Book Reviews

USAWC Press

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters

Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Military History Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, and the National Security Law Commons

Recommended Citation
When addressing the future of strategy, there are few authors more credentialed than strategist Colin S. Gray. Aside from his practical experience addressing nuclear issues in the Reagan administration, he also taught and wrote authoritative texts on the topic for 50 years. For those not familiar with Gray’s prior works, The Future of Strategy draws significantly from his vast bibliography on strategy, which is evident in the first six chapters. These chapters provide a succinct, cohesive thumbnail of arguments Gray made in previous books, including his trilogy, The Strategy Bridge, Perspectives on Strategy, and Strategy and Defence Planning, which describe his “general theory of strategy,” its practice in the creation of particular strategies, the importance of understanding strategic history, and how nuclear weapons are an exception to past strategic history and therefore its place in the development of strategy. While largely redundant with past books, these chapters are concise and easily digested in comparison to the necessarily detailed and expansive explanations in his separate works.

For those more familiar with Gray’s previous works, The Future of Strategy can act as a quick refresher, as well as solidifying his view that the future of strategy, as it is a human endeavor “will be near identical in its functions and purposes to the strategy of the past and present.” Indeed, according to Gray, there is a logical consistency to strategy—both as a theory and in application—that transcends particular time or context. Strategy is fundamentally a mechanism for human societies to solve problems that arise in relation to their needs. Therefore, “we do not need to be taught to consider the world in terms of the ends we desire, and the ways and means for gaining them. It is all but inconceivable to approach problems in any other way” (115).

One item that jumps out in The Future of Strategy, though it is covered in most of his previous works, is the focus Gray places on geography, and specifically his addition of a new term—“geostrategy”—to describe its importance. I take issue with this new moniker given in previous works and woven throughout this book. Gray cites geography as merely one, though significant, aspect within strategy as a whole and the development of context-driven strategies in particular. I wonder if current events in Europe and Asia that many have titled the “return of geopolitics” drove Gray to focus on geography in a desire for relevance beyond the timeless wisdom that is typically found in his works. One positive by-product of this geographical focus is a tangent on the importance of logistics to the application of strategy. As Gray mentions, “Global strategic history always has been governed in practice by logistics . . . it would be a great mistake to assume potentially significant logistical challenges no longer matter” (89).
The most value to be found for those familiar with Gray’s previous works is the addendum following his conclusion, in which he lays out a veritable master-class reading list all aspiring or practicing strategists should attempt to understand. It is no spoiler to say that Clausewitz’s *On War* tops the list, though I was surprised to see Svechin’s *Strategy* closing out the list, as well as Gray’s comparison of it to *On War* (as well as his comparison of Svechin to Clausewitz in his dedication).

Overall, *The Future of Strategy* is a solid, concise version of many of Gray’s previous works. I recommend military and civilian leaders unfamiliar with Gray, or those who are generally interested in—or likely to conduct—the development of strategy, read this book. *The Future of Strategy* should also be used by all professional military and civilian academic institutions attempting to teach both the theory and the practice of strategy, given its cheap cost and short length but deep level of intellectual material.

**The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought**

*By Lukas Milevski*

Reviewed by Tom Moriarty, Professorial Lecturer, School of International Service, American University

War, whether or not we like to acknowledge it, has left a transcendent imprint on our lives. Many of our most important and cherished institutions, processes, and inventions have been influenced or modified by war, just as war has been decisively altered by them. Because of the nature of that interaction—of the constant push and pull of those forces—society’s interest in armed conflict has forever persisted. Yet, not all elements of the study of war have been treated with the equivalence they deserve. Historically, the study, appreciation, and understanding of strategy and strategic thought have often failed to keep stride with the torrid pace of the evolution of war itself. Indeed, the study of strategy has often been exiled to the lecture halls of military academies, war colleges, and a precious handful of civilian universities. Fortunately, that trend has slowly begun to swing upward, as has the number of scholarly works devoted to those neglected subjects. One such work is *The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought* by Lukas Milevski.

While primarily targeted toward advanced, serious-minded strategy scholars, Milevski’s book nevertheless remains accessible to any readers interested in grand strategy, tracing the development of grand strategic thought, mostly in the English-speaking world, during the last 200 years. Whereas the first half of the book examines strategic thinking from the Napoleonic Wars until the latter part of World War II, the second half explores the decline of grand strategic thinking during the initial stages of the Cold War before charting its reemergence toward the end of the conflict. A closing chapter assesses the continued interest in strategic thought after the Cold War.

In addition to providing its intellectual history, Milevski offers a clear, compelling critique of grand strategic thinking. He argues that grand-strategy theorists, driven by a pressing desire to solve immediate problems, have become so consumed in their present circumstances...
they have seldom looked to history and theory for guidance. Although this oversight might not initially seem like a cause for concern, Milevski makes the case that such emphasis on solving today’s problems has prompted scholars to be predominantly ahistorical in their search for solutions. If Milevski is correct, then truly understanding today’s grand strategies does not require us to understand the history and theoretical underpinnings of the past; on the contrary, it requires an appreciation of current geopolitical realities. As such, grand strategic thinking has not so much evolved as much as it has simply changed.

As a student, scholar, and teacher of strategic thinking, I share most of Milevski’s frustrations. Doubtlessly, the strength of his book is the demonstration of the partial incoherence and fragmentation of grand strategic thinking. Serious gaps riddle our knowledge; little agreement exists on even some of the most basic elements of grand strategy, including a unified definition, and even our attention to the need of grand strategy has been inconsistent. Milevski’s case that grand strategy needs more theoretical robustness, greater emphasis on logic and empirics, and a renewed focus on historical trends that can provide today’s thinkers guidance from the past hit home with me, as I am sure it will for other readers as well.

Although I am entirely sympathetic to Milevski’s arguments, I remain unconvinced of the consequences of his conclusions. As an educator, it would make my life much easier if we achieved greater conceptual clarity and unity on many of the issues Milevski raises. Yet, I do not believe it would make the lives of political leaders, military officers, and practitioners of grand strategy any easier, nor would it be particularly helpful to them, either, because strategy is better conceived as an art instead of as a science.

The same rigidness that serves hard sciences such as physics and chemistry so well can have the opposite effect on many disciplines, including strategic thinking. Of course, this argument does not mean history and theory play no role. Grand strategy, however, means different things to different people at different times because context is important. Changes in the international system, the emergence of new technologies, the power of norms and international laws, and the intensity of domestic political debate all affect a state’s conceptual understandings of what is the best grand strategy to use. And that is okay.

Nonetheless, The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought is an extremely timely, efficient work on grand strategy that I believe will greatly improve the quality of debate about—and appreciation for—the subject.
A New Strategy for Complex Warfare: Combined Effects in East Asia
By Thomas A. Drohan

Reviewed by J. Andres Gannon, Researcher, Center for Peace and Security Studies (cPASS), University of California, San Diego

U.S. military strategy in recent years has approached the increased complexity of East Asian threats through narrow changes to combined-arms warfare. According to Thomas A. Drohan in *A New Strategy for Complex Warfare*, US strategists first need a historical analysis of the region to foster a multicultural understanding of security that no longer assumes common values among Asian nations or projects American cultural expectations onto other societies. In placing weapons-centric strategic changes front and center, policymakers are putting the cart before the horse. Thankfully Drohan, a scholar with a doctorate from Princeton who now heads the Department of Military and Strategic Studies at the US Air Force Academy after years of his own military service, is in a unique position to bridge this gap between academic theorists and policy practitioners, a task he successfully accomplishes.

Drohan’s main argument assumes culture affects decisions made about security strategy. What nations consider right and just differs, and their perception shapes their definition of the national interest and how they pursue relative security. Thus, effective foreign policy requires an understanding of the diverse views different cultures have on security. Security culture explains how nations determine what constitutes a threat and how to counter them, reflects preferences affecting strategic performance, and outlines operational concepts that may be unique to each nation. What nations consider rational varies in accordance with values and interests.

While intuitive, the resulting task initially seems daunting. It is understandable why policy practitioners have focused doctrinal changes on new understandings of technological evolution, force integration, and US-centered threat assessment. Fortunately, *A New Strategy for Complex Warfare* does much of the heavy lifting required for acquiring a proper understanding of Asian security cultures. Few works have succeeded as much as this one at succinctly explaining centuries of Asian cultural history and contextualizing that history to current security issues in the region. Members of the security community will greatly benefit from this unique perspective.

Drohan’s book aims at improving US strategic choices toward China, Korea, and Japan. For each country, he provides a chapter on past dominant security culture to help readers understand the underlying motivations behind the unique values and interests driving the country’s actions. This historical analysis, based on impressive primary material in numerous Asian languages, is complemented by a chapter contextualizing the role culture plays in explaining each country’s approaches to contemporary security crises. Chinese security culture, one of asserting sovereignty and harmonizing physical and psychological tools to reinforce asymmetric operations, assumes threats are permanent and solutions to those threats are temporary. Korea’s history (here
referring to both Korean nations) of accommodating a main power and seeking autonomy pragmatically has resulted in external powers being confronted with diplomatic balancing and only limited force. Lastly, Japanese security culture, characterized by uniqueness and ambivalence in foreign relations, explains the slow pace of change that favors only reactive isolation and engagement.

True to his original motivation, Drohan does not simply provide policymakers with pages of historical detail and no guidelines for determining its relevance. He excels in explaining the implications cultural histories have for US security strategy and prescribes both philosophical and pragmatic changes practitioners should make. Philosophically, Drohan develops a combined-effects model that categorizes actions by regional actors and aids in the examination of the interactions between the concepts. Deterrence versus compellence and dissuasion versus persuasion are examples of how policymakers should think about combined effects and how strategic choices interact with one another from a military and diplomatic standpoint. Each chapter concludes with a table that neatly summarizes approaches to security crises based on the cultural influences identified.

Drohan effectively argues his approach should foster an awareness of combined effects beyond the narrow combined-arms approach currently dominating strategic thinking. Pragmatically, he offers concrete suggestions like changes to the *Quadrennial Defense Review* and revised mission priorities that encourage practitioners to incorporate security culture into strategy making. By doing so, Drohan hopes US policy for the region can transform from a “one-size-fits-all,” weapons-centric approach to a multicultural understanding of the strategic interactions of the combined effects of different nations’ policies. By considering values and beliefs, policymakers can better judge and anticipate intentions and capabilities as well as select the proper tools to address effectively US goals in East Asia.
For several years, proposals to cut America’s land forces have been making the rounds in Washington, driven by the belief the United States is unlikely to undertake large-scale ground combat in the coming years. As Brookings Institution scholar Michael O’Hanlon explains in The Future of Land Warfare, “Fatigued by Iraq and Afghanistan, rightly impressed by the capabilities of U.S. special forces, transfixed by the arrival of new technologies such as drones, and increasingly preoccupied with a rising China and its military progress in domains ranging from space to missile forces to maritime operations, the American strategic community has largely turned away from thinking about ground combat.”

It is not hard to understand the context of the idea that the strategic utility of American landpower is in decline: for eight years the Obama national security strategy recognized the utility of military force in the demanding conflict with transnational Islamic extremism but based on the assumption ground combat should be avoided whenever possible. Given this assumption, it is logical to conclude that as the US military shrinks, the services should not be cut proportionately but land rather than air, naval, or space forces should be slashed the most. As a February 2013 discussion paper from the Brookings Institution Hamilton Project, National Defense in a Time of Change by Gary Roughead and Kori Schake, argued, “the military’s current strategy sustains an Army that is far larger than necessary.”

O’Hanlon’s book is a sober, well-documented attack on that idea, making the case that American landpower has enduring value far beyond the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. After a sweep of the security landscape to identify “strategic fault lines” and plausible conflict, O’Hanlon concludes there is “a strong case for keeping an Army, and a Marine Corps, with a broad range of capabilities.” He bases his assessment on a range of potential missions the US military might perform: deterring Russia and China; securing the South China Sea; helping South Asia after a security crisis; deterring Iran; restoring order in places like Saudi Arabia, Syria, or Nigeria; and handling a further meltdown in law and order in Central America. From this assessment, he believes US military planning should be based on a “1 + 2 posture” that he defines as the ability to wage one major all-out regional battle while contributing to two smaller, multイヤイチ, multilateral operations of different possible character.

Ultimately, O’Hanlon advocates continuity, sustaining landpower capabilities about the same size and configuration of American ground forces as today. “Much of this American ground capability,” he writes, “should remain in the active duty forces, the implication is that not only the aggregate size but also the individual components of the U.S. Army should remain roughly as they are today as well. . . . The Army of the
future should not be radically different from the Army of today.” He concludes by arguing, “America’s grand strategy is working. The Army and Marine Corps are crucial elements in that strategy, for deterring conflict, partnering with allies and others abroad, resolving conflicts when necessary, and helping keep the peace in general. But their work, and that of the nation, is far from done. We would be tempting fate and playing with danger if we were to remove or significantly weaken some of the key linchpins in the successful strategy of the last 70 years out of a conviction that warfare, or the world, or the nature of man had dramatically changed.”

While this is sage and carefully constructed advice, there are two problems with The Future of Land Warfare, one modest and one more significant. The modest problem arises from O’Hanlon’s approach to force sizing, particularly in terms of stabilization operations or counterinsurgency. He repeatedly uses a force-sizing rule of thumb from the 2007 version of Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency doctrine which has since been superseded by a newer version that does not stress this guideline. The rule was dropped because it is not applicable to all counterinsurgency operations but only to large-scale US involvement in pacification and stabilization. The rule was developed for nation and security-force creation rather than nation and security-force assistance. A different form of counterinsurgency—think El Salvador rather than Iraq and Afghanistan—would not require as many US forces.

More important, O’Hanlon’s analysis was based on the assumption that the grand strategies of the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations—which were more alike than different—would continue into the future. This assumption might have been true had Hillary Clinton won the 2016 presidential election as expected. But, Donald Trump won the presidency while claiming American grand strategy is not working. The most fundamental premise of US strategy since the beginning of the Cold War—that the United States should be the guarantor of a liberal world order—is being challenged. The problem with Trump questioning existing American grand strategy is that he has not yet proposed an alternative.

If Trump does not transform American grand strategy, then O’Hanlon’s analysis and recommendations will remain germane to anyone interested in US security. If, however, there is a Trump revolution in US grand strategy, the analysis of American landpower must begin anew.
In *Reassuring the Reluctant Warriors*, Stefano Recchia, a lecturer in international relations at Cambridge University, investigates the role civil-military relations played in US efforts to gain the support of international organizations for the use of force. His central hypothesis is “when there is no clear threat to US national security and policymakers consequently disagree about the merits of intervention, a determined military leadership can veto the use of American force” (51). In short, Recchia argues senior military leaders at the apex of political-military decision-making can effectively veto policy when civilian policymakers are divided and the national interest is less than vital. In such scenarios, the military may demand the government obtain the support of international organizations as a condition of the military’s backing of the intervention.

Recchia argues further the military’s demand for an international organization mandate is also linked to the military’s preference for such resolutions to state explicitly that US intervention forces will hand over control to multinational follow-on forces. The existence of such a provision in the planning phase of the operation will not only facilitate the planning process itself with the inclusion of the assumption of the presence of multinational stabilization forces, but will also fulfill the military’s post Weinberger-Powell Doctrine desire for a clear exit strategy before giving its assent to the use of force. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) would usually be the first choice to endorse the intervention given its unique status as the organization the Charter of the United Nations authorizes to approve the use of force, but the approval of other regional organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Organization of American States (OAS) may also suffice.

*Reassuring the Reluctant Warriors* is remarkable on many levels. First, its four case studies: Haiti (1993–94), Bosnia (1992–95), Kosovo (1998–99), and Iraq (2002–03) are extraordinarily well researched. Recchia conducted over 100 interviews with primary participants in the cases to include US secretaries of state and defense, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, national security advisers, US ambassadors to the UN, NATO, and the European Union, and many more with individuals holding positions a tier or two below the principals. The breadth and depth of the interviews enabled Recchia to include many insights from these key participants’ in the deeply sourced text, some of which directly supported his hypothesis. The case studies alone, which include many of these comments, merit acquiring the book.

Second, Recchia illustrates (literally—with useful figures) the factors influencing the military’s viewpoint, their methods for exerting policy influence, and specific conditions that will make the military’s “insistence” to acquire international organization approval more or less likely. Third, through the development of his primary and
alternative hypotheses, he provides readers a rich review of the various factors, conditions, and theory that explains why international organization approval is or is not sought as well as methods employed to acquire approval.

If the book falls short in any area, it is in Recchia's neglect to consider whether the behaviors he documents on the part of senior military leaders fall outside the bounds of civil-military norms. First, there is the discussion of the military's “veto” power. While Recchia painstakingly completes the “process tracing” of the impact of the civilian and military actors in each case, he does not note the military is in what Eliot Cohen deemed an “unequal dialogue” with civilian policymakers, meaning a military veto is inconsistent with the principle of civilian control. Consequently, the table detailing “How the generals can influence military intervention decision-making” with its inclusion of “present some options as unfeasible,” “selectively leak reservations to the press,” and “hint at possible resignation,” along with provide “professional expertise” and “alert civilian policymakers to risks and likely operational costs,” are included side by side despite the issue the former suggestions include behaviors that effectively undermine civilian control.

The case development at times also includes the political opinions of the military along with the professional expertise civilians expect regarding the operational limits of various options under consideration. In the Haiti case, for example, Recchia wrote, “The top-level generals and admirals disputed that important US national interests were at stake in Haiti. They were skeptical about using force to restore democracy and protect human rights and worried about getting bogged down in an open-ended stabilization mission that the Congress might not support” (81). It is not the role of senior military leaders to determine national interest or to set policy. Manipulating the provision of professional expertise in order to get the institution's way on policy is a serious violation of professional norms related to civilian control. Some recognition of this issue in the text would have strengthened the presentation of the cases.

Overall, Reassuring the Reluctant Warriors is a welcome addition to civil-military relations literature in political science. Recchia wrote his purpose was to build theory in such a way that it acknowledges the direct and underappreciated role senior military leaders at the apex of political-military dialogue play in policy development. The text accomplishes this goal with its outstanding case studies. Future and present military leaders, however, should be careful to approach the book not so much as a “user's manual” for greater influence in the policy process, but as a well-written and well-researched vehicle to analyze the actions of former military leaders, who at times, may have exceeded their designated roles in the “unequal dialogue.”

By Derek S. Reveron

Reviewed by Benjamin Jensen, Associate Professor, Marine Corps University, Scholar-in-Residence, American University School of International Service, and author of Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the US Army (Stanford University Press, 2016)

Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the US Military – Second Edition provides an excellent overview of the concept of theater shaping: how military forces conduct cooperative engagements to advance the interests of the United States. These activities, traditionally associated with Phase 0, provide options for addressing what author Derek Reveron calls security deficits, areas of instability that create persistent challenges for US national security. The book provides the historical background and policy context including PPD-23 and the 2015 National Military Strategy behind the expanding definition of security to include practices traditionally associated with development and diplomacy. According to Reveron: “Presidents of all political persuasions continue to use the military as a preferred tool of national power in noncoercive ways” (48). From this perspective, the military is an engagement as much as it is a coercive instrument, and the United States is “more concerned that Pakistan will fail than it is that Russia will attack Western Europe” (4).

Because of the continued importance of theater shaping and Phase 0 activities, future researchers will need to enter the dialogue and ask important questions based on Reveron’s work. First, a persistent theme in the book is that the US military has undergone dramatic change over the last three decades. There is also an implicit assumption that “security cooperation programs have broadened the mission set for the military beyond major combat” (4). If so, this change should be apparent in major shifts in operational concepts and doctrine in each service and, to a lesser extent, due to political influences, path dependencies, force structure, and resource allocation. But, are they? Does the US military, as measured by the individual service doctrines and Program Objective Memorandum submissions, reflect a prioritization of military engagement?

Second, do Phase 0 activities actually reduce security deficits? Reveron contends that military engagement can “reduce other states’ security deficits created when subnational, transnational, or regional challenges overwhelm a partner’s national security institutions” (43). Yet, research by Dafna Rand and Stephen Tankel presented in Security Cooperation & Assistance: Rethinking the Return on Investment (August 2015) suggests the contrary. They found security cooperation and building partner capacity initiatives often fail due to a misalignment of ends, ways, and means as well as the underlying difficulty of measuring progress. For Rand and Tankel “the failure to adequately assess efficacy contributes to the potential overreliance on security assistance and cooperation as a tool of statecraft.” For scholars Gordon Adams
and Shoon Murray, who edited *Mission Creep: The Militarization of US Foreign Policy?* (2014) and whom Reveron addresses in the book, military engagement and Phase 0 reflect the creeping militarization of US foreign policy. The incoming administration needs a comprehensive, empirical study on the correlates of reducing security deficits that measure whether or not Phase 0 activities associated with military engagement are working as intended.

Third, what other historical periods provide insights into the use of military forces outside of battle? While the book offers maritime examples over the land domain, the history of the US Army in Europe also provides numerous cases of the importance of building interoperability as a means of enabling a conventional deterrent. Although not human security challenges or linked to terrorism or piracy, these examples will help military leaders frame the ways decision-makers apply military forces to achieve national security objectives.

Reveron’s work in both editions of *Exporting Security* makes important contributions to the framework academics and military professionals should use to conceptualize plans for employing military forces. Future research and staff estimates should concentrate on additional questions about the efficacy of these military engagements and reflect on the broader range of military and diplomatic historical practice.
Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses – Second Edition

By Stuart Gottlieb, Editor

Reviewed by William E. Kelly, Associate Professor of Political Science, Auburn University

The international threat of dealing with terrorism raises interesting questions and is a controversial topic. This controversy is reflected in the revised second edition of Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses which provides a more expansive discussion than the first edition of how the international community and organizations can cope with increasing threats.

Editor Stuart Gottlieb has an excellent professional background, serving as a senior foreign policy adviser in the US Congress and specializing in foreign policy, counterterrorism, and international security research and coursework. He is optimistic about how the United States is reacting to current dangers and believes the nation is safer, the intelligence community better coordinated, and defenses against terrorism stronger. Yet, he admits the threat from al-Qaeda has not disappeared, and he divides the book into two sections with 12 chapters focusing on important issues related to the different types of emerging threats.


The second section, “Debating Counterterrorism,” provides further thoughts to consider as they relate to counterterrorism strategies and the US Constitution: Do we need bombs over bridges? Can spreading democracy help defeat terrorism? Can international organizations make a difference in fighting terrorism? Is an outright ban the best way to eliminate or constrain torture? Does providing security require a trade-off with civil liberties? Is the threat of terrorism being overstated?

What makes this book so appealing is that it presents important questions related to terrorism and provides answers from experts with opposing views—an excellent way for readers to gain invaluable insights into current threats. Gottlieb should be commended for both his excellent choice of questions and his selection of expert contributors who logically and understandably present their viewpoints. Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses – Second Edition will be of interest and benefit to anyone planning for, and reacting to, the threats of modern-day terrorism.
To say drug trafficking is destroying societies and undermining the legitimacy of states would be an understatement. Yet, despite tremendous social, economic, and political ramifications, traditional theories of international relations, with the primary unit of analysis as the state, have downplayed this fact. Not so, for author Paul Kan. In *Drug Trafficking and International Security*, he shows how “drug trafficking has evolved to become enmeshed in the most serious issues affecting international security,” and how these “activities are significant stressors on individuals, economies, societies, states, and the international system” (184).

Following the implosion of the Soviet Union and the “end of history,” global leaders thought the new international order would create a more peaceful world; however, previous problems were replaced with the emergence of new issues ranging from war, terrorism, migration, human security, and global health to transnational organized crime. Kan believes these issues, traditionally kept under control by authoritarian regimes worldwide, have become integral parts of the new international system, and “the fragmentation of power, rather than centralization of power, will create new and unexpected security challenges based on the convergence of many issues and actors that were once considered separate and distinct from one another” (190).

Kan argues drug trafficking in the post-Cold War international system should be treated as a unique security issue having detrimental implications on the future of the nation-state and the consolidation of democracy worldwide, especially among nascent democracies in developing countries. Drug trafficking, now an integral part of the “deviant globalization” and “durable disorder” of the new international system (12), is chipping away at the framework of society and intersects with all other Cold War security issues as well as rogue nations, failing states, intrastate conflicts, crime, public health, and cyberattacks (14).

As drug trafficking becomes another unit of analysis for international relations practitioners, it is also giving rise to a new player in the international system, narco-states. Narco-states, which can be categorized as incipient, developing, serious, critical, and advanced, according to Kan, exist “where the institutions of government direct drug trafficking activities or actively collude with drug traffickers, creating conditions where the elicit narcotics trade eclipses portions of the country’s legitimate economy and where segments of society begin to accrue benefits from drug trafficking. A narco-state thrives due to its ability to exploit qualities of the state’s link to the legitimate global economy” (51).

One important topic discussed by Kan, but often forgotten by international relations practitioners, is how transnational organized...
criminal groups and drug traffickers have embraced the world’s third revolution—the development of the Internet. These criminal groups use the Internet to promote illicit activities (such as recruitment, money laundering, extortion, and other nefarious interests) conducted on the Deep Web, the Dark Web, or the Dark Net, an area of the Internet encrypted from end-to-end and accessible only with special privileges since communications within the Deep Web use programs such as The Onion Router (TOR).

Deep Web societies can become fragile or failed states, further contributing to the escalation of violence and suffering within the countries while organized criminal groups enhance their power vis-à-vis the government. In societies around the world where the legitimacy of states is being questioned, drug trafficking creates a political vacuum. Organized criminal groups willingly assume the traditional functions of the state and see “a natural fit for drug trafficking activities because they have geographic proximity to demand countries, trade networks that extend to markets in developed countries, pliable policy forces and customs agencies, viable airports or seaports, territory beyond governmental control, arable land, or accessibility to state assets” (74).

We do know that drugs corrupt and chip away the social fabric of society. But, what are the national security implications and how does drug trafficking affect international security? Kan points out several national security implications political leaders should consider—or ignore at their peril. First, government institutions become hallowed, economies become predatory, and civil societies become criminalized (95). Furthermore, the criminalization of society and its political and judicial institutions undermines the rule of law in many countries. The process of democratization, which in many parts of the world is still being consolidated, also suffers in narco-states. As Kan argues, “in a narco-state with democratic institutions, the hallmark of accountability and transparency is replaced with corruption” (95).

Drug Trafficking and International Security clearly shows every important aspect of the international security landscape has been permeated and transformed by this problem (2). I highly recommend this book to readers interested in political science and peace and security studies. Given that many US Army War College students will serve in the countries discussed by Kan, this book will aid in developing a practical understanding of how drug trafficking interconnects with multiple issues in today’s globalized world.

The Outrage Industry: Political Opinion Media and the New Incivility
By Jeffrey M. Berry and Sarah Sobieraj

Reviewed by James P. Farwell, National Security Expert; Associate Fellow, Department of War Studies, Kings College, London; and author of Persuasion & Power (Georgetown University Press, 2012)

Georgetown law student Sandra Fluke testified before Congress, arguing that religiously affiliated universities and hospitals should provide insurance coverage for contraception. Radio talk show host Rush
Limbaugh denounced her as a “slut” and a “prostitute.” His outburst illustrated the media outrage that is perverting political discourse in America today and which Jeffrey Berry and Sarah Sobieraj highlight in their insightful book, The Outrage Industry: Political Opinion Media and the New Incivility. More hosts are conservative, but no-holds-barred outrage affects liberal hosts as well.

Some worry about Vladimir Putin’s propaganda campaigns. But compared to American talk show hosts, the Russians are pikers. Violent imagery, name-calling, personal attacks, homophobia, and dire warnings are stock in trade. Glenn Beck carried a baseball bat onto his TV set. Alan Colmes told listeners, “It’s going to be moron night, isn’t it?” Keith Olbermann declared, “Sean Hannity doesn’t understand that because Sean is very dim.” Mike Gallagher wanted the world to know that “Anderson Cooper . . . he’s the last guy who should go on television and make oral sex references.” Mark Levin invoked a clarion call, “Nancy Pelosi’s politics come as close to a form of modern-day fascism as I’ve ever seen.”

Berry and Sobieraj strongly prefer the older American news media model on the grounds it better promotes fair play, objectivity, and moderation and through these attributes makes the political system function more smoothly. Their perspective is shaped by the impact and role talk shows play in the political system.

The book identifies 13 variables that define talk show tactics: insulting language, name-calling, emotional display, emotional language, verbal fighting/sparring, character assassination, misrepresentation, mockery, conflagration, ideologically extremizing language, slippery slope argument, belittling, and obscenity. Mockery and misrepresentation top the list.

Talk shows have emerged at a time in which trust in traditional news media has dropped. Talk show audiences are generally age 50 and above. Economics drives their success. Talk shows can target advertising to specific audiences. The old joke in advertising was, “I waste half my money advertising. I just don’t know what half.” That is moot. Today’s advertisers can identify niches that produce efficiency.

The top three talk show hosts reach a weekly audience of nearly 40 million. They appeal not despite being offensive but because they are. Fox’s conservative Bill O’Reilly and liberal Ed Schultz entertain and bond with their views. O’Reilly generates controversy. But the implications in national security may be far reaching. Along with iconic interviewer Larry King, Schultz recently signed onto Putin’s US propaganda flagship, RT America. Their action encodes an important Russian propaganda channel with an aura of legitimacy. It is startling. Can one imagine American broadcast journalist Edward R. Murrow or American journalist and war correspondent William L. Shirer copping to Reich Minister of Propaganda Josef Goebbels’ information machine?

The most successful radio talk shows reach a highly engaged audience. These audiences retain what they hear far better than music show listeners, and they create strong bonds of trust in the personality hosting the program with 72 percent of listeners talking to friends about favorite radio personalities and another 70 percent following hosts on social media. The best talk show hosts present themselves as regular
folks. Hannity earns over $20 million and Limbaugh over $50 million, but they are self-deprecating and refer to themselves as ordinary, “just like listeners, evoking empathy and commonality.”

Outrage-based programming uses exaggeration, conspiracy theory, and caricature. Talk shows are more about the experiences audiences desire, not the information they provide. Audiences gain reassurance that they are right. As one Limbaugh fan put it, “Rush is breaking it down and saying, ‘this is why things are happening this way.’ That’s what I think makes a good show because he’s got everybody going, ‘ah, I understand that, that’s much better.’” The discourse helps audiences to feel confident, celebrated for strong character and victorious in political discussions.

Berry and Sobieraj incisively deconstruct the most popular talk shows and explain why their popularity persists and grows. They enlighten readers about American politics as well as the dynamics of talk shows and how they affect attitudes and opinions, reaffirm beliefs, and create distortions that polarize publics against themselves by engaging emotions. In politics, reason persuades but emotion motivates. This outstanding book offers a fine contribution to our understanding of how and why this form of communication achieves both goals.
I
n the last decade or so, numerous useful and controversial books have
been published on President George W. Bush and his administration.
To these works can now be added, *Bush*, a detailed and sometimes
searing study by Toronto University Professor Emeritus Jean Edward
Smith, a historian and biographer of American presidents and leaders,
including Ulysses S. Grant, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John Marshall, and
Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Smith displays a strong understanding of US history and provides
insightful, often harsh, assessments about Bush's actions in office. Smith
describes to name Bush the worst president in American history, but he
strongly maintains Bush's decision to invade Iraq was the most tragic
foreign policy error any US president has ever committed. He considers
the invasion to be a more serious blunder than the US intervention in
Vietnam because the collapse of friendly regimes in Southeast Asia did
not have the global repercussions of the Iraq War's aftermath. He also
states the initial mistake of invading Iraq was further compounded by
the long-term occupation of the country with the goal of turning it into
a functioning democracy.

Although Smith's most important observations relate to Bush's time
as president, *Bush* is a full biography covering his entire life. In discussing
Bush's early life, Smith presents his subject as an unserious young man,
with a distaste for academic learning and a strong streak of "cultivated
anti-intellectualism" he developed as a student and which was especially
strong before he married (14). Despite these views, Bush could never
have gotten as far as he did without important positive attributes beyond
a distinguished family and presidential father.

Bush often displayed remarkably good skills with people, which
served him well throughout his life. He appears to have been a competent
officer in the Texas Air National Guard and did well at the portions of his
business career that involved public relations and working with others.
He was also an extremely effective and enthusiastic politician. Unlike his
father, he loved campaigning and possessed tremendous energy for doing
so. Moreover, throughout his career, Bush never showed the slightest
signs of racism and was deeply sympathetic to the plight of immigrants,
at one time stating, "Family values do not stop at the Rio Grande" (104).
According to Smith, Bush was a humane, productive, and effective
governor in a state where the governor has very little formal power.

Unfortunately, the ability to serve effectively as a governor does
not, by itself, set one up for success as president. Bush knew almost nothing
about foreign policy but liked making decisions, even without knowing
all the important facts. Often, he treated his intuition as more important
than any effort to examine the costs and benefits of a particular policy. In
general, he did not want to be bothered with long discussions and efforts
to explore all sides of an issue. In a world he often saw in black-and-white, rigorous debate seemed unnecessary. Smith states Bush maintained throughout his presidency “an unnerving level of certitude and a habit of hiring support staff based on personal loyalty” rather than expertise or experience (155). Once, while complaining about the extensive level of detail in his briefing books, he said, “I don’t do nuance” (182). At another point, he asserted, “If you know what you believe, decisions come pretty easy” (213).

According to Smith’s analysis, the flaws in Bush’s governing style and personality subsequently played out with tragic consequences when he led the United States into the invasion of Iraq. Bush made no clear effort to consider what might go wrong in the undertaking and later could not understand Iraq’s sectarian problems or why they had become a major impediment on the road to democracy. He had trouble accepting the possibility Western-style democracy might not work in Iraq due to the widespread lack of democratic values.

Smith, emphasizing the undeniable point that Bush wore his religion on his sleeve, correspondingly makes a strong effort to understand the role Christianity played in Bush’s foreign policy decisions. This is an excruciatingly difficult task to undertake since most American politicians, and almost all Republican leaders, find it useful to claim some level of religious belief and devotion. While an argument can be made that Bush’s frequent expressions of piety were mostly good politics, Smith is not having any of this. Rather, he maintains Bush was not exaggerating his strong belief that he was the instrument of God’s will to destroy hostile dictatorships and spread democracy throughout the Middle East.

Smith supports this thesis with quotes from Bush explaining the Godly nature of the task at hand in Iraq. The intensity of these beliefs also came through at more private moments, sometimes with foreign leaders such as when Bush told French President Jacques Chirac, “Biblical prophesies are being fulfilled. This confrontation is willed by God” (339). The French leader was stunned by this and other comments and later became unwilling to enter a war he feared was at least partially based on Bush’s interpretation of the Bible. Additionally, Donald Rumsfeld, Bush’s first secretary of defense, said, “Bush often expressed his belief that freedom was a gift of the Almighty. He seemed to feel almost duty bound to help expand the frontiers of freedom in the Middle East” (357).

In summary, Smith maintains difficulties in Bush’s personality and approach to problem-solving set the administration up for a series of disastrous mistakes in Iraq. He suggests Bush never quite outgrew the anti-intellectualism of his youth and the belief experts tended to overcomplicate simple matters of right and wrong. Moreover, Smith states while Bush’s brand of moral certitude gave him an inner strength and conviction, it also made it easier for him to dismiss the views of people with whom he disagreed.

This sort of evaluation is strong stuff and is at odds with other interpretations of the Bush administration, including those stressing Bush was manipulated by ideologues within his administration. Smith does not concede an inch to this interpretation. Rather, he sees Bush
as a strong leader steering his presidency with an unwavering hand and making key decisions he saw as the only moral alternative. With this level of disagreement, neither Smith nor anyone else is going to resolve these differences, even among Bush’s critics, but he has clearly presented a powerful case that will be important for scholars and students to consider for years to come.

**Admiral Bill Halsey: A Naval Life**

By Thomas Alexander Hughes

Reviewed by Albert F. Lord Jr., Director, Joint Warfighting Advanced Studies Program, US Army War College

William F. Halsey Jr., a truly iconic figure in American military and naval history whose outsize public persona was created and fueled by a wartime press looking for a hero early in World War II, was known for his fighting words “Hit hard, hit fast, hit often!” Thomas Alexander Hughes delivers a remarkable biography on Halsey that cuts through the mythology to show a man whose entire life was shaped by the shadow of his father (a gifted naval officer in his own right), the navy, and his personal struggle with the changes in naval warfare over the 47 years he served in uniform.

Halsey’s birth into a navy family preordained his path into the service. Graduating from the US Naval Academy in 1904, Halsey was often the beneficiary of his father’s legacy as senior officers took an interest in the son of a friend and messmate. He began his long association with fast, smaller ships during an early assignment to torpedo boat duty, and he formed his leadership style while working with these intimate crews on the leading edge of new technology, doctrine, and tactics. Another early influence was visionary reformer William Sims, commodore of the Atlantic Fleet Destroyer Flotilla, who served as Halsey’s superior both before and during World War I. Sims’s influence no doubt played a role in Halsey’s decision later in his career, at the age of 52, to apply for flight training and to thereafter push new ideas for naval aviation as a strike force with a mission beyond just scouting for battleships.

The attack on Pearl Harbor found Halsey commander of the Aircraft Battle Force—the senior aviator afloat in charge of all aircraft carriers in the Pacific Fleet. From January to May 1942, he was continually at sea, attacking Japanese outposts and delivering Jimmy Doolittle’s bombers on their epic, morale-raising raid of the Japanese homeland. In October 1942, Halsey was called upon to take command of the South Pacific Area and to hold Guadalcanal. His reputation and dogged determination invigorated the tired and dispirited troops. Unafraid to commit his precious carriers, aircraft, and surface forces, Halsey rushed ground reinforcements into battle and saved the campaign. His relentless fighting wore down the Japanese air, naval, and ground forces through a war of attrition from which they never recovered.

In June 1944, Halsey departed the South Pacific Area for command of the Third Fleet. The Japanese response to the invasion of the Philippines in October 1944 led to the Battle of Leyte Gulf and
the most controversial episode of Halsey’s life. In the midst of four separate engagements, and suffering from a divided command structure, Halsey, ever the aggressive leader, raced after the last surviving Japanese carriers, leaving a crucial strait open to a powerful Japanese surface force. Only valiant combat by American light escort carriers and destroyers prevented a disaster to the invasion fleet. Legitimately criticized thereafter for “taking the bait” and not hedging his action by leaving a covering force behind, Halsey defended his actions and in his autobiography criticized others for his failure.

After Leyte Gulf, Halsey led the Third Fleet on a rampage to Formosa and the home islands of Japan and dealt a devastating blow to the remaining Japanese armed forces and war machine. In two more controversial events, Halsey’s fleet was caught in deadly typhoons in December 1944 and June 1945. The ensuing damage to his reputation left fleet sailors doubting for the first time Halsey’s capability to lead. Remaining in command to the end of the war, Halsey submitted his request for retirement shortly after the surrender and left active duty following his elevation to the five-star rank of Fleet Admiral.

Throughout the book, Hughes humanizes Halsey, describing a career naval officer who rose to the highest level of the profession by mastering technology and leading change, but who at other times failed to grasp the size and complexity of the US Fleet of late 1944 and 1945. Halsey’s leadership style also comes through loud and clear—in most cases he was firm but fair, sensitive to individuals; however, several instances show he came up short in dealing with immediate subordinates and in taking responsibility for shortcomings. A notable and unique strength of the book is the backstory Hughes tells of Halsey’s medical conditions, including a bout with depression, as well as his difficulties handling his wife’s developing mental illness.

Admiral Bill Halsey: A Naval Life is a superb biography of a man who became larger-than-life in wartime service and who at critical times and places tipped the scales with the force of his personality. Astute students of history can easily draw parallels between Halsey’s leadership style and the qualities required to lead today’s joint forces as well as the forces of the future. Even readers familiar with Bill Halsey and the war in the Pacific will develop a new appreciation for the challenges he faced in wartime command and decision-making.

The Lost Mandate of Heaven: The American Betrayal of Ngo Dinh Diem, President of Vietnam

By Geoffrey Shaw

Reviewed by William Thomas Allison, Professor of History, Georgia Southern University

The brutal assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngô Đình Diem during the coup that overthrew his government on November 2, 1963, remains one of the most pivotal moments of American involvement in what was becoming the American war in Vietnam. Diem’s critics believed the Catholic mandarin was doing more harm than good to his country. With an intensifying Viet Cong insurgency threatening provincial
regions across South Vietnam and internal strife taking the form of the self-immolation of Buddhist monk Quang Pac, South Vietnam teetered on the brink of collapse, so it seemed.

Diem had failed to implement social and political reforms demanded by the Kennedy administration. With the political and military situations worsening, President Kennedy reluctantly agreed with his more hawkish advisers that Diem had to go. Never supportive of Diem, Kennedy’s new ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., gave the green light for a group of politically ambitious South Vietnamese army generals to overthrow Diem and his corrupt government. In the confusion of the coup, Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu met a bloody end at the hands of their South Vietnamese army captors. Horrified at Diem’s death, Kennedy subsequently distanced himself from approving the coup, the results of which arguably sank the United States deeper, terminally so, into the quagmire of Vietnam.

This is largely the story reported at the time and repeated most often by historians. Well-supported arguments by Fredrik Logevall in Choosing War: The Last Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (1999) and Howard Jones in the compelling Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War (2003) conclude that although Diem may have had to go, his “going” undermined Kennedy’s plans for a gradual withdrawal of American military support and led to direct involvement in the conflict in Vietnam. Just over two weeks after Diem’s death, Kennedy was assassinated, leaving the Vietnam morass to Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson. The rest, as they say, is history—a tragic and needless history.

Welcome to this historiographic discussion Geoffrey Shaw, a former assistant professor for American Military University and current president of the Alexandrian Defense Group, a counterinsurgency warfare think tank. In The Lost Mandate of Heaven, Shaw provocatively argues Diem did not have to go. Shaw’s Diem is a pious Catholic, dedicated to preserving South Vietnamese independence against the Sino-Soviet sponsored insurgency to unify Vietnam under a Communist regime based in Hanoi. Throughout his career as a government official, from district chief to president of the Republic of Vietnam, Diem effectively served a nation fighting for its survival. He led through a delicate balancing act that pitted his deep desire to resolve the social and economic issues affecting his country against the demands of the United States, which made his country an American proxy against monolithic Communist expansion.

The Kennedy administration, Shaw notes, betrayed Diem first by undermining his legitimacy as president through heavy-handed American interference in South Vietnam’s domestic affairs, then ultimately by supporting the coup that ended Diem’s government and his life. Shaw places responsibility for Diem’s brutal killing indirectly on President Kennedy, but more eloquently blames a cabal of anti-Diem officials in the State Department, led by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs W. Averell Harriman, for setting the stage for Diem’s overthrow. Unlike former Ambassador to South Vietnam Frederick Nolting Jr., CIA Chief of Station in Saigon William Colby, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and Johnson, who all believed Diem to be the best option the United States had to save South Vietnam, Harriman,
Senator Mike Mansfield, and others conspired to end the corrupt, increasingly despotic (as they saw it) regime of Diem and his brother. The Saigon press corps eagerly, if not unwittingly, played a supporting role in Diem’s overthrow. Shaw portrays these reporters as hostile toward Diem, unyielding in their criticism of his nepotism and what they perceived as dictatorial tactics against the people of South Vietnam. The Viet Cong needed no propaganda; the Saigon press corps spread it for them.

Shaw presents a well-researched, thoroughly documented, and provocative, if not compelling, case. Surprising is Harriman’s influence on Kennedy at the expense of Diem’s supporters in the administration. Shaw also explores the pressure of the upcoming 1964 presidential election on Kennedy, in which the last thing Kennedy needed was for Southeast Asia to become the key negative issue. The press, Shaw most convincingly argues, was already headed down that path.

The Lost Mandate of Heaven is a strong and thoughtful reconsideration of Diem. While some readers may not find all of the book convincing, it deserves attention. Ultimately, all readers should agree, Diem’s “Mandate from Heaven” was not enough to prevent his overthrow and save his life. Even Ho Chi Minh thought removing Diem from power a fatal mistake for the imperialist Americans.
Drawdown: The American Way of Postwar
Edited by Jason W. Warren

Reviewed by Brian McAllister Linn, Professor of History, Texas A&M University, and author of Elvis’s Army: Cold War GIs and the Atomic Battlefield (Harvard University Press, 2016)

It is always difficult for a historian to review a book on a topic that has, or should have, much to contribute to a contemporary military issue. Should the reviewer focus on the book’s historical importance or speculate on its current relevance? The problem is compounded in an edited volume of articles, each of which has to be assessed both for academic worth and as guidance for the present. Unfortunately, Drawdown: The American Way of Postwar is likely to frustrate both historians and those interested in the debates over current defense reductions. Despite some excellent individual essays, the book is inadequately organized and edited, providing neither a coherent interpretation of “the American way of postwar” nor guidance for today’s military realities.

The forward by Peter Mansoor and the introduction by Michael E. Lynch make a commendable effort to impose intellectual consistency. Lynch, referencing one of the chapter titles, postulates a “liberty dilemma” in which the requirement for military forces to defend national security is countered by the public’s fear of military influence and socioeconomic costs. It is a valiant attempt, but Lynch struggles to locate an American way of postwar in a book that is less a collective effort than a diverse collection of essays reflecting a variety of research interests.

Three essays on the post-Vietnam drawdown offer a model that might well have served for the rest of the book, and certainly would have made Lynch’s task easier. Individually they provide both historical narrative and provocative interpretation. Together, they form a coherent, integrated analysis of the drawdown experience since Vietnam.

In a tight, well-researched essay, Conrad C. Crane explores what he terms the “myth of the Abrams doctrine.” His admirers have credited the general with so intertwining the active and reserve components of the military that no president could go to war without both—thus somehow insuring political and popular commitment to future conflicts. Crane questions whether this was ever Abrams’ purpose and concludes, “if he actually did have that goal . . . he failed miserably” (249).

Antulio J. Echevarria II offers an insightful critique of what others have mythologized as the “good drawdown” in which “prodigal soldiers” restored the US Army’s pride and competence. The service’s focus on one mission for nearly two decades—deterring or defeating the USSR in western Europe—inspired reforms in doctrine, equipment, concepts, force structure, training, and so on—all of which appeared to be justified in the quick triumph of Desert Storm, and increasingly irrelevant thereafter.

Richard A. Lacquement Jr. provides a significant investigation of the post-Cold War drawdown, concluding that a combination of inertia,
emerging if relatively low-level threats, and global ambitions left the armed forces comparatively untouched. Comfortably fixated on waging war against a peer competitor, they had a difficult time adapting to the unconventional challenges of the twenty-first century.

All three essays complement each other, raising common themes and ideas and taking them forward from the end of the Vietnam War to the Iraq-Afghanistan conflicts. Studied together, these chapters will benefit both historians and students of the current drawdown.

Other chapters are also worth reading as individual essays, but of less relevance to the subject of drawdown. Samuel Watson’s chapter, spanning roughly the end of the American Revolution to the Mexican War, argues that the reduction of the Army’s officer corps in 1820 increased corporate professionalism by purging wartime veterans unfit for garrison duty. The implications for today are important, if disturbing. Edward A. Gutiérrez and Michael S. Neiberg summarize the four decades between the Spanish-American War and World War II. They see a slow but steady improvement in professional skill and institutional competence, some of it due to the Army having so little to do. Michael R. Matheny examines education at Fort Leavenworth and the War College between the World Wars. Lacking both resources and personnel to train for war, the Army wisely devoted itself to intellectual preparation, educating its best and brightest in the complexities of national mobilization. Raymond Millen’s overview of the post-Korea reduction in forces is a well-researched, cogent defense of Eisenhower’s strategic priorities, though readers might wish he had devoted more attention to the New Look’s effects on the field forces.

If the majority of the essays are good to superior, why is Drawdown unsatisfactory as a book? In my view, an edited volume should be more than a collection of individual chapters: the sum should be better than the parts. And, a work that appears marketed to readers interested in current military reductions should have essays that draw clear parallels with today’s events. By these standards, Drawdown is a disappointment. Whether from an author’s caprice or a lack of editorial oversight, too many essays meander into wartime operations or colonial militia at the expense of a discussion of how this nation has demobilized its wartime forces. Readers will find some excellent solo chapters, but barring the three integrated essays on the post-Vietnam era they will not find an explanation of the American way of postwar.

The vast collection of work on the American Civil War can make it difficult to identify meaningful gaps in the historiography or to find novel methods, approaches, or arguments to further our understanding
of the conflict’s history. In *Bushwhackers: Guerilla Warfare, Manhood, and the Household in Civil War Missouri*, Joseph M. Beilein Jr. embraces these challenges and succeeds in providing a new thematic study of guerilla warfare in Union-occupied Missouri that productively links elements of social and military history. He argues the guerillas of Civil War Missouri waged a “household war” in which men were connected, motivated, and sustained by networks of family and kin. This viewpoint challenges caricatures of guerillas as predatory outcasts, instead depicting their war effort as a system of community defense that mobilized the entire spectrum of Southern social hierarchy, within which roles and allegiances were shaped by age, gender, class, and race.

The book is arranged around specific arguments and themes rather than a chronological narrative, so readers unfamiliar with the characters and events discussed may struggle to place the evidence in historical context or to form clear lines of causation. The first three chapters lay the framework of the argument, outlining the contention that the strategy, tactics, and logistics of guerilla warfare were products of the gendered roles, relationships, and identities of the antebellum household. The strength of Beilein’s research is evident in this section, which uses census data, provost marshal records, and guerilla memoirs to piece together 122 separate rebel households, and then divides them into two distinct groups organized around bonds of kinship in resistance to Union occupation. Describing these groups as the “Fristoe” and “Holzclaw” systems of warfare, Beilein persuasively demonstrates how these distributed networks of autonomous households were effectively connected by family bonds and shared notions of deference and hospitality and fulfilled reciprocal needs of protection, logistics, and intelligence gathering across a guerilla band’s area of operations, satisfying both military and social necessities.

The remainder of the book addresses the material culture of guerilla society, analyzing both the practical uses and social meanings of food, clothing, horses, armaments, and rituals of remembrance. Beilein demonstrates how the domestic production and agricultural labor of women were sufficient to keep the guerillas adequately fed and clothed, negating the necessity for pillaging beyond retribution against anti-Southern households and communities. More important, by providing for the logistical needs of the fighters, women became active participants in the guerilla system and reinforced mutual social bonds and obligations. In addition, Beilein argues the guerillas’ choices to be mounted and to adopt the Colt revolver were due not only to military advantages of mobility and firepower but were also products of a “horse culture” and notions of martial masculinity that valued individual skill and courage as markers of manhood.

Perhaps Beilein’s greatest contribution in *Bushwhackers* is his attempt to analyze guerilla warfare through a gendered lens, which challenges conventions within military history and shows clearly in his endnotes and bibliography. His secondary sources center on a constellation of social and gender history scholars like Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Amy S. Greenberg, Nancy F. Cott, Kathleen M. Brown, Stephanie McCurry, John Mack Faragher, and his mentor LeeAnn Whites. These sources give him excellent scaffolding for theorizing about a system of family- and community-based warfare, one that both contrasts with
and complements social histories of conventional forces like Edward Coffman’s. For scholars of counterinsurgency, this book may prove a useful case study on how irregular forces can subsist and succeed outside conventional logistical networks and a cautionary note on developing strategies to combat insurgencies at the household or community level.

While Beilein’s research is thorough and convincing, and his thematic chapters will have topical interest to scholars beyond the field of military history, his characterizations of both Union and Confederate regulars in the broader conflict are likely to draw criticism. In an effort to emphasize the culture of masculine individuality that guerillas embraced, he casts the regular soldier broadly as its antithesis, where the relationship between soldier and firearm “corroded his identity as a man” (152). He crafts an elaborate contrast between the yeoman farmer of the South, who mastered the land and his weapon as signs of his manhood and independence, against factory workers and regular soldiers, who existed as unskilled and timid cogs in the hierarchical machinery of industrial warfare.

If military discipline and distance from family are what distinguish the regular soldier from the guerilla, it must be considered a difference of degree rather than one of type. Soldiers in the Union and Confederate armies remained individuals and maintained reciprocal bonds with their families and communities that profoundly shaped their experiences, a reality broadly reflected in the literature of the conflict. Simplifications of the regular military experience like this occasionally betray Beilein’s shallow dive into conventional military history beyond Missouri, but within his field of expertise and the scope of his primary argument, Bushwhackers is a welcome addition to the historiography of the American Civil War.

The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire in Habsburg Serbia, 1914–1918
By Jonathan E. Gumz

Reviewed by James D. Scudieri, Senior Historian, US Army Heritage and Education Center

This eye-opening book cuts a path into unfamiliar territory—the Austro-Hungarian invasions of Serbia and the subsequent occupation of Serbia to the end of the Great War. In current joint terminology, the book focuses on an extended Phase IV (to stabilize), with a particular twist on Phase V (to enable civil authority).

The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire in Habsburg Serbia, 1914–1918 is well written, researched, and organized, but it is a difficult book to read. The subject is unfamiliar, as Austrian institutions and mindsets are unlike German or Prussian, of which American readers are familiar. The text cites, for example, Austria-Hungary’s three regular armies. The Common Army, however, with central funding was the only one entitled to the categorization of k.u.k. (Kaiserlich und Königlich, Imperial and Royal). The other two were the Austrian Landwehr and the Hungarian Honved, again, neither reserve nor militia.
The detailed introduction lays out the thesis and major elements of evidence while subsequent chapters are thematic. The conclusion summarizes points of emphasis made throughout the book. Gumz organizes and integrates these components effectively as he investigates how Austrian authorities structured and implemented the occupation of a conquered Serbia, provides an analysis of civil-military relations, and discusses historiography. He highlights, for example, how evidence is at variance with much post-war Serbian narrative of the Habsburg revenge.

Senior Austrian officers possessed hardened, peacetime beliefs. They assumed a short war as did many, if not most, of their friends and foes. More significantly, Austrian military culture viewed the army and the business of waging war as distinct from civilian society and internal politics. The army represented duty, objectivity, and justice, ostensibly without bias, in a domestic world torn by nationalist passions and notions of democratization. Civil-military relations were poor and preciously little.

In 1914, the Austrian officer corps approached the outbreak of war with Serbia as an aberration. Wed to a limited-war tradition and a commitment to international norms, they abhorred a foe whom they understood to have radicalized warfare via a levée en masse with complete civilian participation. They expected to have to deal with wholesale popular atrocities, and their typical responses included threats, hostages, and executions. Gumz is emphatic that Austrian retaliation was dependent upon the specific incident and how Austrian commanders rejected universal total-war solutions, remaining tied to certain institutional, moral, and legal boundaries. Frankly, the responses were brutal.

Subsequently, Serbian occupation was under the military government of Serbia. The military governor answered directly to the chief of the general staff. Serbia was a military preserve, deliberately earmarked for civilian exclusion. The first preeminent mission was to denationalize and depoliticize conquered Serbia in preparation for its becoming part of Habsburg territory, the subject of Chapter 2. Thus, reestablished schools had soldier-teachers, though a teacher shortage was an early challenge. A police network targeted intelligentsia in a structure which saw policing as a military-intelligence function. The government’s most powerful weapon was internment, that is, transportation to a different part of the empire. A new, harsher military governor and fears of an uprising in the wake of Russia’s Brusilov Offensive in June 1916 and Romanian entrance into the war as an ally of the Entente in August 1916 brought mass internments. These actions soon became counterproductive due to little to no coordination with other governmental agencies, worsening labor shortages in a long war, and international opinion.

The law is the focus of Chapter 3. In brief, Serbia endured the most severe form of the increased permeation of military law into civil society throughout the wartime empire. The explanations are the army’s military culture discussed above and the endorsement by the Austrian civilian minister-president. Space precludes a more detailed discussion. The text lays out the specifics, to include precise terms and procedures. Their easement came with the succession of Prinz Karl as emperor upon the death of Franz Joseph in November 1916.
Chapter 4 concerns food. The Austrians decided definitively to preclude starvation in Serbia. Ironically, Serbia became a sort of imperial bread basket. The reasons rest upon relative success within Serbia and worsening conditions throughout the empire, but particularly in Austria, the Hinterland. The army’s total control over Serbia and its anathema over civilian interference make for quite a case study of interagency operations to distribute food outside Serbia.

From 1917, the military government of Serbia had to deal with internal warfare. The initial Austrian response viewed the scenario as civil war with mass uprising, much like their perspective in 1914. Leaders slowly came to realize that the enemy was more localized guerrillas with limited numbers, who could not count on widespread popular support and hence punished civilian elements. Therefore, the Austrians changed their methods from larger-unit sweeps to platoon-level jagdkommandos, who tracked and laid ambushes. Ironically, this war evolved to Austrian forces becoming protectors of the population caught in a civil war of sorts.

The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire in Habsburg Serbia underscores the requirement to understand the past from the perspective of the participants, not the perspective of the readers. The book’s conclusions provide statements with wider implications, including the increasing role of guerrilla war during the Great War and what the occupation of Serbia was not—another example of European colonial domination or a historical progression of events which led to the worst atrocities of the Third Reich.