Book Reviews

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London-based correspondent David Patrikarakos was initially inspired to write _War in 140 Characters_ by his reporting in eastern Ukraine during the spring of 2014. There he saw firsthand how Twitter was providing more up-to-date information than traditional print and television media (2). He then studied ensuing events in Gaza between Hamas and the Israel Defense Forces as well as the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. These situations confirmed his suspicion that the nature of conflict was changing due to the weaponization of social media. Hence, as the author states, “This book was formed in the crucible of twenty-first-century-war” (255). It chronicles the rise of what Patrikarakos terms the “Homo digitalis”—the hyperempowered individual who is networked, globally connected, and able to use social media (via narrative construction and deconstruction) to influence the outcome of conflict directly in a posttruth world (9).

The book is divided into an acknowledgments section, an introduction, eleven chapters, a conclusion, notes, and an index. Each chapter chronicles the impact of social media on a specific conflict and discusses the profile and activities of a major figure. The first chapter pertains to the Gaza conflict and the impact of the July–August 2014 tweets of the Palestinian teenager Farah Baker. The second and third chapter address the Israeli side, focusing on the counternarrative activities of Israel Defense Forces members Aliza Landes and Peter Lerner, respectively. The fourth and fifth chapters focus on the 2014 Facebook exploits of the civilian Anna Sandalova to obtain supplies and other goods in support of Ukrainian forces. The sixth chapter discusses the late-2014 social media activities of Vitaly Bespalov, a Russian troll in St. Petersburg. The seventh chapter discusses the use of social media by Vladimir Putin’s regime to help destabilize Ukraine and then seize Crimea.

The eighth and ninth chapters chronicle the metamorphosis of Eliot Higgins. He was initially an obsessive _World of Warcraft_ (massively multiplayer online role-playing game) player who established the Bellingcat website. Higgins became a respected and innovative open-source intelligence researcher following his involvement in tracing thedowning of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 over Ukraine in July 2014 to the Russian military (167).
The tenth chapter highlights the online recruitment of Sophie Kasiki—born in Senegal and then living in France—by Islamic State operatives. It also details the journey of her and her young son into, and their subsequent life in, the Caliphate as well as their eventual escape from Raqqa and repatriation back to France.

The eleventh chapter provides an overview of the 2012–15 activities of Alberto Fernandez, who headed up the US State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications. This center produced content directly aimed at attacking the narratives of al-Nusra and the Islamic State.

The introduction and conclusion are well-developed with the book’s findings squarely postmodern in their orientation: social media is individually empowering and exploitative, offering both control and freedom, and anti-state in nature in portraying the power of nonstate networks over hierarchies (257–58). In this regard, Alec Ross’s quote is very telling: “Good ideas die in hierarchies. Social media does not lend itself to the clearance process. It fundamentally degrades the effectiveness of diplomatic institutions” (263). Still, autocracies appear to be adapting to this disruptive technology quicker than liberal democratic states. The work is filled with useful information and nuanced insights into how not to cede “social media space” to your opponents and identifies useful open-source intelligence sites and apps such as SunCalc.net, PixiFly, and Slack.

The book is extremely well-written and an easy, relatively quick, and pleasurable read. The citations are adequate with a conceptual reliance on Mary Kaldor’s book New and Old Wars (2012) and P. W. Singer and Emerson T. Brookings’s pre-Like War article “War Goes Viral” in the Atlantic (2016). Of these constructs, Kaldor’s view of twenty-first century military success as being able “to avoid battle and to control territory through political control of the population” is greatly evident within some chapters of the work (261).

While the reviewer was initially put off by the specific major figure treatment within each chapter (or within successive chapters), it allowed each social media weaponization vignette—be it set in Gaza, Israel, Ukraine, Russia, Syria, or the United States—to become more readily digestible and contextually grounded around each character’s life story.

Since the work is now a few years old, it can be purchased at a discounted price. It should be read in conjunction with Clint Watt’s Messing with the Enemy (2018) and P. W. Singer and Emerson T. Brookings’s Like War (2018)—both of which it predates—for maximum impact concerning the changing nature of conflict and the weaponization of social media.

This subject matter is having an immense impact on how contemporary warfare (and gray zone conflict) is being conducted by authoritarian states, such as Russia and China, and radical Islamist terrorist entities, such as Hamas and the Islamic State. Senior military
officers and defense policymakers would be highly remiss in not educating themselves on such an ascendant phenomenon.

**Dark Commerce: How a New Illicit Economy Is Threatening Our Future**

By Louise I. Shelley

Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, adjunct research professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

*Dark Commerce* builds upon decades-long research conducted by Louise Shelley—a contemporary of Moisés Naím, author of *Illicit* (2005)—and a multilingual heavy hitter in the world of transnational organized crime scholarship. She is presently a professor at George Mason University and the founder and director of its Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center established in 1998. Dr. Shelley’s earlier works include Dirty Entanglements: Corruption, Crime and Terrorism (2014) and Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective (2010). The thesis of this new work is that “old forms of illicit trade persist, but the newest forms of illicit trade, tied to computers and social media, operate as if on steroids” (2).

It is much in line with perceptions earlier developed by Nils Gilman and his colleagues in *Deviant Globalization* (2011) and other scholarly works that argue the illicit economy is growing far quicker than the licit. And it represents a means to obtain much higher levels of profit than formal economic activities. Supporting this assertion is the modeling of this evolution in the tables on “The Stages of Illicit Trade” and the licit and illicit “Entrepreneurship and Trade” operations within the business cycle (113, 121). While earlier stages of physical-based illicit trade have not subsided, they have been augmented with computer-facilitated crime, then solely computer-based illicit trade focused on virtual and intangible cyber commodities—such as botnets, passwords, social media influence, malware, data, and digital pornography. Interesting components of the work also concern new constructs—such as dysfunctional selection as “non-evolutionary change [due to illicit activities] that results in survival of the less fit” akin to the tuskless elephant (5)—and newer terms have appeared due to the effects of planetary resource degradation, such as water mafias and climate refugees (6).

The book is divided into an acknowledgments section, an introduction, eight chapters, a conclusion, notes, and an index. The introductory chapter provides an overview of “the fundamental transformation of illicit trade” that is now taking place. The following three chapters provide background and processes related to illicit trade from ancient times to 1800, 1800 to the end of the Cold War, and from 1993 to the present. Chapter 4 offers a detailed study of the exponential growth of the rhino horn trade (between South Africa and Asia) while chapter 5 discusses illicit trade business models.
Chapter 6 focuses on how illicit trade destroys people, and chapter 7 illustrates how it is killing our planet. Chapter 8 summarizes the complex picture of illicit trade proliferation in our globalized world and concludes with ways to counter the challenges illicit trade poses for humanity and the planet. The book is very well researched and highlights the most cutting-edge work produced in the field of transnational organized crime today. It contains 100 pages of detailed endnotes and represents a multiyear effort by Dr. Shelley, utilizing online, depository, and field research supported by university and foundation grants.

Where the work falls short, however, is in the concluding chapter. While vertically and horizontally integrated and unconventional approaches are called for, the book ultimately provides what amounts to a listing of recommendations. These items relate to legal and regulatory policy, awareness and education, changing sociopolitical and environmental mentalities, and some strategies to address environmental and cyber-related illicit trade and to curb corruption. We are left with the less-than-satisfying “Hail Mary” proclamation: “The challenges are great and the windows of opportunity to reverse the planet’s present tragic course are limited. Let us hope that the mundane but important acts of ordinary citizens, combined with the extraordinary acts of the few, help reverse the current growth trajectory of dark commerce” (250).

It is the reviewer’s opinion that far more time and effort was placed into modeling and analyzing the rise of the new illicit economy (primarily computer assisted and cyber based) and too little—including any serious modeling or analytics—was spent on the so-what, back-end-response component.

In summation, Dark Commerce does a first rate job of identifying the threat of a new illicit economy as well as the historical processes and the more recent technological drivers further fueling it. Still, the work would have benefited from far more structure and analysis related to developing mitigation and response strategies concerning the emergence of a new illicit economy, rather than the fact we desperately need them. Dr. Shelley does a commendable and vital service of providing field grade military officers, strategists, and policy analysts with a strategic early warning related to this new threat. Hopefully, in her next work, she will focus on providing guidance on how to address dark commerce effectively.

Atomic Assurance: The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation

By Alexander Lanoszka

Reviewed by Dr. Mark Duckenfield, Department of National Security and Strategy, US Army War College

Alexander Lanoszka’s monograph, Atomic Assurance, has as its central thesis “alliances are more effective in deterring potential nuclear proliferation than in curbing actual cases of nuclear proliferation” [italics
added][9]. The crucial role for an alliance is in providing a potential proliferator with enough credible assurance for the alliance partner to defend it adequately; as a result, the proliferating ally need not take the path of self-help and pursue an independent nuclear deterrent.

West Germany, Japan, and South Korea are the three primary cases, but the question arises as to how much variation there is in the dependent variable as none of these American allies actually ended up developing nuclear weapons. Lanoszka attempts to resolve this through tracing the in-depth historical analysis of the steps in the proliferation decision-making process. Atomic Assurance is at its strongest in its discussion of US foreign-policy making. The frustrations, stratagems, and triumphs of US policymakers are closely tracked through the extensive use of primary American sources from Presidential libraries, as well as an array of State Department and National Security Council documents.

A short-coming of this approach—a common one in security studies—is it provides an American perspective on the problem of alliance management and nuclear proliferation. The prism for information and interpretation is often an American one as the primary documentation for information from abroad is that which is communicated to the United States from its allies. Especially in as contentious an area as nuclear proliferation, there is reason to question whether the concerns German, South Korean, and Japanese governments conveyed were themselves designed to extract concessions from the United States rather than truly reflecting the strength of concerns of the allies.

Atomic Assurance’s central argument emphasizes that security considerations and domestic politics of the potential proliferator are the real agency; merely imputing them from American records and (usually American) secondary accounts thus weakens the evidentiary foundation of the case. In fact, from the source material, it is unclear alliances actually do prevent a potential proliferator from pursuing enhancement of nuclear capabilities as all of the countries in the study, by its own terms, pursued some degree of nuclear proliferation. To ascertain effectiveness, some cases where an allied country should have had reason to pursue nuclear proliferation but did not even start would be helpful in providing leverage on the crucial question. Dogs that do not bark are often as important as those that do.

There is another anomaly in the research design: Lanoszka only examines alliances that include the United States. He does note Cold War-era proliferation issues affected both NATO and the Soviet Bloc. Considering there were proportionately more potential proliferators in American-led alliances than in Soviet-dominated ones might suggest a crucial variable is the nature of the alliance and the underpinning relationships between its members.

As a result, it is probably no accident the three nuclear-curious countries in the Soviet alliance were the three most independent from the Soviet Union—China, North Korea, and Romania. Likewise, the
lining up of the USSR’s Warsaw Pact allies, as well as almost all of its Arab proxies as initial signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), indicates formal and informal arrangements can facilitate some degree of alliance coordination.

There are also variations in the types of American-led alliances—ranging from the multilateral alliance of NATO to the bilateral arrangements the United States has with Japan and South Korea. However, the definition of alliance used here is confined to written agreements. While this is both parsimonious and provides a clear definition, it also obscures the ebbs and flows a more flexible definition of alliance might reveal.

At first glance, this might appear to preclude a less rigorous analysis of cases where the rationale for variations is the writer’s assessment of commitments implied in unwritten understandings, rather than the hard realities of a written treaty commitment. But in process tracing, Lanoszka makes precisely these assessments about domestic politics and perceptions of the international threat environments and alliance coordination.

The Warsaw Pact crushing of the Prague Spring doubtless raised German security concerns not just about German domestic politics. West German ratification of the NPT occurred at the same time as Italy and the Benelux countries due to intra-European and NATO alliance coordination, an aspect not mentioned. Atomic Assurance addresses several of these variations in five shadow cases—Australia, France, Great Britain, Norway, and Taiwan—ranging from one page (Australia) to five pages (Great Britain). The brevity of the coverage of these cases prevents a fuller assessment of the important questions they raise, but Lanoszka is to be commended for including them as a starting point for further inquiry.

This book makes clear contributions to discussions in both academic and practitioner communities. It widens the field of academic discussion by breaking free of data sets and delving into some of the dynamics and contingent processes through which policy is made. Lanoszka avoids concluding on a pessimistic note, emphasizing continuity of American military and technological predominance can alleviate security concerns among its allies if policymakers are attentive to demonstrations of alliance commitment.

The book’s final paragraph contains a strange typographical error referring to potential “Teutonic shifts” in the international balance of power (158). Given the tectonic shifts in international security accompanying the fall of the Berlin Wall and the earlier tremors emanating from Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik (easing the path to ratification of the NPT), one could choose to believe this is the author’s subtle joke about the prospects for sudden change in the international system. Nuclear proliferation could have just such a consequence.
According to the US Army and Marine Corps *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (2007), an insurgency is “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict” (2). Bard E. O’Neill, in his seminal work *Insurgency & Terrorism*, defines an insurgency “as a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources . . . and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics” (15). There are several types of insurgencies, such as anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, apocalyptic-utopian, pluralist, secessionist, reformist, preservationist, and commercialist.

With the publication of the *Plutocratic Insurgency Reader*, Robert J. Bunker, adjunct research professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, and Pamela Ligouri Bunker, nonresident fellow in terrorism and counterterrorism at TRENDS Research and Advisory, Abu Dhabi, add an additional layer to an already extended list of insurgencies. But unlike other insurgencies that attempt to overthrow legitimate governments to establish their fiefdoms, plutocratic insurgencies depend on the existence of the state as well its institutions for survival. As Bunker and Bunker clearly state:

> plutocratic insurgency arises wherever you see financial and economic elites using [their created enclaves] as staging areas for making war on public goods. . . . the defining political-economic feature of plutocratic insurgency [is an] attempt on the part of the rich to defund the provisioning of public goods, in order to defang a state which they see as a threat to their prerogatives (2).

Like guerrillas fighting a war of the fleas, plutocratic insurgents do not want to obliterate the state. They simply, like parasites, want to carve out de facto zones of autonomy by crippling the state’s ability to constrain their freedom of economic action (13). These zones of autonomy then enable individual, tribal, or interest group enrichment (23).

One direct, unintended consequence of globalization is the advancement of predatory capitalism, which plutocratic insurgents have ingeniously integrated into their arsenal of tools to advance their causes. Predatory capitalism is exploitive and oppressive to those below the top one percent. Predatory capitalists use bribery, corruption, coercion, and cooptation to maximize gains and minimize loss. Additionally, to generate profits both nationally and transnationally, plutocratic insurgents use lawyers and lobbyists, rather than violence or overthrowing the state, to create a shadow governance in pursuit of plutocratic policy objectives (219).
Plutocratic insurgents turn the public into their own fiefdom through privately owned public spaces (141). These so-called pseudo-public spaces are former public spaces now in the hands of corporate or plutocratic elites, and they are governed by restrictions drawn up by the landowner, with private security companies or gangs usually enforcing the rules (141–42).

At this junction, it is important to emphasize a plutocratic insurgency is not the same as a kleptocracy. While both organizations’ primary goal is to siphon the wealth of the states, the process by which they achieve their goals and objectives are different. As Bunker and Bunker point out, kleptocracies use the institutions of state to loot the population, whereas plutocracies neutralize those institutions to facilitate private-sector looting (2).

Regardless of whether we call them kleptocracies or plutocracies, the impact of their nefarious activities on the social fabric of society is the same. Their malfeasances destroy the social fabric of society by creating a system of impunity. They create a judicial system that has no authority. They create a government that lacks authority, autonomy, and the capability to address some of the most heinous crimes in a democratic society. Most importantly, it undermines the democratic process.

As John Sullivan states in *Plutocratic Insurgency Reader*, “‘criminal insurgencies’ and ‘crime wars’ are altering the nature of sovereignty and governance” (286). Furthermore, Sarah Chayes argues in her book, *Thieves of the State*, “corrupt government practices contribute to severe economic distortions, threatening financial sector stability” (186).

The end of the Cold War and the “end of history” have led to a more interconnected and globalized world in the twenty-first century. At the same time, the democratization of technology has created a new environment in which previously suppressed actors can exercise greater power via the internet in a dark, deviant globalization. When corrupt politicians join forces with plutocratic insurgents, nation-states pay the price because corruption threatens national and global security.

I recommend Bunker and Bunker *Plutocratic Insurgency Reader* to our future military leaders at the US Army War College. The 27 readings, ranging from September 2012 through February 2019, provide a longitudinal view of the development of plutocratic insurgency for learners. While the concept of plutocratic insurgency may seem “like old wine in a new bottle,” its impact today is more pervasive than ever, and its forms are also morphing to adapt and adjust to the changes within the unstable international system of the post-Cold War.
Red Teaming: How Your Business Can Conquer the Competition by Challenging Everything

By Bryce G. Hoffman

Reviewed by Dr. Charles D. Allen, professor of leadership and cultural studies, US Army War College

Red Teaming is a book where readers can learn what business leaders have culled from the US military experience over the past two decades. It is an organizational “how-to” that provides tactics, techniques, and procedures to improve decision-making and performance for leaders and managers. As such, the process of red teaming is a component of organizational development with the goals to achieve successful organizational change and improved performance through the alignment of organizational learning and knowledge management.

Bryce Hoffman is a former financial journalist who transitioned to a career as an organization consultant and author. His first book, American Icon (2012), is a best seller cited by senior US Army leaders for its key takeaways about leading and managing change in a large enterprise. In 2015, Hoffman gained the distinction of being the first non-US government civilian to attend the Red Team Leaders Course at the Army’s University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Through that unique experience, Hoffman learned of the origins, challenges, and evolutions of red teaming. As a result, he embraced the concept and wrote this book to expand upon and provide methods for any organization to “stress-test its strategy, perfect its plans, flush out hidden threats, identify missed opportunities, and avoid being sandbagged by unexpected events or new competitors” (250). While the author is ambitious in such claims, he provides a well-written presentation of concepts, an effective narrative of their application in military and civilian organizations, and useful caveats for leaders and managers.

The book is well-organized as it begins with a critical reflection by the US Army and the intelligence community in the wake of the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, and subsequent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. When strategies, plans, and operations failed to achieve desired outcomes, it was necessary to reexamine processes and structures, as well as individual factors of decision-making—hence, the need for red teaming. The reader learns through historical accounts that red teaming is not a new concept, nor is it unique to the US Army.

The author identifies the core problems red teaming addresses when the biases of individuals are compounded in groups and within organizations. Chapter 3 presents “the Psychology of Red Teaming” with well-researched and established findings on individual cognition.
that lead to inappropriately applied heuristics, biased judgments, and use of logical fallacies.

The purpose of red teaming is linked to its description in *Command Red Team*, US Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-16, where the command red team is a “cross-functional organizational element comprised of trained members that provide the commander with an independent capability to explore fully alternatives in plans and operations and supporting intelligence, and to enhance staff decision-making through the simulation for critical and creative thought” (I-2).

In chapter 4, “How to Start Red Teaming,” Hoffman directs the reader to consider key questions of the type of red-team model to use, as well as how to staff and to support the team. The three subsequent chapters reveal red teaming is the application of strategic thinking—specifically creative thinking, critical thinking, and systems thinking—which are familiar to senior-level war college graduates. New to military readers will be the compilation of tools and techniques to frame problems, to discern underlying assumptions, and to generate alternative perspectives. Hoffman provides several such tools with practical applications and examples of their use in well-known business organizations. To employ red teaming effectively requires the understanding of organizational culture as well as organizational climate. It also requires an appreciation of team and group dynamics in the decision-making process.

Hoffman asserts that for a red team to be effective, it must be accepted as providing value to the organization. Given that red teams, by design, are not invested in derived plans, courses of action, and selected solutions, the teams are inherently contrarian and viewed as disruptors to organizational processes. Providing value is evident when the red team voice is sought and listened to. While the red team interjections and assessments may not change the organizational strategy, plan, or solution, its engagement can clarify assumptions, generate exploration of potential consequences, and inform contingency development. Hence, red teaming becomes a necessary organizational capability to improve performance of the organization and its members.

Perhaps chapter 10, “The Rules of Red Teaming,” is the most insightful: like in *American Icon*, Hoffman provides caveats for leaders with pithy taglines. Of the seven rules, “Rule 1: Don’t Be a Jerk” and “Rule 6: You Don’t Always Have to Be Right—But You Can’t Always Be Wrong” are useful to consider regardless of the type of team or organization—military or civilian.

National security professionals may be more comfortable with former senior fellow of the Council of Foreign Relations and political scientist Micah Zenko’s treatment of the topic in *Red Team* (2015). Hoffman’s work, however, is more accessible to members of the defense community with engaging vignettes that clearly illustrate the how-tos of red teaming for the military pragmatist. Senior defense leaders will readily find parallel opportunities in warfighting and enterprise organizations within our military to apply red teaming in pursuit of better strategies.
Few questions are more preoccupying to military professionals than why some militaries perform better than others. Certain states, such as Muammar Gadhafi’s Libya and Mobutu Sese Seko’s Zaire, suffered disaster when they fought smaller and less well-armed opponents, such as the Libyans in Chad during the 1970s and 1980s and the Rwandans in Zaire during the 1990s. Other states, such as Israel, performed better in their engagements with conventional Arab militaries than a material “bean count” would suggest.

What explains these wide variations in military performance? Scholarship on this issue has flourished in recent years, with Kenneth Pollack highlighting culture’s role, Caitlan Talmadge demonstrating civil-military relations’ impact, and Stephen Biddle advancing the adoption of combined arms tactics as a *sine qua non*. Despite these works, we are still far from attaining a holistic understanding of military performance. Nathan Toronto’s recent book, *How Militaries Learn* contributes to this ongoing endeavor.

Militaries will underperform, according to Toronto, unless their officers have first developed the intellectual habits needed to adapt their weaponry and training to changing battlefield conditions. Military higher education therefore contributes powerfully to battlefield performance by instilling in officers the requisite intellectual flexibility.

Although Toronto makes a broad-based argument for prioritizing military education, he champions one particular form of education as separating the world’s most efficient armed forces from all others. Socratic teaching methods, as practiced in Western academic institutions, are the key to success. Rote learning, by way of contrast, cannot develop the cognitive skills officers need. Ultimately, a successful system of military higher education system—based on Socratic teaching methods—will develop the essential habits of institutional introspection and critical analysis within an officer corps to prevail at war.

While Toronto advocates Socratic pedagogy in general, he specifically champions the education of midlevel officers. Although most states possess military academies—often organized along the lines of France’s Saint-Cyr, the United States Military Academy, or Britain’s Sandhurst—that educate junior officers Toronto advocates postgraduate military education play a greater role in shaping battlefield performance. Toronto devotes his attention to the family of institutions whose progenitor was the Prussian War College and which includes such diverse American bodies as the National Defense University, the Command and General Staff College, and the School of Advanced Military Studies.
Toronto competently demonstrates his argument’s plausibly in a variety of ways. He begins with a statistical test demonstrating that states possessing staff colleges are more likely to win wars under *ceteris paribus* conditions. He then offers brief case studies of Prussia, France, Turkey, and Egypt. These cases show states deliberately developed staff colleges as a means of enhancing their military power, frequently in the aftermath of catastrophic defeats or periods of military underperformance. Staff colleges’ emergence, moreover, often coincided with periods of economic growth and improving human capital in society. Toronto, finally, offers a longer study of the ongoing effort of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to create a National Defense College.

Toronto does an admirable job at shedding light on postgraduate military education as an important, yet neglected, factor contributing to military power. While Toronto’s effort is notable, it nonetheless leaves important questions unanswered. I, in particular, would have appreciated greater clarity on the mechanisms whereby military postgraduate education translates into battlefield outcomes and on the question of whether the classroom environments needed to develop intellectual flexibility in the armed forces can thrive in societies that lack a modicum of political pluralism.

Although Toronto postulates military postgraduate education improves battlefield performance, he never explicitly states how this occurs. Three responses, however, could be offered—for example, armies with better educated midrank officers may win because they excel at the operational level of war. In a slightly different vein, the real advantage of such armies may lie in the superior adaptability of battalion and regimental commanders when facing unexpected circumstances. Finally, the value of well-educated officers may manifest itself at the strategic level, when it comes to making long-term decisions about force structure and doctrine.

While these mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, Toronto’s failure to discuss how military postgraduate education yields battlefield results becomes perplexing once one contemplates his case studies. France’s poor performance during the Franco-German War, for example, was a product of incompetence at the operational level, which the oftentimes adroit tactical improvisations by midranking officers could not remedy. The Egyptian case, however, suggests tactical adaptability is the primary value of military postgraduate schools. In this case, Egyptian generals developed an ingenious war plan prior to the Yom Kippur War (1973) despite Egypt not possessing an adequate system of military postgraduate education, yet midlevel Egyptian officers’ inflexibility in changing circumstances ultimately led to defeat. Toronto, meanwhile, suggests better peak-level defense policymaking is one of the advantages postgraduate education provides, yet also shows how capable rulers—Turkey’s Ataturk and Egypt’s Mohammed Ali—excelled in this regard despite possessing a comparatively undereducated officer corps.
Just as Toronto fails to address how military postgraduate education produces results, he also vacillates as to whether such education systems are compatible with states lacking political pluralism. Authoritarian governments understandably wince at inviting officers to engage in free-ranging Socratic debates. Toronto acknowledges this factor when he argues “stable” civil-military relations are a prerequisite for first-rate military education institutions. He also shows in his chapter on the UAE how students and faculty members eschew examining certain important regional security issues for fear of upsetting authorities. Despite these strong suggestions that some level of pluralism is a precondition for the institutions Toronto advocates, he at times suggests the reverse. He suggests, for example, that regime type is irrelevant to the quality of military postgraduate education and claims, without support, illiberal societies, such as Russia and China, possess military postgraduate schools on a par with the best in democratic states.

Toronto’s work, How Militaries Learn, in sum, merits a place on the bookshelves of commanders and scholars preoccupied with understanding military performance. The book makes an important and original argument. While it fails, at times, to answer the questions it poses, those lacunae should spur further debate rather than detract from the book’s value.

Lessons in Leadership: My Life in the US Army from World War II to Vietnam

By John R. Deane Jr.

Reviewed by Dr. George J. Woods III, COL, US Army (Ret.), professor of strategic leadership, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, US Army War College

With the US Army’s reinvigoration and reorganization of the Center for the Army Profession and Leadership, the memoir by General John R. Deane Jr., which reflects lessons in leadership from his distinguished 36-year US Army career, could not be timelier. He attained four-star rank having served as the deputy assistant chief of staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition (1973–75) and as the commander of Army Materiel Command, which was redesignated Development and Readiness Command under his command (1975–77).

The lessons emerge through stories of the major events that shaped his development as an officer in a variety of assignments in war and peace. Five years after his death at the age of 94 in 2013, Deane’s memoirs were published through the committed effort of his editor, Jack C. Mason.

While the book emphasizes events from World War II and Vietnam, the first and final chapters capture key moments in Deane’s life before and after those wars. The first chapter describes the influence Deane’s father, a general officer, and his contemporaries had in the young Deane’s life as an army brat. Deane’s early exposure to the Army lifestyle influenced
his pursuit of admission to the United States Military Academy at West Point and eventual Army career. Failing to meet the physical standard for admission, Deane enlisted in the Army where he “learned more in that year about leadership—about what men aspire to, what influences them, what motivates them—than in any other year in [his] life” (11).

Admitted to West Point the next year and graduating with the Class of 1942, he was commissioned as an infantry officer, serving with the 104th Infantry Division, deployed to the European Theater of Operations in 1944. Initially serving as the regimental intelligence officer, he became a battalion commander within the year. The 104th Division was commanded by the legendary Major General Terry de la Mesa Allen—a friend of Deane’s father. Allen represented another aspect of Deane’s professional life and development—exposure to key mentors who provided invaluable advice and examples for Deane to follow.

Following his tour in Europe, Deane served in US Army, European Theater of Operations where he devised a counterespionage program to keep Soviets operating in Germany in check. He performed a similar role to counter North Korean threats after the Korean War. His subsequent Pentagon assignments afforded him influence in important budget expenditures and investments in research and development. His assignments in the Washington, DC area included service as the deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and his career-culminating assignment as the commander, Army Development and Readiness Command at Fort Belvoir.

Military professionals can glean important themes throughout the book that offer timeless lessons in leadership. Appropriately, Don Snider’s 2005 The Future of the Army Profession defines four identities for Army professionals (warrior, leader of character, member of profession, and servant of country). Deane’s memoirs are replete with examples of each in the stories from his assignments in World War II (1944–45) and Vietnam (1966–67) in which he was duly recognized with several decorations for valor.

Illustrating leader of character, Deane recounts several events in which he displayed physical and moral courage. Deane displayed character when making tough decisions—whether taking bold actions to test East German resolve when the Berlin Wall was first erected or during contentious budget debates in the Pentagon.

He demonstrated character by holding himself and others accountable to standards—be it defending his response to a challenge his regimental commander presented or in describing stories of General William E. Depuy’s relief of officers in Vietnam. Similar acts of courage occurred when he stood up to superiors and underwrote mistakes his subordinates made while learning to become better soldiers.

As servant of the nation, Deane’s acceptance of assignments like the deputy at the Defense Intelligence Agency or when assigned to the Defense Communication planning Group demonstrated his willingness to place service to the nation above his personal desires. Furthermore,
his service highlighted instances in which he executed his duties in spite of disagreement with policy or policymakers. The dilemmas exemplify difficult challenges professionals face at the most senior levels of defense.

Finally, as a member and steward of the profession, Deane embraced two critical obligations. First, he internalized the responsibilities of stewardship as defined in the US Army’s *The Army Profession* “to strengthen the Army . . . to care for the people and other resources entrusted . . . by the American people. . . . [and] accomplish every mission ethically, effectively, and efficiently” (2015, 6-2). Second, he mastered “expert knowledge” (professional competence) and invested in the development of others through mentoring, training, preparation, and holding people accountable for achieving standards.

Deane’s service rendered throughout his career should inspire those who currently serve, and military professionals should widely read the lessons he offers in leadership. Using his memoir to spur discussions among professionals would be a most fitting tribute to his work.
he more things change, the more they remain the same in NATO. This year NATO celebrated its 70th anniversary, a significant accomplishment for any alliance. Despite many predictions over the years of NATO’s imminent demise, the Alliance remains as relevant today as it was in 1949 when the Washington Treaty was first signed. Timothy Sayle’s new book, The Enduring Alliance, gives some of the reasons for NATO’s continued relevance.

This well-written and thoughtful book examines the history of post-World War II Europe and the evolution of NATO. It does so through the lens of specific incidents that have put pressure on ties that bind the Alliance. In each instance, NATO adapted, and members found a way to compromise to keep the Alliance intact.

In order to understand why NATO endures, the author first examines systemic forces. The bipolar world into which NATO was born required the United States and its allies to confront the ideological, economic, and security challenges posed by the Soviet Union. In the brief unipolar moment that followed the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, contrary to the prediction of many scholars, NATO played an important role in ensuring stability in Europe during a time of dramatic disruption. Not only did NATO provide an opportunity for many former Warsaw Pact nations, and republics in the Soviet Union, to rejoin Europe, it provided Russia with some assurance a reunited Germany would rise peacefully within the constraints of the Alliance.

Sayle also spends a great deal of time discussing the importance of domestic politics within the key member states. For example, Britain had to juggle its desire for a special relationship with the United States with its desire to join the European Economic Community. The United States had to balance its competing global demands during the Vietnam War with calls from Congressional leaders, such as Senator Mike Mansfield, that Allies pick up more of the burdens of the Alliance or the United States would bring its forces home. It also looked at struggles within Germany to balance the need for greater nuclear reassurance with a growing antinuclear, populist movement. Throughout NATO’s history, national leaders had to balance these competing demands and justify its continued relevance to an often skeptical public.

Finally, the book examines the role of key individuals in either causing disruption in NATO or finding mechanisms to reach consensus
and move the Alliance forward. Clearly, founding leaders played a crucial role in standing up NATO. Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay, General Dwight Eisenhower, and Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery were uniquely able to guide the Alliance through its initial stage of development and provide a structure to meet its aspirations.

This mirrors the role of leaders such as French foreign minister Robert Schuman and West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer in enabling early European efforts such as the European Coal and Steel Community. As NATO evolved, individuals within (German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, US President George H. W. Bush) and outside of the Alliance (President of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbechev) played a significant role in the survival of the Alliance. Activities of key individuals inside the Alliance also caused unnecessary strains, such as US President Jimmy Carter’s handling of the neutron bomb and French President Charles de Gaulle’s withdrawal from the integrated military structure.

The book does a nice job in looking at several key incidents that occurred that might have resulted in the demise of the Alliance such as the Suez Crisis; the Soviet Union’s intervention in Hungary in 1956; France’s departure from the integrated military structure; and the fall of the Soviet Union. While the threat of the Soviet Union (and a future revanchist Germany) were essential to the beginning of NATO, the author argues NATO endured for much broader reasons. Throughout NATO’s history, the real necessity was US leadership to maintain security and stability among member states. This was not only for the benefit of US Allies, but also for promoting vital US interests.

Paradoxically, in order to avoid war and the threat of war, alliances have to be ready and willing to fight. Yet an equally important role for NATO is maintaining the political unity of the Allies, for together, the Allies are much more resilient against external threats and a sometimes fickle electorate. NATO enabled the reconstruction of European economies and provided the security umbrella under which Europeans could pursue an ever-closer union. NATO endures because it enables collective action to demonstrate strength against threats like Russia (and perhaps China), to allow Germany to continue to take its rightful place within Europe without invoking fears of its history, and to keep the United States engaged in a region vital to US interests.

This book will be of interest to international relations scholars, Europe enthusiasts, and those interested in Alliance dynamics. Foreign policy practitioners will also find relevant historical analogies as the Alliance routinely dealt with issues such as burden sharing, the role of larger members, and the very purpose of the Alliance itself. It also highlights the difficulties in justifying continued investments in NATO to a domestic audience that is increasingly untouched by the horrors of the World Wars of the twentieth century. The book is well researched and clearly written. It is a quick but substantive read, delving into sufficient detail to explain the nuances of each phase of NATO’s evolution. The overarching takeaway is NATO endures because it serves
members’ interests. Members gain greater influence and stability within the Alliance than would be possible without it.

**Peacemakers: American Leadership and the End of Genocide in the Balkans**

By James W. Pardew

Reviewed by Dr. Pat Proctor, a retired US Army colonel, who authored four books including *Blameless? The 1990s and the US Army’s Role in Creating the Forever-Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq* (forthcoming)

Ambassador James W. Pardew, a former military officer, had a front-row seat for the American military and diplomatic interventions in the Balkans from 1995 to 2008. He served as a high-level member of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke’s negotiating team in 1995. After the beginning of the NATO peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Pardew led the US training and equipping effort. As a special representative, he led the international effort to record Serbian atrocities in Kosovo. Pardew also served as the US special envoy to Macedonia during tense negotiations to avert a civil war in 2001 and as the US ambassador to Bulgaria from 2002 to 2005.

In this memoir, Pardew makes the case “American leadership of the international intervention in the former Yugoslavia ended the most destructive set of regional conflicts and humanitarian disasters in Europe since World War II” (xiii). *Peacemakers* opens with the US intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995). The book then provides a detailed account of the US-led effort to overcome Serbian opposition to—and US military reluctance toward—training, equipping, and unifying a joint Croat-Muslim army in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Pardew also recounts the NATO intervention in the Serbian province of Kosovo in 1999, focusing much more on events prompting the air war and negotiations ending the bombing than the subsequent US-led peacekeeping mission.

This book truly shines in its account of the little-known crisis in Macedonia and US-led negotiations narrowly averting a civil war there in mid-2001. The dispute, primarily between ethnic Albanians and Slavs in Macedonia, went largely unreported in the United States for a number of reasons. First, by 2001, the American public had grown weary of ethnosectarian conflict in the Balkans. Second, the new administration of President George W. Bush came to power with promises of an end to nation building; they were understandably reluctant to publicize the possibility of a new nation-building mission in Macedonia. And, only weeks after the signing of the agreement ending the conflict in Macedonia, the events of September 11, 2001, turned the world’s attention away from the Balkans to the Middle East and central Asia. In *Peacemakers*, Pardew provides a long overdue examination of the events and players pulling Macedonia back from the brink of war.
As a firsthand account and primary source material for historians of US policy in the Balkans, this book is without equal. Despite his closeness to the subject matter, Pardew provides objectivity lacking in other works such as Holbrooke’s *To End a War* (1998) or Christopher R. Hill’s *Outpost* (2015). At the same time, Pardew’s closeness to the events put the reader in the plane with Holbrooke and his team as they discuss strategy and in the room during US negotiations with Slobodan Milosevic and his cronies who were simultaneously committing genocide and denying their involvement.

The military officer or defense policy professional reading *Peacemakers* will be confronted with a number of uncomfortable truths. Pardew recounts the repeated efforts of senior US military leaders to block US military intervention in the Balkans. This book also details the obstruction by US military leaders in Washington and in the field against the effort to arm and to train the nascent Bosnian army after the intervention began. Pardew does pull a few punches. He fails to note the US military’s willful refusal to hunt down and to capture indicted war criminals in Bosnia. And he stops just short of blaming the US Army’s misguided post-Cold War focus on high-intensity conflict for causing its incompetence in dealing with the low-intensity conflicts in the Balkans. But Pardew’s honest appraisal of the US military’s obstructionism throughout this period will still hit military professionals painfully close to home.

*Peacemakers*, colored by Pardew’s role in these events from within the US government, is not completely clear-eyed. It suffers from many of the same maladies besetting US intervention policy then and now. The author shares the delusional beliefs of the US diplomatic corps in turning failed states into multiethnic, multicultural democracies and of the State Department’s insistence on preserving borders drawn by aged imperialists a century ago.

Moreover, Pardew accepts without question the US insistence on appearing neutral toward all parties and refusing to pick a winner in the conflict. Like the US government at the time, Pardew’s criteria for judging the success of America’s intervention in the Balkans includes single-digit US military casualties and an end to ethnosectarian violence rather than the creation of a political solution facilitating the departure of international peacekeepers. *Peacemakers* is silent on the international military peacekeeping mission in Bosnia—currently under the auspices of the European Union—continuing to this day with no end in sight.

These criticisms aside, *Peacemakers* is an essential book for anyone wishing to understand the history of international interventions in the Balkans. And as the American foreign policy establishment struggles with how to end ethnosectarian civil wars in Syria and Yemen, this book deserves close examination.
The Struggle for Cooperation: Liberated France and the American Military, 1944–1946
By Robert L. Fuller
Reviewed by Michael S. Neiberg, US Army War College

Just hours after the Germans left Paris, Charles de Gaulle made a triumphant march down the Champs-Élysées to the Notre-Dame Cathedral, a symbol of conservative, eternal France. Soon thereafter, he gave an impromptu speech from a balcony on the Hôtel de Ville—a symbol of left-leaning France. In doing so, he sent a message not just to the French people, who had not yet decided upon him as their postwar leader, but also to the Americans, who had not yet ruled out a military occupation of France.

Suspicious of lingering collaborationist sentiment and worried about powerful communist elements in the big cities, the Americans had prepared a full occupation, including a military scrip. De Gaulle’s coup de main and the enthusiasm with which the French people (left, right, and center alike) received him, rendered those plans useless. But the US Army remained in France in large numbers, and the two sides would need to figure out a way to coexist to pursue the common interest of defeating Germany.

In this highly detailed book, Robert Fuller studies the Franco-American relationship on the ground in France. His chapters analyze topics like requisitions, transportation, the use of ports (especially Marseille, the second most important Allied port in Europe behind only Antwerp), refugees, German prisoners of war, black markets, and the occasionally ill-disciplined American soldier. There is more detail than argument in this book. Fuller’s main theme is the largely uncontroversial one that the Americans and the French had points of friction, but they usually managed to work their difficulties out eventually. Both countries saw the need for France to continue to sacrifice in order to bring about Germany’s defeat.

Fuller gives short shrift to how devastated France was in 1944–46. The defeat in 1940 had not only wounded French pride but also led to an armistice that forced France to pay an enormous sum for its occupation and accept a franc-to-mark exchange very much to Germany’s advantage. By 1942, a mandatory labor scheme sent thousands of young French men and women to Germany to work in factories, and the Germans seized most French railroad stock.

Especially after June 1944, the Germans treated France as a larder, taking all the food it possibly could and shipping it back to Germany. American soldiers were shocked at how thin French men and women looked, and General Omar Nelson Bradley finally decided to authorize the dispatch of armed forces to Paris, in large part because he had reports the city was on the brink of famine.
Fuller also pays too little attention to the damage done to France by the Allies. American and British bombers devastated the French transportation network to secure the Normandy bridgehead from German reinforcements. They also targeted Paris, the single most important rail center in the country. Air raids over the La Chapelle district killed hundreds and gave the collaborationist leader Philippe Pétain a chance to argue France was the innocent victim of a war between the Anglo-Saxons and the Germans.

Allied logistical problems after the Normandy landings created further tensions. Needing to move forward, but short of almost everything, the Allies quite naturally began to requisition food and supplies from the people they were liberating.

The Americans wanted supplies to fight the Germans, and the French wanted to return to normal life as quickly as possible. This conflict of interest put France and the United States in competition for the same finite set of resources. A lack of a common language, the small number of Americans who broke the law or took more liberties than they should have, and heavy-handed American policy exacerbated the problems. These problems created tensions, but Fuller argues they never got out of control or caused the US Army significant problems.

For all their differences, the two sides did share an important common goal—winning the war. Lower-level French and American officials, Fuller argues, worked hard to solve problems and find solutions. American civil affairs officers, mostly majors, found themselves in control of towns. They normally found ways to work with mayors, using American resources to repair water lines, rebuild bridges, and help stamp out crime. These acts built goodwill, but the French still looked forward to the moment when the Americans would move on, letting them rebuild their lives for themselves.

Although The Struggle for Cooperation does not present any new or startling findings, it sheds light on an important, and often overlooked, segment of America’s involvement in the Second World War. The images of joyous French men and women celebrating their freedom masked the real problems of daily life in the wake of war. Unsure what they would find in France and anxious to keep fighting the Germans, American officers had to improvise. Fuller shows us how they did so, usually with success, in an incredibly difficult environment. Today’s civil affairs officers would do well to learn from this period of American history.
At the risk of sycophancy, the core of Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the US Navy, 1898–1945 is a book which this reviewer once wanted to write. During the Solomon Islands campaign in 1942 and 1943, the US Navy perfected its tactics, methods which allowed it to defeat the highly skilled Imperial Japanese Navy. For author Trent Hone, this result was not the product of happenstance. Instead, the American Pacific War victory had its genesis in the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, who viewed naval strategy as a knowledge-based discipline, explained by a set of common practices, a tactical doctrine, bred over the next two generations. The Naval War College incubated the development of these ideas, concepts tested by the fleet, all managed by a series of senior leaders who saw the service needing a naval “combined-arms approach” (1).

Hone uses doctrine as a source to explain how and what the Navy learned. The book studies the service’s “enabling constraints,” which shaped its internal language and assumptions, making learning possible (4). To create flexible tactics, the fleet experimented in a “safe to fail” environment encouraging officers’ aggressiveness and adaptability, which became and remained their common intellectual frame (9). Learning paid off during the Navy’s wartime battles, whose success Hone measures not by comparing ship losses for the sides in each action, but by asking whether they met operational or strategic goals. Aggressiveness and adaptability, acting as “heuristics” to permit independent solutions, allowed the remaining fleet after Pearl Harbor to recover, seize the initiative and win, admittedly at high cost: more than 5,000 sailors died off Guadalcanal, including two admirals (207).

As a management consultant, Trent Hone writes history as a sideline, yet everything here is of professional quality. This book follows on the heels of his previous essays and coauthored book, Battle Line (2006). His sources, rooted in Navy officers’ published writings and exercise reports between 1898 and 1941, battle experience between 1942 and 1944, and vitally tactical publications, are complete. What Hone explores through them is the evolution of tactics in the US Navy’s surface force and the extension of combat doctrine to include the aircraft carrier portion of the service later in World War II. At its roots, Hone convincingly argues the US Navy created a “complex adaptive system” to collect evidence from exercises and battles, assess it, posit solutions, distribute them to the fleet, and then repeat the process.

The Navy’s core problem was its confrontation with rapid, continual change. Both before and after 1915, when naval officer Dudley Knox highlighted the military use of doctrine, the Navy integrated ever more
tactical complexity. Gunnery exercise ranges lengthened threefold just before World War I, then doubled in the next decade. Despite the increasing distance challenge, artillery accuracy continually improved under the enabling constraint of fire control taught by William Sims. The Navy later added a linguistic shorthand for clearer correction of fire (63, 83). Torpedo tactics evolved as their ranges lengthened, too. As aviation technically matured, initially for gunnery spotting then for strikes, the Fleet Problems (21 large interwar exercises) allowed experiments with it. Solving these problems reliably in peacetime meant, despite the ruin at Pearl Harbor, the fleet took into stride the technology of radar, while using the Combat Information Center and signals intelligence respectively to manage and to improve its learning. The system defeated the Imperial Japanese Navy, fighting on its preferred terms at night.

The human side gets its due here. The leading figure for Hone is the oft maligned, admittedly mercurial, Ernest King. Service in destroyers—as aide to Sims, a submariner, and a pilot (earning his wings at age 48)—before becoming chief of naval operations in 1942, King was arguably the best example of the Navy’s increased emphasis on learning and education” who led his peers and subordinates (326). Other leaders, only slightly less accomplished (Chester Nimitz, Raymond Spruance, Marc Mitscher, Frank Fletcher, “Ching” Lee, and Arleigh Burke), ably filled roles in wardrooms, and as ship, squadron, task force, and theater commanders using the learning system. Plainly put, the Navy taught officers how to solve problems. Only the Navy’s massive wartime growth, requiring greater standardization for its enormous reservist officer corps, trimmed the complex adaptive system, making late war changes more incremental in nature (316).

Some of Learning War’s initial tables are disconnected from its text; later ones become crucial (26, 86). The US Navy’s submarines are largely absent. Fleet boats were meant to scout and support the battle line, although history instead saw them conduct commerce warfare. But submarine doctrine, focusing on what we now term the high-end fight, needed reworking after the war’s start, another example of adaptability. The Atlantic theater, where anti-submarine warfare also had a learning curve, is not examined. Nor are the Navy’s torpedo problems analyzed. For submarines and surface ships, torpedoes often failed: two destroyers shot over a dozen Mark XV weapons to scuttle the USS Hornet in October 1942, but most misfired. Knowing fallibility of torpedoes undoubtedly forced officers to emphasize gunfire during ensuing night battles.

Since 1996, a touchstone book for historians and naval officers of a peacetime fleet failing to learn has been Andrew Gordon’s The Rules of the Game (1996), studying the Royal Navy before the Battle of Jutland. Learning War is so clear, and makes the case for American doctrinal flexibility so well, this reviewer must argue we now have another book of equal importance to comprehend. Daring to sound glib, before the US Navy outfought the Imperial Japanese Navy, it had outthought it. Members of any armed service will gain from studying Learning War, and will recognize the Navy’s success when they read this book.