CS21. The changes were, in other words, largely rhetorical. The 2015 re-write—A Cooperative Strategy for 21st-Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready—reflected this: as Haynes delicately puts it, “the more traditional approach of the Navy’s post-Cold War strategic statements” was reinstated as the re-write pursued “a narrower and more operationally focused and politically expedient route than the original.” (248) The flaws in the Navy’s strategy process had reappeared.

Peter Haynes has written an essential book. It is one everyone interested in strategy and the future of American power in the world needs to read and reflect upon. The US view of war, despite its limitations, has proved enormously successful. Yet nothing lasts forever. No view of war can persist unless its purpose is clear: why does the United States use and threaten force? One of the most important ways must be to support and defend the global political and economic system. It is, after all, primarily an American system. As Haynes concludes, regardless of where “globalization may lead,” the US Navy is the “only institution on earth currently capable of conceiving and executing a maritime strategy.” (252) Or it is until a nation with a more compelling maritime narrative emerges to replace it.
The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath
Edited by Peter Cole and Brian McQuinn

Reviewed by W. Andrew Terrill, Ph.D., Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath is an important consideration of the recent, tragic past of this tortured country. The book is an edited volume that assembles the work of a number of scholars and journalists with strong backgrounds in Libyan affairs. These contributions are divided into two major sections, (1) “the revolution and its governance” and (2) “sub-national identities and narratives.” Both of these sections are important, but the second is noticeably strengthened by a significant amount of information about Libyan activities following the rebel victory over the dictatorship of Colonel Muammar Qadhafi. Some of the chapters on Libyan minority groups, regional, and tribal groupings, and Islamist organizations are especially valuable in underscoring the divisions within Libya and the byzantine political activity both within and among Libyan sub-national groups.

The Libyan revolution began in February 2011, shortly after the ouster of the presidents of neighboring Egypt and Tunisia. These revolutions appeared to the Libyan public as thrilling examples of the rapid collapse of once seemingly invincible dictators, which correspondingly inspired them to move against the Qadhafi regime. Initially, it was not clear whether the revolutionaries were seeking to overthrow the regime or force it to reform, but as events developed, the possibility of compromise quickly evaporated. Some Libyans maintained early hopes that Qadhafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, might embrace the uprising as an opportunity for the political reform, which he had championed prior to the mid-2000s. This hope ended after Saif’s vitriolic, hardline speech of February 20, 2011. Moreover, as the revolution gained momentum and casualties mounted, neither side seemed willing to accept anything less than victory. The longevity of the fighting also made it difficult for any major Libyan group to remain neutral. In many parts of Libya, community leaders were initially wary of entering into open rebellion, but were forced to take an irrevocable stand against Qadhafi by their youth.

As the war progressed, it developed in a disorganized way along four critical fronts. These were (1) the Benghazi/Brega area, (2) the coastal city of Misrata and its surrounding areas, (3) the western Nafusa Mountains, and most importantly, (4) Tripoli, Libya’s capital city and home to almost one-fourth of the country’s population. These campaigns proceeded like four separate wars with no unified strategy and only limited communications among the rebel groups involved in the fighting. The overall leadership for the uprising was provided by the National Transitional Council (NTC), but this organization was weak, fragmented, and often unaware of key events on the battlefield until after they had occurred. The NTC also avoided asserting strong leadership because it was unelected and did not want to establish parallels with the Qadhafi regime. Adding to the confusion, many new and unknown
groups continued to emerge with little interest in finding ways to fit into any command hierarchy, except to gain supplies, weapons, and equipment. Most groups did not trust others, and one of the most important NTC leaders, General Abdal Fattah Yunis was killed in July 2011, probably by other rebels according to Peter Bartu’s chapter within this volume. While the NTC fulfilled the key responsibility of the peaceful and democratic transfer of power, it was unable to do much for Libyan national unity.

The Libyan uprising was further complicated by the attention of a number of foreign powers, including those with competing agendas for the future of that country. Mindful of the problems in Iraq, Washington did not want large numbers of Western combat forces on the ground, but the United States struck hard from the air against Qadhafi’s forces in Operation Odyssey Dawn in late March 2011. This effort was followed by European and Gulf Arab airstrikes against the regime under the umbrella of NATO’s Operation Unified Protector. Like the United States, the NTC did not want significant numbers of Western combat troops in Libya, but various countries including France and the United Kingdom sent small groups of advisors and liaison officers. Qatar became active early in the war providing trainers and significant amounts of weapons to various preferred factions including some Islamists. The Qataris, who had exceptionally bad relations with Qadhafi, were concerned that the less militant members of the NTC could eventually seek a ceasefire with the Libyan regime, and they correspondingly supported hardliners. Additionally, Qatar and a number of other countries sought to shape the post-revolutionary Libyan government by strengthening groups they favored. Rivalry between Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, which supported different local partners, was particularly fierce and may have damaged the flow of relevant information to NATO planners and targeting officers. It is not clear how much influence any external powers gained after the war since the Libyan revolutionaries were wary of a post-conflict situation dominated by external actors due to the previous example of Iraq.

Tripoli fell to the revolutionaries in August 2011, and Qadhafi was captured and killed on October 20, 2011. The victorious rebels were then faced with an extremely difficult legacy. Previously, both the monarchy and Qadhafi had adopted a divide and rule approach to governance and discouraged a unified national identity. During Qadhafi’s over 40 years in power, state institutions were deliberately neglected and even remained a subject of suspicion after the regime’s ouster. Correspondingly, there was little to build upon when the victorious revolutionaries sought to set up institutions and bureaucracies to adjudicate differences in the society or to provide services. After the defeat of the old regime, creating a functioning state out of such a fragmented society remained an ongoing crisis. Balancing representation among the former Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan, Libya’s three historic regions, was particularly challenging and divisive. There were also numerous problems over how diverse groups could cooperate and organize themselves during and after the uprising with many regional and subnational loyalties competing for the allegiance of Libyan citizens. Adding texture to the reader’s understanding of these differences, many of Libya’s most important ethnic, political, and ideological groups are considered in depth throughout the
latter section of this book, including particularly good chapters on the Amazigh (Berber), Tebu, and Tuareg minorities. The different histories, priorities, and agendas of various factions within these groups is a strong indicator of how difficult future government will be in Libya. Libya’s incorporation of unruly militias into a bloated hybrid security sector was another especially serious blow to the emergence of state authority.

In summary, this book provides a deep examination of some very complex situations and problems that modern Libyans face. Much of the information it presents is not readily available in English, and some of the material on the behavior of different sub-national groups during and after the revolution is an especially important contribution to the relevant literature. The book is not always easy reading as it examines the factions within factions throughout Libyan society and politics. It is a particularly sobering discussion for anyone who might think solving Libya’s problems will be simple or can occur by rigidly using other states as models. The situation is not hopeless, however, and progress in building a more unified national political entity still seems at least distantly possible since wealthy countries with small populations have a great deal to offer a citizenship that is able to find ways to tolerate or even respect its neighbors.

The Improbable War: China, the United States, and the Logic of Great Power Conflict
By Christopher Coker

Reviewed by Andrew Scobell, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation

This is an erudite but ultimately disappointing book. But a reader’s initial reaction is likely to be confusion. A glance at the title could easily lead to the mistaken conclusion that the thesis of the volume is that war between China and the United States is highly improbable. In fact, the author’s thesis is: “that war [between China and the United States] is not inevitable, but nor is it as improbable as many experts suggest.” (181) A reader, however, should not have to puzzle over the title or trudge through five chapters and almost two hundred pages to learn this.

The book reads like a collection of thoughtful and well-researched essays written by a political philosopher. Themed chapters explore such topics as historical analogies and strategic narratives. Professor Coker writes in flowing prose and cites an extensive array of literature. This intellectual journey is always pleasant, frequently engaging, but lacks a significant final destination. The author states he has “sought to craft stories which the reader can explore,” but a scholar of international relations should aspire to do more than weave together tales in a volume about the ominous and unnerving prospect of great power conflict between Washington and Beijing. (170)

Is the author correct in assuming China and the United States “continue to convince themselves that war is too ‘improbable’ to take seriously?” (181) Certainly, US-China relations in recent years have been filled with an array of contentious issues, including probing and finger pointing over cyber security and tensions in the South China Sea, any one of which alone could escalate into conflict. Yet the two governments
do seem intent on averting conflict. Indeed the careful stage management of the September 2015 Washington summit between Xi Jinping and Barack Obama was a clear signal that each leader strongly desires to manage the bilateral tensions. At least in ordinary times of peace—what the Pentagon refers to as “phase zero”—Professor Coker’s concern about the real possibility of a war between China and the United States may appear overly alarmist.

However, it is when tensions arise suddenly, and one side becomes overly confident in its ability to manage the crisis and to control escalation that the prospect of the United States and China stumbling into war becomes frighteningly plausible. So Professor Coker is right to highlight the potential for the “improbable war” almost imperceptibly evolving into a conceivable one.
Tarnished: Toxic Leadership in the US Military
By George E. Reed

Reviewed by COL (Ret) Charles D. Allen, Professor of Leadership and Cultural Studies, US Army War College

Yogi Berra, the American baseball icon, is known for his paradoxical quotes. For Dr. George Reed, “You don’t have to swing hard to hit a home run. If you got the timing, it’ll go” is wholly appropriate. While an Army colonel, Reed was in the inaugural cohort of the Professor US Army War College program, earned a PhD in Public Policy Analysis and Administration, and returned to Carlisle to serve as the Director of Command and Leadership Studies. At the Army War College, he was involved in a study directed by the Army Chief of Staff to explore the phenomenon of toxic leadership. Needless to say, Reed and colleague, Dr. Craig Bullis did not have to swing hard or dig deep to confirm that toxic leadership does exist within the culture of the US Army and that it has an adverse impact on the profession of arms. Thus, the timing of the initial research effort and of subsequent investigations since have resulted in a series of journal articles and this important work, Tarnished: Toxic Leadership in the US Military.

Reed begins by addressing the familiar concepts of leadership and avoiding the imbroglio of leadership theories. To do so, he adopts and presents an elegant but simple definition crafted by Dr. Joseph C. Rost where “Leadership is an influence relationship among leaders and followers who intend real changes that reflect their mutual purposes.” (viii) Reed also establishes his focus on toxic leaders who “engage in numerous destructive behaviors and who exhibit certain dysfunctional personal characteristics...[that] inflict some reasonably serious and enduring harm on their followers and their organizations.” (11)

Reed walks the reader through the various manifestations of bad behavior by leaders and the impact such behaviors have on their followers. He centers on two personality and psychological concepts that may explain why leaders are toxic—psychopathy and narcissism. Psychopathic leaders have a disorder that is hard to mitigate—not that the psychopath would have desire to change or even care about their effect on others. Narcissists may fall along a continuum and may be amenable to changing their behavior, given awareness of impact and prospects for still achieving their ambitions. After providing an understanding of potentially toxic personalities, Reed also suggests organizational culture may contribute to toxic behaviors based on the attention on results and near-term requirements. Given that the military has a bias for action and is all about tactical and operational results, it is easy to imagine how toxic leadership aligns with the stereotype of harsh military leaders.

While many military members have personal experience with bad leaders, some may discount the phenomenon by contending that, like beauty, toxic leadership is “in the eyes of the beholder.” Reed makes a convincing case that such leadership adversely affects organizational
outcomes. He also notes toxic leaders are sometimes paired with, or enabled by, toxic followers. If indeed for every two good bosses, we experience one bad boss and that becomes the primary reason for job dissatisfaction and organizational turnover, then acceptance of toxic leadership is imprudent. If leadership is an exchange relationship between leaders and followers, then followers share responsibility for the climate that exists around a focal leader.

Perhaps the most valuable contribution Reed makes is more than listing the coping skills to survive narcissistic leaders as he presents in chapter 6. Accordingly, he acknowledges “the safest course of action when confronted with toxic leaders is to suffer in silence or seek an expeditious exit.” (113) Such follower behavior perpetuates a negative climate for subsequent organizational members to endure or allows the toxic leader to carry that climate to the next assignment and organization. Reed is not Pollyannaish about the risks and consequences of confronting a toxic leader. The most adverse impact may be the backlash from the military culture that tacitly prides loyalty to commanders above all else.

_Tarnished_ is an important book for several reasons. First, it provides the vocabulary and the concepts to describe a phenomenon that persists within US military culture. Such an initial conversation generated a research report by the Center for Army Leadership. Subsequent initiatives have established processes to assess the perception of toxic leadership and its impact through annual command climate surveys across the services. Second, Reed has attempted to link toxic leadership to the highly dysfunctional occurrence of sexual misconduct. Military cultures or leadership climates that allow such behavior inflicts “reasonably serious and enduring harm on their followers and their organizations” is inherently toxic and intolerable. Last, much has been made of the trust and confidence placed in the US military as a profession of arms. Toxic leadership, where it exists, “represents a violation of the unwritten contracts with the American people about how their sons and daughters should be treated while in service to the nation.” (26)

To close with Yogi Berra, “You’ve got to be very careful if you don’t know where you are going, because you might not get there.” Reed offers an essential discourse on what many may see as an unpleasant, but necessary reality of military culture. It is imperative to military professionals that they know where they going and that how they will get there is aligned with the values and the principles they espouse. Understanding and not tolerating toxic leadership is critical to stewarding the profession of arms.

**Beyond the Band of Brothers: The US Military and the Myth that Women Can’t Fight**  
By Megan MacKenzie

Reviewed by Ellen L. Haring (Colonel, US Army Retired)

Dr. Megan MacKenzie’s newest book, _Beyond the Band of Brothers_, argues the exclusion of women from combat positions is rooted in ideas of male essentialism that are based on a myth. She convincingly...
debunks the notion “the precious and indefinable band of brothers effect so essential to winning in close combat would be irreparably compromised within mixed-gender infantry squads.” According to MacKenzie, when General Scales asserts that all of “our senior ground-force leaders, as well as generations of former close combat veterans from all of our previous wars, are virtually united on one point,” namely, that combat units would be “irreparably compromised” by women, what he is admitting is they have all been duped by a myth of their own making.

MacKenzie begins with a historical analysis of the establishment of the “band of brothers” myth. Originally a literary creation of Shakespeare subsequently perpetuated by Darwin and Freud (though Freud admitted it was not intended to be taken seriously), it became a commonly accepted, rarely questioned, “truth” about the nature of male-only bonding. MacKenzie shows how this myth subsequently informed and sustained laws and later military policies regarding servicewomen’s suitability for combat positions.

Ultimately, women’s exclusion had nothing to do with women’s actual ability to fight; rather, it had everything to do with men protecting their position as exceptional, essential, and elite. She begins by chronicling the path to how we arrived at such a policy, and how it was sustained, even as evidence mounted showing women could, and were indeed successfully integrating in fighting units.

MacKenzie details the depth of the self-deception the US military engaged in, most obviously after 9/11 as it prosecuted two wars with a growing number of women in ever-expanding roles. What made the exclusion policy increasingly untenable was the way military commanders themselves circumvented the policy to accomplish their missions. For example, co-location restrictions were violated almost from the outset, while the practice of “attaching,” (in order to avoid rules that forbade “assigning”) women to direct ground combat units became commonplace.

MacKenzie lays out the parallel and mutually supporting social phenomena that established and then sustained an emotion-based policy. Perhaps the best chapter in the book is Chapter 3 where she examines how beliefs and emotions shape policy, often to the detriment of good decision making. MacKenzie groups the arguments against women into “gut reactions, divine concerns, and threats to nature.” She then shows how gut, God, and nature are “harnessed” to seemingly objective data. By following MacKenzie’s analysis one sees how emotion, shaped by cultural norms and beliefs, defied rational logic and sustained a policy that at times compromised national security and ignored research on women’s performance.

While MacKenzie’s explanation of why and how the exclusion policies existed are sound, her explanation for why it was ultimately eliminated in 2013 is less believable. MacKenzie argues the military made a strategically calculated decision to lift the policy to distract attention from a series of sexual assault, prisoner abuse, and soldier misbehavior scandals. However, how the military came up with this plan or even an explanation for how this decision might reasonably be thought to recover the military’s tarnished image is not clear; nor is it supported by any evidence.
The second problematic area appears in the conclusion when MacKenzie claims “unraveling the band of brothers myth is essential to demystifying and ending wars.” The entire book is focused on how the exclusion of women is not really about women’s capabilities, but about men perpetuating the notion that they and they alone are elite, exceptional, and essential to national security. Nowhere is there an analysis of how debunking this one myth will ultimately lead to ending all wars.

Despite these shortcomings, the book is a fascinating analysis of how policies that impact national security are established and sustained through the construction of symbolic narratives that justify, legitimate, and promote cultural norms.

Building Psychological Resilience in Military Personnel: Theory and Practice
Edited by Robert R. Sinclair and Thomas W. Britt

Reviewed by Thomas J. Williams, Senior Scientist, Director, Behavioral Health and Performance, Johnson Space Center, NASA.

After almost 14 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan and with the threats arrayed around the world today, there is a great need to understand how to sustain the strength of our military. One answer has been to ensure we have a force that is more resilient. However, with over 104 different definitions of resiliency in the research literature, senior leaders and policymakers really need to ensure they understand what exactly we mean by resiliency and what it means for the readiness of the force.

This edited volume focused on Building Psychological Resilience in Military Personnel provides an excellent overview of the conceptual basis for resiliency. The two editors, Sinclair and Britt, both experts in their own right, have brought together an impressive group of authors to guide readers through resiliency as a concept, the theory that underpins it, and the practice of resiliency. To that end, the editors have effectively achieved their stated goals: They have brought together researchers in military personnel and families to highlight the different ways resiliency is defined and to provide an overview of the applied interventions that have been developed to purportedly increase resiliency in service members and their families.

One of the fundamental issues highlighted in this volume is there is no “universally accepted” or agreed upon definition of resiliency and the editors honestly acknowledge the difficulties in doing so, given that resilience is a “nebulous construct.” For their purpose, the editors define resiliency as the “demonstration of positive adaptation after exposure to significant adversity.” The editor’s note “most,” but not all of the definitions offered by other authors within the chapters of this book adopt their definition. Given the lack of consensus on what resiliency is, the editors acknowledge they are seeking to build a consensus on what contributes to positive adaptation as an integral component of resiliency. To that end they offer: realistic optimism, flexible coping strategies, and effective communication.
The authors use the Soldier Adaptation Model as a framework to posit a soldier’s resilience is determined by related processes of appraisal and coping responses to potentially demanding events that influence the outcomes experienced by soldiers. This offers a critical distinction that places emphasis on the “appraisal processes” along with the nature of the “stressful circumstances” rather than on a presumed personality trait, disposition, or capacity that is possessed by the individual. The various chapters help to highlight the importance of carefully considering this distinction since how one views the problem should determine the type of practical training and intervention programs developed to address the problem.

*Building Psychological Resilience in Military Personnel* is divided into three sections. The first section focuses on understanding resilience by reviewing research related to personality, morale and cohesion, the role of adaptation, and how leadership influences and builds resilience. These chapters provide compelling and thoughtful assessments for better understanding why when we consider resiliency, we really need to understand whether we are thinking of something we do (coping resources), something we are (a disposition or personality trait), or something that we possess (skills, experiences or beliefs that can be trained or developed by knowledgeable leaders).

The second section builds on the first by considering how we might build resilience (i.e., by establishing intervention programs). These programs seek to foster resiliency across the deployment cycle by efforts to help soldiers better modulate stress with a dual purpose of either increasing resilience and/or addressing mental health concerns. An important chapter in this section focuses on military families and the unique demands they face with separations from their military member, reintegration stresses, and relocation demands. The final chapter in this section addresses the Army’s Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness (CSF2) program, described as an “empirically driven mental health-related program.”

The authors note that there are varying degrees of empirical support for these programs that have “far-reaching implications” for soldiers in their post-military lives. What is not really addressed is that these programs all seem to assume that there is a certain “model” of resiliency and that if everyone is brought up to that “model-level” with these compensatory programs, everyone is the better for it. However, given the lack of consensus on what resiliency is and how to define it, it would seem prudent to have greater clarity on whether our well-intended efforts may have unintended consequences. For example, many of these programs are focused on and designed to bring every soldier to a certain (unknown at this time) level of resiliency to compensate for (presumably) something heretofore missing. Do we really understand the potential inadvertent consequences of taking someone with no discernible difficulties and requiring them to engage in training that by definition is designed to strengthen their mental health? Does that potentially instill uncertainty in those individuals and thereby alter their positive appraisals leaving them to now question their own ability to cope with the demands? Human reason and the will to prevail in the uncertainty and demands of war are not strengthened by efforts, however well intended, to force every soldier to receive “mental health” focused training. Rather, we
need to ensure that we become more adept at identifying what training is needed by whom for what purpose to what end.

In light of the significant resources invested in resiliency programs, senior leaders and policy makers may find it surprising to learn that evaluations of the training programs cannot yet answer whether they are effective. It goes without saying that if we intend to implement a resiliency program with the stated purpose to “fundamentally transform the military” it should have as its basis a clear understanding of what “resiliency” is and ensure we understand whether we are strengthening the force or intervening to address vulnerabilities. The former seems to fall within the purview of military leaders while the latter is the focus of our medical personnel. While they both strive to strengthen the force as an end-state, their starting points are different: Leaders should not provide “treatment” or interventions to address psychological vulnerabilities and medical personnel should not presume to instill the morale and readiness reflected in a warrior ethos. This book makes an important contribution precisely because, in its totality, it takes the issue of resiliency head on, not trying to oversell it but by acknowledging we still don’t know if resiliency reflects character, a pattern of reactions to adversity, or both...in over a 104 different ways.
For many years now research on private military and security companies has suffered from one crucial problem: a lack of new data. The Markets for Force offers insights into several rarely studied private security markets, including China, Russia, and several Latin American countries. Editors Dunigan and Petersohn’s key argument is the market for force does not exist. While it is usually treated as a single, homogenous, and neoliberal market, different types of markets for types of force exist: neoliberal, hybrid and racketeering markets (if a market exhibits characteristics of more than one type, it is categorized according to its most dominant features).

Thus, the nine country chapters in the volume are tasked with describing how and why a specific type of market developed, and crucially which consequences that market has for the state’s monopoly of force and the provision of security as a public good. The goal of the book is to outline how these consequences vary across different market types. As the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada are frequently studied, this review will focus on the six less-commonly studied cases.

Kristina Mani opens the case study section with Guatemala and Argentina. Both countries face diminished state capacity to provide security, meaning it is mostly available to those who can afford it (although Mani points out that security has rarely been a public good in the region). Instead, the region is characterized by “high levels of insecurity persisting in urban as well as rural areas under democratic regimes.” (24, emphasis in the original). The Argentinian market is a national one. In this relatively wealthy and developed country, informal collaborations between state security and private security companies dominate the market. In Guatemala, a criminal force market can be observed with features that are unique to the region. Mara gangs and transnational criminal organizations have strong links and the latter contract gangs for security.

In Maiah Jaskoski’s chapter on Peru and Ecuador, she outlines the relationship between the “War on Drugs” and private security companies (PSCs). Both countries exhibit military protection markets. Causes of these markets are found in cuts in defense spending, but also increased oversight of the army, combined with weak state capacity. This means army-client relations are pushed to the local level. Much pressure exists on local commanders to contribute to funding their bases. Some do so through private security work. Unsurprisingly, this leads Jaskoski to conclude that these military protection markets diminish the military as an institution and security as a public good.
Oldřich Bureš explains how domestic companies dominate the neoliberal market for force in the Czech Republic. Only non-lethal services are allowed in the country. In 2011, a draft law regulating the industry was presented and included licensing of companies by the Ministry of Interior, but it has not yet been enacted. Interestingly, the country features a reverse revolving doors phenomenon, as it is not uncommon to move from private security into politics.

In her chapter on Russia and the Ukraine, Olivia Allison writes that in both countries buyers and sellers interact based on Soviet-era military and intelligence connections, which is different from the Anglo-Saxon model. The market is dominated by private businesses. Individuals and small companies sell predominantly pilot and aircraft expert services to foreign companies and foreign states. Allison finds that the state monopoly on force is eroded by the informal nature of the market, but that there is no evidence that lack of control over exports negatively affects control over force domestically.

In his very detailed chapter on Afghanistan, Jake Sherman describes the diversity of international, national, and subnational security providers in the country. He argues the main problem regarding contractors is no alternative exists, as the Afghan National Army and Police lack capacity to provide security on their own. However, even if national forces were fully functional this would not eliminate the need for PSCs completely, e.g. for static and convoy security for international forces.

The Chinese market for private security is large and characterized by strict state control and ownership and limited access for foreign firms. Jennifer Catallo explains that PSCs are mostly subsidiaries of police forces, so-called Public Security Bureaus (PSBs). Private security companies are expected to make “social profits,” meaning they should maintain social order and prevent crime. The market is not only organized hierarchically but also vertically across municipalities—with growing regional black markets not under government control.

Where then do these case studies leave us regarding the questions laid out in the introduction, especially a market’s impact on a state’s monopoly of force? The editors conclude that racketeer markets have the most negative effects, while a neoliberal market is less harmful in its consequences. For hybrid markets this varies, depending on how the state exercises control and influences interaction with the market. Now that is in line with what common sense would expect and might not appear groundbreaking, but Dunigan and Petersohn’s project makes a convincing case for paying closer attention to the market type when analyzing consequences of private security.

As Deborah Avant notes in her foreword, the book is a step towards describing and understanding market forms, even if some of the data used in individual case studies seems not entirely reliable. It is also nice to see an edited volume which identifies the methods used and follows a clear structure in most, if not all chapters. One question that remains is how the book’s findings relate to non-lethal services, which of course make up a significant percentage of PSC services (with the exception of the China and Czech Republic all chapters focus on lethal services). Overall, the book makes a very interesting read for anyone studying private security or civil-military relations.
Terrorism, Inc., written by Colin P. Clarke, an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation, uncovers how terror and insurgent groups raise funds. The book’s subtitle, The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Irregular Warfare, is the subject of each chapter, which traces the financial structure of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Hezbollah and Hamas, Afghan Taliban, and finally al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Clarke discourages fixating on strict definitions of terms, arguing it defeats the purpose of solving problems requiring immediate action. For instance, “Counterterrorism (CT) is different than counterinsurgency (COIN) and ISIS is not Al-Qa'ida, just as Hamas is different from Hezbollah.” (3) Instead, Clarke recommends policies that target each group’s principles individually and to follow a “targeted approach on a case by case basis.” (3) Ultimately, Clarke’s research investigates the rise of non-state actors in a post-Cold War era, specifically the diffusion of radical ideas in unstable states, and porous borders that provide for terror and criminal safe havens.

As Clarke shows, the September 11, 2001 attacks changed the nature of terror financing legislation and action. President Bush signed Executive Order 13224, which effectively blocked finances “with persons who commit, threat to commit, or support terrorism.” (25) The UN Security Council additionally adopted Resolution 1373, which compelled all UN member states to outlaw any suspected terror finances, freezing funds and assets among other provisions. Additionally, the USA PATRIOT Act allowed law enforcement and the intelligence community to share information regarding terrorist finances and activities. The realm of financial intelligence has significantly expanded to investigate terror finances. Most notably, the Treasury Department established the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, which jointly investigate terror financial activity with various branches of law enforcement. These have helped combat the Afghan Taliban, which profits primarily from a dark economy. Clarke asserts that cutting off the Taliban’s finances is the best method to cripple the organization since the Obama administration’s increased drone strikes have not been as effective as many thought they would be.

The post-9/11 era has focused predominately on al-Qaeda and most recently, ISIS. Clarke examines the core of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, in which he references their social media capabilities and reliance on the dark economy for funds. Al-Qaeda has an extraordinary ability to adapt to their surroundings and ally themselves with other fundamentalist groups. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, on the other hand, began “metastasizing following the United States withdrawal of troops from Iraq in 2011.” (153) Their
funds are generated mostly from black market oil trades, trafficking women and antiquities, and are now “thought to be the most financially well-endowed insurgent group ever.” (154) Above all, their social media campaign is unlike any other the world has seen by a terror or insurgent group.

Intelligence sharing and Treasury actions have worked in the past, but need to be strengthened in this post-9/11 era with growing cyber sophistication. That also means that financial institutions need be open to allowing more restrictions that will in turn force terror and insurgent groups to seek other avenues, which may make it easier for law enforcement to target group members. Overall, Clarke argues for a “follow the money.” (26) strategy to pinpoint hotspots and monitor specific individuals, and that may suggest providing additional resources to law enforcement agencies to combat the gray and dark economies.

The framework of the book is easy to follow and makes it a quick read. The policy recommendations are also rather practical. They focus on increased Treasury responsibilities and intelligence sharing. Most importantly, law enforcement agencies require additional resources to keep up with growing terror advancements. Further, Clarke offers an adequate introduction to the terror and insurgent groups with a brief historical backdrop, followed by his analysis fitting neatly in each thematic component. Ultimately, the book serves as a primer to the organization and functionality of terror and insurgent groups and their financial networks.

**Violence after War: Explaining Instability in Post-Conflict States**

By Michael J. Boyle

Reviewed by James H. Lebovic, The George Washington University

Michael J. Boyle’s new book offers a welcome look at post-conflict violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Rwanda, East Timor, and Iraq. Despite its title, the book sensitizes readers more generally to the fallacy of assuming countries have graduated to post-conflict status with the ostensible end of fighting. Conflict can persist when parties seek to “renegotiate” the terms of a peace through violence, new parties arise to stake their claim to power, or coalitions dissolve in disputes over the division of the spoils.

The book focuses accordingly on “strategic violence” which is “designed to transform the balance of power and resources in a state.” (8) Such violence is most obvious when one or more of the contending parties seek to challenge the terms of a settlement having agreed to them, perhaps, under duress or false pretenses. But strategic violence sometimes has a more complex explanation with ambiguous evidentiary support. It can occur when groups fragment to pursue their own (unclear) agendas; capitalize on ethnic, religious, or political conflict; and engage in criminal activities and employ criminal gangs to mobilize resources and target opponents for “strategic” purposes: “not only can such violence be unconnected or only indirectly related to the cause of the war itself, but it can also provide a space for opportunists to
pursue a variety of personal or criminal vendettas, some of which will be detached from the fighting that preceded it.” In consequence, “the violence of the post-conflict period will often appear as an inchoate mix of personal attacks, criminal violence, and political-strategic violence significantly different from violence in the war that preceded it.” (5) In Boyle’s terminology, strategic violence mixes with “expressive violence,” an emotional response to loss or suffering, and “instrumental violence,” undertaken for criminal or personal gain. The analytical challenge is met, as Boyle recognizes, by ascertaining the collective (not individual) motives behind the violence, as discerned from tell-tale, aggregate patterns. For that effort, Boyle marshals revealing qualitative and quantitative evidence to portray trends over time in the various conflicts.

According to Boyle, the key to understanding the role of strategic violence in post-conflict countries is appreciating the distinction between the “direct pathway” to violence in which the parties, targets, and issues in contestation remain relatively constant (from the conflict through the post-conflict periods) and the “indirect pathway” in which groups splinter and violence is a function of “multiple and overlapping bargaining games between new and emergent claimants for power and resources.” (12) In discussing these pathways, Boyle’s central argument reduces to four hypotheses that derive from a “2-by-2” table, structured around two binary (independent) variables. These variables are: a) whether the original parties have accepted (yes or no) a settlement and b) how much control (high or low) these parties exercise over their membership. Simply put, strategic violence emerges through the direct pathway when a party refuses to accept a settlement and through the indirect pathway when the level of control is low. Consequently, strategic violence can occur simultaneously through direct and indirect pathways when a party refuses a settlement and when the level of control is low.

In positing these hypotheses and testing them against the case evidence, Boyle moves beyond the largely descriptive focus of the early theoretical chapters to explain the occurrence of strategic violence. In its illuminating detail, the case-study analysis provides support for Boyle’s provocative arguments. Yet it also serves to highlight the book’s limitations, which are as follows.

First, the utility of Boyle’s approach rests on the viability of a “2-by-2” table that assumes implicitly that the loss of control and nonacceptance of a settlement by any side produces the same outcome. Second, the variables in Boyle’s analysis are defined so generally and inclusively that the underlying logic is arguably circular. Third, Boyle could have done more to disclose the processes through which conflicts change. He duly notes that conflicts are complex and fluid but provides little guidance for predicting whether and when one pathway might give way to the other, strategic violence might give rise to instrumental violence, or expressive violence might build to the point that it becomes a strategic force, when channeled effectively by newly emergent group leaders. Thus, Boyle’s use of the phrase “as predicted” is somewhat misleading when he discusses the fit between the book’s arguments and case evidence.

Notwithstanding these deficiencies, Boyle’s book offers valuable insights on an understudied phenomenon of great importance to academic researchers and policymakers.