Abstract
The root cause for the defeat of the Armenian forces in the second Nagorno-Karabakh War was flawed military doctrine inherited from the Soviet Union. This article analyzes the major problems faced by Armenia, uncovers the main reasons for unsuccessful innovation, tests empirical findings against some of the most authoritative theories of the field, and outlines current research on the largest state-onstate warfighting of recent years, while substantiating the analysis with established scholarship in the field of military innovation.
First Page
119
Last Page
134
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
10.55540/0031-1723.3133
Recommended Citation
Zhirayr Amirkhanyan, "A Failure to Innovate: The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War," Parameters 52, no. 1 (2022): 119-134, doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3133.
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