Abstract
This article examines the US Army’s experiences and lessons learned during military interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. It explores why these lessons did not affect the Army transformation, directed in the late-1990s by James M. Dubik, John W. Hendrix, John N. Abrams, and Eric K. Shinseki.
First Page
33
Last Page
45
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
10.55540/0031-1723.3102
Recommended Citation
Pat Proctor, "Lessons Unlearned: Army Transformation and Low-Intensity Conflict," Parameters 47, no. 4 (2017): 33-45, doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3102.
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