Abstract
The strategy of integrated deterrence is a repackaged version of Cold War strategies. The integration of assets to deter adversaries was part of both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations' overarching strategies that forced the military services to change their operating concepts, capabilities, and doctrine simultaneously. The US Army is an example of how national strategy forces organizational changes. This article assesses how the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations forced institutional change while considering the significance of integrating deterrence. These examples will assist US military and policy practitioners with adapting their organizations to existing national defense strategies.
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
10.55540/0031-1723.3260
Recommended Citation
Robert F. Williams, "Integrating Army Capabilities into Deterrence: The Early Cold War," Parameters 53, no. 4 (2023), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3260.