A Compendium to the  
2023 Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment

This list of strategic issues offers insight into the particularized matters impacting defense organizations. Senior leaders across the highest echelons of Army and Department of Defense organizations provided input. This list and the narrative found in SSI’s Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment will help focus the research community on topics important to the Army.

The Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) maintains a menu of Joint Force research topics. Students and researchers with a common access card can explore this list at https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pin=324.

NOTE: This version is intended for public use and therefore omits specific restricted information. E-mail LTC Paul Milas at paul.j.milas.mil@army.mil from an official government account to request the full version including controlled unclassified information (CUI).

INTEGRATED RESEARCH PROJECTS

An Integrated Research Project (IRP) is an intensive, faculty-led, student-executed research effort. It places faculty and students from across the US Army War College (USAWC) in a team setting that produces scholarship of value to the Army, the Joint Force and/or the Department of Defense (DoD). Students can directly influence Army policy, inform senior leader decision-making, and contribute scholarship of value to the national security community beyond the scale and impact typically possible with a Strategic Research Requirement (SRR). Every IRP has at least one external sponsor that establishes the research requirement and/or has a vested interest in the topic. A sponsor is an external entity that agrees to assist USAWC research, sometimes with financial or materiel means but frequently through expert advice or feedback to the research effort. Students should sign up for an IRP only after meeting with IRP faculty leads and after considering the full menu of enrichment programs and other activities. Students may be required to travel to support
research or deliver briefings to senior leaders. Each student will receive credit for the completion of the SRR. Students may also receive academic credits for individual course papers, elective courses, and/or public speaking requirements. See Appendix D of the academic year 2024 student catalog for additional information.

1. The Role of Strategic Landpower in Joint and Combined Operations

This IRP will provide a broadened appreciation of the US Army capability gaps especially at the Service component level and potential solutions. The primary focus will be on Landpower in Joint and Multidomain Operations (MDO) against a near-peer competitor. This IRP will also address future challenges to include homeland defense and all warfighting functions. Meets most graduation requirements. Findings of this IRP will be briefed at the Strategic Landpower Symposium, Carlisle, PA, on 7–9 May 2024.

See notes at head of section. The primary research focus for this IRP is applied strategic art. The intended sponsors for research work are AUSA, HQDA G-3/5/7, Army Futures Command, and the Mission Command Center of Excellence. Students should contact the faculty lead in the USAWC Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL), Dr. Greg Cantwell, to express interest or solicit additional information.

2. The Military and Society: An Annual Survey

This IRP will begin an annual survey of American society that oversamples on veterans and military families, with the aim of understanding the broad factors that influence Americans’ “propensity to serve” and their willingness to advocate for military service. End product will be an inaugural report that aims to examine these correlations and set stage for analysis of the military and society to support the new Center for Civil-Military Relations at the USAWC.

See notes at head of section. The intended sponsors for research work are OUSD Personnel and Readiness, Secretary of the Army. Students should contact the faculty lead in the USAWC Department of National Security Strategy (DNSS), Dr. Carrie Lee, to express interest or solicit additional information.

3. Artificial Intelligence

This IRP will examine the role of AI in conducting planning for multi-MDO. AI can increase the speed of decision, learn about the operational environment, and increase the kinds of decisions it can facilitate. Drawing on lessons learned from 18th Airborne Corps Scarlet Dragon exercises, this project will address the optimal utility AI applications, human-machine teaming best practices, and machine-learning management.
See notes at head of section. The intended sponsor for research is the 18th Airborne Corps. Students should contact the faculty lead in the USAWC Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), Dr. Tony Pfaff, to express interest or solicit additional information.

4. Ukraine War Lessons Learned

This IRP will examine combat effectiveness of Russian and Ukrainian militaries in the current conflict across all warfighting functions. Aim will be to shape doctrine, training, and professional military education of Army leaders.

See notes at head of section. The intended sponsor for research is the G2, US Army Training and Doctrine Command. Students should contact the faculty lead in the USAWC Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations (DMSPO), Dr. John Nagl, to express interest or solicit additional information.

5. Preparing for Protracted War with the PLA in the Indo-Pacific

This IRP will examine the unique features of a protracted war in the Indo-Pacific. What does it look like? How do we prepare to fight and win a protracted conflict? How can land forces generate options in conflict for policymakers and the joint force commander to expand the battlespace without nuclear escalation? What preparatory actions in campaigning enable these options?

See notes at head of section. Students should contact the faculty lead in DMSPO, Dr. Jerad Harper, to express interest or solicit additional information.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs

For the research proposals below, students should contact the Strategic Studies Institute for Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) points of contact and additional information—or as otherwise noted.

1. Civil Support to Defense Activities (CSDA)

USNORTHCOM recently included the concept of Civil Support to Defense Activities (CSDA) in a department planning document. This concept purports that in a homeland contested environment, the DoD may need support from other Federal departments and agencies to maintain DoD critical functions and missions. This concept is not recognized in DoD lexicon or joint publications. Additionally, Federal level guidance, directives, and authorities do not exist for DoD to request the use or prioritization of Civil Support for Defense Activities. Conceptually, CSDA may be viewed
as the reverse of Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) which is codified in legislation and across the defense enterprise through policy directives. Might a similar model be available for DoD to use to request assistance from Federal partners? The Defense Production Act, through the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), offers an example of what a CSDA model could look like. CRAF is a program in which DoD contracts for the services of aircraft, owned by a US entity or citizen, during national emergencies when expanded civil augmentation of military aircraft is required. This capability has only been called on three times since 1950.

Develop a study that, 1) provides a historical review of the CSDA concept including if this concept exists in other nations, 2) proposes a framework for a CSDA authority including the limitations and parameters of the authority, and 3) develops a proposed process that the Department would utilize to execute a CSDA authority. The study should articulate why such a capability might be needed, what legislative guidance would be required, what subsequent policy would federal departments and agencies need to implement, and detail risks that might result from executing CSDA.


The DoD has employed DSCA capabilities to support domestic incident management and response for hurricanes, flooding, wildfires, and other crises across the nation. In a continuing effort to reduce reliance on DSCA, a historical retrospective that identifies what capabilities are most frequently requested by Federal Departments and Agencies is essential. The Joint Force will be prepared to respond to DSCA requests for small-scale, short-duration crises without substantially impairing high-end warfighting readiness. To meet this objective, DoD must understand DSCA trends and how DoD support may impact readiness in executing its primary mission of Homeland Defense.

Build a historical case study retrospective that identifies: 1) the event that precipitated a request for assistance (what was the domestic crises?), 2) the quantity and duration of the forces provided, 3) the type of capabilities fielded, and 4) if those capabilities were unique to DoD. Analyze the gap between what DoD provided and what other Federal departments and agencies could have provided. Determine if DSCA deployments offered a unique capability or were duplicative of capabilities that exist elsewhere in the Federal government.

3. Competing Military and Civil Society Demands for Access to Select National Guard and Reserve Force Capabilities in a National-Level Crisis

Research question and description are CUI. Students should e-mail SSI from an official government account to request a full list.
4. Role of Strategic Adversaries in Activation/Radicalization of Domestic Violent Extremists (DVEs) and Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs)

   Research question and description are CUI. Students should e-mail SSI from an official government account to request a full list.

5. Ukrainian Continuity of Government (COG) Case Study

   Research question and description are CUI. Students should e-mail SSI from an official government account to request a full list.

6. Instituting Service Resilience Programs

   Research question and description are CUI. Students should e-mail SSI from an official government account to request a full list.

7. The Role of Drones to Support “Just in Time Logistics”

   Research question and description are CUI. Students should e-mail SSI from an official government account to request a full list.

8. Service and Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Supply Chain Dependencies and Operational Needs

   Research question and description are CUI. Students should e-mail SSI from an official government account to request a full list.

Joint Staff, J-5

For the research proposals below, students should contact the Strategic Studies Institute for Joint Staff, J-5 points of contact and additional information.

1. The Future of Joint Command and Control

   Research and examine current joint C2 structures to determine if current CCMD structures, with regional orientation, provide deterrent effects, and is appropriate for conflict if deterrence fails at the global level. Does the advantage of unity of command from the concept of supported/supporting outweigh the timeliness of response in a twenty-first-century all-domain battlespace?
2. **Posture in the Indo-Pacific**

   How should the Army plan to coordinate with other services, namely the USAF and the USN, to provide logistical support and protection to distributed basing and resupply efforts in the Indo-Pacific?

3. **Posture in the Indo-Pacific**

   What are the priority basing agreements that the Army must secure in the near-term in order to optimize its long-range fires capability in the Indo-Pacific?

4. **Posture in the Indo-Pacific**

   With DoD strategic guidance directing the defense enterprise toward the Indo-Pacific, how can the Army balance following strategic guidance and providing the persistent support/continuity needed for other AORs/threats. More specifically, how can it do this both in terms of strategy and resourcing?

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**US SPACE COMMAND**

Students who select a research topic from this list will receive informal, open-source access, coaching, and, depending on the topic, unclassified material from one or more USSPACECOM subject matter experts (SMEs). Ultimately, the student and the PME program will determine the form, function, and purpose of all space-related research. Students interested in space-related research need to identify the topic to their faculty advisor or project advisor as their topic of focus. After faculty approval, USSPACECOM will coordinate an online introduction between the student, advising PME faculty/academic lead, and the USSPACECOM SME that requested the research topic. Together, the student and USSPACECOM SME will coordinate until academic completion. The top research papers received will be assessed for potential inclusion in an all-space special issue edited by USSPACECOM’s SIG.

For the research proposals below, students should contact the Strategic Studies Institute for USSPACECOM points of contact and additional information.

1. **Emergent Space Conflict Theory and Policy**

   How should USSPACECOM prepare to fight a future space war? What changes are needed in existing Department of Defense policy, strategy, doctrine, theories, and organizational form/function?
2. The Trinity of Multidomain Conflict

Explore the idea that future conflict may center on space, cyberspace, and special operations forces. How would this function? What changes are needed for US and allied security organizations to shift to this context?

3. Space in the Age of Digital Superiority

USSCYBERCOM was the first Combatant Command that is entirely digital. Is USSPACECOM the first geographic-oriented Combatant Command that also must fight exclusively in a digital context? If so, are there unique considerations and functions for USSPACECOM that USSCYBERCOM does not require?

4. Command and Control (C2)

Historically, the AF Air Operations Center has been the primary program of record for AF C2 systems development and fielding. Working with JADOC, JTT, and other joint C2 software, these software packages have responded to the traditional requirements process. The Joint Force has pursued the same requirements to fielding approach and results have not resulted in improved multidomain C2.

5. Strategic Design of USSPACECOM

While well on its way to being stood up, the fluidity of organizational design of USSPACECOM offers a once-in-a-century opportunity. This study would examine if the United States is making the most of this unique era and would propose organizational changes both subtle and radical to improve effectiveness of space warfighting.

6. Adapting to Advanced Missile Warning Threats

Because the changes and adaptability of new adversary threats, our detection, tracking and display systems/capabilities (satellites, radars, and common operating picture [COP]) must be able to address our adversaries’ abilities.

7. First Strike Instability in Space and Escalation Control

Because of the unstable nature of first Strike instability, there is a pressure to escalate to kinetic activity in the space domain during the competition-conflict transition. Current escalation frameworks do not account for the space domain instability in the broader geopolitical context.
8. The Role of Novel Orbits in Generation-after-Next Generation Warfighting

Research question and description are CUI. Students should e-mail SSI from an official government account to request a full list.

9. Hostile Intent and Hostile Act

How lessons from other domains can inform determining hostile intent and hostile act for space engagements. Examine how hostile intent is determined for other domains and what systems and processes might be changed to improve the accuracy and timeliness of determining hostile intent for space operations.

10. Mega-Constellations

The use of mega-constellations comprised of small satellites is on the rise, both commercially and internationally. These constellations impact the space area of operations and challenge our ability to maintain space domain awareness.

11. Proliferation of Commercial, Civil, and Military Space Systems

Understand what it would mean to have 10,000, 100,000, or 1,000,000 satellites in orbit from a military perspective. Address considerations, including fog of war (for example, how does Space Domain Awareness change), C2, autonomy, and impact to terrestrial services.

12. Responsive Space Architectural Changes to Improve Cost-Benefit

Examine how responsive space elements of an architecture might favorably compare with other resiliency options, particularly for augmentation and reconstitution. This study would compare responsive augmentation and reconstitution options to the baseline and more traditional alternatives.

13. The Road to Norms of Behavior for Space

How is space the same/different and can we get to stability faster than other domains? Examine how norms of behavior developed in other domains and how this information might aid in developing norms for space.

14. Alternative Futures for the Extraterrestrial Battlespace

Examine the future of space warfare through a lens of technology, policy, and evolving space applications. Alternative futures (for example, mining the asteroids/moon, a competitor passes us,
avenues of technological surprise) would be examined to see where the United States would find the most military advantages and disadvantages.

15. The Role of Space in Strategic Deterrence

The role of space in deterrence is emerging as a critical topic in the future development of a deterrence strategy for the United States. Examine the past, present, and future role of space in strategic deterrence and whether space can play a greater or unique role in strategic deterrence, increasing stability and security for the United States and the world.

16. Terrestrial Response Options for Space Aggressions

Determine how to deter space aggressions using terrestrial actions. It is typically difficult to apply Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) deterrence actions to transgressions in the space domain.

17. Space Deterrence Theory

Examine the similarities and differences for how aggression is deterred in other domains as compared with space. Key differences might be that there is rarely a direct loss of life and greater difficulty collecting international interest in deterring space aggression.

18. The Global Proliferation of Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT)

Alternatives to GPS are proliferating, offering the US and its adversaries new opportunities and challenges in the PNT battlespace of the future. This study would plumb the depths of how this proliferation of PNT affects the future of warfare.

19. Replacing GPS for US PNT Requirements

Study alternatives to replacing GPS both technologically, sociologically, commercially, and militarily. Even if technology does not exist, extrapolate how “if” statements might impact dimensions of the PNT user community, particularly the military community.

20. Informational Silos from Classified Programs

The rate of technological convergence and information availability has transformed the commercial industry. US reliance on classification to provide strategic advantage has always been seen as a strength, but with rate of change increasing, it is possible that the siloing of information may prove a strategic
disadvantage. This study will seek to expose disadvantages to slowing information flow caused by classification or other barriers.

21. Information Opportunities and Vulnerabilities for the Space Enterprise

How the US Space Enterprise (terrestrial and in-space) is vulnerable to open source, crowd-sourced, and easily observable information.

22. Critical Asset Analysis Tool

Build a module for the USSPACECOM Critical Infrastructure Decision Support System (UCIDS) for unclassified and classified information using standard Microsoft Office Programs to enable USSPACECOM personnel to load, view, edit, print reports, etc. to manage all USSPACECOM critical assets. Tool needs to be able to identify/show shortfalls and deficiencies for Critical Mission Assets.

23. Chess in Space

Application and Evolution of Military Strategies to the Space and Joint Fight: Develop an appendix to the “Art of War” for space. Student may consider earlier published military research on “Chess versus Go: American and Chinese Defense Philosophical Differences” and other metaphoric, game theory, cultural, and institutional differences as well.

24. Operationalizing Space Deterrence

What is an effective strategy for deterrence? How should the United States enable integrated deterrence in the space domain? How should space deterrence properly nest within national objectives, policy, and deterrence as a whole? What considerations are senior leaders not considering that would complement current trajectories?

25. Enabling Commercial Integration

How should the DoD adapt its business model to the rapid life cycle of innovation and emerging technology? Balancing capability, time, and control, how can the DoD mitigate bureaucratic impediments that delay modernization plans? How is space different from the terrestrial domains regarding commercial integration? How does the DoD go beyond material solutions in partnerships with the private sector to effectively leverage and strengthen the National Security Innovation Base?
26. Civil Enterprise Assumption of Space Situational Awareness

The transition for Space Situational Awareness to be monitored by civil entities is taking too long. What impact does that have on DoD members in cost and manpower? What are the major hurdles institutionally, organizationally, legally, and internationally? What are the consequences if this takes too long for USSPACECOM, the DoD, and other stakeholders? How might this problem be resolved, or a faster solution implemented outside of existing or traditional approaches?

27. Protecting Nontraditional Space Assets

Space elevators are stationary structures stretching to LEO altitudes that will be able to launch satellites. What are the complexities of protecting these assets? Is this a US Space Command responsibility or a Regional Combatant Command responsibility? Both? How should they be protected?

28. Pros and Cons of Commercialization of Space from a Military Perspective

Research question and description are CUI. Students should e-mail SSI from an official government account to request a full list.

29. Who Is the Pacing Threat and Why

Both the Department of Defense and US Space Command selected China as the pacing threat. China is the technically superior adversary, but Russia is at war with a western partner. Did we get this right? Why or why not? What organizational forcing functions come with each choice and why? Has US Space Command addressed these requirements? What are the risks of each choice, and how can US Space Command and the DoD mitigate these risks?

30. Arctic Conflict and Space

What would conflict in the arctic look like from a space perspective? What should DoD, civil authorities, and US Space Command do to prepare for conflict in the arctic? Northern latitudes provide advantages and disadvantages for space operations. How do we exploit the advantages and mitigate the disadvantages of latitude, extreme weather, and limited infrastructure? What alternatives to space should DoD look at for arctic operations?

31. Non-State Actors versus the United States et al.

In the spirit of the British East India Company and the Dutch West India Company, how should the US combat a hostile non-state actor in space? What would the threat look like? What might
trigger a conflict? Would it necessarily be the United States versus the company? What military and non-military options exist?

32. Quantum Theory and Warfare for the Space Domain

Quantum computing, encryption, and other more exotic possible applications are rapidly moving from the hypothetical into the theoretical and small-scale validation on a wide range of quantum applications in defense and national security. Space will play an important role in future quantum applications. How should USSPACECOM and the Department of Defense prepare changes in strategy, doctrine, operations, procurement, and other areas for how quantum will transform future conflict environments?

33. Human-Machine Teaming, AI in Sophisticated Narrow and (Theoretical) General Configurations for Space Applications

AI is a profound and disruptive field impacting virtually all aspects of societies. The accelerated yet still ill-defined future for human-machine relationships, teaming in security applications, and the long-term strategic, ethical, legal, and moral impacts of sophisticated AI (narrow, but potentially even general) posit new questions for the space domain. How does space present particular challenges with respect to AI and human security activities?

34. Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) in the Space Domain

AWS in the space domain presents new and challenging problems for how USSPACECOM, commercial enterprises, and other actors may seek to safeguard or defend space activities, commerce, and societies using ever-increasingly sophisticated AI and human-machine teams. The space domain is unique in the vast scale and celestial conditions that differ from terrestrial contexts. How will AWS employment by friendly, adversarial, and commercial entities occur in space, and how should USSPACECOM implement new designs now to prepare for these considerations?


The space elevator has been prophesized for decades, yet despite most of the components for such a device now being demonstrated as theoretically viable in small-scale and simulations, no major government or investment group have committed fully to building one. China, Japan, and US private industry have declared intents, and new advances in nano-carbon and other technologies suggest a space elevator could be created in the coming decades. How would such a device impact society, and how would USSPACECOM cooperate in Joint and partnered configurations to secure and protect such
a system? What would be the new authorities, changes in CCMD roles/responsibilities, and what might be broad security considerations for such a radical, disruptive development be?

36. The Future of Space Medicine in the Department of Defense

With the stand-up of United States Space Force (USSF) and with USSPACECOM as the DoD Manager for Human Space Flight Support, the future of Space Medicine will significantly impact the DoD. How might the DoD further establish medical education and training to ensure medical professionals are prepared to support these missions? If the future includes DoD astronauts, should training and medical review be the responsibility of NASA or the DoD?

37. Space Debris as a National Security Issue

Anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) are devastating weapons with the capability to destroy a satellite and create large debris clouds. Mega-constellations rob ASATs of their first order effect but what can the United States do to solve the second order effects of debris clouds? Specifically, what policies and technologies need to be pursued to make active debris removal missions a viable capability that deters our enemies through denial?

38. Building a Space Alliance

How can the US DoD Space Enterprise better integrate allies and partners into space organizations, training, equipping and operations by design, that is, incorporating allies and partners in US concepts and plans for executing space operations from the beginning rather than at later stages? Focus on key allies (FVEYs +): the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Germany, France, and Japan. and actions the United States can take in the next 2–5 years.

US ARMY EUROPE AND AFRICA

For the research proposals below, students should contact the Strategic Studies Institute for US Army Europe and Africa points of contact and additional information.

1. US Posture in Europe

How can the US Army/Joint Force better partner with the allied military law enforcement agencies (such as the Italian Carabinieri) that may have unique capabilities that our Army and Joint Force do not possess?
2. Ukraine: Lessons Learned for Frontline States

How the United States could better partner with European Allies in Africa.

US ARMY NORTH

1. Evolving Threats to the Homeland

Emerging technologies are being developed and employed across multiple domains. AI, biotechnology, robotics, cyber and space attacks, and similar technological advances are projected to play a part in future conflicts. These technologies will be employed against the American public, critical infrastructure, the Joint Force’s ability to project force from the Homeland to other theaters, and in ways that we do not yet anticipate. How will emerging technologies impact defense of the Homeland?

Desired objectives: 1) Identify new vulnerabilities emerging technologies will exploit, prioritized by impact on the homeland. 2) Recommend operations, activities, and investments (OAIs) that will enable the land force to mitigate the impact of the most significant threats from emerging technologies. 3) Assess whether this requires a paradigm shift within the land force.

2. Homeland Defense Policy Guidance

Defining defense of the Homeland is undergoing constant revision and challenge. At tension with understanding defense of the Homeland is the competing requirement to respond to Defense Support of Civil Authorities. In the event that near peer adversaries hold the Homeland at risk, it is very likely to coincide with DSCA type events. How should these responses be balanced in Homeland Defense policy?

While the Army must prioritize defense of the Homeland, there is a tension in that the whole of government lacks particular capabilities critical to DSCA responses. Propose role clarity and guidance for Homeland Defense. Should the Army reduce their role in DSCA? How could the whole of government mitigate such a shift?

3. Force Structure in Homeland Defense

In the event the Army mobilizes, there is a need to mobilize quickly, but a significant number of key enablers reside in Compo 2 (Army National Guard) and Compo 3 (Army Reserve). These enablers are critical to both projecting forces forward and defending the Homeland. How should Army North structure forces to ensure timely response and mission success?
Consider overall force structure, as well as compo balance. For further consideration, how does the current recruiting crisis impact force structure and how can that be mitigated?

4. **Defense of Critical Infrastructure**

   This question focuses on how the DoD can ensure the protection of infrastructure critical to military operations and domestic resilience. Assess current and emerging US adversary capabilities to include Violent Extremist Organizations and domestic threats that pose a threat to critical infrastructure vital to military force projection from the US Homeland. Make recommendations on investments that can harden DoD critical infrastructure and policy changes that can enable the protection of non-DoD infrastructure that facilitates military force projection.

   The primary research focus is Homeland Defense. The intended sponsors for research work are USARNORTH, ARCYBER, and the Cyber Center of Excellence.

### US ARMY PACIFIC

For the research proposals below, students should contact the Strategic Studies Institute for US Army Pacific (USARPAC) points of contact and additional information.

1. **Strategic Messaging and Shaping through Training**

   Combined exercises—from small-unit to operational formations—clearly messages resolve while enhancing warfighting competencies. Executed at both Joint Multinational Readiness Center in EUCOM and Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center in INDOPACOM, Army brigade-level exercises are critical to exercising tactical decision-making and enhancing interoperability between multinational warfighting formations. How are high-tactical exercises, such as those conducted at JMRC and JPMRC, facilitating and shaping strategy in campaigning? How can large-scale exercises—conducted in either US training areas or in host nations—tangibly enhance alliances and partnerships in the information sphere? What metrics define tangible enhancement of military alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific?

2. **Contested Sustainment at Range**

   Adversary Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capability bubbles continue to expand and extend. US operational reach and endurance will continue to be challenged by adversaries who will generally enjoy interior lines in the areas most likely for large-scale combat operations. How can the US Joint Force generate new options to overcome the challenges of sustainment in a renewed era of diplomatic and economic coercion for critical partners? How does posture evolve to permit consistency...
while avoiding targetability? How do landpower forces prioritize efforts or determine thresholds to maximize readiness while distributing nodes to avoid over-concentration?

3. Preparing for Protraction

In large-scale combat operations, the Joint Force Commander must consider the enemy’s ability to achieve local overmatch, challenging our ability to impose our military will and return to competition under advantageous conditions. While protraction incurs significant strategic risk for US policymakers, protraction may be more untenable for our adversary. In certain conditions, land forces can endure longer than other joint forces. How can land forces generate options for policymakers in conflict which expand the battlefield without escalating strategic effects? What preparations—active and/or passive—can be executed in campaigning oriented on protraction in conflict? How does strategic deception and information management shape protraction options?

8TH ARMY (8A)

Students who select a research topic from this list may pursue a traditional research route but should also consider leveraging other creative resources such as the wargaming expertise resident at the USAWC Center for Strategic Leadership.

1. Value in Weaponizing Command and Control Facilities in Joint and Service Component Commands

As modern warfare evolves, the importance of information management becomes more and more critical; however, there has been little progress in defining Command and control facility requirements. The focus of this research would be to define programmatic and capability requirements. This would also include providing substantive support and justification for expenditures at facilities like Command Center Humphreys. Finally, it could provide justification for a Program Management Office that could standardize capabilities and evolve future doctrine based on these capabilities.

Weaponization definition includes defining metrics that can be used report readiness in systems such as a Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS). Weaponization includes managing command and control facilities in a manner similar to existing weapons.