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Major General David C. Hill

Celebrating Fifty Years

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Nora Bensahel
Rosa Brooks
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Retrospectives 1971
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**Contemporary Strategy and Landpower Essay Award**

The annual Contemporary Strategy and Landpower Essay Award, formerly the Elihu Root Prize, recognizes and rewards authors outside the US Army War College for the most significant contributions on contemporary strategy and landpower in a volume of the US Army War College Quarterly, Parameters. The journal’s editorial board selects winners based upon the article’s analytical depth and rigor. The Contemporary Strategy and Landpower Essay Award is made possible by the generous support of the US Army War College Foundation. The award winners for Volume 50 of the journal will be announced in the Summer 2021 issue.
From the Commandant

With the publication of this issue, The US Army War College Quarterly, 
*Parameters* celebrates 50 years of successfully presenting cutting-edge scholarly research in a format useful to military and policy practitioners. For five decades, *Parameters* has served as the US Army’s flagship strategy journal, bringing crucial strategic issues to the attention of not only the Army’s senior leaders but the entire Joint community as well. As the archives show, the name *Parameters* was chosen because it represents the responsible framing of defense matters—from the nature of war to the character of civil-military relations—for discussion and debate, and ultimately for action.

Fifty years ago, Major General George S. Eckhardt, then Commandant of the US Army War College, described *Parameters*’ chief objective as the promotion of a broader and deeper understanding of the “goals, the power, and the policies of the United States, as well as those of allies, neutrals, or potential enemies.” As I look back at all the journal has accomplished since then, I am pleased to report *Parameters* has more than met that objective. The Army’s flagship strategy journal not only promotes a deeper understanding of the “goals, power, and policies” of the United States, it also leans forward—anticipating and, in important ways, shaping those goals through the insights of its contributors as well as the open-mindedness of its readers.

Since its inception, *Parameters* has published more than 1,200 different authors and 1,500 articles. Among its authors are notable personalities such as Omar Bradley, Michael Walzer, Barbara Tuchman, George Will, Milton Friedman, John Keegan, David Petraeus, Isaac Singer, Tom Wolfe, Stephen Ambrose, James H. Baker, Charles S. Robb, Saxby Chambliss, Robert Gates, James Mattis, and Michael Chertoff. Likewise, the articles these authors have written for the journal cover such topics as new vistas for American foreign policy, innovations in professional military education, emerging technologies, strategic theories for the contemporary world, the moral impact of racial and gender inequalities, and measures to reduce the incidence of suicide within our ranks.

Yet, just as our nation is greater than the sum of its parts, and the more diverse those parts the better, so too *Parameters* is more than the sum of its authors and its articles, eminent though they may be. The journal’s success stems immensely from you, the reader, and your active participation. To underscore that point, let me echo something Major General Eckhardt noted five decades ago that still rings true today: *Parameters*’ success lies less in its contributors or its content than in the benefits its readers derive from it. We provide you a forum for scholarly research, but you ensure the content is relevant, timely, and accessible by engaging with it.

David C. Hill
Major General, US Army
Acting Commandant
US Army War College

TOC
From the Editor in Chief

This is a special issue of Parameters. It celebrates half a century of publishing first-rate strategic analyses designed to help US civilian and military policymakers decide how best to address the always present and always varying challenges to America’s security.

When Parameters made its debut as a strategy journal in March 1971, the United States was still engaged in the Vietnam conflict with more than 300,000 troops in the country. The terrorist group known as the Weather Underground exploded a bomb in the US Capitol Building that same month to protest the expansion of the war into Laos. Large-scale antiwar protests and sit-ins took place in the nation’s capital in May 1971. One month later, in June of 1971, the “Pentagon Papers” were released, raising troubling questions about the motives for, and sustainability of, America’s involvement in the war. National Public Radio (NPR) made its inaugural broadcast in 1971 as well, adding a public-funded broadcasting agency as an alternative to commercial networks.

But national morale was low. Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert Kennedy were assassinated in April and June of 1968 respectively, and riots in America’s major metropolitan centers continued throughout the remainder of that year. Apollo 11’s successful landing on the moon on July 20, 1969, (and Apollo 12 four months later) was offset by Apollo 13’s aborted lunar mission in April 1970. And the May 4, 1970, massacre at Kent State University, in which four students were killed, was not yet one year old. All of these events were in the rearview mirror, but only just.

In 1971, America’s population was 211 million people and climbing. The United States was experiencing an economic recession with inflation reaching nearly 6 percent the year before, the highest rate since the Korean War; unemployment hovered just over 6 percent, and real per-capita income amounted to $18,000; a gallon of gas cost only 40 cents, while the average price of a new house was $25,000.¹ In the summer of 1971, the country’s voting age was lowered to 18 to align it with the draft age, which had been 18 since the Second World War. Ironically that shift came at a time when the country had begun to move away from conscription toward a volunteer force—which in turn raised far-ranging questions about US civil-military relations and military professionalism.

This celebratory issue consists of two parts. Part I, Prospectives 2021, offers three forums discussing ways ahead for America’s Strategic Landpower, its Civil-Military Relations, and its National Security. Part II, Retrospectives 1971, assesses the contributions made to the inaugural issue of Parameters. We have arranged the contributions to Part II thematically, to aid readers, rather than presenting them in their original order.

Part I’s first forum, US Strategic Landpower, opens with an article by Carol Evans, “Providing Stability and Deterrence: The US Army in INDOPACOM.” She argues the US Army’s long-range, precision-strike capabilities offer powerful means to improve deterrence in the

¹. In 2016 dollars (inflation adjusted).
Indo-Pacific region by means of a “Ring of Fires” concept; furthermore, the Army’s capacity for building military-to-military relationships provides an exceptional mechanism for enhancing the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, and with it regional stability. Nora Bensahel’s “Transforming the US Army for the Twenty-First Century” follows Evans’s contribution, arguing the US Army must make four major shifts in its operational concepts and postures: from a supported to a supporting force, from a focus on maneuvers to a focus on fires, from expeditionary to homeland defense capabilities, and from a culture that sees the active component as “first among equals” to one that considers all components equal.

In the next forum, US Civil-Military Relations, Rosa Brooks asks “Are US Civil-Military Relations in Crisis?” To answer that question she examines, rigorously, five popular claims all of which seemingly point to an affirmative response—namely, US citizens do not know their military, fewer than 1 percent of Americans serve, the US military is too different culturally from civilian society, active and retired senior officers have assumed positions of influence within the US government, and the military has become too political. But she finds each of these claims wanting. Focusing on whether such a crisis exists, she adds, comes at the risk of diverting attention from other more dangerous threats to American democracy. Risa Brooks’s “Beyond Huntington: US Military Professionalism Today” suggests Huntington’s model of an apolitical military, to the extent it was ever adopted, has outlived its usefulness. America’s military professionals now need a new model, one that both reaffirms their commitment to the state and its political infrastructure but allows for flexible interpretation in fluid circumstances.

The third forum, US National Security Strategy, offers two macro-perspectives concerning where American foreign policy ought to be heading. In “Seeing in Stereo,” Anne-Marie Slaughter contends the traditional habit of viewing situations dichotomously, as generally exclusive categories, will not avail in the contemporary security environment. She argues instead for establishing a new tradition, one that permits us to see an overlap in categorical opposites, such as “many” and “one” or “global issues” and “great power competition.” The ability to see such categories “in stereo,” that is, not as mutually exclusive, she contends, will help us resolve national security dilemmas more profitably. In “Charting a Different Course,” however, Nadia Schadlow sends a different message. She reprises her earlier argument about liberal internationalism’s failure to set a sound strategic course for promoting US security interests. The unipolar moment is over, she maintains, and America’s military supremacy is being challenged in various and sometimes discreet ways. Accordingly, America needs to sweep away the myths that have underpinned its national security perspectives to this point and chart a more realistic way ahead based on a sober appreciation of the strengths of its rivals balanced against its own limitations.

Part II’s opening forum, Strategic Organization, features two articles. In “Managerial Aspects of Command,” John Kem and James Breckenridge
analyze the article “Some Managerial Aspects of Command” by Harold Lamp. Lamp attempted to move beyond the debate, then gathering momentum, regarding which skills were more important to senior leaders—those related to command or those pertaining to management—by finding common ground between them. Kem and Breckenridge agree with Lamp’s approach and discuss some of his more enduring insights. The second contribution to this forum, “The Joint Force and Lessons from 1971,” by Jonathan Klug assesses the article, “The Unified Command Structure,” by Duane Smith, which is itself an assessment. Klug finds Smith’s analysis of America’s requirements with respect to strategic commands to be accurate and insightful. He recommends Smith’s article to the military professional, despite its age.

The second forum, (Un)civil Military Relations, in an unorthodox manner consists of a single article. The topic of civil-military relations, featured prominently in this issue’s Prospectives 2021, was, and remains, simply too important not to warrant its own forum. In “Academe and the Military,” Tony and Julia Pfaff do the topic justice through their critique of the essay, “Mutual Misperceptions: The Academic and the Soldier in Contemporary America,” by Donald Bletz. They find Bletz’s argument, that civil-military relations in the United States had become dysfunctional, to be regrettably accurate for 1971. They also ponder to what extent Bletz’s assessment holds true in 2021.

Our third forum, Regional Challenges, evaluates the merits of two regionally focused articles. In the first of these, “Soviet Economic Reform—Surprisingly Prescient,” Robert Hamilton examines John Hardt’s “Breshnev’s Economic Choice: More Weapons and Control or Economic Modernization.” While Hardt correctly perceived the better choice the Kremlin should make, as Hamilton reminds us, Soviet leaders would not be able to overcome bureaucratic inertia or the military’s intransigence to bring it to fruition. Hamilton compliments Hardt’s article for its prescience—its success at standing at an historical inflection point, and the author’s realization of this fact. It has stood the test of time rather well, he concludes. In the second assessment, “Moscow in the Middle East,” Andrew Terrill critiques John Thomas’s “The Dilemmas of Soviet Policy in the Middle East.” Thomas’s analysis has been eclipsed by historical events, as Terrill points out. Soviet interest in the Middle East has changed with the times: rather than being motivated primarily by ideological interests, as it was in 1971 during the Cold War, the Kremlin is now involved in the region mainly through economic relationships and efforts to mitigate terrorist threats to the Russian homeland.

This issue’s last forum, Learning from the Past, is hardly its least. Drawing lessons or insights from the past, however difficult or problematic it might be to do so, was a popular exercise for professional military educational institutions at the time. The US Army War College was no exception to that rule. J. P. Clark’s “US Army Reforms in the Progressive Era” critiques F. Gunther Eyck’s “Secretary Stimson and the Army Reforms, 1911-1913.” Clark places Eyck’s article within its own
historical context and explicates both what the essay says about the US Army’s reforms in the Progressive Era, as well as what the contribution itself reveals about the period in which it was written. Michael Neiberg’s “Coalition Warfare—Echoes from the Past” evaluates James Agnew’s “Coalition Warfare.” Agnew’s article drew, or attempted to draw, lessons regarding the difficulties of developing organizational relationships to manage alliances and coalitions during the First World War. Ultimately, as President Woodrow Wilson discovered, and as contemporary scholars and practitioners well know, it can prove difficult to influence any alliance or coalition partner unless one has “skin in the game.” Even then, the partners who have lost the most in blood and treasure may have the final say, whether wise or not, on the most critical of strategic choices.

Overall, Parameters’s inaugural issue was well served by the many authors who contributed to it. But one might well wonder how closely its main themes paralleled those of its peer journals—Naval War College Review, Air University Review, Military Review, the Naval Institute’s Proceedings, and the Marine Corps Gazette. In the spring of 1971, the Naval War College Review featured two pieces that dealt with the role of public opinion in war, one that analyzed the philosophical outlook of the counterculture, one that explained the military planning process, another that addressed the military management process, and two historical contributions, one covering the influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan on European naval expansion and one discussing Admiral Raymond Spruance and the Naval War College. Each of the first three articles reflects concerns similar in character to those discussed by Bletz in his contribution to the inaugural issue of Parameters. The articles dealing with the military planning and management processes parallel roughly those by Lamp and Smith and reveal the predilections of an era that employed scientific processes as safeguards against the human propensity for error; in Mahan’s day, by comparison, principles played that role. The June 1971 issue of the Naval War College Review would offer an article discussing the Soviet Union and the United States in the Middle East, showing strong parallels with the contributions by Hardt and Thomas. Indeed, Soviet and Chinese strategic thought and national cultures would be persistent themes for all the military journals of the US Armed Forces throughout the Cold War.

Like Parameters, the Air University Review shaped its content according to the concerns of its readers. The US military’s transition to an all-volunteer force ranked high among those concerns. Accordingly the Spring 1971 issue of Air University Review offered two contributions

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stressing the importance of military professionalism, as well as a comparison of professional military educational systems abroad. It also featured an analysis of the military decision-making process from the standpoint of communicating across cultures in addition to an article describing air power’s utility in psychological operations.

Until the appearance of Parameters, the US Army’s Military Review carried not only articles with a tactical focus, but many with a strategic inclination as well. Alongside tactically oriented essays discussing distinguishing between murder and killing in combat and the mental health of frontline soldiers, for instance, were contributions covering Soviet strategic thinking, the defense policies of western European states, the Soviet rationale for arms control, and international systems of recruitment. The Naval Institute’s Proceedings remained more technologically focused. But it did feature articles discussing the future of the US Navy as well as a study concerning junior officer retention rates. Not to be overlooked, the Marine Corps Gazette provided insights regarding training concepts, orders, and the civil war in Jordan.

The pages that follow show just how much the journal’s history is also America’s history. Since 1971, Parameters has “been there,” with its authors offering insightful analyses and policy recommendations to US strategic leaders for matters great and small. Understandably, Cold War concerns dominated the journal’s pages from its inaugural issue to the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Thereafter, Parameters gave space to debates over military transformation, the revolution in military affairs as it was sometimes called, as well as how US foreign policy might adjust to a new strategic situation that required recalibrating from state-on-state conflicts to various forms of irregular warfare. The shock of 9/11 reinforced the importance of the latter dimension of war, and Parameters responded accordingly. Likewise the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq that took place during the first

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two decades of the twenty-first century demonstrated the need for the systematic collection of observations, even “lessons,” of what worked and what did not, for the United States and its many strategic partners; again, the US Army’s flagship strategy journal responded. Now as great power competition has once more attracted public attention, Parameters has adjusted accordingly. Notwithstanding these important concerns, Parameters has consistently dedicated multiple forums to essential matters such as military professionalism, race and gender issues, and strategic theories and concepts.

On behalf of the Strategic Studies Institute and the US Army War College Press, it is our pleasure to present Parameters Issue 51, No. 1. ~AJE
Publication Milestones

| PARAMETERS • 1971 | Practitioner-relevant scholarship since 1971 |
| PARAMETERS • 1981 | More than 1,500 articles and 1,300 book reviews published |
| PARAMETERS • 1991 | 1,200 authors featured |
| PARAMETERS • 2001 | 89 articles by women published since 1980 |
| PARAMETERS • 2011 | Yearly circulation of 48,000 copies |
| PARAMETERS • 2021 | Decisive Point podcast introduced in 2020 |
| PARAMETERS • 2021 | 37,000 downloads since June 2020 |
The efficacy of ground combat comes under question during the Vietnam War. Arriving in Beijing on February 21, 1972, US President Richard Nixon shakes hands with Premier of the People’s Republic of China Zhou Enlai. The visit led to the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China. US Marines in Vietnam honor lost comrades killed in action with battlefield crosses—a long-standing tradition begun during the American Civil War. The United States endures two oil crises—an oil embargo by OPEC in 1973 (the price of oil rose almost 300 percent) and an oil shortage in 1979 (the cost of a barrel of oil more than doubled to $39.50). Both crises cause fuel shortages and long lines at the gas pumps. In January 1973, Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom enter the European Economic Community (EEC), the precursor to the European Union (EU).
Celebrating Fifty Years

Changing US-USSR and US-PRC Relations

Left to right: 6. Desegregation continues to change the culture and demographics of families in and out of the military. Public Law 94-106 allows women to enter the all-male military academies for the first time in history, and in 1976, women join the freshman class of the US Military Academy, the US Naval Academy, and the US Air Force Academy. 7. The United States celebrates its bicentennial and the anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence. 8. An early Apple MacIntosh computer (1976) and other technologies transform society, making computers more mainstream and affordable and radically changing military planning and analysis and the execution of warfare. 9. In September 1978, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat (left) and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin (right) greet each other for the first time at Camp David in Maryland. The Camp David Accords lead to a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel the following year, the first treaty between Israel and any of its neighboring Arab countries. 10. Lebanese Shiite religious leader Subhi al-Tufayli addresses a crowd in Beirut in support of the November 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran.
Left to right: 1. An Afghan mujahideen fighter engages Soviet aircraft with a US-made Stinger anti-aircraft missile. The CIA program, code named Operation Cyclone, arms and finances the mujahideen in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. 2. In January 1981 newly freed American hostages arrive at the US Air Force Hospital in Wiesbaden, Germany, for medical and psychological exams after spending 444 days in Iranian captivity. 3. The United States launches Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada on October 25, 1983, to protect the lives of US students, restore democratic government, and eradicate Cuban influence on the island. 4. Artillery personnel from the 82nd Airborne Division load and fire M102 105-mm howitzers during Operation Urgent Fury. 5. A suicide bomber destroys the US Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, on April 18, 1983, killing 63 people.
Celebrating Fifty Years

Changing US Civil-Military Relations

Left to right: 1. Tanks amass at the Saudi Arabian border in preparation for Operation Desert Storm, which begins on January 17, 1991. 2. The Patriot surface-to-air missile defense system dominates air defense efforts in the Middle East during the Gulf War, engaging and intercepting Scud missiles and contributing to the coalition’s victory in the war. 3-4. The 7th Engineer Brigade comprised of National Guard Engineer Groups combat, combat-heavy and divisional engineer battalions; and topographic, bridging, well-drilling, and firefighting units deploys to Saudi Arabia in 1991 to perform a variety of support missions. 5. At Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, in November 1992, Lieutenant General Jerry R. Rutherford, V Corps commander, discusses last-minute details with Lieutenant Colonel Felipe Casso, executive officer, 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH). The MASH is the first US Army unit to deploy to Zagreb, Croatia, in support of UN Protection Forces in Operation Provide Promise, a humanitarian relief operation. When the mission ends in 1996, it becomes the longest humanitarian airlift operation performed by the Department of Defense.
Celebrating Fifty Years

Military Transformation in the Information Age

Left to right. 6. Marines chat with a village elder in Somalia during Operation Restore Hope in 1992. This Unified Task Force is a US-led, UN-sanctioned multinational force charged with delivering food and other humanitarian aid to Somalia. 7. A soldier from the 6th Battalion, 502 Infantry, Berlin, Germany, stands at attention in Macedonia during Operation Able Sentry, begun in July 1993, to monitor and report activity along Macedonia’s northern border with Serbia. The peacekeeping mission is the first time US armed forces are placed under UN command. 8. On February 26, 1993, Ramzi Yousef and Eyad Ismoil detonate a truck bomb below the north tower of the World Trade Center in New York City, killing six people and injuring over 1,000 individuals. 9. The Pentium processor, released in 1993, revolutionizes computer processing. 10. Domestic terrorists Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols detonate a truck bomb outside the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, killing 168 people. 11. A terrorist truck bomb explodes outside the northern perimeter of the US portion of the Khobar Towers housing complex in Saudi Arabia on June 25, 1996, killing 19 servicemembers and wounding hundreds more. 12. In July 1999, Major General Valeri Evtoukovitch (left), commander of Russian Forces in Kosovo, and Brigadier General John Craddock (second from right), US Army commander of Task Force Falcon at Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo, discuss relations between Russian and American forces as part of the Kosovo Forces, the NATO-led international military force performing peacekeeping missions in support of Operation Joint Guardian, which began in June 1999.
Celebrating Fifty Years

Homeland Security

Left to right: 8. Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia join the EU in 2004. 9-12. Devices such as the iPod (2001) and social media sites such as LinkedIn (2002), Facebook (2004), and YouTube (2005) change how people interact with each other and the world. 13. Soldiers of Company B, Task Force 1-27 Infantry, as part of Operation Wolfhound Power, conduct a dismounted patrol in Hawija, Iraq, on November 13, 2004. 14-15. Following Hurricane Katrina (2005), the Massachusetts National Guard and many other units provide civil and medical assistance in New Orleans, Louisiana, during Task Force Yankee. 16. Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin (2009) change the way people think about and invest in currencies and technology and how the military analyzes economic power. 17. Colonel Dan Stoltz, commander, Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command – Forward, provides guidance to Haitians following the January 12, 2010, 7.0-magnitude earthquake.
Left to right: 1. Osama bin Laden with his adviser Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. US Special Forces raid an al-Qaeda compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, on May 2, 2011, and kill bin Laden, the world’s most wanted terrorist. 2. Terrorists detonate two homemade pressure cooker bombs near the finish line of the Boston Marathon on April 15, 2013. 3. Evolving technology continues to threaten national security as cyberwarfare efforts grow, requiring another dimension in strategic analysis and the impact of technology on war and policy. 4. Military efforts in the Indo-Pacific region ramp up. 5. More than 20 years after its inception in 1991, the World Wide Web continues to influence global dynamics. 6. China’s growing economic power signals China’s increasing threat to US interests. 7. Satellite image of Superstorm Sandy over the eastern United States, Tuesday, October 30, 2012. Sandy killed 75 people and caused $70.2 billion in damage. 8. In 2013 American whistleblower Edward Snowden leaks highly classified documents from the National Security Agency, increasing interest in encryption and the safety of cloud technology for the military and analysis and mitigation of the devastating, long-term impacts of Snowden’s disclosures.
Celebrating Fifty Years

Great Power Rivalry – Global Pandemics

ABSTRACT: Regaining the military advantage in the Indo-Pacific region requires renewed thinking about the US military footprint there, particularly the role of the US Army. The Army’s deterrence and partnering capabilities will be best utilized by engaging its long-range and precision-strike capabilities in a regional “Ring of Fires” concept and further enhanced as part of a broader revitalization and expansion of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.

The US Department of Defense and its Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) are grappling with how to regain military advantage in the region amid a global pandemic and looming defense budget cuts. The US Army’s specific challenge centers on becoming a more effective enabler for the Joint Force, an aim the Army can best accomplish by combining its special deterrence and relationship-building capacities into a two-pronged action plan. Regarding the first prong, deterrence, the Army should leverage its long-range and precision-strike capabilities to form a Ring of Fires that could target China’s critical land-based and maritime assets. Concerning the second prong, relationship-building, the Army should work toward augmenting and operationalizing the multidomain military capabilities of India and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—a strategic-level forum comprised of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—along with the support of key allies, the United Kingdom, and France: a “Quad Plus.”

Introduction

Most experts agree the Indo-Pacific region is the fulcrum for the future global security order and thus of critical concern for the new US administration. As the 2018 National Defense Strategy ominously warned, “China . . . seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future.” But the Biden administration faces a revisionist China rapidly marching toward its intended goals (as outlined in President Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream”) of achieving hegemony in the region and the unification of Taiwan with China either through coercion or force. Accordingly, US military planners must now provide

America’s policymakers with bold, visionary strategic thinking and new operational concepts.

Moreover the United States should supplement its words of commitment to allies and partners with a plan of action that actively improves interoperability and military-to-military cooperation. This article offers just such a strategic and operational roadmap, one that takes better advantage of the Army’s role in the Indo-Pacific to achieve greater stability by deterring aggressive activities. This roadmap assumes, optimistically, the threat posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will spur greater military cooperation among leading Indo-Pacific countries, the United States, and other key European countries. But this roadmap also recognizes the fragile and emergent characteristics of many of these relationships.

This article examines the threat posed by the PRC’s aggressive military expansion from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean and beyond as well as key PRC military weaknesses that INDOPACOM and the US Army Pacific Command (USARPAC) should exploit. The article then details the enabling role the US Army can play vis-à-vis the Joint Force through a new operational concept called Ring of Fires, which would see deterrence-oriented Army precision-strike and other missile capabilities deployed to key locations in the Indo-Pacific region in an effort to challenge China’s economic survival. Finally, the article underscores the importance of further relationship building with India especially, and with the Quad countries, as well as the United Kingdom and France. Together, the combined military and economic capabilities of the United States and its allies and strategic partners can create a formidable security framework for the region.

China’s Military Expansion

American military primacy and its capability to deter aggression and to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific have declined. By contrast China has embarked upon construction of a new security architecture in the region through huge investments in counterintervention and power-projection capabilities. Evidence of this expansion includes the PRC’s unilateral militarization and deployment of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities to address a Taiwan contingency; its expanded naval operations in the western Pacific, into the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea; and the establishment of the first People’s Liberation Army (PLA) base in Djibouti. Since 2008 the PLA Navy (PLAN) has dispatched 35 naval escort task forces into the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden.3

Beijing has buttressed its power-projection capabilities in the region with a military modernization program that is outpacing the United States in shipbuilding, land-based conventional ballistic and cruise

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missiles, and air defense systems.\textsuperscript{4} Xi’s geostrategic Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), especially the Maritime Silk Road (also known as the String of Pearls), underpins this buildup of the PRC’s power projection and expeditionary warfare capabilities. The Maritime Silk Road is a soft power means to build overseas basing and logistics infrastructures to project and sustain PLA ground force—as well as PLAN, Peoples Liberation Army Marine Corps, and Peoples Liberation Army Rocket Force—assets throughout the Indo-Pacific.

Located along key global sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and choke points, Beijing has secured long-term, dual-use, deep-water port facilities in Australia, Bangladesh, Kenya, Malaysia, the Maldives, Mauritius, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Thailand. Many of these ports are owned and operated under long-term lease agreements, often extracted to repay debts to the PRC. As former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper cautioned, China is “gaining strategic influence, access to key resources, and military footholds around the world” via the Belt and Road Initiative.\textsuperscript{5} Indeed the sum of these developments has led observers to lament the loss of American primacy in the region; in short, Washington has effectively “ceded [the] strategic initiative” to Beijing.\textsuperscript{6}

**Joint Force Enabler**

In December 2020 during a major speech regarding the Pentagon’s need to realign US defense spending more acutely to address the threat of Chinese expansion, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark A. Milley commented, “Look, I’m an Army guy. . . . And I love the Army . . . but the fundamental defense of the United States and the ability to project power forward will always be for America naval and air and space power.” As presaged by Milley’s remarks, the Army has long endeavored to solve the conundrum of how to redefine its supporting role to the Joint Force in such a way as to regain the advantage in the Indo-Pacific region.

Successive policy and strategic documents have outlined a Joint all-domain strategy for the INDOPACOM area of responsibility. This strategy entails four lines of effort: increasing Joint Force lethality, strengthening alliances and partnerships, enhancing design and posture,
and exercises and experimentation. Within the Joint All-Domain strategy, the US Army/USARPAC has developed its own multi-domain operations concept (MDO), which emphasizes Army support to the Joint Force in the Indo-Pacific region through integrated air defense; operational maneuver and theater-wide logistics; sustainment, command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR); and long-range precision fires.

For the Army, retooling its capabilities and developing novel applications of land power, particularly in the “Indo” portion of the Indo-Pacific, while learning to flip the playbook from supporting to enabling missions, have been challenging tasks. For instance, recent analyses of US Army theater design in INDOPACOM highlighted fundamental weaknesses in the Army’s MDO strategy for the region. Key among these findings is the fact the Army and the Joint Force are essentially “out of position” because they are too heavily invested in northeast Asia. Additionally the Army’s MDO strategy needs tighter linkages to the broader Joint theater and to the operating concepts of its sister services.

Moreover, five essential strategic partners (based on US mutual defense treaties) make up the focus of the INDOPACOM/USARPAC area of responsibility: Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. Conspicuously absent from the discussion, however, is India, a designated US Major Defense Partner and the country with the largest landmass in the Indian Ocean and the second largest army in the region after China.

Importantly the future deterrence and countervailing power in the region will rest on two unassailable strategic factors—geography and alliances. The US Army’s capabilities regarding geography have been underappreciated. The second factor, alliances, must focus more deliberately on India and the Quad Plus. Together these factors provide the essential foundation for a deterrence concept, a Ring of Fires that would employ Army precision, long-range strike capabilities to target PRC land and maritime assets and which, in the unlikely event of war, would cripple China’s economic means of survival.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, the tyranny of distance does not necessarily favor Chinese over US forces in the Indo-Pacific. In fact the PRC has significant disadvantages in the maritime domain due to its long and vulnerable SLOCs. Beijing’s energy, vital natural resources, manufacturing supply chains, and export trade must pass through the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Crucially, the PLAN and China’s merchant

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10. Freier, Schaus, and Braun, Army Transformed.
fleet must transit through the straits of the Indonesian archipelago, namely, the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok Straits to the South China Sea (figure 1). These choke points are critical vulnerabilities, which the PRC recognizes as such.

When traversing from the Straits of Hormuz, the Gulf of Aden, and the Cape of Good Hope into the Indian Ocean, Chinese merchant ships and naval vessels, as well as their military port logistics bases along the Maritime Silk Road, would be vulnerable to kinetic forms of attack as well as cyber disruption. Vast geographical distances and extended SLOCs typically represent vulnerabilities that can be attacked if insufficiently protected, as witnessed by the campaigns to control the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans during the Second World War. These geography-based weaknesses, in combination with recent US Army modernization efforts and investments in long-range precision strike and hypersonic missile capabilities, afford the Joint Force a unique and as yet underutilized means of contributing to a Ring-of-Fires concept that would support INDOPACOM’s Joint All-Domain operations.

A Ring of Fires

Long-range precision strike capability has traditionally resided with the US Navy and US Air Force. Yet both the US Army and US Marine Corps are adding these capabilities to their repertoire.11 The Army increased its investment in the long-range maritime strike arena with plans to purchase the Navy’s SM-6 (plus extended range variant) and Tomahawk, including the Maritime Strike version, and integration of the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) long-range, surface-to-surface missile with a new maritime seeker.12 Also, following its September 2020 exercise, Project Convergence, the Army announced its intention to include experiments linking Army command and control for coordinating strikes against maritime targets, as well as anti-ship missile tests, in its 2021 exercise.13

Similarly the US Navy and Marine Corps have initiated Project Overmatch to coordinate and link fires from multiple platforms using automation and artificial intelligence to streamline targeting cycles. A key issue for INDOPACOM is, how are these parallel precision strike efforts to be coordinated at the Joint level in the future? In particular, how can the US Army’s potentially larger, more mobile, and

Figure 1. Army Ring of Fires
(Map by Pete McPhail)
weapons-capable arrayed strike footprint be best deployed, and under what future operational construct by the Joint Force?

Notionally the aim of the Ring-of-Fires concept is to target the China’s SLOCs and choke points for energy and trade, its sea- and land-based logistics, and PRC resupply and sustainment capabilities. As depicted in figure 1, the critical Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda Straits could be controlled by US Army, Marine Corps, and allied missile batteries and other armaments. Missile capabilities could involve anti-air and surface maritime attack. These attack vectors are based primarily on Army precision strike weapons including future hypersonic missiles.

Using Multi-Domain task forces, the Army’s targeting plan would be maritime attack against PRC surface warships and merchant shipping. The targeting plan is based on Army missile ranges and missile warheads for different functions. The ability to put at risk the PLAN and merchant fleets, to fire on the SLOCs that sustain overseas PLA expeditionary forces, and to do so while signaling the means to hold the Chinese economy hostage would credibly demonstrate US commitment, and that of its allies and strategic partners, to maintaining peace and stability in the region.

But the concept would require the Army to reposition to a broader range of firing and logistics positions than it currently occupies. This repositioning would include the deployment or redeployment of Army artillery and missile units on support ships or commercial vessels using a containerized, “guns in a box” approach or mobile missile bases at sea.\textsuperscript{14}

Just as important, this concept would also require an alliance structure redesign for INDOPACOM. Strengthening relations with key allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific is essential to providing access, logistics support, pre-positioning of stocks, and sustainment activities.

Basing will also play a key role in the development of a Ring of Fires. New bases could be achieved either through new status of forces-type agreements that permit basing, training, joint exercises, interoperability, and joint unified command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (C4ISRT), or less formal, incremental capacity-building agreements such as those in place between the United States and India. Secure pre-positioned and mobile sites for the US Army are critical. These sites must be planned to ensure minimal detectability. Deception must figure prominently in this plan as well with constant updates based on intelligence assessments of PRC surveillance and reconnaissance.

Weapon logistics is another factor along with base survivability. Deception, camouflage, electronic and cyber warfare, and mobility will enhance survivability from PRC surprise or short-timescale attacks. Additionally Army security force assistance brigades could be deployed to build partner multidomain operations and strike capabilities in the

INDOPACOM region including in Australia, Brunei, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. While some of these countries may be unwilling to countervail China openly or militarily, the Biden administration must develop a cohesive political-military-economic framework for the region that includes all of them, should their inclusion become necessary at a later date.

Command and control for execution of the concept would require redundant facilities, some fixed, some mobile, and all interoperable. The NATO model, such as the Joint Warfare facility at Northwood, United Kingdom, may present initial baseline capabilities for interallied command, control, and communications. So too, future command and control solutions may arise from the Joint Staff Bold Quest initiative, which is examining allied connectivity for All-Domain command and control operations, as well as from the US Army’s Fires Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate Battle Lab, which allows allies to “join and test the compatibility of their own command and control networks and capabilities with those of the US service and other allies.”

In sum the Ring-of-Fires concept provides the US Army with a crucial operational mission tied directly and firmly to enabling the Joint Force. Strategically it enables the United States to maintain a favorable military balance sufficient to deter China and to support a free and open Indo-Pacific theater. Nevertheless this concept cannot succeed without allies. As noted in the US Department of Defense’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, “the challenges we face in the Indo-Pacific extend beyond what any single country can address alone.”

**Alliances and Strategic Partnerships**

While the current INDOPACOM alliance posture is already centered on five anchor relationships, one may well argue India is the most important anchor of all. Not only does India have unique geographic advantage and increasing military capabilities vis-à-vis its erstwhile adversary China, but India is also the epicenter of the Quad Plus. In the closing days of his tenure as US secretary of defense, Mark Esper reflected, “India will well be the most consequential partner for us, I think, in the Indo Pacific for sure in this century.” The disconnection between this statement by a US defense secretary and the lack of a demonstrative focus on India in INDOPACOM and USARPAC strategy documents is striking.

Although not without its limits for the time being, a strategic convergence of sorts is emerging between the United States and India, due largely to the increasing threat environment created by China. That

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threat environment includes the ongoing Sino-Indo conflict along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh; the PRC’s military support of neighboring Pakistan, which has launched successive terrorist attacks against India; the encirclement of India on land and at sea via the BRI China-Pakistan Economic Corridor; and the use of Maritime Silk Road infrastructure investments to usurp India’s role as a regional net provider with smaller Indian Ocean neighbors.\textsuperscript{18} These geostrategic vectors, along with a more proactive foreign policy approach by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, make it realistic to discuss ways to strengthen the US-Indo bilateral relationship and leverage the multilateral capabilities of the Quad Plus.

In fact the burgeoning US-India defense relationship is the product of four cornerstones.\textsuperscript{19} The first cornerstone consists of policy pronouncements, such as the designation in 2016 of India as a Major Defense Partner (a status unique to India and commensurate with the relationships shared with only the closest of American allies) and high-level 2+2 ministerial meetings.\textsuperscript{20} The second cornerstone is the major defense logistics and tactical intelligence-sharing protocols between the United States and India, including the 2002 General Security of Military Information Agreement, the 2016 Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement, the 2018 Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement, the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Intelligence, and the Maritime Information Sharing Technical Agreement, the latter two of which were signed in October 2020.\textsuperscript{21}

The third cornerstone consists of defense sales and trade and technology cooperation, especially the recent sale of Poseidon P-8I aircraft and expected exports of armed Predator-B UAVs. The fourth cornerstone—or foundation stone—lies in the military relationship that exists between the two countries. Evidence for this relationship can be found in training exercises such as the annual Malabar naval exercise, Army and Special Forces exercises Yudh Abhyas and Vajra Prahar, respectively, and the first tri-service Tiger Triumph amphibious exercise.

To be sure military cooperation between the United States and India has been more robust between the two navies. That cooperation has centered on augmenting India’s maritime domain awareness and anti-submarine warfare capabilities to help counteract the PLAN’s growing expeditionary and undersea presence in the Indo-Pacific. By

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contrast cooperation between the US Army and the Indian Army has experienced impediments. Some analysts have pointed to the Indian Army’s posture which is focused on insurgency, counterterrorism, and border protection rather than force projection; others have suggested bilateral army exercises are too small and narrowly structured to be an effective means of relationship and capacity building; and still other analysts have noted the lack of interoperability is not helped by an overreliance on Russian weapon supplies.\(^\text{22}\)

Still, as signaled by the Indian Army vice chief’s visit to INDOPACOM and USARPAC in fall 2020, there are avenues to enhance further operational and strategic level collaboration between the two armies.\(^\text{23}\) Some immediate opportunities include intelligence sharing related to border security and counterterrorism, as well as Special Forces training and professional military education (PME).\(^\text{24}\) Each of these areas deserves their own deliberative Army-to-Army formal assessment, but for brevity’s sake, some key cooperative prospects are highlighted.

### Intelligence Sharing

The PLA military incursions along the Sino-Indian border LAC in May 2020 revealed many intelligence deficiencies for the Indian Army, including lack of indications and warning over PLA intentions, insufficient military satellite coverage, and other C4ISR weaknesses.\(^\text{25}\) Taken together they highlight enormous potential for increased US-Indian Army intelligence cooperation and assistance. For example the US Army’s National Ground Intelligence Center in Charlottesville, Virginia, and US Special Operations Command Intelligence Division could work with their Indian counterparts to assist in border protection and counterterrorist intelligence operations. The US Army could provide technical know-how to develop a C4ISR system designed to meet India’s specific needs along the borders.

A common operating picture would enable an intelligence-based, real-time indications and warning system. This C4ISR system could alert to threats pertaining to border incursions, terrorist plans and movements, and any major nuclear posture changes or actions by either China or Pakistan, or both, that may threaten Indian and US interests.

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and stability in the region. Additionally, the United States could assist India by supplementing the current Poseidon P-8I surveillance mission with deployments of, for example, Joint Stars, Rivet Joint aircraft, or Global Hawk UAVs.26

Training and Professional Military Education

The Indian military has identified the need to improve its special forces.27 These forces remain limited in number and are not considered intelligence collection assets in ways that the US Special Forces operate. In this regard, US Army Special Operations Forces can assist with training, data exchanges, and operational planning support with Indian forces, in concert with regular exercises and personnel exchanges in both the United States and India. Part of this process can include special penetration and exfiltration operations, deception, counterterrorism training, network penetration, and psychological warfare. The US Army, through US Special Operations Command and with the assistance of INDOPACOM, can help create a similar integrated special operations command initially designated for Indian border protection, counterterrorism, and infiltration missions.

With regard to US-Indian PME engagement, the current footprint is too small and could be greatly expanded. India’s own professional military education establishment has come under fire for its military insularity, lack of civilian participation, and emphasis on training over education.28 Critics have suggested India’s PME system needs to be revamped along the US and UK models.29 These factors and a lack of jointness within the Indian military establishment point to areas for US-Indian PME cooperation, especially given China’s recent restructuring of the PLA into a force capable of managing and conducting joint operations. In the near-term, the US Army’s professional military education institutions could collaborate more, for example, with India’s relatively new National Defense University.

Quad Plus

With the US military posture weighted in the western Pacific, Washington has increasingly leaned on New Delhi to be the countervailing power in the Indo-Pacific, leading to high expectations and pressures on the bilateral relationship on the part of the United States. Fortunately, the Quad has been resurrected from its somewhat

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moribund state due to members’ converging concerns regarding China’s increasingly assertive and coercive military and economic behavior in the region.\(^{30}\) The Quad foreign ministers’ in-person meeting in Tokyo in October 2020 and Australia’s participation for the first time since 2007 in the November 2020 Quad-based, Indian-hosted Malabar exercise were important signaling measures demonstrating the potential countervailing capabilities of these strategic partners against China. That RIMPAC-like exercise was conducted in November 2020 with the four Quad navies (US Navy, Japan Maritime Self Defense Force, Royal Australian Navy, and Indian Navy) conducting joint operations centered on the Indian *Vikramaditya* carrier battle group and the US *Nimitz* carrier strike group.\(^{31}\)

The two “Plus” regional players are the United Kingdom and France. The United Kingdom provides the geostrategic base in Diego Garcia and has just deployed the HMS *Queen Elizabeth* aircraft carrier (on its maiden voyage) and its carrier strike group to the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. France’s naval bases in Djibouti and the Reunion Islands already provide logistical support for India’s mission-based deployments in the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, and the Persian Gulf.

Furthermore expanding the Quad into a Quad Plus would leverage the capacities of individual members to mount and conduct joint operations but without engaging in a formal military alliance structure such as NATO. Accordingly INDOPACOM and USARPAC could work to expand the current focus of the Quad, which is maritime/naval-centric, to assist in building multidomain, interoperable military competencies across the land, air, space, and cyber domains. This expansion can be achieved through greater intelligence sharing and collaboration, including those of the “Five Eyes” alliance. Intelligence sharing is an essential step in operationalizing the Quad alliance.

Additionally the numerous bilateral logistical agreements among the Quad Plus members could be networked to provide the grid for launching a larger allied Ring of Fires for basing and pre-positioning of supplies and other logistics support for distributed All-Domain operations. Refocusing INDOPACOM’s exercises and those among the Quad Plus members on the environment for allied multidomain interoperability and joint operations is another component as well. Just as we have seen the establishment of combined Joint task forces in the Horn of Africa and in the Middle East, task forces could be established in the Indo-Pacific as a further means of providing the persistent forward presence necessary to deter and moderate PRC behavior, and, if necessary, defeat any Chinese aggression across all domains of warfare.


Concluding Recommendations

Regaining and maintaining US strategic advantages in the Indo-Pacific will be vital for protecting American interests in the region. America’s window of vulnerability is open, but that window also offers opportunities to recast US military strategies, capabilities, and alliances. With a forward-looking roadmap the US Army can become an even more important enabler to the Joint Force in INDOPACOM. At the core of its efforts to do so should be an emphasis on leveraging its investments in precision strike capabilities to operationalize the Ring-of-Fires concept and strengthening its relations with the Indian Army and the Quad Plus militaries.

As an immediate first step, INDOPACOM must develop a proof of concept for the Ring of Fires with Australia, India, and Japan. Using war games and discrete military exercises among these Quad stakeholders, the Ring of Fires could be tested, refined, and operationalized. Second, INDOPACOM must focus on incremental alliance building with smaller states and in support of India’s many regional initiatives. Finally, INDOPACOM must also coordinate with the Department of State and other interagency players, such as the Commerce and Treasury Departments, to bring to bear the full panoply of US diplomatic, political, and economic instruments to demonstrate a renewed US commitment to the region, a commitment aimed not only at countering the inroads China has made via the Belt and Road Initiative but also building the foundation for continued peace and stability.
ABSTRACT: In an era of great power competition centered on warfighting domains other than land, the US Army faces difficult and likely painful choices. This reality, coupled with looming budget cuts, means the Army must reconsider its approach to capabilities and total force structure, its role in homeland security, and the relationship between its active and reserve components.

When the editors of Parameters gather a new generation of authors to celebrate the 75th or even the 100th anniversary of the journal, how will they view the articles that compose this special 50th anniversary issue? Only time will tell, of course, but certain themes already seem clear. Those authors of the future will very likely look back upon the current era as a major strategic inflection point, much like those following the end of the Second World War, the end of the Cold War, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

This strategic inflection point involves major changes in the types of wars the United States plans to fight, as the irregular wars that dominated the first two decades of the twenty-first century give way to a renewed era of great power competition and, potentially, conflict. The world is experiencing deep changes in the character of war, as the exponential growth of advanced technologies transforms how people fight as well as how they live. And Americans are asking fundamental questions about the definition of national security as the coronavirus pandemic raging through the country has already claimed more US lives than the Second World War did. In February 2021 projections estimated that COVID-19 would kill more than 610,000 Americans by June 2021.1

These changes in the strategic environment will pose serious challenges for each of the US military services, but they will challenge the Army most of all. As the Department of Defense increasingly focuses on China and as defense budgets decline, the Army will be at a disadvantage in the strategic and budgetary fights to come.

Yet the Army has a long history of reshaping itself to address the changing needs of the nation. The service was posted on the frontiers of the growing nation in the nineteenth century, and in the early twentieth century.

century, it fought guerillas in the Philippines and guarded the Mexican border against marauding bandits. The Army quickly expanded to 4 million soldiers during the First World War, demobilized the vast majority of them afterwards, and then suddenly grew to more than 11.2 million soldiers during the Second World War. Following another comprehensive demobilization, the Army expanded again for the wars in Korea and Vietnam and remained a large standing force during the Cold War. In the 1990s the Army focused primarily on peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations, and following the terrorist attacks of September 2001, it slowly reinvented itself as a counterinsurgency force for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Now the Army must transform itself once again, this time to adapt to an environment where the nation’s greatest strategic competitor poses greater potential threats in the maritime and air domains (and the new domains of space and cyberspace) than in the land domain. And the Army will have to do so during a time of declining resources and as the COVID-19 pandemic is making many Americans revisit their basic assumptions about what constitutes a national security threat. This transformation will not be easy and will likely be painful. Yet the sooner the Army embraces these challenges, the better prepared it will be to continue protecting the nation in this new and evolving era.

Changing Strategic Environment

The United States is currently at a strategic inflection point: the irregular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are drawing to a close and a new era of great power competition is beginning. Yet many of the dynamics of this new era are still emerging, creating tremendous uncertainty about the path ahead. While the US strategic environment is transforming in at least four different ways, none of them are on a clear and predictable trajectory and may interact and affect each other in ways impossible to foresee. Strategic uncertainty has been increasing during the past several years and shows no sign of abating. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and China’s increasingly aggressive behavior in the South China Sea have ushered in a new era of great power competition, which became the cornerstone of the 2018 National Defense Strategy. Yet at the same time, unpredictable regional actors with both conventional and nuclear capabilities, including North Korea and Iran, pose persistent threats to the United States and its allies. Violent extremist groups continue to spread around the globe, aided by state sponsors in some cases but also including small cells inspired by al-Qaeda, ISIS, and their ever-proliferating progeny. And several global trends are interacting in ways that increase global instability, including...
climate change, urbanization, refugee flows, demographic shifts, and growing income inequality.\footnote{National Intelligence Council (NIC), \textit{Global Trends: Paradox of Progress}, NIC 2017-001, (Washington, DC: NIC, January 2017).}

The number of warfighting domains has increased from three to five, as space and cyberspace join the traditional domains of land, sea, and air. Although the US military has utilized space and cyber capabilities in recent decades, the United States has not fought a war in either domain. But this fact will almost certainly change in a future war against any reasonably tech-savvy adversary, which will introduce enormous complexity and unexpected challenges.

While outer space somewhat resembles the traditional warfare domains in being defined by physical boundaries, the cyber domain is markedly different from all the others. Cyber may quickly become the most important warfighting domain because it critically enables warfighting in the geographic domains and could therefore pose a massive vulnerability for the US military. Moreover, hostile cyber actions raise fundamental questions about the very definition of warfare, as a growing number of state and nonstate actors can directly target the US homeland without ever having to encounter the formidable warfighting capabilities of the US military.\footnote{See David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “The Irrelevance of Traditional Warfare?” War on the Rocks, January 27, 2015, https://warontherocks.com/2015/01/the-irrelevance-of-traditional-warfare/; and Barno and Bensahel, “A New Generation of Unrestricted Warfare,” War on the Rocks, April 19, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/04/a-new-generation-of-unrestricted-warfare.}

The current scale and speed of technological change is already unrivaled in human history and will continue to grow exponentially. Klaus Schwab argues we are at the brink of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, a massive global transformation where the boundaries between the “physical, digital, and biological” realms interact and overlap.\footnote{Klaus Schwab, \textit{The Fourth Industrial Revolution} (New York: Crown Business, 2016), 8.} This revolution will profoundly reshape every aspect of society, business, government, and, of course, the military. A new generation of high-tech weapons such as hypersonics and directed-energy weapons will transform the range, speed, and destructive power of conventional arms.\footnote{Paul Scharre, \textit{Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War} (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2018); and T. X. Hammes, “Technological Change and the Fourth Industrial Revolution,” in \textit{Beyond Disruption: Technology’s Challenge to Governance}, ed. George P. Shultz, Jim Hoagland, and James Timbie (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2018), 37–73.}

But artificial intelligence, big data, and robotics will also accelerate the development of autonomous weapons systems, which make decisions at the speed of light instead of the much slower speed of human cognition. (Unfortunately this development will reward adversaries who delegate lethal decision-making authority to these weapons with the fewest constraints, making it even harder for the United States and other democracies to impose any ethical or moral restrictions on their use.) Mass will become increasingly important as smaller and cheaper technologies proliferate around the world, enabling
even nonstate actors to employ drone swarms that can effectively counter US offensive advantages.\textsuperscript{9}

The ways in which most Americans define national security may be shifting as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.\textsuperscript{10} For decades the United States has invested hundreds of billions of dollars each year in the Department of Defense in order to defend itself against threats from overseas. Yet as of this writing, over 28 million Americans have contracted the virus, and 506,834 of them have died from it.\textsuperscript{11} With so many individuals and families directly affected by the pandemic—and millions more suffering from unemployment, social isolation, and other indirect effects—many Americans will conclude US national security needs to focus far more on myriad threats from within the homeland than on threats from abroad.

Moreover, Americans will recognize the Department of Defense, whose over $700 billion annual budget constitutes approximately 15 percent of the entire federal budget, did very little to protect them from the pandemic and played only a minor role in responding to it.\textsuperscript{12} A poll conducted in February 2020, several weeks before lockdowns across the nation began, found 31 percent of those surveyed thought the United States spent too much on defense.\textsuperscript{13} That number is likely to rise in the coming months and years as Americans increasingly prioritize internal threats over external ones.

And even if public support for the defense budget remains strong, the massive economic crisis caused by COVID-19 means the United States may not be able to afford continued high levels of defense spending. In January 2020 the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected the federal budget deficit for fiscal year (FY) 2020 would be about $1 trillion and would average $1.3 trillion a year for the next decade.\textsuperscript{14} By June, however, CBO projected the combination of pandemic relief and declining government revenue meant the FY 2020 deficit would be $3.7 trillion and an additional $2.1 trillion in FY 2021.\textsuperscript{15}

Even after adjusting for inflation these figures constitute the largest deficit in US history—even greater than the deficit during all the years


\textsuperscript{11} Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “COVID Data Tracker,” accessed February 27, 2021.


of the Second World War combined.16 And the actual deficit in FY 2021 is likely to be higher than the CBO projection because the pandemic continued unabated in late 2020 and early 2021, with infection rates that dwarfed those of spring 2020. Current and future pandemic relief measures will place upward pressure on an already debilitating deficit.

Deficit spending adds to the national debt of course. In late April 2020, economist Brian Riedl estimated the total costs of the pandemic would add more than $8 trillion to the national debt over the next decade. The debt was already projected to almost double during that period, but this added load led Riedl to estimate it would grow from $17.9 trillion in 2019 to $41 trillion by 2030.17 And that is almost certainly a low estimate since Riedl assumed most of the economy would reopen by the summer of 2020—which did not happen in large parts of the country—and the number of infections would continue to decrease, when they rapidly escalated instead. This rising debt will significantly increase the amount of interest the United States must pay—already $375 billion in 2019—further consuming government revenue and pressuring discretionary spending downward.18

Furthermore the political dynamics surrounding the new Biden administration also suggest the defense budget is about to shrink, and the cuts could be as large, if not larger, than those of the sequestration era. Though President Biden and his advisers are committed internationalists who believe in a strong leadership role for the United States, his highest priority will remain dealing with the pandemic and its aftermath. He has already proposed an additional $1.9 trillion in pandemic relief, and though Congress may not adopt this proposal in full, the legislation will substantially increase the deficit and the debt.19 He will also need to adopt some policies that satisfy the more progressive wing of the Democratic party, which will continue to urge cuts to the defense budget. In July 2020, for example, 93 members of the House and 23 members of the Senate voted for a proposal by the Congressional Progressive Caucus to cut defense spending by 10 percent and redirect those funds to coronavirus relief and other domestic priorities.20

With the Democrats now controlling the Senate, members of that party who support cutting the defense budget for any reason may find

more support for such a move. Moreover, as Biden begins his presidency, congressional Republicans may find their best opposition strategy involves embracing fiscal conservatism once again. That strategy worked fairly effectively after 2008 when a new Democratic president took office during the economic crisis now known as the Great Recession. The Budget Control Act of 2011, which contained the much-hated sequestration mechanism, was originally passed under pressure from Republicans who opposed President Barack Obama and the escalating national debt.

Now after the 2020 election, a new Democratic president has once again taken office during an enormous economic crisis rivaling the early years of the Great Depression. Republicans may well determine the best way to oppose Biden—and improve their election prospects over the next four years—involves sounding the alarm on the escalating national debt. Taken together, these dynamics mean defense spending is about to decline; the only question is by how much. And this reality will make it even more challenging for the US military to prepare effectively for seismic changes in the strategic environment.

Challenges Facing the Army

All the services will find it difficult to adapt to this new environment amidst declining budgets, which will force them to make hard choices about force structure, end strength, and acquisition programs. Yet the Army faces more challenges than the other services as the growing threat from China means the Indo-Pacific is now the US military’s most important theater of operations. Unfortunately for the Army that shift suggests land will no longer be the most critical or most decisive domain of warfare for the United States.

A future war with China will be defined by the air and sea domains together with the new domains of space and cyber. As a result the Army has a tremendous disadvantage in the strategic arguments and in upcoming budget fights. In order to adapt successfully to this enormous shift, the Army will have to address the following four challenges: focusing on the nation’s secondary theater; the increasing relevance of fires over maneuver; the new demands of homeland defense; and the growing importance of the reserve component.

A Supporting Service

Although the 2018 National Defense Strategy prioritized great power competition with China and Russia, the Department of Defense has now explicitly prioritized competition with China. Toward the end of


his term Secretary of Defense Mark Esper clearly stated his goal was “to focus the Department on China,” because China was “the pacing threat” for which the US military must prepare.\textsuperscript{24} To do so he directed the development of a new “joint warfighting concept,” and instructed the National War College to focus half of its coursework on China.\textsuperscript{25}

The Biden administration has signaled it will provide stronger support for Europe and NATO Allies and partners and has affirmed the prioritization of China as our “most serious competitor.”\textsuperscript{26} In 2018, for example, two of the most senior China experts in the Obama administration conceded many US assumptions about China had been wrong and called for a new strategic approach.\textsuperscript{27} Biden’s team will face the simple and sobering fact that only a rising China has the enormous economic power, the cutting-edge technologies, and the advanced military capabilities that could match or exceed those of the US armed forces—and potentially defeat them.

This shift has significant implications for the Army. For decades it has effectively been the first among equals of the US military services. During the Cold War the Army provided most of the NATO forces postured to deter or defeat a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. It also provided most of the forces that fought in Korea, Vietnam, the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In all of these conflicts the Army was the supported service. Yet the explicit focus on China over Russia means this traditional relationship is about to flip. The Army will primarily be a supporting service in any potential conflict with China, enabling the other services to operate in the vast air and maritime domains of the western Pacific.

This seismic shift means the Army will no longer conduct the primary type of military operations against the nation’s biggest strategic threat, fundamentally upending the key warfighting roles and missions it has focused on for the past 75 years. Its ground combat forces will remain essential for deterrence and, if necessary, warfighting on the Korean peninsula, but otherwise the Army’s role in the vast Indo-Pacific theater will remain limited.

The Army does not seem to have fully absorbed the implications of this shift, however, as it continues to push for a combat role in the Pacific. It is still planning, for example, to conduct littoral operations throughout


\textsuperscript{25} Garamone, “Esper Discusses Moves.”


the region even as the Commandant of the Marine Corps General David Berger reshapes his service to focus on this specific mission.\footnote{David H. Berger, Commandant’s Planning Guidance (Washington, DC: Headquarters, United States Marine Corps (USMC), 2019); and Berger, Force Design 2030 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, USMC, March 2020).}

As defense budgets, end strength, and force structure all decline, the Army needs to focus instead on its unique and essential mission of providing critical enablers to the rest of the Joint Force in the Pacific. These include vital capabilities like expanded land-based air and missile defense, theaterwide logistics and engineering, electronic warfare, and possibly long-range precision fires.\footnote{Sean Kimmons, “Army to Build Three Multi-Domain Task Forces Using Lessons from Pilot,” Army News Service, October 15, 2019, https://www.army.mil/article/228393/army_to_build_three_multi_domain_task_forces_using_lessons_from_pilot; and Sean Kimmons, “Army Aims to Further Refine MDO with Indo-Pacific Partners,” Army News Service, June 1, 2020, https://www.army.mil/article/236120/army_aims_to_further_refine_mdo_with_indo_pacific_partners.} Sustainment and protection will be critical vulnerabilities for US forces in the Pacific, and it is far from clear whether the Army can provide them effectively against a high-capability adversary. As resources decline, the Army needs to shift its time, energy, and thinking away from conducting combat operations in the Pacific and into these less glamorous but absolutely crucial responsibilities.

The Army’s traditional ground combat forces will still be required in Europe. Russia remains the most capable and dangerous threat to the United States in the land domain, and Army forces will still need to deter Russian aggression and bolster NATO’s defenses. But those missions, which were the highest US strategic priority for many decades, are now lower national defense priorities than deterring, and possibly defending against, Chinese aggression in the Pacific. The fact the land domain—the Army’s primary warfighting domain—is now of limited importance against the nation’s preeminent threat will pose enormous cultural and practical challenges for the service in the years ahead. The Army will almost certainly see cuts to its force structure and end strength and will likely accept a higher degree of risk in the European theater.

\textit{Fires Over Maneuver}

The Army is also facing challenges from the changing relationship between fires and maneuver as weapons technology advances and long-range fires become an increasingly vital component of warfighting. Traditionally the Army has devoted a significant part of its force structure to maneuver units—the infantry, armor, and cavalry units that assault the enemy and seize and hold terrain—and has used fires from rockets and artillery to support them. Yet the advent of precision long-range fires is inverting this relationship, especially in the Pacific. Traditional artillery generally could hit targets within a range of 15 to 25 miles. Today, land-based precision rockets and missiles are being developed
that will strike beyond 1,000 miles, and hypersonic weapons are being developed that will have vastly greater ranges.30

This unprecedented technological advance is inverting the traditional relationship between maneuver and fires, which poses a significant cultural problem for the Army. For the first time, land forces will be able to strike adversaries at strategic ranges without having to resort to nuclear weapons, which means they may be able to deliver strategic effects. The Army may soon be able to use such long-range fires to destroy adversary units, command and control networks, and vulnerable logistics supplies. The best way for the Army to contribute to a future war in the Pacific could involve using these powerful new capabilities to strike a wide range of targets on land and at sea, utilizing few, if any, maneuver forces.

This reality suggests the Army is now overinvested in brigade combat teams. Such maneuver forces will probably not play a significant role in any conflict against the nation’s primary strategic threat, and their large footprints and substantial electronic signatures make them increasingly vulnerable to an adversary’s long-range strikes. As a result, the Army may need to cut sharply the number of brigade combat teams in its force structure, especially as defense budgets decline and the services are required to use their more limited resources wisely. The Army should prioritize cuts to infantry brigade combat teams, which lack the mobile firepower and robust protection needed to ensure survivability during any high-intensity conflict. The service should then reinvest some of the resources freed by these cuts into more long-range fires and other enabling capabilities for the Pacific (especially in missile defense and logistics units).

Homeland Defense

As noted above, the pandemic has demonstrated the United States is more prepared to address overseas threats than to protect its citizens from threats within the homeland. Yet for all the human suffering the pandemic has caused, the origins of COVID-19 were benign—a natural, if lethal, variant of a coronavirus. A malevolent attack on the US homeland, however, could be far more disastrous. During the pandemic, basic necessities like food, water, and power have remained widely available (if increasingly unaffordable for too many Americans). Yet a concerted cyberattack on the United States could far too easily disrupt supply chains that provide these and other essential goods. And a deliberate attack against US space assets could disrupt or destroy vital military and civilian communications capabilities that enable GPS and other critical infrastructures.

Any future conflicts with a major foreign adversary will almost certainly spill over into the homeland, with potentially disastrous consequences. But such attacks could also occur outside the bounds of traditional warfare, launched by a state adversary trying to stay below the threshold of armed conflict or even by a disaffected group of hackers operating from their basements around the world. In either case the consequences could be devastating.

As direct threats to the homeland continue to grow, the Army will play a key role in helping prevent such attacks and an even greater role in helping to mitigate the consequences. Throughout the nation’s history, the Army has always been the principal military service responsible for defending Americans at home. In recent decades its most important domestic mission has been responding to natural disasters like floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, and wildfires—a role that will become even more important as climate change makes these events more frequent and intense. The Army remains a critical part of the nation’s toolkit in responding to many domestic emergencies, since it has extraordinarily capable organizations standing ready to provide a wide range of logistics, communications, and engineering support to civil authorities when needed.

Yet active duty Army forces will likely play only a limited role in this increasingly vital mission. In a conflict that occurs mainly at home, the Army Reserve and especially the Army National Guard will be far more important. The National Guard operates day-to-day under the command of state governors and is the first military responder to civil disruptions that exceed the capacity of local authorities. During the pandemic, the Army Reserve joined the National Guard in helping beleaguered city and state officials provide food, medical care, and specialized services like mortuary affairs to hard-hit areas, while the active Army contributed comparatively little. In a larger homeland emergency, the Guard and Reserve could lead even broader missions such as providing humanitarian assistance, restoring power and water, and preventing civil disorder. The rising vulnerability of the US homeland will increasingly require the Army to prioritize domestic emergency response capabilities in its reserve forces, requiring tough trade-offs with active capabilities in future constrained budget environments.

The Reserve Component

The Army has always viewed its active forces as the first among equals within the three elements of the total force. Active Army units have traditionally been accorded the first priority for scarce resources and new equipment. Yet growing threats to the homeland combined with the coming era of fiscal austerity may require reversing this

traditional relationship. Reserve forces are a wise strategic investment. They preserve more combat and support force structure at less cost than active forces, which require much higher investments in readiness to be able to deploy rapidly around the world. And unlike active forces, reserve forces provide readily accessible capabilities for both homeland and overseas operations. Future wartime demands may find these forces pulled in both directions, but they nevertheless remain a cost-effective investment across all Army missions.

As the move to a supporting role and declining defense budgets force the Army to make some painful choices, it must avoid the temptation to make equal cuts to active, Reserve, and Guard end strength and force structure simply to share the bureaucratic pain more equally. Instead, the Army may need to preserve some reserve capabilities at the expense of some active capabilities. This move would strengthen the total force’s ability to defend the homeland while simultaneously husbanding critical warfighting capabilities in the most economical way possible. Some of these choices would undoubtedly require the Army to accept more risk in any future European conflict than it would like. But such decisions would be entirely consistent with the decision US political leaders have already made, which identifies China as the nation’s top strategic priority.

Shrinking the Army’s active component more than its reserve component will pose an immense cultural challenge, however. When defense budgets contracted during the sequestration era, the Army’s active and reserve components engaged in an all-out bureaucratic war that can only be characterized as fratricide, leading Congress to charter an independent commission to referee the fight. The Army, and the country more broadly, cannot afford to repeat that experience.

Current Chief of Staff of the Army General James McConville faces the daunting task of managing this countercultural change. He must do so by ensuring active, Reserve, and Guard forces all have an equal seat at the table when cuts are considered. And after tough decisions have been made behind closed doors, all Army senior leaders must emerge in solidarity, emphasizing the needs of the entire Army rather than any of its individual components. Former Chief of Staff of the Army General Mark Milley used this approach to heal the Army’s divisions after the debacle described above (as did former Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Mark Welsh III after a similar crisis in his service a few years earlier). McConville should learn from their approach as he faces the even greater challenge of preventing the Army from disintegrating into factionalism once again.

Conclusion

The Army is facing extremely difficult challenges as it transforms itself for a new era of great power competition. It will have to manage considerable strategic uncertainty, two new domains of warfare, exponential leaps in technology, and the increasing importance of homeland defense—all while defense resources decline and the service transitions from a supported to supporting role against the nation’s greatest strategic threat. The Army has successfully redefined itself many times throughout its history, but this endeavor, like those of the past, will entail hard, painful choices about many things, including its capabilities and force structure, the growing mission of homeland security, and the relationship between Army active and reserve components. Wise decisions on these matters will help ensure the Army remains a relevant and vital element of the nation’s military power in the years and decades to come.
Are US Civil-Military Relations in Crisis?

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ABSTRACT: Civil-military relations has been a subject of Parameters’ articles for the life of the journal. Although interest in the topic waxes and wanes, in recent years it has been the focus of concern due to the appointment of two recently retired general officers to the post of Secretary of Defense and the ahistorical proposed use of the military by a president to address internal unrest. Undue worry over this issue, however, detracts from other more pressing problems facing civil society and our democracy today.

Claims of civil-military crisis are a recurring feature of American politics, and the current moment is no exception. Some skepticism, however, is warranted regarding whether we now truly face a uniquely urgent civil-military crisis. An examination of some of the most frequently made arguments about the dire state of civil-military relations finds the evidence is equivocal. While there is indeed reason for concern about several aspects of this relationship, we should be wary of adopting purely formalistic conceptions of civil-military relations, which can serve to distract us from other, more subtle threats to American democracy.

The frequency with which claims of civil-military crises are made should not be a surprise: the American Republic was born out of violent military and political rebellion, and since the nation’s birth, civil-military tensions have periodically erupted. Although what is understood as constituting a civil-military crisis has varied over time, public and scholarly hand-wringing has accompanied each instance.

In 1783 for example, Continental Army officers, angered by poor pay and conditions after eight years of war, nearly mutinied against the Continental Congress.1 In 1818, when General Andrew Jackson attacked Spanish military posts in Florida in contravention of orders from his civilian leadership, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun denounced his

acts as insubordinate and unconstitutional. The American Civil War was most assuredly a civil-military crisis, among other things. Scores of US military officers took up arms against the elected civilian leadership of the United States. President Abraham Lincoln struggled to control even his own Union generals. Major General John C. Fremont, for example, famously ignored clear direction from Lincoln and issued a proclamation emancipating enslaved people in Missouri. Subsequently Fremont actively sought to prevent Lincoln's emissaries from delivering the presidential message relieving him of command.

Nearly a century later, angst about civil-military relations continued. In 1951 General Douglas MacArthur’s public defiance of President Harry Truman led Truman to relieve MacArthur of command. In the 1990s tensions over the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy regarding gay and lesbian individuals serving in the military led active duty military members to criticize President Bill Clinton publicly, which in turn led many, like historian Richard Kohn, to warn of a “crisis in civil-military relations.”

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, jeremiads about civil-military relations continued, albeit with a striking shift in tenor. With patriotic fervor and public esteem for the military running high, concerns over tensions between military and civilian leaders were replaced by anxiety about changing military demographics, civilian ignorance about military issues, and what was widely conceptualized as the “civil-military gap.”

More recently, the nature of the angst over civil-military relations has shifted once again. During the administration of President Donald Trump, persistent worries about the civil-military gap were joined by growing concerns over the prominent role of retired senior officers in partisan politics, the high number of current and former senior military officials in the president’s inner circle, the sidelining of civilian expertise within the Defense Department, and the use and potential use of the military for essentially domestic missions including law enforcement.

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and election security. In recent years, a growing chorus of voices have suggested (or warned) that military personnel might find, at times, that honoring their constitutional responsibilities requires disobeying—or at least politely ignoring—their commander in chief. This essay examines and evaluates some of the most common claims of civil-military crises.

Evidence of a Crisis

Claim 1: The US military is poorly understood by most American civilians.

This claim is surely true. Studies reveal Americans know little about the military to which, since the 9/11 attacks, they have so eagerly offered rhetorical support. But while the American public’s wholesale ignorance of the US military may tell us something about America, it highlights little that is unique to civil-military relations. After all, the list of things most Americans do not know is distressingly all-encompassing: three-quarters of Americans are unable to name all three branches of the federal government; 37 percent cannot name any of the rights protected by the First Amendment; most cannot correctly estimate the population of the United States, and, as of 2014, a whopping 26 percent of Americans thought the sun revolved around the earth.

This general lack of knowledge suggests a crisis in American education and civics in particular. It does not, however, suggest ignorance about the military is an isolated variable, categorically different from, or more important than, other gaps in basic civic knowledge. By itself, the lack of familiarity is no barometer for measuring or predicting good or bad decisions or healthy relationships among elite decisionmakers on either the military or the civilian side.

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Claim 2: Less than 1 percent of the American public serves in the military, and few members of the public have direct contact with military personnel.

This claim is at once true and, in itself, neither here nor there. The percentage of the US population serving in the military on active duty is unquestionably far smaller today than during the First and Second World Wars or the Vietnam era. As a result, far fewer Americans today have close ties to the military. But US wars involving mass conscription have been historical anomalies. For most of American history, the US military has been small and relatively isolated from the broader population. In 1806 the size of the US Army and Navy combined numbered fewer than 5,000 men, well under 1 percent of the US population.

The size of the military ebbed and flowed over the decades as wars were fought and then ended. In the early 1930s, for instance, after the demobilization that occurred following the First World War, the size of the Army and Navy combined hovered around 235,000 out of a population that exceeded 120 million. These small numbers were not viewed as a civil-military problem but simply as the postwar reversion to the norm of a small army—something perceived as a civic good for most of American history.

The small percentage of the US population currently serving in the military is often cited to explain the public’s ignorance of military matters. Perhaps, but it is entirely possible a broad survey of, say, Army personnel about Navy size, budgets, structure, or deployments, might yield answers nearly as inaccurate as those of the general public. The scale and complexity of the US military challenges even senior military officials and scholars who devote their lives to its study.

Claim 3: Those who serve in the military are different from those who do not.

Undoubtedly the all-volunteer military is less geographically diverse than it was during periods of mass conscription. Today’s armed forces are more Southern and less urban, and those with a parent or sibling in the military are far more likely to serve than those without family links to military service. The US military also remains far more male
than the overall population (women make up just 16 percent of enlisted personnel and 18 percent of officers).\textsuperscript{14}

In many other ways, however, the military differs from the civilian population in that it is more diverse: racial minorities make up 33 percent of the enlisted workforce, compared to a civilian population benchmark of 23.7 percent, perhaps reflecting the military’s enduring and largely justified reputation as an institution that allows for merit-based advancement.\textsuperscript{15} (Numerous studies suggest that despite significant ongoing concerns about equality, women and minorities within the military generally view it as a more equitable environment than the civilian world.)\textsuperscript{16}

In recent decades several studies of military partisan affiliation have suggested that the military, especially the officer corps, skews Republican, but evidence for this finding is mixed. An August 2020 Military Times poll found 41 percent of those surveyed said they planned to vote for Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden in the 2020 election, while only 36 percent said they planned to vote for Republican President Donald Trump.\textsuperscript{17}

The more important question, however, is not whether those who serve in the military are different from those who do not, but whether those differences make a difference. Many professions differ in discernable ways from a random cross section of the population. Lawyers, clergy, doctors, engineers, and bankers all differ from the overall population in patterned ways, but we rarely label this a problem much less a crisis. If demographic or partisan affiliation differences between military personnel and civilians lead reliably to problematic differences in policy or performance, we might have reason to be concerned. But thus far, although military personnel in the aggregate differ from the civilian population in the aggregate, no clear evidence indicates these differences translate consistently into differences in policy or performance at the national level.

Certainly there are independent reasons to seek a military that better reflects the demographics of the United States. Considerations of fairness argue in favor of a more gender-balanced military and a military in which both women and minorities are better represented at the highest ranks and in all branches and military occupational specialties. Research from other occupations also suggests increasing diversity (in particular, increasing gender diversity) correlates with improved


\textsuperscript{15} OUSD-PR, Population in the Military Services, 26.


organizational performance, making it reasonable to worry that during periods in which the military draws from relatively narrower slices of the population, groupthink may increase and military innovation and creativity may decrease.\textsuperscript{18}

But without more clarity on which differences make a difference—and the kind of difference these differences make—it is hard to argue that demographic divergences between the military and the overall population should primarily be construed through the lens of civil-military relations or seen as a sign of crisis.

\textit{Claim 4: Too many current or retired military personnel were given executive branch leadership positions under Trump.}

This claim is difficult to evaluate. Trump’s appointment of several recently retired generals to his first cabinet triggered concerns his administration was tilting too far in a military direction. But President Barack Obama similarly appointed recently retired generals to senior positions. And President Biden selected retired Army General Lloyd Austin as his first Secretary of Defense.

How many generals is too many, and why? Some argue that a cabinet stocked with senior military personnel might bias an administration toward military rather than political, economic, or diplomatic solutions to problems, but no clear evidence indicates that senior advisers with military backgrounds provide advice to presidents in a manner that differs in predictable ways from the advice of civilian senior advisers. During the Trump administration, for instance, Secretary of Defense James Mattis was viewed by many as a counterweight to the often more hawkish and bellicose views of several of Trump’s civilian advisers, despite Mattis’s status as a recently retired Marine Corps general.

A different critique suggests that if senior military officials begin to view political appointments as a natural next step after leaving the military, they may tailor their actions and comments as active duty officers to fit the perceived political preferences of their favored political actors. This hypothesis seems plausible, but it remains untested. Also unknown is the degree to which senior military officials might already tailor their decision making in order to garner congressional funding or position themselves for postretirement positions with defense contractors or on high-profile boards.

Some unique issues relate to having recently retired generals serve as Secretary of Defense.\textsuperscript{19} In 1947 Congress prohibited retired military personnel from heading the Defense Department without a seven-year cooling-off period. The cooling-off period was designed to address two


concrete concerns: first, that recently retired military personnel might be overly loyal to their own service branch, and second, that they would not yet be sufficiently acculturated to the needs and concerns of civilian policymakers, rendering them less effective as the primary liaison between civilian leaders and military officials.

We do not have many data points to evaluate the validity of these concerns because presidents have nominated recently retired officers—and requested Congress waive the cooling-off period—on only three occasions (George C. Marshall in 1950, Mattis in 2017, Austin in 2021). That said, it is troubling that two presidents in a row have asked Congress to pass legislation exempting specific individuals from a clear statutory ban. Arguably, however, this trend is concerning more as a matter of respect for the law than as a civil-military relations matter; a law respected neither by presidents nor by Congress itself is not much of a law.

Claim 5: Too many active duty and retired military personnel take partisan positions in political campaigns and become involved in controversial domestic political issues.

This concern predates the Trump administration, and here too, both sides make compelling arguments. Given the high level of public confidence in the military, it is no surprise political candidates from both parties have sought to surround themselves with military figures with stars on their shoulders and relatively broad name recognition. Moreover, the trend toward seeking military endorsements has accelerated in recent election cycles.

In June 2020 General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was much criticized for accompanying then President Trump to a staged photo opportunity in Lafayette Square after peaceful protesters were dispersed with tear gas. Milley subsequently described his actions as a mistake, acknowledging his “presence . . . created a perception of the military involved in domestic politics.”20 While Milley’s actions triggered a good deal of dismay about partisanship on the part of military officials, this did not stop either 2020 major party candidate from reaching out to retired senior military personnel to speak at campaign events and offer endorsements.

Trump also contravened long-standing norms against using military personnel domestically in a politicized manner. While numerous statutory authorities allow presidents both to federalize National Guard troops and deploy active duty troops domestically, the assumption has been presidents will not use such authorities in narrowly partisan ways or to

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control or suppress Constitutionally protected activities. But during the racial justice protests that followed the killing of George Floyd by Minneapolis police, the Trump administration was widely condemned for its overly militarized response, which included the threatened invocation of the Insurrection Act to enable the deployment of active duty troops in US cities. In the period before and after the 2020 election, President Trump also suggested the military might be used to “safeguard” or monitor voting and vote counting.

But do any of these actions bespeak a civil-military crisis or excessive influence of the military in domestic affairs? Once again it is important to tease out the different issues at stake. Some argue the growing role of military endorsements in partisan politics may, like the appointment of recently retired generals to senior political positions, ultimately jeopardize the military’s reputation for impartial service or erode public confidence in the military. These are legitimate concerns, but they rest on the assumption that a high level of public confidence in the military is an independent good and that it is possible to draw a clear, reliable, and meaningful distinction between advice that is military in nature and advice that is merely political.

Arguably, public confidence in the military is not a good thing in and of itself. Such confidence is a good thing only if the military serves the public well. But has the high level of public confidence in the military since 9/11 been justified by accurate public perceptions of military professionalism, impartiality, and success? Or is high public support for the military instead indicative of public anxiety, guilt, or misinformation? If it is the latter, then an erosion of public confidence in the military might be a healthy recalibration.

Further, can we say with certainty that we know the difference between advice that is strictly military in nature and advice tainted by politics? If war is “politics by other means,” it is politics nonetheless. To assume military professionals inhabit some pure, politically neutral realm is to imagine war as something it has never been and never can be. This is not to say that norms of military professionalism do not matter. Most Americans believe a clear and critical difference exists between good

faith disagreements about ends and means and politically motivated lies. In practice, however, the difference is often more difficult to discern. Concerns about the danger of military politicization resonate with all of us—but here too, claims of a civil-military crisis may overstate or mischaracterize the case.

Similarly a president’s actual or threatened domestic use of the military to further partisan ends poses urgent issues related to civil liberties, the rule of law, and the misuse of executive power. It is less apparent, however, that it makes sense to view these actions through the lens of civil-military relations. In the case of the racial justice protests in the summer of 2020, military leaders were quick to reaffirm the nonpartisan US military is loyal to the Constitution rather than to a particular president.26

Following the January 6, 2021, breach of the Capitol Building by armed rioters openly supportive of Trump, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi reportedly took the unprecedented step of asking the chairman of the Joint Chiefs to ensure safeguards would be in place to prevent the outgoing president from using his nuclear launch authority in his last days in office.27 Needless to say, this too presents issues of civilian control. I and others have argued there might be certain extreme exigencies in which military disobedience to the commander in chief’s orders would be the lesser of two evils, even if those orders were not facially unlawful.28 If, for example, a president embroiled in circumstances such as those of early January 2021 ordered a unilateral, offensive nuclear strike against a target the military did not view as an imminent threat, should ethical officers go along with those orders? Or should they instead refuse to carry them out, perhaps asserting in such a context, the order would violate core law-of-war principles?

Even in this case, it is not clear such ethical and legal dilemmas are evidence of a civil-military crisis. For the United States to have reached a point at which such exigencies are other than purely theoretical, other crises must already have erupted.

**Obscured by Overstatement**

Thus far I have argued that many recent claims of a crisis in civil-military relations prove, when closely examined, to be somewhat overstated or to mischaracterize the issues. While there are genuine reasons for consternation with regard to some matters, the evidence of crisis is either lacking or ambiguous in others. When it comes to civil-military relations, perhaps things are not as bad as they seem. Or,

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at any rate, often the things that are bad have less to do with civil-military relations than with other challenges—from widespread civic disengagement to abuses of executive power.

More than anything, our ongoing preoccupation with civil-military crises may reflect our increasing uncertainty about the overall purpose of the military and our growing inability to define the role of the armed forces—or the distinction between the political and military realms—in any coherent way. Considering today’s complex, hybrid challenges such as terrorism, epidemic disease, climate change, cyber threats, Russian information warfare, and expanding Chinese global influence, it is impossible to draw neat distinctions between the role of the military and the role of diplomacy, development, and trade policy—or for that matter, between foreign and domestic issues and threats. But with the lines between war and not war, foreign and domestic, and military and civilian growing ever blurrier, it is less clear what we mean when we talk about crises in civil-military affairs.

Of course, the categories we rely upon to structure and give meaning to our world—war, peace, foreign, domestic, military, civilian, and so on—are categories we have created. These categories are neither sacred nor stable, and if they no longer serve a useful analytic purpose—if they are beginning to obscure more than they clarify—then we must develop new ways of thinking about power, force, control, and the institutions and rules we need.

This is an urgent challenge. Indeed, it could be our continued fondness for civil-military jeremiads risks diverting attention away from different but just as insidious threats to American democracy—threats that may have more to do with other forms of state capture and democratic dysfunction than with a crisis in civil-military relations or civilian control of the military.

The Founders cared deeply about civil-military relations and civilian control of the military. But they cared about this relationship for quite pragmatic reasons—in the late eighteenth century, those who controlled organized militaries had a unique ability to control the state and its resources. The founders of the fledgling American republic crafted a representative democracy in which, they hoped, the will of the people would always prevail and not be hijacked by force of arms.

The commitment of the framers of the Constitution to civilian control of the military stemmed from their deep mistrust of concentrated power. The US Constitution represents a comprehensive effort to break up concentrations of power, to ensure no one branch of government can outmuscle the others, and to ensure no one individual, region, party, faction, or group can permanently capture the state. In 1789 organized militaries were the sole actors with the ability to cause mass destruction of life and property; they consequently possessed a unique ability to capture, coerce, and control other would-be political actors. A general

commitment to diluting concentrations of power, then, translated into a specific commitment to ensuring that the military, in particular, would be subject to multiple checks and balances.

Moreover these Constitutional checks and balances relating to the use of military force took many different forms. The Constitution established a system in which the military was subordinated to the elected representatives of the people, and for good measure they also divided control over the use of military force between Congress and the president. The framers’ normative goal was to prevent concentrations of power that could displace or distort the will of the people, and civilian control of the military was valued because (and only because) it was one of several overlapping mechanisms to ensure that the will of the people would prevail over the will of the powerful.

Today, these core normative goals are as relevant as they were in 1789, for to believe in democracy is to believe that the political legitimacy of a government derives from the free and informed consent of the governed. Most of us believe that the choices of the American people—constrained by our constitutional commitment to individual rights and due process, but otherwise uncoerced and unmanipulated—should guide our foreign and domestic policies.

But a formalistic commitment to civilian control of the military no longer achieves what it promised to achieve more than two centuries ago. For one thing, the US military today is nothing like the redcoats of King George III, and nothing like the ragtag militias hastily assembled under General George Washington. Instead, the US military now has elaborate internal checks and balances and a deeply ingrained respect for democracy and the rule of law. 30 Most critically, the ability to destroy—and hence to coerce and control—is no longer in the exclusive possession of those with military forces and weapons.

Unlike in 1789, nonstate actors—even lone individuals—can now cause death and destruction on a mass scale, and increasingly both states and nonstate actors also have a range of nonkinetic means of coercion at their disposal, from cyberattacks and bioengineered viruses to the deliberate global spread of disinformation and fake news. All over the world coercive power has become simultaneously more diffuse and more concentrated. Individual billionaires, multinational corporations, hackers, and nonstate terrorist groups can increasingly compete with state militaries in their ability to control the behavior of both ordinary people and political actors. 31

At the same time, as noted earlier, the lines between military and civilian tasks have grown increasingly indistinct. In today’s murky world of gray-zone conflicts and persistent shaping operations, uniformed military personnel train judges, eavesdrop on electronic communications, 

vaccinate cows, and develop microfinance programs—and civilian Intelligence Community employees and contractors conduct raids, plan drone strikes, and execute offensive cyber operations. Both military and civilian actors engage in information and influence operations.

In this blurry world, we need to ask ourselves a serious question: what work, if any, is the concept of civilian control of the military doing today? When we say it was dangerous for Trump to offer too many senior administration positions to retired generals, or discourage President Biden from doing the same, what exactly do we mean? What specific negative consequences do we imagine would be more likely to happen if retired generals make up half the president’s cabinet—and what positive outcomes could result if we keep retired generals out of a president’s inner circle? When we say we do not want retired military officials to make partisan statements, why not? Similarly, when we worry about military involvement in domestic politics, or about military obedience to civilian commands, we would do well to define the harms with greater specificity.

**Conclusion**

The notion of civilian control of the military in America today has come unmoored from its original purpose. Arguably such authority is no longer an effective means to achieve the normative ends we still rightly value. Instead it is at risk of becoming a rule of aesthetics, not ethics, and its invocation is at risk of becoming a soothing ritual without accomplishing anything of value.

Going further, in today’s world a purely formalistic conception of civilian control of the military carries with it potential dangers. If we focus on orthodox rules at the expense of substantive normative ends, we may persuade ourselves that if we can just keep the generals inside the Pentagon and away from the campaign trail and the White House, we will have accomplished something meaningful—even as we blind ourselves to the frightening new forms of power and coercion that increasingly distort our democracy and destabilize our world.

Unlike in 1789, both states and nonstate actors have increasingly found ways to achieve substantial power and control even without the ability to cause large-scale death and physical destruction. Financial manipulation, cyberattacks, social media-enabled propaganda, and disinformation campaigns can demonstrably shift balances of power. In the future, artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies will continue to make the use of physical force just one technique among many.

Humanity continues to wage war the old-fashioned way in many parts of the globe, with success and failure measured in broken bodies and terrain lost or gained. But technological changes have both diminished the ability of states and their organized militaries to monopolize violence and created numerous nonkinetic means of coercion and control. As a
result, military power no longer represents the unique potential threat to American democracy it represented in 1789 (or 1861, 1941, or even 1970).

Should we still worry about the capture of the American state through non-rights-respecting, nondemocratic means? Certainly. But today the problem is not solely or fundamentally a civil-military one, if it ever was. The greatest threats to American democracy stem less from an out-of-control military than from electoral gerrymandering, information warfare, and foreign and domestic influence campaigns, complicated by big data, big money, rising economic inequality, and partisan divisions distorting our political system.

In an era in which foreign hackers, the superrich, and the purveyors of fake news can manipulate the American electoral process by sowing division, mistrust, and violence within the electorate and causing chaos in the international system, society must find effective ways to prevent the powerful from distorting or derailing democratic processes. To focus primarily on the notion the United States is experiencing a civil-military crisis, however, risks forgetting our history and ignoring our present perils.
ABSTRACT: Norms of the military profession today strongly reflect the Huntingtonian separation-of-spheres concept in which the military and civilian elements of policy decision making interact in particularly prescribed and distinct ways. These norms can be a detriment to civilian control of the military, the military’s relationship with broader society, and the success of the country in armed conflict, undermining healthy civil-military relations and US national security writ large.

When renowned political scientist Samuel P. Huntington first published *The Soldier and the State* in 1957, the book elicited enormous controversy. Huntington advocated the United States maintain a professional military whose officers would be isolated from society and wedded to a distinctive apolitical ethic. He was subsequently accused of glorifying militarism, given his favorable assessment of Prussian civil-military relations and of advancing a model of civil-military relations sharply at odds with the Founders’ historical apprehensions about maintaining a standing army. Critics also contended Huntington’s conception of professionalism was unrealistic and ducked rather than engaged the “really hard political problems of civil-military relations.”

Judging by the book’s contemporary influence, one would hardly know Huntington’s arguments were ever so controversial. Indeed, *The Soldier and the State* and especially Huntington’s concept of objective control have come to define contemporary understandings of military professionalism in the United States. The model prescribes a separation be maintained between the civilian sphere of politics and the military’s domain of managing armed conflict. Huntington posited officers would consequently develop an aversion to politics and would leave such matters to the civilians, who in turn would respect the military’s exclusive sphere.
of activity. Objective control would thus, in Huntington’s estimation, both safeguard civilian control and ensure the country’s success in war.

Despite Huntington’s influence, this article explicitly questions his concept of objective control and considers whether it, in fact, provides a sound basis for military professionalism in the contemporary era. In some respects, Huntington’s concept of military professionalism serves the military well, as detailed below. Yet that approach also contains shortcomings detrimental in three areas: civilian control of the military, the military’s relationship to American society, and the military’s role in ensuring the country’s strategic effectiveness in armed conflict. The country’s civil-military relations and its national security would be well served by rethinking professionalism in the military today.

**Concept of Professionalism**

Before delving into a discussion of Huntington’s approach to professionalism, it is useful to consider the origins of the concept. The notion of professionalism originated with social scientists in the late nineteenth century to describe a distinctive form of organizing work among those with specialized knowledge such as the law, medicine, and clergy. Broadly understood, professions are granted autonomy contingent on maintaining the trust of the society they serve; their members cultivate expertise and acquire knowledge within a community of experts who share a commitment to common values and ethical principles. The concept has been applied to the profession of arms since the late nineteenth century, although its meaning and usage has varied.

Historically the emergence of professional militaries was often associated with changes in military organization and recruitment. For example, the professionalization of European armies commonly refers to the end of the practice in the late nineteenth century of selecting and promoting officers based on social class and the purchase of commissions, in favor of the adoption of meritocratic criteria. The concept of a professional military is also used to describe one maintained largely through career military personnel versus one primarily built of conscripts. Globally the professionalization of militaries may be associated with improved training and the adoption of technically sophisticated equipment, standardization of merit-based recruitment and promotion practices, the routinization of organizational processes, and increasing specialization within the organization.4

Today, however, military professionalism in the United States is an encompassing concept comprised of skill and organizational attributes as well as ideational components. A professional military acquires expertise and masters a body of knowledge, but it also aspires to uphold particular values and embody particular principles of action

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and standards of behavior. As Theo Farrell describes, “organizations in a [military] field gradually develop understandings of appropriate form and behavior” and among these are a normative conception of military professionalism.

Broadly defined these norms encompass implicit expectations about what it means to be and act like an officer. They are regulative in that they proscribe and prescribe particular behaviors; that is, they “assign a value to an action or way of behaving (e.g., obligation, permissibility, appropriateness, prohibition) that are recognized in a society or social group.” They are also constitutive of officer identity in that they describe what an individual believes makes him or her an officer. As such the norms are broadly shared and generally agreed upon, although not necessarily explicitly considered; a person may act in conformity with normative principles, while rarely overtly reflecting upon them.

**Norms of Professionalism**

While many scholars might agree on the core attributes of military professionalism, especially the need for ongoing education and expertise, no single conceptualization of the professional ethic exists; what constitutes an appropriate normative construct for professionalism has long been debated by historians and social scientists who study the military. There are different ways of understanding the core principles to which a military officer should adhere and articulating the essential elements of professionalism. Nonetheless, Huntington’s approach is arguably the dominant one within the US military today. As noted above, according to Huntington the military and civilian leadership spheres must remain separate. The military focuses on cultivating its expertise in the management of violence, free from interference by civilian authority; the military leadership then abstains from engagement in the civilian world of politics and policy. Isolated from society and focused on cultivating its expertise,

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Huntington posits the military acquires a strong corporate identity such that officers have a “sense of organic unity and consciousness” in which they identify with the military organization as a whole. Military officers meanwhile maintain a sense of responsibility for protecting the security of society.

In addition, an apolitical ethos emerges rendering the military both subservient to civilian authority and militarily effective in protecting national security. In outlining his model of professionalism, Huntington described how he thought the separation of spheres would shape military identity and behavior and prescribed a particular ideal to which officers should aspire. In this respect Huntington defined a normative framework for military professionalism.

Importantly these ideas about military professionalism did not originate with Huntington, although he put his particular mark upon them. Rather he was building on a longer intellectual tradition and debate about military professionalism that emerged in the nineteenth century. That debate was subsequently encapsulated by the views of General Emory Upton and General John McCauley Palmer who diverged on the merits of maintaining a professional military. Upton favored a model based on the Prussian military, while Palmer argued an army comprised of full-time officers—versus a citizen-army—was not necessary for military effectiveness and would rupture the relationship between the military and society. Upton’s views prevailed within the officer corps, and Huntington came to embrace them in his academic work. He explicitly references Upton’s influence on the development of the “objective control” model.

Several key assumptions and arguments are central to understanding these Huntingtonian-inspired norms of professionalism, including the assumption that clearly discernable spheres of military and political activity in armed conflict exist, and therefore a division of labor is both sustainable and desirable. This assumption, in turn, informs a particular conception of decision making about the use of force, allocating distinctive roles for military and political leaders in authorizing and implementing such decisions and sharply dividing them into exclusive domains. Huntington also assumed the military and society should remain separated—that such a separation was both necessary and beneficial to society. He posited the existence of a monolithic “military mind” that ideologically and psychologically distinguished military personnel from their civilian counterparts.

Especially distinctive, however, to Huntington’s approach was how he conceptualized the apolitical dimension of professionalism. In his estimation this apolitical tenet was (and should be) all-encompassing.

“The antithesis of objective control is military participation in politics,” Huntington argued, and civil-military relations are at their best when the military remains “politically sterile and neutral.”

Notably, being apolitical entailed abstaining from policy decisions as well as maintaining intellectual distance from issues bearing on politics or political thinking. Indeed Huntington was quite absolute in this, deeming it incumbent on an officer to pass any issue requiring political reflection to a civilian leader for his or her consideration. Many scholars and practitioners might agree that overtly partisan activities or forms of political advocacy undertaken by officers are unconstructive and potentially contrary to civilian control of the military. Nonetheless Huntington’s proposition was distinctive in that it grouped all forms of politics and political thinking together and then assessed this activity incompatible with an officer’s identity and roles.

Even when not always explicitly identified with Huntington, the concept of military professionalism he favored has been deeply influential within the contemporary American military. As Eliot Cohen has written, the separation of spheres and the concept of apolitical professionalism are so deeply entrenched that they constitute the “normal theory of civil-military relations.” As William Rapp, a former commandant of West Point and the US Army War College, observed: “Huntington’s 1957 The Soldier and the State has defined civil-military relations for generations of military professionals. Soldiers have been raised on Huntingtonian logic and the separation of spheres of influence since their time as junior lieutenants.” The military’s senior leadership has also regularly reinforced the apolitical tenet.

To be sure, these norms have served the military well in several respects. They provide a baseline appreciation for the importance of staying out of domestic politics and debates. Hence military officers are socialized from early in their careers that they should remain nonpartisan and refrain from political activism that might contravene civilian authority. The emphasis on cultivating expertise has provided for military operational and tactical excellence and an unquestioned sense of responsibility to defend the country. Yet in other respects, those norms today do not always serve the military, its civilian leadership, or perhaps the country’s national security, especially well. The following discussion explores these potential shortcomings.

18. Cohen, Supreme Command; and Finney and Mayfield, Redefining the Modern Military.
Civilian Control

Prevailing norms may first have some unconstructive consequences for military leaders’ relationship to civilian leaders and practices of civilian control in the United States. To see this point it is helpful to consider what civilian control encompasses. The concept can be construed narrowly to refer primarily to the exercise of authority—to political leaders’ power to make decisions. Consequently by this definition, as long as civilians are giving orders and military leaders are following them, civilian control is observed.

Yet while the authority to give orders and have them followed is an essential feature of civilian control, this decision-making authority is not sufficient to allow civilian leaders to realize their objectives. Civil-military relations must be organized in a manner that supports civilian needs in advisory processes and interactions with military commanders. This arrangement helps ensure the policy or strategy preferences held by civilians, who are making these decisions on behalf of the electorate, prevail.

For civilians to control effectively, or more aptly, shape military policy and activity in conformity with their larger political objectives, the structure and character of those processes must conform to their needs and proclivities in policy making and strategic assessment. As Janine Davidson cogently argues, civilians may require a nonlinear and fluid process that simultaneously considers both political goals and resources; assessing goals may be best accomplished from a civilian leader’s perspective inductively and in tandem with consideration of military means.21 That is, when weighing the utility of using the military, civilians are searching for a theory for how force might (or might not) advance some acceptable political outcome—an outcome they may not have arrived at before engaging military leaders in an advisory capacity.

Yet the current norms of professionalism do not prepare officers well for these demands and roles in strategic assessment. The Huntingtonian model supports a modal understanding of the military’s role in advisory processes at odds with an inductive and dialectal process for the integration of ends and means.22 Rather such a model leads military officers to expect definitive guidance and then respond in a potentially iterative but inherently transactional process. That transactional concept, based on the idea there are inviolable boundaries between military and political domains, is inherent in Huntingtonian professionalism.

To be sure the fluidity with which civilians may desire military leaders to speculate on military options may not always be feasible given the challenges inherent in planning for complex military operations. Civilian leaders also need to work to understand military constraints

22. Davidson, “Contemporary Presidency.”
and the functional challenges of military planning. Nonetheless, the obstacles to military adaptation in the advisory process are not merely functional but are also cultural and result from the mindset of military officers steeped in the separation-of-spheres concept. As Tami Biddle has argued, military officers may not understand how to engage civilians effectively in the advisory processes.

Yet the problem may even be more complicated. Officers who have deeply internalized the separation-of-spheres concept may resent adjusting to civilian needs or view them as “inappropriate, unrealistic or irrelevant.” The military may view as dysfunctional civilians’ failure to conform to the transactional model (instead delineating ex ante clear guidance) rather than see it as it is—a reflection of the necessary balance of complex demands and political constraints in the civilian decision-making environment.

These norms also can create an aversion to civilian oversight, which is an institutional expression of civilian control. Huntingtonian norms can encourage military leaders to view with some resentment, and perhaps suspicion, the appropriateness of civilian interventions and the motives and expertise of the political officials undertaking it. Huntington fosters an idea that the military should oversee itself—that autonomy in operational and tactical matters is a right and not a prerogative variously delegated, depending on what civilians deem appropriate and necessary. Indeed Huntington actually makes the case the military has the right to resist actively intrusions into military activity it deems a violation of the separation of spheres.

While all organizations bristle under outside intervention, Huntingtonian norms suggest such interventions are inappropriate and constitute violations of the rightful order of things. Not all definitions of military professionalism entail such an unreserved grant of autonomy. Some even question whether the military really constitutes a profession, given autonomy is incompatible with the need for civilian intervention to monitor or modify military activity and ensure consistency with broader political objectives.

A related and particularly worrisome byproduct of the Huntingtonian mindset is it encourages disparagement of politics and its practitioners—civilian leaders. Politics is seen as something beyond the pure domain of military expertise. Hence politics and the political

concerns that in part motivate civilian leaders’ decisions are viewed as extra-military considerations; constraints on military operations induced by such concerns, resource limits, timelines and the like, are viewed as external factors.

The imposition of such constraints by politicians then further reinforces cynicism about civilian motives in protecting national security. Surveys reveal, for example, that many in uniform agree with the statement, “when civilians tell the military what to do, domestic partisan politics rather than national security requirements are often the primary motivation.”

Heidi Urben reports in her 2009 survey that 55 percent of respondents agreed with the statement, compared with 54 percent who agreed with it in Triangle Institute for Security Studies surveys conducted in the late 1990s. This suggests a deep cynicism about the motives of civilians overseeing military activity, which magnifies the cultural aversion to oversight the separation-of-spheres concept may already foster.

Relationship with Society

Huntingtonian norms can also foster dynamics corrosive to the military’s relationship with American society. Much has been written about the public’s relationship to society and the emergence of a “civil-military gap” between Americans and the military. Americans revere the military, however, this regard is not accompanied by much knowledge or insight into the military or efforts to learn about it. A superficial “thank you for your service” mentality prevails in American culture.

There is also a military side to the civil-military gap, albeit one that does not get the same attention. Service to society is a deeply embedded value in military professionalism today. As United States Army doctrine states, professionalism encompasses a “shared understanding of why and how we serve the American people” among Army personnel.

Yet the humility toward society implied by that tenet may be absent among some military personnel. In the 1990s, journalist Thomas Ricks wrote about how the Marines with whom he interacted derided civilian society. Surveys of military personnel have since shown many

servicemembers continue to disparage American society.\footnote{Feaver and Kohn, *Soldiers and Civilians*, and Schake and Mattis, *Warriors and Citizens*.} Gregory Foster found many of his students at the National Defense University perceived the military to be more self-sacrificing, patriotic, and loyal than their indulgent and self-interested civilian counterparts. Foster wrote such attitudes “accentuate the deep-seated widespread belief—an arrogant one, certainly—among military personnel that they are morally superior to a general public they consider to be in some advanced state of moral decline.”\footnote{Gregory Foster, “Civil-Military Relations on Trial: Through the Eyes of Tomorrow’s US Military Leaders,” *RUSI Journal* 161, no. 4 (2016): 34–41.}

A variety of factors may enable the emergence of such attitudes. One facilitating factor may be that the military does not mirror the cleavages and demographic character of American society. In today’s all-volunteer military, those who self-select to join are demographically unrepresentative of society; military personnel are drawn disproportionately from rural and less populated areas, often in the South and Midwest, while those who choose military services often come from military families.\footnote{Amy Schafer, “Generations of War: The Rise of the Warrior Caste and the All-Volunteer Force,” Center for a New American Security, May 8, 2017, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/generations-of-war.} A partisan skew in the military exists, especially among officers, such that personnel do not mirror ideological divisions in society.\footnote{Feaver and Kohn, *Soldiers and Civilians*, and Heidi A. Urben, “Civil-Military Relations in a Time of War: Party, Politics, and the Profession of Arms,” PhD diss., Georgetown University, 2010.}

Worries about such consequences of maintaining a professional military are deeply rooted in the American tradition and were in part why the Founders were concerned about a large standing army.\footnote{Russell F. Weigley, “The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell,” Special issue, *Journal of Military History*, 57, no. 5 (October 1993).} Sociologists such as Morris Janowitz have also expressed concern that without deliberate efforts to counter such tendencies, military professionalism would generate distance between society and the military and erode the latter’s regard for democratic traditions.\footnote{James Burk, “Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations,” *Armed Forces & Society* 29, no. 1 (October 2002): 7–29.}

Contemporary norms of professionalism may then turn a military that operates apart from society to one inclined to see itself as better than that society. While professionalism may unavoidably create a military officer class apart from society, Huntington goes further in encouraging a sense of distinctiveness as normatively appropriate. He also explicitly argued society should emulate the superior values found in military culture. In the famous closing section of *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington compares the residents of the town abutting West Point to its cadets, arguing: “historically, the virtues of West Point have been America’s vices and the vices of the military, America’s virtues. Yet today America can learn more from West Point than West Point from America.”\footnote{Huntington, *Soldier and the State*, 465–66.}
Retired Army Lieutenant General David Barno captures the implications of these dynamics:

Today’s Army—including its leadership—lives in a bubble separate from society. Not only does it reside in remote fortresses—the world’s most exclusive gated communities—but in a world apart from the cultural, intellectual and even geographic spheres that define the kaleidoscopic United States. This splendid military isolation—set in the midst of a largely adoring nation—risks fostering a closed culture of superiority and aloofness.42

Hence the process of professionalization combined with the particular norms of professionalism—in which military service is viewed as imparting some superior character and values to individuals—may be contributing to some worrisome dimensions of the societal-military relationship. These values, while not formally sanctioned, are seemingly pervasive and in effect characterize a deeply concerning byproduct of prevailing conceptions of military professionalism.

Military and Strategic Effectiveness

Finally, norms of professionalism may be counterproductive to the military’s capacity to help ensure the country’s strategic effectiveness in armed conflict. In part this results from Huntington’s all-encompassing approach to the apolitical tenet and the notion that engagement in debate about political considerations and political thinking are antithetical to the roles and responsibilities of a military professional. This mindset is potentially aversive to healthy strategic assessment—and arguably to appreciating the political effects and constraints of military activity at all levels.43

The making of strategy inextricably combines political and military considerations; strategy sits at the nexus between the operational and tactical domains on the one hand and policy and political outcomes on the other. Yet the separation-of-spheres concept mandates military officers forgo engagement with that which bears on the political. Rather this separation dictates a retreat to the boundaries of ostensibly pure military considerations when such issues filter into debate. Consequently some military officers analytically distance their own thought processes from political considerations.44 As Sam Sarkesian and Robert Connor wrote, “it appears to have been an article of faith in the military profession to erect a wall between the military and ‘politics.’ ”45

This barrier inclines officers to “cognitively stop at the edge of the military playing field as their culture has encouraged” whereas they might otherwise see themselves as “concurrently responsible with civilian leaders and other agencies to achieve strategic policy ends.” As Carl Builder captures it, “the difficulty lies in seeing the strategic side of national security increasingly as the province of politicians and diplomats while the operational and tactical sides belong to the military, free from civilian meddling.” In turn this operational and tactical emphasis interacts with the transactional advisory process. “The current demand by the military for well-defined objectives is eloquent evidence of how far our thinking has drifted toward the tactical domain.”

The aforementioned attitudes to civilian oversight fostered by Huntingtonian-informed norms may also prove counterproductive to strategic effectiveness. The separation-of-spheres model is premised on a tacit agreement between political and military leaders such that civilians violate their obligations when they infringe on the military domain. Yet civilian oversight may be required to ensure the integration of operational and tactical activity with strategy and political goals.

Tactical operations have a rhythm and character of their own that can become disconnected from larger political objectives. A mission may be militarily efficient in that it uses resources well to achieve a discreet military objective. Yet a mission may not be militarily effective if that outcome (or the means used to achieve it) yields counterproductive strategic effects. Certainly many military commanders understand these tensions and work to mitigate these counterproductive tendencies. Yet having civilian policymakers, whose role it is to focus upon and represent these larger political objectives, monitoring military activity and intervening in decisions in consultation with commanders, is a pathway for ensuring means-end integration. If interventions in military activity are viewed as an abrogation of the obligation to respect military autonomy, however, military personnel may resent and mistrust the purposes of such oversight. By fostering the idea autonomy is a right and not a privilege, prevailing norms create a mindset potentially contrary to political-strategic success in armed conflict.

One final feature of these norms is potentially contrary to strategic effectiveness: they may undermine military leaders’ sense of responsibility or ownership over the political effects of military operations. This is an insidious byproduct of the transactional model. Military leaders proffer advice; civilians then choose whether to accept the proposed options for the use of force, ask for modifications, or decline to act. In any

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scenario the military’s role in the decision-making process is complete once options are supplied.

In effect this dynamic absolves the military of taking responsibility for the outcomes of the decisions politicians make with respect to military action. If the military’s responsibility is merely to outline options, the successful implementation of any chosen option becomes the metric for success, not the larger consideration of whether the success of that mission or campaign translates into some enduring political benefit. The assessment of military success devolves into an evaluation of operational and tactical achievements. The war—to win or lose—becomes civilians’ responsibility.

**Conclusion**

If the prevailing conception of military professionalism is flawed, what should be done? First it would be helpful to reconsider the way current norms of professionalism conceive of a military officer’s relationship to politics. The current approach lumps a variety of phenomena together. Particular forms of political activism or engagement in partisan activity during elections are problematic and should be proscribed. But to be a good strategist and participant in strategic assessment, a military officer must think about and engage in politics.

Moreover political acumen is required to keep oneself out of partisan politics. An officer needs to understand him or herself as a (potential) political actor to know best how to minimize his or her impact on political outcomes. Sarkesian, writing in 1981, said it well: “Political knowledge, political interests, and awareness are not the same as political action and bipartisan politics. Indeed the more of the former, the less likely that military men [and women] will develop the latter.”

In other words it is time to leave behind the reflexive and encompassing call for officers to remain apolitical for a more constructive understanding of how they might best engage with politics and political thinking.

Second, it may be helpful to move beyond the separation-of-spheres conception of civil-military relations. On many levels the notion that there are clear and constant spheres of political versus military activity is flawed. Rather than seeing their roles and responsibilities as fixed, officers might be encouraged to view political and military calculations and roles as fluid—varying with a given situation and as often intersecting. This is especially important at the strategic level where politics and military considerations are by their very nature intertwined.

Finally, it may be time to address the military side of the civil-military gap. More work must be done to address attitudes of disparagement of civilian society, civilian politics, and civilian leadership. That such attitudes are apparently pervasive is a troubling feature of the culture of

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military professionalism today. Addressing the flawed premises of the military’s relationship to politics might also help in this respect. As we rethink military professionalism today, Sarkesian, once again, frames the solution well:

To develop the political dimension of military professionalism . . . does not lessen the need for professional skills aimed specifically at battlefield necessities, but what it does demand is that these necessities also be viewed in terms of their impact beyond the confines of the battlefield. Additionally, it means that all military men must be socialized into reinforcing their commitment to the political system and in their understanding of the political-social dimensions of their role as soldiers. How well this is accomplished is primarily a function of military professionalism. The attitudes of the officer corps and their acceptance of a new concept of professionalism will, in no small measure, determine how well the military system adopts to the political-social environment.  

ABSTRACT: Foreign policy experts often rely on familiar dichotomies: great power competition versus global issues, foreign policy versus domestic policy, and a unitary national identity versus multiculturalism. “Seeing in stereo” means superimposing the two halves of each dichotomy on top of one another. Learning to see how great power competition and global issues intertwine, how foreign and domestic policies increasingly merge, and how the United States can be both plures and unum is essential to navigating the complexity of the twenty-first-century world.

The complexity of the twenty-first century requires all foreign policy and national security scholars and practitioners to see in stereo. We must learn to see two very different groups of actors, sets of issues, and patterns of behavior at the same time and integrate them into one picture. Computers that can monitor and integrate different data streams will make this intellectual multitasking easier, but humans are the ultimate analysts and advisers, and we must train our eyes and brains to push back against the luxury of a single worldview.

I propose three broad areas in which we must shift our gaze from mono to stereo. First is the world itself: we must learn to see behaviors of international and global actors simultaneously and weight them equally. Second, we must erase the intellectual divide that scholars, teachers, and bureaucrats have long imposed between foreign and domestic issues. Third, with regard to Americans but also to other multiracial, multietnic nations: we must learn to be plures and unum at the same time, or, in proper Latin, plures et unum.

Remember that the creation of the nation-state system arising out of the Treaty of Westphalia took centuries, and international relations has existed as a recognized discipline for less than a century. The mental maps we impose on what we think we see are constructed and thus can be reconstructed. In an age in which we understand the ways tiny disturbances can lead to great consequences, and change happens so quickly and continually that we must learn to adapt and respond rather than predict and plan, learning to look through two lenses simultaneously rather than one is not so hard, but it is essential.

International and Global

Imagine the pre-Westphalian world in which “international” did not exist as a concept. Nations of people existed but not as political units that possessed sovereignty and interacted with one another. Thinking
about events or affairs between, or inter, nations was thus impossible. Now think about the world today, which is divided into nation-states—the only proper subjects, along with international organizations, of international law. Yet many of those nation-states are far smaller and less powerful than the world’s great cities, corporations, or religious and educational institutions. How do we reconcile the two worlds?

In my 2017 book *The Chessboard and the Web: Strategies of Connection in a Networked World*, I describe the Westphalian world as a chessboard, a board on which strategists typically focus on one opponent at a time, imagining how a series of moves by one side will inspire a series of countermoves by the other. It is actually a board on which many games are played as game theory has formalized: chess, Go, poker, chicken, stag hunt, and the prisoner’s dilemma. What is common to all these games is that they divide the world into discreet pieces. Players move in reaction to the moves of others; they are not directly connected to them, pulled and changed by a web of invisible strings.

The web world, by contrast, is the global world of millions, perhaps billions, of networks—nodes connected to one another by countless electronic and physical links. A network is different from a group. A group can come together and then disperse without remaining connected. A network, by definition, is an entity through which communication and action continue to flow, creating one entity with many parts, each of which affects the other through their connection. In the web world, we need strategies of connection. Those strategies must proceed from maps of what is connected to what and what is not connected or misconnected to what. They also require an understanding of how different patterns of connection can achieve or contribute to specific results, such as defense, resilience, cooperation, coordination, and scale.

So often these different sets of issues are put in the boxes of international and transnational. Transnational, however, still focuses primarily on states: it simply means across state borders rather than between them. Focusing on global issues is much more than semantic; it means we can picture a world of states and a world of global actors superimposed on one another. Russia can be planning an information attack on the United States working through many hidden networks of semiprivate actors, with diplomatic but also potentially criminal consequences. That is seeing in stereo.

**Foreign and Domestic**

Foreign policy expert Heather Hurlburt tells an anecdote about being asked to help a senator up for reelection in 2018 prepare for a debate. When she arrived, the staff commented on the relative lack of foreign policy topics in the news that year. As Hurlburt recounts the story:

And for half an hour I tested and prodded: on immigration, refugees and security; trade and China; defense spending and jobs; anti-Semitism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Eventually, we turned to the more traditional items: Iran, North Korea, Russia. But I couldn’t resist: “Senator, I hope you agree that all these topics are foreign policy, too. They’re what foreign policy is now.”

Hurlburt argues that for much of the twentieth century the United States had the wealth and size to conduct its foreign affairs quite separately from its domestic life, aided by the position of the dollar as the international reserve currency. Today, however, issues like climate change, disinformation, global health, anticorruption, political violence, cybersecurity, democracy, and human rights are not only issues that are as important to Americans at home as to countries abroad, they are also comprised of an inextricable mix of foreign and domestic policies.

Trade is a prime example. Reduction of tariffs has always required national legislation, with the attendant minefield of powerful domestic commercial and manufacturing interests. Over the last few decades, however, the focus has shifted almost entirely to nonmarket barriers: environmental and labor regulations, government subsidies for infant industries, and tax and competition policy—all domestic policies made through domestic legislation or regulation.

In the 1950s, the desire to compete with the Soviet Union and undercut their propaganda about the plight of workers and African-Americans in the United States contributed to an upsurge of labor protections and the beginnings of the civil rights movement. In coming years, issues like gun violence and voter suppression are likely to tarnish the US global reputation in ways that undermine American influence abroad and the prestige of some American institutions, such as universities. On the flip side, the ability to embrace our status as a plurality nation going forward and to nurture connections and networks forged by the many Americans who are first-, second-, and third-generation immigrants to their home countries can be an enormous commercial and diplomatic advantage.

Seeing in stereo on these issues means learning to work with domestic policy experts in a different way. Ultimately, it means moving to a task-force approach to problem solving, putting the right people together depending on the job at hand, much as a commander would select the right mixture of specialists and regular troops for a mission. Without a broad mix of domestic and foreign policy experts at the table for any given problem, however, the decisionmaker literally will not be able to see what is at stake nor the full range of options before her.

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Plures et Unum

The motto of the United States is “E Pluribus Unum,” or “out of many, one.” The Constitution commits us to “a more perfect union,” a coming together as one polity. When I was growing up, civics teachers espoused the melting pot theory: people came to the United States from all over the world and were fused in the crucible of citizenship to emerge as Americans, with one language, one culture, and one history.

No longer. The idea of multiculturalism emerged as students, both men and women, from many different racial and ethnic backgrounds began to challenge the curriculum of college courses traditionally described as Western Civilization or Great Books, featuring works almost entirely written by white men. Over the last several decades, the vibrant clash of cultures that makes up so much of American urban life, a phenomenon that has spread to many smaller towns and cities all over the country, is reshaping curricula, holidays, food, arts, and media.

Many American conservatives and classical liberals are deeply worried about multiculturalism, an ideology that in their view “seeks to divide and conquer Americans, making many groups out of one citizenry.” This same fear powers broader debates over identity politics—the worry, as Francis Fukuyama expresses it, that democracies are fracturing into segments based on ever-narrower identities, threatening the possibility of deliberation and collective action by society as a whole.

But why must it be either/or? Why cannot we be plures and unum at the same time? Why cannot that very duality be our greatest strength? As Yale psychology professor Jennifer A. Richeson writes in response to Fukuyama: “Identifying as American does not require the relinquishing of other identities. In fact, it is possible to leverage those identities to cultivate and deepen one’s Americanness.”

Counterintuitively, it is possible to share experiences of being marginalized, or struggling to find your place in society, in ways that could actually increase social cohesion across very different groups. Tea Party Republicans and Bernie Democrats have experiences in common, as do rural whites and inner-city Blacks. Richeson believes America can have a “unifying national creed that would allow Americans to embrace their own identities, encourage them to respect the identities embraced by others, and affirm shared principles of equality and justice.”

Stacey Abrams, the first African-American woman to be nominated for governor by a major political party who came within 55,000 votes

of being elected as governor of Georgia, put this view into practice. She “intentionally and vigorously highlighted communities of color and other marginalized groups” during her campaign, “not to the exclusion of others but as a recognition of their specific policy needs [emphasis added].” After all, she writes, “the marginalized did not create identity politics: their identities have been forced on them by dominant groups . . . .”

Like Richeson, Abrams insists it is possible to embrace “the distinct histories and identities of groups in a democracy” in ways that enhance “the complexity and capacity of the whole.” This multiplicity, this pluralism, can be who we are as Americans in all our glorious intersections. “By embracing identity and its prickly, uncomfortable contours,” Abrams writes, “Americans will become more likely to grow as one.”

**Et Tu, Military?**

What does seeing in stereo mean for the US military? The Pentagon has had plenty of experience thinking about global threats in addition to international ones; indeed, military planners were focused on the security implications of climate change back in the mid-aughts, well ahead of most people in the foreign policy community. Networks are also familiar challenges. Retired Army General Stanley McChrystal wrote a book about how he reshaped the structure of the Joint Special Operations Task Force in Iraq to be able to fight al-Qaeda’s ever-morphing networks. But do these threats live in different bureaus and boxes? Do strategists and commanders all know how to integrate the perspectives of the chessboard and the web?

On the question of the dissolution of the foreign/domestic boundary, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security after 9/11 would seem to insist the military is strictly for foreign wars. Yet if the United States homeland were to be attacked by a foreign enemy on the ground, in or from the air, on or from the water, or from space, the military would mount the primary defense. Where are the lines between defense and security? And this ambiguity is further complicated by the other domestic governments with jurisdiction over issues that can create rising tensions with traditional adversaries or catalyze action by new ones such as cyberattacks or perceived blasphemy against a foreign religion. The Pentagon has always been part of the many interagency processes the National Security Council oversees but can civilian and military defense officials develop a “spidey-sense” of which domestic agencies to call, looking at issues always in the round?

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The military has long been proficient at forging many disparate individuals into one unit, one platoon, one brigade, one fighting force. War movies specialize in showing the soldier, sailor, or airman risking her or his life to save a buddy, leaving no one behind. Yet as the military becomes far more diverse—adding women, transgender, and LGBTQ individuals and increasingly reflecting the plurality nation the United States is becoming—the training and socialization of students in the military academies and new recruits in the armed services will have to change accordingly. Equally important, however, will be inculcating an understanding of how a spectrum of differences can exist alongside the unity of the force. In fact, unity will require treating all differences equally, rather than singling out some individuals for special treatment, positive or negative.

That is seeing in stereo.

Charting A Different Course

Nadia Schadlow
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ABSTRACT: The failure of liberal internationalism in the post–Cold War period requires the United States to adopt a clear-eyed approach to competition that promotes regional balances of power, emphasizes reciprocity, and creates mission-driven coalitions.

Writing in Foreign Affairs last year, then presidential candidate Joe Biden promised to “address the world as it is” in his effort to restore American leadership. President Biden’s team faces an uphill battle as they translate the president’s vision into policy. The emergence of powerful rivals coupled with the erosion of US capabilities has led to a decline of American agency in the world. Ultimately this trend stems from a series of long-standing illusions about the sources of American power and what it can reasonably accomplish.

Since the end of the Cold War, US policymakers have been beguiled by a set of illusions about world order. Contrary to the optimistic predictions made in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, widespread political liberalization and the growth of transnational organizations have not tempered rivalries among countries. Likewise globalization and economic interdependence have not been unalloyed goods; often they have generated unanticipated inequalities and vulnerabilities. And although the proliferation of digital technologies has increased productivity and brought other benefits, it has also eroded the US military’s advantages and posed challenges to democratic societies.

Given these new realities, Washington cannot simply return to the comfortable assumptions of the past. The world has moved beyond the unipolar moment of the post–Cold War period and into an age of interdependence and competition calling for different policies and tools. To navigate this new era properly, the United States must let go of old illusions, move past the myths of liberal internationalism, and reconsider its views about the nature of the world order.

A Promise Unfulfilled

As the twentieth century drew to a close, waves of global democratization inspired optimism in the West. Ultimately a consensus

formed that a convergence on liberal democracy would lead to a stable international political order. As the Soviet Union withered and the Cold War ended, US President George H. W. Bush called for a “new world order,” a “Pax Universalis” founded on liberal values, democratic governance, and free markets. Several years later, US President Bill Clinton’s 1996 National Security Strategy articulated a policy of engagement and democratic enlargement that would improve “the prospects for political stability, peaceful conflict resolution, and greater dignity and hope for the people of the world.”

This presumption of liberal convergence motivated the decision to allow China to join the World Trade Organization in 2001. As Clinton said at the time, such an opening would have “a profound impact on human rights and political liberty.” The rest of the world would get access to Chinese markets and cheap imports, and China would get the chance to bring prosperity to hundreds of millions of its citizens, which many in Washington believed would improve the prospects for democratization—a win-win situation.

But China had no intention of converging with the West. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) never intended to play by the West’s rules; it was determined to control markets rather than open them and did so by keeping its exchange rate artificially low, providing unfair advantages to state-owned enterprises, and erecting regulatory barriers against non-Chinese companies. Officials in both the George W. Bush and the Obama administrations worried about China’s intentions. But fundamentally they remained convinced the United States needed to engage with China to strengthen the rules-based international system, and that China’s economic liberalization would ultimately lead to political liberalization. Instead, China has taken advantage of economic interdependence to grow its economy and enhance its military, thereby ensuring the long-term strength of the CCP.

While China and other actors subverted the liberal convergence overseas, economic globalization was failing to meet expectations at home. Proponents of globalization claimed in an economy lubricated by free trade, consumers would benefit from access to cheaper goods, lost manufacturing jobs would be replaced by better jobs in the growing service industry, foreign direct investment would flow to every sector, and companies everywhere would become more efficient and innovative. Organizations such as the World Trade Organization, meanwhile, would help manage this freer and more integrated world (never mind its 22,000 pages of regulations).

But the promise that globalization’s rising tide would lift all boats went unfulfilled: some rose to extreme heights, some stagnated, and others simply sank. Liberal convergence was not in fact win-win; there were winners and losers. A populist backlash against this reality caught elites off guard. This reaction intensified as malfeasance on Wall Street and the US Federal Reserve’s misguided monetary policies helped bring about the 2008 global financial crisis. The generous bailouts banks and financial firms received in its wake convinced many Americans that corporate and political elites were gaming the system—a theme Donald Trump would seize on in his 2016 presidential campaign.

Primacy Denied

Although liberal internationalism encouraged interdependence and multilateralism, it also rested on a faith in Washington’s ability to maintain indefinitely the uncontested military superiority the United States enjoyed after the Cold War. Today, however, US military dominance is challenged in virtually every domain. The United States is no longer able to operate freely in the traditional spheres of land, sea, and air, nor in newer ones such as outer space and cyberspace. The spread of new technologies and weapon systems and the pursuit of asymmetric strategies by adversaries have limited the ability of the US military to find and strike targets, supply and safeguard its forces abroad, freely navigate the seas, control sea lines of communication, and protect the homeland.

In the 1990s, space and cyberspace emerged as new domains for strategic competition, and 30 years later the United States finds itself challenged in both areas. America’s dependence on the domain of space for its myriad military and intelligence assets make the United States vulnerable to the potent anti-satellite weapon systems now fielded by China, Russia, and other states. Likewise in cyberspace, hardware and software vulnerabilities have emerged across military supply chains, potentially reducing the effectiveness of important platforms. In 2018, General David Goldfein, the US Air Force’s chief of staff, described the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter as “a computer that happens to fly”—and thus, like all computers, it is vulnerable to cyberattacks.5

At the same time, bureaucratic requirements have made it harder for the military to innovate. More than 20 years passed from when the Joint Strike Fighter program was envisioned to when the first combat squadron of F-35s was declared operational. The military demands unrealistically high levels of performance, which defense companies, hungry for contracts, promise to deliver. Former US Defense Secretary Robert Gates has bemoaned the armed forces’ unwillingness to settle for solutions that could actually be built and fielded in a reasonable time frame.

In addition, America’s adversaries have developed so-called anti-access/area-denial weapons systems that reduce Washington’s ability to project power in key regions. China, for example, has developed and modernized its strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and has invested heavily in technologies to improve its conventional forces. Russia has built an array of exotic “doomsday weapons” and low-yield tactical nuclear weapons, and smaller rivals such as Iran and North Korea continue to develop and refine their nuclear programs. Despite visions of a world in which no one could challenge American force, the era of US military dominance proved to be relatively short.

**Orwell’s Nightmare**

Misplaced faith in the advantages of new technologies was not confined to military affairs. As the digital revolution began, policymakers and business leaders were optimistic these technologies would accelerate the spread of liberal democratic values—so that “the age of information can become the age of liberation,” as President George H. W. Bush put it in 1991. A few years later, Clinton predicted in the twenty-first century “liberty [would] spread by cell phone and cable modem.”

Over time, however, it has become clear the same technologies that connect and empower people can also imperil freedom and openness and limit the right to be left alone—all elements of a flourishing democracy. Authoritarian countries have deployed digital technologies to control their citizens. The CCP has developed the most sophisticated surveillance system in the world, using facial and voice recognition technologies and DNA sequencing to create a social credit system that monitors China’s 1.4 billion people and rewards or punishes them based on their perceived loyalty to the party-state.

These practices are not limited to authoritarian governments, partially because Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications giant, has exported surveillance tools that use artificial intelligence (AI) to 49 other countries. But democracies have also adopted these technologies without Chinese assistance; according to the Carnegie Endowment’s AI Global Surveillance Index, virtually all the countries in the G-20 have deployed AI-enabled surveillance technology, including facial recognition programs. Meanwhile, even as the CCP banned Twitter

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in its own country, Beijing uses the platform to conduct disinformation campaigns abroad aimed at weakening democracies from within.

Global Governance

A final illusion that absorbed US policymakers was the idea Washington could depend on international organizations to help it confront major challenges and that these institutions, with the aid of American leadership, would provide for the emergence of global governance.

This view presumed since other countries were progressing inexorably toward liberal democracy, they would share many of Washington’s goals and would play by Washington’s rules. This belief tended to minimize the importance of national sovereignty and the fact countries differ in how they organize their own communities. Even among democracies, there exists a high degree of variation when it comes to cultural, institutional, and political values.

Nevertheless, international institutions grew more expansive and ambitious. In 1992, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s *An Agenda for Peace* envisioned a world in which the United Nations would maintain world peace, protect human rights, and promote social progress through expanding peacekeeping missions. Between 1989 and 1994, the organization authorized 20 peacekeeping missions—more than the total number of missions it had carried out during the previous four decades.

Mission creep extended to individual agencies as well. The World Health Organization (WHO)—created in 1948 to prevent the spread of infectious diseases—pioneered great accomplishments such as the eradication of smallpox. But over the years its scope grew dramatically. By 2000 the World Health Organization had begun to issue warnings on everything from food safety to cellular phone usage to air quality. This tendency spread staff and resources too thin, crippling the organization’s ability to respond to genuine crises such as the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The institution’s robust defense of China’s response to the pandemic also demonstrated the CCP had used its clout to co-opt the WHO rather than support its missions.

Looking Ahead

Over the past four years these assumptions, long cherished in Washington, have been shown to be faulty. America has left behind the halcyon days of liberal internationalism and the unipolar moment and entered an era of strategic rivalry. As President Biden crafts his policy agenda, it would be a mistake to return to the flawed premises of a bygone era. Great power competition will remain a central feature of the international environment for the foreseeable future, and economic interdependence does not obviate this reality. Whatever the term of art—academics and pundits love to debate terms and definitions—several key features of great power competition will endure. States with sufficient
power and resources will remain at the core of the international system, and states field military forces, provide economic aid, and emit carbon. Great power competition will determine how we live domestically and internationally, because the more powerful states—those that can exert their influence more effectively—are able to set the rules of the road. And we will be directly affected by those who determine those rules.

Today’s multidimensional rivalries will not end in conventional victories. More broadly, policymakers and strategists need to move past their emphases on achieving particular end states, since that springs from a mechanistic and ahistorical view of how politics works. In reality as the historian Michael Howard argued, human acts create new sets of circumstances that, in turn, require new judgments and decisions.\(^\text{10}\) Competition persists because geopolitics is eternal. A main objective of US strategy, therefore, should be to prevent the accumulation of activities and trends that harm US interests and values rather than to pursue grand projects such as dictating how China or other countries should govern themselves. This strategy requires the United States craft policies that aim to maintain regional balances of power and deter aggression by revisionist powers.

Those who favor restraint or retrenchment will be reluctant to embrace the idea of constant competition because they tend to discount the aspirations of other powers. If the United States is restrained, the argument goes, then others will follow suit. But the patterns of history suggest otherwise. Others will be reluctant to accept the idea of a rolling end state because they remain convinced the arc of history is progressing toward a liberal convergence, and they view the push and pull of a competitive world as overly aggressive and likely to lead to war.

Recognizing the centrality of competition does not mean favoring the militarization of US foreign policy nor does it mean a drive to war. A wider acceptance of the competitive nature of geopolitics requires a foundation of military power, but this acceptance also accentuates the need for diplomatic and economic tools of statecraft. Precisely because so much of today’s international competition happens below the threshold of military conflict, civilian agencies need to take the lead in maintaining order and shaping a landscape favorable to US interests and values. But civilian agencies can only adopt this leadership role once the mindset and culture of all US government agencies change to allow for a broader recognition of the competition now underway.

Going forward, US foreign policy success will hinge on a clear-eyed approach to cooperation. Rather than viewing cooperation with other countries as an end in itself, policymakers should recognize it as a means to crafting a stronger competitive strategy. Genuine cooperation requires reciprocity. Reciprocity means urging other powers to take more responsibility for their own security and contribute more to the strength of the US-led order. As a result of the Trump administration’s

pressure on NATO allies, between 2016 and 2018, defense spending by other member states increased by $43 billion, and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has predicted by 2024 such spending will increase by another $400 billion.  

In the economic domain reciprocity also means preventing other countries from taking advantage of American goodwill, including the requirement that China and other countries open their markets to US products and services to maintain access to American markets. Reciprocity also entails no longer tolerating Beijing’s unfair practices, such as forced technology transfer and intellectual property theft. Experts estimate that since 2013, the United States has suffered over $1.2 trillion in economic damage as a result of these abuses—the “greatest transfer of wealth in history.” Margrethe Vestager, executive vice president of the European Commission for a Europe Fit for the Digital Age, perhaps put it best when she expressed the essence of reciprocity in 2020: “‘Where I grew up in the Western part of Denmark, if you invite people over and they don’t invite you back, eventually you stop’ inviting them.”  

In addition Washington needs to accept that global problems are not necessarily best solved by global institutions. This viewpoint will not be popular over the next four years. But as the WHO’s failure to combat COVID-19 demonstrates, international organizations are accountable primarily to internal bureaucracies and nation-state clients, rather than to external constituencies. Such institutions can play useful roles as conveners and centers for information sharing, but they lack the operational capacity to act at scale; bureaucratic complexity prevents them from accomplishing broader missions.

Reconsidering global governance does not require rejecting liberal principles or abandoning an order based on them. But because only a handful of countries are committed to those principles, the goal should be to foster what the scholar Paul Miller has described as a “smaller, deeper liberal order” of industrialized democracies that would defend liberal values and serve strategic and economic purposes. The focus might be on creating mission-driven coalitions—as Biden’s team has suggested—that could construct redundant supply chains, fund research in emerging technologies, promote fair and reciprocal trade, and cooperate on security issues. Such coalitions would be open to new members provided they shared US interests and values and could bring capabilities to bear on key problems.

Washington also needs to refresh its thinking on political economy and improve the capacity of US government agencies to address the interplay of politics and economics. The United States will never be able to integrate its economic policies and political strategies as China does. But Washington should invest more in economic intelligence and make it easier to share such information across departments and agencies by establishing a national center for economic intelligence, perhaps modeled on the National Counterterrorism Center, as the scholar Anthony Vinci has advocated.15

Moreover, the US government must counter China’s massive investments in research and development in emerging technologies. Congress must fund public and private sector research in AI, high-performance computing, synthetic biology, and other strategically important technology sectors. And the State Department should also put economics front and center by giving economic officers more responsibility at embassies and by opening more consulates around the world to improve business and commercial relationships.

The goals of the liberal international order were laudable—and, in many cases, they were achieved against daunting odds. The world is safer, more prosperous, and more just than it once was. But the unexpected consequences of globalization and the unfulfilled promises of global governance cannot be overlooked. Liberal internationalists have a penchant for prioritizing processes, including multilateralism and globalization, over tangible objectives. In order to fulfill President Biden’s “build back better” agenda, his administration must resist these temptations. Pursuing the illusions of liberal internationalism at the expense of US interests will hasten, not reverse, American decline. In a world of great power competition, economic inequality, and dazzling technological capabilities, where ideologies as well as pathogens spread with viral ferocity, the stakes are too high and the consequences too dire simply to stick with what worked in the past and hope for the best.

Managerial Aspects of Command

John S. Kem and James G. Breckenridge

ABSTRACT: Lieutenant Colonel Harold R. Lamp voiced concerns in 1971 about the inadequacy of the new defense managerial analytic framework, operations research/systems analysis, to assess critical intangibles of military readiness. Fifty years later, Lamp's concerns speak to the necessity of including data and effects from all organizational levels in order to ensure the Army can effectively coordinate complex systems and develop leaders capable of managing the same.

The opening sentence of “Some Managerial Aspects of Command,” “A farseeing Army needs to digress now and then in assessing its performances to make certain it is recording the lessons which have a great impact for the future” still rings true. The US Army and the Joint Force are in a similar position today as each organization works to forecast into the late 2020s and 2030s. What are the key insights from 50 years ago that inform these efforts?

Historical context provides essential clues to Lieutenant Colonel Harold R. Lamp's perspectives from 1971. A class of 1970 Army War College graduate, Lamp was writing as the Army was drawing down force levels, with approximately 250,000 US troops still in Vietnam in June 1971. In Europe the Army, under-resourced and with mixed readiness levels, was down to only 215,000 soldiers from a troop strength of over 277,000 as recently as 1962. The ominous Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia had occurred only a few years prior, and Army leadership was increasingly concerned about Warsaw Pact competition and overall capability relative to NATO. The Army of Lamp’s time had an identity problem, poised as it was at an intellectual crossroads.

The Vietnam War preoccupied military thinking, and as Lamp wrote, “the feedback, critique, and assimilation of other important if less spectacular teachings have been dwarfed.” The Army’s identity problem and intellectual struggle at the time was twofold. The Army of the 1970s was a constabulary Army deeply enmeshed in a strategic alliance in the heart of Europe, postured defensively and prepared to conduct conventional and nuclear operations. That same Army was also

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engaged in conventional and irregular combat in Southeast Asia, with few allies and diminishing popular and political support at home.

As 1971 unfolded, it seemed certain the United States would maintain its commitment to NATO defense and withdraw from Vietnam. But it was far from certain how the Army would train, man, equip, and organize in a post–Vietnam environment. Who and what the Army would be and how it would fight remained open, strategic-level questions.

Leadership and management issues flow from any organization with an identity problem. In the case of the early 1970s Army, these issues were exacerbated by the uncertainty and challenges posed by defining the ends, ways, and means needed to balance near-term requirements and long-term investment prioritization. As American involvement in the Vietnam War receded—in August of 1972 the last infantry and artillery units stood down—an ongoing buildup of Soviet conventional forces continued to pose a serious threat to US and NATO forces.

Thus, the transition out of Vietnam and reorientation toward Europe activated critical debates about the proper use of military power. If read through a strictly bureaucratic lens, the pullback from Vietnam, shift to a one-and-a-half war standard, and emphasis on alliances threatened the Army’s institutional autonomy and share of budgetary resources . . . But that misses the negotiation that took place across the Army. Beyond myopic bureaucratic struggles, the leaders of the Army accepted a shift in the international environment and used it as a means of reconceptualizing the role of land forces at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.4

Fifty years on, the struggle for identity resurfaces. The early twenty-first-century US Army, emerging from its long wars in southwest Asia, confronts what is described as a return to great power competition. All the while, the rapidly evolving global strategic environment is further complicated by transnational corporations, climate change, cyber and space operations, pandemics, and extremist ideologies. A new US Army uniform, brown but called green, signals a cosmetic back-to-the-future theme. The uncertainty and identity issues that characterized Lamp’s world remind us of the present.

**Lamp on Command and Management**

Early in the article, Lamp highlighted part of his purpose—the mostly tactical lessons from the crucible of combat operations inevitably “[dominate] military writing,” at the expense of many wider lessons and opportunities for professional discussion, including the role of management at all Army levels.5 Lamp emphasized what he saw as a significant change in the Army and the nation’s approach to a major conflict. Using the Vietnam buildup to illustrate, he argued the two precedents of “(a) the expansion of forces without any significant call-up of the reserve training base, and (b) the costing of manpower along with

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other resources in determining battlefield means” were “now wedded to the military” with significant potential impacts.  

In his view the Army’s ability to mobilize for the Vietnam War was miraculous given its limited resources. Nonetheless this mobilization required the Army to barter with unknown long-term trade-offs at all levels, due to the organization’s inability to understand residual effects far “beyond that recorded numerically in unit readiness reports.” Here Lamp turned to the identity of the Army and proposed key decision areas for the coming decade.

Lamp’s personal experiences and frames of reference provide insight to his perspectives. His service on the Army General Staff, with the 25th Infantry Division in Vietnam, and as a battalion commander in Europe drove his focus. Further the US Army War College Lamp had just graduated from was wrestling with transformative curriculum changes. The college had embraced management practices; as early as 1961, “acknowledgement of the McNamara ideas on strategy and management appeared in the War College curriculum.” By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the war in Southeast Asia was creating a crisis of confidence. “The questions posed so long ago by Tasker Bliss—what should be taught, to whom, and to how many—fleetingly believed to have been settled, reappeared in more critical form.”

Reflecting a major focus on business and analytical approaches, the War College by 1967 had added a command and management seminar. “As presented, the course was more concerned with economic analysis, systems analysis, and automatic data processing than it was with “command.” Systems analysis had expanded from post–Second World War through the 1960s. It was an integral part of corporate management and battlefield calculus in the Korean and Vietnam Wars but with mixed results and viewpoints.

In February 1970, “the War College initiated a formal review of the curriculum” that led to sweeping changes focused on the “intellectual development of the student, specifically the development of his analytical skills.” The 1971–72 resident class program reflected much of the thinking of the curriculum review. Although international relations remained a major area of study, the college eliminated The Search for a National Strategy course and emphasized management skills through the establishment of the Department of Management and its revised course, National Defense Decision-Making and Management.

13. Ball, Responsible Command, 400.
Clearly influenced by this trend in management practice and education, Lamp discusses issues such as “Soldier Intangibles,” “Motivation,” and “Military Professional Judgment.”

“Assaying Soldier Intangibles”

Lamp argued key senior defense officials and policymakers failed to appreciate results achieved by unit-level commanders in Vietnam in the late 1960s and very early 1970s. Importantly, he attributed this failure to the inability of military leaders to think and write professionally. He acknowledged the centralized decision-making characteristic of the military’s “evolved management style” and worried many accompanying decisions were too focused on cost. Further, cost was only part of the picture; in the process of concentrating on the explicitly measurable, “modern defense management style” missed key variables.

Using the then-ongoing debate surrounding the establishment of an all-volunteer force as an example, Lamp argued more measurable factors—economic and political—would ultimately prove the most persuasive in defense management budget decisions, rather than the true costs of training a completely all-volunteer professional force. As a result, decisions on whether to end the draft and related readiness policies would be flawed—a lack of refined analysis prevented accurate assessments of real impacts to the system such as duration, level of soldier training, and what Lamp referred to as “the acquisition-half of quality soldier development.”

“Management of Motivation”

Lamp discussed the importance of motivation in combat but also in training, especially experiential event training. He drew lessons from his time in Europe—with leadership and motivation, even an undermanned and underequipped unit could succeed. The individual training elements were less important than leadership and the environment in which the training occurred. The specific examples Lamp used are disjointed and less relevant today, and his discussion of the training arch was especially tactical, nevertheless, his conclusion to this section remains relevant when considering the Army’s current programming and policy with respect to training. Lamp asked if training policy overly emphasized management of instructional resources to the detriment of the motivational aspects of training and answering the important question, “how much training is enough?”

“Military Professional Judgment”

In this final, less-developed section, Lamp addressed his view on the “current differences between command and management even while recognizing the close relationship between the two.” Both elements were essential for future command even though Lamp had a clear bias for commanders who continued to make good command decisions

despite a lack of systems analysis skills. He further noted Army schools were modernizing to help students quickly acquire these early 1970s-era management skills.

Relevance for Today and Tomorrow

Lamp’s article did not focus on specific solutions to the Army’s identity crisis. The majority of his article identified the training challenges of the early 1970s and provided a diagnosis of the management problem facing Army leaders. But his focus remained far too narrow and tactical.

In 1973, shortly after the publication of Lamp’s article, the Army, under General Creighton Abrams Jr., implemented Operation Steadfast. As international relations scholar Benjamin Jensen points out, this massive internal reorganization plan was designed to streamline domestic operations and training. “The origins of Steadfast date back to a series of reviews conducted under chief of staff of the Army William C. Westmoreland (1968–1972). In particular, William Whipple and John V. Foley’s ‘Pilot Study on the Department of Army Organization’ and . . . the follow-up (Charles) Parker Panel outlined the management problems inherent in the U.S. Army in the late 1960s.”

Jensen further remarks:

> The Parker Panel turned to private industries, including IBM and Xerox, to see how they dealt with ‘decision making, systems management (horizontal) vs. functional management (vertical), and the growth of ad hoc committees’. . . . The post-Vietnam Army would be a smaller professional force operating in a constrained budgetary environment. More forces would be stationed at home, thus requiring high levels of unit readiness to facilitate rapid deployment.

This effort was the early foundation for the Army that developed through the 1980s and fought in Iraq and Afghanistan into at least the early 2000s, a highly capable Army that experienced considerable tactical and operational success. Moreover as eminent scholar Richard Betts notes:

> Modern conventional military effectiveness has become clearly more a matter of quality than quantity of forces, and less a matter of pure firepower than the capacity to coordinate complex systems. The essence of American superiority is not advanced weapon technology per se. Rather it lies in the interweaving of capacities in organization, doctrine, training, maintenance, support systems, integration of surveillance, targeting, and weaponry, and overall professionalism.

Yet today as in 1971, the need for more deliberate, in-depth thinking remains a challenge. Tactical and operational successes are necessary but insufficient. Like Lamp, senior decisionmakers typically focus too narrowly, over-emphasizing squad- and platoon-level training, both of which are foundational critical components of Army basic formations.

Opportunity costs of such company grade-level emphasis by senior leaders include devoting less resources and thinking to the areas Betts highlights: coordinating complex systems and building capability at the strategic-operational nexus. Reinforcing this point, Antulio Echevarria asserts there is a:

lack of emphasis on the end game, specifically, on the need for systematic thinking about the processes and capabilities needed to translate military victories into strategic successes. . . . The new American way of war . . . appears geared to fight wars as if they were battles and thus confuses the winning of campaigns or small-scale actions with the winning of wars.19

Furthermore, the Army has devoted too little analysis, emphasis, and innovative thinking to the role of Landpower in support of US efforts in global competition.

The “interweaving of capacities” described by Betts points to a series of management challenges Army leaders face. For example, Lamp was both intrigued and frustrated by the burgeoning field of operations research/systems analysis and how this new analytic model would impact the effort to build and train the Army. He highlighted the potential negative impact of analyses that failed to incorporate data and effects at all organizational levels. That tension remains today. Commander and organizational decision dynamics are complex, and too few commanders make the effort to remain literate in the current data environment.

And what would Lamp think of the capability of the current Army programming example—the Program Evaluation Group—to program? Undoubtedly he would want to see the multilevel data and analysis and, from an organizational perspective, examine how the Army measures the accountability of high-priority programs and addresses potential moral hazard. Are high-priority programs held accountable in execution, or is poor management indirectly rewarded with unfunded requirement bailouts because these programs are “top priority”? Does the Army analyze the return on investment of some of the lower priority items relative to highly funded programs in order to ascertain the real implications of such resourcing decisions, or is the Army instead “forced to make quick decisions” on an annual basis?

Lamp provided an insightful warning that echoes into the twenty-first century: “For it is this aspect of defense management that the decisionmaker—the civilian systems analyst—does not now weigh in his centralized measurements of military command effectiveness and requirements.”20

The task ahead for Army leadership mirrors the challenge Lamp attempted to identify in 1971 and what several contemporary authors have asserted as the “Army’s professional center of gravity, its sense

of self.” In his seminal book on leadership, James MacGregor Burns pointed out, “the essence of leadership in any polity is the recognition of real need, the uncovering and exploiting of contradictions among values and between values and practice, the realigning of values, the reorganization of institutions where necessary, and the governance of change.” In response to this formidable expectation, the Army must develop effective strategic leaders who can bring personnel together, lead, and serve on teams with expert knowledge, collaborating to develop innovative solutions.

The Army War College takes this challenge seriously. Spurred on by a dynamic strategic environment, fundamental changes in higher education delivery modalities, and a new Joint Chiefs of Staff vision for professional military education, the Army War College is in the midst of an ambitious effort of curricular, organizational, and infrastructure reform. In line with the Joint Chiefs of Staff vision, the War College has placed a renewed emphasis on active and experiential learning with methodologies that “include use of case studies grounded in history to help students develop judgment, analysis, and problem-solving skills, which can then be applied to contemporary challenges, including war, deterrence, and measures short of armed conflict.”

Lamp closed with the observation, “at the Army level we must find ways and means of influencing the decisionmakers.” He inferred that in his Army, an appreciation of modern management practice was insufficient and underdeveloped. Fast forward to today and much the same could be said of Army leader proficiency in strategic communication informed by knowledge management and data literacy skills.

Importantly, just as in Lamp’s day but at a more strategic level, the Army War College curriculum increasingly emphasizes effective communication and decision making. The key and essential “managerial aspects of command” are bounded by problem solving, asking the right questions, and effectively communicating the results to decisionmakers. These management skills are further augmented by building the individual additive skills, knowledge, and behaviors necessary to enable the development of initiative-oriented and innovation-based organizational cultures grounded in the moral foundations of the military profession.

As historian Barbara Tuchman—incidentally, the first female author featured in Parameters—noted, “to a proper understanding of the cause and effect . . . it must be written in terms of what was known and

What will the reader of *Parameters* in 2071 think of the efforts at the Army War College, as part of the Army and the Joint Force, to forecast and prepare for the challenges of the middle half of the twenty-first century?

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RETROSPECTIVES 1971: STRATEGIC ORGANIZATION

The Joint Force and Lessons from 1971

Jonathan P. Klug

ABSTRACT: In 1971 Colonel Duane H. Smith analyzed the unified command structure, examined an existing proposal for change, and suggested improvements. He illustrated how this structure must account for the challenges of the contemporary strategic environment and balance several tensions, such as effectiveness versus efficiency, flexibility versus focusing on a specific mission, and forward-deployed versus home-station forces. Many of Smith’s insights remain applicable to the unified command structure and global force management processes today.

Since 1946 the Unified Command Plan and its inherent unified command structure (UCS) have directed how the US Department of Defense organizes its forces.1 In his 1971 Parameters article, Colonel Duane H. Smith, US Army, evaluated the UCS by exploring the following questions: “Is the present unified command structure adequate for ensuring unity of effort of land, sea, and air forces? Would the peacetime organization require change if the US went to war? If change is indicated, what should the change be?”2 In his analysis Smith examined an existing proposal for change and suggested his own improvements. His approach and many of his recommendations remain relevant today.

The strategic environment and strategic goals are the basis for each iteration of the plan, which aims to create an effective and efficient structure. Additionally this framework provides unity of effort for cooperation, competition, and armed conflict. Striving for an optimal organization has resulted in many iterations of the UCS over the decades, reflecting the dynamic nature of both the strategic environment and options for advancing national interests. In fact, 10 USC § 161 directs a review of the Unified Command Plan and its UCS at least every two years.

1971 Analysis

Smith highlighted the US military’s four strategic goals, derived from then Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird’s military posture statement to Congress in March 1971, to be executed through the specified and unified commands:

• “strategic nuclear retaliation against a nuclear attacker”


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• “defense of the United States”
• “peacetime participation of US forces in mutual security arrangements, including deployment in strategic areas overseas”
• “rapid deployment of mobile forces based in the United States to conduct operations as directed”

The unified and specified commands of 1971 were as unique as their geographic areas or functions. United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) focused on a single geographic area, which contrasted sharply with command responsibilities on the other side of the globe: the Atlantic region had two separate commands—United States European Command (USEUCOM) and United States Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM). While USEUCOM was a unified command responsible for the geographic area, USLANTCOM consisted of naval forces oriented on a maritime mission. United States Strike Command (USSTRICOM) was responsible for rapid overseas deployments. The primary mission of United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) was the defense of the Panama Canal, and United States Alaskan Command (USALCOM) focused on air defense.

Strategic defensive forces were separate from strategic offensive forces and resided in United States Continental Air Defense Command (USCONAD). Three commands controlled strategic offensive forces: United States Strategic Air Command (USSAC) was a specified command that contained bombers and land-based missiles, and USPACOM and USLANTCOM controlled sea-launched missiles. Thus strategic retaliation to a nuclear attack required the coordination of three US commands.

After describing the commands Smith examined the 1970 Blue Ribbon Defense Panel report, which was critical of the UCS. The panel offered several recommendations, most of which revolved around creating a layer of three new unified commands. These new commands would have been functionally oriented and would command the existing, although reorganized, specified and unified commands. Strategic Command was the first of the three new unified commands and would be responsible for all strategic weapons—offensive and defensive—and strategic targeting. This new organization would have commanded the Joint Strategic Targeting Planning Staff, USSAC, USCONAD, and the Navy’s fleet of ballistic missile submarines formerly belonging to USPACOM and USLANTCOM.

Tactical Command was the second of the recommended new unified commands and would have required many changes to implement. Tactical Command would have subsumed the missions of USLANTCOM, USSTRICOM, and USSOUTHCOM and would have commanded

the conventional forces of the United States including USEUCOM and USPACOM. Logistics Command was the third and final unified command the panel recommended. This organization would have commanded supply distribution, maintenance, and transportation for all combat forces. Overall, the panel’s recommendations were sweeping in nature and met with resistance.

Smith first provided a detailed analysis of the panel’s recommendation to create a Strategic Command. This recommendation centered on the ability to retaliate against a strategic attack quickly while maintaining the readiness of the three legs of the nuclear triad—intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and long-range bombers. Quick retaliation relied on effective planning and a key question was: Could the Joint Staff effectively complete centralized planning for deployment of these weapons?

Similarly the question of readiness focused on whether four separate unified commands could maintain the readiness of strategic weapons while effectively executing the Joint Staff’s war plans. Smith argued, “the concept of a unified command for all strategic forces is sound; that we have never established one is a consequence of divergent Service views.”

Smith supported the creation of a new Strategic Command, but he argued against the proposed Tactical Command. These tactical forces belonged to six area unified commands, which the Department of Defense continually rearranged due to new concepts and political realities. Following an examination of the nature, employment, and organization of tactical forces, Smith argued, “the panel has gone too far” with their recommendation for a Tactical Command, as it was cumbersome and increased the number of headquarters personnel. Smith did not investigate the proposal for a Logistics Command due to the inherent complexities of the organization’s broad and complex responsibilities, noting that any analysis of such an organization would be challenging for the same reasons. Furthermore the panel did not discuss the organization in detail—it only recommended its creation, which gave Smith little to analyze.

Smith concluded his article with some recommendations. He argued to disestablish Alaskan Command, disestablish USSOUTHCOM, and merge USLANTCOM with USEUCOM, with the latter serving as the former’s naval component commander. Also he proposed USSTRICOM and United States Middle East/Africa south of the Sahara/South Asia Command reorganize to become Mobile Command. United States European Command would have been responsible for the Middle East, and USPACOM would have been responsible for South Asia. Thus, Smith’s recommended unified command structure would have had four commands: Strategic Command, Pacific Command, European Command, and Mobile Command.

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Still Relevant Today

Smith methodically and fairly evaluated the UCS, analyzed the Blue Ribbon Panel report, and provided his recommendations. The approach he used remains relevant today. First, his analysis of strategic goals captured the essence of long-term US defense objectives, as the 1971 strategic goals detailed above are remarkably like those articulated in the unclassified description of the 2018 National Military Strategy:

- “Respond to Threats
- Deter Strategic Attack (and Proliferation of [weapons of mass destruction])
- Deter Conventional Attack
- Assure Allies and Partners
- Compete Below the Level of Armed Conflict”

The goals in the 2018 National Military Strategy explicitly emphasize deterrence, where Smith’s 1971 strategic goals implicitly included deterrence—unsurprising given the Cold War era of mutually assured destruction. Similarly Smith’s strategic goal of “peacetime participation of US forces in mutual security arrangements, including deployment in strategic areas overseas” demonstrated the United States needed to assure allies and partners in peace and war; as indicated above, the 2018 National Military Strategy also addresses assuring allies and partners. And the United States needed access, basing, and overflight in 1971 just as it does today. Notwithstanding differences in national security vernacular and allowing for implicit aims, Smith began his analysis of the UCS articulating strategic goals similar to current strategic goals.

Smith identified several important features in creating and maintaining the UCS including the inherent tensions involved in designing and operating the commands. Smith effectively captured the interservice tension between operational-level flexibility and operational-level effectiveness, noting service interests more than US national interests drove the UCS and its commands. The Navy preferred commands based on a geographic area of responsibility, which tended to preserve flexibility at the expense of the effectiveness of local control. The Army and the Air Force advocated for commands based on missions and forces, which were more effective in addressing their particular function, but such an arrangement diluted the potential combat power that could respond to an actual crisis.

The Navy approach allowed the Pacific Fleet to operate together more effectively. If the UCS instead called for two or more functional commands within the Pacific area, each command would have had its own naval component. Dividing the Pacific Fleet in this manner would have diminished its combat power and effectiveness, not to mention exposing the smaller naval elements to defeat in detail. These tensions remain to some degree as service realities and perspectives are alive and well.

The ability of the UCS and the specified and unified commands to smoothly transition between peace and war was a vital concern in 1971. Likewise, the 2018 NMS calls for quickly and effectively shifting from peace to war. Contemporary global security challenges demonstrate the need for a more detailed framework to understand this complex strategic environment and operate within it. In response, the 2018 *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning* proposed a competition continuum outlining how the US military had roles in “cooperation, competition, and armed conflict.” A year later, Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, *Competition Continuum*, refined this continuum.

Although seen through the lens of the bipolar international state system, Smith’s 1971 analysis reflected an understanding of what was necessary for success throughout what we would today refer to as the competition continuum. Major unified commands then and now continually conduct peacetime cooperation with allies and partners, compete with other major powers, transition smoothly to and from armed conflict, and succeed in armed conflict.

The balance between mobile and area commands is another recurring tension Smith examined that has implications today. Area commands and their forward-deployed forces are more expensive to maintain, are exposed to potential attacks, and can lead to international tension. But the presence of forward-deployed forces can also reassure allies and have diplomatic and deterrent effects. Keeping military forces in US territory has advantages as well; maintaining force readiness is generally more cost effective and is far less likely to create tensions with potential adversaries.

Smith recommended an approach that used both forward-deployed forces and forces in the continental United States. A crucial part of his recommendation was a new Mobile Command responsible for contingencies occurring outside the USPACOM and USEUCOM areas of responsibility. (Smith did not mention continually rotating units to maintain forward-deployed forces, such as in South Korea or Poland. These heel-to-toe rotations impair unit readiness and require substantial institutional efforts to prepare, rotate, and recover.)

The Mobile Command Smith envisioned would have had immense responsibilities, including five major tasks broad in scope and diversity:

deploy forces under a mobile headquarters, defend the United States from conventional attacks, provide military assistance outside of the areas of responsibility of USEUCOM and USPACOM, bear responsibility for Joint training and doctrine, and augment other unified commands as needed. Additionally, warfighting responsibilities potentially would have involved an immense span of control. Collectively, these five tasks would certainly have overwhelmed one headquarters whether during the Cold War or in a large-scale conflict today.

The tasks Smith proposed for the Mobile Command, comprehensive then, have only grown in size and scope in the intervening 50 years, so much so that several organizations are required to address them. Collectively today’s combatant commands have global responsibility. They also provide military assistance: several combatant commands, principally United States Northern Command, defend the United States from conventional attacks.

Today’s solutions to Joint planning, capability development, force development, readiness, and doctrine are also much more involved than Smith could have foreseen. The nature of today’s tasks and the global and multifunctional nature of contemporary warfighting require today’s chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to act as the global integrator of these functions using the Joint Strategic Planning System, which includes the global force management (GFM) process. Smith’s call for the Mobile Command to support the other unified commands was an early indicator of the requirements behind the GFM. The GFM integrates “readiness, assignment, allocation, apportionment, and assessment.” Within GFM, the dynamic force employment process allows combatant commands to “more flexibly use ready forces to shape proactively the strategic environment while maintaining readiness to respond to contingencies and ensure long-term warfighting readiness.”

Finally, dynamic force employment as a process speaks to the challenge of expanding requirements and diminishing resources. Two developments after Smith’s article was published highlighted these requirements and resources challenges—the establishment of the all-volunteer force in 1973 and the reduction of forces after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Smith’s recommendations that USPACOM and USEUCOM control all conventional forces also reflect timeless questions concerning forward-deployed forces, pre-positioned equipment, and sufficient airlift and sealift capacities. For example, concerns have recently been raised regarding the size and state of US airlift and sealift capabilities as


the latter has shown to be insufficient and of questionable readiness.\textsuperscript{13} These capabilities are elements of the broader processes by which the Department of Defense considers certain activities such as establishing a forward element of the Army V Corps in Poland.\textsuperscript{14}

Smith’s analysis and recommendations foreshadowed the need for the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and today’s unified command structure. The law restructured the Department of Defense and the Joint Force, streamlining the chain of command in an effort to ensure effective Joint operations. Accordingly, the legislation addressed some of the issues highlighted by the Blue Ribbon Panel and by Smith. Smith’s recommendations also pointed toward today’s UCS, which has seven geographic combatant commands, four functional combatant commands, and the Defense Logistics Agency. For example, he advocated for the Strategic Command and what later became the Defense Logistics Agency.

There were several things Smith did not foresee, such as the need for a unified transportation command and the proliferation of area unified commands to encompass the entire globe. Perhaps more importantly Smith did not foresee the immense changes in the space and cyber domains that would emerge by 2020. Even science fiction of the day, such as Stanley Kubrick’s 1968 masterpiece \textit{2001: A Space Odyssey} and its antagonist HAL, the spaceship’s computer, only hinted at the challenges space, cyber, and artificial intelligence would come to present. These challenges were driving factors for the global integration concept, intended to win future wars in which belligerents vie for superiority in the cyber, space, air, sea, and land domains across the globe. Winning such wars requires maximizing effectiveness across the Joint functions.

\textbf{Conclusion}

For its time, Smith’s article was accurate and insightful, demonstrating the kind of analysis necessary for periodic reviews of the unified command structure. He understood such a study had to balance multiple tensions including effectiveness versus efficiency, service preferences for flexibility versus a focus on a specific mission, forward-deployed versus home-station forces and equipment, and the amount and type of airlift and sealift capabilities needed versus their cost. Some of Smith’s more extensive recommendations were prescient. The Department of Defense would later consolidate strategic attack and defense forces under one unified command and create a unified command for logistics.

Smith’s article is an exemplar of the importance of reading old works. His fellow US Army War College faculty member Colonel John
“Jack” McCuen’s 1966 book, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War,* remains an essential part of any counterinsurgency reading list. McCuen’s book and personal efforts were invaluable in crafting the counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq and Afghanistan, which came full circle to the 1960s challenge of insurgency. Similarly, Smith’s efforts have come full circle to the broader questions on how to organize US military forces at the strategic level. Both officers based their writing on Korean War and Vietnam War experiences. They gained their wisdom through study and practice—the old-fashioned way; in short, they earned it. Today’s readers can profit from their efforts.

ABSTRACT: Differences between the academic and military communities and the dysfunction that occurs when these communities comingle can have disastrous consequences for foreign policy. Donald Bletz, writing on the subject in 1971, details this dynamic as it related to the Vietnam War. His observations can be applied to wars since and suggest the need for a balanced relationship characterized by independence and mutual respect.

Writing in the aftermath of the Kent State massacre, Colonel Donald F. Bletz raised the concern that a dysfunctional relationship between academia and the military not only sets the tone for the military’s relationship with American society but also impacts its warfighting abilities. More to the point, academia and the military typically function as two separate and often warring worlds. Fifty years later Bletz’s observation holds true as the dysfunctional academia-military relationship that led to the debacle in Vietnam has repeated itself in the so-called forever wars of the twenty-first century. Bletz saw the disaster of Vietnam primarily as a function of distrust between the academic and military communities resulting as much from their similarities as from their differences. What the intervening 50 years has shown, however, is that such disasters are more a function of how these two communities manage this distrust.

Bletz understood the importance of the academia-military relationship to national security. This relationship, with its associated functions and dysfunctions, arises where the interests and activities of academia and the military converge: first, when the military brings graduates from academia to serve as military professionals, and second, when academics make their way into senior-level national security positions. Dysfunctions at those points of convergence, according to Bletz, give rise to disasters such as the war in Vietnam.

Bletz was also correct in asserting such foreign policy disasters arise as a function of how each community relates to society as well as to one another. Both communities see themselves as guardians while simultaneously regarding the other as a threat to what they seek to protect. Thus as guardians both feel isolated not only from each other but from the society they claim to serve. As a result, the military experiences less access to universities as a commissioning source, and

both communities engage in poor communication with each other and society over policy matters.

Over the last 50 years, however, the military has translated that isolation into increased social trust, while academia apparently has not. That asymmetry in public trust coupled with improved cooperation between the two communities—often in response to the dysfunctions experienced during the Vietnam era—has generated dysfunctions of its own without fully resolving the ones of the past.

Relationships with Society

Bletz argued while the military and academia each see themselves as the guardian of American democracy, they perceive that role in fundamentally different ways. Academics, he argued, see themselves as “critic[s] of contemporary society . . . while the [military] sees [itself] as the defender.”\(^2\) Those different roles attract different kinds of people, amplifying a sense of estrangement. Academia attracts more liberally minded individuals while the military attracts more conservative thinkers.\(^3\) Academics thus view themselves as government outsiders who, due to their broad educational role, are closer to the larger society, and military professionals see themselves as government insiders who, due to the cultural as well as physical separation necessary for effective defense, are distanced from society.\(^4\)

Bletz certainly played a little fast and loose with these generalities, something he repeatedly acknowledged. But the hyperbole he employed captures something important not just about the academic and military communities themselves, but also about the importance of their relationship. In claiming the role of social guardian, neither the academic nor the soldier holds society in high regard, which results in a sense of social isolation for both communities. For the academic, the isolation results from living “in a world they never made and for which they [take] no responsibility.”\(^5\) And while the military is eager for responsibility, it also does not accept responsibility for the character of American society. In fact, Bletz attributed the military’s disposition not to vote as an effort to avoid the political taint partisanship would entail.

A sense of isolation from the larger society is further amplified by these communities’ hierarchical nature and near total institutionalization of members’ daily lives. Both communities, Bletz observed, employ hierarchies that determine who is brought in, what achievements they are recognized for, and whether and to what position or rank they are promoted. Of course those hierarchies are more decentralized in academia than in the military; for Bletz, this translated into more local autonomy for academics on individual campuses.

\(^3\) Bletz, “Mutual Misperceptions,” 6.
Bletz argued it was “the rank structure in both professions which makes the systems work.” While there are certainly similarities, a closer look suggests these similarities are superficial. Both communities certainly have formal structures. In the military there are levels of command within which roles are further differentiated between command and staff functions. In this structure autonomy, at least as it is related to the function of the institution, is proportionate to level: the higher the level of command, the more autonomy one has. The problem for the military is that this arrangement can often privilege the desire for stability and control over the demands of the profession, which values flexibility, discretion, and innovation among other things.

In academia, however, power and authority are not simply decentralized, it is diffused. While a hierarchy of presidents, provosts, and deans oversees the academic enterprise, actual governance is shared by a number of actors including a board of trustees, a president, faculty, and to a lesser degree, students. This system is intended to foster cooperation between these actors by creating a more democratic decision-making process. But because it diffuses autonomy throughout the system, the system can be slow and resistant to change and often pits the faculty, usually in the body of a faculty senate, against the university leadership. The effect is often gridlock. So, while by title, position, and rank university presidents, provosts, and deans might seem analogous to military commanders, their functionalities are very different.

In another important difference, academia is comprised of competing hierarchies in a way the military is not. In addition to the campus hierarchy, academics are also governed by the fields they work in, which can provide certification or even curriculum guidance. In the military this arrangement would be analogous to functional branches having input into whether a platoon leader, for example, executed a particular operation correctly. But because of the relationship between academic reputation and opportunities for promotion, academics can depend as much if not more on their field of study for that reputation than the university that would promote them.

Concurrent with this hierarchical structure, both institutions provide for a variety of personal needs to the point that venturing into the larger society can feel, if not actually be, optional. Where the military has “commissaries, post exchanges, [and] service clubs,” academia has “cooperative shopping facilities, bookstores, student unions, and faculty clubs.” Bletz recognized but did not explore this fact; however, it is not hard to see the immersive experience of both communities

7. James G. Pierce, The Organizational Culture of the U.S. Army: Is the Organizational Culture of the Army Congruent with the Professional Development of Its Senior Level Officer Corps? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), iv, 106–7.
makes interaction with and understanding of the larger society, or vice versa, necessary.

Bletz argued this near total institutionalization, coupled with society’s ambivalence regarding the utility of each community, isolates the military and academia from American society. He did acknowledge this isolation was largely self-imposed and illustrated this dynamic in an admittedly cartoonish fashion: where academics are “quiet and intelligent, but apparently unmanly” the soldier is “manly, but not too intelligent.”\textsuperscript{10} Where the former emphasizes thinking, the latter emphasizes doing. They are joined together by a mutual alcohol problem and are saved from obscurity and irrelevance by “[the] rugged [civilian] individual, clad in buckskin who somehow compensates for [their] shortcomings.”\textsuperscript{11}

Interestingly, Bletz wrote when those views were beginning to change, at least for the military. American society has always had an aversion to a standing, professional military largely due to the original colonists’ experience with the military’s role in domestic oppression in the countries from which they came.\textsuperscript{12} As a result, the military had to fight to earn its status as a profession. The Vietnam experience further soured the military’s relationship with the American people who were no longer interested in allowing their children to be drafted to fight wars of dubious necessity. As a result, the military in the 1970s transitioned to an all-volunteer force. While that change has further exacerbated the sense of social isolation—less than one-half of 1 percent of the population now serve—popular confidence in the military as an institution is above 70 percent, reaching a high of 74 percent in 2018, up from a low of 50 percent in 1981.\textsuperscript{13}

In the 50 years since Bletz wrote his article, campus life has changed dramatically. The massacre at Kent State University marked a shift away from the politically active campuses of the 1960s and early 1970s.\textsuperscript{14} Since then college campuses have become more diverse, more expensive, and more focused on preprofessional studies and skills development rather than education for education’s sake.\textsuperscript{15} Due to the shift in the 1980s from grant-heavy to loan-heavy financial aid awards, the amount of student debt has increased to the point where the cost-benefit analysis of a

\textsuperscript{10} Bletz, “Mutual Misperceptions,” 4.
\textsuperscript{11} Bletz, “Mutual Misperceptions,” 4.
\textsuperscript{12} Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor Jr., The US Military Profession into the Twenty-First Century: War, Peace and Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1999), 60.
traditional college education raises questions about its overall utility.\textsuperscript{16} In contrast to the military, public confidence in higher education in 2018 was 48 percent, despite—or because of—36 percent of the population over 25 attaining bachelor’s degrees.\textsuperscript{17} Today higher education is in the midst of a reexamination of its purpose and relevance within the larger society.\textsuperscript{18} In many ways, the public perception of both professions has flipped in the last half century.

**Relationship to Each Other**

The separation of the academic and military communities would be sustainable if it were not for two points of convergence. The first point is the accessions process for military officers. In 1970 the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) was the largest source of commissions for the Army, producing around 12,400 graduates a year.\textsuperscript{19} From 1968 to 1974, however, ROTC closed 88 detachments, many of which were in elite universities in the northeast. The reasons for those closures were complex. The common narrative is that popular opposition to the war in Vietnam, exacerbated by the shootings at Kent State, encouraged schools to end their ROTC programs.\textsuperscript{20}

While it is true some ROTC units closed temporarily due to vandalism—Kent State before the massacre—the reason generally given by the schools to the Department of Defense was that ROTC courses did not meet the school’s academic standards and thus were not eligible for credit. The Department decided to close and relocate those detachments rather than revise the courses, and it also established 80 new detachments, mostly in schools in the south and west.\textsuperscript{21}

These conditions shaped the quantity, quality, and diversity of the officer corps and determined the potential for interactions between future military officers and the future cultural and policy elites in the United States. Two recent studies have shown that while the percentage of people who graduate from elite schools and attain the most influential policy positions may have decreased since mid-century when sociologists

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\item[18.] Pasquerella, “Higher Education.”
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developed the theories of elite formation, elite schools count among their alumni a disproportionate number of business, policy, and cultural elites relative to the total number of graduates. With close to 87 percent of all college graduates having no military experience, it stands to reason weak connections and mistrust exist between academics and the military.

Bletz argued the second point of convergence occurred when academics crossed over into government. As Bletz noted, academics, particularly scientists, enthusiastically participated in weapons development in support of then President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal and the Second World War—a war with broad public support. In particular, the academic community—contrary to its purpose—kept criticism to a minimum, especially over matters that would later become controversial in the 1960s such as unconditional surrender and the employment of the atomic bomb.

Despite general opposition to the Vietnam War, some members of the academic community—or at least persons with academic backgrounds—moved into government and participated in making war policy. Bletz specifically mentioned Henry Kissinger, a Harvard faculty member who was critical of the military’s attrition strategy employed at the beginning of the war. Bletz could also have mentioned Robert McNamara, secretary of defense from 1961 to 1968. In what is sometimes referred to as the “McNamara Revolution,” he brought in a number of so-called whiz kids from academia and research centers who tried to impose a single common method for management, acquisitions, and budgeting for all the services, many elements of which exist to this day.

While McNamara did solicit the advice of senior military leaders in implementing his reforms, they offered little constructive input and were eventually marginalized from much of the budget decision-making process. In fact, the relationship between the Joint Staff and senior civilian leadership—including President Lyndon Johnson—was frayed because the options the Joint Staff gave for prosecuting the war were not viable.

Related to this point of convergence, academia at the time was showing a growing interest in military affairs. This interest took two forms. One form was the development of the field of strategic studies, best represented by Thomas C. Schelling, that drew on the fields of
economics, political science, and international relations to inform policies on the employment and use of the military. The other form, pioneered by scholars such as Samuel P. Huntington and Morris Janowitz, developed into the field of military sociology, which sought to inform military organizational policies.28

Both fields have grown considerably, bringing academia and the military closer together in ways Bletz did not anticipate. These programs have provided a path for military officers to obtain advanced degrees in these fields, ensuring such expertise resides within the military. For example, the Army now sends over 400 officers to advanced civilian schooling every year.29 And these officers do not just teach at service academies or at professional military education institutions as Bletz did. Many others, particularly foreign area officers and strategic planners, go directly to operational assignments after graduation. The effect, of course, is the military is better able to participate in, and thus control, many of the external reforms civilian academics recommend. A good example of this integration is the development of counterinsurgency strategy during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, promulgated by military officers with advanced degrees and members of civilian academia.30

The military is further favored in this dynamic because it is much easier for an officer to move from the military into academia than it is for an academic to move into the military. One difference Bletz did not note was that the military discharges its members much earlier in life than academia. Many senior officers reach mandatory retirement age while still in their late forties and early fifties, and some elect to take their military experience and advanced degrees and seek positions in academia. According to data collected by George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government Mapping Shadow Influence project, since the early 1990s over 200 academic-related positions have been filled by retired O8-level (major general) officers and above.31

Some very senior retired military officers have gone on to lead universities, such as Admiral William H. McRaven, the former chancellor of the University of Texas System, Air Force General Richard B. Myers who is currently the president of Kansas State University, and Army Lieutenant General Robert L. Caslen who is now the president of the University of South Carolina. Of course, as was the case with Caslen, not all were initially welcomed.32 Nonetheless, the fact they are able to acquire such senior positions suggests the rift between academia and the

military, while real, may not be as big as Bletz originally suggested. Bletz himself became president of Wilson College in nearby Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, where he became an honorary alumnus for his leadership.  

While it is easier for the military to transition to academia, a growing number of research partnerships between the Department of Defense and academic institutions focus not just on hard sciences and technology but on the humanities as well. The DoD Minerva Research Initiative grants program supporting social science research has provided $20 to $22 million in funding, much of which was allocated to social science research and was both widely accepted and criticized within the social science community. A number of university-based research centers also receive DoD and private donor funding.

**Policy Implications**

What Bletz did get right is that rift, no matter how big, can produce disastrous results for national security. What should have been a “brilliant” cooperative enterprise ended up, in the case of Vietnam, in disaster with academics fleeing policy making to write books to “explain away” their involvement. In the case of Vietnam, Bletz argued from the military perspective, asserting academics not only created the policies that led to the war, but their military reforms, especially under McNamara, alienated senior military leadership from the decision making. From the academic-turned-policymaker perspective, the fault lay with an incompetent military that could not figure out how to defeat a much less technologically advanced enemy, thereby ensuring those policies would fail.

This dynamic repeated itself in the 1990s and early 2000s. In the 1990s, much of the academic community protested the presence of ROTC on campuses as well as other engagements with the military because of opposition to the military’s policies prohibiting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) individuals from joining. While perhaps not as impactful as the closings in the 1960s, a number of top-tier schools, including Stanford, Brown, and Harvard, excluded ROTC from their campuses until the ban on LGBTQ participation was lifted in 2011. Now that the military has dropped most of its barriers

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35. The Military Family Research Institute at Purdue University (website), https://www.mfri.purdue.edu/.
to service by members of the LGBTQ community, it has enjoyed more access and less opposition on college campuses.

Like Vietnam, the involvement of the academic community in national security policy in the decision to go to war in Iraq and in elements of the execution of the war itself produced grim results. One reason cited for the US decision to invade Iraq was the writings of political philosopher Leo Strauss suggesting regime change was the only proper way to deal with a “great anti-modern tyrant” such as Saddam Hussein.\(^{39}\) Academic influences did not stop there. The military, in an effort to demonstrate it had learned some lessons from Vietnam, invited academia to participate in operations. Not only were individual scholars employed for their political science and democracy-building expertise, the military tried to purchase academic experience wholesale by establishing Human Terrain System teams, comprised of experienced anthropologists and others from relevant fields, to advise commanders on how to navigate cultural pitfalls in rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan.\(^{40}\)

Perhaps not surprisingly those efforts did not go well. Bletz complained academics in government in the Vietnam era ran back to academia to write books absolving them of responsibility. Much the same happened in Iraq. Whether one wants to impute, malign, or simply display selfish intent as Bletz did, the fact is a number of high-profile academics who assisted the military in Iraq did just that. An obvious case in point is Stanford scholar Larry Diamond and his book *Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq*.\(^{41}\)

The damage inflicted by the effort to include academia in the execution of the war went even deeper. The American Anthropological Association declared participation in the Human Terrain System program unethical and discouraged its members from participating.\(^{42}\) While some anthropologists did participate, many positions had to be filled with inadequately qualified persons. As a result, many teams without the relevant expertise went to the field, which resulted in predictable and disastrous results.\(^{43}\)

These disasters, however, were less a result of the differences between the military and academic communities, than they were a function of academia and the military growing closer together. The

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difficulty with such proximity was and continues to be the outsized influence of the military over the academic national security agenda. Not only does the military pay for research, it pays tuition that helps fill classrooms and then cycles its graduates, many of whom are as well credentialed as their academic counterparts, often either back into academia or to military institutions that interact with academia.

**Conclusion**

The result is a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” dynamic suggesting a harmonic relationship between academia and the military is not only impossible, it may also be undesired. When the military controls too much of the agenda, it risks losing an important critical voice—only valuable as such when lightly connected. Ties are important; the right ties are critical.

Unfortunately, Bletz’s—as well as this review’s—anecdotal approach to the issues raised do not provide much of a basis to form recommendations. Bletz, however, shed a light, albeit a dim one, on a civil-military dynamic that given the disastrous outcomes to date, appears to be poorly understood, at least by the members the communities themselves. Accordingly, this analysis recommends more attention and study be focused on the academia-military dynamic in the interest of seeking balance rather than expanding or improving cooperation and convergence between the two.

It may be the case that academia and the military can serve society separately. But the natural synergies as well as the desire to do good will ensure separation will never be complete. In fact, perhaps Bletz’s most important insight regarded the dependency each community has on the other for its status. Due to the points of convergence, the result of the Vietnam War diminished the prestige of both institutions not only “in the eyes of each other” but “in the eyes of the nation as a whole.” This point only further underscores the importance of both communities to national security.

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Soviet Economic Reform—Surprisingly Prescient

Robert E. Hamilton

ABSTRACT: Writing in 1971, economist Dr. John P. Hardt assessed the trajectory of the Soviet economy arguing the need for reform and evaluating the willingness of key actors in the Soviet bureaucracy to support such policies. Fifty years later, Hardt was remarkably prescient with regard to structural difficulties such reform posed and the costs of delay. The pervasive role of internal and external security concerns in the following decades, however, resulted in economic decisions that defied traditional economic analysis.

Predicting the future is hard. Predicting the future of a country Winston Churchill described as “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma” is notoriously difficult.\(^1\) Despite the growth of an entire class of so-called Sovietologists inside Western academic and policy circles by the late 1980s, few predicted the Soviet Union would collapse, and none predicted the precise timing and manner of its demise. Although many observers of the Soviet Union saw the need for reform by the 1980s, Dr. John P. Hardt was far ahead of the curve. Writing in *Parameters* in 1971, Hardt pointed out the need for reform of the Soviet economy, explained why such reform would be difficult, and concluded every year it was delayed the cost of these efforts would increase. To be sure, Hardt did not get everything right, but he got enough right that his article deserves re-examination for the lessons it still holds 50 years after its publication.

View from 1971

Hardt begins his article by noting Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev had announced in 1969 that improved economic performance was a “first order agenda item for the Party,” setting off a fierce debate between proponents of a return to a “Stalinist heavy industry-military priority” and proponents of economic modernization focused on the civilian economy.\(^2\) The problem was falling productivity. Unless productivity increased, Hardt believed labor shortages would inhibit fulfillment of the economic goals outlined in the Five-Year Plan for 1971–75. The solution was obvious: the release of able-bodied males from the armed forces. Such a policy would alleviate the labor shortages and buy time for the Soviet economy to modernize and accrue the accompanying gains in

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efficiency. While obvious, the solution was a tough sell inside the Soviet Communist Party due to the “pervasive military influence” there.\(^3\)

Hardt saw two issues that might shape Soviet economic policy options moving forward. The first was the familiar “guns versus butter” debate—the tension between investment in the military and investment in growth-stimulating consumer goods. Here he thought the power of the Soviet military-industrial complex would mitigate against the reallocation of resources toward consumer goods. But Hardt saw another issue, one that cut across the guns versus butter debate. This issue pitted the economic professional interested in maximizing efficiency against the party functionary interested in maximizing control.

Hardt believed the emergence of a de facto alliance of economic and military professionals might overcome the resistance of party bureaucrats and allow for economic modernization. Economic and military professionals would be interested in maximizing both efficiency and their own ability to make decisions on resource allocation, free from central party control. As he explained it, “how to formulate economic plans to implement party policy and how to choose among military weapons systems to meet requirements of given missions are technical and professional tasks best performed by the professional institutional groups rather than the party bureaucrats.”\(^4\) In this case, the alliance of military and economic technocrats might be able to inject rationality and efficiency into the ideologically hidebound and sclerotic thinking that dominated Soviet economic planning.

Hardt believed how the guns versus butter and “control versus efficiency” issues were resolved would frame the economic choices available to future Soviet planners. He outlined three possible lines of development for the Soviet Union in the years after 1971. The first line was a return to the essential features of the Stalinist system of priorities, control, and administration. Hardt saw such a return as unlikely, mostly because he thought Stalin’s system could not work without Stalin’s terror, and Soviet leaders had lost the appetite for unleashing such terror on their society.

The next path he saw was a continuation of the equivocal, modified Stalinist system currently in place, in which the economy would still be focused on military and industrial production, but without the repressive measures of Stalinism. This outcome would mean “continued strategic-military emphasis with institutional stagnation or economic *immobilism* [emphasis in original].”\(^5\) Hardt saw this path as problematic because it failed to address the core problem of stagnant economic productivity. Although he thought the emergence of a new, professionally trained planning cadre and managerial class might allow for increases in performance, he noted those increases would be modest without the

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release of resources from the military sector and the delegation of authority from the party’s center.

Finally, Hardt thought declining economic conditions might force the hand of party bureaucrats. The third line of development he outlined envisioned significant changes to the Soviet system. In this case, the policy-making elite would become more pluralistic and professional, and management of the economy would become more focused on efficiency and market stimulation. This transformation would not come about organically but as a response to an economic crisis.

Economic crisis could force the shift from defense expenditures to growth-stimulating ones that would not otherwise be made. In other words, the shift from defense might be resisted on policy grounds but be taken as the only viable economic alternative. Economic crisis could likewise bring about a shift of control to the economic planners and managers in the quest for recovery.

Hardt concluded by arguing the longer the Soviet elite delayed addressing its economic issues, the more difficult these issues would be to resolve. In perhaps the most prescient sentence of the article, he concluded “the cost of equivocation is high and rising.”

Evaluating Hardt

Hardt was correct on many counts. He understood declining productivity and the looming labor shortage were serious problems. He grasped that the pervasive influence of the military over the economy was going to make reallocation of manpower from the military to the civilian economy difficult and would complicate the shift from military-industrial production to growth-stimulating consumer goods. He also seemed to perceive that, writing in 1971, he was standing at an inflection point in history, something difficult to do in the moment.

With the benefit of hindsight, the economist Robert C. Allen says the Soviet economy grew rapidly from 1928 to around 1970 because it “accumulated capital and created industrial jobs for people otherwise inefficiently employed in agriculture.” After 1970 the growth rate dropped abruptly for internal and external reasons—externally the Cold War diverted resources to the military, cutting the rate of productivity growth; internally the end of the surplus labor economy choked off growth. By 1970 “unemployment in agriculture had been eliminated and the accessible natural resources of the country had been fully exploited.” The fact that Allen, writing in 2001, agreed with the main conclusions Hardt arrived at 30 years earlier speaks to the prescience of the latter’s analysis.

Hardt understood military spending was a drag on Soviet economic growth, and that the strength of the military in Soviet policy-making circles would impede the reallocation of resources toward more productive ends. But he did not think change was impossible, arguing the emergence of an alliance of military and economic technocrats or an economic crisis could provide the catalyst for reform. This perspective turned out to be too optimistic. Had Hardt delved more deeply into the reasons for the military’s dominance in policy making he would have been more pessimistic about the ability of the Soviet system to right itself—the outsized role of the military in Soviet policy making was itself the effect of the Soviet government’s understanding of the world and the Soviet Union's place in it.10 So diverting resources from security spending to more productive purposes would not just involve a realignment of policy priorities but a shift in the Soviet government’s entire worldview.

This worldview saw Soviet security as constantly under threat and believed superior military force was the only way for the country to survive. The economist Mark Harrison argues national security considerations were decisive at every point in Soviet decision making. In the Bolsheviks’ understanding of the world, they faced dual threats from an external enemy and an internal enemy, and these enemies colluded with and reinforced each other. To meet these threats, the economy was organized to “mobilize against the foreign enemy and suppress the enemy within.”11

Forced industrialization allowed mass production of military machinery. Forced collectivization prevented farmers from starving the towns and the army. And mass killings eliminated “potential enemies,” those who would “cheer the leaders when it was costless to do so but would betray them in time of war.”12 Western economists called the Soviet economy a command economy because it directed efforts to a few public priorities, imposed rigid quantitative controls on the entire supply chain, and suppressed private motivation in favor of patriotic appeals and direct compulsion. But Polish economist Oskar Lange noted “this was what every society now did in time of war. What called itself socialism . . . was really a ‘war economy.’ ”13

In an economy on a permanent wartime footing, it is unsurprising the military played an outsized role in decision making. Historian Chris Miller gives a revealing account of the military’s role in economic policy making. Not only could the military claim to be defending the country from “capitalist aggression,” but it employed some 15 million people (around 10 percent of the total workforce), conducted 75 percent

of the country’s scientific research, and used 60 percent of its steel.\textsuperscript{14} Even before Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985—14 years after Hardt warned equivocation would raise the cost of addressing the USSR’s economic problems—the need for reform was urgent and was obvious to some in the Communist Party. But according to Gorbachev the power of the military was such “that even a mention of [cutting the defense budget] would mean immediate dismissal” from the party.\textsuperscript{15}

The military also resisted attempts to make its budget more transparent. When Gorbachev finally managed to gain a complete view of Soviet defense spending in 1987, he expressed his frustration that “military expenditure was not 16 per cent of the state budget, as we had been told, but rather 40 per cent.”\textsuperscript{16}

But the military was not the only impediment to reform. Miller details the rise of two additional bureaucratic-economic interest groups that together with the military-industrial complex had come to dominate party policy making by the 1980s. These were the agro-industrial complex and the fuel-energy complex. Inside these three complexes, economic bureaucrats and industrial interest groups developed power bases and patronage networks that allowed them essentially to implement their own policies, sometimes in opposition to those directed by the Kremlin.\textsuperscript{17} Officials often spent their entire careers within the same sector, creating “interconnected webs of relationships, favors, and loyalty.”\textsuperscript{18}

Like the military, the agricultural and energy sectors argued they were critical to the state. The agricultural sector noted it employed millions of citizens and highlighted the Soviet propaganda that portrayed collectivization as “one of the great successes of socialism.”\textsuperscript{19} The energy complex proclaimed it provided the bulk of the country’s export revenue.\textsuperscript{20} As Miller concludes, Gorbachev’s basic dilemma was the economic sectors that most needed reform to balance the budget had the power to prevent that reform.\textsuperscript{21}

The fact Hardt failed to understand the power of the three bureaucratic-economic interest groups that foiled attempts to reform the Soviet economy is not surprising for two reasons. First, when Hardt was writing in 1971 the power of the military-industrial and agro-industrial complexes was already significant, but neither had yet gained the ability essentially to capture the state budgeting process. The fuel-energy complex only gained prominence after the 1973 oil price spike.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{14} Chris Miller, \textit{The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy: Mikhail Gorbachev and the Collapse of the USSR} (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016), 59.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Miller, \textit{Struggle to Save}, 59.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Miller, \textit{Struggle to Save}, 60.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Miller, \textit{Struggle to Save}, 57.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Miller, \textit{Struggle to Save}, 58.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Miller, \textit{Struggle to Save}, 59.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Miller, \textit{Struggle to Save}, 59.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Miller, \textit{Struggle to Save}, 180.
\end{itemize}
Figure 1. Soviet Union and Russian Military Spending

Predicting these three groups would together gain enough power to strangle attempts at reform would have taken a special gift for prophecy.

Next, as an economist Hardt would presumably have expected the Soviet government to make a value-maximizing decision. He said as much when he wrote, “the Soviet economy is likely . . . to find economic performance a factor influencing sharp revisions in resource allocation—especially from defense to investment—and a significant increase in the permissive environment for economic reform.”22 But plenty of research in political science, such as the work of Graham Allison, Philip Zelikow, and David Houghton, explains why governments often make non-value-maximizing choices.23 One of these explanations focuses on the role of government bureaucracies and their tendency to equate their own interest with the national interest—a phenomenon clearly visible in Miller’s discussion of the role of the three bureaucratic-economic interest groups in preventing reform.

Hardt got one final observation right, and it is substantial. He correctly predicted a return to the Stalinist system of priorities, control, and administration was unlikely because it would require a return to Stalin’s tactics of terror, something the Soviet Union was not ready to relive. In Hardt’s words, “the author does not believe that the Stalinist terror could be reinstated again, nor that the leaders of a complex, more modern Soviet state could or would pay the price of depriving their society of its professionals and thinkers.”24

Miller agrees, observing that the political class, which had suffered through Stalinism and the Second World War, welcomed Brezhnev’s policy of stability at the top level of the party as a respite from the fear and violence of Stalinism. But what neither Hardt nor Brezhnev could have foreseen was the effect this policy would have on the Soviet economy. As Miller writes, “in Stalin’s state socialist economy, violence played the same role that market incentives play in a capitalist economy—a means of ensuring that workers and managers work hard and effectively.”25 When the threat of violence faded, so did the incentive to meet the increasingly ambitious economic targets in the Soviet Five-Year Plans. Soviet economic performance suffered as a result.

Conclusions and Lessons

Any author writing in Parameters today would be gratified to have his or her work stand the test of time as well as Hardt’s article has. He saw the need for reform of the Soviet economy before most Western observers did. He also understood the role of the military would complicate that reform, and each year of delay would raise the cost and lower the chances of success in modernizing the Soviet economy.

25. Miller, Struggle to Save, 56.
Perhaps most impressively, he seemed to understand he was writing at an inflection point: from 1928 until 1970 the Soviet economy had grown rapidly but began to decline in the 1970s. That decline accelerated in the 1980s, ending with the economic and political collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Writing in 1971 when many analysts—including Nobel Prize winner Paul Samuelson—expected the Soviet economy eventually to overtake that of the United States, Hardt was much less sanguine.\(^\text{26}\) He correctly identified the serious structural issues Soviet planners would need to address and the challenges to doing so.

Hardt did not get everything right. Although he identified the influence of the military as an impediment to reform, he failed to understand how strong an impediment it was. He also failed to address the reason for the military’s outsized influence—the pervasive fear of external and internal enemies colluding to bring down the Soviet Union. This fear injected national security considerations into normally mundane issues like industrial and agricultural policy, seriously distorting Soviet economic decision making. Finally, as an economist Hardt would have been trained to expect the Soviet government to select policy options that maximized economic performance. But time after time the Kremlin was unwilling or unable to do so until it was too late. As Hardt had predicted, the cost of equivocation was indeed high.

Modern Russia is not the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, some of Hardt’s insights are valuable today. Like the Soviet Union of the 1970s, Russia of 2021 is faced with declining economic performance. After rising rapidly from 2000–7, Russian GDP per capita flattened due to the combined impacts of the financial crisis that began in 2008 and Western sanctions imposed in 2014. In 2019 Russians were essentially no richer in real terms than they were in 2008: Russian per capita GDP in 2008 was $11,088, and in 2019 it was $12,012.\(^\text{27}\)

Also like the Soviet Union, Russia’s economic problems are structural. In the 1970s, the problem was a labor shortage; in 2020 the problem is Russia’s hydrocarbon-dependent economy, which provides rents that stifle investment in other sectors and leaves Russia vulnerable to oil price fluctuations it cannot control. Finally, as it was in the Cold War, today’s Kremlin is fixated on the idea of collusion between external and internal enemies. The ceaseless fight against these phantom threats gives the Russian military and security services outsized roles in Kremlin budgeting and policy making, leaving fewer resources for addressing Russia’s real economic and social problems.


ABSTRACT: In 1971 Dr. John R. Thomas documented the involvement of the Soviet Union in the Middle East from the start of the Cold War. Like its name and borders, the motivations for that country’s involvement in the region have changed. Russia today promulgates relationships with the governments of the Middle East in a nonideological, more limited manner primarily through economic relationships, in energy and arms sales in particular, and in efforts to mitigate terror threats to the homeland.

Fifty years ago Dr. John R. Thomas produced an interesting and valuable article discussing the high point of Soviet involvement in the Middle East. This article was written during a bipolar international era defined by a Cold War between two competing superpowers. In this global environment, the United States led one power bloc, and the Soviet Union dominated the other. Some countries sought to remain outside the conflict, but virtually all of them adjusted their foreign policies to the realities presented by the Cold War. China at this time was a regional power with little involvement in the Middle East. Thomas noted the rise of China as an emerging Soviet problem, which he identified as mostly a complication for Moscow’s strategic planning outside the Middle East.¹

Serious Soviet involvement in the Middle East began with a 1955 Soviet-approved sale of advanced weapons by Czechoslovakia to Egypt, thinly disguised as an independent agreement between the two countries.² In contrast to this cover story, the extent and volume of the weapons supply strongly suggested the bulk of them came directly from the Soviets.³ This process helped establish support for Egypt, under the leadership of then President Gamal Abdel Nasser, as the centerpiece of Soviet involvement in the Middle East. Thomas maintained not all members of the Soviet leadership supported the idea of providing aid to Egypt, which was noncommunist and not formally aligned with either superpower, but these doubters were overruled.

Still, Moscow’s decision to seek a role in the Middle East was problematic, a situation soon exacerbated by Israel’s comprehensive defeat of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the June 1967 Six-Day War. The Moscow leadership could either escalate their involvement with Egypt and other left-leaning states of Syria and Iraq or they could back away from the Middle East. Accepting a diminished role in the region would have risked Arab acquiescence to Western regional dominance and possibly led to Egyptian efforts to work diplomatically with the United States to recover territory captured by Israel in the war. To avoid this outcome, the Soviets chose to continue supporting friendly Arab regimes with arms and other aid despite their disillusionment with the fighting capabilities of these countries.

Thomas noted the Soviets found themselves unable to use the same levers of power they could wield in Eastern Europe, causing some Arab states to become demanding clients, especially regarding military assistance. Some Soviet leaders were also concerned rebuilding the defeated Egyptian and Syrian militaries would not only expend resources but could also draw the Soviet Union more deeply into a Middle East confrontation eventually involving the United States. The first trend was well under way when Thomas wrote the article. At this time, the Soviets had stationed around 15,000 military advisers in Egypt and about 800 in Syria. Moscow provided military assistance to both countries and transferred more weapons and military equipment to Egypt than to any other nation at the time, including North Vietnam, which was then at war with the United States.

There were, however, some limits to the Soviet military support of Egypt, including the provision of Scud missiles and long-range military aircraft that could be used against the Israeli heartland in a strategic role. Leaders in Cairo believed such weapons were essential in any effort to recapture the land Israel seized in the Six-Day War. At this point it was widely known Israel had a nuclear reactor near the city of Dimona large enough to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. The Egyptians wanted to make certain any Arab tactical victories did not lead to a process of uncontrolled escalation in which the Israelis felt they could employ tactical nuclear weapons without cost.

9. W. Andrew Terrill, *Escalation and Intrawar Deterrence During Limited Wars in the Middle East* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), 8–43.
The Egyptians did not have tactical nuclear warheads for the Scuds, but claimed vaguely to have chemical and biological warheads.\textsuperscript{10} Israel, always wary of Moscow, did not rule out the possibility Egypt could obtain nuclear warheads for the Scuds from the Soviet Union in the event of a crisis.

Throughout the early 1970s, Egypt’s new president Anwar Sadat was actively planning to fight a limited war against Israel to recapture territory lost in the June 1967 war. Concurrently the Soviets, as Thomas states, were trying to prevent a new Arab-Israeli war, which they expected the Arab states to lose. These divergent goals were a source of considerable tension between the two sides. Soviet-Egyptian relations also declined further as a result of a failed May 1971 coup attempt by Egyptian leftist leader Ali Sabry against Sadat.\textsuperscript{11} If such a coup had been successful, it would certainly have been viewed favorably by the Soviets, and the Egyptian president suspected complicity.

Even with these intensifying problems, the Soviets refused to transfer the advanced offensive weapons the Egyptians were demanding. Sadat, furious over the deadlock, took dramatic action and ordered the Soviet Union to remove almost all of its military advisers from Egypt, which they did.\textsuperscript{12} In this difficult environment, the Soviet Union finally relented and supplied nonnuclear Scuds and extended-range fighter-bombers to Egypt.\textsuperscript{13}

Convinced he had enough of a strategic deterrent to maintain the planned war at a nonnuclear level, Sadat struck into the Sinai Peninsula in October 1973, while Syria simultaneously attacked into the Golan Heights as planned. The war raged for approximately three weeks. While the Egyptian forces achieved some brilliant tactical victories at the beginning of the war, they were in trouble by the time the lines stabilized before a second cease-fire. When the Soviets appeared to hint at unilateral military action—if joint action with the United States was impossible—the Nixon administration declared a global military alert.\textsuperscript{14} The Soviet government, never fully committed to this option, quickly disregarded any consideration of such intervention in accordance with fears of a wider war, which Thomas discussed.

Thomas also suggested conditions might emerge under which the Soviets would ultimately become a secondary external power in the Middle East. This forecast was accurate and occurred after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, when President Sadat decisively realigned his country with the United States in the belief that Washington, not Moscow, could deliver a diplomatic solution to the conflict with Israel. Sadat was correct about this choice, but no other Arab country would follow his lead for some time.

\textsuperscript{10} Terrill, \textit{Escalation}, 20–21.
\textsuperscript{11} Heikal, \textit{Sphinx}, 227–28.
\textsuperscript{12} Heikal, \textit{Sphinx}, 241.
\textsuperscript{13} Rabinovich, \textit{Yom Kippur War}, 43; and Victor Israelyan, \textit{Inside the Kremlin during the Yom Kippur War} (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 60.
\textsuperscript{14} Rabinovich, \textit{Yom Kippur War}, 482–85.
The Egyptians concluded a separate peace treaty with Israel in March 1979 with US sponsorship. This treaty created the conditions under which Israel withdrew from most and then all of the Sinai Peninsula captured during the Six-Day War. Egypt has remained an important ally of the United States since that time and in 1987 received the formal US designation of being a major non-NATO ally. Syria remained aligned with the Soviet Union, and other Arab countries including Iraq, South Yemen (then an independent country), and Libya continued to purchase Soviet weapons.

Throughout the Cold War the Soviet Union was encouraged by the existence of communist parties in the Middle East, but none of these organizations were able to seize power. During the Cold War era, communist parties were sometimes important in Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Sudan and as part of the Palestine movement. Yet even leftist governments were wary of them and in most cases engaged in outright persecution.

President Nasser moved to counter a takeover of the Syrian government by the powerful Syrian communist party by agreeing to form an Egyptian-Syrian United Arab Republic in 1958. In July 1971 President Sadat also provided important diplomatic and eventually military support to the Sudanese government when it was challenged by a communist-led and Soviet-supported coup that managed to take power for a few days before government forces defeated the rebels.

After the ousting of Iran’s last shah in 1979, the Soviets hoped the communist Tudeh (Masses) party would play a major role in the country’s future. But these hopes turned to ashes when the Islamic government outlawed that organization and imprisoned its leaders as subversives and Soviet spies. Some Tudeh leaders were forced to confess their supposed crimes on television, and a few were executed. A number of Soviet diplomats/intelligence operatives were simultaneously expelled from Iran for their ties to the Tudeh party. In sum, while their prospects were promising at times, communist parties in the Middle East were never able to establish a communist regime. Rather, their activities created further suspicions between Moscow and even the most leftist Middle Eastern governments.
Thomas displayed considerable foresight but could only go so far in accurately predicting the evolution of Middle Eastern politics 50 years hence. This notoriously volatile region changes quickly, and the global environment has evolved as well. The Cold War is over for now, and the Soviet Union has been replaced by a noncommunist, though still autocratic, regime in Russia.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russians in the early 1990s removed themselves almost entirely from an active role in the Middle East and instead focused on retaining influence with newly independent neighbors that had been part of the Soviet Union before its collapse. These changes were not inevitable, and it would have been a reckless long shot to predict them in the 1970s.

Moscow showed a renewed interest in playing an important role in the Middle East in 2011 when Russian leaders felt they had been marginalized on questions surrounding the future of Libya. At that point, the Russians believed Western powers had used a UN Security Council resolution creating a no-fly zone over Benghazi to justify a much larger effort to implement regime change in Libya. They believed these actions went well beyond the scope of the resolution.

Today Moscow seeks regional influence in the Middle East. It has expanded diplomatic and economic relations with a number of Middle Eastern states, and the nature of these interactions has evolved significantly in recent years. Russia no longer has an ideological component to its regional agenda. It does not seek the establishment of communist regimes in the region nor does Russia have a network of communist parties it can call upon to support its objectives. Rather, its concerns are pragmatic. Russia’s emergence as a world oil supplier has made coordination with Gulf oil producers important to regulate competition.

Additionally, Russia seeks to be a significant arms supplier to a wide array of Arab states and Iran. Russia has also become much closer to Turkey despite different policies regarding the Syrian Civil War. In a 2019 move unthinkable during the Cold War, Turkey made an agreement with Russia to purchase the S-400 Triumf air defense missile system.

As during the Cold War, Russia remains close to the Syrian regime though for different reasons than the Soviet Union. Moscow views the Syrian regime as a bulwark against militant Islamic activities and terrorism, which might eventually spread into the former Soviet Republics and perhaps Russia itself. Russia sent military units to Syria to support the Assad regime in 2015. These forces, especially the air

units, provided significant aid to Assad. But they represented a relatively limited intervention. Assad’s most notable other allies include Iran and the Lebanese radical Shiite group Hezbollah, which are not likely to support Sunni Muslim insurgencies and terrorism in the former Soviet Republics.

After the debacle of the Soviet war in Afghanistan, the Russians have chosen to avoid or limit the use of ground troops in Middle Eastern conflicts. In Libya and Syria, the Russians sent hundreds of mercenaries from the Wagner Group, an organization with close ties to the Russian government. While this group is clearly a tool of Moscow, its use avoids the need to send significant numbers of conscripts to Middle East battlegrounds. Such actions thereby avoid domestic fallout such as the Soviet government experienced over the war in Afghanistan.

In sum, Thomas’s consideration of the Soviet role presents a useful overview and analysis of ways in which Soviet involvement in the Middle East occurred during the Cold War. Since that time, Moscow’s role has evolved in ways no one could have anticipated in 1971. Yet the Cold War remains an important chapter in Soviet and then Russian history. Clearly Russian President Vladimir Putin looks with nostalgia at the power and global role of the Soviet Union. For the present, however, Russian goals are commensurate with their diminished power from the Soviet era. Currently Russia has a GDP that is only 10 to 20 percent of China’s GDP, and China rather than Russia may eventually become something of a peer rival of the United States in the region if it chooses to make that one of its goals. Russia will have influence in the Middle East, but this influence will remain limited.

ABSTRACT: A look back at F. Gunther Eyck’s assessment of reforms enacted under US Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson may reveal as much about the historiography of the early 1970s as it does about Stimson’s reform efforts themselves. Eyck’s 1971 evaluation, among the first in a decade of scholarship examining successes and failures of Progressive Era Army reforms, raises important issues but avoids broader considerations of the sociopolitical realities of the United States at the turn of the twentieth century.

During the 1970–71 academic year at the US Army War College, Professor F. Gunther Eyck served as the Henry L. Stimson Chair of Political Science. Presumably the connection with his position’s namesake led Eyck to write a short assessment of Henry L. Stimson’s first tenure as US secretary of war for the inaugural issue of Parameters. While these circumstances suggest Eyck might have come to his subject more by incident than by design, the article is worth revisiting. In fact, Eyck’s factually sound narrative of events is relevant to military professionals today. The article, however, can also be examined as a product of the early 1970s—a period of institutional tumult not unlike our own.

Scholars and professionals are inevitably products of their times; as such, interest in particular topics ebbs and flows. Eyck’s article presaged a wave of scholarship examining military developments and reform in the Progressive Era (1896–1916) that would last for about a decade and then recede, leaving the period largely neglected as a topic of research since.

The article is also emblematic of the extent to which authors depend on the availability of conceptual tools. As historian Daniel T. Rodgers observes, the majority of individuals are “users rather than shapers of ideas” and depend on “the constellation of live, accessible ways of looking at society within which they [work].” Eyck wrote his article just before the advent of the so-called new military history that emphasized the interchange between society and military institutions. Accordingly, even though the early 1970s was a period of intense civilian scrutiny of military affairs, the article’s analysis remained confined, in retrospect, to a surprisingly narrow technocratic focus.

Eyck concentrated on the three most important events related to the effectiveness and efficiency of the US Army during Stimson’s first tenure as secretary of war: the bureaucratic and legislative battle over the size and powers of the War Department General Staff (established

just a few years earlier in 1903), the creation of an Army Reserve, and
the reorganization of the peacetime army from a system of regional
administrative units into one of tactical divisions. The article concludes
with a brief summation of several lesser reforms instituted by Stimson
and his failure to create a cross-departmental body similar to our present
National Security Council.

In its basic portrayal of events, Eyck’s analysis withstands the test of
time. While subsequent scholarship has added some details to the events
described—particularly the circumstances surrounding Stimson’s relief
of the main opponent of a strong General Staff, Adjutant General
Frederick Ainsworth—the basic narrative given in the Parameters article
has remained largely unaltered.

Eyck’s interpretation of those events also still falls within the
bounds of scholarly conventional wisdom, albeit toward a less popular
margin of that band. Eyck concluded Stimson was an effective reformer
who successfully continued the work of his friend, mentor, and law
partner Elihu Root—a transformative secretary of war from 1899 to
1903. Russell F. Weigley, a leading US Army historian, came to a similar
conclusion in his magisterial institutional history first published in
1967. Weigley deemed Stimson one of the greatest secretaries of war of
all time.2

Other accounts, however, cast Stimson mainly as a supportive
adjunct to then Chief of Staff of the US Army Leonard Wood rather
than a major reformer in his own right.3 Some historians contend
because Stimson lacked Root’s political savvy and willingness to
compromise, he not only fell far short of his ambitions, he triggered
a congressional backlash that set the Army back in some respects.4
While these differences are not trivial, they are matters of emphasis and
comfortably situate Stimson within a broader reform movement set in
motion by Root after the Spanish-American War. Readers interested in
the institutional history of the US Army or the topic of military reform
would still profit from reading the article.

In retrospect, the timing of Eyck’s article might be more intriguing
than his findings. As noted above, there was a surge of interest in the
Progressive Era military throughout the 1970s.5 This trend does not
seem to have been due to Eyck; a search of the most relevant works
did not yield any citations of the article. Thus it appears Eyck was a

2. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army, enl. ed. (Bloomington: University of
Indiana Press, 1984), 333.
3. Daniel R. Beaver, Modernizing the American War Department: Change and Continuity in a Turbulent
Era, 1885–1920 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2006), 34.
158, 171–75; and J. P. Clark, Preparing for War: The Emergence of the Modern U.S. Army, 1815–1917
5. See also Lane, Armed Progressive; Allan R. Millett, The Generals: Robert L. Bullard and Officership in
the United States Army, 1881–1925 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975); John Patrick Finnegan,
Against the Specter of a Dragon: The Campaign for American Military Preparedness, 1914–1917 (Westport,
CT: Greenwood Press, 1974); and I. B. Holley Jr., General John M. Palmer, Citizen Soldiers, and the Army
of a Democracy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982).
bellwether rather than a trendsetter. Nonetheless the question remains: What drove this decade-long surge of interest in the Progressive Era Army before the subject once again fell into relative neglect?

A confluence of factors within the historical profession likely played some role. While Weigley’s institutional history of the Army surveyed the Progressive Era in just two of the volume’s 22 chapters, his brief summary might have been enough to expose the subject to a generation of graduate students selecting their dissertation topics. At the time, the field of military history was undergoing a shift away from battle and operational history to the new military history focus on war and society—on events and trends occurring outside of armed conflict, such as the efforts of Root and Stimson.

This explanation, however, does not account for the subsequent waning academic interest in Progressive Era research. The answer may lie in the identity of the historians taking up the subject. The topic of Progressive Era military reform was popular with military officers serving in the late stages and immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War.6

The same sense of looking to the past for answers to questions of how to improve an ailing organization might have motivated Eyck. He arrived at Carlisle just a few months after the US Army War College published a report on the state of the military profession, commissioned by Army Chief of Staff William Westmoreland, on the suspicion the war had eroded both the competence and the ethics of the officer corps. The study gave compelling evidence he was correct.7 Whether Eyck simply wanted to study the namesake of his position or was motivated by an interest in organizational renewal, it is nonetheless suggestive that the post–Vietnam War nadir coincided with an increase in the study of military reform.

If Eyck was motivated by the problems of his time, he was also limited by his contemporary intellectual tools. Though his study was factually sound, in retrospect it is striking just how narrowly Eyck focused on military factors. The feud with Ainsworth is described primarily as a disagreement over methods of military administration—albeit one with wider implications for which offices would wield the most power within the War Department—that was ultimately resolved based on the merits of the case.

To be fair Eyck did note the complicating role of politics in that resolution. For instance, he described how the bitter internecine fight within the Republican Party between then President William Taft and

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Theodore Roosevelt—Taft’s predecessor and friend-turned-rival—was the source of Taft’s reluctance to expend political capital in support of Stimson and Wood against Ainsworth. Eyck also noted the manner in which congressional allies of Ainsworth were able to exact revenge through opposition to some of Stimson’s later initiatives.

Nonetheless Eyck made no attempt to place those intersections between the Army and the civilian sphere in a larger context. They are cast as discrete instances in which the internal battles of two distinct groups—the military and the political class—happen to interact because of the confluence of personalities with ties to both groups: Stimson as a political appointee at the head of the Army, Wood as a friend of Roosevelt, and Ainsworth as an officer with political connections due to the nature of his position.

In this respect, Eyck’s article is written in the spirit of Samuel P. Huntington’s influential *The Soldier and the State*, published in 1957, that viewed military professionalism as best when it was an isolated activity kept apart from civilian society. Indeed, Huntington hailed both Root and Stimson as unusually enlightened civilians who enabled military reform by a deferential shielding of military ideas from corrupting civilian society. Eyck’s article fits easily within this interpretive tradition.

In the five decades since Eyck’s article, the historical consensus regarding the source of Progressive Era military reform has markedly shifted. In the 1980s and 1990s historians conclusively demonstrated the state of military isolation portrayed by Huntington was factually incorrect. The evidence showed the military and American society engaged in considerable intellectual interaction in the decades leading up to the Root reforms Stimson reinforced.

The documentation of those civil-military links led historians to a conclusion far more reasonable than that of Huntington: military reform was not an isolated development but was a product of engagement with civilian society. After all, the Progressive Era was arguably the most intense period of reform in American history. Huntington’s contention that military reform during that period had completely different origins than those of civilian society strains credulity. The aggressive drive for change in society influenced what occurred within the military realm.

Revisiting Eyck’s article with this insight in mind, it is clear he missed some opportunities to make connections among events linked by deeper forces. For instance, the Roosevelt-Taft rift in the Republican Party was not purely incidental to the struggles within the Army. Though personal ambitions and style played a role, the political struggle reflected a fundamental split between the progressive and conservative wings of


the party caused by the same tensions between change and status quo that underlay the Wood-Ainsworth feud. In the political battle, Root, Stimson, and Wood all were forced to choose whether they stood with the Roosevelt faction or the Taft faction.\(^{10}\)

The existence of a similar divide within the Democratic Party is further evidence deeper tensions were straining both civilian and military institutions. Stimson’s tenure in the War Department would come to an end with the election of Woodrow Wilson, a progressive whose southern heritage made him acceptable enough to members of the party’s conservative wing, like Virginia’s James Hay, to win the nomination. Not coincidentally, Hay was Ainsworth’s primary congressional ally and a leading opponent of the General Staff. Conservative Democrats like Hay were ardent proponents of states’ rights, a stance that led to support for the National Guard, antipathy for the regular Army, and a desire for a divided War Department administration susceptible to political influence.\(^{11}\)

Hay’s central role in supporting Ainsworth and in nearly fatally weakening Stimson’s reserve plan seems to lead naturally to a consideration of the National Guard and the long history of federal versus state power. Yet Eyck limited his discussion to the narrow question of length of enlistment as if this were the central issue rather than part of a larger question of whether the balance of power should reside in federal or state governments. The term of enlistment was simply the means by which Hay hoped to sabotage the larger plan, not because he had strong opinions about how long a soldier should serve as one might conclude from Eyck’s account.\(^{12}\)

Ultimately our understanding of the past is a collective, cumulative process. Eyck did his part by writing a well-researched, reasonable interpretation of the past. The purpose of pointing out these missed analytical opportunities is not to criticize Eyck for failing to anticipate later scholarship but to remind readers of the extent to which we are all products of our contemporary milieu. For though Eyck might have lacked the conceptual resources to draw upon, the raw material for recognition of the interplay between the military and civilian spheres was all around him. He wrote just a few years after Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, a former head of the Ford Motor Company, revolutionized Department of Defense policies with a set of reforms explicitly drawn from corporate practices.

More generally the country was debating questions such as who should serve and who was responsible for military accountability. Yet

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12. Leonard Wood, diary, December 7, 8, 15, 17, and 19, 1911, box 6, Wood Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
Eyck chose to describe the military as a separate sphere. In doing so, perhaps he had a different contemporary problem in mind. Eyck's article concluded with a passage reminiscent of Huntington's famous epilogue contrasting West Point with the outlying town of Highland Falls but even more pointed within the context of 1971. For Eyck, Stimson's tenure was notable for having “convincingly demonstrated in his conduct and actions alike that a man could be deeply rooted in a traditional value system yet not cut himself off from the winds of change and the light of progress.”
ABSTRACT: The dilemmas posed by coalition warfare were a subject of academic interest in the inaugural issue of *Parameters* in 1971. Lieutenant Colonel James B. Agnew examined the unified command model pursued by the Allies during the First World War. Agnew’s assessment of the challenges faced by French Marshal Ferdinand Foch speaks to challenges NATO faces today including questions of national sovereignty, national security goals, and developing a joint strategy.

At some point in the summer of 1918 (or so the story goes) French Marshal Ferdinand Foch remarked that since leading a coalition he had lost some of his admiration for Napoleon. By that point Foch had learned how hard it was to keep the interests and needs of a diverse coalition together in the face of a single enemy. Fighting against a coalition enabled Napoleon to exploit the differences and disagreements within it. True to Napoleon’s warning, Foch spent almost as much time in the final year of the First World War balancing the competing needs of the French, British, and American coalition partners as the coalition itself did fighting the Germans.

In March 1918, with the German Army advancing westward, the French and British governments at long last agreed to create a single unified command under Foch’s overall leadership. To Foch’s mind, however, this one step forward came with two important steps back. First, the commanders of the French and British armies (General Henri-Philippe Pétain and Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, respectively) retained the right to appeal any of Foch’s decisions to their own civilian governments. Second, those governments had only given Foch the authority to coordinate strategy. He could not issue direct orders. The only real power Foch possessed derived from his authority to distribute soldiers to threatened sections of the front from a unified general reserve. Foch would therefore have a great deal of responsibility, but little real authority. Neither the Americans nor the Italians, moreover, signed on to what became known as the Doullens Agreement, although in practice they generally followed the system it established.

In “Coalition Warfare,” a 1971 *Parameters* article, Lieutenant Colonel James B. Agnew highlighted the fundamental problem Foch faced. Although the various members of a coalition share a common foe and

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many common strategic aims, they often differ in how they wish to pursue those aims or even how much of their nation’s human capital and treasure they are prepared to devote to a common effort.

In the First World War case under study here, the coalition experienced two additional complications. First, the French held the lion’s share of the power by virtue of having by far the largest Allied army on the Western Front. They were therefore unlikely to yield on questions of strategy, especially as the war was being fought to liberate their own soil. Second, although the Americans were slow to arrive, their growing presence threatened to unbalance the war termination aims of the coalition. Should the war continue into 1919, the United States and its mercurial president, Woodrow Wilson, would surely want a greater voice in Allied strategy and operations than the French and British were willing to tolerate.

For the Allies, the Americans presented a special problem. Under any circumstances, as Agnew argued, adding more countries to an alliance complicates the strategic algebra, requiring members to accommodate additional and often divergent interests and strategic cultures.\(^5\) In the American case, however, the problem was even more complex, and not only because of the enormous economic, military, and industrial power the Americans could bring to bear. Wilson and the United States possessed a different vision of what the war entailed.

Wilson had belatedly brought his nation into the war, and even then he had done so as an “associated power,” not as a formal member of the alliance. He had steadfastly refused to sign the 1915 Treaty of London that created the legal basis for the Allied coalition, and he had insisted American soldiers would not be amalgamated into Allied units. They would fight as an independent American Army on a dedicated part of the Western Front or they might not fight at all.\(^6\) General John Pershing even went to France with a General Organization Report to this effect in his pocket, although in practice Pershing made some temporary exceptions in order to meet the emergency of spring 1918.\(^7\) Wilson also spoke of an ambiguous “peace without victory” that left his French and British partners, who had been fighting a total war for four years, confounded.\(^8\)

Perhaps more concerning, Wilson’s great statement of American strategy, “The Fourteen Points,” seemed aimed at denying the Allies the very goals for which they were fighting. The points included a call for “freedom of the seas,” “a reduction of armaments,” an end to empires, and unfettered global trade. The Germans rejoiced, seeing in Wilson’s vision a way to gain much of what they wanted from the war even if

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they lost on the battlefield. A peace on Wilson’s terms, they knew, would leave them in a strong geopolitical position.9 Allied strategists were appalled by Wilson’s vision of a postwar world, with Haig writing in his diary on October 21 that “feeling was strong against the president. He does not seem to realise our requirements.”10 French Premier Georges Clemenceau famously quipped, “God Almighty has only ten [points]!”11

Nor had the history of coalition operations from 1914 to 1918 given the British and French much cause for optimism. Agnew reviewed some of this history, parts of which have become the focus of intensive scholarly discussion in the years since. Historians continue to debate the British dilemma in 1914 over how to use their small professional army. Secretary of State for War Lord Horatio Herbert Kitchener argued a smaller power like Britain had little choice but to hew to the strategic vision of its larger partner. As he later remarked, Britain had to make war as it must not as it would like. That decision made it all too easy for British leaders in the war’s opening weeks to blame the French for their setbacks.12

As the British Army on the Western Front grew (though it was never as large as the French Army), the British naturally sought a larger voice in overall strategy. The French, maybe just as naturally, resisted. Intense disagreements over strategy for the Battle of the Somme in 1916 led to considerable bitter feelings, especially in British circles.13

A 1917 scheme by French generals and the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George to subordinate Haig to overall French direction led to one of the war’s most serious civil-military relations scandals. Haig and many other British generals considered resigning before taking any orders from a foreign general.14 The crisis led to much mutual recrimination after the French failed disastrously on the Chemin des Dames, forcing the British to launch a hurried attack around Arras in order to rescue the French from an offensive Haig and his colleagues had opposed from the beginning.15 In the Middle East, meanwhile, the position was reversed. There the British had the preponderance of strength and therefore called most of the shots, often to France’s chagrin.16

Agnew was concerned with the various wiring diagrams and command arrangements the Allies developed to solve this problem. One solution they developed involved creating a committee of senior

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politicians with high-ranking military officials acting as their technical advisers. The Supreme War Council (SWC), created at Rapallo, Italy, in November 1917, met at Versailles throughout 1918. Leaning on the recollections of the American representative to the SWC, General Tasker H. Bliss, Agnew saw some promise in the scheme, although just as contemporaries did, he recognized the near impossibility of genuine combined command being exercised through a committee led by politicians and depending on compromise and consensus.

We know a great deal more about the SWC today than Agnew knew 50 years ago. Historian Elizabeth Greenhalgh largely dismissed the council as a “talking shop” of political subcommittees that, in the end, mostly failed to do its primary job of coordinating strategy. Whereas another historian Meighen McCrae has recently provided a more sympathetic treatment. Working with the records of the Supreme War Council itself and moving away from the civil-military controversies the SWC often symbolized, she finds much to admire. Although bureaucratic and ill-suited to making rapid decisions, she argues, the Supreme War Council did provide a critical forum for thinking through the complexities of coalition operations on diverse and distant fronts as well as the potential operational impacts of new technologies like the tank and the airplane. This council may have been the only way for the great powers to think through the myriad problems of fighting a global war while pursuing sometimes conflicting strategies and war aims.

The Supreme War Council was a political and strategic body, not a military one. Senior military officials attended the sessions, but their contributions were normally limited to providing technical expertise. All major decisions rested in the hands of the politicians. To win the war on the battlefield, the two sides worked through a variety of coalition models, several of which Agnew considered. The models are important not only for what they say about the First World War, but how they have influenced coalition operations since. Agnew saw them as discrete phases during the course of the war, but because they overlapped, we might better see them as iterative models rather than sequential ones.

Agnew spent much of his article discussing the most famous model, the one that, in the end, won the war. This model was inaugurated in March 1918 in the town hall of Doullens, France, near the suddenly mobile Western Front. Today a stained glass window in the room marks this meeting of the leaders of the French and British governments. Ferdinand Foch, who had been arguing for a unified command for months, came to Doullens with a plan to do just that.

More importantly, Foch was the only senior official at the meeting who projected not just a confidence but a certainty that the terrifying

German gains were only temporary. While his colleague Pétain talked about evacuating Paris, Foch saw that the Allies would be able to stop the Germans well before they reached the capital if they created a genuine coalition with one man (himself) in charge.  

When Clemenceau congratulated Foch on finally getting the unified command he had always sought, Foch sardonically thanked Clemenceau for the gift. “‘It’s a fine present you’ve made me,’ Foch said to the prime minister. ‘You give me a lost battle and tell me to win it.’”

If these are the exact words Foch used then he may have been more prescient than he knew. The French and British governments did indeed want Foch to win a battle but not necessarily a war. They wanted him to stop the German offensive and then chase the invaders back across the Rhine River, but they did not want him making strategic decisions. As Foch built a coalition and started winning battles, the politicians grew nervous about some of the decisions he would soon have to make. Deciding when to end the war, whether Allied troops would cross the Rhine River, and who would surrender on behalf of the German people were ultimately political decisions George, Clemenceau, and Wilson wanted to make themselves.

This model, minus some of the acrimony, largely shaped the one the Western allies used to fight and win the Second World War. General Dwight D. Eisenhower stepped into the role Foch had played in 1918. Eisenhower’s headquarters were much larger and more international than Foch’s had been, but Eisenhower shared the same basic approach of leaving command authority within the national structures as often as possible. The combined chiefs of staff and the various high-level conferences during the war acted much as the SWC had. This model satisfied the need for national sovereignty and was consistent with western understandings of civilian control of the military.

Although some readers of this journal in Agnew’s time and our own might be surprised by the comparison, in a sense, the French in 1944–45 behaved as the Americans did in 1918. In this model, a nation follows the general strategic guidance of its larger coalition partner, but jealously guards as much of its own sovereignty as possible. In this case the roles flipped. In the First World War, the United States needed French weapons, communications technology, training, staff work, and much more. Thus although Pershing and Wilson had repeatedly expressed their unwillingness to follow French strategic guidance, in fact they had little choice but to do so when it came to Foch’s most important decisions. Pershing and Bliss had little voice in most of those decisions.

Figure 1. Economic and human costs of the First World War


(Killed, wounded, and missing, and financial costs of the First World War," Spartacus Educational, amounts calculated in 2020 USD), https://spartacus-educational.com/WW1KWW1.html

(Economic and human costs of the First World War)
decisions. The United States was not even represented at the French-led armistice negotiations at Compiègne in November.

Similarly, when the United States recognized Charles de Gaulle’s Free France in 1944, it was the French, now the junior partner, who relied on their senior partner. Now the weapons, uniforms, and fuel were American. Consequently, even though de Gaulle had a starkly different postwar vision than that of his American partners, he had little choice but to do (mostly) as the Americans wanted. Just as the Americans had had no representative at Compiègne, the French had no representative at the conferences at Yalta and Potsdam in 1945.

The Germans, whom Agnew did not consider, chose a different model. Beginning as early as their great victories at Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes in 1914, the Germans believed they would have to rescue their Austro-Hungarian ally from its own incompetence. Even before the war, General Erich Ludendorff had described Austria-Hungary as an albatross hung around his neck. Germany’s discovery in 1913 that the Austrian head of counterintelligence, Colonel Alfred Redl, had been selling critical military secrets to Russia further underscored the German perception of the Habsburgs as, in the famous quip, always one army, one year, and one idea behind. Austria-Hungary’s string of defeats early in the war did nothing to change that assessment.

As a result, the Germans began increasingly to take direct control over the strategic direction of their Austro-Hungarian allies. Starting with the massive Gorlice-Tarnów Offensive in the spring of 1915, German officers even assumed direct command of Austro-Hungarian units. Thereafter, Germany dominated the strategy of the Central Powers. Thus after the war, the Allies largely treated Austria better than they did Germany. After all, they reasoned, despite Austria being largely responsible for the outbreak of the war, most of the critical decisions thereafter were German. As to the Germans, they solved this problem for the next war by aggressively pursuing Anschluss, or union with Austria, in large part so they would have the dominant voice in strategy from the start.

In Agnew’s time these same debates influenced the coalition effort of NATO. Although theoretically an alliance of political equals, in terms of military power the United States dominated the alliance. After France left the integrated NATO command structure in 1966, only the United States and United Kingdom had nuclear weapons. The Americans, moreover, brought a disproportionate amount of the

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money, the weapons, and the senior military leaders. So too did they drive NATO strategy.

The problem for NATO commanders, therefore, remained the same one Foch had faced in 1918. How could a military coalition properly pursue the various and diverse political interests of its member states without becoming so divided that it lost the ability to fight as a single, unified force? France’s departure from the integrated command structure proved NATO had not yet solved the problem. Perhaps NATO was fortunate its adversary, the Warsaw Pact, suffered from many of the same dilemmas. Still it faced occasional political problems, such as the uprising in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, just three years before Agnew wrote his article.30

We can thus read Agnew’s article in two ways. In one sense, he was trying to understand the problem of coalition operations by looking backward more than 50 years in order to assess the First World War model that led to Allied victory in 1918. Much as the Germans of 1918 did, the two Cold War coalitions looked for ways to exploit the divisions in the enemy’s coalition. In another sense, however, Agnew was trying to solve a major problem in his own day: how to keep one’s own coalition intact while simultaneously putting as much pressure as possible on the enemy’s coalition. In doing so he reinforced the power of Winston Churchill’s observation that the only thing worse than fighting with allies is fighting without them.31

Defense Management Reform: How to Make the Pentagon Work Better and Cost Less

By Peter Levine

Reviewed by Robert D. Bradford III, assistant professor of defense and Joint processes, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, US Army War College

With over three million people on the payroll and spending of almost $700 billion each year, the US Department of Defense (DoD) is a huge bureaucracy. The Department’s massive scale and vast and impenetrable processes make it a challenging organization to lead. As a public sector organization consuming taxpayer resources and spending more than half of the US discretionary budget each year, the Department of Defense necessarily comes under constant scrutiny. Examiners of such a large and diverse organization inevitably find evidence of wastefulness, and the DoD’s inefficiencies draw public attention. New secretaries of defense, service secretaries, chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and service chiefs consistently include reform among their top priorities. New leaders want to reduce inefficiencies, reassure the public, and reallocate dollars, personnel, and equipment toward their strategic priorities. These leaders would do well to consider the work of Peter Levine.

In Defense Management Reform: How to Make the Pentagon Work Better and Cost Less, Levine provides a well-researched analysis of 40 years of DoD reform efforts. He describes successes and failures through primary source documents and personal interviews with key participants from the executive and legislative branches and senior members from both major US political parties. His case studies demonstrate the three important factors that impact the success or failure of defense reforms. Leaders must clearly frame the problem they need to solve, they need to gain approval from key stakeholders, and they must provide consistent and long-term attention to the implementation of their reforms.

Levine brings a wealth of experience and knowledge gained inside the defense enterprise. He served 28 years as a professional staff member to Senator Levin and the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee. There he reviewed and helped craft legislation for many defense reform initiatives. After leaving the congressional staff, Levine served one year as the DoD deputy chief Management Officer and one year as Acting Undersecretary of Defense for personnel and readiness in the Obama administration. More than a spectator, Levine has been a key player in many of the defense reform efforts he examines.

The book’s three sections are organized around changes to civilian personnel management, defense acquisition reform, and ongoing actions...
to make the Pentagon budget auditable. Levine provides examples to show the value of clear problem definition. He lauds the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 as a case where a solution was developed to a clearly defined problem in Joint planning and mission execution. On the other hand, he shows how Senator McCain's 2014 acquisition reform efforts lacked a similar focus and addressed a large collection of problems within the Department of Defense. These examples also clearly demonstrate the impact of stakeholder buy-in. Levine also highlights the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 as a case where key stakeholders agreed on the problem and the solution and the National Security Personnel System reforms of the early 2000s as a case that failed because it did not accommodate Congress or labor unions.

The case studies also point to the final factor, consistent implementation. In successful reform efforts like Secretary Perry's attempt to increase the use of commercial specifications in acquisition, DoD leadership remained focused on the issue through to successful completion. The quest for a clean Pentagon audit is an example where department leaders frequently lost attention and reforms floundered.

By describing these specific reform efforts in detail and tracking them through success and failure, Levine posits four reasons why reform within the defense enterprise is difficult. First, he notes the Department of Defense cannot go to a single budget line titled “WASTE.” Inefficiencies are spread across the department in multiple budget lines and based on a multitude of processes. Quick fixes are illusory and do not deliver on their promises.

Second, most good ideas have already been tried. A wise leader will survey past actions and be cognizant of people who oversell quick and easy solutions. Third, any DoD reform will face resistance. As in any large organization, new actions will have both supporters and detractors. The department has multiple power centers, and the status quo holds strong. Unless addressed directly, resistors can stop most department change efforts.

Finally, overcoming inefficiencies requires an investment in time and resources. Leader focus is finite, and consistent focus is often hard to maintain. Additionally, to save money, the department must allocate resources upfront. Being more efficient will save funds in the longer term, but will almost always require more resources in the near term when the competition for resources is most brutal.

To address these challenges, Levine provides three guidelines related to successful reforms. First, department leaders require tailored solutions to the right problems. The department should prioritize reform efforts against the most important issues that will yield the highest rewards and then the department must develop specific solutions to address each of these problems.

Second, the initiative must be enacted or approved. Major initiatives are more successful when they are based on a shared understanding
between the executive and legislative branches of government and have support from both major US political parties.

Finally, a consistent focus on resources is required through to full implementation. Successful execution depends on strong leadership and consistent engagement with all stakeholders through completion. While these three dictums seem simple, Levine’s book is full of examples where they were not followed, and he provides plenty of evidence showing the simplest ideas can be challenging to implement.

Defense reform will continue to be a priority for new Pentagon leaders who arrive with a mandate to make the department work better. Defense Management contains powerful examples of success and failure, and its three tenets are valuable signposts for reform practitioners.

Conspiring with the Enemy: The Ethic of Cooperation in Warfare
By Yvonne Chiu

Reviewed by C. Anthony Pfaff, research professor for strategy, the military profession and ethics, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

Writing in the 1930s, German philosopher Carl Schmitt famously opined that war’s real aim is the existential negation of that enemy, a relationship which represents the “utmost degree of intensity” of separation (Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 26). It is easy to understand why Schmitt would see war that way given the experience of the First World War. The experience of the Second World War, of course, simply reinforced the view that war is a zero sum game and anything that benefits an enemy hurts a friend. In such a view, it is difficult to see how cooperation is possible, much less useful. Yvonne Chiu challenges this canon in the provocative, and sometimes surreal, Conspiring with the Enemy. She argues cooperation among enemies in war is often the norm rather than the exception and that cooperation, as currently manifested in the international system, often works at cross purposes to limit the destructive effects of war.

Chiu breaks down cooperation in war to three broad norms: “cooperation for a fair fight, cooperation to minimize damage to a particular class of people, and cooperation to end war quickly” (36, 90, 135). Examples illustrate the range from the obvious, to the interesting, to the genuinely insightful, and include observation of the international law of armed conflict, which bans certain weapons, requires wearing of uniforms, and prohibits the direct targeting of noncombatants, among other things. More interesting examples include timed artillery bombardments in the First World War, which allowed both sides to anticipate attacks and minimize casualties, and British and German units delivering newspapers to each other. A more insightful example is the arrangement between the Indian and Pakistani air forces during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, where both sides agreed for a time not
to attack the other’s ground forces, who were mobilizing in flat, open territory. As one Pakistani officer put it, killing soldiers out in the open seemed “none too sporting” (50).

It is easy to see how Chiu’s discussion can get surreal. The last thing most soldiers will tell you they want is a fair fight, or perhaps more accurately, in choosing between a fair fight and one they are more likely to survive, soldiers will generally choose the latter over the former. This choice is as much a matter of policy as it is of individual preference. In 2016 General Joseph Dunford, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explicitly rejected the value of a fair fight in testimony to the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee (Garamone, “US Troops Should Not,” DOD News, April 27, 2016). Thus it can sometimes be difficult to reconcile Chiu’s putative motivation for cooperation with the actual experience of not only participating in war, but in preparing for it as well.

It is equally clear, however, that Chiu makes a good point. While soldiers certainly want to surprise, overwhelm, or otherwise kill their enemy without getting killed themselves, Chiu argues persuasively that they also want to differentiate the killing they do from murder. So for this reason they sometimes refrain from killing the individual enemy who gets caught defenseless while not thinking twice about killing others by the thousands.

At the policy level, soldiers also cooperate to avoid harm to noncombatants. This cooperation requires taking risks and foregoing advantages that absent that intention—and reciprocity—would not make sense. Thus, soldiers wear uniforms to differentiate themselves from civilians, which also makes them easier to target. They do not use certain weapons, like chemical munitions, even if using these weapons would be decisive in a particular battle, in part because of the potential harms to civilians and also in part because they would prefer such weapons not be used against them.

Chiu also notes that observing norms of cooperation in war does not necessarily make war more humane. Remotely operated precision weapons, for example, undermine the idea of a fair fight since remote operators are not taking risks and ensuring the protection of civilians because the use of these weapons creates unreasonable expectations regarding the number of civilian casualties. Since the aim of war is the rapid defeat of the enemy, norms that require restraint can impede military operations and lengthen a war, which simply increases over time the number of persons killed and buildings destroyed.

Chiu’s remedy is to invigorate cooperation for ending war quickly. This norm, which she argues has been a feature of war since Greek hoplites fought pitched battles to settle limited disputes, has been largely ignored in more modern wars. She attributes this fact largely to the mobilization of mass armies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to fight wars over ideologies. When wars were between monarchs who were more or less moral equals, it not only made sense to fight over
limited objectives it also did not make sense to those fighting to take a great deal of risk. Here ends and means aligned: armies simply were not going to be capable, as a general rule, to realize someone’s excessive ambitions. That changed, in the West at least, when French armies under Napoleon fought for _liberte, egalite, fraternite_ instead.

Chiu believes that international law has largely ceded questions of _jus ad bellum_ to the relevant actors’ ethical sensibilities and political demands. As a result, there is more space for aggressive wars and little space for cooperation to end them quickly. This seems an odd point to make. She is right that international law only permits defensive wars and certain kinds of humanitarian interventions; however, she does not take up the argument that the same system tried to create nonviolent alternatives to settling disputes that might otherwise lead to aggressive wars. So one could argue that rather than ceding questions of _jus ad bellum_, international law instead has answered it in the negative. By rejecting aggressive wars and providing alternatives to fighting, international law seeks to eliminate war as a practice.

Again Chiu has a point. Eliminating war, while a noble objective, is elusive if not impossible. There is a gap between what the law says and the ability of the international community to enforce it. Strong countries still resort to war to realize their interests when they see fit, even when doing so does not conform neatly to the letter or the spirit of the law. Chiu also argues that by limiting just wars to only defensive ones, international law reinforces the status quo and limits the means to address injustices associated with it, whether that be domestic oppression of a minority or boundaries drawn as a result of previous invasion.

This is an interesting concept and raises a number of questions regarding to whom war rights should be given. Over what, besides territory and sovereignty, should wars be fought, and at what point should a party to a conflict concede defeat. To the last point the current answer is “never,” if one’s cause is just and “immediately,” if one’s cause is not. A quick survey of the current geopolitical landscape provides ample evidence that this norm is inadequate. Whether the right answer is to make room for more fighting, albeit limited, is the right direction is an important question _Conspiring with the Enemy_ encourages readers to take up—especially in today’s globally competitive environment where technology has enabled a range of actors to threaten the vital interests of others in ways that risk escalating into war. It is a question worth addressing before it is settled by those who prefer war.
Kishore Mahbubani’s *Has China Won? The Chinese Challenge to American Primacy* addresses the geopolitical contest between the United States and China, highlighting key strategic mistakes while offering lessons and insights he hopes will better inform future policies in both countries. Mahbubani is a prolific writer on eastern and western geopolitics, global governance, and policy and is a distinguished fellow at the Asia Research Institute at the National University of Singapore.

This book is based on his personal experiences as a senior diplomat working with leaders in Beijing and Washington, DC. With a foot in both the occidental and oriental cultures, Mahbubani—an insightful critic of the west—is well positioned to review key policies and help America reflect on itself to find a better approach to face China’s emergence as a world leader. Mahbubani’s vast political experience in Asia serves as a lens, deepening an understanding of the motivations and reasoning behind the veil of Chinese politics. His sagacious insights must be kept in perspective. He does treat China gingerly, which is uncommon in the American press and academia. A more critical lens would have balanced his thorough analysis.

There are nine chapters in the book, with an overview of the current state of affairs between China and America and key strategic mistakes of each country in the chapters that follow. The fourth chapter, “Is China Expansionist?,” is crucial to dispelling media manipulations and misunderstandings of Chinese policy and informs readers of the oriental perspective (79). Other chapters uncover America’s bias of democracy, along with mistaken underlying American assumptions about the global order. Mahbubani adopts an advisory tone in the book, even going so far as to write a fictional letter advising Xi Jinping on the best way to deal with America. The letter is insightful capturing Chinese leader’s views of America in the contest for global influence—Mahbubani’s interactions with key leaders of the Communist Party of China (CCP) shapes his depiction. The letter also acknowledges areas where China will struggle to exert global influence, such as American dominance in universities, and creativity promoted through a focus on the individual which is foreign in Chinese culture.

The great power competition between China and America does suggest a comparison to the Cold War between America and the former Soviet Union, though Mahbubani persuasively argues that much thought and planning went into the latter and is remarkably absent from the
former. The biggest challenge to the west is due to closed mindedness; “to most Americans, the idea that a free and open society like America, the world’s strongest democracy, could lose a contest against a closed communist society like China is inconceivable,” Mahbubani opines (9).

Contrary to what many Americans think, there is not a deep ideological divide between the United States and the CCP over communism and democracy, Mahbubani convincingly argues. Years ago, China made a conscious decision to not promote communism internationally—unlike the Soviet Union. China is different because, much like America, its goal is to promote Chinese expansionism and influence through the global economy. His book is meant to provide support for a major US course correction for America centered around improving the lives of its citizens, while returning to a strategy focused on garnering international support with its most potent weapon, the US dollar rather than the military.

Mahbubani’s perspective provides a sharp contrast to China’s critics such as Stein Ringen who highlights China’s two million Internet opinion analysts who troll the Web to remove undesirable content while shaping the stories into the CCP’s framework. Ringen labels China as a kleptocracy, and his sharp criticisms serve to balance Mahbubani’s flowery perceptions of the CCP. Contrary to Mahbubani’s suggestion, the great power competition between China and the United States will dominate the headlines for the foreseeable future. We all need to hope that both countries remain cognizant of the other 191 countries on the planet.

Perhaps Mahbubani is correct, and America views China’s rapid success on an unconscious level, to present, what he labels a great “yellow peril” that threatens western supremacy and democracy(7, 258). That another system of government might be a viable alternative to democracy and more economically efficient—despite the drawbacks of individual freedom—could be disturbing. The tug ultimately might be between occidental reason and a subconscious aversion to the oriental culture which ultimately might replace western global domination.

As mentioned earlier, Mahbubani’s participation in Singapore’s elite political system more closely mirrors China’s and shapes his perceptions, though Singapore maintains strong ties to the west. Mahbubani’s work will provide greater insight for military practitioners and should be required reading for senior leaders. His criticisms of American policy are thought provoking, while his lucid observations of Chinese motivations and perspective serve to illustrate why analysts continually misunderstand Chinese intentions. Mahbubani reminds us that for too long, the United States focused on the “M” or military element of soft power in DIME—Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economy—to influence national policy objectives. It is time to modify our approach to meet the new emerging global threat, which will not be a military threat but an economic and diplomatic influence around the world. The military needs to be America’s tool of last resort, not the first. America
needs to make decisions to encourage global cooperation, while also being mindful of the objectives of other countries and how their objectives might not mirror our own.

It is time for America to break the fetters of the Cold War and the associated commitment to build and maintain the military infrastructure which has long since taken a back seat to economic and technological growth and innovation. China’s leaders certainly understand and will gladly stand by as America enters costly wars, diverting crucial resources from economic development to the military machine. Has China Won? provides a wake-up call. Let us hope the leaders in Washington can be open minded enough to at least consider another perspective, a redefinition of America’s role in a multipolar world.
We live in a globalized and interconnected world. The high-tech explosion of the twenty-first century has made communications between friends and foe easier—but also harder to detect—and has allowed foreign fighters to create networks, travel with ease, and expand their technological reach. Daniel Byman's *Road Warriors: Foreign Fighters in the Armies of Jihad* provides readers with an analytical history of the contemporary foreign fighter phenomenon in light of the democratization of technology.

Byman, a professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, a senior fellow at the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, and a former staff member of the 9/11 Commission, argues that the potential threat posed by foreign jihadists is large and growing. In addition to conducting international terrorist attacks, they radicalize indigenous fighters in civil wars and regionalize conflicts (8). He defines a foreign fighter as an “individual who travels to a state other than their own to join an illicit group and perpetrate or assist in terrorist attacks or armed conflict” (7). He also derives three sets of observations regarding the foreign fighter based on the following questions: “(1) Why do individuals leave their homes to go fight in faraway lands? (2) What impact do foreign fighters have that makes them of such concern? and (3) How can we [the US Army and other Western nations] better fight foreign fighters” (9). These are not rhetorical questions. They guide Byman’s analysis of the foreign fighters in the jihad armies.

As Byman points out, foreign fighters leave their homes to join the mujahideen to expel occupiers of Muslim lands or groups fighting against the so-called apostate governments or for the establishment of a Caliphate, even if temporarily. They also make a tremendous impact on conflicts worldwide in terms of duration and brutality. Some foreign fighters possess considerable combat and/or technical skills that enhance the conflict’s lethality. Others act as logisticians, travel facilitators, passport forgers, and recruiters and contribute to the armies of jihad because they understand the culture where a conflict occurs and know how to appeal to the community, either with inducements of a better future or hostility toward citizens for noncooperation, and are often “better trained, more highly motivated and networked, and tied to skilled planners back in the war zone” (12).
An important contribution by Byman is his strategy on how to combat foreign fighters and his six-stage foreign fighter production process (13, 252). In stage one, “Radicalize,” a foreign fighter “learns radical ideas” and “becomes angry” (253). As Byman illustrates, no single factor explains why someone radicalizes and becomes a foreign fighter; therefore, the goal of governments during this stage is to identify and dissuade individuals before they take illegal actions. A government must cooperate and coordinate its counternarrative with local religious leaders, community businesses, and neighborhood groups that “promote their own messages of moderation” (254).

In stage two, “Decision,” a foreign fighter becomes motivated to fight and the individual undergoes change such as growing a beard in solidarity to the other mujahideen (253). “As terrorism expert Clinton Watts points out, ‘The call for jihad may be global, but recruitment is extremely local’”; therefore, developing peaceful alternatives while also integrating the mujahideen back into the community is the objective (256, emphasis in original).

In stage three “Traveling,” a foreign fighter “travels to foreign countries to participate in jihad” (253). Byman believes this is an important stage since there must be cooperation with a foreign country in order to obtain passports, money, and travel access. Foreign fighters will usually bribe border control agents to facilitate their comings and goings through a region or country. Border control agents, usually underpaid, see the bribe as an important supplement to their incomes. For example, Venezuelans have been able to travel to Iran without having to stamp their passports. Another example, illustrated by Byman, is the Mauritanian government. According to Byman, “the Mauritanian government paid Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb ten to twenty million Euros a year and promised that it would not interfere with jihadist travel if, in exchange, the group agreed not to kidnap tourists or otherwise attack in Mauritania” (257).

Stage four “Training and Fighting in the War Zone,” is, perhaps, the most important stage (253). Here the foreign fighter “gains skills and experience, connects to global jihadi networks, and adopts more extreme views” (253).

In stage five “Return,” the foreign fighter returns home by means that “avoid law enforcement and security services” (253). Byman contends “the return stage entails the greatest number of competing agendas, requiring a state to adopt an array of policy options” (265). While some governments have taken a mano dura (firm hand) approach when dealing with foreign fighters who return home, the overall evidence indicates it does not prevent or dissuade an individual from continuing nefarious activities. Byman discusses the examples of France and Denmark and their approach to returnees. France systematically prosecutes its returnees on terrorism charges while Denmark has carefully reevaluated its approach to reintegrate the individual into society upon his return rather than criminalize him. As the Danish pointed out, “being more
coercive might strengthen ‘the victim’s discourse’ within the Muslim community and thereby exacerbate the social conditions that can lead some individuals to participate in jihad” (265). In stage six “Plot,” the foreign fighter plans a terrorist act and recruits potential ideological sympathizers to join the mujahideen movement (253).

In conclusion, Road Warriors provides a history and assessment of the modern jihadist foreign fighter movement. Furthermore, Byman’s foreign fighter’s life cycle, provides practitioners and scholars of terrorism with an approach for dealing with a topic unlikely to go away any time soon. Terrorism, a pandemic of the twenty-first century, can only be mitigated, never completely eradicated. While terrorist organizations are often fragmented and highly divided along ideology, religious beliefs, and leadership personalities, Byman’s long-term hope is that “transnational jihadism, like international anarchism and communism before it, will burn itself out or at least move from center stage to a sideshow” (267). However, terrorism and jihadists are not simple issues policymakers and law enforcement agencies can easily handle. As Byman suggests “because of this resilience, the foreign fighter problem will endure even with the Caliphate being forced underground at the end of 2018” (250). Byman further explains that “[f]or now, governments must assume the movement will endure, try to counter it, and limit the damage that can be done by foreign fighters and the terrorists they inspire” (268). I recommend Road Warriors to anyone interested in international studies, terrorism, and international relations. But, most importantly to future Army leaders in a “world in disarray.”

**ISIS Propaganda: A Full-Spectrum Extremist Message**

Edited by Stephane J. Baele, Katharine A. Boyd, and Travis G. Coan

Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, instructor at the Safe Communities Institute at the University of Southern California

The edited volume ISIS Propaganda, pertaining to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (or Syria), is the second work in the Causes and Consequences of Terrorism Series, a partnership between Oxford University Press and the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland. Its editors, all at the University of Exeter, are Stephane J. Baele, senior lecturer in international relations and security; Katharine A. Boyd, senior lecturer in criminology; and Travis G. Coan, senior lecturer in quantitative politics. Inclusive of the editors, 16 contributors also participated in the volume, including well-known terrorism specialists Thomas Hegghammer, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI); Haroro J. Ingram, George Washington University; and Charlie Winter, King’s College London.

ISIS Propaganda provides the “first comprehensive overview and detailed analysis of this (ISIS) propaganda effort, which, we argue
here and throughout the book, constitutes an outstanding instance of ‘full-spectrum propaganda’” (2). This is quite a feat given no prior book has attempted to arrange the mosaic pieces related to ISIS propaganda activities in order to create a more encompassing picture that can be better understood and analyzed in its totality.

ISIS Propaganda is composed of front and back sections, an introduction, eight chapters, and an afterword. The front sections consist of the contributor listing and a glossary of frequent Arabic terms—including terms in English, their original Arabic spelling, and the ISIS translation in English—and individual and group names in English and their original Arabic spelling. The introduction provides an overview to the work and explains how ISIS is utilizing a full-spectrum propaganda approach within the context of the “IS moment of prodigious plagiarism” (8). The impact of the use of propaganda by ISIS and the “thorny question of the propagandists’ and propagandees’ respective agencies,” however, is not addressed (11).

The first chapter provides two key tables. The first table—related to the “Islamic State’s ‘Hedging’ Approach”—identifies themes prioritized during bust and boom cycles (32). The second table, “Multiple Formats Mobilized in Islamic State Propaganda,” highlights the messaging mediums analyzed in the follow-on chapters (36). This important chapter recognizes “IS seeks to synchronize the actions of its ‘competitive system of control’ with the messages at the heart of its ‘competitive system of meaning’ ” (44).

The second chapter is organized into three parts focused on ISIS’s ideological genealogy, the context in which its message developed, and speculation concerning its futures messaging (51). The next four chapters provide the messaging case studies related to the mediums utilized for Salafi-Jihadi—that is Wahhabi derived—propaganda purposes, principally in Arabic and English but other languages are also touched upon. The third chapter addresses magazines, highlights the importance of the Arabic language magazine al-Naba and the better-known Dabiq and Rumiyah, English language magazines, and utilizes network linking and in- and out-group and quantitative analysis.

The fourth chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the propaganda videos utilized by the Caliphate, focusing on “province” (Wilayāt) produced content and trends, “script” content analysis related to ISIS narratives, and the “Selected 10” featured video placement found in magazines such as Dabiq. Chapter five reviews Islamic State online propaganda use with an emphasis on its active engagement with the target audience as opposed to more passive interactions. The successful use of social media such as Twitter and Telegram is then explored. The sixth chapter concerns the lesser propaganda media utilized by ISIS in terms of their “religious chants . . . photo galleries/reports, infographics, books, and news communiqués,” with the a cappella Islamic chants (anashīd)—perhaps the most fascinating element (189). The seventh chapter focuses on counter-ISIS propaganda activities including shutting down their safe
online spaces, limiting legitimate media amplification and exploitation for intelligence-gathering purposes, and counter-narrative strategies. The final chapter discusses terrorist propaganda futures through its answering of specific questions to guide the analysis related to imitative and creative behavior on the part of ISIS and its successors (243). Each chapter contains a reference listing at its conclusion.

The afterword by Hegghammer credits the book for helping the field overcome a five-year struggle to better understand the “scale and nature of the IS full-spectrum propaganda machine” by fusing the talents of “propaganda specialists and ‘in-the-weeds’ jihadism observers” (266). This afterword is followed by an anashīd appendix, excerpts from a provincial news report from Al-Bayan Radio appendix, and an index.

The book has one slight demerit. Some of the chapter content appears to have been completed in 2018 with later sporadic contributions refreshing it into 2020, giving the information a lessons-learned rather than a cutting-edge feel given how quickly the ISIS jihadi propaganda spaces evolve. This problem, unfortunately, is part and parcel of academic book publishing with its industrial-era production cycles and is not a critique of the book itself.

Ultimately, any critique would be quibbling. *ISIS Propaganda* is an extremely high-quality book with good use of tabling, figures, and imagery. It is very informative and does an excellent integrative analysis of seemingly disparate forms of ISIS propaganda material. It will be of specific interest to military officers and governmental personnel tasked with the US global response to ISIS social media use for propaganda, radicalization, and recruitment purposes. Much of this concern today ties into the current emergence of ISIS cells in new parts of the globe and the foreign fighters phenomenon—with its battlefield shifting potentials—that still has not been fully resolved.
From Quills to Tweets: How America Communicates about War and Revolution
Edited by Andrea J. Dew, Marc A. Genest, and S. C. M. Paine

Reviewed by Ross Harrison, senior fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC

Carl von Clausewitz, the famous nineteenth-century Prussian war strategist, said, “War is the continuation of politics by other means” (Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 87). Part of the politics of war for Clausewitz is the interaction between the government, the people, and the military. *From Quills to Tweets* embodies this insight to its fullest.

For the authors of this new and fresh contribution to the study of war, the successful prosecution of military campaigns often depends on adept communication strategies. Even successful military campaigns not accompanied by an adeptly waged “war of words” risk political objectives not being met, resulting in the most profound kind of strategic failure (44).

Dew, Genest, and Paine fuse an elegant, simple-to-follow conceptual framework with a sweeping historical treatment of war that yields a rich understanding of how war and revolution are inherently political enterprises. Readers come away with the insight that communication can be as important a part of military strategy as the fighting itself, even though the authors do not explicitly say this. Without effective communication strategies, political and military leaders risk rendering even successful military campaigns unsuccessful in meeting their political objectives.

The book uses the insight about the inextricable connection between warfare and communication, not as an endpoint but rather as a jumping-off point. The authors drill down deeper than previous treatments of the same subject, providing readers with a wonderfully innovative analysis of how the United States has, at times, framed the political dimensions of war to its advantage, and how at other times, political leaders have used messaging to provide a soft political landing for military failures like Vietnam.

The book grabs readers from the first page with the crisp treatment of the Revolutionary War against the British and the importance of messaging as a determinant of its success. Almost every major US military campaign is examined—from the War of 1812, the Spanish-American War, the two World Wars, Korea, Vietnam, and the more recent military campaigns in the Middle East.

The authors are as adroit in getting their message across as they are in providing readers with an understanding of the importance of
messaging in war. Readers will see that while time and technology have changed the communication side of war, the fundamentals have remained largely unchanged since the American Revolution. For sure, military campaigns have become more geographically expansive and complex, and the technology of messaging has become more sophisticated. But like in earlier times, the ability for government leaders to translate military success into the political wins discussed by Clausewitz depends heavily on adept management of the message.

This book gets good stylistic grades as well. For an edited volume, it is remarkably cohesive. All contributing authors used the tight framework of the messages of war, the messengers who propagate those messages, and the media by which the messages are propagated. Readers will forget this book is a compilation of contributions by many authors—unlike many edited volumes.

From *Quills to Tweets* is an incredibly timely contribution at a time when US foreign policy seems to lack clearly stated objectives and strategies, and when effective communication to the American public, to allies, and to adversaries remains elusive and flatfooted. This tightly written volume will provide a wakeup call for a more coherent strategy that communicates both military and political objectives to the American public and the world. It will be a conversation starter for renewed discourse on how war is, in fact, a quest to achieve clear political and strategic objectives by other means.

**Organisational Learning and the Modern Army: A New Model for Lessons-Learned Processes**

By Tom Dyson

Reviewed by Seth A. Johnston, fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, and lieutenant colonel in the US Army

Tom Dyson’s *Organisational Learning and the Modern Army* evokes the old admonition not to judge a book by its cover. This slim hardback makes good on its title proposition for army lessons learned. It also surveys British and German experiences in Afghanistan, synthesizes literature on military change, contemplates NATO, accounts for the United States among many other factors, and offers policy advice for related topics, including officer education and civil-military relations. Its density is less like a sabot round than canister: though covering a large area, each fléchette of insight still stings.

The book concentrates on how armies institutionalize learning. Dyson views lessons learned processes as an important “transmission belt” for moving hard-won lessons from the field into enduring changes in training, doctrine, and other aspects of the institutional army (1). Contrasted with other authors on the subject, Dyson is especially bullish on the value of formal lessons learned institutions—which he
abbreviates “LL” (3). His model identifies organizational activities—especially operational design, basic and predeployment training, and education—that support such formal lessons learned. On the question of sources for military learning, Dyson considers the full range of options but concludes factors external to the military are decisive and that civilian leadership is especially important (246).

The book features an introductory cluster of theory chapters, two case studies from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and closing reflections on military learning mainly aimed at practitioners and “Practice Turn” scholars (10). In his review of theoretical literature, Dyson pulls few punches in criticizing the “limited analysis” of Richard Downie, John Nagl, and other authors on organizational learning (5). To be sure, other authors, including Sergio Catignani and Theo Farrell, enjoy multiple complimentary citations, though perhaps as much for their shared empirical focus on the British army in Afghanistan. Dyson embraces theoretical eclecticism and draws explicitly from organization theory, process models like bureaucratic politics, and strategic and other cultural approaches, all before embracing neoclassical realism—itself a broad tent. The result is a detailed chart of theoretical propositions on military learning, focused on the tactical and operational levels of war.

Although the book is titled and organized as a theory proposing work supported by two case studies, it could be equally well read the other way around. An examination of the two biggest European participants in the ISAF mission—and among the most important armies in NATO generally—is empirically valuable. Military and civilian practitioners will find the summary takeaways from the British and German experiences illuminating applied reading and a superb complement to the Parameters’ special issues on Afghanistan lessons learned published during the last year (158–63, 232–42).

Dyson assesses that while British and German armies began their Afghanistan campaigns with decent learning potential, both failed to realize enduring lessons. The detailed reasons why reveal unexpected gems, such as a fascinating historical and generational account of the “three visions of military professionalism” in the Bundeswehr (221–23). Beyond the main tactical and operational focus, Dyson reflects on “unrealistic” British and German political expectations of their armies, with some good sense of civil and military recommendations to close the gap (248–49). With so much else written on the American experience, this book offers a rare perspective. It is not merely a documentation of past campaigns, but a work of forward-looking clarity. Dyson convincingly argues the relevance of these cases for an army’s modernization and readiness for newer challenges such as hybrid warfare (31, 88, 158, 247).

Organisational Learning and the Modern Army is serious reading, and a more ruthless editor might have demanded cuts. Not all theories do equal work in the analysis, for example, and there are some hints that still other conceptual approaches were indeed cut from earlier drafts—mainly
historical institutionalism and associated terms like “path-dependence” that remain sprinkled through individual sections (58). Empirically, the book offers useful information about the multinational NATO lessons learned institutions, but these are not central to the British or German cases.

Stylistically, I admit to a momentary sense of déjà vu before realizing the first paragraph of chapter two is a verbatim facsimile of the preceding paragraph. In word choice, spelling, and other conventions, the book exemplifies the old saying that the United Kingdom and the United States are two nations divided by a common language. Yet the application of so many theoretical traditions and their associated technical terms (e.g., “Potential Absorptive Capacity ‘PACAP,’” “Realized Absorptive Capacity ‘RACAP,’” “single-loop” and ‘double-loop’ learning,” etc.) present a steep learning curve to anyone (2, 12). American political scientists might also quibble about the research design, including the reliance on qualitative methods and interview sources, or using only two case studies to advance such an exhaustive new model. But Dyson’s clear command of the material, the richness of the information conveyed from interviews, and the uncommonly helpful and explicit practical implications of the analysis outweigh these concerns.

Dyson’s book contributes to a renaissance in transatlantic scholarly interest in military learning, often motivated by and focused on the American and European experience in Afghanistan. It follows works “such as “Learning the Hard Way” (2016) by Jörg Noll and Sebastiaan Rietjens and NATO’s Lessons in Crisis (2018) by Heidi Hardt. Hardt and Dyson pair together exceptionally well. While both authors undertake a qualitative case study analysis of NATO in Afghanistan, Hardt emphasizes the international rather than national structures, the strategic rather than tactical and operational, and the informal methods of learning rather than formal “LL” (3). Together the books set up a great debate on the future of this subject—or perhaps the beginning of a new synthesis. Either way, Dyson makes an important addition to contemporary conflict viewed from an allied but non-US perspective, comprehensive thinking about military learning, and practical considerations for army institutional leadership and civil-military relations. I highly recommend Organisational Learning and the Modern Army.
Phoenix Rising: From the Ashes of Desert One to the Rebirth of U.S. Special Operations
By Col Keith M. Nightingale (Ret)

Reviewed by David Fivecoat, leadership consultant and retired US Army colonel

Operation Eagle Claw, the US military operation to rescue the 52 American hostages being held at the US Embassy in Tehran, Iran, ended in failure at Desert One on the night of April 24–25, 1980, when a RH-53D helicopter collided with an EC-130 tanker during refueling operations. In 1979, Keith Nightingale—then a major working on the Department of the Army staff in the Pentagon—was assigned to the Joint Task Force Headquarters for the operation. Phoenix Rising is Nightingale’s fast paced, extremely well-written account of his perspective on the operation and the subsequent creation of US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

Nightingale’s detailed perspective on the planning, rehearsals, and execution of the raid are the strongest aspect of the book. Early on he lays out the challenges of Operation Eagle Claw:

- “Fly 15,000 miles around the world, the last 850 miles in hostile airspace, and arrive undetected.
- Enter a sprawling metropolitan city of 2,000,000.
- Close with and breach the walls of a heavily guarded, 27-acre compound.
- Free, without injury, 60+ American citizens from their guards without injuring any civilians” (15).

Additional conditions included planning, rehearsing, and executing the operation in complete secrecy within 10 days of notification; no funding for the operation; and extraction of the assault force and hostages. These parameters made the hostage rescue plan extremely complex. With no standing organization trained for the mission, the Army created an ad hoc Joint Task Force with a headquarters of 32 people on the Joint Staff in the Pentagon under the command of Major General James Vaught. The task force included a Delta Force element, a US Army Rangers element, US Navy RH-53D helicopters, US Marine Corps helicopter pilots, US Air Force EC-130 and MC-130s to transport the assault force, US Navy fighter aircraft operating from the USS Nimitz and USS Coral Sea, as well as US Air Force AC-130 gunships for air support and US Air Force C-141s to extract the force.

The entire Eagle Claw team worked tirelessly to provide a viable military option to then US President Jimmy Carter. Although the lowest-ranking person in the Joint Task Force Headquarters, Nightingale
successfully captures the personalities and series of decisions that increased the complexity and ad hoc nature of the operation. Vaught and the team overcame obstacle after obstacle to plan, rehearse, and execute the operation—especially maintaining secrecy and operating without a budget.

Although Nightingale concludes the mission failed for mechanical, organizational, and political reasons, he highlights the US Navy’s failure to fly the eight RH-53Ds on flight profiles that would have replicated the distances of the raid—despite being ordered three times to do so. He also asserts that flying the rehearsal flights, as directed, would have stressed the aircraft and might have prevented the mechanical loss of three helicopters prior to Desert One. This omission by the Navy was not brought up in the post-operation inquiry.

The second-best element of *Phoenix Rising* is Nightingale’s perspective on working in the Pentagon. The 1979–81 Pentagon was very similar to my experience working in the basement of the Pentagon from 2012–14. I agree with Nightingale’s assessment that for the military “significant change must come from outside the bureaucracy. Bureaucracies are very good at fighting that which they don’t want to do” (208). The stories of resistance from the services, briefings in the tank, bad meals in the food court, and daily crises will resonate with readers assigned to the Pentagon, especially those working in the Joint Staff.

Nightingale provides a unique perspective on the creation of USSOCOM. From the book, I learned more about programs still used today (Honey Badger, ELT, Yellow Fruit, and DARISSA) that helped develop special operations capabilities in the 1980s. Nightingale also provides a detailed play-by-play of the bureaucratic and political fight behind the creation of the four-star headquarters that would oversee all Special Operations Forces and have a line item in the budget to fund the organization. It is clear, without the failure at Desert One, USSOCOM would not exist.

While reading the book, I wished Nightingale had used his unique viewpoint and friendship with the key players to write the definitive history of Operation Eagle Claw. Charlie Beckwith, Eric Haney, James Kyle, Mark Bowden, and now Keith Nightingale have all tackled the raid from different perspectives. It has been more than 40 years since the operation and not one published book covers all facets of the mission. Maybe Sean Naylor, Seth Jones, or Eric Schmitt will take on this task.

In short, *Phoenix Rising* is superb. The book was a pleasure to read and added another piece to the Operation Eagle Claw puzzle. It should be read by personnel at all levels in the special operations community who will draw lessons on planning complex operations, grasp the challenges of creating ad hoc organizations under pressure, and develop a deeper understanding of USSOCOM history. It is also a valuable read for anyone assigned to the Pentagon who will walk away with a better comprehension of how the bureaucracy works.
A book title that strings together the words covert and regime change is certain to attract potential readers from the academic, public, and policy-making communities. Add the subtitle “America’s Secret Cold War,” impressive research, and methodological rigor, and the book will be eagerly sought after by top-tier press acquisition editors and top-tier journal book review editors and provide a gateway to a tenure track position. Lindsay O’Rourke’s revised dissertation is evidence of that.

It is surprising, then, that O’Rourke’s contribution to the history of US foreign relations, intelligence history, and international relations theory is not just valuable but also original. After all, especially since the failed Bay of Pigs operation in 1961, US-orchestrated covert actions aimed at influencing, destabilizing, or overthrowing foreign governments often made headlines. Even before that, clandestine operations in Albania, Iran, Guatemala, Indonesia, Congo, and elsewhere were hardly well-kept secrets. O’Rourke’s dataset identifies more than 60 covert efforts to bring about regime change, some 10 times the number of overt efforts, pursued by the United States between 1947 and 1989. Scholars and journalists have been aware of each of these efforts. Yet because of the continued classification of documents and attendant impediments to research, few authors have sought to chronicle and analyze them as comprehensively and systematically as O’Rourke, and no one has succeeded as she has. We owe her a great debt.

Yet O’Rourke’s goal in Covert Regime Change is not so much to uncover what but to explain why and assess the results and consequences. Bolstering the salience of the questions she explores is the continued appeal of covert regime changes after the end of the Cold War when, at least until 2001, the United States appeared to have less reason to fear global antagonists. O’Rourke explains this phenomenon by formulating a typology to categorize the drivers of US policymakers’ decisions to seek regime changes. She begins with offensive operations, conventionally associated with rollback or liberation, designed to overthrow a perceived security threat and/or its allies. These operations, most which targeted Eastern Europe or Soviet nationalities during the Cold War, were the least effective. The second category is preventive operations, which aimed to stop a state from developing a weapon or weapons system or deter it from joining a hostile alliance. Iran and other Middle Eastern states are exemplars.

Finally, O’Rourke identifies hegemonic operations as those intended to establish or maintain US dominance. Caribbean and Latin American nations such as Guatemala, Brazil, or Chile fit this template.
All told, O'Rourke classifies 23 covert operations in the first category as covert, 25 in the second category, and 18 in the third category. The sum of the overt operations that spanned the categories is six, half of which were hegemonic. She also formulates typologies for the covert actions themselves.

As a historian I am uncomfortable with typologies. Our discipline stresses contingency, dissimilarity, and change. In my judgment, the distinctions O'Rourke draws among the missions are somewhat artificial, and the boundaries that separate them are porous. One can identify the 1954 Guatemalan coup d'état—code name Operation PBSuccess—as offensive or preventive as easily as hegemonic. Nevertheless, because the United States sought to effect so many regime changes during the Cold War—revealingly the term regime change did not become popular until the post–Cold War era when applied publicly to such states as Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria—there is value to establishing patterns and commonalities. Chief among these, O'Rourke argues persuasively, is the perception that regime change will advance US interests more fundamentally than any alternative (negotiations, for example), that the problem the United States confronts is intractable, and, perhaps most problematically, that the United States can replace the offending regime with one more sympathetic to American aims if not necessarily its values.

Another pattern O'Rourke detects, and perhaps the one on which the others hinge, is that although covert operations are more likely to fail than overt ones, policymakers find them all but irresistible because they appraise the potential risks and costs as lower than overt operations. They presume a failure will remain hidden or at least the United States will be able plausibly to deny its culpability. Further, the operation is unlikely to provoke a great power response. Hence, regardless of the dismal success rate, covert operations have continued and will almost surely continue to be high on the menu of policymakers’ options and instruments. The processes administrations across the board use to decide on an operation, moreover, are unlikely to serve as a deterrent.

O'Rourke thus joins the chorus of critics who argue that covert actions are ineffective instruments of US foreign policy and national security. Even when the operations succeeded in the short run, she writes, the “covert regime changes seldom worked out as intended,” and the costs to America’s reputation, image, global relations, and more far exceeded the rewards (83). But she goes a step beyond by estimating that notwithstanding the validity of this assessment, policy makers will be unable to resist the temptation to approve them. This contribution to the literature is more constructive than her typology, her articulation of a theory that explains covert regime changes in terms of realism and security, or even her exhaustive catalog of operations.

Without minimizing the historiographical value of Covert Regime Change—O'Rourke does intervene in some debates, perhaps most notably by arguing that John F. Kennedy was “intimately involved” in
the decision to support a coup against Ngo Dinh Diem—O'Rourke’s objective is primarily theoretical (179). That will affect readers’ reception of, if not the book, several of its chapters. All will applaud her research, however, especially her archival research. In this regard, even though she fails occasionally to acknowledge adequately that some of her secondary sources are more reliable and authoritative than others, she has carefully reconstructed the history of the numerous case studies she presents. The takeaways from this book will differ among political scientists, historians, and practitioners, and some will lament the absence of a bibliography. They all should read it nevertheless.

Civilizing Torture: An American Tradition
By W. Fitzhugh Brundage

Reviewed by Dr. Larry D. Miller, professor of communicative arts, US Army War College

Author W. Fitzhugh Brundage, the William B. Umstead Distinguished Professor of History at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, has crafted a perceptive and rather unsettling contribution to the understanding of torture. Civilizing Torture: An American Tradition presents eight wide-ranging and articulate chapters that constitute an admittedly fractured yet remarkably informative history of torture.

Brundage’s contribution is necessarily imperfect: torturers prefer to work in the shadows, seldom maintain detailed records, and portray their activities as favorably as possible when challenged or called to account. Victims are often reluctant to speak, and an unknown number of victims never have the opportunity to speak. In addition, what qualifies as torture in an expansive historical context is as malleable as it is disturbing. As Brundage aptly observes, “There is no unambiguous threshold that separates cruelty from torture” (5). Nevertheless, some constants apply. Invariably inflicted by the powerful on the powerless, torture involves physical, mental, and often life-threatening pain.

The basic theme throughout this volume is the torture record demonstrates that American exceptionalism is, and has always been, far more aspirational than real. By and large Americans have historically accepted and tacitly embraced brutality and torture while steadfastly posturing under a presumption of innocence. Torture, Americans believe and believe with little doubt, is something others do, not the United States. Alas, Brundage demonstrates the conflict between belief and action: despite lofty values and assurances to the contrary, Americans have historically employed torture as a viable means to an end, so much so that torture, as he argues convincingly, is something of an ongoing American tradition.

Brundage challenges readers to discern whether a fair, just, and democratic society can legitimately engage in torture while proudly
clinging to the foundational values, principles, and perspectives of a liberal democratic republic that rejects torture as unacceptable and uncivilized. By documenting the use of torture across multiple historic contexts and issues, and detailing the ways in which torture has been enacted, Brundage directs attention to the sustained and compelling conflict between means and ends—an exceptionally important contribution, though one that leaves the text disjointed at times.

The Brundage torture tour moves in a hopscotch fashion beginning in the early 1500s in America, England, and Europe and eventually landing in the modern era. In each extended and well-developed instance, Brundage demonstrates the powerful have authority to act, although torture itself is often, but not always, hidden from view. He begins by documenting a wealth of torturous acts and brutality well understood, respected, and practiced by warring tribal groups and adopted in part by European colonists intent on securing land and establishing a new republic.

Brundage shows that, over time, torture came to be gently civilized in the public mind. Torture for the most part was relegated to and associated with savagery, unregulated frontier conduct, fading recollections of monarchial tyranny, and often simply ignored or dismissed as a distressing aberration from the societal norm. Thus, because torture is antithetical to civility in a liberal democratic republic, the developing state opted for humane approaches for formal rehabilitation of individuals whose conduct warranted incarceration and punishment.

Throughout the book, Brundage presents exemplars to demonstrate the resulting divide between the imagined civil state and the enacted brutal state characteristic of prison life, police conduct, and military engagements—all of which are regrettably relevant to contemporary audiences. Prison life in nineteenth-century America, for example, was rife with cruelties sanctioned by the state and routinely administered by institutional authority. Indeed, the shower-bath—a forerunner of waterboarding—and hooding were common practices in some northern penitentiaries in the 1800s. The emergence of the modern police force gave rise to “the third degree,” forced confessions, and an array of often brutal extralegal practices. The book also examines torture during the Cold War, the Vietnam experience, the post 9/11 War on Terror, events at Abu Ghraib, and efforts by senior government officials to authorize “enhanced interrogation” as a legal and acceptable technique for securing information from suspected terrorists and unwilling informants (309).

With the publication of Civilizing Torture: An American Tradition, Brundage effectively augments the literature on torture in the American experience and its relationship to justice, human rights, dignity, and democracy. Military strategists, policymakers, and historians will benefit from his insights, as will readers interested in the strained relationship between civility and security. Brundage’s unique contribution is to place, for today’s readers, the reality of torture as a practice conducted
simultaneously in support of and in direct opposition to American lives and values. He reminds us the extreme polarization so often identified as unique to this historical moment is, in fact, rooted in our founding and made visible through the structures and abuses of power represented at home and abroad by the specter of American torture.
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