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Rebooting Clausewitz: On War in the 21st Century

By Christopher Coker

Reviewed by Dale C. Eikmeier, Assistant Professor, US Army Command and Staff College

Carl von Clausewitz’s On War may look more impressive on our bookshelves, but Christopher Coker’s Rebooting Clausewitz ‘On War’ in the 21st Century will be more useful. Coker argues forcefully that Clausewitz is not only relevant in the twenty-first century but still the world’s greatest war theorist, and those interested in the study of war still need to understand his work. Coker believes that by “rebooting” Clausewitz, his greatness as a theorist can be better recognized and more fully understood. Just as modern physicists do not read Sir Isaac Newton but also still know and understand his laws and principles, military professionals and civilian members of the defense community, need not wade through On War but must also understand Clausewitz’s theory of war.

To be clear, Coker is not advocating ignoring On War. He believes On War is the most complete text on the phenomenon of war. And despite the criticisms of Basil Liddell Hart, Martin van Creveld, John Keegan, and others, Coker argues Clausewitz is still unsurpassed. Admittedly On War is a “dense philosophical forest that few of us have the ability or inclination to navigate alone” (prologue). Herein lies the contribution of Coker’s work. Military professionals, and war theory instructors, now have a guide and do not need to navigate the Clausewitzian forest.

Coker’s work brings Clausewitz to life for a student audience. And let’s face it, when it comes to understanding Clausewitz, we are all students. Coker departs from the traditional scholarly approach to Clausewitz and uses a series of fictional seminar discussions between Clausewitz and modern audiences. This is where he takes risks, but it is also the strength of his book. The idea is to reach military and security professionals that run from anything Clausewitz. The result is a well-researched, well-sourced, highly informative, yet entertaining analysis and explanation of Clausewitz’s theories applied to the contemporary environment.

The first fictional seminar is with cadets at the US Military Academy. The venue is deliberate. Coker and his fictional, albeit accurately sourced, Clausewitz admit that On War was for senior military members and policymakers, and thus too advanced for cadets with little contextual experience to appreciate it. However, Coker believes the foundation for understanding Clausewitz’s theories needs to be set early, hence the cadet forum. The West Point discussion lays out the basics required for understanding On War. The discussion covers what is theory, the why and how of theory, and finally, what theory achieved. The cadets’ questions place Clausewitz’s theories in the current era with Clausewitz attempting to answer and reconcile his nineteenth-century experience with the twenty-first century. With the instructor as moderator, and linking the cadets’ modern worldview with Clausewitz’s explanations, he
addresses many modern criticisms. The seminar-formatted discussion demonstrates the continued relevance of Clausewitz in the modern era.

The next seminar, takes place in a fictional Washington, DC, think tank in the context of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. Participants include Clausewitz, a journalist, a national security scholar and author, and a retired Marine Corps general. This panel represents many of the current critiques against Clausewitz and modern war. Topics include strategy, political purpose and its role in strategic planning, intelligence, the fog of war, and of course, the center of gravity. Even modern concepts such as the revolution in military affairs and “shock and awe” make cameo appearances. Many readers will find this section the most relevant as it explores the enduring qualities of Clausewitz’s nineteenth-century theories against twenty-first century realities.

The final seminar, at the Military History Circle in London, focuses on the value of military history. According to Coker, Clausewitz used history to backup ideas with illustrative examples, ground theory in experience, illustrate a theory’s possible truth, and prove a theoretical proposition. The discussion, more accurately described as an interrogation of Clausewitz, covers diverse subjects such as Newtonian and quantum physics, causality, mathematical predictions, the role of technology, and moral content. In these discussions, Clausewitz rebuts, explains, corrects, or accepts the validity of the criticisms, and thus provides the reader a point-by-point analysis of many modern critiques of Clausewitz.

Coker departs from the fictional seminar format in the chapter “What if Clausewitz Had Read Darwin.” Here he adds balance by acknowledging Clausewitz’s shortcomings and failings. Coker claims Clausewitz’s theories may be illuminating, but not illuminating enough, because the objectives were too ambitious and at the same time too modest. To address these shortcomings, Coker “sticks his neck out” and “reboots” Clausewitz through the lens of Darwinism. This section is Coker’s most significant and original contribution to both war theory and the study of Clausewitz. Coker postulates that had Clausewitz read Darwin (which was published 36 years after Clausewitz’s death), he might have asked different questions on the nature of war. Coker applies Clausewitz to the Darwinian framework of origins, mechanisms, ontogeny, and functions, identifying where Clausewitz is silent and where he contributes to the body of knowledge.

Coker concludes with a chapter titled “If Not Clausewitz, Then Who?” The only other candidates, according to Coker, that address the theory are Sun Tzu and Thucydides. He describes Sun Tzu’s work as a list of aphorisms divorced from context while Thucydides was an historian, not a theorist, who raised questions without answering them. For these reasons, Clausewitz is the gold standard On War theory which, if not read, should at least be understood.

Coker’s fictional seminars and analysis give nineteenth-century theory twenty-first century legs. Thus Rebooting Clausewitz is not only a useful guide for both novice and experienced scholars but also an essential companion to On War. While On War may rest on the bookshelf, Rebooting will likely be on the desktop, dog-eared and tabbed.
Bottom line up front, you should read this book. That said, while I do recommend it, it is not without some serious issues.

The book is an attempt to construct a theory of tactics. The author justifies this ambitious goal on the basis that this has not been done to date. He simply states, “There has never been a true tactical theorist” (1). That might be correct, and possibly for a very good reason, but it would also be fair to state that many people have written very insightfully and usefully about tactics.

What is good, and possibly excellent, is that the author understands well enough, and advocates for, an understanding of tactics based in their utility to strategy and thus policy. He does so from the strategic theory primarily provided by Clausewitz. In that regard, and in my opinion, he cannot be faulted. This alone makes the work a notable and worthy addition to the library. Thus the basic argument of the book is that strategy can only be done as tactics, and tactics needs a body of theory as rigorous and useful as that which Clausewitz provided for strategy. He then goes on to provide a series of tenets, not principles, which should provide the basis of a theory of tactics. These tenets are grouped into JFC Fuller’s framework of moral, mental, and physical categories. Any British officer will know these categories have long formed the United Kingdom’s definition of combat power expressed as conceptual, physical, and moral. It is noteworthy that combat power is not tactics in the British framework.

This is where the problems begin because the author never explains how and why he made the choices he did, and he makes some extremely odd choices. For example, why Fuller? Fuller’s theoretical body of work is far from infallible, and its utility is much debated. This might be said to be a matter of opinion, but Fuller is far more widely criticized and his ideas are far less certain than some imagine. In the case of conceptual, moral, and physical, the physical presides over all else. Ask any logistician. Sadly, the book is devoid of any real discussion of logistics.

While the author cites Foch’s 1903 Principles of War there is no discussion of the core functions—surely one of the most widely used tactical frameworks Foch ever developed and discussed as a campaign planning tool linking strategy with tactics in one coherent form. Foch is also absent from the discussions on so-called mission command and attack by infiltration all of which were featured in this 1903 work.

While On Tactics champions the human element of war, Jim Storr’s Human Face of War is cited exactly once despite being directly relevant to almost everything the author has to say, especially when it comes to firepower, maneuver, shock, and surprise. Friedman may wish to assert there are no true tactical theorists, but Jim Storr is about as close as you can get, and his work also notably addresses and discusses items such as the core functions plus a great deal more relevant to tactics.
Robert Leonhard’s work *The Principles of War for the Information Age*, and his wider body of work, is far too summarily dismissed despite its wealth of relevance to what the author is trying to say and its provision of excellent conceptual frameworks that would have served this work well.

Hans Delbrück’s Clausewitz conjecture, which is critical to connecting strategy with tactics, is wrongly cited. He never mentions Clausewitz and is relegated to a section on counterinsurgency instead of being central to what Friedman says about strategy having to serve tactics. The author simply seems unaware of this fairly major point.

The main problem with this work is that the author is, either by accident or design, clearly intent on not being seen as standing on the shoulders of those who have tackled the subject before him even when they have skillfully and comprehensively presented many of the points he wishes to make.

This should not detract from the basic utility of the book, but tactics is not a little known subject. What creates “victory” is a vast field of literature. It is a practical skill presided over by considerable physical limitations, and there is a massive body of literature which covers it, some risibly poor but some excellent and useful.

As strategy can only be done as tactics (ends and means) the true results of tactics lie in their effect on policy. That said, there is no worthwhile discussion on rules of engagement whose sole purpose it is to align tactics with policy (means with ends), which is the very point the author wants to champion. Given their centrality to modern operations, this is another odd choice.

Despite all my criticism, very little—or nothing—in the book is actually incorrect or misleading. Most of the major problems are those of omission that would have served the writer’s wider cause.

*On Tactics* contains some excellent sections, and truly insightful observations, most of which will be obvious to most readers. *On Tactics* addresses a number of issues with precision and skill and says much that practitioners can agree with. If you are new to the subject, then you will be provided with a strong starting point that is unlikely to set you on the wrong path. *On Tactics* more than passes the mark for making soldiers curious about their profession and should be read by all those who are.

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**Clausewitz**  
By Bruno Colson

Reviewed by Vanya Eftimova Bellinger, Visiting Professor, US Army War College

At the very end of absorbing the new biography of Carl von Clausewitz, Bruno Colson cites the great French philosopher Rene Girard. For Girard, the Prussian military theorist’s seminal treatise *On War* allows the French to see their history and national hero Napoleon through different eyes (391). The same could be said for Colson’s book. While written in French and primarily intended for a Francophone audience, this biography enables a wider circle of readers to see Clausewitz not just as the Prussian officer and the German patriot, as he is often portrayed.
From the pages of Colson’s book, Clausewitz emerges as a man who wrote in German but whose mindset radically transcended his homeland’s physical and intellectual borders. He was edified by the great promises of the Enlightenment and often clashed with the world shaped by the French Revolution. Despite his deep personal resentments against Napoleonic France, he advocated moderation after its defeat, for he understood the political necessity of winning the peace. This ability to see the world and war in complex and global contexts, beyond a narrow national, militaristic, and momentary framework, transformed Clausewitz from a Prussian officer into one of the West’s most influential strategic thinkers.

Bruno Colson, a professor at the Universite de Namur (Belgium), is also the author of *Napoleon On War*, a comprehensive collection of texts and authenticated quotes by Napoleon on his vision of war, published in English in 2015. In it, Colson built upon the framework of Clausewitz’s seminal treatise to organize Napoleon’s ideas, and accordingly invited comparison between the two.

Scholars often study Clausewitz’s life solely as the blueprint for *On War*. Colson writes mostly about the man, and while discussing Clausewitz’s prolific oeuvre, he trusts readers to make connections and form conclusions. As a military historian, Colson is at his best when he describes the battles Clausewitz participated in and analyses his possible role and contributions. The chapter devoted to his time as a prisoner of war in France, “A *Bildungsreise* in the Enemy’s Country,” reveals many new details, as the French police kept the foreign officers under close surveillance and the records are still preserved. Napoleon personally read the reports and often left delightful comments about these, in his words, *officiers fanfarons* (braggarts), although regretfully he never mentioned Clausewitz by name (89).

In 1815, by Waterloo, while the Duke of Wellington’s Anglo-Dutch Army and the rest of the Prussian Army fought against Napoleon, the Prussian III Corps held Marshall Emmanuel de Grouchy by Wavre. The decision to retreat in the face of an enemy twice as strong would darken the image of Clausewitz, chief of staff of the III Corps, in the times of the buoyant German Empire and militaristic Third Reich. While devoid of glory, this was nevertheless the prudent course of action, for it preserved his men’s lives, especially since the main battle was already won. Hard choices like these, Colson argues, make Clausewitz appear modern and close to our understanding about what war is fought for (385).

Contrary to popular modern academic assertions, Colson disputes the notion that a sudden crisis occurred in Clausewitz’s thinking around 1827, causing him to rethink and rewrite his seminal theory. Famously in the note of July 10, 1827, published as a preface of *On War*, the military theorist asserted there were two types of war: one with the objective to overthrow the enemy and “render him politically helpless” and the other with limited objectives, such as forcing the enemy to the negotiating table. As stated in the note, Clausewitz envisioned a careful rewriting of his treatise in order to explore the two types throughout its pages.

For Colson, this groundbreaking idea pertained less to a sudden change of mind but was instead a product of a long and careful reconsideration (384). Clausewitz’s diverse experiences between 1793
and 1815, which Colson meticulously emphasizes on the biography’s pages, revealed the complexities of real war and how narrow, misguided, and counterproductive “the imagination of war as a series of victories and victory battles” was (385). Again, Clausewitz demonstrated he was an individual who was well ahead of his time and could, through a careful thought process, project both timeless and innovative concepts.

Colson’s Clausewitz deserves to find its English-language publisher and wider audience. It is a carefully researched and well written scholarly work. Yet thanks to its dynamic and accessible style and lively details, it reads like a gripping novel. To assist its readers, the French publisher Perrin also offers clever props such as a short chronicle of Clausewitz’s life, year by year, and an index of geographical locations with their nineteenth-century names and statehood, followed by the modern ones. An American edition would probably require some amendments to accommodate an audience less knowledgeable of European history.

### More On War

*By Martin van Creveld*

Reviewed by F. G. Hoffman, National Defense University

The Israeli historian Martin van Creveld established his reputation as a scholar decades ago. His early works, especially *Command in War* and *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*, became and remain mandatory requirements for any professional military library. These works combined solid history with clear, blunt, and enduring insights. More recently van Creveld has written on cultures of warfare and about the changing face of war. These books spoke more to contemporary context in Israel. But with *More On War* van Creveld returns to military theory and provides an occasionally provocative update to Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz.

In his introduction, the author asserts a number of shortfalls in the published writings of the two major strategic theorists from whom we extract the most meaning today:

- neither “has anything to say about the causes of war or the purposes for which it is fought” (3)
- both “tend to make war appear more rational and more subject to control than it is” (4)
- both “come close to ignoring the implements of war, (i.e. the field broadly known as military technology)” (5)

These statements will surely surprise students of war familiar with Clausewitz’s concepts about the pervasive presence of passion, enmity, fog, and friction at all levels of war. But it is true that Clausewitz chose not to pay attention to the role of technology in war. Clausewitz lived in an age where military technology was static and equally available to protagonists. Scholars, including Hew Strachan in *Clausewitz’s On War: A Biography*, argue the longevity of Clausewitz is precisely because he ignored the transitory changes of technology for the more critical role of politics, moral forces, and the human dimension.
Military strategists will find van Creveld’s strategy chapter to be particularly valuable. In this most original chapter of the book, and the least tied to the canon, van Creveld contrasts the polar tensions of any “strategy in action.” These include

• maintenance of aim versus flexibility;
• concentration versus dispersion;
• battle versus maneuver;
• breakthrough versus envelopment;
• advance versus retreat; and
• strength versus weakness.

In this chapter the real major choices available to commanders, like direct versus indirect, annihilation versus dislocation, or attrition versus exhaustion are not adequately addressed. Readers should see Antulio J. Echevarria’s *Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction* for these strategic options. This is an interesting approach to military strategy, ideal for use in classroom and Joint Professional Military Education settings; however, its connection to Sun Tzu and Clausewitz is limited.

*More On War* contains numerous creative chapters that seek to extend our understanding of theory in its contemporary context. Given the classical theoreticians were seemingly land-centric, van Creveld adds a chapter on war at sea. However, the chapter does not apply the key elements of policy, fog and friction, culminating points, or centers of gravity to naval warfare.

Other contributions include chapters that Sun Tzu would have been intensely interested in. These include a chapter on air, space, cyber war, as well as one on nuclear war. Air power has been the subject of intense development for many years, but few of its advocates find use in Clausewitz. Both Colonel John Boyd’s and John Warden’s writings were suffused with connections to Clausewitz. On War’s centers of gravity, friction, fog of war, and decision-making were central to Boyd’s understanding of war. Warden used the term “center of gravity” several dozen times in *Air Campaign*, and explicitly cited Clausewitz nine times. Neither embraced every element of the classics, but both found value in starting with them to make their own arguments about generating military effects. Several writers in the last decade have worked to apply the traditional theories to new domains like cyber—such as Craig Greathouse’s useful comments in “Cyber War and Strategic Thought: Do the Classic Theorists Still Matter?” in *Cyberspace and International Relations*. Likewise, Denmark’s Jeppe T. Jacobsen’s work *The Cyberwar Mirage and the Utility of Cyberattacks in War—How to Make Real Use of Clausewitz in the Age of Cyberspace*, has relevance. Van Creveld could have exploited those insights to underscore the utility of the canonical theories to these modern dimensions.

Another innovation was the author’s inclusion of a chapter on law. The security field has taken an interest in lawfare partially due to apparent Chinese exploitation of legal maneuvers as part of their “Three Warfares” concept. There is more work needed in this area, and readers seeking ideas should review the writings of the Heritage Foundation’s expert on China Dean Cheng.
In the conclusion, those opening misinterpretations of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu come full cycle. The author adopts a Hegelian technique and offers a synthesis more in keeping with the fundamental teachings:

- “A great many things have not changed, nor do they seem about to change. The challenge war presents and the demands it makes to those who wage it do not change either” (196–97).
- “The fundamental principles of strategy are dictated less by the tools it uses than by its own nature” (198).
- “War is a flexible and inventive beast. Like some mythical shape-shifter, it will adapt itself without giving up its essential nature” (199).

These conclusions are far more consistent with the perspectives, one from the East and one from the West, that frame our basic understanding of war. There is a reason that Clausewitz remains relevant today. Both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz can be accused of being both endlessly frustrating and consistently invaluable. After reading More On War, their continued utility will be self-evident. No one else has been able to grasp the essence of war so succinctly—even if seemingly convoluted at times. Sun Tzu may be even more valuable in an emerging era of great-power competition with an Asian rival, and the greater odds of surprise and deception today.

Their value is augmented, not replaced by van Creveld’s chapters on the various domains and dimensions of war that today’s practitioners must contend with. The author deserves credit for helping modern students of war apply classical thinking to contemporary times. Some readers might be concerned that van Creveld has committed heresy. However, as Colin Gray once quipped “On War is not ‘Holy Writ.’” It is simply the best distillation of historically based theory we have.

More On War is recommended for those with a bent for thinking and for specialists in the various domains like airpower or cyber that are still searching for their own Prussian sage.

**REGIONAL STUDIES**

**China’s Military Transformation**

By You Ji

Reviewed by Andrew Scobell, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation

One of the world’s leading experts on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has produced an important book. Readers should be clear at the outset: China’s Military Transformation is not a comprehensive or up-to-date assessment of the PLA under People’s Republic of China (PRC) President and Central Military Commission Chair Xi Jinping who has dominated Chinese politics since 2012. Moreover, this volume does not provide a thorough overview or analysis of the organizational reforms of China’s national defense establishment announced in late 2013 and underway in earnest since 2015. Those seeking an up-to-date assessment of China’s defense reforms must look elsewhere. This

So what is China’s Military Transformation about? The study is an illuminating and authoritative examination of some major facets of the PLA under the tenures of Xi Jinping’s two immediate predecessors—Jiang Zemin (1992–2002) and Hu Jintao (2002–12). This book is perhaps best described as the long delayed sequel to You’s earlier volume, The Armed Forces of China, published by IB Tauris in 1999. The book under review makes good use of in-country interviews and primary Chinese language sources to solidly address “a select spectrum of PLA reform” (22). You pens illuminating chapters on civil-military relations, the PLA’s role in national security policymaking, and developments in aerospace, maritime, and the paramilitary People’s Armed Police. There is also a particularly fascinating chapter on the evolution of military strategy since 1949. What is missing, however, is comparable coverage of the PLA’s strategic rocket force or ground forces.

Despite these omissions, a particular strength of the study is the rare combination of authoritative analyses of both the hard and soft power dimensions of the PLA. Most examinations of China’s military modernization focus almost exclusively on hardware—numbers and capabilities of new and anticipated weapon systems and platforms—while overlooking key softer elements such as strategy and civil-military relations. On the question of military allegiance to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), You makes the important but overlooked observation that “the PLA has little incentive or need to disobey the Party” because the military is a highly privileged organization that tends to be well resourced by the CCP (29).

A recurrent theme permeating this volume is that over the years the United States—both in its policies, military activities, and own defense transformations—has been an underappreciated impetus for change in China’s military. The PLA has undertaken three waves of modernization since 1949. The first wave, which occurred in the 1950s, was in response to the Korean conflict when PRC leaders realized the serious limitations of the World War I-era Chinese forces when confronting the World War II-era US military on the battlefield. The second wave of PLA modernization occurred in the 1980s when China emerged from its Maoist-era trance to an embarrassing performance in a short border war against Vietnam in 1979. This prompted the PLA undergo extensive reforms and downsizing with the US military as its prime exemplar.

The third wave of PLA reforms began in the 1990s prompted by the recognition that, despite considerable military reform over the previous decade, China’s armed forces remained far from the equal of the armed forces of any other great power. What was particularly shocking for top Chinese political and military leaders were the impressive high-tech displays of the US military prowess in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, and the 1998–99 air campaign against Kosovo, which included the accidental US bombing of the PRC embassy in Belgrade (125–35). (Many in China believe that this was an intentional act.)
Where the PLA’s aircraft carrier program is concerned, You focuses on the array of aspirational maritime operational requirements carriers are intended to meet, while omitting the fact that this program has also been driven by a deep desire to compete with and counter the impressive aircraft carriers of the US Navy (201–14). American carriers have signaled on multiple occasions US power projection capabilities and persistent presence in the western Pacific, including during the Taiwan Strait crisis noted above. The combined impact of these displays provided the impetus for the PLA to launch the shift from mechanized forces toward an Information Age defense establishment. Not surprisingly, the model for this effort was the US military.

You writes with considerable insight as well as from personal experience—he literally grew up in the PLA because his father was a general and he was raised in a military compound. This book is required reading for PLA watchers and anyone seeking to understand the process of China’s incomplete military transformation.

**Chinese Naval Shipbuilding: An Ambitious and Uncertain Course**

By Andrew S. Erickson

Reviewed by Carl O. Schuster, Visiting Professor, Hawaii Pacific University

China’s expanding fleet and operations have raised questions about its future capabilities and intentions. However, few examine China’s other maritime components, its merchant marine, coast guard, maritime militia, and the shipbuilding industry that supports them all. That industry experienced an unprecedented 13-fold increase in capacity from 2002 to 2013—one encompassing more than just shipyards. Naval shipbuilding integrates heavy industry, electronics and information technology, and large-scale propulsion systems to construct weapons platforms that balance human habitation, fuel, ordnance, aviation support, and seakeeping requirements to meet a nation’s operational and strategic needs. As such, it provides insight into the future plans and intentions of the People’s Liberation Army’s Navy (PLAN). In writing *Chinese Naval Shipbuilding*, Dr. Andrew Erickson and his team have made a vital contribution to understanding China’s ability to build and maintain its maritime forces, especially the PLAN.

China’s shipbuilding industry is the world’s largest, constructing more ships, and a greater variety of them, than any other. It has given Beijing the world’s third largest merchant marine and the largest fishing fleets. China also has the world’s largest coast guard and is on track to possess the world’s second largest navy by 2020. But numbers alone do not tell the story. Via a combination of imitative innovation, extensive study of foreign developments, and heavy investment in technology, China has leapfrogged several stages of combat systems, sensor, and weapons developments.

An industry and scientific community once devastated by war and the Cultural Revolution has evolved from producing copies of obsolescent post-World War II designs 40 years ago to one manufacturing and
installing the latest sensors, weapons, communications, and information technology into hulls that incorporate the most recent advances in stealth features and shipbuilding techniques. By 2025, PLAN will qualitatively match, or be closely equivalent to the United States Navy. Rapid though that improvement has been, it is the result of an evolutionary design process driven by a combination of changing strategy and mission requirements as defined by the PLAN’s Naval Research Institute; and the Naval Armaments Research Institute’s (PLAN’s research and development community’s) judgements.

During the last 30 years, China has modernized its doctrine as well as its military equipment to meet the nation’s evolving national security requirements. The brief Sino-Vietnamese War (1979) exposed the limitations of Mao’s “People’s War Doctrine,” forcing a reevaluation of China’s approach to war. The resulting active defense doctrine of the mid-1980s extended the PLAN’s mission to one of active defense of the near seas. The “near seas” consisted of the seas near China’s coast out to the “First Island Chain”—Spratly Islands, Indonesia, Philippines, Taiwan, and the Japanese Islands. The distance and level of PLAN’s naval operations has been expanding slowly and steadily since. From a defensive mission, the PLAN now must safeguard China’s overseas interests, protect its sea lines of communications, and contribute to international security. That last mission is exemplified by the PLAN joining the UN-mandated Indian Ocean anti-piracy operations in 2008. Then civil strife and conflicts forced the evacuation of thousands of Chinese citizens from African and Middle Eastern countries. In addition to providing valuable logistical and operational experience, the deployments strengthened China’s diplomatic and strategic engagement with Africa, the Middle East, and ultimately Europe. The PLAN is now a permanent fixture and exercise partner in those waters.

China’s technological base initially struggled to keep pace with fleet requirements but caught up within the last decade via foreign acquisition and derivative development. Post-2009 PLAN warships are no longer equipped with 1950s-era radars and weapons systems. They carry new longer-ranged surface-to-air missiles derived from Russian designs but largely retain the PLAN’s initial focus on anti-surface ship warfare, with newer and more deadly anti-ship cruise missiles. Ships commissioned since 2012 have Vertical Launch Systems for their missiles, accelerating their combat engagement cycles and increasing their ordnance load.

To improve power projection, China acquired a derelict ex-Soviet aircraft carrier in 1998. Commissioned in September 2012, the ski-ramp equipped Liaoning has served as a fleet training and doctrinal development tool, enabling the integration of naval aviation into fleet operations. Future carriers will incorporate a conventional takeoff and landing system, giving the carrier greater striking power, range and flexibility. The PLAN started installing land attack cruise missiles on surface ships and submarines in 2013. But, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities remained underdeveloped. More ships were capable of embarking ASW helicopters but the ships were limited to hull-mounted sonars until variable depth sonars and towed arrays became available in 2014.

The submarine force has seen similar evolutionary upgrades since the late 1980s. Hull designs became more streamlined and propulsion systems more powerful and reliable. In the 1990s, China acquired Russian
Kilo-class submarines with anechoic coatings that reduced vulnerability to active sonar detection and battery technology that increased underwater speed and endurance. China also purchased air-independent-propulsion technology a decade ago. It then incorporated all those technologies in its Yuan-class conventional submarines. However, for prestigious reasons, the Communist Party rejected using foreign technology in its nuclear-powered submarine program with costly results. China’s early nuclear powered submarines, the Xia ballistic missile and Han-class attack submarines were underpowered, noisy, and difficult to operate. Their problems forced a 20-year hiatus in nuclear submarine construction. The nuclear-powered Jin-class SSBNs and Sang-class SSNs built since 2011 have better sensors and more reliable power plants, but they retain their predecessor’s noisy acoustic signatures.

Dr. Erickson’s team has written the most comprehensive study of China’s shipbuilding industry extant. The book’s maps and tables clarify and strengthen the narrative. Chinese Naval Shipbuilding presents a detailed, in-depth assessment of the PLAN’s future. Relying extensively on Chinese-language sources, the authors base their analysis on intimate knowledge of the economic, political, and strategic factors underpinning China’s maritime activities from the PRC’s beginnings. They discuss economic factors most other books ignore. They note China’s slowing economy will constrict future defense funding growth and Beijing eventually must shift resources from construction to maintenance as expanded naval operations increase the wear on fleet units. Funding global operations will also come at the expense of construction monies. Well organized, insightful, and succinctly written, this is a must-read for serious students of China’s maritime and economic developments.

Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire
By Agnia Grigas

Reviewed by Richard J. Krickus, Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the University of Mary Washington and former Oppenheimer Chair for Warfighting Strategy at the US Marine Corps University.

In August 1993, as a convoy of Russian trucks rumbled through the cobblestoned streets of old-town Vilnius, the last one carried an ominous message: “We will be back!” The locals who applauded the exit of their “elder brothers” took comfort in the thought that never again would Russian tanks traverse the byways of Lithuania. Confidence along these lines later surged when the Baltic democracies entered the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and rejoiced in the safe harbor of Article 5.

But President Trump caused alarm in Eastern Europe when, on a spring trip abroad, he failed to reaffirm Washington’s commitment to collective defense. What’s more, when German respondents were asked whether or not their country should safeguard the security of the Baltic democracies in face of Russian armed aggression, most answered “No!” Not surprisingly, citizens of other former Soviet Russian republics are especially unnerved by the thought that, after the 2008 war in Georgia and the Crimean putsch several years later, they will be the next victims of “little green men.”
To put these concerns in perspective, Agnia Grigas has written an important book, *Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire*, which explains why these concerns prevail throughout much of the old Soviet space. Well written and powerfully argued, this book rests on extensive research and interviews of people residing in the “near abroad.” Grigas’s narrative justifies speculation among Russian experts that Vladimir Putin is bent on the “re-imperialization of Russia.” Toward this end, he hopes to exploit the 25 million ethnic Russians and over 100 million Russian speakers, “the compatriots,” who once resided in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, were considered a financial liability by Moscow upon the Soviet Empire’s demise, and became an asset as the Russian economy grew with a spike in oil prices. They served as a vital component in Putin’s campaign to restore the Russian empire and, in turn, dismember both the European Union and NATO. This aspect of Putin’s foreign policy has not received the attention it deserves by American security analysts, and Grigas’s book ably fills this gap. Simultaneously, her unmasking of this bold strategic campaign will be useful to those who are considering the pros and cons of a reset in relations with Russia, which is one of the major elements of President Trump’s foreign policy.

The people who are the central focus of her book represent a significant segment of residents in Central Asia, the Baltics, Ukraine, Georgia, and other former political entities that were once subjects of various Russian empires—Czarist, Soviet, and today. Putin’s campaign involves seven stages:

1. **Soft power.** The Russian language, the Russian Orthodox Church, and extensive media outlets and business enterprises under Moscow’s control that penetrate all the societies in question
2. **Humanitarian policies.** Real and alleged human rights violations to promote turmoil within targeted societies
3. **Compatriot policies.** Honoring former Soviet policies such as pensions for the elderly and educational opportunities for the young
4. **Passportization.** Compatriots without citizenship status who have passports and retain the opportunity to return “home”
5. **Information warfare.** “Aggressive use of propaganda to destabilize, demoralize, or manipulate the target audience and achieve an advantage over an opponent including by seeking to deny, degrade, corrupt or destroy the opponent’s sources of information” (44)
6. **Protection.** Scrutinizing the soft power represented above to display hard power
7. **Annexation.** Formal or de facto annexations of the territories where compatriots reside

*Beyond Crimea* is a valuable source for defense and foreign policy analysts and practitioners who are taking stock of the pros and cons of resetting relations with Russia, which according to conventional wisdom may be sabotaged by America’s preoccupation with our 2016 presidential election. But that distraction will have little bearing on Putin’s drive to impose Russia’s influence upon the former entities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. To a significant degree, because of Putin’s skillful exploitation of the compatriot issue, he has successfully disrupted
the Euro-Atlantic Alliance. Among other things, he has forestalled—perhaps permanently—Georgian and Ukrainian efforts to join the EU and NATO while fostering serious discord between the Europeans and Americans. American strategists who are working to counter this campaign of disruption should read this book and consider some of the author’s countermoves while acknowledging some disturbing facts.

First, the West must appreciate that Putin’s campaign is real and not a flight of Cold War fancy. We must not adopt the realist perspective that all of these countries “belong” to Russia, and it is foolhardy to think otherwise. Furthermore, Grigas observes it is a profound intellectual mistake to accept the Kremlin’s view of the status and nature of the compatriots. In her interviews, she found people so identified may favor Russian TV and share feelings of solidarity with other former Soviet citizens but prefer living in their new homelands and not Putin’s Russia.

That said, the West must recognize that scenario is being outplayed in Europe’s hybrid warfare with Russia. Putin’s drive to restore Russia’s imperial outreach is showing results as many eastern-bloc countries in the EU and NATO have sought closer ties with Moscow. Furthermore, the Americans and the Europeans have assumed that when the ball is in the soft-power court, they are favored to win, but the fact may be just the opposite as recent events indicate. In response, the West should develop aid programs, including education and training, for many of the countries that are Putin’s target. The EU and NATO must “create information alternatives to Russian propaganda” and prepare “for Russia’s hybrid warfare” (255–56). This means “countering transnational paramilitary groups, as well as engaging separatist territories and frozen-conflict zones” (256). At the same time, Grigas has words of criticism for the countries at risk. They are not paying sufficient attention to legitimate grievances of their compatriots regarding arms, drugs, human trafficking, terrorism, organized crime, and collapsed economies.

Prominent scholars, such as Steven Blank, and diplomats, such as Michael McFaul, have justifiably applauded Grigas’s book, but one cannot ignore one of its shortcomings—that is, not spending more time on the role organized crime plays in the Kremlin’s reimperialization campaign. Russian criminal organizations, often with the complicity of indigenous mafias, play a critical role in corrupting the economic and political systems of all former Soviet entities. They continue to exploit the transition period from communism to a free market where even otherwise patriotic cultural, economic, and political elites are vulnerable to kompromat because of dodgy practices on their part or maturing legal systems. In short, Russian bankers and business tycoons are so entangled with organized crime figures it is impractical to deal with them as separate entities. The same holds true of the oligarchs and their involvement with Russian security institutions. Clearly, more work must be done on this score, but that is the subject of another book.

Finally, in light of the disarray that afflicts the Euro-Atlantic Alliance today, there is no reason to be optimistic that the Western response to Putin’s reimperialization campaign will be up and running any time soon. Planners at the Departments of State and Defense must rectify that situation as soon as possible.
NATO’s Return to Europe: Engaging Ukraine, Russia, and Beyond
Edited by Rebecca R. Moore and Damon Coletta

Reviewed by Elie Perot, PhD candidate, Institute for European Studies (IES), Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB)

The troubles in Ukraine have compelled NATO to shift its attention back to the Old Continent. After years during which collective defense was not at the front stage of the Alliance’s preoccupations, the renewed focus on this mission is a small revolution. In brief, NATO is back in Europe and back to its original raison d’être.

But, to what extent is this true, and to what extent should it be the case? To put it differently, in the wake of the Ukraine crisis, how has NATO struck a balance between diverging geographical priorities and between its three self-assigned missions (i.e., collective defense, crisis management and collective security)? And what should the future equilibrium look like? These are the questions to which NATO’s Return to Europe: Engaging Ukraine, Russia, and Beyond intends to provide an answer.

As indicated by the editors, the book’s chapters can be grouped under three broad sections. The first one focuses on the major strategic issues facing NATO today. The opening chapter by John R. Deni argues NATO’s current force posture is ill-prepared to deter conventional aggression by Russia as a consequence of the continuous decrease of allies’ armed forces—despite the adaptation and reassurance measures recently adopted. As underlined by Schuyler Foerster in the subsequent chapter, however, the continuing relevance of extended deterrence for NATO should not let us forget that such a strategy inevitably raises perennial credibility concerns and dilemmas. Foerster warns against extending the deterrence guarantee towards NATO’s partners such as Ukraine and Georgia, as this would result in a “dilution” of the guarantee. In turn, Andrew T. Wolff weighs the prospects for further enlargement of NATO to encompass Ukraine. Contemplating the respective trade-offs entailed by Ukraine’s membership, or by the present status quo, the author argues then in favor of a third option, which would be to renounce enlargement of NATO—an appeasement signal sent to Moscow—while establishing another type of relationship with Kiev to encourage democratic reforms.

In the fourth chapter, Magnus Petersson examines to what extent the global and the regional ambitions of NATO are pushing the Alliance into incompatible directions. Expeditionary strategy and territorial defense are two approaches that complement one another, as both presuppose a certain degree of interoperability and offensive capabilities. In a similar vein, Sten Rynning shows several lessons learned by NATO in Afghanistan can be put to good use in future contingencies: the need to share the same politico-strategic vision among Allies, the necessity to adopt a comprehensive approach, and the requirement of close coordination with operational partners.

The second section of the book deals with NATO’s partnership policy and security cooperation with Russia. Ivan Dinev Ivanov assesses
the relationship between the various patterns of institutionalization of NATO’s partnership agenda and the compliance of the Alliance’s partners with its security policies. Of particular interest is the description of NATO’s central partnership dilemma between extending the “liberal security order” in Europe, for example, to Ukraine or Georgia and keeping a stable relationship with Moscow. Continuing this discussion, Rebecca Moore shows that, although the Ukraine crisis has made clear that NATO’s Article 5 does not extend to its partners, the Alliance should not be intimidated into renouncing the liberal order through its partnership policy. The last chapter of this section, by Damon Coletta, delves into the opportunities for NATO-Russia technical cooperation, in particular on missile defense. Hindered in many ways since the Ukraine crisis, technical cooperation is nonetheless partially ongoing and it should be expanded in order to generate positive spill-over effects for the relationship between NATO and Russia.

The final group of contributions is more eclectic. Huiyun Feng focuses on the impact of the Ukrainian crisis on the Russia-China-US triangle. If the Russian intervention in Ukraine has contradicted the principles of noninterference and of the respect of state sovereignty defended by China, the crisis has also brought Russia and China—driven by a common rivalry with the United States—to forge closer ties in the economic, military, and political realms. Finally, the conclusion of the book, by Stanley R. Sloan, puts the significance of the Ukrainian crisis for NATO into a broader historical perspective by analyzing the evolution of the Alliance’s identity through time. The volume closes on the idea of building a stronger “transatlantic community” through a deeper cooperation between NATO and the European Union.

In terms of analysis, NATO’S Return to Europe delivers a very robust and updated overview of the Alliance’s current strategic situation. One may notice some overlap between contributions, although this may be unavoidable in an edited volume. Individually, the chapters do not provide a direct answer to the overall theme of the book, but by reading the chapters successively, the reader may sketch an overarching conclusion.

In terms of policy prescription, some recommendations advanced by different contributors may not accord with one another, notably because of a divergence in their assessments of Moscow’s benign or hostile intentions. From different diagnostics follow distinct remedies. Gauging which of these policy options are sound is ultimately a matter of political judgement, but the necessity of “a Schuman Plan of some sort” between NATO and Russia may raise more skepticism than more conventional proposals contained in the book (212).

Some readers may regret no specific chapter has been devoted to the very issue on which the book ends, namely the relationship between NATO and the European Union. One could argue that some of today’s hottest policy proposals, the creation of a “military Schengen,” for example, precisely revolve around this complex relationship. In any case, these are minor reservations. The book should be of great value and interest for practitioners and students of transatlantic relations.
Nanoweapons: A Growing Threat to Humanity

By Louis A. Del Monte

Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, Adjunct Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army

The author of Nanoweapons, Louis A. Del Monte, has a corporate background in microelectronics, sensors, and integrated circuits at the micro- and nano-technology levels. He has also written earlier books on artificial intelligence and time travel (theoretical) to which this book on the subject of nanoweaponry is, in many ways, a natural progression. The subject focuses on nano (one billionth of a meter), as opposed to micro (one millionth of a meter), technology manipulation and the increasingly evident weaponization potentials this offers to states, corporations, terrorist organizations, and potentially even brilliant—but amoral and unstable—individuals.

The 246-page work is divided into acknowledgements, an introduction, three thematic parts (The First Generation of Nanoweapons, The Game Changers, and The Tipping Point) spanning 12 chapters, an epilogue, three appendices, notes, glossary, and an index.

Nanotechnologies—unbeknownst to most of us—are becoming ubiquitous in the consumer, industrial, and medical industries with a product value exceeding $1 trillion dollars (43). Further, they have a projected value of $6 trillion by 2025, which would place their product valuation at about 7 percent of the entire global economy (34). In addition, active American (leader), Chinese (a near follower), and Russian (a distant third) nanoweaponry programs exist at the classified level (67). While the majority of information pertaining to these programs is shrouded in secrecy, Del Monte has been able to synthesize enough disparate open source intelligence together to create basic outlines of US military service initiatives as well as those belonging to a number of other nations—both potentially belligerent as well as allied (45–75, 191–203).

The initial generations of nanoweapons as discussed in the work clearly function as enhancers of present conventional—even nuclear—weaponry as well as sensors, body (or tank) armor, and a host of other forms of matériel. For example, nanoparticles added to explosives or even nukes are able to enhance their efficiency and destructive yield and, in some instances, even allow for their miniaturization (11, 47–48). It is not this component of the work, however, which is its real importance. Rather, it is the potential longer-term technological trends some decades away where the strategic implications of this advanced weaponry form become significant. These are derived from the projected emergence of advanced computers with artificial intelligence, such as singularity computers, that will, at some point, exceed the combined intellect of humanity coupled with the development of self-replicating smart nanobots (139–42).
My impression from the book, in which I agree with the author’s primary concerns, is that nanoweaponry is rapidly becoming the third rider beside nuclear and biological weapons in a potential technological apocalypse. This form of weaponry offers a new set of horrors that can be inflicted upon humanity. The subject matter appears very science fiction-like and is reminiscent of Frank Herbert’s 1982 novel *The White Plague* in which a molecular biologist creates a designer bioweapon that becomes a scientific reality, which exceeds even the early projections of that genre.

That said, a basic criticism of *Nanoweapons* is that essentially no literature review was conducted related to the small number of earlier works on the technology predating this effort. While K. Eric Drexler’s celebrated 1986 text *Engines of Creation* is highlighted—as are other important nanotechnology related events and over 150 notes (typically Internet citations) related to data points, technologies, and governmental programs—specific topical works are ignored. For instance, no mention is made of Daniel and Mark A. Ratner’s *Nanotechnology and Homeland Security*, Jurgen Altmann’s *Military Nanotechnology*, or Margaret Kosal’s *Nanotechnology for Chemical and Biological Defense*. Another criticism is that Del Monte—by his own admission—is a technologist and not well versed in policy, or for that matter, international affairs (187). So when he makes military and arms control suggestions or envisions the international system of 2050, he is not always authoritative in his arguments.

Even with these inherent criticisms, given the glaring dearth of unclassified works on nanoweaponry, the book fills an important and critical gap in an emerging and little-understood area of twenty-first century military science. The area is one that the author, accurately proposes will result in the rise of powerful nanoweaponry-armed states (and, potentially, even corporations), and where a misstep with this cutting edge technology could someday potentially result in an extinction-level event equivalent to that of a strategic nuclear exchange taking place between the Russia and the United States.

**The Future of War: A History**

By Lawrence Freedman

Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, Adjunct Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

Lawrence Freedman, the author of *The Future of War: A History*, is an Emeritus Professor of War Studies at King’s College London and has had a long and illustrious career, which he points out is by no means over. His is a familiar name to the *Parameters* readership—due both to his decades long series of highly acclaimed books written on war and strategy and his contributions to this journal; see, for instance, *Beyond Surprise Attack* (Summer 2017) which draws upon *The Future of War*—the focus of this review.

The work has been written as a historiography of future-war thinking and projections—not as a projection of future (around mid-twenty-first century) warfare itself. It predominately draws upon the perspectives
of the United Kingdom and the United States, due to their sequential positions as dominant global powers, and encompasses thought, theory, and military affairs related to the late mid-nineteenth century into the contemporary and emerging eras (xix). The book is divided into three parts: the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71 through the end of the Cold War (1989), 1990s through contemporary issues, and developing and future concerns. These three historical sequences are dominated by multi- and then bi-polarity (such as great powers and superpowers); unipolarity (the United States as the last remaining superpower), state-fragility, and the rise of violent nonstate actors; and resurgent multi- or bi-polarity along with the concurrent emergence of high-tech weaponry. The book is well referenced, has an extensive bibliography, and an index for keyword and name searches.

The approach utilized in *The Future of War: A History* is one that:

locates the writing on future war in the concerns of the time. The aim is not just to assess how prescient different writers were, or whether they could have done better given what was known about new weaponry or the experience of recent wars, but to explore the prevailing understandings about the causes of war and their likely conduct and course. How people imagined the wars of the future affected the conduct and course of those wars when they finally arrived. Unanticipated wars, in forms that had not been imagined, left participants and commentators struggling to understand where they had come from and how they might best be fought (xix).

Much of the work’s value for the practitioner exists in its final couple of chapters. Chapter 24 “Coming Wars,” for instance, initially highlights Major General Robert Scales’s five schools of future wars thinking (264–65). Chapter 25, “The Future of the Future of War,” on the other hand, revisits important themes discussed in the book related to the forecasting of knockout blows (such as quick victory scenarios) (277–79), the significance of the development of nuclear weapons on future war thinking (280–81), whether the America’s present position as the predominant military power may continue (282), ring of institutional boundaries related to the state, and even war and peace itself, as a result of gray-zone conflicts (284–85).

Criticisms of the work are difficult to find, but a slight issue potentially exists in the author’s ongoing use of thematic chapter foci—essentially, the minivignettes, such as those, focusing on barbarism, cyberwar, robots and drones, and megacities in some of the later chapters—which provide a quick and dirty overview of a theme along with some dominant concepts pertaining to it sourced to well-known scholars—for example Mary Kaldor’s *New Wars* (143–44) or Dunlap’s “lawfare” (201–2). This fast paced “short video clip” approach may lead the lay or undergraduate reader to readily accept the lessons learned without needing or wanting to understand the full extent of the argument Freedman presents.

In summation, Freedman’s *The Future of War* would be highly useful for graduate and War College level military strategy courses and those focused on better understanding the rationale behind and biases inherent in producing visions of future warfare. While some general readership interest may exist for the work, its arguments—and a reader’s ability to contextualize them along the continuum of late mid-nineteenth century military developments—are too daunting for undergraduate level study. Still, the work is extremely well written and an erudite product produced...
by a renowned military theorist. It should, without reservation, be considered a welcome addition to both the personal library of the more seasoned scholar as well as that of the senior level officer.

**War in 140 Characters: How Social Media is Reshaping Conflict in the Twenty-First Century**

By David Patrikarakos

Reviewed by James Farwell, Associate Fellow in the Centre for Strategic Communication, Department of War Studies, Kings College

This lively account describes how Twitter and Facebook are changing the dimension of warfare. He argues social media has helped to dismantle traditional information and media hierarchies. That point has been well made elsewhere. Patrikarakos’s contribution is to bring alive the realities of this change through the experiences of individuals dealing with the Middle East, Russia, and Ukraine to weaponize social media.

The stories of Palestinian Farah Baker and two Israelis, Lieutenant Colonel Peter Lerner and David Rubenstein, show how social media can create global impact.

Sixteen years old, Farah bore witness to Israel’s 2014 incursions into Gaza. Her credibility lay in her status as an eyewitness. Photographs and vivid language brought home the emotion and horror of a little girl trying to survive battlefield violence. She used Twitter to highlight the most extreme effects of war, garner sympathy, and build public support for Gaza by showing the extent of the carnage that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was wreaking. “BOMBING CHILDREN IS NOT OKAY,” she tweeted. “That when u know that HUMANITY DIED. #Gaza.”

Her tweets show how users reacting in real time can powerfully bypass media filters and articulate ground realities. Using media to tell a story that detailed what she was living through, Farah defined a powerful message: war caused children to suffer. She showed that controlling the narrative mattered as much or more than kinetic warfare.

Imaginative and brilliant Israelis such as Lerner and Rubenstein proved resourceful. Israelis had to show they were not targeting civilians. They responded rapidly, using YouTube to generate powerful visuals to get out their narratives. Sending out clear and compelling content caused legacy media—broadcast networks—to pick it up. Israel thus refocused the perspective through which actions should be judged. Their technique started sentences with verbs and created titles and subtitles for the illustrations of the battlefield violence, which bolstered credibility.

In Ukraine, Anna Sandalova proved the power of Facebook in assembling a volunteer network that supplied Ukrainian soldiers fighting Russian-backed separatists. The author’s account of the effort provides a primer on how to use weaponized Facebook for troop support. Notable is the account of how Elliot Higgins proved that crowdsourcing intelligence can beat government bureaucracy. He and a volunteer team proved that Russian-armed separatists shot down Flight MH17.
Interesting but less impressive is Patrikarokos’s account of Russian trolling. That topic has been better covered elsewhere. The section lacks depth in articulating Russia’s doctrine of hybrid warfare, attributed to Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov, it calls for a “hybrid” capability for which the Internet is one tool in the arsenal. Patrikarokos’s story of Russian troller Vitaly Bespalov is interesting. But his account fails to explain, as others have, the trolling operation, and the analysis of Putin’s strategy could use greater dimension.

Patrikarokos’s account of how the Islamic State used social media to recruit individuals like Sophie Kasiki is well told but adds nothing to what has been previously written. The final section discusses the State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, supplanted today by the Global Engagement Center, in countering such narratives. Neither entity has proven successful.

Bottom line. This book is definitely worth a read. The author is a fine journalist. While imperfect, the book’s strengths add strong insight and keen understanding into a new, potentially decisive element in conducting engagement and waging conflict in today’s threat environment.

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Eisenhower's Guerrillas: The Jedburghs, the Maquis, & the Liberation of France

By Benjamin F. Jones

Reviewed by Raymond A. Millen, Professor of Security Sector, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, US Army War College

In *Eisenhower’s Guerrillas*, Benjamin F. Jones examines the operations of Jedburgh teams in support of the Allied campaign for France in 1944. Formed into three-person teams, comprised of American, British, and French service members, the Jedburghs began parachuting into France just prior to D-Day in order to organize, equip, and train the various French resistance groups, the Maquis, in guerrilla warfare. Altogether, 93 Jedburgh teams deployed to France, organized tens of thousands of guerrillas, and coordinated the delivery of hundreds of thousands of weapons and munitions.

Jones’s research unveils new details regarding the Allied use of the Maquis during the liberation of France. By delving into American, British, and French war archives, as well as interviewing Jedburgh and Maquis veterans, Jones provides fresh perspectives regarding Eisenhower’s intent with, and ulterior motives for, the Jedburgh mission. Jones expands on the history of the Jedburghs by tying together the planning and implementation of their mission, the involvement of other Allied special forces—often at cross purposes—with the Maquis, and the reasons for successes and failures among the various Jedburgh teams.

Operating through the Maquis, the Jedburgh mission was to support the Normandy invasion by sabotaging rail and road bridges, ambushing
German occupation troops in Brittany, and actively interdicting German units moving to the Normandy beachhead. Counterintuitively, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) and the Special Forces Headquarters (SFHQ) stressed that the Maquis were not to instigate a wholesale insurrection for fear of indiscriminate German reprisals against the population. Restricting Maquis activities until after the Normandy invasion, SHAEF and SFHQ sought to preclude German and Vichy French counterespionage operations to neutralize the Maquis prematurely.

As more Jedburgh teams parachuted into the French interior during June and July, 1944, the Allied invasion of southern France (early August) prompted a change in mission—preventing German forces in southwestern France from withdrawing to the east. The results were mixed: German armored and mechanized divisions managed to avoid capture; however, the Maquis forced the surrender of one German infantry division. Ultimately, the failure to ensnare substantial numbers of German troops permitted a defensive line to be established in eastern France. One important lesson from the latter stages of fighting in France is that the Jedburghs and the Maquis were more effective when rear areas existed, but less so once German divisions began streaming eastwards.

The Jedburghs faced numerous challenges. This political tension inhibited cooperation, and these groups refused to cooperate with one another due to these differences. Paradoxically, the communist resistance groups were better organized, motivated, and fought more effectively, a fact the Jedburghs quickly recognized and supported.

The Jedburghs’s inability to arm hundreds of thousands of Maquis who enthusiastically materialized after the Normandy invasion stemmed from various causes. Significantly, SHAEF and SFHQ vastly underestimated the number of French who wanted to end the German occupation and replace the Vichy government. Successful supply drops required good weather, appropriate moon phases, and secure drop zones, which rarely aligned. Communications between the Jedburgh teams and SFHQ to coordinate the airdrops was also problematic when communications sergeants were injured or the radios were destroyed. Finally, Eisenhower wanted to limit the number of armed Maquis (less than 120,000) to prevent their activities from spiraling out of control.

For Eisenhower, the Jedburghs served a higher purpose than disrupting German operations, a revelation that Jones explains in detail. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s persistent refusal to recognize General Charles de Gaulle’s provisional government, French Committee of National Liberation, until the fall of 1944, posed significant challenges for the successful prosecution of the war. To optimize combat power on the front, Eisenhower sought to have de Gaulle’s provisional government assume governance functions at the local and national level so as to minimize the need to secure the rear areas with combat troops.

Accordingly, Eisenhower appointed French General Pierre Koenig as a SHAEF field commander, making him responsible for the French Forces of the Interior and the various French military delegates, as well as control of the Maquis through the Jedburgh teams. As the Allies liberated France, Koenig incorporated scores of Maquis groups into the
Free French Army. In this manner, de Gaulle enjoyed the political support of the French people and was able to assume control of government.

Jones’s account of the Jedburghs is often repetitious and confusing, which is understandable given the complexity of French and Allied attitudes and agendas regarding the political landscape, the plethora of personalities involved, and the magnitude of the Jedburgh mission. Fortunately, Jones provides two appendices on the French resistance leaders and the Jedburgh teams, outlining names, assigned regions, and deployment dates. The maps depicting Jedburgh locations and activities are also essential for reader understanding.

For strategic leaders, Eisenhower’s Guerrillas provides useful insights in the use of resistance groups in occupied territories in conjunction with the execution of conventional military campaigns. Jones emphasizes that Jedburgh-like teams are quite effective in occupied enemy territories but fail dismally in enemy countries with domestic resistance groups. He concludes such resistance groups lack the requisite passion, organization, and wherewithal to overthrow the government of a police state. Strategic leaders will find Jones’ history of the Jedburgh teams and his keen insights invaluable.

Blood Sacrifices: Violent Non-State Actors and Dark Magico-Religious Activities

Edited by Robert J. Bunker

Reviewed by Nathan Jones, Associate Professor, Department of Security Studies, Sam Houston State University

Blood Sacrifices: Violent Non-State Actors and Dark Magico-Religious Activities is an edited volume that addresses some of the more extreme violence found on the twenty-first century criminal and insurgent battlefields. Editor and author of a particularly strong chapter, Robert Bunker has assembled a strong cast of authors including Dawn Perlmutter and Paul Rexton Kan to explore this understudied topic. The general thrust of their argument is that the role of blood sacrifice and dark magic symbols, is understudied, under-recognized and under-appreciated in the modern study of violent nonstate actors (VNSA).

In addition to the preface and introductory chapter, the book consists of five topical essays, one review essay, four book reviews, and a postscript. Various chapters introduce case studies on the use of dark magico-religious activities—that are so defined because “they involve morally reprehensible acts directed at other human beings”—including case studies of al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, Boko Haram, the Lord’s Resistance Army, and Mexican drug trafficking organizations such as Los Zetas, the Beltran Leyva Organization, and La Familia Michoacána.

Dawn Perlmutter’s preface is masterful and its introduction of etic and emic cultural anthropological concepts are useful for those outside the anthropology discipline. Her argument is that a refusal to acknowledge some of these VNSAs engage in dark magic violence has led scholars to ignore an important motivation and factor in these violent acts. Rational choice theorists are at a loss in these types of cases, and the
dominance of these methodologies has stifled our understanding of and willingness to even acknowledge VNSA’s use of dark magic.

Bunker’s introduction defines and operationalizes dark as “criminal in nature and involves morally reprehensible acts directed at other human beings.” He acknowledges that dark magico-religious criminals are a small subset of all VNSAs in a useful chart, which provides a framework for the analysis. As a researcher of Mexican drug trafficking organizations, I enjoyed Bunker’s chapter on dark magico-religious violence in Mexico and his discussions of the Saint Death, Santa Muerte, which graces the cover art of the volume. Bunker argues that while organized crime or rational choice explanations are not incorrect, “a much deeper social process can also be said to be taking place.” He goes on to argue traditional social norms are being supplanted by norms of criminality, drug use, and violence.

This volume has already received significant attention on Borderland Beat, a popular webpage covering border security issues, and was reviewed by Patrick Corcoran for Insight Crime, another popular and respected website covering organized crime in the Americas. While I agree with Corcoran’s critique that viewing VNSAs through the economic and political motivation lens is still best, though he does recognize additional study is needed, the authors of this volume illustrate the importance of acknowledging and understanding the dark magico-religious aspects of their behavior.

Further, authors such as Rexton Kan acknowledge how the rational choice and economic understandings of VNSAs are not mutually exclusive with dark magico-religious practices. In his chapter on drug use by organized criminals, guerrillas, and terrorists, Kan describes how VNSAs incorporate drug use to enable gruesome killings that build a reputation. Rexton Kan acknowledges the instrumental use of extreme violence by terror groups and cartels to strike fear in the population and rivals. A careful reading of Bunker makes clear he does not reject rational choice explanations but sees deeper underlying phenomena at play in an evolutionary or devolutionary process. This point could have been pushed further to meld the rational choice theories with emic anthropological perspectives on the use of dark magic violence by VSNAs.

Lisa J. Campbell’s Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and Boko Haram, dark magic violence case study chapter is illuminating for those seeking to understand the role ritualized executions can have in increasing the internal cohesion of enemy fighters. She provides useful insights such as Islamic State continued drug use, which is non-Islamic, pushing it in the direction of a criminal network rather than a political insurgency.

As Corcoran argues in his review of Blood Sacrifices, there is no systematic research telling us exactly how widespread these phenomena are, such as what percentage of criminal or insurgent organization members engage in this activity. This level of aggregate data is vexingly hard to obtain and, even if it were fluid, criminal networks and insurgencies are dynamic. As the various authors persuasively note, however, the practices are evolving and even when limited, have a wider symbolic impact upon the VSNAs and are thus worthy of study and attention.
In *The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relationships in Counterinsurgency*, Walter Ladwig III argues that a liberal great power is more likely to coerce a counterinsurgent government into making reforms when it makes its support for its client conditional. Imposing tit-for-tat conditions on aid and other types of support, Ladwig argues in this scholarly investigation, tells the counterinsurgent government clearly that it must make the demanded changes in its behavior if it wants to get more help.

*The Forgotten Front* makes the valuable and often overlooked point that counterinsurgent governments backed by a liberal great-power sponsor face significant domestic costs if they implement their sponsor’s demands for reform. The interests of patron and client align on defeating insurgency, but often little more. Reducing corruption such as nepotism, expanding political participation, and initiating other liberalizing reforms will deprive the host nation’s elites of the benefits that they are fighting to protect (23). This is particularly a problem for the host nation if it is focused on the short-term need to defeat the insurgency quickly, Ladwig argues (34). Repression may quickly defeat a challenge but increase violence longer term. The government’s liberal sponsor, meanwhile, believes reforms will drive insurgent defeat and lead to greater political stability in the longer term, though reform may be destabilizing in the shorter term. The important related point Ladwig also underlines is that the patron has relatively little leverage over the client because it has already identified client survival as an important security interest.

Ladwig focuses on how the patron can increase the likelihood of implementing reforms to professionalize the counterinsurgent military and increase political participation or otherwise reduce the grievances driving the insurgency. The lavish provision of aid, he argues, is unlikely to produce the desired changes in counterinsurgent government behavior. He bases his argument on analysis of three US interventions, in the Philippines against the Huk from 1947–53, in South Vietnam from 1957–63, and in El Salvador from 1979–92. Ladwig identifies specific US demands for reform and its behavior toward the client (conditionality or inducement, sticks or carrots), and then evaluates whether the counterinsurgent government complied with US demands or not, and if so, to what degree.

His policy recommendations are sensible:
1. Expect tense relations with the client.
2. Do not fear coercing allies in crisis.
3. Make conditions clear, measurable, and realistic.
4. Prepare for internal opposition.
5. Cultivate ties with local reformers.

This clearly written, well-researched study brings welcome attention to counterinsurgent government interests and the client government’s ability to resist patron pressure. Ladwig’s book fits well into mainstream counterinsurgency studies with its assumption about the need for reforms to defeat the insurgency but is more rigorous in its theoretical and empirical analysis than much other work in this area.

One surprising gap is the limited reference to the work of Douglas J. Macdonald, whose wonderfully named Adventures in Chaos: American Intervention for Reform in the Third World makes an argument similar to Ladwig’s. Ladwig cites Macdonald for his concept of the commitment trap, in which a great power’s commitment to its client’s survival reduces the great power’s leverage over that client (46). But Macdonald, like Ladwig, finds that a tit-for-tat relationship with the client is most effective in attaining reforms. In Macdonald’s study, the patron increases its leverage over the client by bargaining for specific reforms and providing support contingent upon implementation of the previously specified actions by the client government. Macdonald, like Ladwig, also finds unconditional commitments to the client mean less success in coercing the client to implement reforms. The studies are not identical, of course, though two of the authors’ cases (the Philippines and Vietnam) are the same.

As with any scholarly work, there are limitations to the findings in The Forgotten Front. Ladwig considers only grievance-based insurgencies with significant popular support and those in which insurgents rely on the populace for their existence. In addition, the study examines only cases of US intervention during the Cold War. These scope conditions properly raise questions about to what degree these findings may apply to cases beyond the three studied. It is also not clear how the author identifies and measures leverage and degrees of policy implementation.

The author also does not consider the relative cost to the client of different reforms and different types of reforms. Ladwig notes that military aid is of particular interest to the counterinsurgent government but might have drawn this thread throughout his analysis (313). A government is more likely to make policy changes that cost it relatively less than other demanded changes, and it is more likely to make policy changes that gain it more desirable benefits. Thus client compliance is more likely on less costly reforms and on military reforms.

No one book can answer all questions, of course. The Forgotten Front raises important questions for further study. The most pressing questions involve client interests and behavior, including the relative likelihood of client implementation of different types of reforms. Other questions raised here likely to lead to further fruitful analysis include the degree to which reforms are necessary for insurgent defeat, and to what degree, if at all, symbolic reforms help defeat an insurgency (141).
Gangs and the Military: Gangsters, Bikers, and Terrorists with Military Training

By Carter F. Smith

Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, Adjunct Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

The author of *Gangs and the Military: Gangsters, Bikers, and Terrorists with Military Training*, Carter F. Smith, possesses a unique blend of Army-gang investigative experience, primarily gained in the 1990s, and advanced academic qualifications that provide him with a deep understanding of this national security concern as well as many insightful perspectives related to the area of military-trained gang members (MTGMs). On a positive note, the work also has the endorsement of a number of well-respected gang researchers with considerable field time under their duty belts.

With a forward by Al Valdez, a former gang unit supervisor in Orange County, CA, and the afterward by George E. Reed, a former Commanding Officer, US Army Criminal Investigation Command battalion, Fort Bragg, NC, the work focuses on “the intersection of gang life and military services” with the gangs representing violent nonstate actors (2). As specified in the work itself, a military-trained gang member “is defined as a member of a street gang, prison gang, outlaw motorcycle gang, or domestic terrorist group who appears to have received military training either directly or indirectly” (2). Chapters five and six highlight gang activity in the military and civilian communities, respectively, and the criminality—including numerous homicides—that such members have engaged in.

The fact that gang members are increasingly using military-like tactics on the streets of the United States is made clear to the reader. The threat these individuals represent elicits the author to propose “it would make sense to respond to gangs whose members have military training (whether in or out of the military) as if they were insurgents” and recommend that a counterinsurgency approach, initially focused on intelligence gathering and analysis should be followed to contend with them (153).

Unsurprisingly, given such concerns, the book conceptually draws upon the third generation gangs (3 GEN Gangs) model of which John P. Sullivan and the reviewer are proponents (21–23). This model, developed in the later 1990s, discusses the evolution of street gangs through turf (1st), drug (2nd), and mercenary (3rd) generations of sophistication and how the more evolved 3 GEN Gangs—Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Los Zetas type entities—are becoming a significant threat to domestic security despite being a minority representation of gangs. This model is in variance with more traditional criminological- and sociological-based gang models, which focus on delinquency and deviance and are devoid of any form of gang-derived national security threat potentials.

The reviewer found the work to be very well written and engaging, with the overview on early gangs, from the seventeenth through the mid-twentieth centuries, and their connections to the US military quite fascinating from a historical perspective. It has been written with
professionals, not academics, in mind which makes it more readable than more densely written scholarly tomes. Critiques of the book are relatively minor and focus on three primarily style and layout issues. First, the work could benefit from a selected references section. Paging through over 30 pages of notes to determine which works have been consulted in the book can be rather tedious. Second, the notes section suffers from overcitation of the works drawn upon, with full bibliographic information then continually being provided rather than simply using an “ibid.” Third, the use of stock photos tends to debase the value of this unique and important work. All of these shortcomings could easily be addressed in a second edition of the work.

The book has few, if any, equals with other works on this subject outside of some US governmental gang reports—such as National Gang Intelligence Center publications—or possibly Matt Kennard’s *Irregular Army*, which is more of a journalistic account of gang members, extremists, and other undesirables joining the US military after September 11, 2001. I see great value in the work for military readers as it candidly chronicles an internal personnel issue—and metastasizing homeland security issue—typically shunned by the services due to bad publicity.

In closing, *Gangs and the Military*—due to widening recognition of this concern—should be of increasing interest to US military officers and national security scholars well into the future. It provides them with an understanding of how security threat groups have gained a foothold in the armed services, the implications of their military-trained members being unleashed on their constituent communities, and the author’s recommendations for the military to address this issue (201–7). These recommendations focus on providing commanders tools and options to mitigate the emergence, existence, and effects of military-trained gang members in their units as well as advocating a points system for agencies to determine the gang involvement of military personnel.

**Utility of War**

*War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory*

By Nadia Schadlow

Reviewed by Conrad Crane, Chief of Historical Series of the US Army Heritage and Education Center, US Army War College

All of us who teach at the US Army War College have experienced moments of epiphany when a student makes a particularly insightful observation. In a recent session examining stability operations, Colonel Pat Proctor observed the Army proudly proclaims it wins the nation’s wars, when in reality, it is not structured organizationally or intellectually to do so. Instead the service is content just to win the nation’s battles, and strongly resists any attempts to go beyond that role, a position reinforced by civilian leaders reluctant to concede any role to the military in translating battlefield success into lasting political outcomes.
As Nadia Schadlow argues persuasively in *War and the Art of Governance* only the military has the authority and resources to accomplish that difficult task in the wake of war. Through more than a dozen rich historical case studies, she illustrates a persistent “American denial syndrome” that refuses to properly recognize and prepare for the political and military challenges involved in restoring order after combat operations. She attributes this syndrome to four main causes: democratic discomfort with the military leading political activities, a traditional American aversion to any taint of colonialism, a belief that civilians should always handle governance, and a narrow military view of its proper professional role in war reinforced by interpretations of Carl von Clausewitz and Samuel P. Huntington.

Well versed on national security issues from her work at the Smith Richardson Foundation, Schadlow begins her historical analysis with General Winfield Scott’s conduct of basic reconstruction in Mexico in 1847 despite a lack of guidance from Washington. In many ways the exercise of military governance there and in the conquered territories marked a sort of highpoint for the practice, as the American record over the rest of next century was usually much worse. It was only with the establishment in 1942 of a separate Civil Affairs Division on the General Staff and the School for Military Government at Charlottesville that the whole issue of military governance began to gather significant interest and adherents further motivated by the problems General Eisenhower was confronting in North Africa. Extended occupations in Italy, Germany, and Japan produced models of what enlightened and empowered military governance could accomplish. More limited and less well-prepared efforts in Korea were not as successful. Schadlow’s analysis could have also profited from looking at the American experience in Austria, a 10-year occupation judged also to be successful, though Austrians claim that was despite Allied polices and not because of them.

After examining Cold War postconflict reconstructions of Korea, the Dominican Republic, and Panama, she moves on to the rather dismal record in Afghanistan and Iraq, demonstrating how the denial syndrome undermined any chance for strategic success in both theaters of operation from the very beginning. And again, we have failed to learn from that experience. She points out the Defense strategic guidance for 2015 specifically states US forces will “no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations” that are actually essential to consolidate political gains. (274) She argues the Army must be big enough and capable enough to accomplish necessary governance tasks along with conventional kinetic requirements, civilian leaders must be prepared to relinquish operational control of such reconstruction efforts, there should be real unity of command and not competing fiefdoms, and everyone must understand how long political consolidation will take.

This very important book should be read by soldiers and policymakers, although the message may not be one they want to hear. As General Buck Turgidson proclaimed in *Dr. Strangelove*, “The truth is not always a pleasant thing.” But until the US government realizes, and acts on, the necessity of reforms, the nation will be destined to continue struggling toward any strategic gains from modern conflict, especially in contemporary wars among the people.
Assessing War: The Challenge of Measuring Success and Failure
Edited By Leo J. Blanken, Hy Rothstein, and Jason Lepore

Reviewed by John A. Bonin, Professor of Concepts and Doctrine, US Army War College

Assessing War: The Challenge of Measuring Success and Failure is a timely and needed anthology. The editors—Leo J. Blanken, Hy Rothstein, and Jason Lepore—address a previously ignored and esoteric aspect of national defense, military assessment, in a comprehensible manner. Two of the editors serve in the Defense Analysis Department, US Naval Post Graduate School. The third, Jason Lepore, is a professor of economics at California Polytechnic State University. General George W. Casey Jr (US Army Retired), the first commander of Multi-National Force Iraq, provides the foreword, stating the importance of an assessment process that anticipates challenges and identifies opportunities as well as justifies changes. The authors include leading experts and veterans of the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This book seeks to generate recommendations and models for future strategic assessments and to document historical accounts of this neglected aspect of military history.

The editors seek to provide a multidimensional look at military assessments in theory and in practice through historic and contemporary case studies as well as through alternative dimensions. In the introduction, the editors describe “wartime assessment” to mean the act of gathering information to update one’s belief as to who is winning the war with subordinate lines of effort that may include “measures of effectiveness” and “measures of performance.”

The first section of the book expands the theoretical basis for an assessment process. In the first chapter, Blanken and Lepore, discuss a metrics triangle composed of benchmarks, incentives, and information, as well as the critically important separation between a state’s political goals and its operational benchmarks. In the next chapter, Rothstein further analyzes this “Clauswitzian gap” and argues it is often caused by divergence between the experiences of political and military leaders. The final chapter of this section discusses the three primary problems with assessments: information overload, decision making without sufficient information, and uncertainty.

The editors tasked the authors of the nine historical chapters of the second section to consider, what types of assessments had been made and how they affected actors’ conduct during the war. As with any anthology, the case studies proved somewhat uneven in both subjects and sources. Edward Lengel’s chapter on the American Revolution effectively argues the centrality of George Washington, his headquarters for American military assessments, and his growth in effective decisionmaking that resulted in victory at Yorktown. The chapter on the Seven Years’ War in America only assesses a narrow aspect, regarding the use of proxy forces by the British and French during the first three years. Several of the case studies, such as those on the Civil War and the Indian Wars, cover only singular aspects of these long and complicated conflicts.
Brian Linn’s chapter on “Assessing the Philippine War” proved to be one of the best in that it covers this entire, almost forgotten, successful counterinsurgency and concluded “the assessment process . . . worked better than could be expected” (124).

Likewise, Conrad Crane’s chapter on measuring gains in Korea effectively argues wartime assessments of successes and failures there shaped future US policies, and not always for the best. The chapters covering the two world wars only provide analysis of selected aspects of strategic assessment. Stephenson considers Falkenhayn’s belief the French could be bled white at Verdun and the German Navy’s belief in unrestricted submarine warfare proved to be strategic failures; Foch’s belief that a series of coordinated allied offensives in 1918 could achieve decisive results proved correct. Gerhard Weinburg only looks at assessments used during two major strategic decisions in World War II: Hitler’s decision to postpone the invasion of Russia from his unrealistic date in the fall of 1940 to his advisors preferred date in the summer of 1941 and Churchill’s controversial policy shift by the Royal Air Force to night area-bombing of cities to prevent unacceptable losses.

The last chapter on Vietnam, and the third section, focus on more current case studies during limited wars and counterinsurgencies. The wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan proved difficult for the military to assess as these included more nonmilitary factors such as political, economic, and informational impacts on military efforts, and were subject to the “Clauswitzian gap.” Despite practitioners’ perspectives, not only is it too early to assess American success and failure in the latter two conflicts accurately, but as Mark Stout tentatively presents, even al-Qaeda does assessments.

The last section addresses alternative dimensions of assessing war. These include a discussion of the Just War concept of proportionality; the challenge of assessment in cyberspace; the significance of assessing the war of ideas, or the battle of the narrative, and immature assessments of expensive economic development efforts. Finally, the prolific author on modern war Anthony Cordesman and Rothstein conclude the United States must set meaningful strategic goals with appropriate public narratives that can be assessed by suitable military assessment organizations using realistic metrics.

Assessing War is a valuable book for serious students of strategy and military policy and is a must for readers interested in assessing military success. Expanded case studies that further investigate this important, but often overlooked, aspect of military strategy and planning—assessing how we are doing—are still needed.
In defense, dollars are policy. If the nation does not spend sufficient funds wisely on procuring the correct amount of manpower and material necessary to provide for the common defense, national security will suffer. Unfortunately, most strategic thinkers do not spend sufficient time mastering the details of the annual defense-budget process. Instead, most prefer to focus on the more glamorous strategic and tactical issues.

The American political system was never designed to be efficient. Instead, it emphasizes checks and balances and popular control. Therefore, even though the women and men of the Department of Defense spend at least eighteen months carefully developing the annual defense budget for the armed services and defense agencies, the entire Congress, individual committees, or even individual members or their staffers can and do make numerous changes to specific programs in the proposed budget. Moreover Congress is not only becoming increasingly involved in the details, it is taking longer and longer each year to pass a defense budget even in a time of war. In fact, Congress has not passed a budget on time in nine of the last ten years. Therefore, it is more important than ever for soldiers, scholars, and practitioners to understand the relationship between policy, strategy, and budgets.

In her new book, *US Defense Budget Outcomes: Volatility and Predictability in Army Weapons Funding*, Army Major Heidi Brockmann Demarest helps close the gap. She does this by providing an excellent analysis of how and why certain Army procurement programs were, or were not, funded adequately or even at all in the annual Congressional budget process in the period after September 11, 2001.

Demarest demonstrates even though the top line for defense only changes incrementally from year to year, or even during the Congressional process, there is a great deal of volatility in individual procurement programs after the budget is submitted to Congress. She does this by examining voluminous data from 1,152 programs over several fiscal years. She analyses how the Congress alters funding for 40 percent of the programs in the Army budget each year, and alters two-thirds of those programs by more than 25 percent. Major Army programs like the Crusader, the Bradley, the Striker, the Ground Combat Vehicle, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle, and the Future Combat System are among the programs she carefully and comprehensively analyzes.

According to Demarest, no single factor directly accounts for this volatility. Instead, each program’s funding history is a combination of its technical, industrial, and political characteristics. Moreover, the Army’s ability to influence Congress depends more on the quality of the engagement with Congress than the quantity.
The book also offers some important suggestions on how to improve, clarify, and extend the discussion of the budget as it makes its way through Congress. According to Demarest, program funding is not incremental, no single factor explains outcomes, quality Congressional engagements can suppress funding volatility, and an incremental strategy may control budget outcomes for individual systems most effectively.

While many people, particularly in the executive branch, understandably become frustrated with what they perceive as Congressional meddling in the budget process, Demarest points out correctly that members of Congress or congressional staffers not only can, but should, get involved in determining how the Army and the Pentagon spend our taxpayers’ dollars each year. These women and men are from the most representative branch of the American government. Those who agree or disagree with their decisions have a remedy. It is called elections.

I have spent the majority of my professional career analyzing defense budgets, and spent five years actually helping to formulate and defend them. Yet, I still learned a great deal from Demarest’s book and recommend it to all who analyze national security or become involved in the decision-making process.

To her credit, Demarest recognizes the results she outlines can be expanded insuring that her conclusions are not exclusively driven by a decade of war, or whether her insights apply to the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps as well. Based upon my own research and involvement, I would argue that the budgets of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps are not changed nearly as much by Congress as those of the Army, but that can be the subject of her next book.

I do, however, have a minor suggestion to improve the usefulness of the book. While Demarest has voluminous footnotes within and references at the end of each chapter, the bibliography at the end does not include the vast number of the references nor are many of them included in the index.

The Origins of the Grand Alliance: Anglo-American Military Collaboration from the Panay Incident to Pearl Harbor

By William T. Johnsen

Reviewed by Henry G. Gole, author of The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934–1940

In the prologue of his Origins of the Grand Alliance, Professor William T. Johnsen, of the US Army War College, tells the reader precisely what to expect in this 256-page narrative validated by 85 pages of endnotes: “The story told in this book is an effort to explain the origins of the Anglo-American coalition, outline its early development, and clarify how this early collaboration set the conditions that led to the Allied victory” (prologue). This clear statement of intent is realized in execution so that he can conclude “between December 1937 and December 1941 British and American staff planners forged the foundation of the Grand Alliance.” Historian Rick Atkinson, author of The Liberation Trilogy, highlights the
singular importance of that alliance, calling it “the most vital American partnership of the twentieth century.”

Scrutiny of that partnership has produced many excellent works, but “no one treatment offers a comprehensive picture of the military elements of the early Anglo-American process” (2). Johnsen provides that comprehensive picture. Many earlier works begin with, and focus on, the full-fledged staff talks in January–March 1941, the American-British Conversations known as ABC. They were “held in utmost secrecy,” because President Franklin D. Roosevelt was concerned with isolationists and noninterventionists still active in the United States (6). Johnsen writes with authority grounded in tight organization, thoroughness, extensive research in British and American archives and secondary sources, and judgment shaped by his scholarship, teaching experience, and military career.

Johnsen begins with two short chapters providing context, one on the American-British coalition experience in the Great War and one on the interwar years. Then, his descriptive chapter headings cue the reader to the deepening relationship as it evolves from handholding to marriage, which are abbreviated here and robbed of the wit found in the original: Coalition Encounters, 1936–1939; Ties That Bind; Allocation of War Matériel, 1939–1940; Assessing that Britain Would Survive After the French Collapse, 1940; ABC in January–March 1941; Turning Grand Strategy into Practical Military Plans; The State of Cooperation at the Time of Pearl Harbor; and the Conclusion. Johnsen does a good job sorting out what is essential to his story from what is interesting but extraneous, focusing on coalition grand strategy. Political leaders agree on grand strategy and provide coherent guidance to military leadership, as poetry becomes prose.

Formulation of national strategy is a complex process; making coalition strategy is even more complex. Then, providing military leaders with coherent and timely guidance for implementation is problematic, particularly when, as Johnsen and many biographers note, Roosevelt “loathed closing any options” (238). His management style has been characterized as divide-and-conquer with a strong preference for oral communication that often left advisers wondering what he had really said. His American military advisers, left in the dark, sometimes got their guidance from British counterparts who were clearly guided by Winston Churchill.

Unfortunately, strategy formulation does not flow textbook fashion from national interests—in this case coalition interests—from policy to strategy, with the latter’s component ends, ways, and means. It is a human activity. Errors and misunderstandings abound. So do shading of meaning and “spin” by staffers. And, sometimes in the course of bilateral discussions and analyses, the US Navy and the Royal Navy shared more on a specific issue than either navy shared with its own national army or air force.

The best writing in the book is in Johnsen’s concluding chapter, replete with wit and wisdom. He captures the special relationship of Churchill (strategist) and Roosevelt (planner) as well as the evolution and iteration of planning that led to victory. A “Reflection for the Future,” his last words, are three pages on planning for coalition warfare and
recommended for the curricula of staff schools and colleges as well as for serious students to mull over.

Historians will forgive this reviewer’s counterfactual grace note. What if Germany and Japan, in a grand alliance, had given priority to defeating Russia by a coordinated offensive in 1941? Without Pearl Harbor, the United States might have bowed to noninterventionists as the Japanese exploited the defeat of Russia by grabbing Dutch and French colonies. The Brits had their hands full defending the homeland, combating German submarines in the Atlantic, and keeping open their lines of communication through the Mediterranean to east of Suez. The sinking of HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales and the loss of Singapore and its garrison demonstrated by actual events that the British cupboard was bare. That German-Japanese grand alliance would have produced a very different future, now past.