In Focus:

**Extremism in the US Military**
Matthew Valasik and Shannon E. Reid

**Crisis Management and Risk**
Leonard R. Hawley, prologue by Michèle Flournoy
Wade A. Germann and Heather S. Gregg
Jason W. Warren and John A. Bonin

**Soft Power and Military Aid**
Michael W. Wissemann
Gregory L. Aftandilian

**Leadership and Professionalism**
Brian McAllister Linn
Everett Spain, Gautam Mukunda, and Archie Bates
Ilmari Käärikö
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The US Army War College Quarterly, Parameters, is a refereed forum for contemporary strategy and Landpower issues. It furthers the education and professional development of senior military officers and members of government and academia concerned with national security affairs.

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In addition to introducing our new cover design and font styles, this issue of Parameters opens with an In Focus contribution concerning Extremism in the US Military. In “The Alt-Right Movement and US National Security,” Matthew Valasik and Shannon Reid identify potential causes for the disproportionate number of current and former members of the military associated with White supremacist groups. They then suggest steps the Department of Defense can take to address the problem.

Our first forum, Crisis Management and Risk, begins with Leonard R. Hawley’s personal experience article, “Crisis Management Lessons from the Clinton Administration’s Implementation of Presidential Decision Directive 56.” Hawley’s contribution offers some best practices for policy practitioners when responding to global crises. We would like to extend a special thanks to Michèle Flournoy who graciously wrote a prologue for the article. Wade Germann and Heather Gregg follow Hawley’s article with “Assessing Risk at the National Strategic Level: Visualization Tools for Military Planners.” Germann and Greg propose two models—the National Strategic Risk Abacus and the National Strategic Risk Radar Chart—to aid military planners in addressing America’s current security challenges. Jason Warren and John Bonin close out the forum with “Reversing the Readiness Assumption: A Proposal for Fiscal and Military Effectiveness.” In light of anticipated cuts in defense spending, Warren and Bonin suggest some guidelines for helping defense leaders make wise choices in the months ahead.


Our final forum, Leadership and Professionalism, begins with Brian McAllister Linn’s “Samuel Huntington, Professionalism, and Self-Policing in the US Army Officer Corps.” Linn considers the third phase of Huntington’s model of professionalism—self regulation—and reviews how well the US Army implemented it from the Civil War through the Vietnam War. He then discusses the implications of this implementation for the Army’s officer corps. In “The Battalion Commander Effect,” Everett Spain, Gautam Mukunda,
and Archie Bates present statistical evidence confirming how Army battalion commanders are significant determinants of the retention of their lieutenants—especially high-potential lieutenants—and what that might mean for promotion boards and professional military education. In “The Evolution of Hybrid Warfare: Implications for Strategy and the Military Profession,” Ilmari Käihkö considers the evolution of the concept of hybrid war and its implications for strategy and the military profession. ~AJE
The Alt-Right Movement and US National Security

Matthew Valasik and Shannon E. Reid
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ABSTRACT: Identifying the January 6 insurrection at the US Capitol as an inflection point, this article analyzes the historical relationship between White supremacy and the US military from Reconstruction after the Civil War to the present. The article posits causes for the disproportionate number of current and former members of the military associated with White power groups and proposes steps the Department of Defense can take to combat the problems posed by the association of the US military with these groups.

Introduction

Currently, there is an overrepresentation of military veterans affiliated with far-right groups and the broader White power movement, but the disturbing relationship between White supremacy and the American military dates to before the American Civil War.¹ Most recently, this affinity was underscored by the disproportionate number of servicemembers, who participated in the failed attempt to prevent the certification of the 2020 election on January 6, 2021. This incident renewed concerns about the association between the US military and the White power movement.²

As of July 16, 2021, 563 individuals have been arrested and charged in federal court in the aftermath of the insurrection at the US Capitol. At least 82 (14.6 percent) of those arrested are individuals with military backgrounds predominately affiliated with the Army and the Marine Corps—more than double the percentage of servicemembers in the US population (approximately 6.1 percent).³ While the motivations driving those individuals vary, almost two-thirds of those arrested are affiliated with either Proud Boys, an alt-right gang, or Oath Keepers, a far-right militia. Like many alt-right groups with a White power orientation, these two groups are loosely structured, lack a rigid ideological focus, and are united by things they oppose (for example, immigration, feminism, gun restrictions, and so

rather than any central tenet, and are best described as racist. Based on US Code, Title 18, Section 2331, Item (5), both groups would be classified as organizations engaging in domestic terrorism. The FBI and the Department of Homeland Security commonly refer to these groups as domestic violent extremist (DVE) organizations.

This overrepresentation of veterans, however, is supply driven and reflects veterans’ greater willingness to join far-right groups than the average civilian. It appears servicemembers are more susceptible to the propaganda and diatribes of far-right groups, and this relationship needs to be addressed. This article examines the disconcerting connection between the US military and the White power movement, traces the historic relationship from past conflicts through the War on Terror, and provides direction on steps the US military can take to combat this dilemma.

### Historic Relationship with the Military

White anxiety about the inclusion of former slaves into the social order, including economic competition with White middle and working classes produced not only the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), which was founded by six Confederate war veterans, but the Knights of White Camellia, the White League, and other assorted White power DVEs. It was not until the Reconstruction Acts of 1867 and 1868, forcing former Confederate states to rewrite their constitutions, granting voting rights to Black citizens, and installing the US Army as peacekeepers, that White power groups proliferated, offering an outlet for Whites to terrorize Black citizens. Arguably, the aftermath of the Civil War and the subsequent Reconstruction era could be viewed as an outlier exaggerating the affinity between the White power movement and military veterans.

Yet, surges in membership among veterans enlisting in White power DVE organizations correlate all too well with the ending of wars and

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conflicts involving the US military, creating a pattern following World War I, World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, and the War on Terror. In particular, America’s defeat in the Vietnam War produced “loss, frustration, and doubt” among servicemembers, similar to the feelings experienced by Confederate veterans. Whereas state power reinforced a White supremacist social order and enabled DVE violence during Reconstruction, the fallout from the Vietnam War was quite different. First, after the Vietnam War ended, the fear of communism spreading across the globe remained a foreign policy concern that provided veterans with an outlet to channel their discontentment by participating in counterinsurgency operations as “soldiers of fortune.” Such operations were supported by both neoconservatives and the White power movement, creating a complex web of interconnections.

Second, the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s drew attention to the legacy of White supremacy in policing and state power and created an environment in which vigilante violence was no longer publicly supported by the state. This disavowal marked a turning point in how the White power movement viewed its relationship to the government. The narrative introduced was a corrupt, bureaucratic, and ineffective federal government that had hamstrung Vietnam veterans from becoming triumphant warriors—by restraining their use of force against the enemy—which the White power movement used to sow distrust of the government in the minds of veterans.

The overrepresentation of Vietnam veterans in the White power movement played an instrumental role in transforming the structure, operation, and direction of White power DVE organizations. For instance, noteworthy Vietnam veteran Louis Beam made a major impact on the White power movement. As a former Klansman and prominent neo-Nazi, Beam urged the White power

13. Belew, Bring the War Home, 78.
movement to utilize the strategy of “leaderless resistance.” Beam contended that large, centralized White power organizations, such as the KKK or Aryan Nations, should be abandoned in favor of small groups to better avoid detection and disruption by law enforcement. Guided by this strategy, Beam established “Aryan Liberty Net” (Liberty.net) in 1984. This clandestine Aryan Nations online bulletin board (a precursor to websites today) allowed users to access recruitment materials, pen pals, password-protected personal ads, and lists of potential targets to sabotage or individuals to assassinate. This capability made Beam and the broader White power movement one of the first adopters of the Internet to communicate digitally and organize globally.

The asymmetric use of digital technologies, evolving from Liberty.net, has allowed White power DVE organizations to maintain communication even if members are not spatially proximate to each other and spread positions and propaganda with minimal resources. The adoption of leaderless resistance as a strategy significantly contributed to the proliferation and persistence of the movement throughout the United States and internationally. The Order, also known as the Silent Brotherhood, is an example of the application of leaderless resistance by White power DVE organizations. This group, composed of military veterans, engaged in paramilitary training and used weapons and tactics from the Vietnam War to participate in an array of serious and violent crimes (for example, counterfeiting, bank/armored car robberies, and murder) in the mid-1980s before being apprehended.

As the Vietnam War drifted from American collective memory, the public’s distaste for militarism began to dissolve, and the cycle started again following the Gulf War. In 1990 Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. The United States responded, along with a broad coalition of support, and drove out Iraqi forces and restored Kuwait’s independence in under six weeks. While this quick and seemingly easy victory ended American’s aversion to foreign military conflicts, it had an unintended consequence among members of the White


power movement. Instead of the Gulf War being viewed as a heroic triumph able to offset the defeat and frustration of the Vietnam War, the White power movement used the resounding success of the military campaign as evidence that an untrustworthy federal government had betrayed Vietnam veterans and prevented them from wearing the mantles of triumphant warriors.20

In conjunction with the standoff at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, and the siege at Waco, Texas, in the early 1990s, the White power movement further fueled the fabrication of a brutish federal government that was intentionally targeting civilian groups (for example, far-right) and oppressing them.21 This narrative circulated and gained support from Gulf War servicemembers and veterans who were disaffected with the US military, often as a result of personal difficulties.22 By far, the most noteworthy Gulf War Army veteran who subscribed to these White power talking points is Timothy McVeigh, who perpetrated the deadliest act of domestic terrorism in the United States on April 19, 1995—the Oklahoma City bombing that killed 168 people and injured 509.23

Perhaps Beam and McVeigh’s experiences and training in the Army assisted them in later endeavors among various White power DVE groups and inspired others. Beam and McVeigh are just two examples of a litany of servicemembers who have brought the war home with them and continue fighting today. In the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, the scrutiny of far-right groups, particularly antigovernment militias, by federal law enforcement agencies peaked and drove affiliates underground and into the recesses of the Internet.24 The White power movement festers and metastasizes in this digital medium until a physical environment becomes hospitable for them to reemerge in public. During the 2000s, the growth of the White power movement remained generally uninterrupted, due to the focus on jihadi violent extremists and the subsequent War on Terror following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.25

22. Belew, Bring the War Home, 213.
25. Crothers, Rage on the Right, 109–18; and Smith, Gangs and the Military, 68–73.
The War on Terror and the White Power Movement

While the swift and resounding victory of the Gulf War seemed to shake “Vietnam Syndrome,” it appears the ghosts of Vietnam “buried forever in the sands of the Arabian Peninsula” have become poltergeists, tormenting American servicemembers once again with America’s never-ending War on Terror, now approaching its twentieth year. The same “loss, frustration, and doubt” felt by Vietnam and Confederate veterans is being experienced by today’s servicemembers. Even more alarming, post-9/11 veterans are more likely to have been deployed, served in combat, experienced emotional trauma, had difficulty transitioning to civilian life, and felt less proud to serve in the military than pre-9/11 veterans. A modern-day all-volunteer US military might be expected to be less disillusioned than those who were drafted during the Vietnam War.

Arguably, the quota requirements for troops needed for the War on Terror lowered the recruitment standards, increased the use of “moral waivers” to dismiss criminal convictions, and decreased the use of discharges for misconduct. Shifts in these policies resulted in the military enlisting substandard personnel to meet the quotas, an outcome observed among other federal agencies (for example, the Department of Homeland Security) that succumb to filling positions with warm bodies.

While the mass recruitment of less-than-ideal servicemembers is problematic on its own, the War on Terror is substantially different from America’s prior conflict in Western Asia (for example, the Gulf War). Differences include the structure of warfare, fighting an insurgency, guerilla war tactics, suicide bombers, and pervasive improvised explosive device use, with infantry and special operators being the principal military component as opposed to the use of tanks supported by air and sea campaigns in the Gulf War. Additionally, the duration of the

27. Belew, Bring the War Home, 21; Kennard, Irregular Army, 215–16.
War on Terror is approaching two decades while the Gulf War only lasted 43 days. Together, these distinctions have contributed to servicemembers experiencing greater emotional trauma and more challenges transitioning back to civilian life. In addition, the poor quality of care provided to servicemembers has only facilitated disillusionment.33

Present-day White power DVE organizations harness and pervert these feelings to support their narrative and refine their talking points to connect with a broader, more mainstream audience—a process accelerated by the ubiquity of the Internet and the increased use of social media platforms.34 They cast a much wider net to ensnare potential followers by deploying ironic and caustic memes rapidly across a variety of digital platforms.35 There is a variability in the content that gets distributed, depending on the level of fanaticism. For instance, many alt-right gangs, like Proud Boys or Rise Above Movement (an alt-right mixed-martial arts group), tend to obfuscate their extremism to appeal to more mainstream youth.36

Other more extreme DVE groups do not attempt to mask their adherence to White supremacy. Atomwaffen Division, The Base, and Boogaloo Bois use extreme imagery and catchy slogans in their propaganda materials and explicitly advocate for violence against the government in preparation for an upcoming race/civil war.37 They require members to participate in paramilitary training, similar to long-established far-right militias.38 Even though such activities make these militias illegal in all 50 states, there is no shortage of veterans in their ranks.39 Furthermore, the accelerationist rhetoric used to recruit members—calling for a second civil war or a racial holy war—is translating into real-world violence. Members have been arrested for stockpiling firearms and explosives, plotting terror and infrastructure attacks, kidnapping government officials, and committing murder.40

Current State of the Problem

The level and extent to which support for White power sentiments has infiltrated the US military remains unclear. As routine practice, the service branches deny its persistence. Both the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security have expressed concern for over a decade about the recruitment of active servicemembers by White power DVE groups. Yet, there remains limited knowledge about just how pervasive far-right affiliations are among active-duty personnel.41 What little is known about the current prevalence of White power sympathies comes from a 2019 poll of Military Times readers. The poll revealed 36 percent of troops witnessed “[W]hite supremacist and racist ideologies,” with enlisted and non-White members being more likely to observe these behaviors than officers and White members.42 This is a substantial increase from a 2018 poll of Military Times readers when only 22 percent reported the presence of White power activities. This trend is moving in a concerning direction.43

The military’s response to DVE affiliations has been inconsistent, partially due to maintaining troop quotas and not raising alarms that would increase congressional scrutiny.44 When the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq required more troops, the number of discharges declined and the standards for recruitment were relaxed, meeting quotas with substandard personnel.45 The combination of reduced standards and an entrenched “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy regarding the attitudes of servicemembers toward White supremacism and other extremist beliefs have fused in a dangerous and volatile manner.46

As details about the January 6 insurrection continue to emerge, it becomes clear alt-right gangs, antigovernment militias, and conspiracy theorists (for example, QAnon) played an outsized role.47 The fact that this attempt to usurp America’s democracy involved not just an overrepresentation of servicemembers, who solemnly “support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic,” but any at all is disconcerting.48 Recent years have shown a greater portion of the public than expected are sympathetic to identity politics and White power propaganda of the alt-right—

41. Johnson, Hateland; and Smith, Gangs and the Military, 106–9.
43. Shane, “Signs of White Supremacy.”
44. Belew, Bring the War Home, 27; and Kennard, Irregular Army.
45. Kennard, Irregular Army, 46–47; and Smith, Gangs and the Military, 38–39, 201.
approximately 6 percent of non-Hispanic, White Americans, or about 11 million citizens. The presence of extremists in the ranks should raise concerns among military leaders about the way military training and practices fail to prevent these associations and may perpetuate them. Furthermore, servicemembers, active duty or discharged, present a potentially greater threat than civilians given their leadership skills, military training, and advanced training in special operations, explosive ordnance disposal, or cyber-operations.

Despite well-documented incidents over the years involving servicemembers engaging in White power-inspired violence and disrupting civilian communities, ongoing efforts by the military to address the public’s outcry on White power DVE groups are lackluster. Though lacking the sustained scrutiny of the January 6 insurrection, the 1995 murders of two Black civilians by active-duty paratroopers in Fayetteville, North Carolina; the 2012 mass shooting by an Army veteran at a Sikh Temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin; and the participation in violence by at least four Marines, two active-duty and two discharged, at the 2017 “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, were inspired by the White power movement. January 6 produced an inflection point about the growing number of active-duty and discharged servicemembers who are associated with far-right groups. The US military now has an opportunity to address the concerns raised for over a decade by the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and the FBI.

Combating the White Power Movement

As the understanding of the connections between the White power movement and the military continues to grow, the US military needs to take serious steps to prevent, intervene, and potentially suppress the far-right activities of both active-duty and retired servicemembers. The ubiquity of the Internet and other digital communication (for example, online forums, image boards, and social media platforms) has allowed individuals interested in or affiliated with the White power

Instead, a starting point would be to consider the shifts in a servicemember’s life course—from recruitment to basic training to deployment to reintegration to end of active-duty service. These different transitions may have a multitude of impacts on an individual’s behavior. For example, research shows that entering military service can be a turning point that inhibits criminal activity. What is less clear is how the act of leaving military service, particularly if it is involuntary, might impact future behavior when the institutional social structure and networks are removed. As seen in other research areas, such as traditional street gangs or White power DVEs organizations, risk factors can shift over time and life circumstances. This finding includes a key dynamic. Once an individual joins either of these groups, their behavior is more delinquent than individuals who are just surrounded by delinquent peers.

Intervention and prevention programs should target these turning points and provide appropriate transition services, including initial social
media literacy and critical-thinking courses as part of basic training and a survey and assessment at each turning point in a service career. As an added benefit, these assessments would also help servicemembers take stock of other mental health issues while giving military leaders a screening tool for identifying personnel susceptible to White power DVE groups or even those working on behalf of the organizations. Following active-duty service, the US Department of Veterans Affairs could establish moderated in-person and online social support groups as an alternative forum to challenge the disinformation propagated by White power DVE organizations. While all veterans would likely benefit from increased social support, a more-tailored approach focused on veterans who are assessed as being vulnerable to extremism, far-right or otherwise, could be required to participate in the prosocial support groups or one-on-one therapy or risk losing benefits.

Research has also shown that in paramilitary organizations (for example, police departments) where the chain of command oversees disciplinary action, the consequences of misconduct are frequently light and often thought to be one-off incidents without any systemic influence on the unit or department. Recent studies have noted that misconduct by law enforcement officers spreads through a police department’s social networks. This contagion model of misconduct could be applied to understanding how White power beliefs and behavior spread through institutions, such as the military.

The assumption that an individual’s behavior is separate from the larger unit has led to a dearth of research regarding deviance among those in positions of power and the influence of these individuals on the larger group. For example, the arrest of an active-duty Marine at the January 6 insurrection underscores that the rules in place are not sufficient to restrain individual behavior. Furthermore, that Marine’s larger social network may have influenced this behavior (including those who may have been present but not arrested) and should be investigated instead of treating him as a single bad apple.

In order to address this issue, the military should ensure support for or activity with White power DVE groups will be identified as a criminal matter to be handled by Criminal Investigation Divisions and not treated as a discipline and order issue. By reclassifying such activity as criminal rather than disciplinary, the Army could prevent casual engagement with White power viewpoints that might grow into serious criminal tendencies after separating from the military. A criminal investigation would also help the Army to identify larger networks and mediums of influence and how White power DVE organizations disseminate messages throughout their ranks, enabling the US military a greater opportunity to educate and protect current and former servicemembers. In addition to providing support services that would help nullify the abandonment narrative, the military’s criminalizing support for White power DVE organizations could help frame these extremists as villains who—like foreign agents—seek to undermine and corrupt American democracy.

The final, and perhaps most at-risk transitional phase for servicemembers is when they exit the military. Disillusionment, trauma, lack of opportunities, and removal of the rules and safeguards in place can put veterans in a vulnerable situation for recruitment by White power DVEs and make them much more susceptible to the pull of these groups, who provide a new enemy to hate and move against.

Again, using the insurrection at the US Capitol as an example, at least 82 individuals with military backgrounds participated in the vitriolic violence and rioting. As we consider this transition, we can regard active-duty military service as a period of strong labels, control systems, and associations. These labels and associations are thrown into doubt during the preparation for and separation from the military. To prevent these issues, the US military can conduct a series of exit interviews to monitor the mental and social health of veterans and reach out with additional resources as needed.

Additionally, the military should provide more career counseling and support groups with former servicemembers to engage veterans in prosocial support groups that meet synchronously online or in person. As the January 6 insurrection reveals, without the US military creating and propagating a counternarrative among its personnel that frames White power DVEs as terrorists and enemies of the state, these extremist groups will continue to thrive and recruit active-duty, retired, and separated servicemembers.

At the end of the day, all servicemembers come home. It is imperative military leaders proactively address the issues surrounding the adoption of far-right narratives or association with White power DVE organizations—and not brush them aside or ignore them. To reduce the allure of far-right extremism, the military should develop appropriate health-care systems for both active-duty and retired servicemembers, particularly addressing PTSD, and establish wraparound services to ease the transition to civilian life, including financial assistance programs for economic hardships. Instead of protecting the nation from a domestic enemy, the military's inaction is contributing to the White power movement's growth and capacity for violence, making American communities less safe.

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In the wake of the Battle of Mogadishu, Somalia, on October 3-4, 1993, in which 19 American servicemembers were killed and 73 injured, I was tasked to lead an effort to discern the strategic lessons to be learned from the ill-fated US intervention. The study highlighted several shortfalls: the absence of a clear US strategy and whole-of-government plan for the operation, the onset of mission creep as the operation evolved from a humanitarian mission into a manhunt for a notorious Somali warlord, the lack of coordination across the US government agencies and other coalition partners involved, and the failure to maintain proper oversight of execution as one presidential administration transitioned to the next. The study’s recommendations, which were briefed to the secretary of defense, the national security adviser, and other key participants, ultimately led to a more integrated US approach to planning for US operations in Haiti in 1994 as well as a new Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56), *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*.

In this context, Len Hawley, a retired Army colonel, who as a civilian served as the director of multilateral affairs, became the National Security Council’s (NSC) point person to lead the implementation of PDD-56. Throughout his tenure in the Clinton administration, Len oversaw the drafting of more than 40 political-military plans for contingencies ranging from East Timor to Kosovo. These plans sought to incorporate the costly lessons of Somalia in an effort to improve the outcomes and reduce the risks associated with US contingency operations overseas.

After 25 years in the Army, Len continued to serve his country as a civilian leader in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the NSC staff, and the 9/11 Commission staff. This article is the last piece Len wrote before he died of complications from leukemia in 2020. It is full of the insights and wisdom of an unsung hero who was an extraordinary public servant, strategic thinker, and beloved mentor and colleague to many.
Importance of Interagency Management and Planning

Since the end of the Cold War, the national security environment has placed new demands on American leadership abroad. As Thomas J. Friedman wrote in 2002, “the lesson of 9/11 is that if we do not visit the world’s bad neighborhoods, they will surely visit us.”¹ This strategy is employed because local conflicts in distant places can lead to threats to US citizens and facilities abroad, incite fanaticism and import terrorism to the US homeland, undermine regional stability and development, displace whole population groups and create refugee crises, perpetrate human rights abuses and atrocities, empower corrupt governments, and strengthen organized criminal syndicates.

Warfare has fundamentally changed since the early 1990s in that conflict has become more nonmilitary, irregular, and hybrid in nature. The 9/11 Commission concluded that while the American military and allied armed forces needed to find and destroy terrorist groups in the field, the future US counterterrorism strategy must be balanced.² Long-term success demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, law enforcement, border control, financial controls, cybersecurity, economic development, public diplomacy, and homeland defense. A successful US response to a future threatening adversary will likely rely heavily upon civilian agency capabilities rather than applying entirely military coercion and force. This shift places even greater reliance on interagency planning of US multidimensional crisis responses.

In the face of these challenges, the Biden-Harris administration can learn from the Clinton administration’s implementation of Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56), Managing Complex Contingency Operations, which ensured the unity of effort in interagency planning of multidimensional coalition operations for international crisis response.³ Drawing upon my personal experience implementing PDD-56 and overseeing the drafting of 44 political–military plans as director of multilateral affairs during the Clinton administration, this article distills lessons for effective strategic planning to address prospective future complex emergencies that could

profundely affect vital US interests. These emergencies could range from a September 11, 2001-style terrorist attack on the United States to armed ethnic conflict to massive climate catastrophes and other natural disasters.

No country, however powerful, can deal with such complex emergencies alone. While US leadership will be essential, the US government will need the support of allied and friendly nations in responding to these emergencies successfully. Indeed, not only will responses require cooperation between nations, but any US response will call for disparate agency efforts to be integrated into a coherent strategy to achieve US policy aims. Thus, strategies for international collaboration and interagency management and planning, like those promoted by PDD-56, are essential to ensure the US government fully integrates all agencies when responding to foreign emergencies.

**Genesis of Presidential Decision Directive 56**

Presidential Decision Directive 56, crafted in response to a series of crises in the 1990s, highlighted the need for greater international and interagency cooperation. Its practicality and utility are best understood as a by-product of the lessons its crafters and implementers learned from these crises.

For example, the 1992–93 intervention in Somalia was a failure in nearly all respects—impeded by meager interagency strategic planning in Washington and contentious coalition operations in Somalia. Marine Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni, the director of operations for the United Task Force Somalia, frequently spoke about “twenty lessons learned,” emphasizing the necessity of better integrating civilian and military efforts. His lessons signaled a growing appreciation for effective interagency management and political-military planning as being critical to the quality of policy decisions and the success of complex contingency operations.

On the heels of the Somali intervention, the 1994 intervention in Haiti marked the Clinton administration’s first venture into organized interagency management and political-military planning. Before the intervention, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili briefed President Clinton on the campaign plan to seize Haiti. Afterward, the

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4. Dennis Skocz, director of State Political-Military Affair’s Office of Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping, had daily conversations with NSC staff members planning complex contingencies and compiled a list of 44 distinct political-military planning efforts in response to foreign crises.

The president asked, “How long will this take?” The chairman replied, “Sir, we will secure Haiti in about a week.” Then the president turned to several of his policy advisers and asked, “What happens in the second week?” No one had an answer.  

In reaction, NSC Senior Director for Global Affairs Richard Clarke established an assistant secretary-level executive committee to prepare an interagency political-military plan that designated objectives for the first six months of the Haiti endeavor. Clarke ensured the NSC staff worked closely with senior officials at the Pentagon, the Justice and State Departments, the US Agency for International Development, the US Information Agency, and the CIA. Their collaboration resulted in an overarching plan for civilian and military activities that would achieve realistic political, security, humanitarian, rule of law, and economic conditions on the ground.

Days before the Haiti intervention, Clarke had his assistant secretaries conduct rehearsals of each agency’s responsibilities for operational success for the Deputies Committee. With the NSC staff leading this innovative planning effort, the US government secured the gains achieved by the US military takeover of Haiti. Although only a first step, this pioneering interagency planning effort tested several new management mechanisms for planning and conducting future complex contingency operations.

Early in 1995, following the initial progress achieved in Haiti, Clarke asked Michèle Flournoy, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to draft a presidential directive to capture the emerging interagency management mechanisms and planning activities that proved effective in the Haiti intervention. Flournoy codified Clarke’s management vision to hold administration officials at the assistant secretary level accountable for the programs, the people, and the funds required for successful operations. If agency stovepipes emerged during a US crisis response, the fault would lie with uncooperative assistant secretaries in Washington—not lower-ranking agency officials working on the front line.

Flournoy’s draft outlined a broad and flexible crisis management framework that dealt with a wide range of crises and strengthened the unity of effort by harmonizing civilian and military endeavors during an intervention. It also included two important initiatives—an after-action review to capture lessons learned and annual training to develop US expertise in planning future multidimensional operations. By mid-1995, the

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6. Author recollection of conversation following briefing by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili, 1994.
Crisis Management and Risk

draft entered the cumbersome, legalistic vetting and clearance process for presidential directives.

Applying Flournoy’s draft of PDD-56, Clarke quickly established an interagency working group to conduct political-military planning for the small UN peace implementation mission in Eastern Slavonia, a territory of Croatia seized by Serbia in 1991. The administration’s plan guided the establishment of the UN Transitional Authority for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium, which proved to be an effective invention. After 1995, the Clinton administration encountered continued occurrences of state collapse, ethnic and religious conflict, threats of genocide, and the rise of criminal states, all of which forced reluctant policymakers to deal selectively with crises abroad. From 1995 to 2001 under PDD-56, the Clinton administration planned over 40 interventions in Eastern Slavonia, Guatemala, Sierra Leone, Burundi (potential genocide), the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea-Ethiopia, North Korea (potential collapse), Iraq, Serbia, Kosovo, East Timor, Kashmir, and Lebanon. With the NSC staff leading the interagency working groups in these political-military planning efforts, credible American leadership emerged across the international community.

By 1998 the Deputies Committee became accustomed to relying upon the NSC staff to lead interagency working groups in anticipation of impending crises adversely affecting US interests. The lessons learned from these complex interventions were articulated in the *Generic Political-Military Implementation Plan*. Initially only six pages long, the plan grew to 59 pages as it incorporated new lessons from ongoing missions. Senior civilian and military officials, well after the Clinton administration, regularly used this plan.

Kosovo: A Case Study of Success

The need for greater interagency management and planning and the positive impact of PDD-56 upon planning can best be seen in the contrast between the Bosnian crisis and the intervention in Kosovo. The bitter crisis in Bosnia greeted the Clinton administration’s arrival in office. And soon, the US effort became mired in the same problems experienced in Somalia—meager strategic planning and contentious coalition operations. Unfortunately, the 1995 Dayton Accords contained only a single mention of coordination by the civilian and military components of the mission, and this coordination was not mandatory. The sharp division was intentional—designed by the Pentagon to ensure the success

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of the military mission would not depend on the performance of the civilian mission. By insulating itself so effectively from the civilian component, the US military guaranteed the failure of both. In Kosovo, a tight working relationship between civilian and military efforts was forged in response to the failure of this relationship in Bosnia.

In 1998 as senior officials and political–military planners looked ahead to the emerging crisis in Kosovo, the theme was “let us not do Bosnia ever again.” Reliance upon interagency planning and coalition operations as outlined in PDD-56, therefore, became central to several Deputies Committee decisions. To advance his war aims, Serbia’s President Slobodan Milošević used various tactics to undermine unity among NATO allies, including the ruthless 1999 displacement of 850,000 ethnic Albanian citizens of Kosovo. As the crisis unfolded, US leadership prevented a reversal in security cooperation between Russia and NATO and kept the Balkans peace process on track.

The Clinton administration recognized Milošević as a serious threat to NATO’s cohesion and European Union solidarity. Following the successful NATO air campaign to pressure Milošević to exit Kosovo, US policymakers determined the international community needed to mount an unprecedented joint UN/NATO transitional administration for Kosovo to secure NATO’s military success. Authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1244, the UN/NATO mission established an interim civil administration for the country as the first step toward Kosovo’s substantial autonomy.

Between 1998 and 2001, the Clinton administration planned a series of international interventions for Kosovo, including coercive diplomacy, sanctions enforcement, humanitarian relief, a diplomatic observer mission, a NATO air campaign, peace implementation, stabilization, and reconstruction. The administration completed as many as six sequential policy-planning efforts, each contributing significantly to the successful establishment of stability in the Balkans and leading to the eventual removal, apprehension, and conviction of Milošević by the International Criminal Tribunal. Kosovo declared its

independence in February 2008—a success for the fledgling nation and proof positive of PDD-56’s efficacy for responding to international crises.  

**Evolution of Successful Crisis Management**

The Kosovo case demonstrates the Clinton administration’s substantial growth and success in the “art and science” of crisis management. Interagency planners developed insights and learned what it took to achieve success in different situations, whether the international response sought to prevent a crisis, wage war, protect human life, or implement peace. Many lessons required planners to reexamine their perceptions of a given situation, including allowing wishful thinking to flourish without prudent judgment and circumspection; realizing the local situation among fighting groups as well as adversaries and spoilers are poorly understood and often misjudged; being wary of dismissing ill-defined threats as unlikely; overlooking potent corrupt economic incentives; underestimating operational needs for a response, both civilian and military; misreading partners’ commitments and realizing hopeful projections of indigenous popular support are wrong; understanding that instruments of government action are inadequate or irrelevant; and failing to ask the question: *What happens next?* These insights advanced the art and science of policy planning for crisis response and created a pragmatic appreciation for the many obstacles confronting government leaders.

Over time, Clinton administration policymakers and interagency planners became more risk-conscious. As they sought to understand the many unintended consequences when planning a crisis response, they set aside unrealistic expectations for a quick fix and exit and accumulated a sophisticated appreciation for the complementary civilian and military contributions of a US government response. Diplomacy, political moderation, military security, humanitarian relief, public safety, economic assistance, governance, human rights, public diplomacy, and social reconciliation—interdependent major mission areas that were embraced within PDD-56 planning efforts—became even more critical.

**Art of Crisis Management**

Clinton administration planners realized policymakers need flexibility and want credible options rather than a detailed political-military plan right up to the eleventh hour of an intervention. Conversely, agencies want a plan that spells out agency roles, specific objectives, timelines for implementation,

and workable coordinating mechanisms. It is important to note that there is considerable tension between the needs of policymakers for flexible options versus the needs of agencies for clear guidance when planning assigned tasks as directed by a political-military plan.

Over time interagency planners crafted the “Advance Pol-Mil Planning Process” to address the demands of policymakers and the needs of agency planners simultaneously. Over time interagency planners crafted the “Advance Pol-Mil Planning Process” to address the demands of policymakers and the needs of agency planners simultaneously.13 This cutting-edge process impacted NSC-led interagency crisis management efforts, avoided critical interagency problems, and generated an integrated, whole-of-government civilian-military intervention plan to advance US interests abroad. This process provided senior US officials with six planning outcomes that:

- Shape prudent US policy aims in a crisis that range between do nothing and save the world.
- Develop a political-military intervention strategy that appreciates the complex situation on the ground and garners international support to respond.
- Identify the range of unintended consequences of decisions.
- Clarify the major mission areas of the intervention as the core components of an integrated civilian-military campaign.
- Mobilize allies, partners, and other nations and international organizations to contribute to the coalitions deemed necessary.
- Facilitate the hand-off to a follow-on mission after several years, as local conditions improve to a viable peace, usually a redesigned mission of less size and reduced costs, eventually leading to ownership by the host nation over the coming three to five years.

These outcomes helped balance the need for clear and practical operating procedures at the agency level while providing flexibility at the policy level.

A second refinement focused on decision making within the Principals and Deputies Committees, which became more rigorous after Clinton signed PDD-25, Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. It directed disciplined policy analysis of the conflict situation as policymakers considered response options.14 The NSC tasked the intelligence community to analyze crisis situations according to baseline and success

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13. Leonard R. Hawley, “The Advance Pol-Mil Planning Process” (unpublished manuscript). This document can be obtained from Michael Dziedzic by sending an e-mail to michaeldz71@gmail.com.
factors derived from lessons learned during recent missions and provide this information as inputs for the NSC planning process.  

NSC officials also relied on assessments from international partners, diplomatic envoys and peace negotiators, officials of regional organizations, and other knowledgeable actors residing in a region. Before a Principals or Deputies Committee meeting, the NSC staff prepared a discussion paper to inform policy deliberations with the support of the interagency working group. Just as the NSC’s discussion papers brought together information and issues from disparate sources, so too did the Clinton administration’s interagency planning experts in creating a language or science of political-military planning.

Science of Crisis Management

Clinton administration interagency planning experts created distinctive terms to capture their mission and establish a unifying lexicon rather than each agency working from their own. By 1997, this lexicon included new terms such as transformation strategies, major mission areas, and instruments of government action, among others. A related interagency planning evolution involved developing a realistic intervention strategy for mobilizing, wielding, and sustaining global power for interventions. This critical section of the political-military plan, often written by members of the Policy Steering Group who are officials at the deputy assistant secretary/major general level, fused intelligence assessments; confirmed the policy aims of the intervention; clarified the strategic purpose, mission, and near-term objectives; and integrated the international coalition interests needed to gain adequate contributions to support a successful intervention. The resulting intervention strategy became the core section of the political-military plan for an intervention.

In addition, the nature of successful coalition operations evolved with the important distinction between an intervention and a coalition. Complex contingency operations are mostly multinational and multilateral, which means interventions usually require several different coalitions to get the job done. The international mission in Kosovo, for example, embodied eight coalitions led by the Contact Group (Balkans) (political), NATO (military), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (humanitarian relief), the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (rule of law), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (democratization and institution-building), the European

Union (reconstruction and economic development), the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (human rights), and the G8 (donor coalition).

For interventions to succeed, the political and structural foundations of each coalition had to be organized and set in place during the planning process, and planning efforts had to be married with diplomacy at the assistant secretary/lieutenant general level. High-level consultations with allies, regional friends, UN Security Council members, international organizations, and other potential contributors were crucial to ensure Washington’s political-military plan had buy-in from partners and the various coalitions needed for success.

When Clinton finally signed PDD-56 in May 1997 after a lengthy vetting process, various agencies were already applying a host of institutional reforms. The changes constituted a significant transformation in how the US government conducted interagency planning for crisis response. Under the leadership of Ellen Laipson, vice-chair of the National Intelligence Council, the intelligence community revamped its exercise and training programs to focus on complex emergencies and incorporate PDD-25 baseline factors and success factors into intelligence reporting as a crisis emerged. Meanwhile, the US State Department increased its organizational planning capacity by establishing an Office of Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping within its Bureau of Political-Military Affairs to support the NSC’s interagency planning activities.

Within the military, the Joint Staff required all military operational-level plans include an “Annex V (Interagency Coordination)” to address critical civilian agency efforts necessary for military operations. The NSC staff convened several after-action reviews to capture lessons learned from recent planning efforts and interventions that were included in the Generic Political-Military Implementation Plan.

At the interagency level, the Deputies Committee approved professional education programs within the Departments of Defense and State to offer courses in interagency planning for crisis response. The War Gaming and Simulation Center at the National Defense University worked with the Foreign Service Institute to sponsor annual interagency training exercises to strengthen the basic skills of mid- and senior-level agency officials. Though the signing of PDD-56 codified the need for interagency cooperation and collaboration, the changes made by these US government agencies acknowledged the utility of the strategies the directive contained long before it was signed.
Overall, the historical evolution of the art and science of interagency planning for multidimensional coalition operations is a story about conceptual evolution coupled with the creation of new institutional mechanisms in the policy planning arena. These innovations demonstrated contingency operations could be successful despite their situational complexity, political controversy, and pressures for disunity among US departments and agencies.

**Dismantling of PDD-56**

Soon after taking office in January 2001, the Bush administration dismantled the Clinton administration’s interagency planning capabilities. Bush discarded the *NSC-centric approach* embraced by PDD-56 and adopted an *agency-centric approach* in National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 1: *Organization of the National Security System*. The consequence of this action was that under Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the Pentagon held the dominant role in crisis management in the Bush administration.

The dismantling of the PDD-56 process came quickly. In early 2002 James Dobbins, the US special envoy for Afghanistan, urged the Deputies Committee to get interagency political-military planning up and running for Afghanistan, but his proposal went nowhere. A ranking official at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, at the direction of Rumsfeld, discarded a draft presidential directive prepared by the Joint Staff that was akin to PDD-56. In the run up to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Rumsfeld leveraged the Bush administration’s agency-centric approach for crisis management to relegate senior officials of the State Department, the US Agency for International Development, the Justice Department, and other civilian agencies to the back row in policy decision making and planning.

The Bush administration did not draw on interagency strategic planning capacity for its interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. This serious deficiency, exacerbated by feuding among senior leaders of departments and agencies, resulted in serious gaps and disconnects on the ground. In 2004 after just one year in Iraq, Americans witnessed the violent Sunni revolt in Fallujah, the hostile Shia uprising, and the scandalous pictures of torture in the US prison at Abu Ghraib. After three years of stalemate in Afghanistan, Congress in late 2004 asserted intense pressure on the Bush administration to fix its failures.

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in interagency strategic planning and correct its structural deficiencies for conducting complex contingency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.19

In August 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell announced the establishment of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize US government civilian capacity to prevent conflict and plan for stabilization operations. In June 2005, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers cited the importance of S/CRS for an integrated approach to peacekeeping, reconstruction, and stability operations and to relieve stress on the armed forces.20 In November 2005, the Pentagon published DoD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, which gave stability and reconstruction operations priority comparable to combat operations.21 Eventually, in December 2005, President Bush signed NSPD-44 that sought to empower the secretary of state, facilitated by the newly formed S/CRS, to lead and coordinate the US government response in reconstruction and stabilization missions across all involved agencies and to work with the secretary of defense to harmonize civilian and military activities.22

None of the Bush administration initiatives created under the agency-centric approach favored by Rumsfeld in 2005 proved to be effective in crisis management. S/CRS produced some useful work, such as the Interagency Management System, to improve cooperation and planning between the Defense and State Departments and other departments and agencies.23 The Interagency Management System, however, was entirely disconnected from decision making for crisis management by Bush Deputies and Principal Committees. Moreover, the powerful regional bureaus of the State Department and offices of the US Agency for International Development saw the work of S/CRS as infringing on their turf, and Congressional appropriations committees never provided sufficient funding or staffing for S/CRS. Most important, the Pentagon ignored S/CRS efforts to lead interagency planning because of its prevailing view that the Pentagon does not work for the secretary of state.

The key lesson from the Bush administration’s unsuccessful responses to crises is that policy decision making and interagency political-military planning must go hand in hand. This relationship thrived during the Clinton administration because it applied the NSC-centric approach under PDD-56 to manage crises. In contrast, the Bush administration’s agency-centric approach under NSPD-44 allowed Rumsfeld to control crisis decision making and skew planning toward military priorities, without a corresponding civilian contribution by other US departments and agencies or from international organizations. Rumsfeld’s domination of the process expedited dysfunction in Washington, which led to costly, stalemated missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The salient lesson for future administrations is that an \textit{NSC-centric approach} will not always guarantee success, but an \textit{agency-centric approach} will surely lead to failure.

\textbf{Recurring Weaknesses and Critical Problems in Interagency Collaboration}

The critical problems examined in this section are based on my personal involvement in managing the preparation of over 40 political-military plans as NSC director for multilateral affairs. They highlight interagency planning deficiencies and their adverse impact on effective crisis management. Most of these deficiencies are correctable, and best practices and achievable solutions for dealing with them are elaborated in the following section.

\textit{Insufficient authority for the NSC staff.} Over reliance on an agency-centric as opposed to an NSC-centric model for crisis management encourages discord, turf protection, inefficiency, planning failures, and unforeseen disconnects that lead to severe adverse consequences for operational success in the field.

\textit{Excessive growth of the NSC staff.} The NSC staff’s enormous size of about 300 professionals in recent years encourages the NSC to assume agency operational responsibilities rather than to integrate, oversee, and focus agency officials in support of the policy decisions of the Deputies and Principals Committees.

\textit{Mistrusted dialogue between the intelligence and policy communities.} Discussions are often unproductive when intelligence professionals risk retribution from policymakers when providing early warning, situation assessments, historical analyses, and political forecasts necessary for timely anticipation of a potential crisis.
Predisposition by assistant secretaries to protect agency turf and resources. Assistant secretaries are prone to set aside their responsibilities for integrating their activities with other agencies, thereby creating independent, disconnected agency stovepipes in the field.

Inadequate professional competence among senior officials. Most rising civilian and military officials do not appreciate their professional limitations for collaborative leadership and integrated policy planning, leading to high-level wariness and resistance to applying best practices for interagency crisis management.

Inconsistent concepts of planning across agencies. Most agency planners do not appreciate that planning an international intervention is fundamentally different from their traditional agency planning methods. Their distinctive agency planning methods are not relevant to requirements for NSC-led policy planning of an intervention.

Inadequate information sharing among agencies creates disconnects and disunity. Many US government officials consider information as power and fail to share it with other agencies, thus breeding an unwelcome lack of trust within an interagency planning group.

Parochial personnel management. Agency career tracks and assignment policies discourage personnel who take broadening assignments in other agencies. Cross-agency assignments are scorned as diversions from mainstream career paths.

Disappointing return on investments in agency training and exercises. Although considerable agency money is spent on training and exercises, the return on these investments is disappointing because interagency issues are rarely designed into agency exercises.

Absence of a funding line for the NSC to support interagency training, tabletop exercises, and strategy games. NSC staff must search for the funding needed for training, exercises, and strategy games which impedes the development of expertise in interagency planning for crisis response.

Disconnected agency budgets supporting foreign interventions. The practice of submitting separate agency budgets to support each agency’s responsibilities in

a foreign intervention results in an ad hoc, fragmented budgeting system that usually leads to critical program funding shortfalls and execution delays.

Several reports and studies suggest the reform of the US government’s interagency process for crisis management must be driven by Congress, in a manner similar to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation created horizontal structures and processes to strengthen jointness among the military services within the Department of Defense.

Presidential prerogatives in structuring the US government interagency to meet emerging foreign policy and national security priorities, however, should be preserved. One of the most valuable features of the current system is that the president has complete constitutional authority to tailor existing interagency capabilities of the US government to address emerging threats effectively (for example, cybersecurity). Legislation dictating rigid bureaucratic arrangements which would jeopardize the flexibility now granted to the president to retool the interagency policy-making system to deal with new threats and seize emerging opportunities should be avoided. The executive and legislative branches must find the right balance between the need to adapt rapidly to emerging national security threats and the need for oversight.

**Best Practices for Interagency Planning and Coalition Operations**

Fortunately, seasoned Clinton administration interagency planners confronted many of these problems and found solutions under PDD-56, thereby improving unity of effort in interagency planning for multidimensional coalition operations. What follows are best practices for addressing these recurring problems.

*Interagency planning is best directed and coordinated by the NSC staff.* Consensus building is critical to effective interagency planning. The NSC staff often champions an overarching US policy perspective compared to agency officials. Under the NSC-centric model, the NSC plays a decisive role as an advocate for US policy aims with the clout necessary to bring closure to disputes over narrow agency interests.

*Senior officials need to be collaborative leaders.* Appointees at the deputy assistant secretary/major general level or higher should regularly demonstrate the attributes of effective collaborative leadership in interagency activities.25

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High-performing senior officials who are collaborative leaders prefer a mutual effort to find solutions to complex problems, listen to other points of view, and are committed to building consensus among counterparts.

*Processes help manage the overwhelming complexity of crisis situations.* An important benefit of the Advance Political-Military Planning Process is that it can reduce the complexities associated with international crises. This NSC-led interagency planning process can help senior officials better understand an emerging crisis, including its historical roots, its local politics, possible scenarios, the risks associated with a crisis response, and the gravity of US concerns.

*Effective interagency planning improves the quality and timeliness of policy decisions.* The clarification of policy issues is a core purpose of interagency planning. Most immediate and longer-term policy questions are identified in the Advance Political-Military Planning Process and are brought to principals and deputies in a timely manner to support their decision making for an effective response to a crisis.

*Expertise in policy planning for crisis response must be assiduously developed.* This special knowledge is critical to creating conditions for policy development, crafting effective strategies, and integrating available instruments of power. Few mid-level officials have an in-depth understanding of these special skills. An interagency training and exercise program in crisis management is an absolute necessity to develop this expertise.

*The intelligence community needs to be advised of the issues being confronted by policymakers.* Intelligence officials need advance notice of issues being considered by Principals and Deputies Committees so a focused intelligence summary can be distributed to committee members and NSC staff 24 hours prior to their meeting.

*Build trust within interagency planning groups by encouraging sensible information sharing.* There is no need for sharing sources and methods, but sharing unbiased assessments is critical for the interagency planning team to understand the nature of complex challenges and to find integrated solutions. The NSC chair of the Interagency Planning Group should seek consensus about how shared sensitive information will be protected and the practices needed to achieve this.
Informal dialogue among agency officials is crucial. Informal discussions among agency officials are often more constructive than formal meetings. Such communications are aided by the cross assignment of personnel and habitual relationships within the interagency planning community. The trick is to bring together officials within diverse interagency clusters of functional planners, such as military officers and human rights officials, in ways that promote new understanding and unity of effort through friendly crosstalk over a cup of coffee.

An intervention requires many different coalitions. A large, complex intervention usually requires a political coalition to steer international action and support, a military coalition to conduct security operations, a humanitarian coalition to provide relief, a rule of law coalition to provide public security and justice, a political-economic coalition to build a legitimate economy, a development coalition to support post-intervention reconstruction, a human rights coalition to address abuses, and a donor coalition to pay for operations. Each coalition has both political and structural foundations that must be set up and managed by its leading partner.

Coalitions are always ad hoc and inherently fragile. A standing coalition that can be quickly deployed within a week is a planning fantasy. Each intervention is essentially a pick-up game where willing participants in an ad hoc fashion come to play. The core group of an international intervention is formed very early in the interagency planning process because this small group of nations makes a significant contribution to the planning and mobilization of other nations and international organizations to participate in the intervention. Cohesion is essential to success, yet unity can be quite fragile compared to an adversary leader’s single-minded will and determination. Capable leadership among political directors of a core group of coalition partners is central to the success of an intervention.

Consolidated budgets for foreign interventions. The US government cannot rely upon separate agency budget submissions for programs supporting field activities for foreign interventions (for example, deployments, relief activities, military operations, police missions, and elections). The Office of Management and Budget should consolidate these one-year agency budgets into a single consolidated three-year budget request, updated annually, for funding the intervention. Authorized by a Joint Committee of Congress for Foreign Contingencies, a single consolidated budget passed on time each fiscal year will reinforce unity of effort for integrated civilian-military activities.
While these practices will alleviate most of the weaknesses and problems identified in the previous section part of what makes the NSC-centric approach laid out in PDD-56 so successful is its responsiveness to individual situations. Thus, each new crisis will create new and unique problems and while these best practices can be applied broadly, no two crises are the same.

**Recommendations for Effective Crisis Management**

The deadly global COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with the ensuing global economic disaster, has created an even more turbulent and dangerous world than the one faced following the Cold War. Great power competition will only make foreign crises more dangerous. To meet this challenge, the Biden-Harris administration’s earliest and highest priority should be to establish a renewed PDD-56 process. The following recommendations for updating PDD-56 are distilled from my experience managing the preparation of 44 political-military plans during the Clinton administration:

**Structuring the Interagency for Effective Crisis-Response Planning**

To provide battle-tested management practices and implementing instructions for Presidential Security Memorandum (PSM) 2: *Renewing the National Security Council System*, the Biden-Harris administration should prepare a PSM drawing on PDD-56 to operationalize an NSC-centric approach to managing complex contingencies. The NSC senior director for strategic planning should be empowered with authority across the US government. The office should be staffed with planners who are collectively capable of managing about five to seven complex emergencies and ongoing missions.

To identify operational issues for emerging political-military implementation plans, the Office of the Secretary of Defense Undersecretary for Policy should host a one-day “Red-Blue-Gray” strategy game involving participants at the deputy assistant secretary/major general level from relevant departments and agencies, including the J-5 director of planning at the relevant combatant command(s). This game would help clarify the regional crisis scenario and US and allied concerns, identify likely countermoves by bad actors, and highlight surprising events and outcomes that might unfold through time.

To support the timely execution of interagency planning by the designated Interagency Policy Committee for the crisis response, the Biden-Harris administration should direct specific intelligence assessments provided by the National Intelligence Council that focus on early warning, comprehensive situation assessments, historical analyses, political forecasts, and personality assessments of bad actors/spoilers.

Finally, a political-military implementation plan should be the primary tool used for integrating US government actions and managing complex contingency operations with coalition partners. Prior to the execution of the plan, a rehearsal should be conducted to review the political-military plan’s main elements with each Interagency Policy Committee official presenting to the Deputies or Principals Committee. The sequential implementation for their major mission area, triggers and decision points, any unresolved policy issues, and the adequacy of resources required for their major mission area should be included.

**Setting Up the Interagency for Success**

The Interagency Policy Committee should conduct an after-action/lessons-learned review at the end of each major stage of the complex contingency operation to capture lessons learned. Appointees at the deputy assistant secretary/major general level and higher should be required to attend a one-week, senior-level professional development course that addresses the administration’s interagency planning process and imparts the talents and skills necessary for effective collaborative leadership in interagency activities.27 To improve America’s ability to manage future operations, an interagency training and exercise program should be created within US government agencies to develop a cadre of professionals familiar with the political-military planning process. All departments and agencies involved should be directed to conduct a review to identify agency upgrades to support timely implementation of the provisions of a PSM for managing complex contingency operations.

Implementation of these recommendations will take a serious commitment by the president and senior NSC officials to strengthen interagency planning for international crisis response. As this article has demonstrated, however, the PDD-56 process anticipated the exponential increase in global interconnectivity and consequent need for collaboration between nations and within the US government. To date, the directive remains the most successful template for balancing military and civilian planning in a world where the need for effective crisis management is only growing larger and more prevalent.

27. Linden, *Leading across Boundaries.*
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Colonel Michael J. Dziedzic, US Air Force retired, edited Len Hawley’s draft posthumously to prepare it for publication with Parameters. After serving as the strategic planner for the UN Mission in Kosovo, he co-edited Quest for Viable Peace with Leonard Hawley and Jock Covey.
ABSTRACT: The reemergence of great power competition, conflict with near-peer competitor states below the level of armed conflict, and persisting threats from nonstate actors with transnational ambitions and global reach pose challenges for strategists planning, executing, and assessing military operations and strategy. Building on current visualization tools, two proposed models—the National Strategic Risk Abacus and the National Strategic Risk Radar Chart—address these challenges and better depict how the US military may inadvertently contribute to risk at the national strategic level.

This article offers insights and tools to assist strategic planners in assessing how US military actions may produce “national strategic risk”: risk to the grand strategic goals of American security and prosperity over time. Most current risk assessment tools are useful for capturing tactical and operational level risk; however, as this article proposes, they are insufficient for comprehending the complexities of national strategic risk. Specifically, assessing risk at the national strategic level is more difficult than assessing risk at the tactical or operational levels because of “compounding risk,” the unanticipated effects of military actions on achieving national security goals. Furthermore, military actions taken at one point in time could have unintended long-term effects, “cascading risk,” making risk assessment at this level difficult. Finally, the considerable challenges inherent in formulating an effective response to what several scholars call “strategic surprises” to national security can also produce risk.1

This article proposes two visualization models US military planners can use to capture compounding and cascading risk and identify risk during times of strategic surprise. These models will offer a first step for visualizing the complexity of risk assessment at the national strategic level and will provide guidance for military planners considering the macro-level and long-term effects of operations on wider national security strategy.

The article proceeds as follows. Section two outlines how the US military addresses risk at the tactical, operational, and Joint levels, which are doctrine and models designed to assess and mitigate risk within its own operations. Section three defines national strategic risk, including how it differs from military risk, and demonstrates some of the challenges associated with identifying, assessing, and predicting risk at the national strategic level. Section four highlights the utility of visualization tools and introduces two visualization models designed to capture compounding and cascading risk: the National Strategic Risk Abacus and the National Strategic Risk Radar Chart. Finally, section five provides concluding remarks.

**Risk Assessment at the Tactical, Operational, and Joint Levels**

The US military has developed a series of nested doctrine and models to assist leaders in addressing risk at the tactical, operational, and Joint levels, including Field Manuals (FM), Army Techniques Publications (ATP), and Joint documents. While these tools have proven helpful in mitigating risk within the US military’s operations, they are insufficient for assessing national strategic risk.

In 1998 the Army developed the first systematic tool to assess risk, FM 100-14, *Risk Management*, to codify its process for assessing, managing, and evaluating risk, primarily at the tactical level. The manual articulates a five-step risk management process to “identify hazards, assess hazards to address risks, develop controls and make risk decisions, implement controls, and supervise and evaluate.” These steps, designed to help leaders make better-informed decisions that save lives and resources during a mission, do not address broader considerations beyond basic control measures. This risk assessment tool, therefore, has limited utility at the national strategic level.

To provide a more holistic approach to risk assessment, the US Army published FM 5-19, *Composite Risk Management*, in 2006. While maintaining the same basic five-step risk management process from FM 100-14, FM 5-19 outlines a new tool matrix that considers the severity of risk (negligible, marginal, critical, and catastrophic) with the probability of risk (unlikely, seldom, occasional, likely, and frequent). This combination of frequency and severity of risk produces an assessed outcome (low, medium, high, or extremely high) that allows leaders to identify an acceptable level of risk based on the likelihood of an event occurring measured against the severity of impact to things like “personnel, equipment,

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5. HQDA, FM 5-19, 1–9 to 1–10.
environment or mission.” Although this tool includes more aspects associated with risk, it is still primarily focused on the tactical and operational levels.

Building on FM 5-19, the US Army published ATP 5-19, *Risk Management*, in 2014 with the aim of further systematizing risk assessment by identifying potential hazards, assessing them, and managing their associated risks, in what the training publication calls “composite risk management.” ATP 5-19 retains a holistic view of risk management but adds the complexity of multiple mission sets rather than the traditional practice of separating accidents into single events. Additionally, it better integrates this approach into the Army’s military decision-making process. Finally, ATP 5-19 calls for leaders to employ the Risk Assessment Matrix, originally outlined in FM 100-14 and depicted in FM 5-19, to use the five-step process cyclically and continuously and to apply the process across all Army operations, big and small. Again, as with FM 100-14 and FM 5-19, this manual focuses on the tactical and operational levels of risk and is not easily applied to assessing strategic level risk.

In 2019, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff drafted the manual *Joint Risk Analysis* to assist senior leaders in understanding military risk at the Joint level. The document establishes a new Joint Risk Analysis Methodology (JRAM). The JRAM framework incorporates three major components to assess risk: risk appraisal, risk management, and risk communication, with four activities: “problem framing” (identifying what the risk is assessed against), “risk assessment” (identifying where the risks are coming from), “risk judgment” (identifying what level of risk is acceptable to assume), and “risk management” (identifying what actions should be taken to help mitigate the risk). The three JRAM components tie together the four steps of the framework and promote the continual consideration of the components throughout the four steps.

The overall goal of the JRAM is to provide military leaders and staffs with a model for assessing risk at the Joint military level, the actions needed to achieve specific outcomes, and the resources required to achieve those outcomes. By moving away from simple terms such as high or low to articulate risk, leaders can identify greater specificity in the description of risk across a broader range of events and actions. Despite the improvements the JRAM brings to assessing risk at the highest operational level, particularly the inclusion of both quantitative and qualitative methods of articulating risk, the tool addresses risk to military

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8. HQDA, ATP 5-19, 4-1–4-14.
10. JCS, CJCSM 3105.01, B-2–B-6.
goals only and does not provide adequate means for assessing risk at the national strategic level. As will be described later, more complex models are needed to assess and visualize national strategic risk.

Assessing Risk at the National Strategic Level

The US military, despite developing doctrine and models aimed at understanding how actions affect risk at the tactical, operational, and Joint levels, has focused few resources on the ability to identify risk at the national strategic level. This section provides insights into how US military actions could create risk at the national strategic level, differentiates national security strategy from military strategy, describes the instruments of national power needed to realize national security and prosperity over time, considers the role national security documents play in naming threats and opportunities, and identifies specific types of risks the US military might create through its actions at this level.

The first step in understanding how military actions may incur risk to national security strategy is distinguishing it from military strategy. Military strategy focuses on achieving an objective in war using the military as the primary instrument of power. National security strategy (also called grand strategy or statecraft) provides a broader, long-term vision of a country’s threats and opportunities and actions that will help shape the world in a way that favors its interests. Colonel R. W. Van de Velde describes statecraft as “the process through which a nation attempts to minimize its weaknesses and limitations, and to maximize its strengths and capabilities in a current international situation.”

National security strategy has much broader and longer-term goals than military strategy, which include security as well as prosperity. It requires multiple instruments of power and a whole-of-government approach for realizing these goals. Van de Velde outlined four broad instruments of national power in particular: “the diplomatic, the economic, the military, and the psychological” tools of statecraft. Subsequent descriptions of the instruments of national power have changed the psychological tool to the information tool, creating the acronym DIME, but perhaps losing the purpose of information, which is to influence the

13. Van de Velde, “Instruments of Statecraft.” Here it is assumed that no one agency or department controls any given instrument of national power. For example, see Heather S. Gregg, “Crafting a Better US Grand Strategy in the Post–September 11 World: Lessons from the Early Years of the Cold War,” Foreign Policy Analysis 6, no. 3 (July 2010): 237–55.
thought and behavior of a target audience. Still others have expanded the tools of statecraft to include finance, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIME-FIL or MIDLIFE). Including intelligence as a separate tool of statecraft is especially important because it differentiates the practice of gathering and assessing information to help in decision making at various levels from information as a tool used to “change or maintain the drivers of behavior” in target audiences.

To realize its national security strategy, the US government has developed several documents to identify its threats, opportunities, and national strategic goals. The National Security Strategy (NSS) drafted by the executive branch of government is the principal vision for articulating the nation’s strategic threats and opportunities. The 2017 NSS identified several threats to US interests, ranging from “transnational criminal organizations” to the need to secure US borders and territory to the importance of promoting “free, fair, and reciprocal economic relationships” with other countries. Some of the opportunities addressed in the 2017 NSS included promoting the prosperity of the United States through “lead[ing] in research, technology, and innovation,” and renewing its competitive advantage by improving capabilities across multiple domains, such as cyber and space, as well as its nuclear posture. The NSS draws on all instruments of national power to address these threats and opportunities over time.

The 2018 National Defense Strategy written by the Office of the Secretary of Defense takes guidance from the NSS and applies it to the military instrument of power. The National Defense Strategy names the following military goals: “build a more lethal force, strengthen alliances and attract new partners, and change the way we do business,” as the US military’s means of implementing the NSS. The 2018 National Military Strategy drafted by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff helps “inform the prioritization of force employment, force development, and force design for the Joint Force.” The National Military Strategy identifies

several threats to the US military, ranging from the “reemergence of great power competition” to newly emerging technologies, which are “changing the character of war” and “empower[ing] nonstate actors.” Additionally, the National Military Strategy addresses opportunities, including working with “allies and partners” to strengthen national security and evolving areas within force employment, development, and design. These strategic level documents identify a range of threats and opportunities that all require the assessment of risk, not just for military actions but for all the instruments of national power.

These documents are necessary but insufficient for identifying risk at the national strategic level. Critically, risk can occur independent of threat assessments of an adversary’s capabilities and intentions and can actually be the unintended result of actions taken within a government to secure itself. One critical way risk can inadvertantly occur within the US military’s actions is through compounding risk. Compounding risk can occur when actions conducted by one department or agency in the government, such as the military, could incur an acceptable level of risk for that particular organization, but could also affect other agencies and cause unintended risk to broader national security interests. This form of risk is similar to challenges identified in complexity theory, where complex, nonlinear, loosely organized yet interconnected elements within a system affect one another, or to the butterfly effect, where small changes in a nonlinear system can have bigger consequences across the organization and over time.

One example of the US military’s creation of compounding risk comes from an incident in Afghanistan. In 2012, the US military discovered detainees were using religious materials, including Qur’ans, to pass information to one another. Military police confiscated the materials and chose to burn them, unaware of how Muslims would perceive these actions. Reports of the burned materials led to violent riots in Afghanistan and resulted in at least 41 deaths and strained relations with US allies. This poorly thought-out act incurred minimal risk to US troops, but had compounding effects, beyond just the military, on departments and agencies that use diplomacy and information to achieve national strategic goals.

Another challenge to assessing risk at the national strategic level requires accounting for cascading risk, or the accumulation of risk over time. Unlike tactical or operational plans in the military, national security strategy has a much longer time horizon which, in theory, is never-ending, presenting considerable challenges for military planning, which usually assumes an end point.\textsuperscript{25} This lengthened time horizon complicates weighing opportunities and risks associated with actions in the here-and-now and considering their possible effects in the future. Actions that seem to have reasonable risk in the near term may have lasting and cascading consequences for national security over time.

An example of cascading risk is visible in the Global War on Terror, declared by the president of the United States following the 9/11 attacks. This strategy, which drew heavily on the US military, produced the following cascading effects: it led to a major military engagement in Afghanistan, the United States’ longest war; it contributed to the reasons given for invading Iraq in 2003; it increased US military activities in Africa and Asia; and it even prompted changes in US privacy laws. The Global War on Terror also strained relationships with European countries and other allies and has had a lasting negative impact on the image of the United States in the Muslim world.\textsuperscript{26} This accumulation of actions related to the Global War on Terror has incurred risk to national security through strained relationships with allies, the prolonged deployment and expenditure of US military power around the globe, and counterproductive perceptions of US intentions in the Muslim world. It is unlikely these cascading consequences over time were considered in 2001 when the Global War on Terror was declared.

Assessing risk at the national strategic level also requires planning for events that are rare or without precedent. Several scholars study this form of risk, “strategic surprise,” which includes events such as large-scale terrorist attacks, covert nuclear proliferation, and sneak attacks from adversarial states.\textsuperscript{27} The difficulty in planning for and responding to risk from strategic surprise in national security stems from the challenges associated with identifying early warnings in intelligence gathering, the trust that policymakers have in that intelligence and their overall belief in that threat, the ability of leaders

to consume that information, and decision making under duress. Bracken, Brenner, and Gordon also note the challenges posed by subject matter experts who become too narrowly focused in their expertise, which inhibits their consideration of new frameworks for analysis and poses another potential hindrance to identifying strategic surprise. Finally, most individuals are biased by their perceived understanding of the current environment and historically similar events, which can skew decision making and risk analysis. Risk from strategic surprise and the need to respond in a crisis can in turn exacerbate compounding and cascading risk. The Global War on Terror, as described above, delineates the challenges posed by assessing risk in actions undertaken during strategic surprise.

While the US government has articulated various threats and opportunities to its national security in key documents, these documents are insufficient for addressing how US military operations may incur risk to national security strategy, specifically, the challenges posed by compounding risk and its effects on other instruments of power and government activities, cascading risk over time, and how strategic surprise can exacerbate these forms of risk. The next section offers two visualization tools designed to help the US military account for these challenges and assess risk at the national strategic level.

**Visualizing Risk at the National Strategic Level**

Assessing risk at the national strategic level requires the US military to identify and assess how their actions may affect the government’s use of other instruments of statecraft to achieve national strategic goals over time. Visualization tools are particularly useful in this endeavor because they can capture otherwise disparate information, show how various actions might incur compounding and cascading risk, and identify potential risk in times of strategic surprise.

Visualization expert Edward Tufte describes the utility of visualization tools by summarizing “What is to be sought in designs for the display of information is the clear portrayal of complexity.” Visualization tools can present qualitative and quantitative data as well as spatial and conceptual information. For example, French civil engineer Charles Joseph Minard’s now-famous nineteenth-century depiction of Napoleon’s disastrous 1812 march to Moscow captures six different types of quantitative and spatial data through a combination of size, placement, and color: “the size of the army, its

location on a two-dimensional surface, direction of the army’s movement, and temperature on various dates during the retreat from Moscow.” The result is a clear visualization of Napoleon’s loss of troops relative to time, terrain, and temperature. In the age of big data, visualization tools have become particularly useful for gathering and presenting large amounts of statistical information in a way that is understandable. Yet, as depicted by Minard and others, nonquantifiable information can also be displayed with visualization tools in a way that clarifies complexity.

Two visualization models help depict compounding and cascading risk to military planners and may be particularly useful for identifying risk during times of strategic surprise—the National Strategic Risk Abacus and the National Strategic Risk Radar Chart. The National Strategic Risk Abacus helps military planners think specifically about compounding risk, including compounding risk incurred through strategic surprise. It depicts two sets of variables: a spectrum of acceptable to unacceptable risk on the bottom horizontal line, and the instruments of national power—diplomatic, information, military, economic, and external/other which, for example, could include variables like allies—as the abacus beads. See figure 1.

![National Strategic Risk Abacus](image)

**Figure 1. National Strategic Risk Abacus – Example Assessment of Collective National Risk**

The beads can slide from left to right, depending on the amount of risk assumed within each instrument, to show how military actions can have a compounding effect on the use of the other instruments within the departments and agencies of the US government. Here it is assumed that no one agency or department controls any given instrument of national power. The abacus is particularly useful for addressing compounding risk incurred during incidents of strategic surprise; it allows for a simple

and quick assessment of how military actions might inadvertently incur risk to the other instruments of national power and US efforts to wield these instruments for national security goals.

In the strategic surprise caused by the Global War on Terror, the US military could have used the National Strategic Risk Abacus to consider the possible compounding effects of specific actions on the other instruments of national power. The abacus could have helped planners visualize how military actions might affect Muslim attitudes toward the United States, which could incur risk to the information tool, or how military actions might strain relationships with Muslim-majority allied countries, which could affect the government’s use of both the diplomatic and the military instruments of national power.

The second model, the National Strategic Risk Radar Chart, uses a radar chart (sometimes called a spider chart) to depict compounding and cascading risk. A radar chart “is a 2D chart presenting multivariate data by giving each variable an axis and plotting the data as a polygonal shape over all axes.” More simply, a radar chart plots different variables onto a graph. Each variable has its own ray originating from the center, like a spoke on a wheel. Connecting each plot point creates a polygonal shape on the chart. This chart is particularly useful for plotting multiple variables and disparate information on a single graph for visual analysis, including both compounding and cascading risk.

Several government agencies currently use radar charts to assess national threats, incorporating numerous variables to visualize their holistic effect. The Department of Homeland Security uses a radar chart to assess the effects of a potential “cyberattack on critical infrastructure,” as well as to visualize the wide-ranging effects of an influenza pandemic on the United States. These charts contain 5 levels of homeland security hazards, ranging from 1 (low) to 5 (high) in concentric rings across 16 identified attributes (the spokes), including health-related issues such as injuries or deaths, economic impact, and environmental effects. Risk is plotted on a scale from 0 (at the center) to 1 (at the edge), with 0 representing the lowest value in this set of hazards, and 1 representing the highest value.

Finally, the attributes are grouped in quadrants: the upper right quadrant addresses health effects, the lower right quadrant focuses on economic damage, and the upper and lower left quadrants consider environmental or atmospheric consequences. These three sets of factors—contributing variables, level of risk, and effect on health

and economics—allow for a quick visual comparative representation of several types of risks and their holistic effects.

![Radar chart](image)

**Figure 2. National Strategic Risk Radar Chart**

Radar charts are especially useful for assessing risk at the national strategic level because they can accommodate many critical variables for quick visualization of compounding and cascading risk. Figure 2 includes five levels of risk (from low to high), along with 10 variables on the spokes, including time, allies, and economic impact. The instruments of national power are depicted as polygonal shapes, each with its own color, to visualize the risk to each instrument. Most important, this radar chart includes time as a variable, allowing for cascading risk to be considered. A radar chart like this one would have allowed military planners to see a wide range of possible risks incurred from actions in the Global War on Terror, including the effects of actions on international support, resources, allies, and partners and risks to their own missions and forces.

**Conclusion**

The US military’s role in assessing national strategic risk and its ability to understand and mitigate this form of risk is a critically important task. This article provided insights into what national strategic risk is and why current risk assessment tools in the US military are insufficient for addressing risk at this level. Specifically, it argued that assessing risk at the national strategic level is more difficult for the US military than assessing risk at the tactical or operational levels because this level of analysis involves considering the effects of military actions on other instruments of national power across the US government and
risk over time. US military actions could inadvertently cause compounding risk, or risk to other instruments of power; it could incur unforeseen risk over time, or cascading risk; and it could produce risk through decisions made under duress from strategic surprise to national security. The two proposed visualization tools for considering risk at the national strategic level—the National Strategic Risk Abacus and the National Strategic Risk Radar Chart—could help military leaders rapidly assess the risks associated with proposed courses of action and make more informed decisions on a way forward.

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ABSTRACT: Looming budget cuts will necessitate adept management to retain a military capable of competing and winning by avoiding the mistakes made in prior drawdowns. This article presents a framework for government and defense leaders to prepare for the coming drawdown and plan for the necessary capacity of tomorrow across the diplomatic, information, military, and economic framework.

As Peter Mansoor posits “Anyone can design a military force in times of plenty; it is in times of scarcity that strategic leaders with foresight are most needed.” The US economy is hurtling toward such an era with the Department of Defense (DoD) fiscal year 2022 budget of $715 billion failing to keep pace with inflation, and for the first time since 9/11, defense spending is facing significant realignment. While the Service Chiefs have quietly begun planning for drawdown, there is a lack of overall historical awareness for such decision making, as well as a clinging to a readiness paradigm better replaced by an effectiveness framework. This coming austerity will necessitate adept management to retain a military force with enough personnel and capabilities to compete and win.

The result of a US Army War College project, Drawdown: The American Way of Postwar, demonstrates the United States’ past failures to manage force reductions, leading to inefficient expenditures and losses in “First Battles.” Heeding the insights from Drawdown—technological development, strategic and doctrinal updating, and more education for leadership—the military can counter a loss of force structure during drawdowns and allow leaders to plan for necessary capacity across the diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) framework.
Although the military controls only the military lever of national power, it operates across the DIME framework as a part of the interagency, and government leaders should take the following measures to ameliorate the coming drawdown: (1) a ground forces reversion to a mixed standing force and cadre construct that retains experience, while reducing some personnel costs; (2) increasing investments in operations in the information environment (OIE); (3) a permanent integration of allies into the standing military establishment; (4) meeting threats with a periphery strategy; (5) and reprovisioning the US Air Force (USAF) and US Navy (USN) for the reality of precision fires.6

**Moving from Readiness to Effectiveness**

For the first time in American history, National Security Council Report 68 (NSC 68) created a large standing military establishment at the onset of the Cold War.7 Since this era, national security experts have preferred the readiness of standing forces for possible near-term battles over an effective strategic force. There has been little analysis about readiness as an appropriate organizing principle for this construct, which is fiscally problematic because readiness requires a significant investment in a large standing military establishment focused on training for current missions.8 Toward the end of the Cold War, historian Paul Kennedy warned policymakers to balance such perceived contemporary military needs with the economic health of the nation state (the “E” in DIME).9

Measuring the effectiveness of military forces is a more realistic framework and a cheaper organizing principle than readiness, with forces like cyber already engaged with adversaries. Effectiveness entails how well military forces are accomplishing missions across the levels of war and satisfying the requirements of national policy objectives.10 The readiness of standing forces usually does not equate to effectiveness in achieving national policy objectives. America’s pre-1950 era witnessed better strategic military results than the postmodern era even though

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the standing military forces were not ready at the outset of wars, experiencing tactical losses in First Battles.¹¹

The post-1950 expensive standing military establishment has fostered a tactical mindset, distracting military leadership from strategic thinking. This has led to less national policy success at astronomically higher costs.¹² US/NATO readiness did achieve deterrence against the Soviet Bloc, but even during the Korean and Vietnam Wars the Soviets remained deterred when US readiness in Europe ebbed. As the Cold War intensified during the Reagan administration, scholars explored military effectiveness, particularly the mismatch between policy objectives and military ways and means.¹³ This scholarship complements Drawdown’s conclusions on the necessity of technology and allies to offset the loss of force structure means during drawdowns. Winning and losing wars is a complex issue beyond the defense establishment purview alone, but the lack of strategic results is a negative return on investment for an expensive force structure.¹⁴

Achieving strategic results is imperative in an era of renewed great power competition which the Department of Defense has described as the “competition continuum,” where powers remain in various states of cooperation, competition, and conflict.¹⁵ Ready for a conflict in progress is a contradictory proposition. The forces in competition rapidly adapt to current circumstances which may require training for new equipment, organizations, and procedures that the readiness structure did not anticipate. As the Joint Staff already utilizes metrics for effectiveness in assessments of campaigning and operations, the Department of Defense could readily refocus on effectiveness at the operational level of war that links to both strategy and policy.¹⁶

Additionally, an effectiveness model corresponds with the competition continuum, measuring a unit’s progress toward objectives with the reality of continual campaigning. It acknowledges conflict occurring in multiple military domains and reorienting military leadership to current missions. Readiness is largely irrelevant when adversaries have already seized the initiative in the

¹¹. Since 1950, the United States fought to a tie in Korea, lost Vietnam and Afghanistan, and achieved middling results in Bosnia and Iraq.
¹². After extremely high expenditures from 1943 to 1945, the budget recovered to pre-war levels until doubling after NSC 68 to over $400 billion. It continued to climb steadily (except the Eisenhower administration) by about $1 billion a decade until hitting the mid-$700 billion of this era (all are numbers in 2013–adjusted dollars). William R. Johnston, “US Expenditures for Defense and Education, 1940–2014,” Johnston’s Archive, last modified May 5, 2018, http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/policy/edgraph.html.
information environment.\textsuperscript{17} Even within an effectiveness structure, readiness processes must exist while tactical forces are reconstituted. Effectiveness would take the lead in this model, while readiness would orient toward the type of training units need based on the current effectiveness of friendly forces.

### Understanding Mixed Force Structure

The route to high command once ran through the military’s educational institutions. Douglas MacArthur was superintendent of West Point and Malin Craig was commandant of the US Army War College before becoming Army Chief of Staff. A critical difference between the contemporary and pre-1940 environment was that few meaningful command opportunities existed in the interwar years.\textsuperscript{18} National Security Council Report 68 increased opportunities for tactical command, and the expansion of the civilian workforce within the newly created Department of Defense steadily pushed strategic thought away from the officer corps. A tactical-only mindset emerged with the increased number of troops now available and tactical level command became the nearly exclusive path to attain general officer.\textsuperscript{19}

The previous officer paradigm rested on the development of strategic leaders. The pre-1940 American officer corps appreciated this and spent much time on professional military education, discussions of strategy, and broadening assignments focused on managing the post-1898 US imperial holdings. These officers produced strategic plans at the war colleges that resulted in victory in 1945.\textsuperscript{20} With approaching austerity, it is sensible to return to the earlier paradigm.

A realistic decrease in standing forces also recognizes relevant social conditions. Since colonial times, Americans have been suspicious of the standing military, described in \textit{Drawdown} as the “Liberty Dilemma” or paradox where the standing forces required to maintain American liberty represented a threat to that liberty.\textsuperscript{21} This view has not disappeared. For example, recent calls to avoid naming recently retired General Lloyd J. Austin III as secretary of defense demonstrate the lingering fears of military threats to civilian authority.\textsuperscript{22} A return to a smaller establishment of a mixed standing and cadre force could ameliorate these latent American attitudes.

\textsuperscript{19} Warren, “Centurion Mindset,” 30, 32.
A smaller standing military would also force the federal government to observe the realities of current recruiting conditions. Due to ambivalent attitudes toward national service, large numbers of eligible recruits in college, an increasing felony rate, and the obesity epidemic, recruiting shortfalls have been legion.\footnote{23. Beth Bailey, \textit{America’s Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 128, for initial recruiting problems of the AVF. Also see Dennis Laich, “Manning the Military, America’s Problem,” Military Times, July 22, 2019, https://www.militarytimes.com/opinion/commentary/2019/07/23/manning-the-military-americas-problem/. While the military mostly satisfies its recruiting goals, it often lowers standards by issuing “waivers.”}

With troubled recruits often filling the shortfall, an intertwined military sexual assault crisis emerged, leading recently to the unprecedented relief of 14 of Fort Hood’s commanders, and the crisis has shown no signs of abating even with additional leadership attention and budget outlays.\footnote{24. Kyle Rempfer, “Fourteen Leaders Relieved,” \textit{Army Times}, December 8, 2020, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2020/12/08/fourteen-leaders-relieved-or-suspended-after-scathing-report-on-fort-hood-crimes/.} The result of a responsible drawdown would likely mean the retention of higher-quality recruits and reduced military crime.\footnote{25. This would not solve the problem of reconstituting during conflict.}

All force reduction measures must be executed with caution and an eye toward remobilization. A reduced force structure would only hold before reinforcements arrived; hence a threat analysis is critical in harnessing resources at the decisive point. As with any strategy, the possibility of failure does exist, particularly if partners in the Pacific and Europe do not materialize or instead, join American adversaries. What standing force posture is necessary to gain superiority in the Indo-Pacific region through effectiveness of existing structure, offsetting some active-duty personnel shortfalls with technology and other capabilities while maintaining some presence in Europe? This question should ultimately drive the current drawdown and the consideration of a better strategic and technological capacity and more robust alliances, but with less standing forces.

\begin{center} Knowing Partners on the Periphery \end{center}

The Chinese case calls for the United States to employ a peripheral strategy with a new coalition of neighbors bordering China. The United States cannot shoulder the manpower burden required to stare down a Chinese army of over two million personnel and a half-million more reserves, while the China also maintains a strategic population advantage.\footnote{26. Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2020 \textit{Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China} (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2020), https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF, 38. For reserves, see Global Security, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/pla-reserve.htm.} Offsetting this manpower disadvantage requires the United States to both bolster alliances in the Pacific and fill staff shortages with allied officers. Since World War I, the United States has fought with combined Joint headquarters.
With the US military waiting until a crisis to fill all staff billets, lag time is created between integrating allied officers and a proper functioning command and control enterprise. Given the United Kingdom’s and the Commonwealth’s reduction of forces, while American headquarters are too few and undermanned, there is an opportunity for allied officers without meaningful billets to staff these critical US shortages.27 The French should also join this arrangement.28

A peripheral strategy of continuous concentric pressure to contain China in its near-abroad calls for strategic raids in the information environment, especially against the Chinese command and control and party leadership structure. A US coalition would simultaneously support anti-government rebels, cut off Chinese garrisons in ocean areas, fix Chinese forces on the Korean Peninsula, and employ a “grid” support structure on China’s southern flank.29 Some of this strategy already exists in unclassified portions of US Pacific planning, the difference here is counting on less-available force structure at the outset of conflict and more on allies, while also reorienting most of the Marine Corps to this region.

The Pacific is the main focus of the Marine Corps, and with the service’s proposed drawdown in forces, the US Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR) should be expanded.30 The means for this strategy against China require stationing the majority of the Marines in the I Marine Expeditionary Forces and the III Marine Expeditionary Forces in the Pacific, with the II Marine Expeditionary Force reduced to one Marine expeditionary brigade rotating as a Marine expeditionary unit in the Atlantic as an emergency reserve. A remade, smaller-capital ship Navy and a reconfigured littoral Pacific fleet would provide the technical amphibious landing capabilities, temporary resupply, and some fire support, with Naval reservists manning additional amphibious ships to support the USMCR.

With this strategy, US Army Pacific fully embraces not only the effectiveness paradigm but also precision fires. It also provides both theater information and fires commands with multi-domain task forces, and long-range fires battalions, operating in conjunction with the Navy and Marines. Army Support to Other Services (ASOS) would include providing longer-range fires and conducting OIE

from bases in new Army area commands in the Western Pacific. As a war with China would precipitate one with North Korea, the Eighth Army must remain at current capacity, with the 2nd Infantry Division containing a rotational armored brigade combat team (ABCT), a long-range missile brigade, and a theater air defense artillery brigade forward in the Peninsula, as the core of a combined Joint Force. Additional brigades, or even a multidivision corps, would remain available for reinforcement from the continental United States. With the US-led coalition fixing Chinese forces in anticipation of limited offensive operations, US armored and mechanized forces would form the schwerpunkt upon which the rest of the coalition would rally. The Army’s security force assistance brigades (SFABs) would advise these allies, which are now critical to operations given the smaller number of US forces.

The same strategic problem with China exists when conceiving an effective military capacity for a resurgent Russia. Russia still poses a regional military problem to critical American allies in and out of NATO, but to a lesser extent than China because of a stagnant economy and static population. Russia, however, has successfully modernized its once ineffective force and leads the West in the crucial areas of missile technology, armor, and warfighting doctrine.

More dangerously, the Russians have embraced information warfare. Russia employs an initial disinformation campaign against local populations, seconded by cyber and electronic warfare attacks, followed by the insertion of special operating forces; then, only if necessary, does it introduce conventional forces. This is a far cry from its predictable echelon deployment of conventional forces in the 1980–90s. Russia also conducts strategic raids in the information environment on the United States, meddling in two presidential elections and backing proxies who hacked into the US Treasury and Commerce Departments through a SolarWinds contractor. Even with a reduced force from the Cold War now numbering around 950,000 soldiers (with an active reserve of one million), Russia remains a dangerous enough threat to require some US forces designated for Europe.

A direct military approach against Russia is also a losing proposition and calls for achieving exhaustion through continuous concentric pressure on its...
As in China’s case, maintaining a large standing force bent on tactical dominance in Russia’s near-abroad is a poor investment. Just enough US forces repositioned in Europe are required to prop up NATO and other allies. This posture would also decrease the need for scarce strategic lift assets that have atrophied for decades. With this strategy, European allies would still bear the brunt of an unwise conflict with a declining power. A more-capable Soviet Union did not take advantage of a similar NATO economy-of-force posture in Europe during the Cold War with the United States decisively engaged in the Pacific.

An enhanced US Army Europe-Africa headquarters capable of providing NATO an operational command post for the command and control of multicorps combat would also take the lead in Europe and include a forward stationed armored cavalry regiment backed up by a robust continental corps of up to six divisions. Just as important in any of these potential conflicts is using enhanced Army theater air defense artillery, long-range missiles, and OIE to counter the Russian missile and area-and-access denial advantage.

Given the Army and Air Force’s multi-domain operations (MDO) concept for combating China and Russia, these friendly heavy forces require their own missile strike capabilities to fight a modern battle. The recent combat between heavy forces in the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict evidenced the lack of protection and survivability of these formations from precision fires enhanced by drone/robotics technology. MDO doctrine is an attempt to offset current Russian advantages and future Chinese capabilities. The Russian scenario has focused on a so-called wet gap crossing into the Kaliningrad Corridor which would turn Russian positions in old East Prussia. Refighting the Battle of Tannenberg on the east European plain or Inchon in a Chinese Pacific Rim scenario will not come cheaply and could end in nuclear conflagration, thus diplomatic efforts (the “D” in DIME) must be exhausted before resorting to great power conflict. The West would require the remaining standing forces of the post-drawdown to bolster allied-centric coalitions until the United States could mobilize to fight a global war.

Reducing and Reassigning Active Forces

The financial savings for a smaller standing establishment would be significant. Downsizing the Army’s active divisions to 7 from 10 and active brigade combat teams (BCT) from 31 to 29 would reduce over 12,000 tactical-level personnel and still allow for 7 divisions at the outset of a conflict.38 Besides the savings garnered by reducing recruiting, training (including transportation/fuel), equipping, medical support, housing and other family and personnel costs, it would also shrink BCT rotations through the training centers—one of the Army’s biggest budget ticket items—from 20 to 14. The Army conducted 21 rotations in 2019 for a cost of approximately $30 million each. By reducing the standing force by one Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) and rotating only the six priority Infantry BCTs (IBCTs) through training the Army would save $120 million.39 This dividend can be minimally reinvested in professional education and assignment broadening for additional officers in fully staffed higher-echelon headquarters capable of operating across the conflict continuum.

The DoD must remake mobilization, building back bureaucratic mechanisms and structure to overturn the readiness posture that made mobilization seem unnecessary. Planning for military expansion was a priority in the small standing Army from its inception through World War II.40 SFABs may be modified or even expanded to serve as mobilization platforms for the reduction considered here, which with the proper planning and infrastructure can rapidly reconstitute. During World War II, entire new infantry divisions were produced in one year, while it took over a year for brigades to be created during the Iraq “surge” after decades of neglect for mobilization processes.41 The “Total Force” concept of relying on the reserve component can also offset tactical risk while retaining an active cadre force structure and a practiced mobilization plan. The Army would preassign Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) personnel to active units with reserve-component training units expanding the training base during a mobilization crisis, while the active-component cadres man new brigades.

The other services would face a similar budgetary reckoning. The Navy faces not only cost overruns in its shipbuilding programs to replace an aging fleet but

an overall lack of readiness with its surface force.\textsuperscript{42} Even with the advent of precision fires ensuring pinpoint missile accuracy against large formations such as carrier groups, the Navy retains 10 large-deck carrier groups.\textsuperscript{43} Reassigning at least four of these legacy ships and their auxiliary armada into the naval reserve—would generate a sizeable cost savings. The Navy should convert its \textit{America}-class amphibious helicopter assault ships to light carriers capable of carrying 20 short-takeoff-and-land F-35Bs. The Navy could reinvest some of the savings into a more employable short-deck carrier capable of supporting more F-35Bs and a dispersed fleet of precision-missile-carrying \textit{Zumwalt}-class destroyers and littoral combat ships. Some of these platforms would autonomously operate and posture to survive Chinese missile salvos in the southern Pacific.\textsuperscript{44} Increased use of \textit{America}-class light carriers would also require transferring some, if not all, of the Marine Corps F-35Bs squadrons to the Navy with a corresponding reduction in Navy procurement of F-35Cs that are intended only for use on the now-reduced number of large-deck carriers.

Further, the DoD must undertake a complementary reduction of 50,000 in the proposed force structure of 170,000 Marines now only earmarked for amphibious operations. The Marine Corps \textit{Force Design 2030} envisions eliminating capabilities for sustained land combat and reducing infantry battalions from 24 to 21 and expeditionary units from seven to five.\textsuperscript{45} The Marines will add up to four littoral regiments. Since each of the regiments consists of only one infantry battalion and 1,800 to 2,000 total personnel, it is difficult to justify this proposed size for so little capability.\textsuperscript{46} The Marine Corps is around 35 percent of the Army’s size, but executes only a fraction of its missions. After 30 days ashore, the Army provides substantial support to the Marines except close air support.\textsuperscript{47} To compensate for active reductions, the USMCR should expand to 45,000 personnel as the Marine’s authorized third division/wing team of at least three infantry regiments.


\textsuperscript{45}  Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC), \textit{Force Design 2030} (Washington, DC: HQMC, 2020), 7.

\textsuperscript{46}  David H. Berger, \textit{Commandant’s Planning Guidance: 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps} (Washington, DC: HQMC, 2019); and HQMC, \textit{Force Design 2030}.

The Air Force also maintains an excessive force structure, as the service struggles to redefine its warfighting paradigm for the twenty-first century. A cut of 30,000 personnel is possible by adopting Army personnel practices, transitioning the remaining A-10 squadrons to the Air National Guard, and replacing aging fighters such as the F-16 with more and better drones. Adopting Army force-structure practices could convert USAF squadrons with as few as 35 personnel commanded by a lieutenant colonel to flights commanded by a captain, and converting USAF groups with as few as 400 personnel and a colonel in command to squadrons with a lieutenant colonel in command. Assigning the newly created Space Force to the Air Force would save redundant bureaucracy, while retaining a capable joint force Space Command.

The active Army would provision the enabling brigades needed for full multi-domain large-scale ground combat operations: aviation, fires, sustainment, protection, and information. The remaining four partial-cadre divisions, including the current 7th Infantry Division, could be rendered reduced authorized levels of organization. Each organization would maintain only two active BCTs with a reduced-strength cadre headquarters, and correspondingly, reduce assigned division troops. Area commands, such as Southern European Task Force and US Army Alaska, would be a new type of flexible operational command designed for competition and deterrence for prevention with both assigned and rotational units. Selected brigades from IBCTs would maintain only two active maneuver battalions and a third battalion in the Army National Guard. Infantry brigade combat teams could be employed for noncombatant evacuation operations, small-scale counterinsurgency, domestic/global defense support of civil authorities, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. While SBCTs offer more protection, maneuverability, and strike capability than IBCTs, the Army should eliminate one of them, converting the Second Cavalry Regiment in Europe to an armored cavalry regiment. In total, this reduction equates to three BCTs and nine total infantry battalions. This would allow the Army to decrease by around 35,000 total personnel (including the 12,000 above), as well as an artificial intelligence/machine learning (AI/ML)-enabled reduction of over 2,000 intelligence and cyber personnel, while still compensating for the current and proposed reductions in USMC ground combat capability. At a Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

estimated cost of roughly $107,000 per military personnel, the total personnel savings for a 165,000 cut in all service personnel is estimated to be $17,655,000,000. This does not include the more substantial additional cost savings in corresponding elimination of bases and equipment.

Another cost-saving measure that increases effectiveness is embracing AI/ML technology in place of some military personnel. The DoD has created the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, however, there has been little operational integration of these promising technologies, especially in the realm of the information environment. For example, understanding the DoD information network—a federated network of networks that encompasses the entire Department of Defense (including the services and contractors) and its computer-related equipment—has predictably proven impossible to secure, operate, and defend.\footnote{JCS, \textit{Cyberspace Operations}, JP 3-12 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2018), viii.} Artificial intelligence/machine learning could replace some operational personnel in US Army Intelligence and Security Command’s major subordinates, while serving as the first line of security for the cyber terrain.\footnote{See US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), website, http://www.inscom.army.mil.} This proof of concept is especially important across the force because every piece of major equipment uses some element of technology vulnerable to cyber or radiological attacks, where US forces face disadvantages.\footnote{Marcus Clay, “To Rule the Invisible Battlefield: The Electromagnetic Spectrum and Chinese Military Power,” War on the Rocks, January 22, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/to-rule-the-invisible-battlefield-the-electromagnetic-spectrum-and-chinese-military-power/ .} Instead of adding to the complexity of soldier tasks and increasing risk to mission, AI/ML employment can reduce risk by identifying threats and quarantining them more rapidly than human operators can.

Friendly forces should also employ AI/ML as the first line of defense against disinformation. Considering informational aspects are a central aspect of DIME (“I” in DIME). Cyber operations are almost always aimed at protecting or hampering information. Information also assumes a critical aspect in military operations—the reason for fighting and sacrificing—and the ability to generate, or reduce, morale rests on informational integrity and dissemination.

\section*{Moving into the Future}

The DoD must study and understand the insights gleaned from its history of drawdowns, implement needed changes, and replace the readiness assumption for one of effectiveness. As in the past, a military leadership focused on education, training, technology, and strategic and doctrinal updates can create military capacity to operate successfully and effectively across a DIME

framework within the current fiscal parameters. The US Armed Forces must also reinstitute a mixed-force structure of standing and cadre units and reduce the active force to recruitable levels. This move should incorporate allied officers before the shooting starts, integrate AI/ML to bolster OIE as well as new technologies in the space domain and precision fires, and promulgate revised strategy and doctrine that encompasses these changes and parallels the current Russian doctrinal framework. These alterations should support a periphery strategy to thwart China and Russia and allow time for national mobilization. Only with this reckoning will the US national security apparatus once again regain an affordable yet successful warfighting capacity that will help achieve national objectives.

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Great (Soft) Power Competition:
US and Chinese Efforts in Global Health Engagement

Michael W. Wissemann

ABSTRACT: Global health engagement, an underutilized strategy rooted in the strengths of soft power persuasion, can lead to more military-to-military cooperation training, help establish relationships that can be relied on when crises develop, stabilize fragile states, and deny violent extremist organizations space for recruiting and operations. Examining Chinese efforts worldwide to curry favor and influence and the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, this article shows health as a medium is a very compelling and advantageous whole-of-government approach to national security policy concerns.

Introduction

The answers to achieving many of a strategic leader’s objectives may lay in the use of soft power. “Soft power” was first coined by Joseph S. Nye Jr. in the 1990s. Nye’s definition of soft power distinguished itself from hard power by using “attraction and persuasion rather than coercion or payment.”1 The premise is that forging relationships with nations and key influential individuals who have a like-minded view of a liberal world order will produce relationships more inclined to stand the test of time. Conversely, relationships built upon fear and the effects of coercive power are more likely to result in resentment and crumble when stressed.

Global health engagement (GHE), sometimes referred to as medical diplomacy or strategic health diplomacy, is a soft power strategy used by both China and the United States. It is a natural derivative of soft power, focused on providing a resource (health care) that many consider a human right. Countries that use GHE effectively may be left with a marked advantage, especially in today’s volatile, unpredictable, complex, and adaptive operating environment. While the use of GHE cannot unilaterally halt some of the actions of revisionist powers or violent extremist organizations (VEOs) in these environments, the process can help stem the rising tide and slow revisionist rise.

Extremist powers and VEOs employ gray zone strategies to erode American influence worldwide. These methods fall below the threshold for traditional armed

conflict. Some gray zone strategies include “disruption of order, political subversion of government or nongovernmental organizations, psychological operations, abuse of legal processes and financial corruption.” Not a new concept, this version is a reincarnation of Sun Tzu's famous adage that, “To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” Sun Tzu goes on to say that to “capture his cities without assaulting them and overthrowing his state without protracted operations” is key. Not surprisingly, China is following the playbook of their greatest military theorist. While a high-intensity conflict with a near peer remains a distant, but catastrophic, possibility, subduing the enemy without the need for conflict could prove far more effective, both financially and militarily. As the world witnesses the erosion of social norms, grows tired of the international political banter, and continues to toil with the COVID-19 pandemic, the environment is ripe to inspire allies and potential partners to follow the America’s lead through high-visibility, cooperative, medical partnerships.

The foundational basis for GHE is established in numerous national policies. President Biden’s March 2021 *Interim National Security Strategy Guidance: Renewing America’s Advantages* mentions “health” 23 times. He encourages cooperation with the United Nations and European Union through the Global Health Security Agenda and states as one of his three pillars the need to “reinvigorate and modernize our alliances and partnerships around the world.” Meanwhile, the latest available *National Defense Strategy (NDS) 2018: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge*, a remnant of President Trump’s tenure, also extensively discusses “Strengthen[ing] Alliances and Attract[ing] New Partners.” Three key components of this objective are an effort to grow alliances in the US Indo-Pacific Command, strengthen NATO alliances to deter Russian aggression, and to support partner countries in Africa to minimize the threat from terrorism. Diplomacy in the form of incentives for allies through GHE, subject-matter-expert exchanges (SMEE), and joint training exercises can sway host nation opinion and secure US influence.

**US Efforts**

Recently, the US military has provided medical assistance globally, without regard for hemisphere, country, or creed. These efforts began with

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the construction of the Panama Canal which led to research and vaccines for malaria and yellow fever, work that continues today through the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. The Department of Defense’s reputation as a world leader in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief is well earned, with medical care being a key tenant of that mechanism. The codification to do so is provided in Joint Publication (JP) 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, which provides the imperative “to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation” in areas outside of the United States.8 Furthermore, Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 6000.16, Military Health for Stability Operations, defines medical stability operations as a fundamental competency and something the military health system must be prepared to execute across the continuum of operations, up to helping reconstitute a host nation health-care system, if necessary.9

In 2004, on the receding tides of the world’s most deadly tsunami, the USNS Mercy arrived in Indonesia and began a humanitarian assistance medical presence that would last for five months.10 Staffed by limited military medical personnel and over 200 staff from the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Project HOPE, the endeavor showcased America’s ability to cooperate and the country’s willingness to care in desperate times.11 In Rear Admiral William McDaniel’s words, “The ship sells itself… Virtually everyone who visited Mercy became an ally in our efforts.”12

The following year, the United States deployed military medical assistance professionals to Pakistan to help the country in the aftermath of a 7.6-magnitude earthquake. The 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital arrived from Germany at the epicenter within three weeks, along with a medical battalion from the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force. During their time in country, the unit cared for over 14,000 patients.13 In the end, the 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital donated the hospital tents and medical equipment to the Pakistani government, certainly adding to the partnership of a key strategic ally needed to blunt the influence of regional VEO.14

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In 2010, the US military responded to the deadliest natural disaster in two generations, a 7.0-magnitude earthquake on the island nation of the Republic of Haiti, resulting in an estimated 300,000 deaths. The only hospital left operating after the earthquake was an Argentine military field hospital; they were quickly joined by medical teams from across the world, including the United States, Russia, and China. Twenty-six countries provided everything from supplies to field hospitals and hospital ships. The small nations of Qatar and Israel established field hospitals. Again, the US Navy partnered with civilians from an NGO, this time aboard the USNS Comfort hospital ship, and performed 843 lifesaving surgeries. Overall, the US task force performed over “1,000 surgeries[,] and treated more than 9,000 patients.” While this intervention surely positively impacted Haiti’s citizens’ impression of the United States by the thousands, a lack of quantifiable data only allows us to posit conclusions. This common theme in GHE should be rectified (see conclusions).

US global health engagement efforts have employed both reactive and proactive measures. Besides tsunami and earthquake-type humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, one of the most recent large-scale proactive responses to a medical crisis has been the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014–15. Named Operation Unified Assistance, the response, at its core, showed progress toward overcoming one of the largest stumbling blocks in providing medical aid across the world. A common critique of foreign medical assistance, especially aid provided by the Department of Defense, is that substituting US capabilities instead of bolstering host-nation effectiveness increases reliance on the United States, and in the long term, undermines the local system. It is easy to see how this creates resentment from host-nation medical experts and runs counterproductive to US strategic objectives.

To address these shortcomings, DoD involvement was “limited in scope and duration; designed to supplement or complement Liberia’s own efforts; and worked in support of the [US Agency for International Development] USAID.”

In recent years, an effort has been made to synchronize US efforts with the host nation’s desired end states. For example, in December 2020, US Army Africa in coordination with the US Africa Command hosted a virtual conference between military medical leaders in countries identified for a partnership exercise to be held in summer 2021 and their US partner units. In addition to fostering buy-in from partners, this synchronization ensures that whatever plan is implemented by the United States is beneficial for the host nation, and sustainable in the long run, given the economic and cultural constraints other nations’ experience.

A more common example of proactive measures occurs during the use of Medical Civil Action Programs (MEDCAPs), sometimes called Medical Civilian Assistance Programs. MEDCAPs were a staple of the Vietnam era and an effort to influence the local population by providing health care to citizens in remote areas and bolstering the locals’ ability to do so independently. MEDCAP II was designed to be an improvement but unknowingly supplanted host-nation capabilities during counterinsurgency operations. People are the center of gravity on which insurgency or counterinsurgency thrive. At times, MEDCAPs are used to shape the operational environment, targeting specific locations and populations or assisting in information operations. Lieutenant Colonel Bradley Tibbetts was responsible for delivering MEDCAPs in Kosovo in 2001–2. He shared:

> A lot was about passive intelligence gathering. The more you know the area and the people, the more they would tell you and the more you started to notice things that were out of place. We never went out with intel collection in mind or actively sought information but it’s amazing what they would tell you after you gave them a bottle of Motrin and a box of Sudafed. I later learned that tips from my reports identified both arms smuggling from Macedonia and human trafficking.

The aim of famed counterinsurgency theorist David Galula’s first law of counterinsurgency is to gain the support of the people. MEDCAPs, such as those conducted in Kosovo, and more broadly GHE, directly contribute to this aim by allowing the military to gain support and connect with the host-nation populace. Additionally, Galula’s fourth law states that zone by zone, the counterinsurgent must clear the enemy and strengthen infrastructure

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23. Brad Tibbetts, e-mail message to author, November 7, 2019.  
to help degrade insurgents. Medical exchanges and SMEE support this by empowering host-nation medical assets and creating capacity and medical infrastructure, giving potential insurgent groups less of a foothold in struggling countries.

Additionally, the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research plays a role in being proactive and exporting US influence abroad. With a tangible research lab presence in the country of Georgia, Kenya, Peru, and Thailand, as well as partner and field sites in over 40 additional countries, the US armed forces conduct research with host-nation partners on a myriad of endemic diseases. These medical research labs do far more than just research and health protection for US troops. They are part of US branding abroad. “In Peru, Kenya, Egypt, Thailand and Cambodia,” the host nations have assigned the US facilities high-visibility partner organizations from their own government, viewing the US labs as “national assets.” These partnerships also serve as a symbol of hope and support for many countries. Peru sits next to Colombia, which struggles with narcoterrorism. Likewise, Kenya borders Somalia, which has difficulty providing basic social needs for its population and lacks effective governance. Many of the associated field sites for the labs are in or near fragile states. The US partnership helps fill a void that another country or nefarious forces could exploit.

America, too, has demonstrated a large medical commitment to Africa over the last 18 years. While the venture is State Department led, the result of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), established by President Bush in 2003 and renewed twice since, is a resounding success in GHE. Countries in sub-Saharan Africa with a PEPFAR program, compared with those countries that do not have the program, demonstrated three times the growth in UN human development index scores. They also showed a significant increase in opinion of the United States and a 40 percent reduction in political instability and violence. These effects are tied directly to the aid provided to 7.7 million Africans, through antiretroviral treatments. In Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa, the United States is viewed favorably in each country: 70 percent, 62 percent, and 57 percent, respectively.

There is little debate about the utility of PEPFAR efforts. Diplomats express increased access, influence, and greater opinion of US forces following humanitarian assistance and partnership exercises. The PEPFAR program also helps foster more robust military relationships. Ambassadors have noted that GHE opened the door to military collaborations, fighting VEOs and a range of other security issues. The program has advanced public diplomacy, opened doors in difficult relationships, extended the reach of US embassies, and leveraged domestic investment in health. All these benefits help prevent a void where VEOs can find space to operate, flourish, and destabilize countries and regions.

**Chinese and Foreign Efforts**

While GHE efforts have increased US standing on the world stage, China is narrowing the gap. Over the last several years, worldwide US approval ratings dropped from 48 percent to 31 percent, while China’s leadership rating by contrast posted a slow steady gain from 31 percent to 34 percent. According to a 2020 poll, China’s President Xi Jinping received higher confidence “to do the right thing regarding international affairs” than the US president (19 percent versus 16 percent). Further, African countries such as Nigeria and Tunisia had a more favorable opinion of China. China continues to ignore global rules and to maximize their advantage, a common practice of rising powers.

Essential to this tactic is the stick-and-carrot approach. China’s biggest stick is using their mammoth economy to browbeat trading partners into bilateral trade agreements that benefit only China. This stick is coupled with debt-trap financing to leverage favorable deals when overwhelmed countries default on Chinese loans, all backed by an aggressive military that has deliberately disregarded UN rulings. China continues to expand military colonization of islands in the South China Sea years after the area was awarded to the Philippines.

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by the International Court at The Hague.\textsuperscript{35} Given the aforementioned coercive and sharp tactics, it is easy to overlook China’s use of other diplomatic strategies that have the People’s Republic of China gaining ground around the world.

There is a misperception that China does not understand the use of soft power. Their abysmal human rights record at home and in Taiwan, coupled with censorship of the Internet, conjure visions of soft-power inadequacies.\textsuperscript{36} Married with China’s sharp/coercive power and its prolific gray zone strategies, these themes paint a dark picture. China, however, is quite astute in the applications of soft power, leveraging soft power tools like Panda diplomacy, stadium diplomacy, and Confucius Institutes.\textsuperscript{37} Additionally, China is using their Belt and Road Initiative, a massive infrastructure program connecting China to other continents, to open the door for application of softer means across Asia, Africa, and even into Europe.

China initiated GHE efforts in 1963, when they sent medical teams to Algeria, building a hospital there. Since then, according to Peilong Liu, “about 23,000 Chinese medical workers have been sent to about 66 countries to provide services to an estimated 270 million people. At the end of 2013, 1,171 Chinese medical workers were working in 113 medical centers in 49 countries.”\textsuperscript{38} China has complemented these efforts in the past decade with the christening of its first hospital ship.

The \textit{Daishan Dao}, also known as the \textit{Peace Ark}, is China’s most tangible and visible instrument of influence abroad through medical means. Built for a mission set like the USNS \textit{Comfort} or USNS \textit{Mercy}, China’s hospital ship is an unwavering exporter of Chinese soft power. On its initial tour, the ship conducted a three-month operational cruise around the Horn of Africa; a decade later this location is now the site of China’s first overseas base.\textsuperscript{39} Since 2008, the Chinese ship and its team of medical professionals have provided medical care


to 180,000 people across 40 countries. According to the People’s Republic of China, the ship contains several operating rooms and can care for 1,000 patients simultaneously. During a weeklong stop in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, in 2018 the ship’s staff cared for 4,000 patients. That same operational tour, titled “Mission Harmony,” included 10 other country stops, many throughout the eastern Pacific and western hemisphere, including Venezuela.

During past partnership exercises, such as Pacific Rim, US and Chinese medical personnel worked together. These exchanges have helped craft Chinese policy changes on how to employ or staff the hospital ship, which is a win when viewed through a humanitarian lens. This collaboration establishes common ground for cooperation in high-stakes humanitarian relief or disaster relief operations. The People’s Liberation Army Navy is “gearing up the transformation from a green-water navy to a blue water force that does not just protect its own sailors in naval combat but also saves the lives of those in need, regardless of nationality.” With China’s shift from a regional power to a country with worldwide reach and ambitions, the Peace Ark will undoubtedly play a role in those efforts.

In addition to the Peace Ark circumnavigating the globe, China has made significant GHE contributions worldwide. The country contributed to Haiti earthquake relief in 2010. More recently, China played a significant role on the world stage during the Ebola endemic in West Africa. China has had a significant medical presence across Africa since first aiding Algeria during their war for independence in 1963. In 2015, they committed “to send 1,500 medical professionals to the continent.” Since 1963, they have deployed 18,000 medical professionals to 46 countries. It is clear China is well versed in using GHE and continues to leverage this strategy to shape the operating environment to its benefit.

A recent high-profile example of China using GHE to alter a country’s ill-perception of them involved the shipment of face masks to Canada during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. While the whole world was in need,

42. AP, “Chinese Hospital Ship.”
46. Volodzko, “China’s Medical Diplomacy.”
Canada was in the midst of selecting a company to install 5G networks across their country. Huawei, China’s state-sponsored telecom giant with ties to the Chinese Communist Party, was a contender, however, fears of privacy violations and spying were a major concern. The face masks were designed to increase the favorable perception of Huawei and potentially get them beneficial action regarding their bid. Similarly, China shipped supplies to European countries like Serbia and Spain. These actions helped China reinforce the narrative that the United States abandoned these countries, that China can fulfill the role of leader on the world stage, and that China is taking COVID-19 seriously.

Due to their participation in high-visibility medical missions and international cooperation activities, it comes as no surprise that China enjoys a positive reputation across Africa. A recent Pew Research poll explored over 24 countries’ views of China, including three Africa countries. Kenya and Nigeria expressed a 67 percent and 61 percent positive rating of China, respectively. South African opinion was supportive as well, with 49 percent favorable and 38 percent unfavorable. China’s medical diplomacy will continue to help the country make inroads across the entire southern hemisphere, especially in Africa.

**Recommendations and Challenges**

Several recommendations for improvement, many with a foundation or framework already in place, bear consideration. Some proposals are best practices and whole-of-government approaches that can be replicated across other combatant commands. Leveraging existing organizations with expertise, resourcing those entities, and investing early in cross-domain training for company-grade officers can pay long-term dividends. First, there is a distinct need for greater synchronization of efforts across the interagency and others to realize the full potential of GHE. There has been little coordination in the past when synchronizing military and civilian NGO efforts. Navy hospital ships have arrived in ports without advance planning or communication with the NGO already on the ground. Coordinating across all instruments of national power is imperative to maximize effectiveness and achieve synergy.

Given the previously mentioned concerns regarding unity of effort, all combatant commands should endeavor to provide synchronization, as the AFRICOM
model does, through liaisons with other governmental agencies. US AFRICOM has embedded more than 30 personnel from a variety of other US government agencies, including personnel from USAID.\textsuperscript{52} USAID is a key partner in delivering humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and the training and provision of host-nation medical facilities. Furthermore, the AFRICOM leadership team includes a deputy commander for civil-military engagement and a senior Foreign Service officer from the US Department of State. This integration enables a whole-of-government approach and maximizes preexisting on-the-ground resources, whether other governmental agencies or supporting long-term NGOs partners. The framework to do so already tenuously exists.

The Department of Defense should leverage under-resourced tools already in place to help synchronize efforts. The “Uniformed Services University Health Sciences (USU) is the nation’s federal health professions academy,” which should be doing more than just training doctors, nurses, and future scientists.\textsuperscript{53} The university’s Center for Global Health Engagement was established to provide support to the combatant commands.\textsuperscript{54} With the alignment of the Defense Health Agency and Uniformed Services University as a direct-report unit, the Defense Health Agency should be resourced to synchronize efforts and act as a repository for GHE best practices across combatant commands.

Second, GHE is a wide-reaching effort that affects not just the military and needs the incorporation of interagency, NGOs, and other governmental agency partners. Midgrade officers should receive yearlong assignments to organizations such as the Department of State or USAID to gain interagency experience.\textsuperscript{55} The Army Medical Department already affords similar opportunities through “Training with Industry,” where select personnel spend a year with the Joint Commission (responsible for health-care facility accreditation) and RAND, among others.\textsuperscript{56} These officers then return to the Army Medical Department and infuse it with fresh ideas. Further, the connections made with civilian counterparts in these agencies can lead to career-long relationships that facilitate cross-organization collaboration.


\textsuperscript{53} “About,” Uniformed Services University (USU), accessed August 26, 2019, https://www.usuhs.edu/about.


Third, the United States can continue to project and brand American global goodwill by leveraging high-visibility entities already performing on the world stage. The USNS *Mercy*, stationed in San Diego with ready access to the Naval Medical Center San Diego, should be a keystone component in partnership enhancement. With one third of Indo-Pacific Command’s vast area of responsibility composed of island nations, a hospital ship can expand global influence and help brand American diplomacy across half the earth’s surface.\(^{57}\)

Concurrently, the USNS *Comfort*, stationed on the east coast and collocated with the Naval Medical Center Portsmouth, is a prime candidate to bring medical training and assistance to Africa, something the Chinese have been doing for half a century. Medical SMEEs with NATO countries on the European continent will help reinforce commitments to alliance partners staring down the barrel of overt Russian aggression.

Finally, abundant information on the statistical impact of global health engagement is available. Initiatives that show results get funded. In an era of constrained resources, it is incumbent upon the services providing GHE to show the combatant commanders a return on investment. While subjective and anecdotal evidence can demonstrate the great impact of this engagement, quantitative changes in local perceptions would further support the need to continue or expand the program. Quantitative analysis should start with pre- and post-questionnaires of the local populace and foreign military medical personnel participating in MEDCAPs and SMEEs. A survey created for a 2020 engagement in Senegal, designed in English and translated into French, to receive frank quantitative feedback, was not fielded due to the cancellation of the exercise. Adding tools like this survey and leveraging processes and organizations already in existence can help multiply the impact of American global health efforts.

Challenges for limited resources and the global pandemic will continue to impact overseas engagements. The COVID-19 crisis phase and stateside response necessitated the cancellation of three scheduled African GHEs in summer 2020. As US response operations stabilized, and the organization reviewed the ability to put together a single exercise, unknowns and quarantine restrictions hampered the ability to gather a full team. During planning, a paucity of valid statistics on COVID-19 prevalence rates in a given country, changes of embassy staff, and sealing of national borders complicated issues. Further, there were cultural questions about whether US personnel bringing in their personal medical protective equipment would be perceived as favorable and considerate or whether it would sow distrust.\(^{58}\) Finally, the time required to remove a critical clinician from soldier-focused care, such as an orthopedic surgeon (two weeks

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\(^{58}\) Author’s personal experience, April–May 2020.
stateside quarantine, three weeks in country, two weeks quarantine upon return) is untenable given the surgical caseload of musculoskeletal injuries the active-duty population sustains. Some of these concerns can be mitigated by utilizing fully vaccinated medical professionals. If GHE is to continue, the remainder of these issues will need to be addressed early in planning through requests for information and leveraging previously established relationships on the ground.

**Conclusion**

While global health engagement and strategic health diplomacy are not new concepts, they are still compelling tools for influencing behavior. The use of global health engagement as an instrument of national power could provide the catalyst for countries teetering between alliances to side with whoever can garner favor with their population, achieving the ends of spreading democracy, values, and influence worldwide.

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Hope versus Reality: 
The Efficacy of Using US Military Aid to Improve Human Rights in Egypt

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ABSTRACT: Using US military aid as a lever to achieve human rights reforms has proven only marginally effective. This article examines the approaches employed by the Obama and Trump administrations to US military aid to Egypt and proposes practical steps that can be taken by policymakers and the military personnel on the ground to advance US human rights values.

For the past 20 years there has been mounting controversy over the annual $1.3 billion US security assistance package to Egypt. Critics have complained the aid rewards the Egyptian government for repressive behavior and human rights violations. Total US aid to Egypt is roughly $1.425 billion a year, of which about $125 million is civilian economic aid.1 Supporters say it is necessary to protect Egypt from real threats, maintain the peace between Egypt and Israel, and provide the United States with influence in Egypt, including the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria affiliate in the Sinai Peninsula.2

In recent years, a growing number of voices in think tank and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) have advocated for cutting the aid, in whole or in part, in reaction to the authoritarian practices of the government of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Some estimates show Egypt may have as many as 60,000 political prisoners, nonviolent and violent alike.3 Many supporters who have pressed for this tougher line claim US military aid, which in 2005 accounted for as much as 80 percent of Egypt’s military procurement

budget, gives the United States significant leverage. These advocates believe the aid should be used as a pressure point on the Egyptian government, by threatening a cut in aid or by making an actual cut in aid, to compel the government to adhere to human rights norms.

In recent years, some suspensions of military aid to Egypt have taken place under successive US administrations (first under the Obama administration and then under the Trump administration), which should give a sense of whether such suspensions have been effective. Leveraging US military aid for improvements in human rights have not proven effective historically, and this article will provide alternative policy recommendations.

**Obama Administration Approach**

The Obama administration was confronted with a major crisis on July 3, 2013, when Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood was ousted in a military coup by then defense minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. This coup was supported by millions of liberal and secular-minded Egyptians who opposed what they believed was the incompetence of Morsi’s rule and the fear he would turn Egypt into a theocratic state.

The Obama administration was “deeply concerned” about Morsi’s removal and the suspension of the Egyptian constitution. Despite Morsi’s many shortcomings, as he was the first democratically elected president in Egypt, the administration wanted to show its support for Egypt’s democratic transition. At the same time, the Obama administration avoided using the term coup because that recognition would have automatically cut off all US military aid to Egypt under the Leahy Law, which prohibits funding of a foreign government brought to power by a military coup. The administration clearly wanted to keep its options open as it assessed the situation, particularly as the coup was initially popular with a large segment of the Egyptian population. Both US and EU diplomats traveled to Cairo that summer to convince the new Egyptian authorities to release Morsi, but to no avail.

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Violence, however, appeared to have forced the administration’s hand. On July 8, clashes occurred in front of the Republican Guard building in Cairo (where Morsi was thought to be held) and at least 51 protestors (mostly Muslim Brotherhood activists) and three members of the security forces were killed.9 That incident, and Sisi’s unwillingness to restore the constitution and release Morsi, apparently prompted the Obama administration to suspend the delivery of F-16 aircraft that had been slated for Egypt, which prompted Sisi to complain to a Washington Post journalist that the holdup was “not the way to deal with a patriotic military.”10

A violent mid-August crackdown on two large, pro-Morsi protest encampments in the Cairo area then set off a sharp crisis in bilateral relations, resulting in over 800 deaths in a single day.11 This crisis was followed by more arrests of Brotherhood activists and members in subsequent weeks. Obama interrupted his vacation to condemn the harsh crackdown, cancel the US-Egyptian Bright Star military exercises that had been scheduled for the following month, and promise to order a thorough review of US assistance to Egypt.12

Within the administration there was a vigorous debate on how the United States should respond to the crisis. In October 2013, the administration decided a significant portion of US military aid would be suspended to signal US dissatisfaction with Sisi’s harsh policies and to lay down markers on what actions would be required for the aid to be restored. In the words of a US State Department spokesperson: “We will continue to hold the delivery of certain large-scale military systems and cash assistance to the government pending credible progress toward an inclusive, democratically elected civilian government through free and fair elections.”13 A few weeks earlier in an address to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, Obama criticized the new Egyptian government for actions “inconsistent with inclusive democracy.”14 The military aid suspension, however, proved ineffective.

Rather than heeding the rationale for the suspension, the Egyptian regime grew more repressive. On November 24, 2013, the government implemented a new protest law that, in the words of Human Rights Watch, “effectively grants security

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officials discretion to ban any protest on vague grounds, allows police officers to forcibly disperse any protest if even a single protestor throws a stone, and sets heavy prison sentences for vague offenses.”  

Adly Mansour, the titular head of the government, defined such a vague offense as attempting to “influence the course of justice.” The following month the government officially designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization and seized the assets of Brotherhood-owned businesses.

Cushioning the blow from the suspension of most US military aid was the cash windfall Egypt received from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait shortly after the military coup in the summer of 2013—an estimated $12 billion in total. This figure dwarfed the US security aid package of $1.3 billion and enabled Sisi to purchase military equipment from other sources, including Russia and France. Supporters of the US aid suspension claim that without this aid from the three wealthy Gulf Arab states, Sisi would have succumbed to US pressure, but that belief seems to have been based on wishful thinking given the size of the Gulf aid package.

The combination of national pride and perceived threats have long made Egypt a difficult partner of the United States. Even during the Hosni Mubarak era, there were instances where Cairo refused to follow the US lead, probably believing that, by doing so, the government would be accused of being a toady of Washington and ignoring the public’s will. In late 2013, there was every indication to believe that even if the Gulf Arab money did not materialize, Sisi and his military and civilian allies would have continued their repression of the Brotherhood in the face of the US aid suspension as they saw that Islamist group as an existential threat. This is not to say the Egyptian government was happy with the suspension of US military aid. Indeed, Cairo hired public relations firms in Washington to try to get the suspension lifted. The Egyptian military has been US-trained and

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equipped for many decades, and it is not easy to switch to another foreign military benefactor, as was the case after the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty when Cairo switched from a Soviet-supplied military to an American-supplied one.21

During the suspension (about 18 months), then US Secretary of State John Kerry walked a fine line by maintaining good relations with Egyptian authorities while imploring Cairo to improve human rights.22 His softer diplomatic approach, however, did not lessen the repression either. The only concession the Egyptian government made after the aid suspension period was the release of a dual US-Egyptian citizen, Mohamed Soltan, who had been arrested during the August 2013 crackdown on the Brotherhood. Although Soltan’s father was a member of the Brotherhood, Soltan himself was not and he was considered by the State Department to have been unjustly arrested.23 His case became a priority for the White House, and Sisi probably believed that releasing Soltan was a low-cost way to mollify the Obama administration.

By late March 2015, the Obama administration essentially backed down and restored the suspended US military aid. The only punitive measure retained was the suspension of cash-flow financing, a mechanism that allowed Egypt to pay for US defense items in partial installments rather than in one lump sum.24 The administration’s decision to restore aid was likely due to Egypt’s need to respond more effectively to the surging terrorist insurgency in the Sinai (though the Egyptian government’s heavy-handed practices in the Sinai were often counterproductive) and the realization that the aid suspension did not reverse the government’s repressive practices as hoped.25

**Trump Administration Approach**

President Donald Trump initially took an opposite approach to the Sisi government, though he too would later attempt to use military aid as a lever against the Egyptian government. As a presidential candidate, Trump first met Sisi in September 2016 when the latter was in New York for the UN General

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24. CRS, Egypt.
Assembly. The two leaders reportedly got along well, due to a mutual antipathy toward the Muslim Brotherhood. Trump also wanted to be seen as the anti-Obama and believed it was important to embrace Sisi rather than to keep him at arms’ length. At this meeting, Trump referred to Sisi as a “fantastic guy.”

Trump’s good relationship with Sisi was initially used to obtain the release of a dual US–Egyptian citizen and her husband from prison, but that event did not lead to any overall human rights improvement in the country. After Trump became president, Sisi was invited to the White House where Trump praised him as a “great friend and ally” who was doing “a fantastic job in a very difficult situation.” Trump clearly saw Sisi as a tough guy who would forcefully deal with threats to Egypt. Trump only alluded to a “little problem” that he hoped Sisi would take care of. The problem was later revealed to be the case of dual US–Egyptian citizen, Aya Hijazi, who ran an NGO in Cairo and who was imprisoned along with her husband on bogus charges. Trump, after the urgings of some members of Congress and human rights groups, took up this case and persuaded Sisi to release Hijazi and her husband. They were later received in the White House, which Trump touted as a great foreign policy success.

Undoubtedly, Sisi again believed releasing these two individuals would mollify the US president and be a low-cost way to stay in his good graces. Trump reportedly did not take up the cause of the thousands of other political prisoners in Egypt in this or subsequent meetings.

In August 2017, the Trump administration, much to the surprise of the human rights community, suspended about $195 million in US military aid to Egypt over Egypt’s alleged military assistance to North Korea (at a time when the Trump administration was ratcheting up pressure on that communist country) and made the decision to move ahead with a draconian NGO law, which restricts the activity of these organizations to only development and social work and imposes a five-year prison term for those who do not comply with it. The inclusion of the latter was reportedly driven by the State Department which, institutionally, had long bristled at Sisi’s repressive policies.

Like in the Obama administration, the aid suspension did not last long—this time about 11 months. In July 2018, the State Department announced the aid suspension had been lifted. An unnamed department official did not cite any specific steps Sisi had taken to improve human rights but instead emphasized that “preserving U.S. security cooperation with Egypt” was a main reason the funds were released.\(^\text{30}\)

Although the State Department under the Trump administration had reportedly raised human rights with the Sisi government in private, the temporary suspension of US military aid in 2017–18 did nothing to improve the overall human rights situation in the country. Thousands of political prisoners still languished behind bars, bloggers and journalists continued to be arrested for criticizing the government, and several potential Egyptian presidential candidates in late 2017 and early 2018 were either arrested or forced to drop out of the race so Sisi would have no serious competition for reelection.\(^\text{31}\) The one consolation was that Egypt may have scaled back its assistance to North Korea, though the details of these ties were largely out of the public domain.\(^\text{32}\)

In spring 2020, reports surfaced that the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs of the State Department was in favor of suspending up to $300 million in US military aid in reaction to the January 2020 death in custody of dual US-Egyptian citizen, Mustafa Kassem. Kassem had been incarcerated for six years before going on a hunger strike and dying from medical complications.\(^\text{33}\) After hearing the news of Kassem’s death, David Schenker, the head of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, called it “needless, tragic, and avoidable,” and vowed to continue to take up the cause of human rights and imprisoned Americans in Egypt “at every opportunity.”\(^\text{34}\) His apparent effort to once again use US military aid as a lever on Egypt, however, did not gain traction inside the administration.

Hence, there were some similarities between the Obama and Trump administrations on the issue of human rights and Egypt. While Obama occasionally spoke out against Sisi’s repression, Trump did not, preferring to leave such things to subordinates. Unfortunately, these examples show Washington has little influence.


over Egyptian state repression—aid suspension or not. The most the Egyptian
government has been willing to do under US pressure is to free some dual citizens
from prison, however, these releases have not improved the overall human rights
climate in the country.

A Values-Based Approach to US Aid

The above analysis presents a rather sober assessment of the limits of
US influence to make friendly but repressive governments adhere to human rights
norms, and this situation is not just confined to Egypt. It should be noted that in
the post–World War II era, when the United States became a major player in the
Middle East, there were periods when human rights were not even on the agenda,
as anticommunism and the Arab-Israeli conflict dominated the discussion. At
other times, human rights may have been among the talking points of US officials,
but the topic was not in the top tier of issues. Moreover, governments like Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain became adept at withstanding pressure on human rights,
when that issue did emerge as a US priority, either by patiently waiting out the
salience of the issue for a US administration or by playing the so-called strategic
card. For example, Bahrain, a country that has long repressed its Shiite majority
population, has been able to withstand US pressure and even some suspensions
of particular US military items by hosting the US Fifth Fleet and playing up the
Iran threat.

Understandably, American think-tank specialists and human-rights
activists have placed much focus on Egypt because of its central position in the
Middle East, its close relations with the United States since the late 1970s,
the relatively large amount of US military aid the country continues to receive,
and the repressive policies of the Sisi government that have received significant
media attention.

Given that Washington has limited influence on the overall human rights
situation in the Middle East and that strategic issues such as cooperation on
counterterrorism will remain important for the United States, what should US
leaders do in the case of Egypt? US policymakers should pursue realistic goals.
Eliminating the entire US military aid package, as some activists have advocated,
would be counterproductive, as it would likely end any influence Washington does
have with Cairo, while other players, like Russia, would be more than happy to step
in. Moscow has already begun to supply Egypt with some weaponry, reactivating
Egyptian-Russian ties that were close from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s.35
Moreover, a cutoff of all US military aid could potentially hurt Egypt’s security,
as the country continues to face an Islamic State in Iraq and Syria affiliate in the

Sinai, instability and terrorist infiltration from neighboring Libya, and the need to protect its economic interests in the eastern Mediterranean region.

Keeping business-as-usual is not a good option either because it erodes the US image from a moral standpoint. To remain silent on the incarceration of thousands of political prisoners and not take meaningful action gives the impression Washington is uninterested in human rights, not just with Egypt but with other strategic partners globally. For the United States’ own values, the current administration and Congress should confer and agree to a reduction in military aid to Egypt by a certain percentage (perhaps by a third), shift those resources to economic aid as administered by the US Agency for International Development, and keep the reductions in place until there is a significant improvement in human rights. This reduction and shift in resources will certainly upset the Egyptian political and military hierarchy, but it would conform to a values-based approach to US foreign and security policy without scuttling the entire relationship. In addition, it will signal to Egyptian nonviolent oppositionists who champion democracy that the United States still stands for human rights and cares about the plight of the Egyptian people despite its strategic ties to an authoritarian government. As imperfect as this policy recommendation is (human rights advocates will attack it as too soft while apologists for the Egyptian government will say it is too harsh), it would allow for a values-based approach in an imperfect world. Shifting the way the United States approaches aid to Egypt is not sufficient by itself; it requires a more active approach by the US military.

### Implications for the US Army

The US military has developed close relations with Egyptian counterparts since the late 1970s, and many Egyptian military officers have undergone training in the United States, including Sisi, where civilian control of the military and respect for human rights is taught. Hence, US Army officers should not be swayed by their Egyptian counterparts who may have disregarded this training, believing that Egypt needs to keep tens of thousands of political prisoners locked up or that journalists who do not toe the government line should be arrested to preserve the country’s stability. In the long term, such draconian policies are likely to cause more instability, as stifling dissent often breeds anger and upheaval.

The decision to reduce military aid to Egypt is the purview of the US civilian leadership, both in the executive and legislative branches of government, as mentioned above. While US Army officers are not such decisionmakers, they...
play a role when dealing with a strategically important but repressive country like Egypt. Before US Army officers are sent to Egypt (for participation in joint military exercises or as part of the Office of Military Cooperation in the US embassy, for example), they should undergo predeployment training in the United States on the types of situations and interactions they might encounter with Egyptian counterparts. They should be taught to not be taken in by arguments supporting the belief that the Egyptian government needs a heavy hand to keep the country safe and stable, that Westerners do not understand democracy is ill-suited for Egypt, and that Western standards of human rights should not apply. If Egyptian military officers raise the fact that some dual US-Egyptian citizens have been released from custody, US Army officers should acknowledge such releases respectfully, but then ask about the fate of the thousands of Egyptian nationals languishing in jail, not all of whom are terrorists, a term that is used very loosely by Cairo to label most oppositionists.

This is not to say US Army officers should get into arguments with their Egyptian counterparts. If they are confronted with such diatribes, they should diplomatically remind their counterparts that such attitudes run counter to Egypt being a signatory to the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international norms. Additionally, they should remind these counterparts that the curriculum at US professional military education institutions, like the US Army War College, emphasizes the importance of respect for human rights for all US partner countries not just for Egypt. Critics of this approach may argue it is improper for Army officers to play a role that is traditionally the purview of professional diplomats, but since the military plays such a prominent role in Egyptian society (military personnel run many businesses and are the source of governorships of provinces), their officer corps is arguably the most important institutional player in the polity, one that would be more receptive to the views of fellow military officers than civilian diplomats.

In order for this strategy to work without causing severe rifts in the government, State Department officials should be part of the instructional, predeployment training. US Army officers assigned to Egypt should meet with officials at the State Department Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. That way, the messages US Army officers will convey to their Egyptian counterparts will be in sync with State Department policy. The effort made by US Army officers to raise these issues in a respectful manner when in discussions will not magically turn around the human rights situation, but the discussions might contribute to a marginal improvement in rights and lessen repression down the road as these officers rise in rank and become key decisionmakers.
Another important role US Army officers can play in Egypt, and elsewhere, is to be the eyes on the ground. If they see human rights abuses, such as US-supplied military equipment being used against innocent civilians as opposed to genuine terrorists, they have a duty to notify their superiors in Washington. Such unvarnished reporting will give US national decisionmakers the data they need to make informed decisions about whether to maintain or cut off aid and by how much.

Although this article has dealt with an issue relevant to the National Command Authority and the decisions the Department of Defense must make on an important, bilateral security relationship, US Army officers can play an important role in supplementing traditional State Department reporting on human rights by witnessing, for example, Egyptian counterterrorism training and hearing from their Egyptian counterparts what took place in various security-related encounters.

**Conclusion**

This article argues that, despite much conventional wisdom to the contrary, the United States has limited influence on human rights in a country like Egypt and that using military aid as a lever to improve the human rights situation usually does not work—or is only marginally effective. Egyptian officials will make decisions on the use of repression based on their calculations of the perceived domestic threats whether the United States likes it or not. That said, US officials should not simply give up on this issue, but should make decisions based on strategic and moral calculations. If repression continues, the United States should not remain silent and should pursue policies consistent with a values-based approach to foreign and national security policy. At the same time, the United States must balance this moral stance with its strategic interests. Hence, reducing military aid, but not cutting if off completely, and shifting US resources to economic aid may be the appropriate approach.

Because Egyptian military officers play an important role in Egyptian society it makes sense for US Army officers to serve as interlocutors on a host of issues outside the military sphere. This proposed new role, however, would take US military officers outside their comfort zones and require them to undergo significant political training in order to address human rights concerns. As long as their messages are in sync with State Department policy, their involvement should be welcomed by the US government. This enhanced US military role, while unlikely to change the human rights situation in the near term in any significant way, could pay future dividends.
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ABSTRACT: Drawing on Samuel P. Huntington’s three phases of self-regulation used to determine if an occupation qualifies as a profession, this article focuses on the third phase of policing and removing those who fail to uphold the standards set forth in the first two phases. It reviews how the Army implemented this phase following the Civil War through the post–Vietnam War years and the implications for the officer corps.

In the 64 years since its publication, Samuel P. Huntington’s The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations has inspired an extensive literature on military professionalism. In keeping with Huntington’s own focus, most of the commentary has focused on his concepts of proper civil-military relations, such as objective control, corporate identity, responsibility to society, and apolitical service. What has seldom been addressed is the implication behind his assertion that the officers in the armed forces were professionals because there existed “an organization which formalizes and applies the standards of professional competence and establishes and enforces the standards of professional responsibility.” In short, three phases of self-regulation—defining its ethics and proficiencies, credentialing its members, and policing and removing those who failed to uphold those standards—were essential to determining whether an occupation qualifies as a profession. While the first two aspects of self-regulation have generated a great deal of literature, there has been little study of the last.

This article redresses this imbalance by examining the US Army’s self-policing efforts in the decades between the 1890s to the 1950s that Huntington used as his model. It then extends its analysis to the volunteer professional force of the post-Vietnam era. It will focus not on the discharge of officers for ethical or physical causes, but on the elimination of deadwood—the substandard, the incompetent, the placeholders who, like Beetle Bailey’s General Halftrack, continue to be not

only retained, but promoted. On an institutional level, it provides context on an impediment to officer corps excellence that has concerned the service throughout its existence. On an individual level, it addresses a question most officers have asked themselves at least once: "How is that person still in uniform?"

### Post-Civil War Era

Huntington began his study with the post–Civil War decades. For the 30-year period after Reconstruction the strength of the officer corps was fixed at 2,200, creating a closely knit community. Upon commissioning in the Regular Army, each officer received a number and advanced in seniority within their branch or bureau as fast as officers ahead of them were promoted, retired, or died. Although West Point held a virtual monopoly on new commissions, Civil War veterans dominated the field grades and could be found commanding companies as late as 1898. Most regarded officership as a sinecure for loyal service rather than a profession, to be held until retirement at 45 years of service or the age of 62 (after 1870). Their horizons were confined by decades spent in garrison life, limited by the incessant routines of drill, administration, supervising fatigue (work) details of perhaps 20 men, and social events: "soldiering had long since become a chore to them, and they were not looking for work." The mediocrity of so many of their colleagues outraged progressives. In 1884, Lieutenant Arthur Wagner put forward as a professional standard for any regular officer the ability to command a wartime regiment. He noted sarcastically that many who wore epaulets could not discharge a sergeant’s duties. That same year, Commanding General Philip Sheridan told Congress the primary impediment to Army efficiency was the overabundance of sick, crippled, and otherwise incapacitated officers.

In 1890 in what might be interpreted as the first effort at mandating professional self-policing, Congress, despite significant Regular Army opposition, required both annual efficiency reports and examinations for promotion up to major. An officer who failed his examination lost his place on the seniority list; if he failed again, he was discharged. Although the exam itself was rigorous, there is no evidence of any officers, veteran or not, being discharged for failing. In 1896 when Lieutenant William Carey Brown suggested that officers incapable of physically or mentally performing their duties be retired, an officer retorted it was better to have an infirm lieutenant of 60 then to force out a loyal

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officer.\textsuperscript{5} The wars in Cuba and the Philippines demonstrated the consequences of protecting caste rather than promoting professional merit. One veteran wrote of his colleagues’ dismay at the “useless slaughter of our men at San Juan through the worst possible mismanagement” and their bitterness that “the blunderers were promoted with indecent haste, while most of the army thought they would be courtmartialed.”\textsuperscript{6}

Huntington considers the “Root reforms as \textit{a}, if not \textit{the} fulcrum” in the transition to a professional officer corps. While it is certainly true the Root era institutional reforms—the General Staff, the War College, the Leavenworth schools, and so forth—contributed to professional expertise, did these reforms result in enhanced professional self-policing? Like Huntington, many researchers have confused this era’s creation of the aforementioned professional organizations with the enforcement of higher professional standards but were these parallel developments? Throughout the decade following Root’s alleged transformation, there were complaints that the retention of the superannuated ensured the “dead stagnation in promotion.”\textsuperscript{7} In 1905, only 11 of the 346 officers taking promotion exams failed, and not a few of these due to moral or medical causes.\textsuperscript{8} A 1909 report by a major general noted many “officers utterly incompetent for the commands they exercise have clearly demonstrated their inefficiency yet under existing regulations and interpretations thereof it has been found impossible to get rid of these officers.”\textsuperscript{9} In a 1910 letter to Leonard Wood, John J. Pershing listed some of the “fossils” he was cursed with: “Colonel Bowen of the 12th Infantry whose utter inefficiency you are familiar with; Lieutenant Colonel Ames of the same regiment, whose worthlessness has continued throughout his army career; and Colonel Dodd of the 12th Cavalry, who has drunk himself into a hopeless state of imbecility.”\textsuperscript{10}

Pershing’s sentiments, if not his pungent language, were echoed that year in Chief of Staff J. Franklin Bell’s testimony to the Senate. The Army’s peacetime promotion policies all but ensured “the minimum of promotion with the maximum of rust and decrepitude.” Promotion by merit would “kill ambitions and destroy zeal” and those passed over “would remain to spread dissatisfaction and

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discontent and poison the military atmosphere in their vicinity.” Bell’s solution was to increase the number of majors and colonels—the very group he admitted were the most underperforming—on the grounds it would free up advancement for lieutenants and captains. Unimpressed by this logic, Congress refused the plan. Bell’s successor declared all efforts to eliminate “deadwood” in the officer corps “a practical failure.”

**Era of the World Wars**

The post–World War I peacetime force had a similar problem with self-policing despite both the Regular Army and Congress declaring their intention to purge the substandard. The 1920 National Defense Act mandated an annual evaluation for each active-duty officer, first by his immediate superior and then by the personnel department of his respective branch. Those who received unsatisfactory ratings (Class B) were to appear before a board for possible discharge. As with previous (and future) efforts to eliminate officers, this policy worked better in theory than practice.

The first officer evaluation form was a fiasco. Its 1922 replacement had a longer tenure, not because it was adequate but because the agencies overseeing the profession’s self-assessment process could not agree on its revision. In one respect, the evaluation system did work; it revealed a true Army of Excellence. In 1926, 11,400 officers were rated; 343 were assessed as superior, 4,323 as above average, 6,546 as average, and only 86 as below average. The 1927–28 Class B board with 14,000 potential candidates, classified only 131 into Class B status, of which only 46 retired or resigned. After a thorough study of the process, Major J. C. F. Tillson of the US Army War College concluded they allowed poor commanders to intimidate subordinates with the threat of a Class B, “thus disgusting and losing the true loyalty of the better officers and making the deceitful ones more cunning.” The criticism had merit. From a perspective three decades later, one prominent military intellectual dated the decline in officer integrity to making promotion dependent on efficiency reports rather than examinations. Prior to this, he recalled, officers had obeyed orders with exactitude, but did not hesitate to disagree with their superiors on military issues in social

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settings. Afterwards, they fawned over their seniors and avoided any hint of independent thought.\textsuperscript{15}

The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 (OPA-47) represented, in part, another Congressional effort to impose professional standards and remove subpar officers. It replaced the century-old process of promotion by lineal seniority with one of up-or-out merit and established a career path with clear gates to advancement. Promotion would be rapid in the early grades, with a second lieutenant pinning on lieutenant’s bars after three years, a captain’s bars after seven years, and a major’s oak leaves at 14 years. Most careers would end with retirement at 20 years as senior majors with pension, health care, and other benefits. An ever-shrinking select would progress to lieutenant colonel, colonel, and general, all but the latter retiring by 30 years with even more generous pensions.

To ensure only the best officers advanced, promotion past lieutenant was competitive, with each year’s candidates evaluated by selection boards. Officers turned back twice were dropped from active duty. In theory, the OPA-47 provided the nation and professional officers with three great benefits. It outlined a fair, stable, and rewarding path to advancement for an elite of dedicated career officers while eliminating anyone unable to make the grade. It provided sufficient senior and field grade officers to prepare the Army in peace and administer and command the mobilized citizen-soldier forces in war. Finally, it created in the reserves a second tier of experienced commanders, specialists, and managers who could be called back to the colors. A fourth benefit was not mentioned, but in making the officer corps responsible for deciding the standards of merit, it awarded the professionals autonomy in policing their membership (or what Huntington termed “objective control”).\textsuperscript{16}

Passed prior to the Cold War buildup, the OPA-47 anticipated an all-volunteer career force of 50,000 officers and 400,000 enlisted. A decade later the Army numbered 96,000 officers, with almost 900,000 in other ranks. Congress deferred to the Armed Forces’ conviction that any future conflict would require a host of senior managers to direct the nation’s military mobilization and to train, administer, and command millions of citizen-warriors. In 1946 and 1971 the US Armed Forces were roughly equivalent at 3,000,000—but in 1971 they boasted 21,000 more majors (or their equivalent), 15,000 more lieutenant colonels, and 4,000 more colonels—and almost 120,000 less lieutenants! The ensuing emphasis on retaining senior management inflated these grades far beyond peacetime needs. At the other end, the OPA-47 assumed a steady, predictable stream of entry-level second lieutenants rising through

in rank and keeping the career escalator moving smoothly. However, what if—as was demonstrated after OPA-47’s passage—there were too few superior, or even average lieutenants and captains willing to make the service a profession? Then the need to maintain the career escalator might force the promotion of the substandard who remained, adding a new layer of deadwood.¹⁷

The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 also encouraged Army career managers to make professional military education one more box to check in the up-or-out timelines. According to Michael David Stewart, historian, at the formerly elite Command and General Staff College, “selection to attend, rather than learning while in attendance, became a mark of professional achievement.”¹⁸ The Army further diluted education credentials by awarding them for nonacademic duties and keeping high performers out of school. Huntington’s definition of “expertise” emphasized individual experience was insufficient, and a profession required “institutions of research and education for the extension and transmission of professional knowledge and skill.” In the pre–World War II Army, an officer’s performance at the elite staff and war colleges often played a significant role in his selection for higher command. In the post–OPA-47 decades, however, the primacy of officer career management could make advanced professional military education one more box to check: selection to the school mattered, not excellence once there. Reflecting the emphasis on experience rather than education, two years into the Korean War, the commandant of the Command and General Staff College complained that not one of his 900 incoming students had been a successful regimental commander in that conflict. He dreaded the imminent bureaucratic fight to have even a few of these elites diverted from their Pentagon assignments.¹⁹

Cold War and Corporatization

As matriculation at the educational institutions that formalized and applied the standards of professional competence increasingly became rungs up the career ladder, so the enforcement of standards to remove nonperformers declined. In the two decades following the passage of OPA-47, the metric to identify both merit and mediocrity—the Officer Evaluation Report (OER)—was rewritten an average of once every three years. Surveys found a majority of officers believed each variation was unfair, and some senior officers refused to follow the

guidelines. Nor did the OER prove an effective pruning tool. The Army emphasized that all officers with OERs placing them in the bottom 2 percent must go before a board for possible separation; in the five years prior to 1957 only 220 regular officers were involuntarily eliminated. Frustrated by the bloated officer corps and the inability to remove the substandard, Congress forced reductions between 1953 and 1957, eliminating 5,500 active-duty officers. Yet these draconian cuts may have actually increased the proportion of deadwood. R. N. Young, one of the chief agents in the separation process, estimated the Army would have purged over twice as many “at the bottom of the efficiency totem pole” had not “voluntary attrition [of] our most efficient officers” made their retention necessary.

Cuts came largely through outside directives and not the service’s elimination process. Congress passed the 1960 White Charger Act that removed many of the World War II cadre who had been rapidly promoted and then went to seed. In 1964, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel estimated that among 110,000 active-duty officers less than 200 were separated each fiscal year for incompetence and another 300 for being passed over twice. As a point of comparison, the Army routinely lost three times as many officers through resignation. These resignations were most prevalent among the high-performing junior officers the service needed to retain, and surveys consistently reported a, if not the, primary reason was poor leadership. As an unintended consequence, the generous retirement package provided by the OPA-47 led many officers to opt for early retirement including roughly two-thirds of the colonels during the Vietnam War.

In the wake of the My Lai massacre and the US Army War College Study on Military Professionalism, Army Chief of Staff William C. Westmoreland made yet another effort at corporate policing. He directed General Walter T. Kerwin Jr., his deputy chief of staff for personnel, to reform the officer selection system. Even more than fast-tracking high performers, he emphasized it was essential to “institute a vigorous ‘selection out’ process” for those officers whose toxic leadership or mediocre abilities were “highly detrimental”

22. DCSPER, “Quality of the Officer Corps.”
to the morale and effectiveness of their subordinates. Kerwin's efforts to incorporate Westmoreland's mandate into the Officer Professional Management System encountered great resistance from senior officers whose careers had benefited from the existing methods. Most of the more ambitious initiatives, including the identification and elimination of substandard officers, were not implemented. Westmoreland's successor, Creighton Abrams Jr., famously warned field commanders, in his “pull up your socks” memo, that they would be sanctioned if they inflated OERs. Within six months Abrams had been forced to surrender, and OERs continued to rate the great majority of officers as above average.

Congressionally imposed postwar reductions cut active-duty officer strength from 111,000 at the Vietnam War peak to 98,200 in 1976. Did the service ensure this was a qualitative as well as quantitative reduction? According to Secretary of the Army Robert E. Froehlke, the service’s boards had discharged those “who, in the harsh light of competition, we felt would not measure up in the longer haul.” Although the post-Vietnam officer elimination process has been curiously understudied, it is clear the Army targeted specific skills, reservists, Officer Candidate School graduates, and those lacking college credentials. More revealingly, the cuts fell disproportionately on the lower grades. Of the 4,900 officers involuntarily removed from active duty in fiscal year 1974, all were at captain or major grade. These targeted eliminations so protected the Regular Army senior leadership that in 1976 the Army's grade structure contained more lieutenant colonels (10,835) than lieutenants (10,320). This disproportionate rank structure remained despite its original justification—that a large corps of senior managers were necessary for wartime mobilization—had essentially disappeared with the nation’s return to a small, all-volunteer professional Army. Moreover, it occurred simultaneously with vacancies in the company grades reaching “crisis proportions.”

It might be argued the top-heavy rank structure reflects a higher standard of professionalism. Presumably as officers advance in rank, they are subject to ever-increasing institutional policing and thus become more expert and rigorous

in upholding the profession’s standards for themselves and others. Officers unwilling to accept these escalating professional standards depart. Unfortunately, there is no evidence to support this trend. Rather, both survey and anecdotal evidence indicates the primary reason the Army failed to retain high-quality junior officers was that these officers perceived their seniors as lacking in both professional ethics and competence. Supporting this view, in fiscal year 1979 one of five colonels and one of 10 lieutenant colonels declined command, the majority on grounds command time would not advance their careers. Nor did this trend get noticeably better in the “zero defects” force of the 1980s; one command climate survey found that three in four officers believed the officer corps was more focused on personal gain than professionalism.30

**Implications**

The great question remains. Why does a military institution that so prides itself on its Huntington-derived definition of professionalism find it so difficult to shed its deadwood? Additionally, why did this difficulty persist even after Huntington defined officership as a profession because it had, over a half-century of largely internal reforms, “applie[d] the standards of professional competence and established and enforce[d] the standards of professional responsibility?”31 Two explanations suggest themselves.

The first reason is that the professional corporate identity so valued by Huntington impedes purging substandard personnel. A 1978 RAND study found both Army officers and white-collar counterparts shared “an almost pathological reluctance” to fire fellow managers. Instead, they “shelved” them either through transfer or assignment to unimportant tasks.32 A career officer’s disinclination to terminate underperforming colleagues may be even greater than a white-collar equivalent due to emotional bonds established at the academy, on troop duty, or through intermarriage between military families. This inclination may also explain why the Army, unless forced by outside agencies, had reduced its officer corps by lopping off personnel at the bottom of the career ladder rather than known mediocrities, who are also peers.

A second reason is that Huntington failed to recognize that the rise of the twentieth-century-professional US Army he extolled coincided with that

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institution’s inability to retain enough high-quality career officers in the 6-to-12-year brackets during peacetime. The lack of sufficient high-performing and proven company-grade officers choosing the service as a career creates a vacuum that pulls lower-performing officers into the field grades. The result is a self-perpetuating cycle of too many meritorious officers leaving, too many mediocre officers rising, and the danger that the substandard becomes the new standard.33

Is it time to retire Huntington’s claim that corporateness equals professional self-regulation as a structural pillar? To recognize that a profession’s credentialing agencies exist more as gatekeepers to admission than as monitors of lifetime adherence to its ethical or expert standards? To acknowledge that once initiates have surmounted the hazing of the bar exam, the doctoral dissertation, the medical boards, the tenure process, and so on, all further enforcement of the profession’s ideals could well be interpreted as demonstrating these policing agencies had failed?34

Perhaps today’s officers have become too complacent, claiming a Huntington-based professional status without reflecting on whether their institution is actually following Huntington’s criteria. To some officers the very fact their careers are successful proves that institutional self-policing not only exists but works! But what of second-rate peers who are equally successful? When is quantity more important than quality? When does Gresham’s Law apply to professions, and when does the supply of bad officers begin to drive out the good?

These are all questions both the Army leadership and its officers must constantly wrestle with. Perhaps, as occurred after the Vietnam War, it is time for the Army officer corps to conduct a deep and hard examination of its profession’s ideals and practices. An excellent start would be to recapture the urgency that fueled the US Army War College professionalism and leadership studies. Both studies shed a hard light on the state of the postwar officer corps and inspired many members of the officer corps to reform their service.

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Brian McAllister Linn


ABSTRACT: Statistical evidence suggests that Army battalion commanders are significant determinants of the retention of their lieutenants—especially high-potential lieutenants. Further, this so-called Battalion Commander Effect should be included in brigadier general promotion board assessments and used to inform officer professional military education curricula.

A n empirical analysis of 1,745 former US Army battalion commanders and the 36,032 lieutenants who served under their command provides statistical evidence for what many researchers have believed, anecdotally, for years: battalion commanders significantly influence their lieutenants’ decision to stay in or leave the Army. Moreover, the analysis shows this effect is even stronger on high-potential lieutenants. Accordingly, battalion commanders should consider the effects of their leadership on the junior officers in their formations, and the Army should calculate and consider the battalion commander effect (BCE) when making appropriate talent management decisions for senior officers. Ultimately, measuring the BCE will enhance the Army’s overall assessment of leader effectiveness, especially when used in conjunction with other newly emerging measures guiding Army talent management.

Background

Consider two hypothetical newly commissioned lieutenants. At the completion of the same Basic Officer Leadership Course, Second Lieutenant Smith and Second Lieutenant Nguyen are assigned to different battalions on the same Army post. During their three years as lieutenants in their first operational units, both Smith and Nguyen serve under adequate yet unremarkable company commanders; however, they have very different experiences with respect to their battalion commanders. Smith’s battalion commander is an outstanding officer who cares deeply about others and leads an exemplary personal life, much like the role model battalion commander described in the seminal article, “The Subordinates.”1 In contrast, Nguyen’s battalion

commander frequently exhibits counterproductive leader behaviors and strained personal relationships.

During their three years as lieutenants in their first battalions, Smith and Nguyen demonstrate performance and potential—knowledge, skills, and behaviors—at or near the top of their peer groups. As they prepare to depart their first units, they receive orders to the Captains Career Course, the second level of Army officer professional military education, and are promoted to the rank of captain.

At this juncture, both officers face the most consequential professional decision since joining the Army—should they stay in the Army? As they evaluate their options, Smith and Nguyen might well reflect on the leadership and examples set by their battalion commanders. Knowing their battalion commanders are representative of other Army senior leaders, they might ask, “Do I want to continue serving under leaders like my battalion commander?” Knowing people grow more similar to those they spend time with, they might also ask, “Do I want to become (a person like) my battalion commander?”

Fast forward two years. Thankfully, Smith and a majority of the 20 lieutenants she served with in her first battalion chose to stay in the Army. She completed the Captains Career Course, joined another unit, and will soon assume company command. Most importantly, Smith remained in the talent pool from which Army senior leaders are drawn. Unfortunately, Nguyen and a majority of the 20 lieutenants he served with in his first battalion chose to leave the Army, and the Army lost their talents forever.

Although the Army’s top priority is its people, today’s Army does not reward Smith’s battalion commander for her retention or hold Nguyen’s battalion commander accountable for his loss. Consequently, the Army misses the opportunity to spread the positive behaviors of Smith’s battalion commander while Nguyen’s battalion commander remains on the fast track for promotions and will likely continue his or her counterproductive behaviors, including driving other top talent out of the Army. To avert such outcomes and better develop and select future senior leaders, the Army must begin to measure and seriously consider what we term the battalion commander effect.

### Remaining in the Army

Prior research has shown battalion commander quality can predict the performance of junior officers, but the impact of battalion commanders on
their junior officers’ decisions to stay in the Army is less clear.² A wide array of research has shown many factors influence junior officer retention or attrition.³ Some lieutenants stay in the Army due to guaranteed pay and benefits, the officer career education system, opportunities for diverse assignments, and frequent leadership roles. Lieutenants who leave cite factors such as dissatisfaction with long work hours and deployments, strains on personal life, frequent moves, seniority-based promotions, and competitive job opportunities in the civilian sector. Of note, most junior officers understand these structural factors before they decide to join the Army.

Additionally, interpersonal factors such as relationships with peers and subordinates are likely influential. People value serving with others who enjoy their company, share their values, and hold similar interests; these and other social factors influence this sense of belonging.⁴ Lieutenants’ direct bosses—company commanders—are likely influential, as research has shown that individuals stay in organizations when they have high-quality relationships with their immediate supervisors and actively exchange value with their leaders.⁵ Still, other research has shown an employee’s job satisfaction and overall performance increase when the employee sees his or her direct boss as an admirable role model.⁶

Recent remarks by the Chief of Staff of the Army suggest battalion commanders also affect junior officer retention and attrition: “That lieutenant colonel influences 500 or 600 people, whether they want to stay in the Army

or get out of the Army. It’s a level of leadership that I think is the most important. . . . If you look at officers who may have gotten out [of the Army] early, you ask them how their battalion commander was, it was probably not who they wanted or inspired them to serve.” Yet apart from an abundance of anecdotal evidence, little was previously known about the impact of battalion commanders on junior officer retention and attrition.

Even though company commanders spend more time with lieutenants due to proximity, there are several reasons why battalion commanders may be more influential. Battalion commanders have the sole right to approve or deny promotion to first lieutenant. Additionally, the demographics of battalion commanders make them stand out. While a company commander usually leads 4 to 7 lieutenants, a battalion commander normally leads 14 to 35. Battalion commanders are approximately 15 years older than their lieutenants, 10 years older than their company commanders, and often referred to as the unit’s “old man” or “old lady.” Indeed, battalion commanders are at, or near, retirement age—the Army’s equivalent of AT&T and General Motors “company men and women.” And they are elite. While the Army practically guarantees officers company command, only 25 percent of officers who remain in service for 18 years will ultimately be selected for battalion command.

[My battalion commander] cared about his lieutenants. He asked us, “What are your career goals, what do you want to do next, what can we do to keep you in?”

—Former lieutenant

Therefore, from the junior officers’ perspective, battalion commanders are carefully positioned partners in the Army enterprise, and the Army considers them to be models of the organization’s values. As the Chief of Staff of the Army recently noted, battalion commanders’ organizational authority, influence over command climate, and extensive experience give them an “out-sized ability to shape the future service of the soldiers they lead.”

Since battalion commanders have significant influence on their lieutenants’ career outcomes and are conspicuous examples of what the Army develops and rewards in its leaders, this study hypothesized that battalion commanders would,

on average, significantly affect their lieutenants’ decisions to stay in or leave the Army. The study aimed to estimate and understand the BCE of these leaders, which would enable the Army to improve its senior officer talent management—both individually and collectively.

**Research Methods**

The researchers conducted a statistical analysis designed to test the hypothesis that battalion commanders influence their lieutenants’ future decisions to remain in or leave the Army. The study team accessed the Army's officer personnel database, with permission of the Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis, Department of the Army G-1. Since 1991, the Army has logged a monthly database entry for each of its officers, including active-duty status, rank, assigned unit (specific battalion, recorded by its six-digit unit identification code), demographics, and some military school qualifications.

To limit variance in the analysis, the study included only traditional deployable battalions of the 1990s and early 2000s. Current and historical organizational documents were used to identify the name and six-digit unit identification code for each active-duty battalion. Next, the Army’s electronic personnel database was used to identify the lieutenant colonel assigned to each of these battalions during each month. Finally, the database was searched for second and first lieutenants who served in the same unit during one or more of the same months as one or more of the previously identified battalion commanders.

The study did not include aviation battalions (due to the longer service obligation), battalions that were moving home locations due to Base Realignment and Closure actions, or battalion commanders who supervised fewer than 10 or more than 60 lieutenants. In total, the study’s dataset included 265 deployable battalions, 1,745 battalion commanders, and the 36,032 lieutenants who served under them.

The study then defined the retention point that best signifies a lieutenant staying in the Army past his or her initial obligation. Depending on commissioning source, new lieutenants have three-year (Officer Candidate School [OCS] and Reserve Officer Training Corps [ROTC] nonscholarship), four-year (ROTC scholarship), or five-year (United States Military Academy [USMA]) active-duty service obligations. When junior officers decide to separate from the Army at the end of their obligation, they may not leave immediately; instead they often wait until an optimal transitional point, such as one coinciding with a graduate school start date, a significant family/life event, or a civilian job offer. Yet almost all officers who intend to separate from the Army early in their career do so before assuming company command, which typically happens during an 18-month
period between the fifth and eighth year of an officer’s active-duty service. To account for the varying active-duty service obligations and idiosyncratic decision timing against the additional time commitment of company command, the study defined the retention point as the end of an officer’s sixth year of service, since very few officers would have completed company command by that time.

The study then employed a multivariable regression statistical model to test the hypothesis that battalion commanders affect their lieutenants’ decisions to remain in or leave the Army. The dependent variable was defined as a lieutenant remaining in the Army past the sixth year of service, and the first explanatory variable was defined as the battalion commander under whom the lieutenant served. Although every junior officer’s retention decision is individual and influenced by many factors, the sheer size of the dataset produced a high degree of confidence in the results, particularly once the regression included control variables like the lieutenant’s year group (which accounts for strength of economy and Army-wide trends), branch, duty location (post), commissioning source, gender, race/ethnicity, age, undergraduate institution quality, marital and child status, and graduation from Airborne, Air Assault, or Ranger Schools.

This model enabled the study to measure each battalion commander’s unique predictive effect on the retention decision of the average lieutenant who served under him or her. The empirical results were as expected: some battalion commanders have a positive influence, some have a negative influence, and others have a negligible influence. Yet we wanted to test whether battalion commanders, on average, influenced their junior officers’ retention and attrition in a significant way. The study, therefore, applied a more-complex regression analysis that measured the average effect of all 1,745 battalion commanders in predicting their 36,032 junior officers’ decisions to stay or go. The results revealed—with a 99.9 percent confidence level—a significant battalion commander effect on the Army’s retention of lieutenants.

“My battalion commander] was degrading. The best lieutenants in the battalion got out. They could not stand his oppressive and demeaning behavior. By and large, most lieutenants got out.

―Former lieutenant

To further test for this effect, the researchers ran a series of additional regressions to compare the explanatory power of the battalion commander to the explanatory power of the study’s 13 control variables. The results showed that the identity of the battalion commander explained at least 22 percent and 58 percent...
more of the lieutenants’ retention decisions than any of the control variables, in terms of main effects and incremental effects, respectively (measured with the adjusted $R^2$ statistic). This finding infers that the battalion commander may be the most impactful factor in a typical lieutenant’s decision to stay or go.

But other leaders in the formation matter as well. Lieutenants’ platoon sergeants, company commanders, and field-grade officers likely also exert influence on retention decisions. The study’s empirical design, like Army culture, implicitly holds battalion commanders responsible for the entire leadership culture in their units. Consequently, the study conducted additional empirical tests to see if other characteristics of the battalion, such as the other leaders who influence the lieutenants and the traditions and culture not influenced by the battalion commander, were more influential in explaining the retention pattern of its lieutenants than the battalion commanders.

To test this finding for fixed effects of the battalion (influence from the battalion not related to the battalion commander), the study added a battalion dummy variable to the regression as an additional explanatory variable. Yet the study still found that the battalion commanders’ variable remained statistically significant while the battalion dummy variable did not. The analysis, therefore, indicates battalion commanders, on average, may have more influence on the Army’s retention of lieutenants than other battalion-level effects, such as other leaders in the battalion.

Next, the study considered nuances from different types of battalion commanders and lieutenants. Since a lieutenant can serve under several battalion commanders, the study tested the relative influence of each battalion commander and found the battalion commander under whom the junior officer served the longest was more predictive than the order (first, second, or third) of the commander. This finding is logical due to the likely increase in interaction and observation in these relationships. The study then tested if the BCE was different for officers from the three major commissioning sources. By running three additional regressions, each regression conditional on the lieutenants being commissioned by USMA, ROTC, or OCS, the study found an interesting distinction. On average, the battalion commander effect is significant for ROTC and USMA lieutenants, but not for OCS lieutenants.

This variance could result from the fact many OCS officers are prior enlisted soldiers with experience serving under several battalion commanders, and who are therefore more resilient under various qualities of leadership. Also, since OCS officers are, on average, closer to retirement age than their ROTC and

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USMA peers, they have higher incentives to stay in the Army, and their retention decision would correspondingly be less influenced by the identity of their battalion commander.

Since the study previously matched each battalion commander with his or her junior officers, each junior officer’s total length of service under each battalion commander can be measured. Also, the study assumed a junior officer who served under a battalion commander for a shorter period was less affected than one who served under the same battalion commander for a longer period. Accordingly, the study weighted the value of each junior officer retention decision in proportion to the number of months the lieutenant served under that battalion commander. Statistically, the study measured the BCE as the percentage of a battalion commander’s junior officers who remained in the Army long enough to command a company, weighted by the number of months each junior officer served under the battalion commander.

\[
BCE_j = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} M_i \cdot [1(\text{if LT retained past 6 years}), 0(\text{if not})]}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} M_i}
\]

\[M = \text{months serving under battalion commander } j\]
\[i = \text{LT who served under battalion commander } j\]

Figure 1. The battalion commander effect equation

Running this equation (figure 1) on each of the 1,745 battalion commanders, the study found the average (mean, or \(\mu\)) battalion commander had a BCE of 59 percent with a standard deviation (\(\sigma\)) of 13 percent. That is, the average battalion commander in the study retained 59 percent of his or her lieutenants, and most battalion commanders retained between 46 percent and 72 percent (each one standard deviation from the mean) of their lieutenants. The range of the battalion commanders’ BCE was striking. Some battalion commanders had a BCE of less than 20 percent while some were over 90 percent. If the study assumes the sample of 1,745 battalion commanders is representative of Army battalion commanders in general, then the 500-plus battalion commanders with a BCE of less than 46 percent or greater than 72 percent are unusual.

**Retaining High-Potential Lieutenants**

This project’s previous analysis calculated the battalion commander effect with the underlying assumption that all lieutenants have equal potential. But
this assumption is erroneous. Since the new *Army People Strategy* recognizes each person’s unique combination of knowledge, skills, behaviors, and preferences, the BCE could be customized to better reflect a comprehensive talent management approach.\(^\text{10}\) More specifically, some lieutenants are higher performing and likely have more potential, while others do not display the minimal knowledge, skills, and behaviors needed to serve as effective company commanders. Since previous research has found lieutenants with higher ability respond differently to leader influence, examining how well a battalion commander’s lieutenant retention pattern matches the actual potential of his or her junior officers could produce greater insights.\(^\text{11}\)

To accomplish this goal, the Army could measure and use a version of the battalion commander effect that accounts for high-potential (HIPO) lieutenants—the BCE\(_{\text{HIPO}}\). Assuming an officer evaluation report is an accurate (valid) classification of a lieutenant’s potential, each lieutenant’s report profile, now available electronically, could be coded as a high-, moderate-, or low-potential officer. For example, if at least 66.7 percent of a lieutenant’s evaluation reports were rated “most qualified” by their senior raters, he or she could be coded as high-potential. If 66.6 to 33.3 percent of the reports were “most qualified,” he or she could be coded as moderate-potential. If 33.2 percent or fewer of the evaluation reports were “most qualified,” he or she could be coded as low-potential.

After each junior officer was coded as high-, moderate-, or low-potential, the BCE formula could be changed to give the battalion commander positive credit if each lieutenant’s retention decision was most advantageous to the Army (if a high- or moderate-potential junior officer retains or if a low-potential junior officer leaves) and no credit if that decision was least advantageous to the Army (if a high- or moderate-potential junior officer departs or if a low-potential junior officer remains in the Army). In other words, if all of a battalion commander’s high- and moderate-potential lieutenants chose to stay in the Army, and all of his or her low-potential lieutenants departed the Army before company command, the battalion commander would have a BCE\(_{\text{HIPO}}\) rating of 100 percent.

Other ways to code lieutenants as HIPO might include factors such as performance in the basic and career officer courses, order of merit at their commissioning sources (such as distinguished military graduate designations), or the quality of their undergraduate institutions. Since the Army is

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generally better off when all junior officers want to stay on active duty, an additional way to calculate the \( \text{BCE}_{\text{HIPO}} \) would be to give battalion commanders credit for all junior officers who stay, but give more weight to the high-potential junior officers than the moderate- or lower-potential ones. Since high-potential lieutenants are likely to find more attractive options in the civilian workforce (and thus are more likely to decide to stay in the Army because they want to), the study hypothesizes battalion commanders have even more influence on their high-potential lieutenants’ retention decisions than on those of moderate-potential or low-potential lieutenants.

To test this hypothesis empirically, lieutenants were coded as HIPOs using available data: those who graduated from USMA, from an ROTC program at a highly competitive undergraduate institution, or as a distinguished military graduate of their ROTC or OCS cohort. In all, 12,239 (37.9 percent) of the 36,032 lieutenants were classified as high-potential officers. Running the regression equation again for only HIPO lieutenants, the study found the identity of the battalion commander explains more of the variance in high-potential lieutenants’ retention decisions than it does for average and non-HIPO lieutenants.

Additionally, \( \text{BCE}_{\text{HIPO}} \) has a wider distribution than BCE (figure 2), which would be expected if the \( \text{BCE}_{\text{HIPO}} \) is stronger. For example, just one battalion commander had a BCE of less than 10 percent, but 55 battalion commanders had a \( \text{BCE}_{\text{HIPO}} \) of less than 10 percent. Ultimately, the evidence strongly suggests battalion commanders have even more influence over their high-potential lieutenants’ decisions to stay or go. Measuring \( \text{BCE}_{\text{HIPO}} \), therefore, may be even more important to effective Army talent management.

![Figure 2. Battalion commander effect distribution (BCE and BCEHIPO, n=1,745)](image)
Senior Officer Talent Management

Developing Future Battalion Commanders

By making the battalion commander effect official, the Army could clearly signal to all officers that it places great weight on their ability to develop subordinates, which will likely catalyze positive, thoughtful leader behavior in battalion commanders across the service. The mere awareness that their BCE is being calculated and potentially viewed by senior leaders would shape the behavior of future and current battalion commanders, or at least increase those commanders’ awareness of their responsibility to nourish future leaders.

Developing Former Battalion Commanders

The BCE provides a wide range of options and contexts to reinforce and spread positive leadership behaviors while also identifying and reducing counterproductive ones. For example, when a former battalion commander presents a very high or very low BCE (perhaps beyond one standard deviation from the mean), the Army should check his or her Army Commander Evaluation Tool (ACET) results, an existing 21-question peer and subordinate evaluation administered by the US Army Combined Arms Center’s School for Command Preparation.

Battalion commanders with a high BCE, strong positive ACET feedback, and high organizational performance are likely the best in the Army. They should be publicly acknowledged, rewarded, and presented as role models for others. Officers with low a BCE and negative ACET feedback likely have deep challenges, but may still have potential. They could be put into a four- to six-month special leadership development program, with goals to become self-aware of counterproductive behaviors such as toxicity or apathy. Such mentorship programs could be led by a retired general officer with a high BCE and high organizational performance. Upon completion, officers who do not demonstrate significant behavioral changes could be thanked for their service and asked to submit their retirements. Those who show increased self-awareness and positive behavioral changes could be encouraged to remain on active duty. Only those who demonstrate transformational behavioral change should be given the opportunity to compete for a future command.

Informing Selection for Senior Officer Talent Management

Additional relevant information leads to better talent management decisions; consequently, the Army has created several new programs designed to better match
its officer talent with the talent profile required, such as the talent marketplace. Further, the Army has started gathering more information about the skills of its officers, such as their communication ability, strategic potential, and mental and physical fitness, during its new command assessment programs.

Due to the career timelines of the most junior lieutenants in a battalion, the Army must wait up to five-and-a-half years after battalion commanders depart their commands before it can calculate their full BCE and BCEHIPO. Considering this lag, the Army could examine ACETs and climate surveys from officers’ time in command to provide similar feedback to the senior service (war) college selection board, colonels promotion board, and colonels command assessment program (CCAP, which already considers ACETs).

To better inform these colonel-level selection boards and program, the Army should calculate an interim BCE and BCEHIPO each year after a battalion commander departs command. This data should be considered by the CCAP, within the context of it still being incomplete. Certainly, each former battalion commander’s full BCE and BCEHIPO should be calculated and strongly considered by what is perhaps the Army’s most important leader selection event—the brigadier general selection board.

**Shaping Institutional-Level Leader Development**

The battalion commander effect is also a potentially powerful tool for improving Army leadership training and development. The Army should further analyze the ACETs and climate surveys of officers with very high and very low BCEs to identify the specific leader behaviors shown to be consistent with their scores. These behaviors could then be taught as evidence-driven examples of best and counterproductive leadership practices at pre-command courses and all officer education schools. To further reinforce the message, the Army could establish an annual battalion commander-level award informed by the BCE or BCEHIPO, similar to the Army’s current General Douglas MacArthur Leadership Award given to outstanding company-grade officers.

Additionally, calculating the battalion commander effect for each battalion commander will allow the Army to see the developmental routes—schools, assignments, interventions—that tend to produce battalion commanders with high and low BCEs with corresponding organizational performance. By examining these patterns, the Army could redesign its officer assignment system to maximize developmental paths that yield high BCE, high organizational performance officers.

Limitations

While the battalion commander effect should be considered in senior officer talent management decisions, it should not be the sole information source about an officer’s past leadership or potential. Several contextual factors are needed to interpret its meaning properly. First, it is easy to imagine a battalion commander who practices “likership” more than quality leadership, resulting in a high BCE when positive leadership such as “tough love” was absent. Second, a counterproductive— toxic or ineffective—battalion commander’s negative effect could be mitigated by a group of high-quality field- and company-grade officers and NCOs, with the battalion commander ending up with a high BCE for which he or she is not responsible.

Third, a battalion may have had a commander who was a very effective and thoughtful leader, yet the battalion experienced an extremely difficult deployment, or its lieutenants had to make their retention decisions during a particularly strong economy with high-paying civilian job opportunities. Finally, one could imagine a battalion commander who receives a cohort of lieutenants who are of unusually high or low quality or predisposed to want to stay in or leave the Army. Therefore, the battalion commander effect is just one of several important measures of leadership effectiveness, including 360-degree feedback, command climate surveys, reenlistment rates for junior enlisted personnel, unit conduct, and unit performance at centralized training events.

Conclusion

The Army needs quality leadership, and it expects its officers to provide that leadership consistently within the constraints of the institution. As the Army looks for ways to retain talent, the battalion commander effect should play a role. While officer evaluation reports capture supervisors’ perceptions of their subordinates’ leadership performance and potential, the BCE is an objective measure of leader effectiveness by utilizing subordinates’ decisions to vote with their feet. In essence, the battalion commander effect provides support for the notion that “people do not quit organizations; they quit leaders.”13

When taken in context, the battalion commander effect is an important way to identify the presence of counterproductive leader behaviors in a way performance evaluations may not. Officers who are effective at managing the perceptions of their

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seniors while abusing or disregarding their juniors will likely ace official evaluation reports, but they will be held accountable by the BCE.

Ultimately, the battalion commander effect is a new measure of leadership effectiveness that should be calculated and considered, within context, when making senior officer talent management decisions. In doing so, the Army will improve its brigadier general selection process, better understand the developmental experiences that produce officers who inspire retention, and send an unmistakable message to current and future battalion commanders that they will be held accountable for the retention or attrition of its most critical asset, its young talent, and especially its high-potential lieutenants. Additionally, since leadership in a military context has many similarities to leadership in civilian settings, a modified BCE could inform the selection of the first tenured-level supervisors in other contexts, such as not-for-profit senior directors, law firm partners, corporate general managers, and consulting and banking executives.

In the words of retired Army Lieutenant General Walter F. Ulmer Jr., the former III Corps commander and former president and CEO of the Center for Creative Leadership, “battalion commanders—even more powerfully than division commanders—craft the organizational climates that motivate or discourage lieutenants . . . and everybody else.” The BCE can measure that aspect of leadership objectively, powerfully, and reliably, giving the Army a new tool to help create an organizational climate that will maximize both its current and future effectiveness.

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14. Walter Ulmer, personal communication with the authors, March 25, 2020.
The Evolution of Hybrid War: 
Implications for Strategy and the Military Profession

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ABSTRACT: The concept of hybrid war has evolved from operational-level use of military means and methods in war toward strategic-level use of nonmilitary means in a gray zone below the threshold of war. This article considers this evolution and its implications for strategy and the military profession by contrasting past and current use of the hybrid war concept and raising critical questions for policy and military practitioners.

In a 2005 article coauthored with James Mattis and in his 2007 analysis, Frank Hoffman envisaged the “rise of hybrid wars.” According to Hoffman, these wars involved the mixing of different methods and means and combined regular, irregular, and criminal elements with terrorism and new technologies. This variety of means and ways was expected to lead to positive synergy effects for those waging war.1 In addition, converging modes of war and increasing complexity would result in an increased threat to those targeted.2

Hoffman’s idea of hybrid war built on two ideal types of war: regular and irregular, which fused together into a hybrid variant. The two previous ideal types are already questionable since the regular interstate variant has long been the exception.3 Even the Cold War remained cold because both superpowers sought to avoid escalation that could lead to nuclear war. While the Cold War offers excellent examples of the combined use of various military and non-military methods and means, this combined use takes place in virtually all wars.4 In the end, the hybrid buzzword appeared most

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useful if it resulted in more analytical thinking about war and warfare or how it is waged.\(^5\) Unfortunately, this is not what happened.

While the hybrid war concept received some initial attention, its breakthrough came in 2014 with the Russian occupation and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine. Hybrid warfare was immediately linked to a now-famous speech by General Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the general staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, to the extent that it became used interchangeably with a(n entirely mythical) doctrine named after him. In the September 2014 NATO Wales Summit, hybrid warfare was discussed alongside Russian aggression.\(^6\) These developments caused Hoffman’s original concept that already rested on shaky analytical grounds to start evolving to a problematic direction. Hybrid war now became synonymous with Russia rather than nonstate actors and was seen as the most immediate security threat for the West.\(^7\) This evolution turned hybrid war into an ambiguous catchall concept, which constantly risks reinventing the wheel. While this plasticity makes the buzzword useful in policy and public discussions, the lack of precision hinders its use for scholarly and policy purposes. Without a precise definition, hybrid war risks saying both everything and nothing in a way prone to hindering a better understanding of contemporary war and warfare.\(^8\)

Contemporary research has failed to acknowledge the evolution of hybrid war from Hoffman’s more precise definition to the catchall it has become today. This article argues that the problem of defining hybrid war is not merely an analytical one. As the concept essentially tries to come to terms with a more comprehensive understanding of war, immediate real-world implications for strategy and the military profession arise.

The first part of the article describes the evolution of the concept toward gray zone conflict; the contemporary understanding of hybrid war has moved away from the operational level use of military means and methods into the strategic realm. The evolved hybrid war has become a synonym for gray zone conflict with both terms typically referring to Russian action in a way that hinders more general analysis.

The second part of the article focuses on the main issue at stake, of the elevation of nonmilitary means over military ones. From the perspective of strategic theory that focuses on the relationship between ends, means, and ways, hybrid war indicates the


\(^{6}\) “Wales Summit Declaration” (press release, NATO, August 30, 2018), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm

\(^{7}\) Bettina Renz, Russia’s Military Revival (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2018).

insufficiency of narrow military strategy that focuses on use of force as a threat or as actual employment of violence.

The third part of the article discusses the implications for the military profession. Regardless of what the phenomenon is called, contemporary conflict is perceived to have shifted from the narrow military domain. What does this shift away from use of force mean for the military profession, which has traditionally focused on managing and meting out death and destruction? The article concludes by exploring the centrality of these questions for policymakers and military practitioners.

Evolution of Hybrid War to Gray Zone Conflict

The concept of hybrid war has constantly evolved. The concept dates to 1998 when it was used to describe the combination of conventional forces with special forces.9 Whereas Hoffman’s understanding of hybrid war focused on mixing regular and irregular means and methods on the operational level during war, the Russian invasion and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in early 2014 caused practitioners to broaden the description. This almost bloodless operation was interpreted through Gerasimov’s prescient, if not prophetic, speech printed a year earlier in February 2013.10 Although Gerasimov did not mention the words hybrid or Ukraine, his speech was soon interpreted as a Russian “Gerasimov doctrine” of hybrid war.11 According to Gerasimov, nonmilitary means can be used to ignite an armed conflict in a previously flourishing state that justifies a decisive intervention by foreign forces.12 The resulting gray zone conflict waged under the threshold of war bears more resemblance to the strategic-level use of nonmilitary means than either traditional war or Hoffman’s hybrid variant. Gerasimov and gray zone conflict thus envisage a shift from use of force in war to use of nonviolent means below the threshold of war.

While the interpretation of a Gerasimov doctrine was incorrect, it proved politically helpful after the exhausting wars waged in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. Russian aggression against Georgia and Ukraine and more limited operations elsewhere have contributed to the belief that Russia poses the greatest and most immediate security threat for the Western countries. The Russian threat was familiar to many politicians and armed forces. This threat was also politically convenient since it allowed the focus to shift from a costly and uncomfortable war on terror to what some observers immediately understood as a renewed Cold War.

Politics aside, there are two reasons why equating hybrid war with Russian foreign policy is unfortunate. First, this equation lacks conceptual clarity and skews the understanding of reality by connecting dots in what may be unwarranted places. If only Russia wages hybrid war, it logically follows that hybrid war can be studied through Russian actions. From this perspective, every action Russia undertakes can constitute warfare. This reasoning helps little in understanding a more general category of war applicable even to other actors. Empirically, it is uncertain whether Russia achieved its goals on Crimea, where unique circumstances allowed limited use of force. Understanding all Russian actions as a part of a coordinated strategy will undoubtedly lead to hawkish overestimations of the Russian threat and risk the development of poor strategy for countering real dangers, including unnecessary escalation.

The second issue with equating hybrid war with Russia is the assumption hybrid war will always be initiated by an aggressive opponent, leaving everyone else on the receiving end. This difference between the perceived need to become better at strategy while reactively shielding ourselves from outside interference is a crucial one; status quo actors seek to protect and maintain what they have, whereas revisionist actors like Russia actively seek to attain change. The assumption that only our adversaries possess active strategies betrays a limited understanding and practice of strategy and a lack of urgency to master hybrid war.

Limitations in regard to strategy are perhaps best evident in the Afghanistan War, which demonstrates how strategies narrowly focused on deployment of force are bound to face difficulties. With national defense establishments focusing on deterrence and maintenance of the status quo during the relatively stable years of the Cold War, most countries lacked experience on how to change it through warfare. The Russian occupation of Crimea came at the precise moment when the withdrawal of most Western forces from Afghanistan confirmed the counterinsurgency strategy had failed. Paradoxically, the concept of hybrid war, which emphasizes combining different ways and means, allowed shifting attention from the failure to do so in Afghanistan. In this way, the timing of the Russian occupation of Crimea was opportune for Western militaries, which never had to admit defeat against the Taliban. With an urgent new threat, there was little pressure to draw lessons from the long war.

Gerasimov’s presentation can be understood to advocate the opposite course of action and to take stock of past experiences. The cumbersome full title of the presentation was “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges

15. Freedman, Future of War; and Renz, Russia's Military Revival.
Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying Out Combat Operations. As can be expected, the core issue was emphasizing the crucial role played by military science in understanding contemporary realities. Much of the presentation focused on key lessons of several recent wars fought by Russia and the United States. One lesson was that “the role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.” A figure attached to the presentation illustrated this new reality by proclaiming a current “correlation of nonmilitary and military measures” at a “4:1” ratio.

The efforts in Afghanistan, descriptions of hybrid war, and Gerasimov’s portrayal of contemporary war bear more than cursory resemblance. Counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan too sought to combine different military and nonmilitary means and ways to achieve positive synergy. In fact, Gerasimov essentially repeated the classic counterinsurgency ratio of military to nonmilitary means in a more general context that war consists of four-fifths political action and one-fifth military action. Perhaps then, the main difference between counterinsurgency and hybrid war is that we waged the former there, while the latter targets us here? Is it possible that we are observing the same kind of war, but that we are as unaccustomed to wage it as we are to experience it waged against ourselves?

While it has since been emphasized that Gerasimov merely provided his interpretation of the way Western countries wage war, the discrepancy between our failures and perceived Russian successes in combining military with nonmilitary means has been explained not only by skillful new strategy but also by a superior Russian command and control system. Both explanations have been criticized as “simply unrealistic.”

To summarize, hybrid war and gray zone conflict suggest that success in contemporary war depends on coordination and combination of military and nonmilitary means. This is not a new argument and has been discussed at least since the so-called Three Block War of the late 1990s. Neglecting to analyze

our own experiences in places like Afghanistan and equating Russian action and hybrid war have contributed to a poor understanding of Russia and how we can combine various means and ways to achieve our desired political ends.

Associating hybrid war with Russia alone also reflects the absence of a major rethinking of war and warfare in general even though the Afghanistan War alone illustrates how we struggle to wage this kind of war ourselves. It is equally difficult to see any major organizational reforms these new insights have heralded, for instance the need to coordinate and combine military and nonmilitary means. Considering that armed forces do not possess most of the nonmilitary means emphasized by notions of hybrid warfare, it is unsurprising that use of force and military technology have remained top priorities even in Russia.  

As its title suggested, even Gerasimov’s speech focused on carrying out combat operations and soon turned to high-tech capabilities, including artificial intelligence and robots. Military professionals around the world still assume the centrality of traditional military operations and above all the use of violence in war. This kind of narrow military strategy does not correspond with the emphasis in contemporary conflicts that has shifted from use of force in war to use of nonviolent means below the threshold of war. The evolution of hybrid war indicates that the current emphasis lies in a grand strategy that applies all available means an actor possesses, not in narrow military strategy that focuses on mere violence.

**Political Warfare and Strategy**

Strategy lies at the core of the military profession because it bridges war and politics. Without this connection, war would be mere violence, and those who wage war little more than murderers. From the strategy perspective, the use of what has been called the “full spectrum,” that includes even nonviolent means, should only be surprising if one perceives strategy and warfare narrowly as predominantly belonging to a military domain.  

Continuing a long emphasis of combining various military and nonmilitary means in Russian strategic thinking, Gerasimov explicitly avoided this pitfall by noting that “the focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures—applied in coordination with the protest potential of the population.” As hybrid war evolved to overlap gray zone conflict, it

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simultaneously expanded from narrow military strategy to subsume broader grand strategy in a manner reminiscent of political warfare waged during the Cold War. This evolution indicates devaluation of the perceived utility of violence in contemporary war and comes with immediate implications for strategy.

The centrality given to violence in Western military theory can be traced to Clausewitz’s early-nineteenth-century writings. Despairing over his contemporaries’ relative lack of interest about fighting, Clausewitz emphasized violence in war to the point of elevating violence as the constant nature of war, and he defined war as the use of force to make the enemy submit to our (political) will.26 His definition of war paved the way for a military profession focused on a single activity—applying violence to make the enemy defenseless.

This focus has endured, as illustrated by Harold Lasswell’s definition of soldiers as “specialists on violence.”27 Samuel Huntington famously built on the definition when he dubbed officers “managers of violence,” claimed that “the function of a military force is successful armed combat,” and argued that the military constitutes a profession.28 Huntington saw that effectiveness dictated leaving military matters to professionals, who acted under “objective civilian control.”29 The domain of the military profession thus constituted war and warfare or use of violence in war.

This division is evident even in strategic theory. While the prefix military to strategy explicitly refers to violence, most writings on strategy still depart from Clausewitz’s writings. For Clausewitz, strategy was “the theory of the use of combats for the object of the War,” and tactics “the theory of the use of military forces in combat.”30 While grand strategy encompasses all means actors may employ to achieve desired political ends, military strategy focuses more narrowly on a subordinate level where military means and actors prevail.31 Military strategy, therefore, involves the use of force, which in turn forms one of the means available for broader grand strategy.

Clausewitz’s influence is discernible even in attempts to make sense of hostile activities in the gray zone below the threshold of war. This is the starting

point of George F. Kennan, the American diplomat best known for writing the “long telegram” analysis of the Soviet political system. He defined political warfare as “the logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives.” With his definition and despite its age, Kennan succeeds in capturing gray zone conflict better than many who write about the phenomenon today. Nevertheless, the definition builds on potentially unstable conceptual foundations.

From the perspective of Clausewitz’s theory of war, political warfare is an oxymoron. There are two reasons for this. First, considering Clausewitz’s view of war as a continuation of politics by other means, the political prefix makes little sense to warfare. For Clausewitz, all war and hence warfare is inherently political. Considering the way Kennan believed “the realities of international relations” to consist of “the perpetual rhythm of struggle, in and out of war,” the prefix political was likely chosen by Kennan to de-emphasize violence and to move narrow military strategy toward broader grand strategy. Political warfare in any case soon became a way to wage the Cold War in a manner less likely to escalate to a nuclear exchange.

Second, if indeed all war is violent in the manner Clausewitz believed, it is unlikely that he would have recognized activities that lack violence as constituting war or warfare. While the evolution of hybrid war stemmed from the emphasis given to nonviolent means, the gray zone furthermore suggests these means are not employed during war or the traditional military domain. Kennan’s political warfare departed from similar premises.

Appraisals of contemporary conflict which devalue violence have immediate bearing for strategy: highlighting nonviolent means elevates broader grand strategy at the cost of narrow military strategy. While it is first and foremost Russian action that has fed into these theories, even other past conflicts—including our own engagement in Afghanistan—illustrate how military strategy and violence alone are unlikely to deliver wide-ranging political goals. In this regard, it is important to note that Clausewitz’s

35. Smith, Utility of Force.
understanding of strategy has been criticized as focusing too much on what is understood today as the operational level of war.36

Another criticism comes from the admission that the threat posed by actors like Russia requires a more total defense than what armed forces alone can provide. While total defense—the use of all available means in the defense of a country and its interests—links back to grand strategy, this thinking betrays the passive status quo assumption that it is others who engage in what could be understood as a full-spectrum offensive.

The broadening of strategy to encompass nonmilitary means in ways that potentially put them ahead of military means raises a troubling question for military professionals. Regardless of the label used, many of the activities ascribed to gray zone, hybrid war, and political warfare lie outside the traditional military domain, or use of violence in war. How does the devaluation of conventional warfare influence the military profession? In other words, how will a profession that has so far focused narrowly on managing death and destruction meet the new opportunities and threats?

**Politics and the Military Profession**

The Western military profession is founded on the ideal of its apolitical nature. This emphasis is justified by the special remit of the profession—use of violence. While necessary for protecting polities, militaries’ capacity for violence raises the threat of militarism that endangers democracy. Violent capacity allows not only maintaining political order, but also undemocratic seizure of power. This type of loss of democratic political control was also what Lasswell feared during World War II when he described “garrison states” dominated by the military.37 As a result, militaries have been subjected to tight political control and separated from and subordinated to democratic politics when possible.38 This was Huntington’s solution, which envisaged a narrow military domain that focuses on use of force and keeping the military separate from politics.39

Huntington has since been accused of misunderstanding Clausewitz, who according to a different reading rejected a politically neutral military that

waged compartmentalized war in isolation from the surrounding society.\textsuperscript{40} The question of whether warfare can be thus compartmentalized highlights the two understandings of strategy—broad grand strategy and narrow military strategy—and ultimately begs the question of who owns war. This question of ownership is entrenched in bureaucratic, normative, and legal frameworks. Ownership comes with crucial ramifications, not least political ones. If war is mainly understood to concern use of force, it belongs to the remit of the military profession which, like all professions, seeks autonomy within its professional domain. Here it is important to emphasize that one key reason why the concept of grand strategy was invented was to assert that the political control of war remains in civilian, not military, hands.\textsuperscript{41}

If one believes the adherents of hybrid war and similar concepts, much of contemporary conflict lies outside this traditional military domain, raising fundamental questions for the military profession. If violence is devalued in contemporary conflict, then what remains of the special remit of the military profession? Must the profession reinvent itself by expanding its traditionally narrow professional domain? Would interfering with existing boundaries lead to conflict and clash with democratic civil–military relations as militaries inevitably become involved in what must be considered political activities?

These questions are uncomfortable, yet necessary. It is not difficult to imagine why they have often been avoided. Beginning with Clausewitz, his focus on violence largely allowed him to prescribe the core activity of the emerging military profession in a rather technical way that offered the promise of bypassing politics. Clausewitz elevated violence to the guiding principle of war and saw that wars are decided through violence; political goals in war were best achieved by forcing enemies to their knees. This belief required destroying enough of an enemy’s armed forces to make them unable to defend themselves. After this, an opponent’s country had to be conquered to prevent its citizens from raising new forces and offering renewed resistance.\textsuperscript{42} As Jan Willem Honig puts it, “such a definition of the strategic object . . . possessed the great advantage of providing a seemingly clear-cut professional remit for the military. Destroying the enemy’s armed forces was a job they could do independently, without requiring constant political oversight and inviting potential meddling.”\textsuperscript{43} Judging from recent experiences and scholarship alike, the applicability of this prescription in the contemporary era appears questionable.

\textsuperscript{42} Clausewitz, \textit{On War}, 20–21.
\textsuperscript{43} Honig, “Future of Military Strategy,” 150.
Kennan fared little better in addressing the consequences broader strategy causes to the military profession. While he envisaged political warfare had a military component, he dodged addressing the role of the military in political warfare by handing the responsibility over to the Department of State instead of the Department of Defense.\(^{44}\) This choice made sense because political warfare too is waged in the gray zone between war and peace. Ultimately, and against Kennan's wishes, the Central Intelligence Agency came to answer for covert operations.\(^{45}\) While the supreme authority of the military continued in theatres of war, the exact role the military was to play in political warfare elsewhere was left undefined.

In this sense, Hoffman perhaps comes closest to the mark. Recognizing the contradiction between Kennan's and Clausewitz's understandings of war, Hoffman saw the main problem with the definition of political warfare was not only that it employed nonmilitary means, but that they were employed "short of war": "if it [is] short of war, then it's not warfare."\(^{46}\) Like political warfare in theatres of war, hybrid war was still war in a way that allowed the military profession to remain in its traditionally narrow domain.

The problem with Hoffman's argument is that the concept of hybrid war has evolved from its original conceptualization. Whereas Hoffman's concept focused on combining regular and irregular means and ways predominantly on the operational level and during times of war, the concept has moved toward Gerasimov's and Kennan's strategic-level emphasis of nonmilitary means in the gray zone. The shift to the gray zone terminology contains the core of the issue at stake.

With its main activities lacking violence and taking place outside war, what role should the military play in such conflict? In other words, the more contemporary understanding of hybrid war conflates it with gray zone conflict and makes it impossible to avoid the implications to the military profession. To offer only one concrete example, the blurred line between war and peace questions established norms of civil-military relations and the boundaries of acceptable military action. Even policymakers should be cautious. Equaling political competition with war risks expanding the military sphere and militarizing not only foreign policy, but potentially whole societies.

\(^{44}\) Kennan, "Organized Political Warfare," 2, 6.
\(^{46}\) Hoffman, "On Not-So-New Warfare."
Conclusion

The purpose of Gerasimov’s well-known 2013 presentation was to prod Russian military experts to think harder. Early on, Gerasimov reasoned the new context where war is waged leads to logical questions: “What is modern war? What should the army be prepared for? How should it be armed? Answering these questions will determine the construction and development of the armed forces over the long term. To do this, it is essential for military planners to have a clear understanding of the forms and methods of the application of force.”47

It is uncertain whether Gerasimov’s plea led to substantial action among Russian scientists or military professionals. One wonders whether we too need a Gerasimov, someone who recognizes that war and warfare have changed and who is capable of instigating research about these and related questions. This article’s conclusions, which deserve to be addressed in future debates, can be summarized as five points: poor definition of concepts, fixation on Russia, evolved concepts of hybrid war toward gray zone conflict and political warfare, insufficiency of narrow military strategy in this kind of war, and the question of how the military profession can best contribute to waging it.

While hybrid war has entered academic, policy, and public debates, it still frequently does so in the guise of a poorly defined neologism. In its evolved form, hybrid war is a buzzword that can mean almost anything. The situation is only slightly better with gray zone conflict. Like political warfare, both these concepts are equal to grand strategy in their breadth. While this kind of conceptual vagueness can explain in part the popularity of these concepts in policy circles, ambiguity hinders a better understanding of contemporary war and warfare, and ultimately a better policy. This ambiguity appears unfortunate and above all unnecessary.

Most discussions of hybrid war continue to revolve around Russia, equating the concept with its actions and saying little about the world at large. If hybrid war is something only waged by Russia, then it logically does not describe a more general type of war. This equation of hybrid war with Russia has also contributed to a lack of urgency regarding learning to wage this kind of war; if only Russia wages hybrid war, then we only need to defend ourselves. Our limited success in combining means of different kinds raises two questions. First, how has Russia succeeded in mastering this kind of war? Second, do our previous failures not suggest there is still much to learn? In any case, forfeiting active strategy risks leaves us as passive defenders of the status quo, not creators of a new

one. To make matters worse, it is far from certain whether passive strategy can safeguard our interests.

The hybrid war concept evolved after Hoffman presented it in 2007. As his later comments demonstrate, his concept focused on the operational level and gave primacy to military means—use of force—in a context that was clearly a war. The means are less obvious with the evolved concept that comes closer to Gerasimov’s notion of a gray zone conflict where nonmilitary means dominate below the threshold of war. Ultimately, one wonders whether this conceptual evolution is just rechristened political warfare, a term coined by Kennan immediately after World War II. Much content in the hybrid war discussions that concern Russia resembles Cold War debates, and hence risk reinventing the wheel.48

Regardless of what one calls this kind of war, hybrid war envisages that military means have lost their primacy in producing political ends. On one hand, relying on force has become more expensive and hence difficult. On the other hand, the aims sought in war may not be best delivered through death and destruction or the threat of it.49 From the strategic theory perspective, this development must be understood to emphasize grand strategy that applies all available means at the cost of narrow military strategy that focuses on mere violence. The use of similar kinds of strategy that sought to tie together various military and nonmilitary means in Afghanistan suggests inherent challenges. What most practitioners can agree on, however, is that military means alone will not suffice when faced with fundamentally political problems.

This discussion suggests it is necessary to go further than Gerasimov and the Russian military, which appears to have shifted little from its core focus on conventional warfighting.50 If one accepts the premise that contemporary conflicts witness a disproportionate use of nonmilitary means against traditional military ones, does it not logically follow that policymakers and military professionals must address this development?

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48. For example, see Gregory F. Treverton, Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World (New York: Basic Books, 1987).
49. Smith, Utility of Force.
In 2014, then Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond T. Odierno convened a strategic studies group to research a new reality facing the US Army. In the foreword of the group’s report, Megacities and the United States Army, Odierno wrote: “Our Army has [had] experience throughout its history of operating in urban environments, from Aachen to Seoul to Baghdad. We have not, however, operated in urban areas with populations of over 10 million people—the megacity” (Army, 2014, 2).

Written by scholars and practitioners currently in the field or retired from the military, this book:

[P]rovides a foundation for understanding urban operations and sustaining urban warfare research. This Small Wars Journal (SWJ) Anthology documents over a decade of writings on urban conflict. In addition to essays originally published at SWJ it adds new content including an introduction by the editors, a preface on “Blood and Concrete” by David Kilcullen, a foreword “Urban Warfare Studies” by John Spencer, a postscript “Cities in the Crossfire: The Rise of Urban Violence” by Margarita Konaev, and an afterword “Urban Operations: Meeting Challenges, Seizing Opportunities, Improving the Approach” by Russell W. Glenn. These essays frame the discussion found in the collection’s 49 chapters” (Small Wars Journal, January 14, 2019).

Together the chapters shed light on an important issue, conflict in densely populated urban centers of the twenty-first century. Collectively, this anthology also addresses an array of issues faced when “fighting in built-up areas (FIBUA) or policing urban communities” (1). As the editors point out, “urban conflict is dominated by blood in terms of casualties and concrete in terms of the built environment,” which is where conflicts of the future will take place (li).
While some military leaders still romanticize conflicts taking place in remote jungles around the world, the reality of future military conflict is quite different. Future conflicts, or so-called mega-urban operations, will most likely occur in a megacity. A megacity is any large urban center, common in the twenty-first century, with a total population of 10 million people or more.

Megacities are predominantly present in developing or emerging market economies. Dhaka, Bangladesh, and Rio de Janeiro or São Paulo, Brazil, are examples of megacities. Those major urban centers are often loosely integrated, and many parts of its sovereign territory may be ungoverned areas controlled by transnational organized crime, criminal factions, or cartels.

An ungoverned area is defined as “a sector where the government has lost control and capacity to manage the population. Security is challenged by non-state actors such as terrorists, insurgents, criminals, and extremist organizations” (177). The provision of basic services, such as drinkable water or electricity, are usually controlled by a militia that preys on the poor and marginalized members of society. In many parts of the world’s megacities, criminal elements are better armed than the armed forces of the state.

Whether we ignore it or take the “out of sight, out of mind” approach, urban warfare will occur as societies continue to urbanize and industrialize, and the US Army will have no option but to fight in such locations in the future. As David Kilcullen notes, urban operations are here to stay. Not only have the vast majority of major battles and campaigns taken place in urban terrain, but the largest battles of any kind since World War II took place in cities (xxxvii).

There are several characteristics of megacities that make them a suitable environment for conflict in the future. For example, most megacities have the following attributes: potential for massive poverty and social unrest; potential for environmental concerns; potential for ungoverned spaces; quick mobilization of the population by social media during times of social unrest; and demographic indications of higher birth rates, city migration, and young unemployed masses (174–75). Furthermore, due to urbanization (tendency for migrations to larger cities in the developing or emerging economies), littoralization (the propensity for people to cluster on coastal cities), and connectedness (the increasing connectivity among people, wherever they live), megacities will be the new “bazaar of violence” in the future (35, 176).

An important lesson members of the armed forces, but especially the US Army, will learn after reading this anthology is that in many instances, government response to the challenges in megacities may exacerbate the problem. As John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus pointed out in their essay “Postcard from Mumbai: Modern Urban Siege,” “Government responses to
urban terrorism, however well intentioned, have exacerbated the problem through the usage of urban military special operations and the construction of militarized space" (38).

In many instances, the community, rather than partnering with the authorities to identify community criminals and drug dealers, resents the police for how they treat members of the shantytowns. Rather than becoming an asset in warfighting against criminal elements in the megacities, the citizens become abettors. For the police forces operating within those megacities’ shanties, “there is little distinction made between residents of the favela [shantytown] and drug traffickers” (39).

Another important lesson provided by the contributors is the notion of megacities as a “bazaar of violence.” According to this idea, urban insurgents will attempt to destabilize governments through strategies of sheer violence indiscriminately applied to government officials and civilian populations. Those heinous acts of violence aim to demonstrate to the population that the authorities cannot help them and that they are helpless against the power of the gun (36).

The megacities of the twenty-first century also bear a resemblance to Richard J. Norton’s idea of the “feral city.” According to Norton’s seminal essay “Feral Cities,” a feral city is “a metropolis . . . of more than a million people in a state the government of which has lost the ability to maintain the rule of law within the city’s boundaries yet remains a functioning actor in the greater international system” (Naval War College Review, 2003, 98). In the megacities or feral cities of the developing world, militants can easily blend into the local civilian population and use the city’s complex and dense terrain for cover and concealment (648). Furthermore, the unwillingness, or perhaps the inability of governments in megacities or feral cities, to address issues such as urban poverty, youth unemployment, and social and economic marginalization allows criminal networks to gain ground, enabling the flow of illicit drugs, arms, and money into those already relatively deprived communities.

While some military leaders believe the US Army is designed for combat in open terrain, the reality of future combat will be quite different. As the aforementioned strategic studies group concluded, “the Army is currently unprepared” for conflicts in megacities. “Although the Army has a long history of urban fighting, it has never dealt with an environment so complex and beyond the scope of its resources” (21). As Margarita Konaev succinctly states, “as the world’s urban population continues to grow, the future of global security will be determined by what happens in the cities” (651).
The greatest Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu in *The Art of War*, argues that military strategists should avoid urban warfare unless necessary. In other words, attack cities only when there is no alternative. There is no alternative in future wars. Warfare has become an urban phenomenon. Conflicts, political violence, and war will most likely occur in urban megacities rather than rural areas (xli). I recommend *Blood and Concrete: 21st Century Conflict in Urban Centers and Megacities* to students and future leaders at the US Army.
Civil-military relations refers to the relationships between the military and the state it serves and protects. In democratic societies, this field of study involves all facets of this interaction including the relationships between elected officials and security institutions such as the armed forces, law enforcement agencies, and intelligence services. This profession essentially defines and employs the mechanisms of state control over the military to ensure the state’s interests are served. Generally, these relationships involve applying civilian control over the military. In democratic states, elected officials control the military. But hybrid and authoritarian states can—and often effectively do—exert civilian control over their armed forces.

The precarious nature of civil-military relations is currently of great interest as democratic norms involving the separation of civil and military affairs are increasingly challenged. In the United States, the Trump administration blurred the lines between professional ethics and norms by politicizing the military and eroding the professional barriers to political action by servicemembers. The erosion of the separation between military and political spheres is also evident in the rise of authoritarian regimes outside the United States. These contemporary challenges make this edited collection an important guidepost in the discussion of achieving a balance between civil and military power.

The editors, Thomas C. Bruneau, a distinguished professor emeritus in national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School and Aurel Croissant, a professor of political science at the Institute of Political Science at Heidelberg University, built this volume on the foundation of a workshop on comparative civil-military relations centered on the nexus of control and effectiveness. Indeed, that nexus is the key to understanding the relationship between the civilian political sphere and the sphere of military operations. That relationship, as described in a continuous implicit thread throughout the book, is one of maintaining balance between civilian and military interests, politics and operations, and control and effectiveness.
Achieving and understanding the factors influencing the balance between civilian control and military effectiveness is the collection’s overarching theme. In the book’s first chapter, “Civil-Military Relations: Why Control Is Not Enough,” the editors chart the course for their exploration of civil-military relations through a series of case studies. This introduction provides a useful survey of the literature and introduces the case studies and the rationale for their selection while identifying common themes and limitations in understanding the scope of civil-military relations. Conventional warfighting is only one of those missions—and a relatively rare one as interstate war is relatively rare in the post–World War II setting.

Counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, humanitarian disaster relief, peacekeeping operations, and supporting the police in fighting crime are increasingly common. These endeavors, collectively known as military operations other than war, challenge the traditional boundaries of the civil-military nexus. Chapter 1 introduces three attributes of military effectiveness that help address this range of activity: defense planning, structures, and resources.

The next two chapters, which are highly technical, address theory and methodological considerations in researching civil-military relations. This rigorous foundation for understanding the scope and applicability of the case studies in this survey also inform future research design. Regime, coup, and military effectiveness datasets are discussed in both qualitative and quantitative dimensions.

The remainder of the book is divided into three substantive sections on civil-military relations with regard to “Establishing Democracies,” “Emerging Democracies,” and “Hybrid and Authoritarian Regimes.” This information is followed by the editors’ summary of the various facets of the civil-military nexus.

Part 1 contains a survey of the established democracies of America, Japan, and Germany, providing a familiar, yet evolving landscape that recaps the historical influences of political scientist Samuel P. Huntington and the relationship between America’s Congress, president, secretary of defense, and military services. The tensions inherent in these relationships and the balance between civilian control and military effectiveness are then examined in Japan and Germany. These two nations have respectively sought to ensure civilian control to limit militarism and have based their military framework on participation in coalition operations and avoidance of interstate war.

Part 2 looks at the emerging democracies of Chile, Tunisia, and Indonesia where military operations other than war are predominate. Each of these states imposed civilian control in the aftermath of strongman regimes. Tunisia and Indonesia are now facing significant criminal or criminal-terrorist challenges.
Part 3 examines the hybrid and authoritarian regimes of Russia, Turkey, Egypt, and China. These case studies are perhaps the most interesting and pressing in the current threat environment. In Russia, the military plays a key role in domestic politics by exerting internal soft power in support of a regime ruled by a strong leader. Information operations are thus a major component of maintaining the civil-military balance and projecting hard power in external relations.

In Turkey, strengthening civilian control allowed Recep Tayyip Erdogan to suppress opposition and consolidate personal power. In Egypt, military rules and a lack of civilian control results in diminished military effectiveness, as seen in that state’s inability to win interstate wars or contain terrorism. The chapter implicitly suggests corruption is a key civilian influence over military affairs. China is the final case examined, and here readers see the Chinese Communist Party is at the core of the civil-military balance. The military owes fealty to the party, and in return, the party gives the military significant control over the party’s operations.

This collection provides a solid political science exploration of civil-military relations in a range of states. Senior military leaders, professors and students at war colleges and of civil-military relations, and scholars of the states examined in the case studies will benefit from reading this fine work of scholarship.
This new effort by Max Manwaring compliments his earlier trilogy of books that ended in 2012 with *The Complexity of Modern Irregular Warfare* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012). A recognized subject matter expert in insurgency, the gray zone, political warfare, and crime wars and how they are influencing the twenty-first-century national security environment, Manwaring belongs to an older generation of warrior-scholars who are now fading into collective memory. His past writings, especially those related to politicized gangs and Venezuela under Hugo Chávez, proved quite insightful regarding new and emerging patterns of war and conflict.

*Confronting the Evolving Global Security Landscape* conveys the accumulated wisdom Manwaring has amassed over many decades of soldiering and study. The foreword by Joseph M. Humire, executive director of the Center for a Secure Free Society, discusses his past association with Manwaring and the need to change our thinking about how to approach modern warfare given its increasingly changing nature. The preface acknowledgments and prologue then provide background context, which is meant to transmit “hard-learned, but too often ignored, lessons from the past and present” (xvi).

The ninth and final chapter recaps the case study lessons for decision makers and other interested parties.

The afterword by Alan D. Manwaring—the author’s son who has supported his father for two decades and advocated for getting the national security policy recommendations of his father (and his father’s associates) out to wider audiences beyond policy makers—represents a tribute to his father, this book (quite possibly his last work), and his prior major works. The notes and index sections are well appointed although it is evident Manwaring relied on his decades of expertise to provide the bulk of the creative insights and lessons learned rather than drawing upon the constructs and theories of others.

The case studies and Manwaring’s interpretative analysis of them are the heart of the book. For comparative purposes, each case study includes an introduction, the key issue and context, the findings and response, an outcome, implications and conclusions, and key points and lessons. The case studies build upon one another, and Manwaring uses their qualitative dataset to extract selectively the gestalt of the key points and lessons accumulated through this analytical process. The reviewer sees the artistry and mastery of the process; however, “accumulated wisdom” when transmitted is subjective and nuanced with some faith placed in the expertise of the source. Readers will either accept Manwaring’s past record with the SWORD model and his linear-analytic case study approach or discount his record from the get-go for lack of quantitative scientific rigor (6–7).

The other more-pronounced drawback to this insightful work is the steep price of both the hardcover and e-book editions. This criticism is principally directed at the publisher rather than the author as the cost will severely curtail the book’s distribution. It is hoped a more-affordable softcover edition will be produced in the future. Until then, Confronting the Evolving Global Security Landscape will remain principally within the purview of university and think-tank libraries and, to a lesser extent, the private collections of national security specialists and military officers. In summation, Manwaring is an “old dog” of sorts but, to his credit, he still has the capacity to teach readers a new trick or two about twenty-first-century insurgency, political warfare, and crime wars.
Professionals study logistics, especially the impact of logistics upon both strategy and tactics, to determine the connection between victory and loss. That is precisely what US Air Force Colonel Jobie Turner offers readers in *Feeding Victory*. He sheds much-needed light on battlefield successes being highly dependent upon the transportation capabilities of its supply chains. During the past three centuries, technology has evolved from the preindustrial era of horse-drawn wagons through the industrial era of locomotive iron horses to the modern digital era of unmanned aerial systems, requiring innovative methods along the way to supply military operations successfully.

The book is divided into an acknowledgments section, an introduction, five chapters, a conclusion, an appendix, notes, a bibliography, and an index. Each chapter contains a well-documented historical case study that examines a technological era represented by its motive power and dominant materials. Turner aptly provides readers with a solid understanding of how changes in technologies, skills, processes, and organizations impact logistical support planning.

During the French and Indian War (1754–63), the British fought the French at Lake George. The larger British force should have quickly overwhelmed the French, but control of the lake vacillated between both sides for years. The French used well-fortified waterways for resupply, while the British moved supplies overland using valuable resources and time-consuming construction processes to produce animal-powered wagons and roads for their main supply routes, which were most frequently attacked and required more resources for fortification. Although the British won the battles, they financed their logistics through increased levies and economic restrictions upon the colonists, which later contributed to their loss of the colonies a few years later.

In a contest of sea versus rail power in 1917, Britain and Germany fought battles as they leveraged new transportation technologies in which iron, coal, and steam replaced wood, wind, and sail. With the world’s biggest navy, Britain
preferred sea movement while Germany favored rail transportation to move supplies overland nearly 50 times faster than horse-drawn wagons. Unfortunately, British dominance of their sea lines of communications ended once they hit the ground, relying heavily upon horses to move forces the “last tactical mile.” With more concern for tracking soldiers and munitions and their one-way logistics system, the British neglected to track port operations, rail usage, and traffic flows. Turner acknowledges this flawed system further inhibited Britain’s ability to handle crowded conditions, to communicate information, and to manage supply flow to the proper locations at the right time. By the end of 1917, however, Britain began employing combined arms—ground and air power—in their operations, while Germany effectively used the rail lines to counter British successes.

Several years later with supplies being transported faster globally, the new technologies of aluminum, oil, and radios replaced iron, coal, and steam, while mobile firepower from aircraft and ships replaced the impact of artillery. As such, aircraft speed, range, and firepower swiftly became necessary for both the United States and Japan as they fought battles for the control of Guadalcanal from 1942–43, with each possessing similar transportation systems and weapons. Logistics, or the lack thereof, affected ground combat power with soldiers on both sides suffering illnesses, hunger, and dehydration. Turner suggests the United States used its valuable resources to project power on the island, doing whatever was necessary to supply its forces. On the other hand, Japan projected its massive power to obtain resources, leaving its forces to survive on their own. This contrast became evident when the rapid influx of Japanese soldiers on the island to overwhelm American forces instead resulted in the decimation of Japanese food supplies. The starving Japanese soldiers, marching through the dense humid jungle, quickly sapped their combat power and remaining supplies, eliminating their ability to conduct effective offensive operations. Favoring its combat power over supplies and choosing speed over capacity, Japan lost the logistics battle and ultimately lost final control of the island.

At the same time, while fighting the Soviet Union during the Battle of Stalingrad, Germany de-modernized its logistics, moving from engine-powered vehicles that either broke down or lacked fuel to animal-powered transportation. This degradation happened because the Germans outran their ground supply lines that stretched hundreds of miles through mud and snow. The Soviets, however, were unable to capitalize upon this weakness—even with more tanks, artillery, and aircraft—because they lacked integration of their logistical efforts to support effective military operations. Germany also controlled the land supply routes by control of the air, done at great expense to logistical sustainment that often resulted in halted attacks when they ran out of fuel. Without effective logistics, Germany’s overwhelming combat power disappeared, and military missions failed.
As part of the 1968 Tet Offensive, the North Vietnamese besieged American soldiers during the Battle of Khe Sanh in South Vietnam. The US use of computers, pressure sensors, improved radar sensors, and satellite communications enhanced logistics and made it harder for the Vietnamese to conceal the location of their combustion engines. The United States successfully used these new technologies to control its supply lines, which allowed the transport of supplies anywhere in the world in just days. Even with overwhelming firepower and control of its supply lines, the United States was unable to destroy resupply efforts of North Vietnamese guerrilla forces. Since the guerillas relied upon arms and munitions, not food or fuel, supplies flowed mainly via human- or animal-powered transportation, such as bicycles and elephants, making it difficult for the United States to stop the flow completely. Ultimately, North Vietnam did not need to win the battles; it just needed to move enough supplies to convince the United States of its enduring strength.

Turner admirably illustrates the effects of technology upon logistics and its abilities to support military missions. Centuries ago, military leaders understood the need to command the sea. Today, command of the air and information domain is equally important to military success. Senior military leaders will appreciate Turner’s research, and his lessons will enhance their ability to address logistical considerations when developing future strategic plans.
Killing for the Republic: Citizen-Soldiers and the Roman Way of War

By Steele Brand

Reviewed by Dr. John A. Bonin, consultant, US Army War College

This timely book answers the question of how Rome—originally a small hill village—became the master of the Mediterranean world by 146 BC through the employment of part-time citizen-soldiers. Using classical Roman primary sources such as the works of Livy, Polybius, and Cicero, he argues that Roman republican values and institutions better prepared common men for the rigors and horrors of war than any other ancient civilization. Brand, an assistant professor of history at The King’s College in New York City, served from 2009 to 2013 as a US Army tactical intelligence officer who deployed to Afghanistan.

The book includes a preface, a prologue, four parts (one thematic and the others chronological), and an epilogue. The preface and the prologue argue why the Roman Republic and its citizen-soldiers are significant to modern America. The first part describes the relationship between ancient Rome’s citizens and their republic. Part 2 provides a history of Rome’s original royal and early republic armies, while the third part continues with the success of the Roman middle republic as their citizen-armies defeated the major powers around the Mediterranean. Lastly, Part 4 covers the late Roman Republic from Marius to its replacement with an empire by Augustus. The epilogue questions if the resulting professional imperial Roman army is a better model than one with more participation by citizen-soldiers.

Brand analyzes five specific battles that best represent Rome’s constitutional, military, and cultural evolution. During this evolution, Rome’s citizen-soldiers, both the elites serving as cavalry and the middling Roman landowners serving as infantry, confronted some of the toughest warriors of the day—from barbaric Gauls at Sentinum in 295 BC to Carthaginian mercenaries at Cartagena in 209 BC to professional Macedonian successors to Alexander at Pydna in 168 BC. In every battle, the numbers, morale, and competence of Roman citizen-soldiers proved decisive. But finally, Rome’s citizen-soldiers faced their most dangerous foe, other Roman citizen-soldiers during brutal civil wars—especially the battles of Mutina in 43 BC and Philippi in 42 BC.
Brand does not just review military history. He also explores Rome's cultural and political history and investigates Rome's constitutional basis as a republic and how it obtained maximum military participation and effort from all classes so they achieved socially acclaimed virtue through service. While Brand's research and analysis is extensive, I believe his thesis has several flaws.

First, and most significant, the Roman Republic had already become a de facto empire with its successive defeats from 202 to 168 BC of every other major power in the Mediterranean—Carthage, Macedonia (twice), and the Seleucid Empire. The wealth derived from the empire and the demands of maintaining large deployments of Roman citizen-soldiers in Spain, North Africa, and Asia Minor changed the empire's social structure by the late Roman Republic. The elites, who avoided these deployments, now sought wealth accumulation and ruined the small Roman landowners whose plots were then seized and operated by aristocratic landowners using the flood of slave labor provided by these conquests.

Second, Brand overly focuses on the later stages of the late Roman Republic. Many of the problems with the erosion of the Republic and the decreasing role of true citizen-soldiers happened years before as described in The Storm before the Storm: The Beginning of the End of the Roman Republic by Mike Duncan (PublicAffairs, October 2017). The Roman Army and its civic militarism had already been significantly challenged—especially by the 105 BC invasion of the Cimbri and Teutons—with the resulting military reforms credited to Marius. These reforms reduced property qualifications for military service, eliminated elite citizens as cavalry, began providing state equipment for common soldiers, and increased soldier dependence on their generals for loot and retirement benefits. In violation of the Republican constitution, Marius was elected consul numerous times and later engaged in the first of several brutal civil wars with his rival and successor, Sulla.

Third, the first triumvirate of Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus that ruled Rome circa 60 BC, and the subsequent civil war between Caesar and Pompey with their personal armies from 49 to 45 BC, marked the end of the previous constitution. Brand appears to believe the Roman Republic and its citizen-soldiers could still be saved as late as the battle of Philippi in 42 BC between Caesar’s heir, Octavian, and Mark Anthony and Caesar’s assassins, Brutus and Cassius. By this time, the Roman Republic and its mass part-time citizen-armies appeared to have been irreparably destroyed. Of course, historically Octavian became Augustus and created the actual Roman Empire and its professional army that maintained Pax Romana for centuries to come. This historic parallel with the contemporary United States Republic policing Pax Americana with a professional army and its impact appears to be one of Brand’s primary concerns.

Despite my criticisms, Killing for the Republic: Citizen-Soldiers and the Roman Way of War is a valuable resource for serious students of Roman history, civil-military relations, and the future of the American political experiment.
In his introduction, Frederick Taylor identifies an alternate title for his book was “The War Nobody Wanted” (1). He asserts that, unlike 1914, “there was no mass outbreak of enthusiasm for war” in 1939 (1). Instead, “the propaganda campaign undertaken by the Nazi regime . . . provides a near-perfect example of how, when a government exercises total control of information, an entire nation can be bent to its will” (2). Taylor then tells the familiar story of events leading up to the war, beginning with British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s pronouncement of “peace for our time” and concluding with the opening days of the Nazi invasion of Poland.

Instead of extensive research into historical documents, Taylor bases his narrative on newspapers, diaries, secondary sources, and interviews with British and German citizens who lived through the experience. He notes there were “a host of diaries, newspapers, and memoirs” providing insights into “the everyday lives, fears, hopes, and prejudices of the British population during the year covered by the book” (3). The British Imperial War Museum supported Taylor’s research with audio interview recordings, and German archives and daily newspapers provided individual perspectives on the increasing control of the Nazi party apparatus over the news media. Through this approach, Taylor captures what individuals were doing and thinking as the war approached, but did not necessarily dominate their attention. The result is an interesting—if somewhat episodic—examination of everyday life in Britain and Germany as both nations approached the abyss.

Although often engaging, the book fails to make a case for Taylor’s premise that this was a war nobody wanted. Much to the contrary, he mounts a convincing argument that the leaders of Nazi Germany waged a masterful campaign of propaganda and misinformation to generate public support and enthusiasm for the regime’s military adventures. Readers have only to watch footage of the rallies at Nuremberg to understand the effectiveness of those efforts. If anything, Taylor at times seems to be trying to exonerate the general population, blaming the racism and anti-Semitic hysteria exclusively on Nazi manipulation. Not overtly, but the undercurrent is there.
On the other side, readers see the reluctance of the British citizenry to return to the battlefield. Nonetheless, Taylor paints a vivid picture of their resilience and growing resignation to the reality of what is taking place on the continent. A more accurate assessment might conclude the war was one most of the German population came to embrace, while most of the British population recognized the war was one that had to be fought.

In today’s political climate, the book’s most relevant aspect is its depiction and analysis of the news media as a weapon of warfare. Anyone who casually employs the term fake news in irritation with today’s media would do well to read this story of what the term really means and the power it wields. While the Nazi mastery of information warfare is evident throughout the book, British efforts are equally effective if more subtle. As the German media marshaled and harnessed the outrage of its citizens to support the move toward war, so too did the British newspapers as they began to sway public opinion toward intervention—all without the benefit of the Internet, social media, or, for the most part, television.

While 1939: A People’s History of the Coming of World War II adds little new insight into an admittedly well-worked field, it is, however, a satisfying and entertaining account of the perceptions of everyday civilians to the gathering storm brought to life through interesting anecdotes and insights. Although Taylor occasionally digresses to current political affairs, he generally avoids the comparison. While his argument that nobody wanted war is unconvincing, his descriptions of efforts on both sides (particularly the Germans) to control the information released to the public and to shape popular opinion are disturbing—and at times uncomfortably familiar.
Special operations forces (SOF) have been at the forefront of global counterterrorism efforts and an integral part of America’s military approach since 2001. The military’s reliance on special operations has led to closer cooperation between SOF and conventional forces, while also resulting in a twofold increase in SOF over the past two decades (CSIS 2019). Despite greater operational familiarity and the increased regularity of irregular warfare in conventional military lexicon, much remains unknown about the Cold War history of SOF and how it shaped today’s special operators. This lack of information is unfortunate because current security professionals can learn much from previous irregular warfare experiences as the United States competes with Russia and China. *Special Forces Berlin: Clandestine Cold War Operations of the US Army’s Elite, 1956–1990* is a valuable unit history that reduces this gap.

James Stejskal, a former SOF and CIA officer, tells the story of the 39th Special Forces Detachment/Detachment A and its successor Physical Security Support Element-Berlin during their three-decade existence. Originally established in 1956 to provide small unit direct action and unconventional warfare capabilities during a Soviet invasion, Detachment A adopted a counterterrorism role in the 1970s as the threat of terrorism increased. In the early 1980s, Army officials closed Detachment A and replaced it with Physical Security Support Element-Berlin over fear the unit and its personnel were too well known to Warsaw Pact countries. Despite a name swap and a new cover story, the unit’s mission remained unchanged. Toward the end of the Cold War, the Army disbanded Physical Security Support Element-Berlin and assigned its members to other Special Forces units. The unit’s unconventional warfare and counterterrorism expertise, coupled with its clandestine collection capability, made it a valuable asset for the US Army, its German allies, and its partners beyond Berlin’s borders. Even though a Soviet invasion never occurred, the unit remained active during the Cold War and helped shape contemporary SOF.

The book’s eight chapters follow a chronological time line of the unit’s evolution from its founding in 1956 through its transition in 1984 to its closure in 1990. Although Stejskal focuses on Special Forces in Berlin, he also nicely nests the unit’s history within a larger historical context, allowing readers to appreciate how the environment shaped the unit and
how the unit and its members influenced others. For example, a discussion in the first chapter on the early years of SOF and its relationship with the CIA regarding unconventional warfare is particularly useful. The chapter also provides an excellent example of early Department of Defense/CIA relations. It describes bureaucratic struggles so readers can understand the roles and responsibilities of each in a dynamic and uncertain environment. These debates will resonate with practitioners trying to appreciate shifting roles and responsibilities within the current security environment.

Practitioners will also find the discussion on the evolving unit mission and the risks involved with shifting operational focus informative. Although a direct action counterterrorism capability in Europe was needed during the 1970s and 1980s, Stejskal points out how preparing for counterterrorism missions distracted the unit from “the more esoteric tradecraft required for the wartime [unconventional warfare] UW mission” (272). Contemporary security practitioners should appreciate this type of trade-off. Stejskal also shows how organizations created for one purpose often evolve in directions that were unforeseen at their establishment. Although practitioners might not discover solutions in the book, they should find solace in knowing that previous generations grappled with similar dilemmas.

Having served in the unit during the 1970s and 1980s, Stejskal has personal knowledge and access that most authors do not, and his storytelling approach results in interesting personal stories and detailed descriptions of unit members and their experiences. He brings the personalities to life and engages readers, making for a memorable and entertaining book. Stejskal’s descriptive telling of unit members’ involvement in preparation for the attempted Iran hostage rescue is one example. This story is fascinating and reveals the unique combined capabilities the unit provided the United States.

Overall, readers will benefit from Stejskal’s insights and experiences; however, there are times when his passion results in too much detail for general readers. For example, some readers may find the in-depth discussion of underwater operations and SCUBA gear in chapter 3 interesting, but it distracts from the more fascinating elements of the story. With that said, the book is largely free of minutiae, and the presence of such details highlights Stejskal’s passion and familiarity with the topic.

As Stejskal makes clear, this book was a labor of love. In addition to his reflections, he interviewed more than 50 former unit members and senior leaders. His intimate knowledge of special operations in Berlin, personal experiences, and passion shine through in his writing, resulting in an enjoyable and engaging book that places readers in the visual environment he creates. While Special Forces Berlin: Clandestine Cold War Operations of the US Army’s Elite, 1956–1990 is aimed at a more general audience, scholars will find value in accessing experiences and details previously locked in a classified vault or unit members’ heads.
Southern Gambit: Cornwallis and the British March to Yorktown

By Stanley D. M. Carpenter

Reviewed by Dr. Scott A. Smitson, professor of geostrategy, geoeconomics, and transnational affairs at Joint Special Operations University

In a monograph for the US Army War College Press, the late strategic theorist Colin S. Gray argued that despite changes in the character of war over time, the core logic of strategy remains timeless. During uncertain and increasingly complex times in the global security environment, a select numbers of scholars like Gray have routinely emphasized the utility of history to examine contemporary challenges for continuities in the human experience of designing, implementing, and executing strategy. In that tradition alone, Stanley D. M. Carpenter’s Southern Gambit: Cornwallis and the British March to Yorktown is a tour de force.

The book meets the highest standards set for historical scholarship—from the depth of Carpenter’s research, his demonstrated mastery of the topic, and his avoidance of the myopic to his balanced analysis of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war and his clear contributions to the study of the history of the American Revolution. Beyond these accomplishments, Carpenter’s most important achievement is brilliantly weaving the core components of strategic theory and practice in an underappreciated and understudied arena of the Revolutionary War: the British Southern Campaign of 1778–81.

Two years after the Declaration of Independence, the Revolutionary War was at a strategic stalemate, which drove the British to consider alternative approaches to regain the initiative and bring the war to a reasonable conclusion amenable to the desires of the Crown. Ending the war was imperative, as Carpenter illustrates, because the Revolutionary War was a subset of a broader global war between the British Empire and the French and Spanish Bourbon Empires. The British hoped by emphasizing the South as the main theater of consequence in the war, it could leverage Loyalist support in the agricultural-rich southern colonies, re-establish Crown control colony-by-colony northwards, defeat the Continental Army under the leadership of General George Washington, and bring about a negotiated settlement to the war on terms favorable to the Crown. Once Crown control had been re-established, British military assets could then be redeployed for the global war against France.
The strategic dilemma for the British, as put forth by Carpenter in the preface, was not alien to the type of conflict America increasingly finds itself in today: how does a distant great power prosecute an irregular war within the context of a regional struggle, all within a global competitive environment? As Carpenter explains, the war in the American colonies was largely an economy-of-force effort for the British, given the competing resource demands in other regions around the world in the war against France. This shortage of resources and manpower motivated the Southern Strategy, yet also contained within it the seeds of its own destruction: the assumption that the significant numbers of Loyalists within the populations of the southern colonies would be a key asset and resource and enable an ultimate British victory. As readers will learn, this assumption did not hold.

Carpenter's central aim is to highlight and understand why a strategy that seemed, in principle, a well-reasoned and logical approach, not only failed to translate to success for the British in the south, but also led to their overall defeat and eventual American independence. Carpenter expertly walks readers through the collapse of the Crown's approach through a British strategic perspective, to include the role of Lord Charles Cornwallis, the commander of all Crown forces in the southern colonies.

To structure his history and analysis of the Southern Strategy, Carter admirably takes the time and effort to introduce a framework of strategic concepts that he returns to time and time again. The introduction and inclusion of this framework in the initial chapter is elemental to the book's success, as it serves as the foundation for a broader narrative that is subtly present throughout the detailed chapters: while the character of war is always changing, its nature does not, and the core logic of strategy endures across time and space. By taking this approach, Carpenter elucidates issues of strategy and war that have applicability and utility beyond the Revolutionary War period, up to and including the current complex security environment in which the United States finds itself.

The violation of these enduring tenets of strategy led, in Carpenter's argument, to the ultimate undoing of British strategy—from a lack of strategic and operational coherence across the colonies, repeated breakdowns in unity of command and effort, the inability of strategic leaders to select and implement appropriate strategies, and most crucially a flawed theory of victory that rested on untenable assumptions that foundered in a kind of war the British could not understand.

While the British were adept at projecting power globally and achieving victory at sea and on land in conventional conflicts of the time, the Revolutionary War was not a classic conventional war, from Carpenter's perspective, but a hybrid war with conventional, irregular, and revolutionary elements. For Cornwallis, his
unwavering commitment to offensive, conventional war in a theater that was anything but would be his ultimate undoing, including his inability to defeat the Fabian approaches taken by Continental Army General Nathanael Greene and the irregular warfare tactics employed by the “Swamp Fox” Francis Marion.

The British strategic and operational leadership failed to understand the nature of the conflict in which they found themselves. Considering the significant experience of Cornwallis, before and after the Revolutionary War, this failure should be a cautionary tale to personnel in the profession of arms—past victories do not easily and automatically translate to present and emergent challenges. As the US military reorients its focus on great-power competition, while still committed to fighting irregular wars in distant lands, the implications of Carpenter’s argument in *Southern Gambit* are as timely as they are relevant, making this book a must read for scholars and practitioners of the strategic and operational arts.
In *Adopting Mission Command: Developing Leaders for a Superior Command Culture*, noted author and practitioner Donald Vandergriff offers a fascinating look into the change needed to transform the Army from an Industrial-Age behemoth to an Information-Age cheetah. The cultural philosophy of the German Army, often summarized under the concept of *Auftragstaktik* and translated as “mission command,” has received much focus in the past 30 years. Few authors have been more active researching, articulating, and implementing its core tenets in both theory and practice.


In the first few chapters, Vandergriff sets the foundation for the optimal learning environment for agile military leaders based on the concepts of mission command. The unchanging nature of war consists, in no small part, in its uncertainty and unknown, the “fog and friction” that make the simple difficult (chap. 9). Therefore, the *sine qua non* of military leadership is the ability to form and reform mental constructs constantly within that uncertainty and act upon them quicker than the adversary’s decision cycle’s ability to respond to the reality created by those decisive actions. Successful leaders create and clarify a shared mental model of utmost importance—the mission—while entrusting to their subordinates the creativity, innovation, and independence necessary for its execution within the dynamic environment that is war. Following the first chapter
featuring John Boyd’s theory on decision making, Vandergriff sees in the historic German military culture the ideal embodiment of the development of a profession of arms of excellence. The ultimacy of the leaders and their development—at every level—is not the technology, doctrine, or even the system, but the asymmetrical advantage necessary to win the future war.

Vandergriff is at his best when summarizing the essence of what Dr. Chet Richards called the “blitzkrieg culture” the key cultural concepts of “Einheit, Behändigkeit, Fingerspitzengefühl, Auftragstaktik, and Schwerpunkt” (chap. 11). Interestingly, concepts such as mental agility, reciprocal trust and loyalty, intuition, the development of tacit and collective knowledge, internalized ownership, and decentralized control are found in cutting-edge leader development theories in the civilian sector, Deliberately Developmental Learning Organization and High-Velocity Learning Organization to name a few. While education is essential for the acquisition of knowledge (knowing) and training for the increase of competence (doing), it is the focus on the transformative development of strength of character (being) through shared life together (experience) that characterizes the leader who can integrate knowledge, independence, and joy of taking responsibility inherent into leading well.

The barrier to a mission command culture is the Army’s antiquated personnel system, a holdover from Industrial-Age values and allegiances that facilitates compliance, careerism, and micromanagement rather than ownership, innovation, and trust. For Vandergriff, emphasizing the concepts of Auftragstaktik in the preparation of Army leaders would set the conditions necessary for the longer-term reforms needed in the personnel system and force structure of the institution. Implementing methodologies he and others pioneered, such as Outcome-Based Training and Education and the Adaptive Course Model, would enable a generation of young mission command–developed leaders to emerge and facilitate the evolution toward a flatter and more adaptive organization. These methodologies incorporate the latest advances in experiential learning and prioritize the development of agile, autonomous thinking leaders in changing and uncertain environments over mere adherence to task, condition, and standards, teaching how to think rather than what to think.

The heart of the book is a veritable “how-to” on developing the conditions for this superior command culture, based on the German model and Vandergriff’s years of experience and implementation. Leaders must be teaching leaders par excellence—which has two important implications. Only the best teaching leaders should be assigned to education and training commands, and a leader mindset leads by education, training, developing every day, and using daily tasks and contexts (experience) as the curriculum for intentional leader development. Sharing best practices for creating outcomes and measures, Vandergriff systematically lays out
chapters on tactical decision games, war gaming, free play force-on-force exercises, combat physical fitness, and evaluations to inculcate cognitive complexity, initiative, and confidence in subordinate leader development. The leader leads not only by demonstrating the commitment to a culture of professional excellence but by an intentional dedication—intrusive in the best sense of the word—to the personal growth and development of the team. A chapter on the implementation of Outcome-Based Training and Education and an Adaptive Course Model at the Army Reconnaissance Course showcases the promise and possibilities of implementing these methodologies throughout the Army.

Vandergriff concludes the book with the mission command success of Major General J. S. Wood and the 4th Armored Division in World War II as an example of what right looks like. Many salient components of mission command are personified in the character of Wood and his leaders. While strength of character and, specifically, moral courage seem to be key components of the mission command culture, this example is the closest Vandergriff comes to a clear definition of these foundational elements. Interestingly, Wood’s success in utilizing mission command is directly proportional to the German military leaders’ abandonment of their Auftragstaktik culture; most tellingly, their loss of moral courage. In the final analysis, perhaps, ultimacy must transcend mission—as lofty as the defense of the fatherland is—or it may fall victim to something less than human excellence.
D
avid W. Kearn Jr., in *Reassessing US Nuclear Strategy*, sheds light on the public debate about US nuclear weapons, with the goal of identifying “an optimal nuclear strategy” for the United States (Introduction). In this deeply researched volume, he collects the thoughts, analysis, and recommendations of key writers and scholars who have wrestled with nuclear strategy for nearly 60 years and divides their writings into “three ideal type (or representative) nuclear strategies,” derived from the schools of thought evident in the literature from both the Cold War era and more recent years (Introduction).

Kearn evaluates and compares the three approaches—nuclear primacy, robust nuclear deterrent, and minimum deterrent—and assesses whether the strategies and their associated force structures, declaratory policy, and employment guidance would strengthen or undermine US national security and nuclear deterrence objectives. He examines how the approaches will affect the US goals of extending nuclear deterrence to US allies and dissuading adversaries from challenging the United States—whether they will bolster or weaken US arms control and nuclear nonproliferation objectives and how they might affect the cost of nuclear weapons modernization programs.

Kearn presents each strategic approach “on its merits . . . using the best cases made by its advocates” (Introduction). Consequently, much of the book consists of passages that piece together concepts enunciated by “academic scholars and policy analysts,” with the goal of producing a synthesized framework for each ideal strategy (Introduction). While this approach demonstrates the depth and breadth of his research, it creates an awkward narrative that often undermines his analysis.
Many of the policy analysts cited are better characterized as policy advocates who promote their views when out of government, while waiting for the opportunity to join the government and implement their preferred strategies. When these policy analysts do serve in government, they sometimes change the rhetoric used to describe US nuclear strategy, but rarely have a lasting effect on its fundamental character or its implementation.

This rhetoric is not evident in Kearn’s book because he never describes the actual contours of US nuclear strategy. He focuses instead on public statements and academic debates—an odd omission, as a study seeking to evaluate possible changes in US nuclear strategy should, at the very least, offer enough information about the current approach for readers to understand what would change if the United States adopted any of the “ideal nuclear strategies” (Introduction). By focusing on the theoretical concepts favored by scholars and policy advocates, Kearn never addresses factors like domestic politics, technological limits, and budgetary restrictions that have affected US nuclear programs. For example, he assesses how each alternative strategy might affect the cost of nuclear modernization, but never acknowledges the reverse, that concerns throughout the nuclear age about costs have affected the size, structure, and planning for US nuclear weapons.

Kearn’s study is also weakened with inaccurate data and superficial analysis. He frequently provides incorrect dates for historical events—START II was signed in 1993, not 1992; the Clinton administration’s Nuclear Posture Review began in 1993, not 1992 (when Clinton was not yet president); and President Obama’s speech in Prague occurred in 2009, not 2008 (when he was not yet president). His descriptions of the current US nuclear force structure and the goals of the modernization programs often reflect the preferences of his research sources, not the goals enunciated by US national security officials. His summary of US arms control and nonproliferation objectives is simplistic and echoes the critiques of analysts who reject these goals. While these errors may be the result of poor editing or Kearn’s unquestioned acceptance of his sources’ preferences, the frequency of errors raises doubts about his understanding of the material.

Kearn limits the value of his analysis in two additional ways. First, he asks a question that answers itself and second, he does not address the actual question that animates most debates over US nuclear policy. On the first point, Kearn opens his analysis with a discussion of the assumptions guiding his effort. He begins with the “central assumption that nuclear weapons are and will remain important for the overall security of the United States” (Introduction). He also notes the United States “finds itself engaged in a renewed great power competition with Russia and China” and indicates his analysis will assume this security environment will persist into the future.
(Introduction). These assumptions essentially determine the outcome of the study.

If one assumes China and Russia will remain great power competitors, then a nuclear primacy strategy will fail. As Kearn notes, both nations have the means to respond to US efforts to achieve dominance, and the effort itself would likely generate an expensive and destabilizing arms race. The authors cited in the book who support this strategy generally recognize this problem. Those writing in the 1980s saw US nuclear superiority slip away as the Soviet Union expanded its offensive forces and hoped a US buildup of ballistic missile defenses would re-establish US primacy. The United States, however, lacked the technology—and funding—for expansive missile defenses, while US policy supporting their development likely encouraged the Soviet Union to further expand its offensive arsenal. Authors writing about this strategy in the 2000s assumed Russia and China could not compete with the United States, and, therefore, a US attempt to establish primacy over regional adversaries would also produce primacy over these two nations. They never argued the United States should seek primacy over a resurgent Russian and growing China.

If one assumes “nuclear weapons are and will remain important for the overall security of the United States” then a minimum deterrence strategy will fail (Introduction). Scholars and analysts who support this strategy would likely agree with Kearn’s assessment that the strategy would not achieve many of the goals identified in his analysis because it is not intended to do so. Their case for minimum deterrence rests on the argument the United States should reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons. To achieve this goal, the United States would need policies that mitigate the risks from great power competition without relying on larger arsenals and more aggressive targeting.

Finally, although Kearn’s extensive research led him to conclude a robust deterrent is the ideal approach for US nuclear strategy, the US national security establishment has relied on this approach for decades (Introduction). The United States has sought to maintain a robust deterrent since the 1960s, when it was evident the Soviet Union would challenge US nuclear superiority. The debate within the US national security community has almost always been about the numbers and types of weapons needed to maintain a robust deterrent, not about whether the United States should change its strategy. Thus, Reassessing US Nuclear Strategy shines light on a debate found mostly in academic literature and fails to address the areas of debate relevant to senior members of the US defense community.
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Submissions to the US Army War College Press must address strategic issues regarding US defense policy or the theory and practice of land warfare while exhibiting the highest standards of research and scholarship. Actionable strategic, policy, or instructional recommendations must be included. For more information, visit https://press.armywarcollege.edu.

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1. Monographs (accepted from USAWC faculty and staff only): 20,000 words (15,000-word main text, 5,000 words in the foreword and executive summary).
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Articles: 4 to 6 weeks.
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CJTF-OIR conducts mortar night fire training.

US soldiers from Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2nd Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, fire rounds from an M120 mortar system at Al Asad Air Base, Iraq, July 25, 2020. Mortar training enhances base defense operations and acts as a show of force.

US Army photo by Specialist Khalil Jenkins
VIRIN: 200725-A-AI587-0318Y
Photo ID: 6288440
https://www.dvidshub.net/image/6288440/cjtf-oir-conducts-mortar-night-fire-training

New Jersey National Guard secures area around Capitol.

New Jersey National Guard soldiers and airmen from 1st Battalion, 114th Infantry Regiment, 508th Military Police Company, 108th Wing, and 177th Fighter Wing arrive near the Capitol to set up security positions in Washington, DC, January 12, 2021. National Guard soldiers and airmen from several states have traveled to Washington to provide support to federal and district authorities leading up to the 59th presidential inauguration.

US Air National Guard photo by Master Sergeant Matt Hecht
VIRIN: 210112-Z-NI803-1662
Photo ID: 6479779
https://www.dvidshub.net/image/6479779/new-jersey-national-guard-secures-area-around-capitol

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