From the Editor in Chief

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This is a special issue of Parameters. It celebrates half a century of publishing first-rate strategic analyses designed to help US civilian and military policymakers decide how best to address the always present and always varying challenges to America’s security.

When Parameters made its debut as a strategy journal in March 1971, the United States was still engaged in the Vietnam conflict with more than 300,000 troops in the country. The terrorist group known as the Weather Underground exploded a bomb in the US Capitol Building that same month to protest the expansion of the war into Laos. Large-scale antiwar protests and sit-ins took place in the nation’s capital in May 1971. One month later, in June of 1971, the “Pentagon Papers” were released, raising troubling questions about the motives for, and sustainability of, America’s involvement in the war. National Public Radio (NPR) made its inaugural broadcast in 1971 as well, adding a public-funded broadcasting agency as an alternative to commercial networks.

But national morale was low. Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert Kennedy were assassinated in April and June of 1968 respectively, and riots in America’s major metropolitan centers continued throughout the remainder of that year. Apollo 11’s successful landing on the moon on July 20, 1969, (and Apollo 12 four months later) was offset by Apollo 13’s aborted lunar mission in April 1970. And the May 4, 1970, massacre at Kent State University, in which four students were killed, was not yet one year old. All of these events were in the rearview mirror, but only just.

In 1971, America’s population was 211 million people and climbing. The United States was experiencing an economic recession with inflation reaching nearly 6 percent the year before, the highest rate since the Korean War; unemployment hovered just over 6 percent, and real per-capita income amounted to $18,000; a gallon of gas cost only 40 cents, while the average price of a new house was $25,000.1 In the summer of 1971, the country’s voting age was lowered to 18 to align it with the draft age, which had been 18 since the Second World War. Ironically that shift came at a time when the country had begun to move away from conscription toward a volunteer force—which in turn raised far-ranging questions about US civil-military relations and military professionalism.

This celebratory issue consists of two parts. Part I, Prospectives 2021, offers three forums discussing ways ahead for America’s Strategic Landpower, its Civil-Military Relations, and its National Security. Part II, Retrospectives 1971, assesses the contributions made to the inaugural issue of Parameters. We have arranged the contributions to Part II thematically, to aid readers, rather than presenting them in their original order.

Part I’s first forum, US Strategic Landpower, opens with an article by Carol Evans, “Providing Stability and Deterrence: The US Army in INDOPACOM.” She argues the US Army’s long-range, precision-strike capabilities offer powerful means to improve deterrence in the

1. In 2016 dollars (inflation adjusted).
Indo-Pacific region by means of a “Ring of Fires” concept; furthermore, the Army’s capacity for building military-to-military relationships provides an exceptional mechanism for enhancing the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, and with it regional stability. Nora Bensahel’s “Transforming the US Army for the Twenty-First Century” follows Evans's contribution, arguing the US Army must make four major shifts in its operational concepts and postures: from a supported to a supporting force, from a focus on maneuvers to a focus on fires, from expeditionary to homeland defense capabilities, and from a culture that sees the active component as “first among equals” to one that considers all components equal.

In the next forum, *US Civil-Military Relations*, Rosa Brooks asks “Are US Civil-Military Relations in Crisis?” To answer that question she examines, rigorously, five popular claims all of which seemingly point to an affirmative response—namely, US citizens do not know their military, fewer than 1 percent of Americans serve, the US military is too different culturally from civilian society, active and retired senior officers have assumed positions of influence within the US government, and the military has become too political. But she finds each of these claims wanting. Focusing on whether such a crisis exists, she adds, comes at the risk of diverting attention from other more dangerous threats to American democracy. Risa Brooks’s “Beyond Huntington: US Military Professionalism Today” suggests Huntington’s model of an apolitical military, to the extent it was ever adopted, has outlived its usefulness. America’s military professionals now need a new model, one that both reaffirms their commitment to the state and its political infrastructure but allows for flexible interpretation in fluid circumstances.

The third forum, *US National Security Strategy*, offers two macro-perspectives concerning where American foreign policy ought to be heading. In “Seeing in Stereo,” Anne-Marie Slaughter contends the traditional habit of viewing situations dichotomously, as generally exclusive categories, will not avail in the contemporary security environment. She argues instead for establishing a new tradition, one that permits us to see an overlap in categorical opposites, such as “many” and “one” or “global issues” and “great power competition.” The ability to see such categories “in stereo,” that is, not as mutually exclusive, she contends, will help us resolve national security dilemmas more profitably. In “Charting a Different Course,” however, Nadia Schadlow sends a different message. She reprises her earlier argument about liberal internationalism’s failure to set a sound strategic course for promoting US security interests. The unipolar moment is over, she maintains, and America’s military supremacy is being challenged in various and sometimes discreet ways. Accordingly, America needs to sweep away the myths that have underpinned its national security perspectives to this point and chart a more realistic way ahead based on a sober appreciation of the strengths of its rivals balanced against its own limitations.

analyze the article “Some Managerial Aspects of Command” by Harold Lamp. Lamp attempted to move beyond the debate, then gathering momentum, regarding which skills were more important to senior leaders—those related to command or those pertaining to management—by finding common ground between them. Kem and Breckenridge agree with Lamp’s approach and discuss some of his more enduring insights. The second contribution to this forum, “The Joint Force and Lessons from 1971,” by Jonathan Klug assesses the article, “The Unified Command Structure,” by Duane Smith, which is itself an assessment. Klug finds Smith’s analysis of America’s requirements with respect to strategic commands to be accurate and insightful. He recommends Smith’s article to the military professional, despite its age.

The second forum, (Un)civil Military Relations, in an unorthodox manner consists of a single article. The topic of civil-military relations, featured prominently in this issue’s Prospectives 2021, was, and remains, simply too important not to warrant its own forum. In “Academe and the Military,” Tony and Julia Pfaff do the topic justice through their critique of the essay, “Mutual Misperceptions: The Academic and the Soldier in Contemporary America,” by Donald Bletz. They find Bletz’s argument, that civil-military relations in the United States had become dysfunctional, to be regrettably accurate for 1971. They also ponder to what extent Bletz’s assessment holds true in 2021.

Our third forum, Regional Challenges, evaluates the merits of two regionally focused articles. In the first of these, “Soviet Economic Reform—Surprisingly Prescient,” Robert Hamilton examines John Hardt’s “Brezhnev’s Economic Choice: More Weapons and Control or Economic Modernization.” While Hardt correctly perceived the better choice the Kremlin should make, as Hamilton reminds us, Soviet leaders would not be able to overcome bureaucratic inertia or the military’s intransigence to bring it to fruition. Hamilton compliments Hardt’s article for its prescience—its success at standing at an historical inflection point, and the author’s realization of this fact. It has stood the test of time rather well, he concludes. In the second assessment, “Moscow in the Middle East,” Andrew Terrill critiques John Thomas’s “The Dilemmas of Soviet Policy in the Middle East.” Thomas’s analysis has been eclipsed by historical events, as Terrill points out. Soviet interest in the Middle East has changed with the times: rather than being motivated primarily by ideological interests, as it was in 1971 during the Cold War, the Kremlin is now involved in the region mainly through economic relationships and efforts to mitigate terrorist threats to the Russian homeland.

This issue’s last forum, Learning from the Past, is hardly its least. Drawing lessons or insights from the past, however difficult or problematic it might be to do so, was a popular exercise for professional military educational institutions at the time. The US Army War College was no exception to that rule. J. P. Clark’s “US Army Reforms in the Progressive Era” critiques F. Gunther Eyck’s “Secretary Stimson and the Army Reforms, 1911-1913.” Clark places Eyck’s article within its own
historical context and explicates both what the essay says about the US Army’s reforms in the Progressive Era, as well as what the contribution itself reveals about the period in which it was written. Michael Neiberg’s “Coalition Warfare—Echoes from the Past” evaluates James Agnew’s “Coalition Warfare.” Agnew’s article drew, or attempted to draw, lessons regarding the difficulties of developing organizational relationships to manage alliances and coalitions during the First World War. Ultimately, as President Woodrow Wilson discovered, and as contemporary scholars and practitioners well know, it can prove difficult to influence any alliance or coalition partner unless one has “skin in the game.” Even then, the partners who have lost the most in blood and treasure may have the final say, whether wise or not, on the most critical of strategic choices.

Overall, Parameters’ inaugural issue was well served by the many authors who contributed to it. But one might well wonder how closely its main themes paralleled those of its peer journals—Naval War College Review, Air University Review, Military Review, the Naval Institute’s Proceedings, and the Marine Corps Gazette. In the spring of 1971, the Naval War College Review featured two pieces that dealt with the role of public opinion in war, one that analyzed the philosophical outlook of the counterculture, one that explained the military planning process, another that addressed the military management process, and two historical contributions, one covering the influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan on European naval expansion and one discussing Admiral Raymond Spruance and the Naval War College. Each of the first three articles reflects concerns similar in character to those discussed by Bletz in his contribution to the inaugural issue of Parameters. The articles dealing with the military planning and management processes parallel roughly those by Lamp and Smith and reveal the predilections of an era that employed scientific processes as safeguards against the human propensity for error; in Mahan’s day, by comparison, principles played that role. The June 1971 issue of the Naval War College Review would offer an article discussing the Soviet Union and the United States in the Middle East, showing strong parallels with the contributions by Hardt and Thomas. Indeed, Soviet and Chinese strategic thought and national cultures would be persistent themes for all the military journals of the US Armed Forces throughout the Cold War.

Like Parameters, the Air University Review shaped its content according to the concerns of its readers. The US military’s transition to an all-volunteer force ranked high among those concerns. Accordingly the Spring 1971 issue of Air University Review offered two contributions

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stressing the importance of military professionalism, as well as a comparison of professional military educational systems abroad. It also featured an analysis of the military decision-making process from the standpoint of communicating across cultures in addition to an article describing air power’s utility in psychological operations.

Until the appearance of *Parameters*, the US Army’s *Military Review* carried not only articles with a tactical focus, but many with a strategic inclination as well. Alongside tactically oriented essays discussing distinguishing between murder and killing in combat and the mental health of frontline soldiers, for instance, were contributions covering Soviet strategic thinking, the defense policies of western European states, the Soviet rationale for arms control, and international systems of recruitment. The Naval Institute’s *Proceedings* remained more technologically focused. But it did feature articles discussing the future of the US Navy as well as a study concerning junior officer retention rates. Not to be overlooked, the *Marine Corps Gazette* provided insights regarding training concepts, orders, and the civil war in Jordan.

The pages that follow show just how much the journal’s history is also America’s history. Since 1971, *Parameters* has “been there,” with its authors offering insightful analyses and policy recommendations to US strategic leaders for matters great and small. Understandably, Cold War concerns dominated the journal’s pages from its inaugural issue to the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Thereafter, *Parameters* gave space to debates over military transformation, the revolution in military affairs as it was sometimes called, as well as how US foreign policy might adjust to a new strategic situation that required recalibrating from state-on-state conflicts to various forms of irregular warfare. The shock of 9/11 reinforced the importance of the latter dimension of war, and *Parameters* responded accordingly. Likewise the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq that took place during the first


two decades of the twenty-first century demonstrated the need for the systematic collection of observations, even “lessons,” of what worked and what did not, for the United States and its many strategic partners; again, the US Army’s flagship strategy journal responded. Now as great power competition has once more attracted public attention, Parameters has adjusted accordingly. Notwithstanding these important concerns, Parameters has consistently dedicated multiple forums to essential matters such as military professionalism, race and gender issues, and strategic theories and concepts.

On behalf of the Strategic Studies Institute and the US Army War College Press, it is our pleasure to present Parameters Issue 51, No. 1. ~AJE