From the Editor

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This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters by an authorized editor of USAWC Press.
This issue of the Quarterly opens with a special commentary by Gates Brown, who argues the US Army has an identity crisis that ought to be resolved by focusing its efforts on improving its proficiency at combined arms maneuver warfare against a near-peer competitor. His view is sure to inspire debate.

Our first forum, Toward Strategic Solvency, features two important contributions. The first, “Ensuring Effective Military Voice,” by MG William E. Rapp, describes how culture, psychology, and the structures involved in decision-making place limits on the development, delivery, and influence of effective military voice in policy discussions. Military and civilian leaders must work together to ensure their dialogue contributes meaningfully to developing solvent national security policies. The second contribution, “The Crisis of American Military Primacy and the Search for Strategic Solvency,” by Hal Brands and Eric Edelman, explores three options America has for achieving primacy with strategic solvency. Their solutions may well gain traction.

This issue’s second and largest forum, Are Our Strategic Models Flawed?, considers whether we ought to reexamine our fundamental concepts of war, peace, and strategy. In “Faith in War: The American Roots of Global Conflict,” Gregory A. Daddis argues war has become a form of secular religion for many Americans in the modern era. But he questions whether that faith is justified. In “Solving America’s Gray-Zone Puzzle,” Isaiah Wilson III and Scott Smitson contend America will remain unprepared to fight, win, and fully finish gray-zone wars until its “flawed by design” concepts of war, peace, and strategy are sorted out and deconflicted. In “Strategic Uncertainty, the Third Offset, and US Grand Strategy,” Ionut C. Popescu demonstrates the usefulness of rethinking our understanding of uncertainty and how that might affect the course of America’s Third Offset Strategy, and its grand strategy in general. Finally, in “Ends + Ways + Means = (Bad) Strategy,” Jeffrey W. Meiser builds on Sir Lawrence Freedman’s definition of strategy as a theory of success and suggests the purpose of strategy is to create advantage, generate new sources of power, and exploit weaknesses in our opponents.

Our third forum, Regional Issues in Asia, offers two articles concerning recent trends along the Pacific rim. In “Turning It Up to Eleven: Belligerent Rhetoric in North Korea’s Propaganda,” Mason Richey examines some of the rhetoric from Pyongyang and whether (or when) it represents a risk of conflict escalation or even a casus belli. In “Foreign Military Education as PLA Soft Power,” John S. Van Oudenaren and Benjamin E. Fisher argue Chinese foreign military education programs are designed to promote a positive international image of China while simultaneously advancing military-to-military relations. In response, US policymakers should reprioritize international military education in support of long-term partnerships. ~ AJE