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Academe and the Military

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ABSTRACT: Differences between the academic and military communities and the dysfunction that occurs when these communities come into contact can have disastrous consequences for foreign policy. Donald Bletz, writing on the subject in 1971, details this dynamic as it related to the Vietnam War. His observations can be applied to wars since and suggest the need for a balanced relationship characterized by independence and mutual respect.

Writing in the aftermath of the Kent State massacre, Colonel Donald F. Bletz raised the concern that a dysfunctional relationship between academia and the military not only sets the tone for the military’s relationship with American society but also impacts its warfighting abilities. More to the point, academia and the military typically function as two separate and often warring worlds. Fifty years later Bletz’s observation holds true as the dysfunctional academia-military relationship that led to the debacle in Vietnam has repeated itself in the so-called forever wars of the twenty-first century. Bletz saw the disaster of Vietnam primarily as a function of distrust between the academic and military communities resulting as much from their similarities as from their differences. What the intervening 50 years has shown, however, is that such disasters are more a function of how these two communities manage this distrust.

Bletz understood the importance of the academia-military relationship to national security. This relationship, with its associated functions and dysfunctions, arises where the interests and activities of academia and the military converge: first, when the military brings graduates from academia to serve as military professionals, and second, when academics make their way into senior-level national security positions. Dysfunctions at those points of convergence, according to Bletz, give rise to disasters such as the war in Vietnam.

Bletz was also correct in asserting such foreign policy disasters arise as a function of how each community relates to society as well as to one another. Both communities see themselves as guardians while simultaneously regarding the other as a threat to what they seek to protect. Thus as guardians both feel isolated not only from each other but from the society they claim to serve. As a result, the military experiences less access to universities as a commissioning source, and

both communities engage in poor communication with each other and society over policy matters.

Over the last 50 years, however, the military has translated that isolation into increased social trust, while academia apparently has not. That asymmetry in public trust coupled with improved cooperation between the two communities—often in response to the dysfunctions experienced during the Vietnam era—has generated dysfunctions of its own without fully resolving the ones of the past.

**Relationships with Society**

Bletz argued while the military and academia each see themselves as the guardian of American democracy, they perceive that role in fundamentally different ways. Academics, he argued, see themselves as “critic[s] of contemporary society . . . while the [military] sees [itself] as the defender.” Those different roles attract different kinds of people, amplifying a sense of estrangement. Academia attracts more liberally minded individuals while the military attracts more conservative thinkers. Academics thus view themselves as government outsiders who, due to their broad educational role, are closer to the larger society, and military professionals see themselves as government insiders who, due to the cultural as well as physical separation necessary for effective defense, are distanced from society.

Bletz certainly played a little fast and loose with these generalities, something he repeatedly acknowledged. But the hyperbole he employed captures something important not just about the academic and military communities themselves, but also about the importance of their relationship. In claiming the role of social guardian, neither the academic nor the soldier holds society in high regard, which results in a sense of social isolation for both communities. For the academic, the isolation results from living “in a world they never made and for which they [take] no responsibility.” And while the military is eager for responsibility, it also does not accept responsibility for the character of American society. In fact, Bletz attributed the military’s disposition not to vote as an effort to avoid the political taint partisanship would entail.

A sense of isolation from the larger society is further amplified by these communities’ hierarchical nature and near total institutionalization of members’ daily lives. Both communities, Bletz observed, employ hierarchies that determine who is brought in, what achievements they are recognized for, and whether and to what position or rank they are promoted. Of course those hierarchies are more decentralized in academia than in the military; for Bletz, this translated into more local autonomy for academics on individual campuses.

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Bletz argued it was “the rank structure in both professions which makes the systems work.” While there are certainly similarities, a closer look suggests these similarities are superficial. Both communities certainly have formal structures. In the military there are levels of command within which roles are further differentiated between command and staff functions. In this structure autonomy, at least as it is related to the function of the institution, is proportionate to level: the higher the level of command, the more autonomy one has. The problem for the military is that this arrangement can often privilege the desire for stability and control over the demands of the profession, which values flexibility, discretion, and innovation among other things.

In academia, however, power and authority are not simply decentralized, it is diffused. While a hierarchy of presidents, provosts, and deans oversees the academic enterprise, actual governance is shared by a number of actors including a board of trustees, a president, faculty, and to a lesser degree, students. This system is intended to foster cooperation between these actors by creating a more democratic decision-making process. But because it diffuses autonomy throughout the system, the system can be slow and resistant to change and often pits the faculty, usually in the body of a faculty senate, against the university leadership. The effect is often gridlock. So, while by title, position, and rank university presidents, provosts, and deans might seem analogous to military commanders, their functionalities are very different.

In another important difference, academia is comprised of competing hierarchies in a way the military is not. In addition to the campus hierarchy, academics are also governed by the fields they work in, which can provide certification or even curriculum guidance. In the military this arrangement would be analogous to functional branches having input into whether a platoon leader, for example, executed a particular operation correctly. But because of the relationship between academic reputation and opportunities for promotion, academics can depend as much if not more on their field of study for that reputation than the university that would promote them.

Concurrent with this hierarchical structure, both institutions provide for a variety of personal needs to the point that venturing into the larger society can feel, if not actually be, optional. Where the military has “commissaries, post exchanges, [and] service clubs,” academia has “cooperative shopping facilities, bookstores, student unions, and faculty clubs.” Bletz recognized but did not explore this fact; however, it is not hard to see the immersive experience of both communities

7. James G. Pierce, The Organizational Culture of the U.S. Army: Is the Organizational Culture of the Army Congruent with the Professional Development of Its Senior Level Officer Corps? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), iv, 106–7.
makes interaction with and understanding of the larger society, or vice versa, necessary.

Bletz argued this near total institutionalization, coupled with society’s ambivalence regarding the utility of each community, isolates the military and academia from American society. He did acknowledge this isolation was largely self-imposed and illustrated this dynamic in an admittedly cartoonish fashion: where academics are “quiet and intelligent, but apparently unmanly” the soldier is “manly, but not too intelligent.” Where the former emphasizes thinking, the latter emphasizes doing. They are joined together by a mutual alcohol problem and are saved from obscurity and irrelevance by “[the] rugged [civilian] individual, clad in buckskin who somehow compensates for [their] shortcomings.”

Interestingly, Bletz wrote when those views were beginning to change, at least for the military. American society has always had an aversion to a standing, professional military largely due to the original colonists’ experience with the military’s role in domestic oppression in the countries from which they came. As a result, the military had to fight to earn its status as a profession. The Vietnam experience further soured the military’s relationship with the American people who were no longer interested in allowing their children to be drafted to fight wars of dubious necessity. As a result, the military in the 1970s transitioned to an all-volunteer force. While that change has further exacerbated the sense of social isolation—less than one-half of 1 percent of the population now serve—popular confidence in the military as an institution is above 70 percent, reaching a high of 74 percent in 2018, up from a low of 50 percent in 1981.

In the 50 years since Bletz wrote his article, campus life has changed dramatically. The massacre at Kent State University marked a shift away from the politically active campuses of the 1960s and early 1970s. Since then college campuses have become more diverse, more expensive, and more focused on preprofessional studies and skills development rather than education for education’s sake. Due to the shift in the 1980s from grant-heavy to loan-heavy financial aid awards, the amount of student debt has increased to the point where the cost-benefit analysis of a...
traditional college education raises questions about its overall utility.\textsuperscript{16} In contrast to the military, public confidence in higher education in 2018 was 48 percent, despite—or because of—36 percent of the population over 25 attaining bachelor’s degrees.\textsuperscript{17} Today higher education is in the midst of a reexamination of its purpose and relevance within the larger society.\textsuperscript{18} In many ways, the public perception of both professions has flipped in the last half century.

**Relationship to Each Other**

The separation of the academic and military communities would be sustainable if it were not for two points of convergence. The first point is the accessions process for military officers. In 1970 the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) was the largest source of commissions for the Army, producing around 12,400 graduates a year.\textsuperscript{19} From 1968 to 1974, however, ROTC closed 88 detachments, many of which were in elite universities in the northeast. The reasons for those closures were complex. The common narrative is that popular opposition to the war in Vietnam, exacerbated by the shootings at Kent State, encouraged schools to end their ROTC programs.\textsuperscript{20}

While it is true some ROTC units closed temporarily due to vandalism—Kent State before the massacre—the reason generally given by the schools to the Department of Defense was that ROTC courses did not meet the school’s academic standards and thus were not eligible for credit. The Department decided to close and relocate those detachments rather than revise the courses, and it also established 80 new detachments, mostly in schools in the south and west.\textsuperscript{21}

These conditions shaped the quantity, quality, and diversity of the officer corps and determined the potential for interactions between future military officers and the future cultural and policy elites in the United States. Two recent studies have shown that while the percentage of people who graduate from elite schools and attain the most influential policy positions may have decreased since mid-century when sociologists...
developed the theories of elite formation, elite schools count among their alumni a disproportionate number of business, policy, and cultural elites relative to the total number of graduates. With close to 87 percent of all college graduates having no military experience, it stands to reason weak connections and mistrust exist between academics and the military.

Bletz argued the second point of convergence occurred when academics crossed over into government. As Bletz noted, academics, particularly scientists, enthusiastically participated in weapons development in support of then President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal and the Second World War—a war with broad public support. In particular, the academic community—contrary to its purpose—kept criticism to a minimum, especially over matters that would later become controversial in the 1960s such as unconditional surrender and the employment of the atomic bomb.

Despite general opposition to the Vietnam War, some members of the academic community—or at least persons with academic backgrounds—moved into government and participated in making war policy. Bletz specifically mentioned Henry Kissinger, a Harvard faculty member who was critical of the military’s attrition strategy employed at the beginning of the war. Bletz could also have mentioned Robert McNamara, secretary of defense from 1961 to 1968. In what is sometimes referred to as the “McNamara Revolution,” he brought in a number of so-called whiz kids from academia and research centers who tried to impose a single common method for management, acquisitions, and budgeting for all the services, many elements of which exist to this day.

While McNamara did solicit the advice of senior military leaders in implementing his reforms, they offered little constructive input and were eventually marginalized from much of the budget decision-making process. In fact, the relationship between the Joint Staff and senior civilian leadership—including President Lyndon Johnson—was frayed because the options the Joint Staff gave for prosecuting the war were not viable.

Related to this point of convergence, academia at the time was showing a growing interest in military affairs. This interest took two forms. One form was the development of the field of strategic studies, best represented by Thomas C. Schelling, that drew on the fields of

economics, political science, and international relations to inform policies on the employment and use of the military. The other form, pioneered by scholars such as Samuel P. Huntington and Morris Janowitz, developed into the field of military sociology, which sought to inform military organizational policies.28

Both fields have grown considerably, bringing academia and the military closer together in ways Bletz did not anticipate. These programs have provided a path for military officers to obtain advanced degrees in these fields, ensuring such expertise resides within the military. For example, the Army now sends over 400 officers to advanced civilian schooling every year.29 And these officers do not just teach at service academies or at professional military education institutions as Bletz did. Many others, particularly foreign area officers and strategic planners, go directly to operational assignments after graduation. The effect, of course, is the military is better able to participate in, and thus control, many of the external reforms civilian academics recommend. A good example of this integration is the development of counterinsurgency strategy during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, promulgated by military officers with advanced degrees and members of civilian academia.30

The military is further favored in this dynamic because it is much easier for an officer to move from the military into academia than it is for an academic to move into the military. One difference Bletz did not note was that the military discharges its members much earlier in life than academia. Many senior officers reach mandatory retirement age while still in their late forties and early fifties, and some elect to take their military experience and advanced degrees and seek positions in academia. According to data collected by George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government Mapping Shadow Influence project, since the early 1990s over 200 academic-related positions have been filled by retired O8-level (major general) officers and above.31

Some very senior retired military officers have gone on to lead universities, such as Admiral William H. McRaven, the former chancellor of the University of Texas System, Air Force General Richard B. Myers who is currently the president of Kansas State University, and Army Lieutenant General Robert L. Caslen who is now the president of the University of South Carolina. Of course, as was the case with Caslen, not all were initially welcomed.32 Nonetheless, the fact they are able to acquire such senior positions suggests the rift between academia and the

military, while real, may not be as big as Bletz originally suggested. Bletz himself became president of Wilson College in nearby Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, where he became an honorary alumnus for his leadership.\footnote{Wilson College, “Alumnae Association of Wilson College Awards,” June 7, 2020, https://www.wilson.edu/aawc-awards.}

While it is easier for the military to transition to academia, a growing number of research partnerships between the Department of Defense and academic institutions focus not just on hard sciences and technology but on the humanities as well. The DoD Minerva Research Initiative grants program supporting social science research has provided $20 to $22 million in funding, much of which was allocated to social science research and was both widely accepted and criticized within the social science community.\footnote{Elizabeth Redden, “Pentagon Proposes Cuts to Social Science Research,” Inside Higher Ed, March 5, 2020, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/03/05/pentagons-social-science-research-program-chopping-block.} A number of university-based research centers also receive DoD and private donor funding.\footnote{The Military Family Research Institute at Purdue University (website), https://www.mfri.purdue.edu/.}

**Policy Implications**

What Bletz did get right is that rift, no matter how big, can produce disastrous results for national security. What should have been a “brilliant” cooperative enterprise ended up, in the case of Vietnam, in disaster with academics fleeing policy making to write books to “explain away” their involvement.\footnote{Bletz, “Mutual Misperceptions,” 9.} In the case of Vietnam, Bletz argued from the military perspective, asserting academics not only created the policies that led to the war, but their military reforms, especially under McNamara, alienated senior military leadership from the decision making. From the academic-turned-policymaker perspective, the fault lay with an incompetent military that could not figure out how to defeat a much less technologically advanced enemy, thereby ensuring those policies would fail.

This dynamic repeated itself in the 1990s and early 2000s. In the 1990s, much of the academic community protested the presence of ROTC on campuses as well as other engagements with the military because of opposition to the military’s policies prohibiting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) individuals from joining.\footnote{Devin Dwyer, “Repeal of Gay Ban Opens Door to ROTC Return at Top Schools,” ABC News, December 21, 2010, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/dont-repeal-rotc-return-university-campuses/story?id=12453612; and James Fallows, “DADT and Ivy League ROTC,” Atlantic, May 24, 2010, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/05/dad-and-ivy-league-rotc/57203/.} While perhaps not as impactful as the closings in the 1960s, a number of top-tier schools, including Stanford, Brown, and Harvard, excluded ROTC from their campuses until the ban on LGBTQ participation was lifted in 2011.\footnote{Karen McVeigh and Paul Harris, “US Military Lifts Ban on Openly Gay Troops,” Guardian, September 20, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/20/us-military-lifts-ban-gay-troops; and Gordon, “Top U.S. Schools.”} Now that the military has dropped most of its barriers...
to service by members of the LGBTQ community, it has enjoyed more access and less opposition on college campuses.

Like Vietnam, the involvement of the academic community in national security policy in the decision to go to war in Iraq and in elements of the execution of the war itself produced grim results. One reason cited for the US decision to invade Iraq was the writings of political philosopher Leo Strauss suggesting regime change was the only proper way to deal with a “great anti-modern tyrant” such as Saddam Hussein.\(^{39}\) Academic influences did not stop there. The military, in an effort to demonstrate it had learned some lessons from Vietnam, invited academia to participate in operations. Not only were individual scholars employed for their political science and democracy-building expertise, the military tried to purchase academic experience wholesale by establishing Human Terrain System teams, comprised of experienced anthropologists and others from relevant fields, to advise commanders on how to navigate cultural pitfalls in rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan.\(^{40}\)

Perhaps not surprisingly those efforts did not go well. Bletz complained academics in government in the Vietnam era ran back to academia to write books absolving them of responsibility. Much the same happened in Iraq. Whether one wants to impute, malign, or simply display selfish intent as Bletz did, the fact is a number of high-profile academics who assisted the military in Iraq did just that. An obvious case in point is Stanford scholar Larry Diamond and his book *Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq*.\(^{41}\)

The damage inflicted by the effort to include academia in the execution of the war went even deeper. The American Anthropological Association declared participation in the Human Terrain System program unethical and discouraged its members from participating.\(^{42}\) While some anthropologists did participate, many positions had to be filled with inadequately qualified persons. As a result, many teams without the relevant expertise went to the field, which resulted in predictable and disastrous results.\(^{43}\)

These disasters, however, were less a result of the differences between the military and academic communities, than they were a function of academia and the military growing closer together. The

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difficulty with such proximity was and continues to be the outsized influence of the military over the academic national security agenda. Not only does the military pay for research, it pays tuition that helps fill classrooms and then cycles its graduates, many of whom are as well credentialed as their academic counterparts, often either back into academia or to military institutions that interact with academia.

Conclusion

The result is a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” dynamic suggesting a harmonic relationship between academia and the military is not only impossible, it may also be undesired. When the military controls too much of the agenda, it risks losing an important critical voice—only valuable as such when lightly connected. Ties are important; the right ties are critical.

Unfortunately, Bletz’s—as well as this review’s—anecdotal approach to the issues raised do not provide much of a basis to form recommendations. Bletz, however, shed a light, albeit a dim one, on a civil-military dynamic that given the disastrous outcomes to date, appears to be poorly understood, at least by the members the communities themselves. Accordingly, this analysis recommends more attention and study be focused on the academia-military dynamic in the interest of seeking balance rather than expanding or improving cooperation and convergence between the two.

It may be the case that academia and the military can serve society separately. But the natural synergies as well as the desire to do good will ensure separation will never be complete. In fact, perhaps Bletz’s most important insight regarded the dependency each community has on the other for its status. Due to the points of convergence, the result of the Vietnam War diminished the prestige of both institutions not only “in the eyes of each other” but “in the eyes of the nation as a whole.” This point only further underscores the importance of both communities to national security.

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