Book Reviews

USAWC Press

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters
Since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and the opening of China in 1978, China has been marching toward great-power status on par with the United States—with breathtaking results. The title of Clyde Prestowitz’s latest book, *The World Turned Upside Down*, aptly captures the impact of the rise of China and the high stakes involved for Western economies. Until recently, it was unclear what impact China’s economic development would have on the rest of the world. The emergence of China and its participation in the concert of nations were supposed to be blessings for peace and prosperity. They are starting to appear more like curses.

Fortunately, as we take stock of what has happened, we may be better able to deal with the predicament before us. Now that China has made it to the top of the agenda of the June 2021 G7 summit in England and was included in the final statement at the NATO summit in Brussels that same month, we may finally have a thorough discussion on what ails Western economies in the face of the Chinese juggernaut and what to do about it. The assessment and prescription that will emerge from such a discussion could decide whether the West as we know it can maintain its predominance in the world.

Author Clyde Prestowitz, a seasoned observer of Asia, has been building his expertise since the late 1960s. On the advice of his father, he pursued the study of Japan and subsequently joined the Foreign Service before working at the Department of Commerce. He was involved in negotiations with Japan over its trading practices in the 1980s. He details his views of Japanese commercial practices in the influential book *Trading Places* (Basic Books, 1988). He was identified with a small group of Japanese hands who rejected the traditional view of successful economic development found in neoclassical economic theory. Now, in *The World Turned Upside Down*, Prestowitz uses his expertise to describe China and the United States’ respective paths toward economic development and offer prescriptions to redeem the situation with China.

For Prestowitz, China’s defining element is its self-perception. The term *Zhongguo*—middle kingdom in English—centers China in the world. This perspective has fed China’s perception of itself as a uniquely important power and dominated the entire Chinese imperial period. The Chinese Communist Party’s assumption of power in October 1949 revived this China-centric perception with near-religious zeal. The differences between imperial and communist China can have dire consequences—Communist China can exact obedience and conformity unprecedented by imperial rule. China’s public-government relationship has allowed its government to reform and
direct various economic sectors in a manner that enhances state power and is at odds with the global community and various international regimes seeking greater integration involving give-and-take.

The failure to appreciate this reality was compounded by a misunderstanding of the origins of America’s path to economic development. In his extensive survey of the evolution of the United States’ economic policy making, Prestowitz begins with the early days of the Republic, quoting Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Like China did earlier, the United States made extensive use of mercantilist policies in the nineteenth century to build its economy. This fact was largely forgotten by the end of World War II, when the reconstruction of Europe and the need to respond to the Soviet threat led the United States to promote economic activity actively in the West and also in places like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. By the 1980s, as China was opening up, the United States was promoting a policy of engagement with China to integrate it in the world economy, undermine communist influence, and lead to liberalization and democratization. The application of this policy, however, suffered from a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the Chinese state.

In the third and final part of The World Turned Upside Down, Prestowitz summarizes the evidence and offers proposals to manage the threat China poses to the current order. Taken in aggregate, these proposals would involve a cultural transformation on a level arguably unseen since the reform era under President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the 1930s. Some of Prestowitz’s suggestions are targeted at China in particular, but most of them involve domestic programs and a new vision of the compact between the state, the American people, and big business. Given the debates of recent years over a national health-care program and the mixed record in the attempts of the previous administration to force behavioral change in Chinese trade practices, it is difficult to maintain optimism about the United States’ ability to respond successfully to this new challenge. The lucidity of the sometimes unexpected and depressing picture that emerges nevertheless provides hope for the future.

**Partners of First Resort: America, Europe, and the Future of the West**

By David McKean and Bart M. J. Szewczyk

Reviewed by Dr. Scott Smitson, professor of geostrategy and transnational affairs, Joint Special Operations University, and lieutenant colonel (US Army, retired)

While the United States retracts from the Middle East and simultaneously positions itself for long-term strategic rivalry with China and Russia, the relative strength of the post–World War II international order—and America’s role in it—is once again a topic ripe for discussion in defense and foreign policy circles. *Partners of First Resort* assesses the utility of alliances and coalitions within this context. Written and published in the initial months of the Biden-Harris administration, it provides foundational knowledge on the history of transatlantic ties between the United States and Europe, the current status of relations,
and where the North Atlantic community should orient its future efforts. Part history lesson, part advocacy, part commentary, the book attempts to embody many things, yet is only somewhat successful in its execution.

Authors David McKean and Bart M. J. Szewczyk, seasoned policy veterans of transatlantic affairs, passionately argue it is in America's best interest to optimize the depth and breadth of its strategic collaboration with Europe. Key to their argument is a comprehensive and consumable primer on the genesis and maturation of the liberal order following World War II and the outsized role the United States and Europe played in sustaining and benefiting from it. This section of the book is excellent. It outlines the history of the iterative growth of multinational institutions like NATO and the EU, fosters a greater appreciation for the establishment of the post-war order, and explains how that order ultimately succeeded against the Soviet threat. Additionally, the authors provide an in-depth analysis of the key events that shaped transatlantic relations in the dying days of the Warsaw Pact and the initial years of America's “unipolar” moment. This contribution should be applauded, as events like the reunification of Germany, nuclear disarmament, and early NATO expansion in the Baltics were not foreordained, nor were they inconsequential.

The remainder of the book is adversely impacted by polemic attacks on certain presidencies at the expense of true objectivity. Although this tendency may be in part a function of the authors’ professional experience in past administrations, the borderline pejorative language detracts from their important—and, I believe, accurate—argument that American interests are best served when deeply integrated in European affairs. The narrative devices hinder what should be a significant scholarly contribution to canonical writings on the transatlantic community.

First, the authors are quick to condemn the behavior of former President Donald J. Trump toward Europe, conferring too much agency and explanatory power to the actions of a one-term president as the sole reason for weakened transatlantic ties. In reality, American presidents’ interactions with Europe have waxed and waned over time, depending on geopolitical circumstances, crises, and domestic political considerations. In many ways, the differences Presidents Barack Obama and George W. Bush had with Europe are downplayed, minimalized, or ignored, devoid of major domestic political analysis. This deficiency also reveals itself in select elements of the policy recommendations that close out the work.

Second, while much of the back half of the book praises American-European engagement during the Obama administration, in contrast to the more adversarial and transactional approach taken by Trump, there is little discussion concerning the huge impact of populism on the politics of both sides of the Atlantic and how it acts as a major impediment to greater transatlantic integration. From Trump in the United States to the push for Brexit by the UK Independence Party, the ever-present strength of Marine Le Pen’s National Front (Le Front National) party, and the rise of leaders in Eastern Europe like Viktor Orbán in Hungary, the politics of disenfranchisement among populist-sympathetic voters is just as important a factor in forecasting American-European relations as is any judgment or hagiography of a president. This element of future transatlantic relations is crucial, but it only receives cursory attention near the end of the book. There is also little mention of French President Emmanuel Macron’s strong push for the “strategic autonomy” of Europe—a major point of friction between the United States and select
European nations (like France), as some see this as weakening NATO over the long term (7–8).

Third, I constantly struggled to identify the book’s intended audience. While many policy recommendations are enlightened and meaningful (and would find traction in the beltway), like the idea of a new Atlantic Charter, it begs the question if this work was intended to influence the transition between administrations or exist on its merits. While the sections on historical analysis are ideal reading for university students, chapter 3 seems to place the preponderance of strategic drift between the United States and Europe solely during the Trump administration, when tensions emerged well before the 2016 election (84). Additionally, this judgment significantly underappreciates the scope and scale of enduring institutional coordination and collaboration that occurs—despite these tensions—between the United States and European nations, regardless of who occupies the White House.

The authors argue the transatlantic community needs a new vision grounded in “principled pragmatism,” with a nuanced understanding of strategic geopolitical context and understanding, and informed by an objective analysis of mutual strategic interests (88, 166). I agree. This diagnosis is only the beginning, however. It is the voting constituencies of nations on both sides of the Atlantic—the same constituents who elect the politicians who decide the budgets for foreign and defense policy initiatives—that will determine the long-term solvency of the transatlantic community.

It is difficult to see how much of the policy advocacy spelled out in Partners of First Resort will easily translate and resonate with US domestic political audiences—particularly the middle class. Of the entire American population, the middle class enables the kind of grassroots populism that views multinational institutionalism as anathema to America’s long-term interest. This audience—not necessarily established policy wonks and academics—needs to be informed and educated on the absolute importance of transatlantic relations.

**DEFENSE STUDIES**

**The Sailor: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Transformation of American Foreign Policy**

By David F. Schmitz

Reviewed by Dr. Sarandis Papadopoulos, strategist, US Navy

Retrospectively, American’s foreign role seems to have witnessed a 1941 caesura. Before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States was a continental nation—holding a few insular colonies or territories—with US presidents who usually played minimal external roles. A small State Department managed international affairs—attended by equally lean Army, Navy, and Marine Corps units overseas, as a minority of citizens traveled or did business abroad. These conditions marked the post-1919 Paris Peace Conference era. Yet, by 1945, a series of changes had occurred,
transforming America’s foreign role into something unrecognizable. The United States joined international organizations and committed to defending its allies around the globe, actions backed by overseas militaries numbering in the hundreds of thousands. American noninterventionism—pejoratively termed “isolationism”—was gone, succeeded by robust internationalism. How did this change occur?

According to historian David F. Schmitz, President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) anticipated a need and seized the initiative to craft this national shift. Contemporary Americans were uncommitted to a significant international role, having perceived benefit from US intervention in Europe’s Great War. FDR expected the 1930s economic crisis to menace global interests and the domestic way of life and extended America’s attention outward. While he sought to accommodate noninterventionists, FDR educated US citizens on the need to engage with the world and kept an eye out for opportune routes to navigate the rising tide of aggression and threat.

Before 1941, FDR’s changes meant embracing the “Good Neighbor Policy” of equal trade, respecting foreign sovereignty in Latin America, and tactically signing the 1935 and 1937 Neutrality Acts to embargo overseas arms sales, while also negotiating with nationalist-socialist Germany, fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan (preface). The last step of this policy—then called appeasement—had a meaning other than what the term now represents. At the time, appeasement referred to the negotiation of compromises with aggressive states, consideration of whether to empower less assertive foreign elites, avoidance of drawing the communist Soviet Union into wider European affairs, and evasion of war in general (69). American domestic opinion, before and after the 1936 elections, was ardently neutral, and FDR needed time to change it. The president also modified his stance as new crises unfolded. For example, he initially attempted to maintain neutrality during the Spanish Civil War but later accepted the need to prepare the armed services as deterrents or for war.

During wartime, FDR could rely on greater national support. Even before the attack on Hawaii, a close relationship with Great Britain, resistance against aggressive states through the authorization of Lend-Lease, defense of values (the Four Freedoms), and US rearmament had all become acceptable to his constituents. FDR also sought international support. In order to ensure victory over Nazi Germany at a realistic cost to the United States, he had to secure an alliance with Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union. Later, FDR committed America to the United Nations, which he believed would tie together the victorious Allies in peacetime and prevent another war, extend American values overseas, as exemplified by the Good Neighbor Policy, and manage the decolonization of European empires. According to Schmitz, these accomplishments, realized after FDR’s death, make the president “the most important and most successful foreign policymaker in the nation’s history” (242).

Schmitz relies on FDR’s archived letters and speeches and records of his wartime meetings with Winston Churchill, Chiang Kai-shek, and Stalin. His choice to use public pronouncements to understand foreign policy—acts often performed behind closed doors—may seem odd, but these sources show the gradual evolution of the president’s ideas and language. FDR sustained his foreign policy leadership by continually remaining slightly in advance of evolving public opinion. Multilateral meetings in Argentia, Cairo, Casablanca, Quebec, Tehran, Washington, and Yalta sustained wartime goals while attempting to bind the Allies in the post-victory order. At the Yalta Conference meetings, FDR sought to keep Stalin in the wartime alliance by delaying
agreement on Poland’s postwar alignment. Although the results of those meetings proved unsustainable, Soviet troops in Eastern Europe and the president’s subsequent death probably prevented a better outcome (227).

*The Sailor* does have flaws. Readers might fault Schmitz for placing the heaviest focus on relations with Europe and not East Asia, but FDR himself accepted a grand strategy of Germany first: Nazism threatened America more than Imperial Japan. Additionally, the metaphor in the book’s title and occasional mention of FDR tacking through the hazardous waters of the political environment are not compelling descriptors of the president. He was a yacht sailor, but the maritime comparisons are too limited in scope. Readers might expect to encounter information about the prioritization of naval investment, given FDR’s background as former assistant secretary of the Navy, or at least reference to FDR’s durable commitment to rearmament at sea (which began well before World War II), but they will not. Instead, Schmitz presents all military spending as though the Department of Defense existed before 1947. This gap matters because FDR remained committed foremost to the Navy, and he understood the longer lead times needed to create the oceangoing forces for World War II and the postwar order. This last objection is minor.

In sum, *The Sailor* is literate and accessible. It successfully shows readers how the greatest shift in American foreign policy took place and how FDR’s efforts realigned American attention for the long term. A self-contained continental republic no more, the United States became, and remains, a globally interested nation with the following foci, which Schmitz highlights: international organizations, free trade, and military power in concert with other nations (at least when they agree on goals). Contemplating FDR’s ability to make such vital changes and resource them, despite the strongest headwinds contemporary domestic politics could pose, will provide readers food for thought on how to sustain an American internationalist mindset.

**Military History**

Land Warfare since 1860: A Global History of Boots on the Ground

by Jeremy Black

Reviewed by Dr. Jason W. Warren

Prolific historian Jeremy Black’s *Land Warfare since 1860: A Global History of Boots on the Ground* is an original and useful overview of land warfare, but it is too ambitious for the goals he sets out to accomplish in the preface and introduction. These types of synopsis histories of large swaths of time—as is the case with the author’s other offerings as part of Rowman & Littlefield’s series on the histories of the domains of warfare (air, land, sea)—are best delivered modestly. In this case, Black aims to achieve his deep analysis of multiple land warfare issues from 1860–2018 in under 300 pages. This leads to areas in the volume that lack in-depth analysis.
Although a diverse and interesting account of little-known wars such as the War of the Pacific (1879–83) of Bolivia, Chile, and Peru—featuring such battles as San Juan and Chorrillos and Miraflores—which contextualizes the standard Western military focus, it proves too much to achieve his broader objectives (28–29). This includes the idea that there is “no one essential character of warfare,” which “invalidates notions of clear-cut developmental patterns, as well as the related clichés, such as total war, industrial war, and wars among the people” (viii). He also addresses what he views as the historiography’s shortcomings on the obsolescence of land warfare given the current lens of failure with the wars of post-9/11: an overly Western focus that keys on occidental great powers; gapping time between Western wars, which leads to misinterpretations; and the explanatory factor that more means and nuclear capabilities usually determine the winner of conflicts.

There is more. Black seeks to critique the “End of History” thesis from the fall of the Soviet Empire, the focus on technical military history compared to people’s war, counterinsurgency (COIN, also known as compound or hybrid) war, differing Western Services’ views on war, the levels of war (tactical, operational, strategic), and a concept of time where there really is only a fleeting present, and hence the past determines the near future (viii, 1–10).

This overreach inevitably leads to strange apportionments of limited space, such as four pages spent on mapping in World War I out of a total of 30 pages detailing the conflict (82–86 out of 57–87; see also Professor Peter Mansoor’s review, Journal of Military History 83, no. 3, July 2019, on apportionment). There is a tendency toward a sympathetic view of British military history with a synopsis of the Dunkirk evacuation coming in for two pages of World War II coverage and an overly flattering portrayal of General Bernard Montgomery’s abilities during 1944–45 (146). Black does not mention British COIN failure in southern Iraq during the 2003 Iraq War while tweaking the American effort there, which ultimately witnessed the Iraqi Army—backed by US enablers—pacify the Basra haven of insurgents the British left behind (215–16). Further, there is no consistent definition of land warfare that could have lent more cohesion to this wide-ranging book. Military doctrine on landpower, for instance, would have been a useful starting point for thematic development, and its evolution from 1860 may have been monitored in a more holistic fashion.

To Black’s credit, he adequately addresses a number of his goals. He is particularly effective in underlining the Western lens—especially with his coverage of China. This is useful given the United States’ current standoff with this near-peer power. Black is at his best when dissecting combined arms warfare, particularly in the World Wars. Black concludes with a useful chapter on the future of land warfare, in which he makes a solid case for its continued utility and offers useful frameworks for thinking about it (233–44). Land Warfare is more of analysis of various historical interpretations rather than a standard history of what happened in the ground domain during the modern and post-modern eras. Had Black stuck to this with a consistent theme or two, this book would have been an excellent history for such a series. As it stands, it is still very useful for students of military history and military officers seeking a brief coverage of historical events and major ideas on the topic of land warfare.
The US Volunteers in the Southern Philippines: Counterinsurgency, Pacification, and Collaboration, 1899–1901

By John Scott Reed

Reviewed by Dr. Robert S. Burrell, assistant professor, Joint Special Operations University

Within The US Volunteers in the Southern Philippines, John Scott Reed, associate professor of history at the University of Utah, studies in detail how the United States raised, maintained, and employed a volunteer force to subdue resistance in the Visayas and Mindanao regions of the Philippines from 1899–1901. This comprehensive, heavily referenced history leans on official Army reports, congressional inquiries, and military policy and doctrine. It represents the author’s important archival effort and contribution to the topic of counterinsurgency as a whole and provides an increased understanding of the mobilization of militias for foreign occupation.

Reed efficaciously argues the US approach to counterinsurgency during this period included incentives for Filipinos to accept US occupation and strong deterrents for resistance. On the one hand, enticements included opportunities for participation in representative government, education for children, employment through roadbuilding, and medical vaccinations. The United States also offered immunity to guerillas who turned themselves in—a strategy that curtailed violent means of resistance. On the other hand, coercive punishments included confinement, banishment, or execution—not to mention the loss of land or business interests. Infamously, the United States also used water torture to elicit intelligence. In general, the carrot-and-stick approach—enforced by control measures—worked against stifling opposition, particularly in towns and barrios where the US Volunteers were garrisoned.

Most of the book reviews the Army’s implementation and operation of the US Volunteers militia system. Meticulously organized, the book is arranged by chapters covering the organization, morale, medical matters, and discipline of the regiments. Reed identifies the unification of local state militias into a national armed force with a common culture and ideology as one of the chief challenges. The author successfully argues that the coalescence of the US Army’s doctrine, policy, and code of conduct facilitated the indoctrination of the Volunteers.

Another major obstacle Reed addresses is the control of rampant illness in the United States, as the once-dispersed militias began to aggregate there, and in the Philippines, as US troops faced foreign diseases. To combat this problem, the US Army increased the number of active-duty and contract doctors to implement preventative healthcare. Most of these part-time soldiers conducted their duties with diligence and endured the harsh conditions of service in the Philippines, which Reed attributes to their shared concepts of masculinity and patriotism. Indeed, it is remarkable that the United States succeeded in its imperialist ambitions with volunteers, most of whom had little prior military experience and had never traveled outside their own states.
While extremely useful in its elaboration on the implementation of a US volunteer system for the purposes of foreign occupation, this study provides little insight into the Philippine resistance, instead focusing singularly on US forces. Diverting attention from the complexity of the resistance movements, Reed characterizes the many ethnolinguistic groups fighting US occupation as “nationalists.” In fact, other than the Tagalogs, most groups fought the United States for local and tribal reasons, which the author spends no time detailing (8). Additionally troubling is Reed’s statement that “the Filipino people had no tradition of sustained resistance to foreign domination” (1). This idea has been countered by many modern scholars who have cited continuous forms of Philippine resistance to outside influence, especially on the islands of Leyte, Mindanao, Panay, and Samar (the primary geographic regions discussed in the study) (1). For a comprehensive picture of the violent struggle over the Philippines during this period, readers must supplement their research with other sources.

Although Reed insists his work has no lessons for modern warfare, I recommend this book to professional military leaders and international policy specialists. I also recommend this book to infantry officers, who might enjoy the history offered on small-unit tactics used to counter guerillas in a tropical climate. It is an excellent case study on the unique US approach to counterinsurgency and the incentive-based method which continues to influence policy and tactics. Additionally, the tactics used to quell the rebellion and to keep US forces free from disease remain relevant.

Germantown:
A Military History of the Battle for Philadelphia, October 4, 1777
by Michael C. Harris
Reviewed by Rev. Dr. Wylie W. Johnson, US Army War College class of 2010

Michael C. Harris’s second readable and well-researched volume in his Revolutionary War history of the battle at Germantown, Pennsylvania, studies the summer 1777 British campaign to capture and defend the colonial capital city, Philadelphia, and end the American Revolution. The book continues the saga of colonial General George Washington’s on-the-job training in senior military command. The fledgling, ill-equipped colonial forces’ surprising and unforeseen second victory against the world’s most powerful professional army caused European powers to take strategic notice (xi).

The book’s nice arrangement begins with 28 brief biographies to acquaint readers with familiar and unfamiliar major characters involved in the military campaign. Harris then narates the larger strategic overview of the Philadelphia Campaign in the first chapter. He addresses what prompted the second British attack on Philadelphia and the colonialist response. Harris includes numerous helpful maps and photos of landmarks. He goes to great lengths to identify modern locations (such as roads, intersections, and buildings) of the eighteenth-century battles. This exceptional
scholarship helped me—a longtime resident of this region—reconcile the incredible differences between 1777 terrain and 2022 structures.

General William Howe, the commander-in-chief of the British Army in North America, had two options for the summer campaign. His first option was to go north from New York City and link up with his forces descending the Hudson River from Canada—effectively cutting off the head of the rebellion and isolating New England. Howe's other options was to go south, seize the colonial capital, Philadelphia—given the southern colonies' perceived loyalty to the Crown—proceed up the Hudson, join General John Burgoyne's forces, deprive the colonies of the middle states, cut off New England, and quell the rebellion. This ambitious plan was stymied, however, by arrogance, logistics, weather, and Washington.

The story of an outclassed, poorly equipped, and semi-professional (at best) colonial army reeling from a major defeat at Brandywine River parallels this one. In that battle's aftermath, colonial and Crown forces maneuvered for advantage while fighting some small engagements. Washington faced a huge strategic problem, including the protection of his logistical supply bases in Reading and Lancaster and of the colonial capital. Washington made the expedient but deadly political choice to protect his bases and relinquish the capitol.

Howe could not survive without his own logistical base—an armada of 265 deepwater ships commanded by his brother, Admiral Richard Howe—so he chose to occupy Philadelphia. The colonial river fortifications obstructing the Delaware compelled General Howe, who was in possession of one of the largest Western cities, to divide his superior occupation force into a security cordon: north, west, and south. Part of this force cleared the Delaware River to solve the resupply problem, which resulted in the Crown having about 9,000 British and German mercenary troops positioned northeast to face the colonial threat.

Washington's active spy network in the city kept the general well-informed of the British dispositions. Washington developed an “all-in” plan to divide his Continental regulars and various militia forces into four offensive columns. He estimated his numbers superior to the distributed British force emplaced at Germantown. Each of the columns would have to march all night for about 20 miles on parallel roads and then launch simultaneous surprise attacks at dawn—with no apparent resupply plan. Washington knew his army might have to flee if defeated and sent the baggage train to Bethlehem, Pennsylvania—a high-risk plan even by today's standards. Amazingly, he nearly pulled it off.

Many compounding factors obstructed success. Washington’s army had exhausted its ammunition in the previous battle. In the interim, each soldier and artillery crew was restocked from scratch, but there did not seem to be a plan for resupply; the army was operating on the margin. Dense fog arose through the night, which inhibited attackers and defenders. Another hindrance included the partial loss of the element of surprise, despite the poor, though credible, British communication of an impending colonial attack. Finally, distance stood in the way. Colonialist forces had to tramp nearly 20 miles there and back—and give battle for 4 to 6 hours—all within about 24 hours.

At first, the plan succeeded. The colonials coordinated surprisingly well as they initiated the attack against the Crown's surprised, unprepared, and overwhelmed forces. The colonial force had the solid initiative over the battlefield. British forces retreated into the tiny but sturdy village of Germantown. Today, Germantown lies
in a blue-collar, urban, section of northwestern Philadelphia. In colonial times, it lay at the rural outskirts of the city settled by German immigrants who built stone homes—each house equivalent to a mini-fortress. West of Germantown was one such building named Cliveden.

During the retreat, British Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Musgrave took parts of three platoons of his 40th Regiment of Foot into Cliveden, which had a two-foot-thick stone front wall, to make their stand. Colonial forces enveloped them as the British fell into Germantown proper. There, Washington’s inexperience turned the tide of battle against himself. He made the fateful decision to launch an attack at a single building rather than to isolate that impediment and continue pursuing the retreating enemy. Up to that point, the battle had been won. This action stalled Washington’s attack and turned the initiative to the British.

Harris concludes the study with a thoughtful epilogue, three appendices—including a thorough Order of Battle—and a final index. The book will provide a useful and readable study for the military historian seeking to walk the ground with Washington and his forces. I especially appreciated the in-depth discussions of the various armament, forces, personalities, and political considerations involved. Coupled with Harris’s prior volume, Brandywine (Savas Beatie, 2014), this book makes a thorough study of the 1777 Philadelphia Campaign and would be a worthy addition to any library.

The U.S. Navy and Its Cold War Alliances, 1945–1953

by Corbin Williamson

Reviewed by Dr. Nicholas Prime, postdoctoral fellow, Army Strategic Education Program, US Army War College

To label this book a timely work of history would understate its potency. United States relations with the United Kingdom and its anglophone former colonies—namely, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand—have maintained relevance in US foreign policy since World War I, but the countries’ naval relationships have not had such relevance since the precise 1945–53 period Corbin Williamson explores.

September 2021 saw the United States revitalize its political-military and military-to-military relations with Australia and the United Kingdom while the parties eyed the Indo-Pacific region’s shifting political dynamics. The sudden announcement of the AUKUS trilateral agreement and the Australian pursuit of nuclear submarines with the support of the United States and the United Kingdom—at the expense of the planned purchase of French conventional submarines—makes Williamson’s book an invaluable reflection on the history of such endeavors. The kinds of challenges arising from balancing national interests in bilateral and multilateral relationships are deeply embedded throughout Williamson’s work.

Williamson begins with a concise, helpful backstory of anglophone states’ naval relations prior to and during World War II, but he places his work’s principal focus on the immediate post-war years leading into the Korean War. Eschewing a simple
chronological narrative, Williamson layers his chapters to examine critical components foundational to fostering and sustaining interoperability at sea. Williamson balances this approach by providing readers with a macro-level context of the diplomatic and political relations between heads of state combined with an adaptation of Paul M. Kennedy’s “History from the Middle” approach. The latter approach provides readers with a valuable understanding of the effects of grandiose statements and intentions of senior policymakers on naval effectiveness in wartime. The book shows a range of influence from famous figures—such as Winston Churchill, Harry S. Truman, Bernard L. Montgomery, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Chester W. Nimitz, and John A. Collins—and lesser-known mid-career naval officers—such as Stephen Jurika Jr., former US naval attaché to Australia. Williamson highlights the ability of middle management to help or hinder the grand ambitions of the most senior leaders.

In later chapters, Williamson explores essential aspects of fostering and maintaining cooperation between navies to make combined operations at sea possible, let alone effective. Williamson begins with another top-down discussion of efforts made to collaborate on global naval planning—no small challenge given the divergence of interests and simple challenge of geography. Williamson reminds readers of the near constancy of the struggle to weigh US security focus between Europe and Asia—from the attack on Pearl Harbor through the Cold War—in a fashion any observer of current events can appreciate.

From here, the book explores the seemingly mundane but consequential issues of personnel, equipment standardization, and training and education nuances—each of which comes with myriad challenges worthy of reflection by anyone seeking to understand contemporary allied and partner collaboration challenges. The Korean War functioned as a test case for the application of practical avenues for the development and maintenance of a functional level of at-sea collaboration. Although Williamson forgoes a detailed campaign analysis, he provides strong, compelling evidence of where efforts made in 1945–50 have shaped the US Navy’s operations with partner navies off the Korean peninsula.

Most importantly—and to his credit—Williamson does not simplify his narrative as a well-varnished, shining success story. He balances his narrative of the practical, ground truth of alliance relations. By some measures, the book’s most valuable contribution as a historical work lies in its present relevance. Williamson explores unvarnished challenges accompanying shifting interests and contingent on trust. These challenges offer valuable lessons to astute observers of current events and present or future practitioners.

In March 2021, Admiral Philip S. Davidson, the then commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, offered a pronounced statement of concern before the Senate Armed Services Committee regarding the risk of conflict in the Pacific, which he expects to peak in 5 to 10 years. The accuracy of Davidson’s “window” aside, so long as the United States perceives the Chinese Communist Party agenda as a threat to regional stability, it must remain cognizant of the lessons learned from the period Williamson covers. In particular, the United States must appreciate the delicate balance of interests in multi-lateral alliance relations with regard to concerns about trust and the sharing of precious knowledge, information, and technical development—more tightly guarded now as technological complexity has exploded over the last 70 years. Williamson provides a valuable contribution to the field of history and a cogent
remindder of history’s ability to speak with uncanny cognizance and candor to the challenges of today and tomorrow.

The Road Less Traveled: The Secret Battle to End the Great War, 1916–1917

by Philip Zelikow

Reviewed by Dr. Dean Nowowiejski, Ike Skelton Distinguished Chair for the Art of War, Command and General Staff College

Through haunting depictions of forfeited opportunities, Philip Zelikow reveals in his gripping history, The Road Less Traveled: The Secret Battle to End the Great War, 1916–1917, just how close several diplomats came to ending World War I two years before its resolution. Zelikow exhausts American, British, and German sources in a new exploration of the conversations and opinions of would-be peacemakers. He mines diplomatic records, secret communications, and the diaries and papers of many participants to recreate a coherent sequence of events—at times evoking a feeling of being in the room with or in the minds of the protagonists during key discussions. With his rich archival study and ingenious recombination of documents, Zelikow relates a thorough, chronological tale of incompetence, missed signals, and misunderstandings in World War I.

This piece of essential reading for the defense community makes a convincing case for the potential to reach—or squander—lasting peace through diplomacy. Zelikow emphasizes the criticality of making peace as a part of making war. Through his narration, he shows disastrous consequences follow when military leaders lack awareness of diplomatic and political circumstances or work to thwart political leadership. He also brings into focus what happens in war when all the instruments of national power are not accounted for and when economic factors constrain the ability to wage war.

Zelikow—who holds two professorships of history and governance at the University of Virginia—has unique qualifications because of his lifetime of achievement as a diplomat. He understands the potential of diplomacy, how to set conditions, negotiation, agreement, armistice, treaties, and how to achieve peace. Looking through the lens of diplomat and historian, he understands the minds and conversations of the historical figures, appreciates what should have been done, and recognizes the wasted opportunity for an early end to the war.

In this drama, Zelikow features President Woodrow Wilson and Edward House, his trusted adviser, as principal actors in the United States. Germany and Britain looked to Wilson, the then leader of the most significant neutral power, to help start the process for peace, especially given Wilson controlled Britain’s purse strings. Next to Wilson, House had the most significant chance to help nations avoid further bloodshed, despite having no official governmental role. It is amazing that a figure with no office and no State Department position would help determine,
through his own inclinations and failures, such consequential wartime decisions. Yet, House stepped into this role because Wilson did not trust anyone else—including the then Secretary of State Robert Lansing—to help him through the secretive peace process. House served as Wilson’s private counselor and go-between, thereby shielding the introverted president from wider personal engagement with either side. Wilson’s failure to execute at such a consequential moment—due to his incompetence and botched choice of a confidante—is the story’s sorriest revelation.

Other key actors include German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, who staved off German militarists for months. Another important German was Count Johann von Bernstorff, the competent German ambassador to the United States, who signaled German readiness for peace. Unfortunately, his signals were lost in transmission due to House’s limitations.

Significant British actors include Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith, Foreign Secretary Edward Grey, David Lloyd George (Asquith’s successor), and other members of Asquith’s War Committee. Asquith and his allies pursued peace, but George’s rise to power and House’s misreading of the British willingness for a ceasefire thwarted their efforts. Under George—who kept the initial path to peace open—the window of opportunity for peace talks closed. Britain’s financial weakness, its correlated high susceptibility to American influence, and the rise to power of Generals Erich Ludendorff and Paul von Hindenburg provide a backdrop to the failed opportunity to end the war sooner. The ascent of Ludendorff and von Hindenburg resulted in Germany’s declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1, 1917, and ended the chance to come to a conflict-free agreement among nations until later.

Others have explored the broad aspects of this failed effort for peace—the late 1916 secret German attempt has long since been publicized—but Zelikow has the distinction of showing how often key figures could have concluded World War I before 1918. Zelikow resurrects key actors in a pathos filled reconstruction of consequential interactions. Zelikow’s illumination of this real chance for peace stands in stark relief when contemplated with all that occurred and, perhaps, all that could have been avoided after January 1917: the American entry into the war; the casualties and destruction on both sides in 1917 and 1918; the collapse of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, German, and Ottoman empires and their accompanying revolutions; the failed Treaty of Versailles; and the Treaty of Versailles’s relationship to World War II.
Break in the Chain—Intelligence Ignored

By W. R. Baker

Reviewed by Phillip Dolitsky, master’s degree candidate, School of International Service, American University

Ever since Bernard Brodie attempted to explain our failure in Vietnam in his War & Politics (Macmillan, 1973), scholars and practitioners—recognizing the past often acts as prologue—have probed the Vietnam War for insights into better ways to wage war. W. R. Baker, a US Army intelligence analyst during the Vietnam War, has added to the ever-growing body of analysis with Break in the Chain. Part memoir and part historical account, the book is a welcome addition to scholarly and popular literature on the jungle conflict.

Baker begins by recounting his journey from “army brat to basic training” and then to his deployment in Vietnam (5). Readers will feel as if they are listening to a grandfather describe his life’s story to his grandson seated on his lap. This account includes both serious discussions—for example, in “The Barn,” where Baker learned map reading and mapmaking as part of his military training—and more lighthearted anecdotes, such as soldiers playing poker played in Vietnam (13, 21). Although ancillary to his overall theme of the Easter Offensive, the introductory chapters add a personal touch to the book.

In the next two sections, Baker’s extensive knowledge and firsthand account of the events surrounding the Easter Offensive shine. This book is a truly comprehensive tactical history of the attack and a magisterial culmination of decades-long research and study. Baker’s unparalleled work traces the origins of the Easter Offensive to Operation Lam Son 719, which he notes gave the North Vietnamese the idea and confidence to launch a massive offensive action. He documents the North’s buildup along the border and highlights the goals they hoped to accomplish by launching the surprise attack, in a vivid play-by-play of the battle only available from a firsthand account.

As to the book’s subtitle, Why the Easter Offensive Should Have Turned Out Differently, Baker’s thesis remains unchanged from his articles published in the 1990s. Despite reliable intelligence indicating heavy North Vietnamese buildup and a large offensive operation, US and South Vietnamese commanders ignored those warnings (71). Baker specifically points to three failures of the decisionmakers: “deferring to a command hierarchy, ‘stove-piping’ intelligence, and relying on one form of intelligence” (71). He notes a similar failure occurred during the Battle of the Bulge. In particular, US and South Vietnamese leaders ignored vital human intelligence—especially intelligence provided by a “usually reliable source”—which revealed the North Vietnamese Army’s switch to conventional operations in 1972 (73). He writes that in ignoring “the evidence of [photographic intelligence] PHOTINT, [signals intelligence] SIGINT, and [human intelligence] HUMINT collections, the major field and national commands displayed either complete ignorance, incompetence, or deliberate malfeasance towards what was about to take place on the battlefields” (158). What accounts for the command failure? Baker suggests it was “that
the United States was too much in a hurry to leave South Vietnam and that shifting responsibility was the order of the day” (159).

Although Baker does not present a large, theoretical deep dive into intelligence failures and surprise attacks, there is much to admire about his thesis. He shies away from the conventional wisdom of surprise attacks, which insists failure to anticipate attacks is caused by a lack of imagination or the inability to connect the dots (a thesis popularized by Roberta Wohlstetter). Instead, he notes the best intelligence in the world is meaningless without a receptive and captive audience who can issue orders to act. Erik J. Dahl expounds on a nearly identical thesis in his book *Intelligence and Surprise Attack* (Georgetown University Press, 2013). In *Break in the Chain*, Baker presents an important case study in how failure to push aside preconceived notions and unwillingness to listen to intelligence reports can have disastrous consequences. If only we would learn our lesson.

Two critical points should be raised. First, readers will find it hard to overlook Baker’s bias. Written from “the perspective of the only trained US Army Intelligence Analyst in I Corps” who reported on the North’s buildup and possible invasion, the book represents a case of self-exoneration (cover). Because Baker was intimately involved in the intelligence surrounding the Easter Offensive, he is able to shift blame easily from himself and his fellow analysts and onto his superiors. This point does not discredit his account and thesis—he may very well be correct—but readers should be aware of this strong bias. Second, a heavier editing hand could have enhanced the book’s quality. Grammar and syntax issues throughout make for an occasionally slow and uncomfortable read.

Overall, Baker’s book is a valuable addition to Vietnamese history and historiography and intelligence literature. It is an impressive tactical history with a message that should be heeded sooner rather than later.
Jessica Davis writes that the objective of her book *Illicit Money* is to “guide academics and practitioners in understanding terrorist financing” by providing a “framework for analysts of terrorist financing . . . [and] a theory from which to predict how terrorist groups, cells, and individuals will finance their activities” (2). She achieves this goal by providing well-researched historical examples that support the different facets of her proposed framework. *Illicit Money* and the knowledge provided within it will benefit both newcomers and those already entrenched in the world of counterterrorism financing, whether it be through tangible examples of the procuring of funds or through a new way of approaching terrorist financing as a business study and understanding the vertical integration techniques terrorist organizations use to operate.

The book is thoughtfully laid out: first, with an explanation of how terrorist organizations, cells, and individuals raise money; next, with an explanation of the use, storage, management, and movement of that money; and, finally, with an explanation of the link between past, emerging, and future terrorist financing methods—and how to disrupt them.

Davis analyzes 55 terrorist organizations, 18 plots, and 32 attacks in a quantitative analysis for readers. The figures and charts presented throughout the book provide depth to this analysis—however, readers will better appreciate her discussions of actual events. Davis references supporting research from scholars in this area and utilizes her past employment experience with the Canadian Security Intelligence Services and her time at the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada to provide as well-rounded a study of terrorist financing as any currently available.

Davis first walks readers through the ways in which terrorist organizations, cells, and individuals source funds for their operations. She establishes a framework here for distinguishing operational activities from organizational activities. Davis’s breakdown is an effective tool for unraveling the sources, use, and movement of funds. If investigators were to focus strictly on operational funding for an attack, for instance, they would limit the areas in which they would be able to identify the source or use of funds for more expensive organizational costs. The first section of the book also conveys that shared ideologies are not the only common threads among those providing funds to terrorist organizations. From state sponsorship to a common social identity originating from shared geography, culture, language, ethnicity, grievance, or religion, many factors drive those who help support terrorist
organizations, both financially and otherwise. Davis also addresses the fine line between voluntary donations and extortion or other rackets.

In supporting her proposed framework, Davis highlights the stereotypes or common misconceptions that may interfere when investigating the financing of terrorism. For example, she clearly explains the confusing influence of the media’s veiling of certain terrorist organizations as drug cartels. Davis explains that these terrorist organizations are more involved in taxation and extortion than the actual movement of drugs.

The book then delves into an interpretation of terrorist organizations as global business enterprises. This supports the author’s goal in setting up a framework for an analytical approach toward these organizations. Davis clearly defines the businesslike importance of appreciating local resources—such as human, environmental, and geographical—and how these develop the scope and methods of business operations. Familiarity with a region’s resources—whether illicit or legal—is a key starting point to understanding financing opportunities to the terrorist organization.

*Illicit Money* details the sophistication of some of the larger terrorist financing schemes that operate with a near-corporate strategy of diversification through taxation, extortion, and donations. This strategy requires bookkeeping capabilities to manage the stream of financing and account for organizational costs, salaries, and training expenses. Davis notes some regions require strategies to enable terrorists to operate within the same “market” as other terrorist organizations while maintaining their funding sources and occurrences where one terrorist organization will provide assistance in the form of money or weapons to another, seemingly unrelated one.

The final section rounds out the book by detailing approaches to counterterrorism and the overlap in methods needed to ensure its effective implementation. This section also elucidates many current shortcomings within the counterterrorism realm. Davis stresses the need for public and private initiatives to work together and share information and tools. Challenges also emerge from developments and changes within terrorist organization operations—from in the rise of extremism to the use of bitcoin and social media. Davis notes that, while the Internet has benefited terrorist organizations by allowing them to reach a broader audience, the digital trail could prove useful in unwinding financing methods.

Ultimately, Davis successfully shines a light on a broad topic and supports her analysis with tangible, historical events. She provides a balance of details without losing readers in her presentation of statistics. This book would serve well as a tool for anyone hoping to become involved in the prevention of terrorist financing. Davis’s proposed framework helps develop the mindset of readers to approach the understanding of terrorist financing in a new and robust way.